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NATIONAL REPORT FROM TAJIKISTAN TO THE THIRD REVIEW MEETING

OF JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

MANAGEMENT

Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency October 2008

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Contents Section A: Introduction………………………………………………………………….3 Section B: Policies and Practices………………………………………………………..4

Radioactive waste management policy…………………………………………….4 Radioactive waste management practices………………………………………….5

Section C: Scope of Application……………………………………………………….27 Section D: Inventories and Lists……………………………………………………….28 Section E: Legislative and Regulatory system………………………………………...30 Section F: Other General Safety Provision…………………………………………….31 Section G. Safety of spent fuel management…………………………………………..33 Section H. Safety of radioactive waste management…………………………………..33 Section I. Transboundary movement…………………………………………………..34 Section J. Disused sealed sources……………………………………………………...38 Section K. Planned activities to improve safety……………………………………….40 Annex – 1: Disused sealed radioactive sources in Tajikistan as of 1 October 2008…..41

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SECTION A: INTRODUCTION: Young independent state (1991), socio-economic conditions affected by civil war (1992-1997), rich and bright history and culture, developing political system. Mountainous environment 93% mountain, only 7% arable land, world’s third water resources per head and 50% glaciers of CA. Population is close to 7 million. One of the lowest GDPs in CIS, cotton the most important crop, fragile economy/ unstable growth, need for roads, future export of hydro electricity to bring revenue (3 stations under completion). Tajikistan deposited an instrument of accession to the Joint Convention on 12 December 2007. There were no declarations or reservations attached to the instrument of accession. The Convention entered into force for Tajikistan 11 December 2008. The Republic of Tajikistan is not a nuclear country, but it uses achievements of nuclear science and technology in a number of manufacturing branches, medical and research sectors. That is why the important problems for us are treatment with radioactive wastes which are occurred in result of these activities. Since there are no any nuclear industry, research reactor*, or other facility generating radioactive substances in Tajikistan, many of the requirements of the Joint Convention do not apply to Tajikistan. There is no nuclear fuel in the country. There are high level wastes - 4 Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG’s) which are temporary stored in the Republican Waste Disposal Site (50 km distance from Dushanbe) and uranium tailing dumps located in the North of Tajikistan. During 45 years in the territory of 6 regions of Soghd oblast (North of Tajikistan) there are 55 million uranium wastes are accumulated in 10 uranium tailing dumps with total area 170 hectares. Total activity is more than 6,5 thousands Curie. Radioactive wastes in Tajikistan originate mainly from the use of radioactive sources in medicine but also from uses in research, education and industry. There is central facility for long-term storage of radioactive waste that serves the whole country. Since the Republic of Tajikistan is a young member of IAEA and the established regulatory authority is functioning just five years there are currently 4 Laws and 6 regulations are worked out for ensuring the radiation safety in Tajikistan and new regulations are under the process of development. Mainly radiation protection in Tajikistan is based on the Law on Radiation Safety (June, 2003); the Law on Utilisation of Atomic Energy (November, 2004) and the Law on Licensing of separate kinds of activities (May 2004). The present report is the first Tajikistan national report and it going to be presented in the Organizational Meeting of Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management which take place from 13-14 October 2008 at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna. The report was prepared by the regulatory authority of the country – Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency. The report is prepared in compliance with requirements contained in the IAEA Information Circular INFICIRC/604/Rev.1 of 26 July 2002. Since this is the first report submitted by Tajikistan, it welcomes this opportunity to present the status of radioactive waste management in Tajikistan and to participate in a constructive dialogue on ways for improvement. *There is an ARGUS research reactor in Tajikistan which was constructed in 1990. Upon the decision of 6 working session of Dushanbe town council (19 July 1991) all further works were stopped. The Argus research reactor was never uploaded by nuclear fuel

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SECTION B: POLICIES AND PRACTICES Tajikistan has no nuclear reactors and no nuclear fuel processing facilities. Radioactive waste management policy

Until the recent time the radioactive waste management at the territory of Tajikistan was regulated basically by sanitary rules, created still in the period of 1984 through 1991 (when Tajikistan was a part of the former USSR) and also by the number of legislative documents, which are related to the sphere of industrial and other toxic waste management in general. It is regulated by specific laws and norms concerning the sphere of handling the radionuclide wastes and requirements of radiation safety which were developed and adopted in the country during recent 6-7 years.

Legislation in the area of industrial and toxic wastes management

• Regulation of the Council of Ministers of Tajikistan SSR No.167 of 12-06-1984 about measures to implement Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR № 394 of 03-05-1984 «On utilization neutralization and burial of toxic wastes».

• The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan «About Nature Protection».

• The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan of 23-12-1993 № 619 «About approved rules to identify payments and its limits for the contamination of natural environment, releases of wastes».

• The Government Decree of the Republic of Tajikistan of 30.12.1998 № 534 «About measures to fulfill the State Ecological Program of the Republic of Tajikistan».

• The Law «About population Human health protection», 1997.

Development of special norms in the sphere of radiation safety was promoted by advancements of international co-operation between the Republic of Tajikistan and IAEA. Thus, in the year 1997 Tajikistan has joined “Nuclear weapons non-proliferation agreement”.

In accordance with the statements of this Agreement the other consent was signed in the year 1999 between the Republic Tajikistan and the IAEA, it was “Agreement on application of guarantees in connection with the “Agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear and radiation materials” (Additional protocol on the guarantees was signed in November, 2004)

In the year 2000 it was the Government Decree of the Republic of Tajikistan No.338 establishing the Commission for interactions with IAEA, including top leaders of all related Ministries and Authorities. In the year 2000 Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency was created in consistence of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic Tajikistan, which was authorized to coordinate and to develop collaboration with the IAEA. With assistance of the Agency several important laws were established and put into operation in 2006, whereas some of them are currently processed in a stage of approval:

• «Law on radiation safety» (adopted in 2003)

• «Law on Licensing the separate kinds of activity» (adopted in 2004),

• «Law on the use of atomic energy» (adopted in 2004)

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• «Norms of radiation safety» (adopted in 2006)

• «Requirements to ensure the radiation safety» (adopted in 2008)

In 2004 «Decree on State regulations in the area of radiation safety»was approved by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, and in the year 2005 Council was established to ensure its implementation.

The statement “About the order of registration, processing and delivering licenses for the activities related to the use of radioactive substances and sources of ionizing radiation” approved by the Act of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency of the Republic Tajikistan in 03-01-2006.

The Department for licensing and control of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency of the Republic Tajikistan was established in the year 2006 and the Statement “About inspector for radiation safety of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency of the Republic Tajikistan “.

The other important documents relevant to radiation safety which are under development and will be issued in the nearest time are the following:

• «About state system of registration and control of radioactive materials»

• «About individual doses of professionals from sources of ionizing radiation»

• «About transportation of radioactive wastes» etc.

At the same time the legal framework of the Republic in the sphere of safe management of the former Uranium industries is not well developed and therefore it’s requires improvements and harmonization with Basic Safety Standards of the IAEA. The norms and guides how to provide safe management, rehabilitation and in some cases secondary reprocessing of the uranium waste rocks and tailing are either absent or not implemented because of lack of experience, and also no adequate mechanisms for put in operation properly of the already existing laws.

In particular, there no clear requirements for environmental monitoring and data reporting; the dose limits to the worker and population at the Uranium legacy sites are not well developed; the clearance criteria and level of exemption from regulatory control, which have to be established for all former uranium facilities according to the IAEA BSS are not became an effective tool for radiation protection practice and safe management of the former facilities in the country. In particular in Tajikistan, as in most other Central Asia countries, the regulatory basis for uranium mining and processing (as for other ore mining and its processing activities) is not covered by regulations addressing other types of radioactive waste. Therefore, it is important to identify specifically the legislative and regulatory provisions in Tajikistan which are applicable to uranium mining and processing facilities.

Radioactive waste management practices: Sealed sources, open sources, categorization of radioactive sources. A new joint project with USA started which is financed by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The objective of this project is to make an inventory of all available ionizing radiation sources (sealed, unsealed, generators and associated equipment) and input them to the database. This database is RASOD. The uniqueness of RASOD is that the program automatically determine the current activity and categorization of the source (categorization is made in accordance with IAEA-Safety Guide-No RS-G-1.9, – Recommended categories for sources used in common practices).

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In accordance with inventory carried out in the North and Directly Ruled Districts of Tajikistan (West) there are 936 sealed sources, 35 unsealed sources and 569 generators of ionizing radiation. Most of them are not in use and in the nearest time under the joint project with IAEA disused sources from North and West will be transported for long-term storage to the Republican waste Disposal Site (RWDS). Besides mentioned radioactive sources there are 55 million uranium wastes are accumulated in 10 uranium tailing dumps with total area 170 hectares. Total activity is more than 6,5 thousands Curie. Uranium mining and milling was an intensive industry in most of the Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union. It has left a legacy of radioactive residues. Development of most of the uranium deposits in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and partially in Kazakhstan was stopped after collapse of the former Soviet Union. All of these countries found themselves facing the problem of safe management and remediation of many sites affected by operation of uranium mining and milling facilities. After these countries became independent, the issues of restructuring and decommissioning of the mines and other uranium facilities arose at the same time. Also the common problem is lack of previous experience in safety assessment and remediation planning. National experience in development of environmental monitoring and analytical capacities of most laboratories which were in charge of monitoring programmes at legacy sites and other areas of concern were also very limited. The uranium industry in the former USSR was state run and organized in a centralized manner. The information flow regarding the issues of uranium production was vertical, strictly controlled and along hierarchical lines directly to the then responsible Ministry for Medium Scale Machine Industry. The enterprises were directed centrally, data were not allowed to be retained at the level of the mining companies and there was no horizontal data exchange on the local level. Mining and milling data from the days of Soviet rule are not available in the Central Asian countries; all data concerning past uranium production are in the Russian Federation in the archives of the successor to the former responsible Ministry. During the 1970s and 80s, more than 30% of the total uranium production of the USSR came from the Central Asian countries. The mining and milling technologies applied for uranium production were uniform, designed and developed by the same engineering unit attached to the Ministry of Medium Scale Machine Industry. Accordingly, the characteristics of the uranium mining legacies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (as well as in Russian Federation, Ukraine and East European countries) are essentially identical.

In the USSR the responsibility for the uranium industry was centralized in the Ministry of Medium Scale Machine Industry and the regulatory body was part of the same Ministry. The application of the regulatory standards (“norms”), for exposure and emissions control was uniform across the industry, which made their application easy to administer. The standards used were comparable to the European/US standards from the 1960s and 70s. However, because of the dual responsibility of the Ministry for production and enforcement of the regulatory standards, the achievement of production targets took generally precedent over environmental, health and safety concerns. Production targets were strictly enforced and performance supported by a reward system; compliance with the health, safety and environmental standards tok a second place behind production targets and their achievement or improved performance triggered no rewards. For development of new uranium mines and milling facilities no baseline data essessment was required and, consequently, no such data are available today for purposes of comparison with the present situation at the legacy sites.

The former Soviet Union operated a large number of uranium mines in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The operations ceased at various times between 1961 and

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1995 but little was done in the way of remediation unless sites were close to significant population centres. Thus, in Tajikistan in an urban area of Ckalovsk the waste rock pile at Ghafour received a stable shape and was covered by a soil layer 1meter thick, which reduced radon emanation and gamma dose rate considerably. Nevertheless, the waste pile continues to be a risk factor to the apartment buildings located less than 50 meters away. In contrast, the Degmai tailings repository located some 2 kilometers from the nearest settlement received no cover at all and is now subject to invasion by persons foraging for scrap metal in the tailings and livestock grazing on the pioneer vegetation establishing itself on the tailings surface.

There was little or no provision for remediation at most of the sites and no specific fund created to remedy the radiological safety situation. The Regional and National Technical Co-Operation Projects of the IAEA.

The IAEA involvement was initiated by the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan requesting assistance with the assessment of risks to the public and environment emanating from the uranium mining and milling wastes, organisation of the regulatory structure responsible for the legacy sites and preparation of the remediation of the uranium mining and milling legacy sites. Because the requests for assistance from the four republics were very similar, the country requests were bundled into a Regional Central Asian Project and the Department of Technical Cooperation assigned the task to establish and manage the regional project. The objectives of the project in particular were to:

• facilitate the development of a regulatory framework

• estimate the current situation and help assess the radiological impact emanating from both the legacy sites and the operating uranium facilities

• evaluate the state of remediation in these countries

• check whether international guidelines and recommendations are being observed

• initiate/support the development of a National Strategic Action Plan for remediation of the legacy sites

• provide state of the art sampling and analytical measuring equipment to the regulators.

The form of project assistance included workshops, scientific visits to advanced projects in other countries and expert advice regarding improvements of the national legislation, provision/upgrading of sampling and analytical equipment, and training of the management and laboratory staff.

The scope of the IAEA Regional Project turned out to be broader than originally envisaged. As part of the project, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan received assistance with the development of the national Action Plans of legacy remediation as well.

Besides the IAEA Regional Project, the legacy of the former uranium mining and milling facilities in the region attracted the attention of other international organizations as well. As a result, a number of international projects addressing the issues of the legacy sites were (and ar) running parallel to the IAEA Project, such as the projects of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Environment Program (UNEP), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and North Atlantic Treaty

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Organization (NATO). They all address the problem of the former uranium mines from various perspectives and are, basically, compementary to the objectives of the IAEA Regional Project. In this conjunction, considerable effort of the IAEA Regional Project went into communication and, to some degree coordination and harmonization with the above projects.

The provision by the IAEA of specific measuring equipment and associated training to the local supervising authorities served the purpose of putting the participating countries into the position to be able to estimate the inventories of the waste dumps, characterise the legacy sites and obtain good quality monitoring and surveillance data. It is expected that this in turn will allow to develop a suitable basis for preparation of (pre-) feasibility studies needed to request funding for specific remediation projects for the prioritary objects from international financial institutions.

Although not contemplated at the beginning, it turned out that beyond the listed objectives the IAEA project considerably contributed to the improvement of communication and exchange of information / experience among the four Central Asian countries as well and helped establish a formalized liaison through the country representatives.

Furthermore, it became appearant that the uranium mining and milling legacies in the region has an important political dimension as well. This is due to a number of legacy sites located in the same Syr Darja watershed discharging into the Fergana Valley shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and inhabited by more than 20 million people (Fig 1.1). In order to be able to address the reoccurring issue of cross boundary contamination of the Fergana valley and settle the associated disputes, reliable monitoring of the discharges into the Syr Darja River and its tributaries are required. For this, along with reliable measurements a harmonization of the measuring protocols in the involved countries is required as well. The IAEA Regional Project is well suited to address the issue in a credible way and facilitate the introduction of monitoring methods capable of resolving (and defusing) the desputes concerning the cross boundry contamination via the Syr Darya River.

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Fig. 1.1. Location of the principal legacy sites of the former uranium facilities in the Fergana Valley

(UNEP,2005).

The first phase of the project focused primarily on creation of conditions necessary for development of an effective monitoring system, providing guidance on technical and organizational issues in this respect, supply of the equipment necessary for reliable measurements, preliminary assessment of the state of the legacy sites and assistance with preparation of national remediation plans. The prioritization of the legacy sites for remediation and preparation of the necessary remedial feasibility assessments is part of regional Project for 2007-2008. The most important issues identified during the workshops were as follows:

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• How to develop an effective regulatory system, which will help to establish an appropriate radiation control of the contaminated areas around the former uranium facilities (mines, waste rock pile, tailings) and adjacent areas.

• How to develop an adequate environmental monitoring and surveillance system at the former Uranium legacy sites and impacted areas. Establish the responsibility for funding, development and operation of the observational network at the former uranium facilities.

• How to evaluate the safety status of the left behind uranium mining legacy, such as waste rock piles and tailings.

• What exemption rules and clearance levels are to be used when planning the remedial measures?

• How to optimize remediation strategies, technologies and costs under consideration of a prolonged exposure of the local population in the vicinity of the former uranium mining and milling facilities?

During the first phase of the project the main focus of the project activity was to provide assessment of the present status of the uranium legacies in the participating countries and their preparedness for solution the rehabilitation problems with former uranium facilities. Regarding the participating Central Asia countries the Agency has in last few years provided a substantial technical support for number of laboratories mainly as provision of equipment and training for the local laboratories staff. The international expert team has assisted the regulating authorities and the key laboratories in participating countries with evaluation and drafting the environmental monitoring programs. The other type of consulting and site specific expertise at the different legacy locations have been provided in regard for better understanding the strategies for further development of the national site specific monitoring networks and methodology on Safety analyses at the areas around the former uranium facilities to be applied.

The second phase of the project was directed to assist the regulating authorities of the participating countries with a review of the current regulatory documents used for radiation protection and harmonization of the national standards with the Basic Safety Standards. In spite of the great technical support from the Agency and the actions undertaken in frame of the first and second phases of the project all of these still do not guarantee that recipient laboratories will be able to operate this analytical instruments and techniques properly. The main gap in most of laboratories is lack of experience and also lack of quality assurance concern, difficulties in calibration of the detectors and absence of the national intercomparison exercises. This perceptible variation is becoming a barrier in trust to the transboundary monitoring results and also in justification of the adequate remediation actions. It is also recommended to develop the program and to implement the QA/QC systems for application of analytical techniques in national wide environmental radiation monitoring by the key Member State Laboratories in accordance with internationally accepted quality standards (ISO/IEC 17025, ISO 9001).

During 2005-2008, there were three relevant (regional and national) IAEA TC projects ongoing in Tajikistan: (1) Project RER-9086 “Safe Mangament of Residue from Uranium Mines and Milling Activities in Central Asia Region”; (2) TAD/9/002 “Application of International Safety Standards on the Management of Uranium Milling Residues” (3) TAD/9/003 “Establishing a Radiation Monitoring System at Uranium Tailings Sites in Northern Tajikistan”

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The IAEA Project activities focused on:

• consulting and technical assistance to improve the existing monitoring system in the area of the former Uranium facilities in Sogdy oblast;

• improvement of the existing legislative framework regarding the radioactive waste management from the former Uranium Mining and Milling industries;

• methodological assistance with environmental sampling, analytical procedures and procurement of the equipment for the analytical laboratory of the State Enterprise “Vostokredmet” and for the Nuclear Regulatory body of the Tajik Republic.

All equipment planned within the framework of the project and needed for dosimetry and analytical purposes have been supplied to the counterpart institutions. IAEA field missions were carried out to help with monitoring and assessment of the radiological situation at the legacy sites of the former Hydrometallurgical Plants in Chkalovsk, in Taboshar and in Digmay in November 2005, June 2006 and beginning 2007. Most of the former Uranium tailings sites are under the control of State Enterprise “Vostokredmet”. Joint field missions serving the purpose of training, demonstration of proper use of the sampling and analytical equipment and proper application of measurement procedures were held at the Taboshar and Degmai tailing sites. These opportunities were used to measure also the background contamination of water and sediments in the Kaira-Kum Reservoir and Syr Darya River.

The number of dosimetric devices and in particular Radon radiometry monitors, field gamma dose rate dosimeters, which are equipped with beta- and alpha activity detectors, and gamma spectrometer “Inspector-1000” were delivered to the counterpart institutions.

Sogdy Branch of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency and SE “Vostokredmet” was supplied with Radon radiometers, and also air samplers for alpha-reactive aerosols. Filtering devices for pumping the large volumes of atmospheric “High Flow Air sampler” and also sediment corer were purchased as well. Pumping and lifting equipment and also portable electro-generator were purchased for the regular groundwater sampling from the wells around the tailings.

The solid scintillation gamma-beta spectrometer and scanning Roentgen-fluorescent spectrometer “SPECTROSCAN” were delivered to the laboratory of SPA “Vostokredmet”. These devices in combination with the their available equipment for radiochemical extractions of the water samples and the other already existing equipment in the laboratories of “Vostokredmet” allow to establish the initial cycle of analytical measurements of environmental samples. The provided equipment in general allows to renovating the observations on the contents of radionuclides of uranium-thorium series in surface and ground waters, ambient air and grounds in the area under impact of the former uranium facilities which belongs to State enterprise “Vostokredmet”.

Currently new sampling points are constructed at the observations network which will allow collecting data on the current status and predicting spatial and temporal distribution of the environmental contamination relevant to the former uranium production. This is to serve as a basis for radiological assessment needed for justification of the optimal rehabilitation strategy and current protective measures if needed.

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Remediation problems of the former uranium facilities

One of the basic sectors of the economy in Tajikistan is the mining industry. Its development in the past led to an accumulation of large amounts of waste mainly associated with the uranium milling facilities. These wastes contain radionuclides in high concentrations (basically uranium-thorium series) and other hazardous substances. These facilities are often located in residential areas and in the upper side of the main watersheds of the region, such as Amu-Daria and Syr-Daria (see Fig.1.1)

Due to the location of the uranium mining facilities in the watershed of the two major rivers of the region the contamination from the legacy sites has become widely spread. This reinforces the need to upgrade the monitoring system in the region in accordance with the objectives of the regional IAEA programs on monitoring. These programs aim to evaluate the current and potential future impacts on the environment, and to establish the priorities for necessary remedial actions. The estimation of the level of cross-border transport of radionuclides of the uranium-thorium series and of other toxic elements becomes particularly relevant for the rivers of Syr-Daria and Amu-Daria. At the same time it remains important to take into consideration the regional character of the radiation risks and of other ecological hazards to public and ecosystem of the region.

In order to evaluate the environmental impact of the former mining facilities and to assist in solving the ecological problems of the region a number of international projects (by UNDP, OSCE, NATO, etc.,) came into being in Tajikistan during the last years.

An important step in the development of international cooperation in the region was the decision of Tajikistan, in 2000, to participate in the IAEA Programs. The present work builds on the regional project “Safe management of residues from former mining and milling activities in Central Asia (RER/9/086, phase-1 for 2005-2006)” and has the task of defining and evaluating the state of the former uranium facilities in the region. In the initial stages, the project focused on training of decision-makers and technical specialists in radioactive waste management. Furthermore, within the framework of the project, assistance includes the provision of equipment to analytical laboratories, development of tools and methods for environmental monitoring and fieldwork and demonstration of primary monitoring data analysis. During 2000-2006, representatives of the regulatory authority of Tajikistan (NRSA) and of the state enterprise “Vostokredmet”, as well as regulators and operators from other countries of the region, received training and participated in IAEA-funded fellowships. The laboratories of the country were equipped with up to date analytical and field equipment to assist the remediation work and the development of environmental monitoring programs. A number of specialists also had opportunities to visit uranium facilities in both neighboring countries (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), and in the Ukraine and Germany. This was to familiarize themselves with the remediation approaches used at the former uranium mining sites in these countries.

Evaluation of the status of former Uranium facilities and current remedial activities

Tajikistan has a number of uranium ore deposits and mining and milling facilities, which operated in the past. This country’s own ores and imported raw materials were processed mainly at the former Leninabad Geochemical Combine facility (currently State Enterprise (SE) “Vostokredmet” )

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and also at other hydro-metallurgical plants located in the vicinity of uranium ore extraction sites (Adrasman , Taboshar, Isphara etc.). Presently the only operating enterprise in the Republic of Tajikistan, which still has the potential to process Uranium ores, using an acid leach extraction process, is the SE “Vostokredmet”.

It is interesting is to note that the mine wastes at the Adrasman site were recently successfully reprocessed to produce a lead concentrate. Otherwise, all underground and open pit mines and old radium and uranium facilities have been decommissioned, but most of them are still not remediated. Due to the recent significant increase in the price of uranium, the uranium mining residues have become a focus of interest for various different investors and commercial companies who are considering reprocessing the waste rock piles and mill tailings of Northern Tajikistan.

Based on estimates from SE “Vostokredmet”, the total amount of residual uranium in the tailings and waste rock piles in the Republic of Tajikistan is about 55 million tons. The total activity of these wastes is estimated to be approximately 240-285 1012 Bq (Table 1). The total volume of waste rock piles and tailings in the vicinity of former hydrometallurgical plants and chemical-leaching sites is more than 170 million tons.

The waste rock piles and tailings at Taboshar, Adrasman and Degmay (which is near the outskirts of Chkalovsk) are not well contained. In particular the surfaces of the tailings usually have no protective cover; and the surface is eroded or damaged by burrowing animals. There is exposure of significant amounts of contaminants, which are subject to dusting and wind blow. Any cover of these tailings and waste rock piles has usually been washed away by water, mudslides and wind, thus becoming a source of highly contaminated drainage water which is migrating into surface and ground water bodies. The same sources of water are commonly used by local population.

In many areas where water is in short supply it is common to have livestock grazing and watering using such contaminated waters; also local horticulture uses these drainage waters for irrigation and even for rice paddies and orchards located near the sites of uranium waste piles.

Illegal excavation and collection of non-ferrous metals from areas of tailings and waste rock piles and mines has become more frequent. This creates serious concerns over transfer of contamination as well as the exposure of the individual diggers. There is concern that these metals are sold on at local, illegal, markets in Tajikistan or even transported abroad.

Some estimates of status of the former uranium facilities in Tajikistan are presented below.

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Таble. 1. Tailings of the former Uranium facilities according to data of SE “Vostokredmet”

Name of disposal site Locations and distance to the

closest settlement

Period, when

tailings were created

Sanitary protection zone, (м) Square,

(ha)

Efficient disposal volume

(м2)

Cover characterizati

on

Gamma dose exposure rate at

the surface ,

µR h-1

Amount of disposed waste

in million of tons,

------------ Curies

1. Tailing Degmai, Gusion

1.5 km

1963 400

90.0

194*105

No cover 650-2000 20.8

4218

2. Tailing Ghafourov

0.5 km

1945-1950 -

4.0

2.4*105

Soil,

2.5 m

20-60 0.4

159

3. Tailing Cells 1-9. Chkalovsk , 2 km

1949-1967 50.0

18.0

26*105

Soil,

0.5 m

20-60 3.034

779

4. Tailing I-II Taboshar,

2 km

1945-1959 50.0

24.7

9.88*105

Soil,

0.7-1 m

40-60 1.69

218

5. Tailing III Taboshar,

0.5 km

1947-1963 50.0

11.06

10.6*105

Soil,

0.7-1 m

40-60 1.8

232

6. Tailing IV Taboshar,

1.0 km

1949-1965 50.0

18.76

24.3*105

Soil,

0.7-1 m

40-60 4.13

510

7. Tailing N 3 Taboshar,

3.0 km

1949-1965 50.0

2.86

0,69*105

Soil,

0.7-1 м

40-60 1.17

15.2

8. Storage of the factory of “barren ore” (FBO)

Taboshar,

4.0 km

1950-1965 -

3.35

11.9*105

No cover 40-100 2.03

253

9. Tailing N2 Adrasman, 1 km

1991г. -

2.5

2.4*105 Soil up to 1 m

50-60 0.4

160

10. Mine-3 (4 units) Khujand, 2 km

1976-1985 -

5.9

2.07*105

Soil,

0.5 m

60-80 3.5

11.0

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Uranium tailings in vicinity of Chkalovsk town Chkalovsk is a suburb of the city of Khujand (formerly Leninabad – the center of Sogd oblast of the Republic) this is the location for several mining industries including “Vostokredmet" (former Leninabad Mining Chemical Complex), which was previously involved in the milling and processing of the uranium ores.

During the soviet period, the uranium ores processed at the hydrometallurgical plant of Chkalovsk were obtained from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. During the last three years of operation ores from a Kazakhstan plant were also transported to Chkalovsk in the form of acid extraction material obtained by heap leaching and underground leaching (up to 200 mg l-1 U). These concentrates were processed into uranium protoxide-oxide and returned to Kazakhstan.

Residues from the extraction process and acid residues following the neutralization were transported and deposited in the nearest tailings. Pumping was conducted through an existing coal slurry pipeline. In the outskirts of Chkalovsk there are three plots (Fig.1), where these tails were placed (Ghafourov, Sell 1-9, Degmay). This site was located on the outskirts of the town with some buildings nearby. The topographical form of the facility was a gently mounded site with no obvious erosion scars on the flanks. The site was reported as extending over 18 ha; containing 2.9 million tones of residues that had been covered with a soil layer 0.5 to 1 m thick.

The total amount of radioactivity in the heap was stated to be about 29000 GBq. Gamma-dose rate exposure observed at the surface of tailing was 0,2-0,6 µSv/h (20-60 µR/h). The cover over the tailings is 0.5-0.7 m. There are no warning signs or fencing around the site which is about 6 km from the mill. There were a number of pipelines from this area to the mill, which are mostly very rusty but are apparently monitored, checked and operational. The difference in elevation from the mill to the distant tailings sites is about 100 m.

According to “Vostokredmet” reports the present monitoring consists of a network of 10 monitoring wells and two distant downstream monitoring wells. The wells are cased and up to 150 m deep. However, no observations were made during the past 5 years.

The surface of the tailings was covered with grasses which are attractive to flocks of sheep as grazing. There is free access of population to the surface of the tailings. The area around this tailings site is cultivated with orchards for apples and stone fruit (plums. apricots etc.) and it was stated that a bioassay program is to commence in the future.

“Ghafourov” tailings The tailings site at “Gharfourov” is located 5 km west of the city of Ghafourov. It was in

operation during period 1945-1950, at the same time as the so-called “Experimental hydrometallurgical plant”.

This facility is located some 10 km from Degmay and 2000 metres from the mill. The site extends over 5 ha, is approximately 13 meters high and contains some 400,000 tones of residues including tailings, waste rock, and scrap metal and decommissioned machines. The waste rock

Fig. 1. Tailings site at the vicinity of Chkalovsk (Sells 1-9)

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reportedly contains up to 800 tones of U3O8. The cover is apparently sedimentary material comprising gravel and cobble-sized stones and sand in a silt-clay matrix, and is between 1 and 2 meters thick. The heap was constructed on the natural land surface without any special site preparation. The waste was reportedly layered into the heap and it was claimed that selective extraction would be easy to perform if it was decided to try to recover the remaining uranium.

The site is located adjacent to a main road with blocks of apartments less than 50 m away and a railway station within 150 m (Figure 2). There were no signs of abnormal erosion or human or animal intrusion on the surface of the heap. There are no reports of any significant problems with this facility. However, it was reported that there is only a visual monitoring program in place and thus there is no evaluation of possible contamination plumes or ground water impacts. There was some discussion about the general remediation options with the host group. The participants’ opinion was divided over the issue of re-processing of the material before finally relocating it. Currently, these abandoned tailings have the status of a

dormant mine. Surveillance of the surface and periodic sequential sampling of radon releases and Gamma dose rate are conducted by “Vostokredmet”.

Due to effective ground coverage the condition of the tailings is considered satisfactory, meaning that they have no apparent significant impact on human population around it. Meanwhile, these tailings are located near a residential area, and therefore it is necessary to conduct regular observations regarding the exhalation of radon in aerosols and the content of radon decay products in atmospheric air. Simple observations are needed at the surface of tailings with selected atmospheric air pump sampling to evaluate possible contamination with the radon decay products.

Degmay tailing Degmay tailing was in operation during the period from 1963 to 1993. It is located in the

Ghafourov region on the Degmay hill, 1,5 km away from the nearest settlement (Guzyen) and approximately 10 km from the city of Khujand. This facility is the largest single uranium mill tailings site in Central Asia. It extends over 90 ha and holds about 20 million tones of uranium residue wastes, about 500 thousand tones of sub-economic uranium ores and 5.7 million tones of vanadium raw material wastes; the estimated total contained activity is about 16000 GBq. The dam was described as being 83% full and approximately 50% of the tailings are derived from imported ores. The site is located on a hill-top site that is a combination of a basin and a saddle. At one end of the facility there is a dam across the basin with a length of 1800 meters and a maximum height of 35 meters.

Artificial plantations of mat rush (Scirpus validus) over the surface of tailings were established in the early 90s in order to reduce dust transfer. However, the extent of the rush plantation declined after significant losses of water area down to 2/3 of its initial extent; the surface is now covered with cracks and clefts 1-2 m deep and 30 to 80 cm wide (Fig.3.)

Fig. 2. Ghafourov tailings site: Note the proximity of dwellings, the cover appears intact with no obvious erosion features

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Figure 3. Scheme of Degmay tailings in the surroundings of Khujand and Chkalovsk. Arrows 1 and 2 point place where aerosol and soil samples were taken (Table 2)

Residues of uranium extraction were pumped to the tailings dam contained high concentrations of ionic sulfate (average 20 g l-1). As a result of the significant decline in 1992-1993 of the volumes of milling the uranium ores, the transmission of material into the tailings dam declined. During the period 1991 to 2000 less concentrated solutions were pumped into the tailings dam after filtration through strata layers; this resulted in partially cleaner, filtered waters. At the same time it showed that ultimate cleaning was not attained and contaminated ground waters were transferred to Syr Daria River. Until the middle of 90s the surface of tailings was partially covered with water, but later the water gradually dried out and the tailings surface became completely dry by the year 2000. It then became covered with cracks that intensified the exhalation of radon and increased the risk of erosion of the surface and increases in dusting by the wind.

According to the data obtained during the IAEA mission of 2006 the high gamma dose rates measured on the tailing surface (4.5-20 µSv·h-1) were significantly higher than the reasonable safety levels permitting public access to the area.

At the other end of the facility a small earth dam creates a small basin in the saddle area. The maximum depth of tailings was stated to be 20 m (Fig. 4). Above the saddle the land is being used as a municipal landfill. Seepage waters are reportedly collected from the toe of the dam and pumped back to the main reservoir. This system was not seen during the visit and there was no evidence of any pump-back flow. The site was freely accessible there being no gates on the access track with only one warning sign remaining in place and sheep grazing across the tailings area. There was clear evidence of human intrusion into the tailings where people had been excavating to remove scrap metal for sale.

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Fig. 4. Degmay tailings site: looking towards the overflow basin. Note municipal landfill on hill at left background. Close up of area of human intrusion and site of digging for scrap metal.

The main spectrum of natural radionuclide in technogenically increased concentrations, which are characteristic for tailings, consists of the isotopes of uranium, thorium, radium and their decay products, such as 210Pb and 210Po. The results of analysis of tailings material and aerosols sampled in different locations of tailings were obtained by the laboratories in Ukraine as part of analyses conducted for the IAEA (Tables 2, 3 and 4). Isotope contents were measured at the UHMI on the samples collected during the IAEA expert’s mission.

In accordance with the classification used in the Russian Federation (Radiation Safety Norm 99), used as a basis for Radiation Safety Norms in Tajikistan, the tailings materials having such levels of alpha-active natural radionuclides in technogenically-increased concentrations belong to the category of low-level radioactive wastes requiring regulatory control.

Тable 2. Activity (Bq kg-1) of natural radionuclides in the samples of tails, collected at the territory of Degmay tailings

№ Sampling location 238U 226Ra 230Th 210Pb 210Po

1 Sample 1 (Fig. 3.4) 980 ± 100 7620 ± 580 15600 ± 1700 14600 ± 1070 13200 ± 1320 2 Sample 2 (Fig. 3.4) 820 ± 80 7250 ± 560 11165 ± 1240 10140 ± 740 12350 ± 920

Guidelines of the IAEA RS-G-1.7 define that natural radionuclides having the above concentrations in a mixture significantly exceed the figures for activity concentrations of natural radionuclides, which can be exempted from regulatory control. Therefore, the region affected by the tailings via the main pathways of their migration through ambient air and ground water should be subjected to regular monitoring observations and the site should be controlled.

The surface of tailings is not covered, thus allowing a significant constant radon exhalation from the tailings. Exhalation of radon -222 into the atmosphere is sufficiently increased after drying of the tailings surface, especially in parts of the tailings pond where cracks, some reaching to a depth of over two meters and having a width of 20 to 40 cm, occur. The outdoor radon concentration in the air over the tailings surface during the summer time, when IAEA experts visited the site (under windy condition), was observed to be in range of several hundreds up to 1000 Bq/m3. Exhalation of radon-222 was found by direct measurements

.

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in June 2006 at different places to vary from 10 to 60 Bq m2 c, which is significantly higher that the recommended safety level in case of covered surface of the tailing in Tajikistan (1 Bq m2 c).

Depending on the meteorological conditions and parameters of atmospheric stability the air masses with high concentrations of radon and daughter decay products could spread over a distance of a few kilometers from Degmay tailings.

The volume activity of ambient radon concentration over the tailings site (observed under windy conditions when the dilution in the air is rather high) also increases considerably the mean background value of Rn concentrations in this area (Table 3.).

This result suggest that there might be a problem which could be more acute than previously estimated, because this flow of radon into the ambient air may create high concentrations of decay products such as 210Po and 210Pb in the air and atmospheric precipitation, which in turn could remain in the ambient air and/or become deposited on agricultural lands. Dispersion of the radon decay products by the airflows may contribute to the spread of soil surface contamination into the adjacent areas. Thus, observation well No.18 shows in the surface soil layer behind the tailings pond a 210Pb content of 98 ±14 Bq·kg-1 and a 210Po content of 62 ±16 Bq·kg-1 this is twice the mean background level of these radionuclides in local soils.

This may be evidence that contamination from the radon decay products of 210Pb and 210Po has occurred in the area adjacent to the Degmay tailings. Therefore, it is necessary to consider a new program of observations with focus on the contamination of ambient air (aerosols) with the above radionuclides, and to assess dusting and the effect of wind dispersal on distribution of radionuclides from the tailings through the air.

Table 3. Gamma-dose rate and Radon exhalation measured during IAEA expert mission at the Degmay uranium tailing (June 2006). Wind 7 m s-2

№ Locations

(See Fig 3.)

Gamma-dose rate,

µSv·hour-1

Outdoor Rn-222

Bq·m-3

EEVA Rn-222,

Bq·m-3

Rn –exhalation,

Bq m2·с -1

1 1а 3,9-4,0 102±24 5,2 9,18±2,75 2 1б 18,0-20,0 321±68 8,15 65,5±19,7 3 2а 6,5-7,0 187±36 15,85 50,8±16 4 2б 4,5-5,0 207±57 12,75 31,4±9,4 Regional background 0,2-0,3 15-20

Independent measurement carried out during spring period by P. Stegnar and NATO

project partners from SE “Vostokredmet” show that at some parts of Degmay tailing the ambient concentration of Rn-222 near soil surface reached 1000 Bq·m-3 . Currently the surface of tailings is not covered and the site is surrounded by a reinforced concrete fence; however, access of people and livestock to the tailings is not prevented. Dusting from the uncovered surface of the tailings may become a serious problem. Measurements of the activity of the aerosols over the tailings surface are not available. Collections of aerosols (dust) from the ambient air in large volumes up to 300 m3 was conducted in June 2006 at two plots on the tailings. Air filtering devices were arranged at the height of 0.5 m above the ground. Aerosols were sampled on large diameter Petri filters and the collection time averaged 3 hours. The filters were measured after combustion by a semi-conductor gamma-spectrometer.

The results are shown in Table 4 and compared with the data for the same period from the locations of Chkalovsk and Taboshar. Dusting from the tailings is a major concern with average wind velocity often exceeding 15m/sec. Experiments with artificial coatings of the tailings surface using latex based and similar materials were tested for prevention of dusting, however without any long-lasting effect.

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Тable. 4. Aerosol activity in air samples taken at the tailing sites (06-15.06.2006)

Aerosols activity , 10-5 Bq/m3 Volume

238U 226Ra 210Pb 228Th Be-7 * K-40 Location (м3) +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/-

Taboshar, U-Pit 430 1.8 0.8 1.9 0.5 47.5 3.4 0.5 0.2 421 11.2 10.4 0.9

Degmai 1 (Fig 3.) 220 3.4 1.4 40.9 1.7 125 6.3 5.8 2.3 447 20.8 20.2 1.7

Degmai 2 (Fig 3.) 300 4.6 1.8 33.2 1.5 92.4 4.6 4.6 1.8 450 23.0 35.2 1.9

Chkalovsk, HMP 350 15.6 2.2 4.8 0.6 12.9 6.3 0.5 0.2 485 19.5 12.7 1.1

The screening data show that, Degmay tailings is a potential source of dispersion of natural radionuclides of increased concentrations and it may have a negative impact on the human population in the nearby settlement in case of people have access to this territory, mainly because high gamma dose rate of expose and ambient Rn concentration in the air, which will create main contribution to the human dose exposure. It should be considered if an evaluation of the effective individual radiation dose to the critical groups of the local population needs to be carried out.

During the IAEA expert mission the condition of the groundwater observation network was assessed. There have been no observations of the ground water dynamics and contamination carried out around Degmay during the past 10 years. Most of the wells are unserviceable for observation of the contamination movement and will require reconstruction or replacement (Fig.3.5). Therefore, the assessment was done based on archive data of SE “Vostokredmet”.

Fig. 5. The groundwater observation wells at Degmay tailings sites and its vicinity

The nearest settlement is a village about 1500 meters away from the tailings dam. The drinking water supply used by the villagers comes from wells. Water from the wells is also used for irrigation purposes. The wells are monitored. The agricultural activities come as close to the site as 200 m. Livestock may also be grazing vegetation on the tailings site. The river is about 3500 m away from the site and directly in the downstream flow path of any material washed out from the dam. The underground pathway for water to the river has reportedly been determined to be 8000 m.

In the previous studies carried out by SE «Vostokredmet» it was revealed that there is a significant contamination of ground waters with sulfate ions, thus implying a possible contamination with radionuclides from the accumulated tailings materials. The main macro-ions of technogenic contamination, including the radionuclides are within the sulphate plume

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characterized by increased mineralization. The spatial distribution within the plume is in direct relationship to the degree and range of formation of the contaminants.

This peculiar property of ground water contamination was applied by the specialists of SE “Vostokredmet” for studying the aureole of distribution of the contamination using geophysical methods of electro-sensing (Bezzubov et al, 2005). The results obtained with this method in 1994 and later in 2003 are the only observations; these can predict dispersion of the polluted groundwater front on the way toward the river. The potential propagation of the groundwater contamination was estimated using mathematical modeling. This evaluation (Koptelov et al., 2005) show that in recent times the contamination plume has gone from the tailings on the surface and is moving toward the Khoja-Bakyrgan and Syr Daria Rivers. The contamination plume consists of several lenses containing highly concentrated sulphate and soluble uranium.

The specifics of the situation need a more detailed analysis. According to model forecasts the contaminated ground water from the tailings site will discharge into Syr Darya and subsequently may be used by the local residents for irrigation of orchards and horticultural crops. Under these circumstances it would be prudent to evaluate and predict the development of the ground water quality near the Degmay tailings pond from the point of view of a potential risk to humans using the water for irrigation (Fig. 6).

Fig.6. Exploitation wells used irrigation and flooded rice paddies in the area of Degmay.

In the surroundings of the tailings it is necessary to undertake monitoring of the chemical contamination of ground waters, because the crushed ores, which were disposed of here over a long period of time, have high contents of ionic sulphate (from 0.5 to 20 g/l). In earlier studies, the status of the ground water contamination with sulphates due to infiltration through the tailing body and its migration towards the Syr Darya River was evaluated by “Vostokredmet” using mathematical models. The results of modeling show that the front of the contamination plume extends toward the river and the mineralization of the water falls significantly with distance from the tailings. The ground water near the tailings pond must be considered unfit for drinking purposes and related uses. The existing wells around the tailings pond are unsuitable for reliable monitoring of the spread of the contamination in the groundwater system beneath and around the tailings pond; most of them would require overhaul and, subsequently, proper maintenance. Any new monitoring boreholes should be designed taking into account the location and depth of the contamination plume. In case of any continued assistance of the IAEA in this matter, the Tajik partners would welcome SE “Vostokredmet” receiving advice on the proper installation and instrumentation of the monitoring wells, introduction of methods of quality control and estimation of the movement of the contamination plume from the Degmay tailings pond towards the Syr Darya River.

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Waste rock piles and tailings at the Taboshar site The uranium mines at Taboshar are the oldest uranium mines on the territory of the former

USSR. The mines were discovered 1936 and small-scale extraction of ores followed until the large-scale production started in 1949, which lasted until 1965. After production, an area of over 400 ha, was left abandoned covered with mine waste of all kinds. Part of this legacy is the site of the low-grade ore sorting facility (See Figs. 7-9).

The township of Taboshar with the population of 12 thousand people is located a few km away from the disposal sites. The complex of large capacity depots includes abandoned open mines, demolished buildings and three tailings dumps with about 10 million tones of waste acid uranium ore extracts.

The tailings were produced by two hydrometallurgical plants. The total area taken up by the tailings is about 54 ha with a total of 7.6 million tons of waste.

The residues at the site of the sorting plant contain about 1.17 million tons of low grade ore, located approximately 3 km above the spring of

the Say Creek (Archasoy) and 3 km from the center of Taboshar. On the site, besides the low grade ore residues, there are waste rock dumps

from the underground uranium mines and a 50 m deep open pit uranium mine, currently flooded (Fig.8). The material of the low-grade ore pile consists of ground ore prepared for heap leaching at the same site. The ground low-grade ore was produced in the 60s but was never processed. The pile is not covered and has been exposed to wind and water erosion for the past 40 years. Local residents have access to the pile (“yellow hill”) and allegedly, the material was used as sand in various construction schemes.

During heavy rainfalls the fine fraction of the residues is washed out of the “Yellow Hill” dump and re-deposited in the riverbed of the Say Creek (Archasoy). The gamma dose rate of the deposited sediments in the field is up to 2-4 µSv hour-1 (200-400 µR hour-1).

Fig.7. Taboshar tailing site (UNDP,2005)

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Fig. 8. Waste rock piles of balanced ores and quarry material near former Radium open cast mine covered with water. Contents of dissolved Uranium in the water of quarry 40-50 Bq l-1.

Fig 9. The «Yellow hill» a waste rock pile of the factory “barren ore” created during 6o-s of the last

century is one of the objects where remediation measures are required.

The low-grade uranium ore pile received special attention because of the potential for environmental impact (Fig. 9). The material from this pile is released from the pile by erosion and washing out processes and subsequently carried by small creeks downstream to the Say Creek. The activity of the eroded material deposited below the pile has a gamma dose rate in the range of 2.2-2.7 µSv·h-1(220-270 µRh-1). Compared to this, the gamma dose rate measured on the surface of the pile is not particularly high; the dose rate is in the range of 1-1.5 µSv·h-1 (100-150 µRh-1). The low dose rate on the pile is probably due to the thin crust, which has developed over most of the surface.

Fig. 10. Raw material from the “Yellow Hill” erosion and water runoff spilling at the distance up tseveral km covers the bottom of the creek (Say).

The Radon exhalation at the same area appears to be elevated. The gamma dose rate measured near the “Yellow Hill” is 0,4-0,7 µSv·h-1 (40-70 µRh-1) and reaches up to 3,0-4,0 µSv·h-1 (300-400 µRh-1) in the places where uranium waste rock was dumped. A significant

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amount of the ground ore was dispersed in the environment mainly because of erosion and washout processes (Fig.12). The radionuclide composition in aerosols and soils is given in Tables 5-7.

Fig. 11. The washed eroded materials from FBO deposited at the depressions of the local relief (left photo) and near the protective dam (right photo), which was specially constructed to prevent significant dispersion of this material with the water runoff.

The tailings from the hydrometallurgical plant are located in the upper spring area of the Say Creek and other tributaries of the Utken-Suu River. Besides erosion into the creeks, these tailings are also subject to mudslides. Thus, following heavy rains during 1998-2000 mud slides occurred in the tailings pond No.3, which resulted in significant amounts of tailings being released into the valley of Sarym-Sakhly-Say creek.

Tailings material of reddish sand appearance was re-deposited along the valley over a distance of 3 km toward the Utken-Suu River, which is the downstream water resource for the local residents. The redeposit material on the flood plane has a gamma dose rate up to 250 µR h-1. The re-deposited material is distributed within a relatively large settlement on the bank of the river. The contaminated sediments along the bank form the beach of the river and have an appearance attractive to residents for purposes of recreation and thus, they may result in an avoidable exposure. This applies particularly to children playing with sand on the riverside. These sites require remediation (Fig.12).

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Fig. 12. The red-yellow materials from the tailing 1 of the Taboshar Hydrometallurgical Plant have been spilled to the distance up to 3.5 km due to high flood and mudflows.

In 2005, with the financial aid and assistance of an OSCE program in Tajikistan, the upper springs were cleaned and a mudslide trap was re-established, a cut-off drain was constructed to minimize the consequences of possible mudflow above the spring in the future. The “tongue” of the tailing of the facility No 3 was covered in 2005, thus reducing the risk of repeated mudflows for some time. However, the clean up of dispersed tailings material (red color on the photos Fig.12) in the Say valley remains a problem needing resolution.

The tailings pond No. 3, which was operational from 1949-1965, covers the area of 2.9 ha, and contains 1.2 million tons of tailings. The tailings pond is located 1 km from the residential area of Taboshar and according to the certificate issued by the Sogd Branch of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency is covered by “neutral soil” of 0,7-1,0 m thickness. The condition of the tailings pond cover appears to be poor.

The similar certificates concerning cover were issued for the tailings ponds I-IV , which are also located in the outskirts of the residential area. The real thickness of the covers, based on observations during the IAEA mission in 2006, does not exceed 0.5 m and in some parts it was only 0,2-0,3 m. This insufficient cover increases the risks of denudation of the tailings surface and intrusion by burrowing animals, thus increasing the chances of contamination being spread by increased seepage infiltration and dusting (Fig.13).

Fig. 13. Surface cover breaks caused by animal burrowers at the Taboshar facility

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Fig. 14. Surface of tailings used by local residents as a pasture for livestock and for recreation

Traces of animal burrowing are all over the slopes of the tailings dumps and in some of the holes tailings material can be clearly identified. As a consequence of the activity by burrowing animals the tailings material becomes spread on the surface of the cover and the burrows become radon discharge points. The radon exhalation from these excavations exceeded 1.0 Bq·m-2·s-1 in some cases. At some locations where the cover was damaged, radon exhalations in range 3-9 Bq m-2 s-1 were measured, which is 9 times higher than specified in the “sanitary norm”. The radon measurements are presented in Table 5.

Таble 5. Gamma-dose rate and Rn contamination – at the Taboshar site

№ Locations Gamma-dose

rate, µSv·hour-1

Outdoor Rn-

concentration, Bq·m-3

EEVA Radon,

Bq·m-3

Rn –

exhalation, Bq m2·с -1

EEVА Thoron, Bq m2·с -1

1 Taboshar Pit 0,48-0,56 20 1,92 0,09±0,03 0,23 2 “Yellow mountain” milled

residues of the depleted ore » 0,76-2,8 0,35-0,4

17 2,0 0,86±0,25 1,06±0,28

0,17

3 Waste rock piles 4 km from Taboshar

0,18-0,23 12 3,3 - 0,15

4 Taboshar tailing 4 0,3-0,5 25 3,0 4,8±1,6 - 5 Taboshar tailing 3 0,3-0,6 35 8,78 - - 6 Taboshar tailing 1-2 0,4-0,9

45 2,57 3,8±1,2

(9,97±3,0)* 0,33

• - a location where the tailing surface cover is broken.

A special problem of the Taboshar tailings is the seepage of residual acid solutions from the tailings dumps no.: 1-2. The seepage at the bottom of tailings has high levels of sulphate (9200 - 9600 mg/l) and carbonate (1800 mg/l of HCO3 ) and carries dissolved uranium as well

The gross alpha activity in several samples taken from the seepage waters discharging into the Say Creek was in the range from 1200 to1500 Bq l-1; the contribution of uranium (238U+234U) to the gross alpha activity was in the range 1110-1450 Bq l-1 (converted into weight concentrations this represents 50-70 mg l-1). Due to the arid climate the seepage water evaporates on the banks of the creek creating a yellowish precipitate, which crystallizes as sulphate and carbonate complexes with high uranium content. These yellow crystals of uranium sulphate complexes have an alpha activity of 12-15,000 Bq kg-1.

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The uranium complex precipitates at the tailing dumps № 1 and № 2 occur as a result of acid leaching of the material in the waste dumps; this happens either through the high residual acid content or the action of acid mine drainage. Irrespective of the origin, the seepage from the dumps flows significantly during the rainy season. A determination of the origins of the ongoing leaching process in the waste dumps would require a more detailed study.

The risk of exposure of the population of Taboshar is aggravated by the fact that the residents regularly lead their cows and sheep to contaminated watering places. A common local practice is to deepen the springs by digging out little troughs to make watering easier. Due to this practice, the watering troughs become collectors of the shallow water seepage, which is also contaminated.

Fig.15. Drainage water residues with high contents of sulphate and carbonate ions as a result of water evaporation and salt deposition. The view on the drainage water residue in April after rain period and during summer 2007 (August) with low groundwater table.

The contents of uranium in cow milk after watering at this spot was estimated to be rather low, around 45 mBq l-1 (one sample). However, the data obtained are insufficient to determine accurately the degree of radiation threat arising from this practice as special additional assessment and measurements would be needed.

The outdoor concentrations of Radon-222 at the uranium tailings and in adjacent settlements of Taboshar town were also investigated during the IAEA mission. This work was conducted jointly with national partners from the Sogd Branch of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency of Tajikistan. Track detectors were installed at locations in the area of Taboshar and were exposed over 2 months. The detectors films were then processed in the Department of Radiation Hygiene of the Ukrainian Institute for Hygiene and Medical Ecology with the use of techniques approved in Ukraine. The results of these measurements are shown in Table 6. The coefficient selected for calculations of volumetric activity for radon in the interior living space was 0.4 .

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The results show that the radon-222 activity in houses and public buildings in the townships Taboshar and Old Taboshar does not exceed the recommended safety level of 100 Bq⋅m-3 specified in the Radiation Safety Norms of the Ukraine and 200 Bq⋅m-3 in (NRB-99) of Russia.

Table 6. The results of measurements of volumetric activity of radon 222 in the air in the facilities of Taboshar (Dates 07.06.2006 – 09.08.2006)

№ п/п Location

Rn-222, Bq⋅m-3

EEVA Rn-222, Bq⋅m-3

1 Taboshar, Lenin street. Hospital 45 18

2 Taboshar, Gagarina street, 20 115 46

3 Taboshar, Sadovaya street, 2 (house) 48 19

4 Taboshar, Sadovaya street, 2 (yard) 134 -

5 Taboshar, Pushkina street, 29 85 34

6 Taboshar, Telmana, street, 43 171 68

7 Taboshar, Telmana, street, 43 (yard under roof) 121 -

8 Taboshar, Leninabadskaya 7/39 (yard) 168 -

9 Taboshar, Leninabadskaya 7/39 (hose) 44 17

10 Taboshar, Khukomat 195 78

11 Taboshar, School 150 60

12 Old Taboshar, school 144 58

13 Taboshar, Demolished building of the Plant 1319 528

Relatively high concentrations of radon-222 were measured in the ambient air in

Taboshar. They exceeded the average indoor radon concentration. This could be attributed to the radon exhalation from the waste rock piles and tailings dumps in the vicinity or to the use of waste rock material for construction of the buildings. High radon 222 concentrations were measured indoors of the former hydrometallurgical plant-now half demolished. There is a need to decommission and demolish the old buildings and remediate the area of the former facility. Samples were taken from the “yellow mountain” waste pile as well. The results of gamma-spectrometric and alpha-spectrometric analyses are shown in Table 7. Таble 7. Radionuclide activities (Bq ·kg-1) in the materials of waste rock piles and tailings near

Taboshar town (taken from the surface)

№ Location 238U, 226Ra, 230Th, 210Pb, 210Po, 1 Residue Material of FBO “yellow

hill” sample 1 (light) 1405 ± 200 6570 ± 600 5600 ± 1050 5885 ± 470 5350 ± 580

2 Residue Material of FBO “yellow hill” sample 2 (dark)

250 ± 60 2090 ± 200 1320 ± 630 2225 ± 185 1820 ± 250

3 Residue Material FBO “yellow hill” sample 3 (washed out)

800 ± 70 1735 ± 130 1025 ± 300 1950 ± 145 1840 ± 190

4 Residue Material of FBO “yellow hill” sample 3

250 ± 80 1030 ± 85 1010 ± 400 1935 ± 145 1510 ± 245

5 Tailing (sell 1-2), sample 1 585 ± 60 3010 ± 240 2900 ± 530 3895 ± 290 3250 ± 370

6 Uranium salt from the bank of drainage creek. Tailing 1-2

12210 ± 900 55,9 ± 27 Does not detected

Does not detected

Does not detected

The random measurements carried out at various points of the Taboshar site indicate the presence of numerous potential health risks at the site. This, combined with the present lack of

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an active legacy management program on the site suggests that the first step to be taken at Taboshar should be the implementation of an adequate system of radiation and health and safety control. Along with the health and safety control, an educational campaign among the local population could result in considerable improvements. Based on the results of monitoring and stakeholders’ consultations an effective plan of the overall site remediation could then be worked out.

An urgent remedial measure in Taboshar should be the treatment of the overflowing mine water discharging directly into Taboshar. Because of the lack of other water sources the local population uses this water. The analysis of the water samples taken during the IAEA mission in spring 2007 shows that the water is highly contaminated (see Table in Fig.16 ). The mine water should be regularly sampled at the discharge points and along the creek as it runs down to Sarym-Sakhly-Say, Utken-Suu River; this includes seepages of the tailings dumps no. 1-2 . There should be a priority to conduct regular observations on water quality in surface water bodies in the region of the tailings. This is an important issue as a priority for radiation control, as the actual water supplies for technical uses and drinking in Taboshar may be highly contaminated following their interaction with the tailings and buried materials.

Fig. 16. Assessment of the water bodies pollution at the Taboshar town. Data on radionuclide concentration in the water in the table given in Bq l-1.

Consideration should be given to the development of a radiation monitoring network in Taboshar; in particular regular observations of radon-222 gas in air and its decay products in ambient air and dust. To facilitate such observation large air pumps and other sampling equipment have been requested through the ТС IAEA procurement mechanism.

An important element of any monitoring survey to be regularly provided at Taboshar site would be observations of contamination in surface and mine waters. Comprehensive food pathway analyses and radiation exposures for local population may also be needed-in particular due to water intake for irrigation and drinking purposes. The waters mainly come from old mines

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and galleries inundated with groundwater. The activity of uranium isotopes measured in the mine waters varied between 25 to 35 Bq l-1 with typical values of pH 6.5-6.8. The mine waters drain to the Sary-Sakhly Say Creek and then to the Utken-Suu River, which is one of the water supply sources for the surrounding settlements. Despite such relatively high contamination, these waters are used for irrigation and as the water supply by the local population. The overall status of the water chemical composition is to be established through the regular monitoring program of the Vostokredmet environmental protection laboratory.

Waste piles and mine water drainage near Khujand The waste rock piles of the former Uranium mine no. 3 are located 4-5 km from the

residential part of the city of Khujand along the slope and foothills of Mogoltau. The uranium mining in this area went from 1976 to 1985. The total area taken up by the waste rock piles is about six ha and the piles contain about 350,000 tones of waste rock. The waste rock piles have a soil cover of 0.5-0,7 m thickness. The gamma-dose rate on the surface of the waste rock piles is in the range of 30-60 µR/hour, indicating that dose rate is not significant and the cover adequate and functional. Despite this result, public access to both the mine and open pit should be prohibited. The mine waters discharge from the gallery and have an increased content of radionuclides of the Uranium-Thorium series. For this reason a mine water treatment facility including sedimentation ponds and anion exchange columns was installed at this site at the end of the 90s (Fig. 17) working with good results both in terms of environmental protection and extraction of uranium from the mine water containing 30-36 mg l-1 of Uranium. However, in the recent years the treatment facility has been closed.

Fig. 17. The old mines, mine waters and water cleaning facilities in Khujand town on the right bank of the Mogoltau

It is recommended that a single screening analysis be undertaken to establish the level of contamination of mine waters. This will provide data to be used in decision making concerning possible remediation measures

Uranium tailings and former facilities in Adrasman In former times, a uranium extraction plant operated in the town of Adrasman. The remnant of this activity today is a dump containing approximately 800,000 tons of tailings material. The tailings are located on the outskirts of the city and covered with 40-60 cm of waste rock and soil, the material being obtained from local sources. This relatively recent remediation was carried out by SE “Vostokredmet”. According to the data of “Vostokredmet”, the gamma dose rate on the top of the tailings cover is in range 0.3-0.4 µSv h-1, which is sufficient from the point of view of direct exposure.

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Fig. 18. Tailings in Adrasman. Erosion of the tailing covers and contaminated water use.

However, on the side of the tailings dump a 2 m deep ravine has developed due to water erosion. Such features usually exhibit rather high gamma-dose rates. The regular checking of the erosion gully should be part of the regular monitoring and surveillance plan for this site. The tailings dump is not fenced off and people have an unrestricted access to the site, which they frequently do, including the children living in the close by settlement. The access to the tailings dump should be restricted.

Reportedly, there is seepage water coming out of the tailing dump during the rainy period. Unfortunately, no quantitative observations of the seepage are available. The seepage water is used by the local population for irrigating the outlying vegetable gardens. The contamination level of the water is unknown. In this conjunction, the chief officer of the Sogd Branch of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency of Tajikistan has proposed to include these observations into the regular monitoring and surveillance plan. The officer of the branch requested assistance in the development of an optimized system of radiation control and contamination monitoring of the surface and ground waters, ambient air and local foodstuff grown on the plots potentially impacted by the tailings dump.

Some achievements and recommendations for a further stage of IAEA RER 9/086 project development

National priority for cooperation It was the general opinion of national experts and beneficiary organizations that the collaboration in a framework of the IAEA project “Safe Management of Residue from Uranium Mines and Milling Activities in Central Asia Region” during 2005-2006 was evaluated by local experts as positive. It has provided new opportunities to identify and estimate problems regarding the sites located in the region; it gives an opportunity to think again about the strategy of management in the former uranium facilities in the country; an opportunity to evaluate results of current remediation activities; and also to familiarize with the experience of the other countries in the sphere of waste handling in uranium mining and processing

The results of the first phase of collaboration of the international and national experts in the republic (2005-2006) have the following conclusions:

The main subjects for further collaboration with the IAEA in the Republic of Tajikistan should be remediation and monitoring of uranium facilities in the city of Chkalovsk (Degmay

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tailings), the planning of residue disposal and remediation of former uranium facilities in Taboshar and Adrasman. It is necessary to restore regular monitoring on the contamination of environment in these locations.

The physical protection of the facilities in the former uranium industries must be reinstated especially within the limits of the established sanitary-protection zones; in addition the access of residential population and the use of wildlife at these sites must be restricted.

The former uranium facilities located in Taboshar are currently considered as sources of contamination of surrounding territory through spread of the sulfate salts and waters of high uranium contents and the decay products of radionuclides of uranium-thorium series. It is necessary to minimize seepage from tailings and to restrict access of the residential population and livestock to contaminated sources of water.

Taking into account the realities of cross-border transfer of radioactive elements through Syr Darya and the potential for contamination of neighboring countries it is necessary to establish a uniform document for the Central Asian countries. This should include agreement for the use of a single standard of radiation safety in the former uranium facilities, including those in an operating or remediated state. One of the main components in this document should be a chapter on radiation monitoring systems and processes for the environment around a remediated or derelict uranium facility as well as on the regional scale.

The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan should take measures to accelerate the development of national standards documents on radiation safety (Norms of Radiation Safety of the Republic Tajikistan, Basic Sanitary Rules of the Republic Tajikistan etc.) which should be compliant with the Law of Tajikistan about radiation safety and the Law of Tajikistan about the use of atomic energy, and also compliant with contemporary international requirements on radiation safety.

In connection with the limited number of qualified specialists in the country the IAEA should continue to provide technical assistance in preparation of standrads documents and to provide training for local specialists.

It is necessary, as soon as possible, to establish radioecological monitoring in the region of Degmay tailings, and to evaluate, using the results, the dose rates for human population. In addition it is necessary to develop a project on remediation of Degmay tailings and rehabilitation of the adjacent territory.

There is a need for radiation monitoring to be undertaken at other uranium facilities of Tajikistan (e.g. Adrasman) and to extend the surveillance of the level of contamination of natural environment and foodstuffs in settlements located in the areas of possible impact around former uranium facilities.

It is suggested that, in the future, based on the collected data there is an evaluation of the radiation risk to the natural environment in the contaminated territories. This should be followed by preparation of proposals and the priorities in remediation measures for impacted areas Recommendations regarding monitoring and data collection Development of an efficient monitoring system

The prerequisite to planning successful remediation is to have the required data and

characteristics of the sites. The data collected must be such that a meaningful evaluation and interpretation becomes possible. For this, the monitoring system must be set up to answer the specific questions relevant to the site and location. For instance, on tailings ponds the key problem may be radon exhalation, contaminated seepage and dusting or geotechnical stability of the dam or surface, or both. In

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addition, for tailings located on steep slopes it is the soil stability and liquefaction risk, which may be of prime concern. Reliable geomechanical measurements of deformations and monitoring of the water balance are crucial in such cases. To satisfy this requirement may require the design of a new monitoring system or the adjustment of the existing system.

The purpose of the monitoring system in case of remediation of the Central Asian legacy sites will change with the progress of remediation:

1. Measurements and collection of relevant data for site assessment prior to implementation of remedial measures will be needed to:

• derive the (usually unknown) base line by making measurements a sufficient distance from the location and site, which is deemed not to have been affected. Using these measurements the reference levels can be derived,

• assess the risk presented by the site and components(s) based on the inventory of the content, pathways of contaminants propagation and stability of the object and site,

• decide whether remediation is needed and, in case of remediation, justify the remedial solution proposed

2. Monitoring of the site/component during remediation is likely to involve measuring the

same parameters as during the site assessment. Additional parameters could include occupational exposures to radioactive and hazardous contaminants and monitoring of the work conditions. As work proceeds, additional sampling and testing may become necessary to check and validate whether the impact is in the same range as predicted in the assessment.

3. After remediation it will be necessary to focus on indicators/measuring points and perhaps

omit some previously monitored parameters, which are not indicative of remedial performance in the long term. Checking the state and trend of the key indicators of remedial performance is to

• prove the effectiveness of the implemented remedial measures

• demonstrate compliance with any regulatory requirements,

• provide assurance to stakeholders of the improved situation, and

• observe the performance (or deterioration) of the mine waste containment in the long term. Post-remedial monitoring is likely to be required for a period of time adequate for observation of the effects of the natural processes acting on the remediated object and site (usually in order of 20 to 50 years), i.e. sometimes longer than the operation of the mine or plant where the waste originates from. During the post-remediation period it can be expected that it will be possible to continuously decrease the frequency of sampling and measurements in accordance with the observed trends.

Data collection for site assessment (prior to remediation)

The monitoring programs for the legacy sites are to be designed or adjusted according to the objectives of the measurement at the specific site and an understanding of how the data will

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be used. In order to design the monitoring system for the needs of the specific site the following specifics must be considered:

• Type and form of the site;

• Conditions downstream/downwind of the site;

• Properties of the soil and/or geological base of the site;

• Groundwater conditions on the site;

• State of the area around the site;

• Environmental conditions on the site (vegetation, borrowing animals etc.);

• Meteorological conditions on the site (for a particularly vulnerable site it may require the establishment of a dedicated meteorological station);

• Proximity to population, buildings and infrastructural features (roads, electric transmission lines etc.).

The aim of the measurements must be to understand (and, possibly model) the mechanisms that control the state (geotechnical stability, erosion, re-suspension, dusting, leaching and seepage) of the site and area to be remediated.

Prior to selection of monitoring instruments the following question must be answered, “Which parameters are most significant for the site under the existing and also possible future conditions?”. Experience from the Borst site of the Slovenian remediation company, RZV shows that the risk assessment of tailings deposited on a mountain slope prone to sliding and which is potentially subject to seismic events, requires the evaluation of the site responses and their consequences under a wide range of conditions.

At mountain sites it will be important to recognize whether changes of monitoring parameters are related to the causes or represent the measured effects of the observed change. For example, an important performance parameter of the slope stability of an object or cover is the deformation, which is a consequence (an effect) of the problem. Assuming no earthquake in this case, the cause of the problem is most commonly a change of the ground water situation. By monitoring both cause and effect, a relationship between the two can be developed, and a remedy of the undesirable effect implemented, by removing the cause of the problem.

Predictions of the maximum possible values for the monitored parameters under the site-specific conditions are the best guidance in selection of the measuring instruments. The question of instrument accuracy should be answered by predicting the minimum expected value of the parameter which is to be measured. It is recommended that reliability of the instrument is never sacrificed for unnecessary accuracy. This in turn may be more economical in terms of not only initial cost, but also reliability and maintenance expenses in the long term.

While predictions of the anticipated change of the monitoring parameters directly serve the recognition of deviations from normality, they can be used (in combination with parameter predictions under the most unfavorable conditions) for determination of hazard warning levels, which may be defined for several warning situations. This approach should be taken at sites such as, the Digmay tailings ponds and/or Mailuu Suu.

The placement of the monitoring instruments should be in accordance with the most likely predicted behavior of the object and conditions of the site and the method of analysis that will be used for interpretation of the data. Nevertheless, a flexibility of placement is needed so that locations can be changed as new information becomes available during remediation. Relocation may also be needed as a consequence of remediation earthworks etc.

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Measurements by themselves will not be sufficient to allow useful conclusions. Recording of the factors that may have influenced the measurements must be planned for as well. Procedures ensuring correct functioning of the instruments would have to be established and written step-by-step procedures for monitoring prepared e.g. as operational manuals or handbooks. Procedures for data collection, processing, presentation, archiving and interpretation should be prepared; and, most importantly, staff training planned.

Development of remedial plans and their implementation

From the point of view of post-closure remediation there are two issues faced in the region, the remediation of the legacy sites and the preventive post-closure planning for the operating and new mines and mills.

The remediation of the old legacy sites is best approached as an intervention measure to deal with a pre-existing situation. The first step should be the preparation of comprehensive national remediation master plans, which would consider all abandoned tailings deposits, waste rock dumps, contaminated areas and structures to be decommissioned and demolished. This will allow prioritization of the individual sites.

Specific remedial plans should then be developed for each site while the selection of the most suitable remediation solution should be done by weighing the risk potential of the abandoned objects against economic factors and stakeholder issues.

The remedial actions selected must be both effective and justifiable under the local conditions, i.e. they should consider all events that can jeopardize the containment of the wastes (including human and animal intrusion, earthquakes, and extreme weather, etc) but the selected remedial solution must be in balance with the consequences of the waste release.

The sustainability of the remediation results over long term is best ensured by following the strategy of putting the reclaimed land and remediated objects to productive use, whenever feasible. A post-remedial stewardship plan must accompany the transfer of objects/sites for post remediation use to ensure that safety requirements are met in the long term. Some form of institutional control is always going to be required.

Because of the considerable expansion of uranium mining and development of new mines in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan a proactive environmental approach is recommended regarding the currently producing and any future mines.

This should be of particular interest to the producers because the new mines are likely to be of lower ore grade and both economic and environmental issues will become even more challenging than in the past.

The recommended strategy under these conditions is the proactive minimization of mining and milling waste and prevention of future damage at the stages of development and production. This should include mining process modifications, improvements of processing and waste management practices as well as considered decisions on the disposal sites.

Apart from environmental reasons the remediation of legacy sites is also desirable for socio-economic reasons. Experience from various parts of the world shows that a successful post mine-closure development in a former mine district is greatly assisted by successful environmental rehabilitation. An example from a remote area is presented by Elliot Lake, Canada, where an attractive retirement community developed after rehabilitation of the uranium mines. An example from a densely populated area is provided by the town of Schlema in the Ore Mountains in Germany, which after remediation of the Wismut legacy was successfully re-developed into a popular health spa.

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In this sense it must be remembered that the returning of mining and milling legacy sites and objects to productive use is an essential pre-requisite for regional re-vitalization. However, it is essential that in all cases the long-term memory of the “as remediated” status and inventory of the content of the remediated sites be carefully preserved.

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Conclusions and Constraints to implementation of an efficient monitoring system and remediation

Making due allowance for some small variation in climatic and geographic conditions, the technical legacy problems left behind by uranium mining and milling in Central Asia are not very different from other countries. The most important constraints to development and implementation of an efficient monitoring system and remediation plans observed during the IAEA project can be summarized as follows:

• Costs of remediation and limited availability of national funding. In none of the Central Asian countries have any funds been set aside for mine closure and remediation. Except for Kazakhstan, none of these countries has a systematic national program for remediation of the legacy sites. Considering that the GNPs in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are considerably lower than in Kazakhstan, it is considerably more difficult for these governments to dedicate adequate funds for this purpose without an incentive. A combined national/international financing program would be a feasible approach in these cases.

• Inadequate knowledge of the inventory of the legacy components and the risks associated with them. Except for some obvious cases, such as Mailuu Suu and similar sites, there are presently not sufficiently reliable data for assessment of the “realistic” risks presented by the legacy sites. A reliable database is paramount for justification and prioritization of the remediation, especially in case of some less obvious sites. The preparation of the effective and efficient remedial plans requires additional data to that available for most of the legacy sites today.

From the perspective of the current knowledge of the state of the affairs it appears to be necessary to obtain first a consistent and reliable assessment of the legacy sites and components, which should include:

The characterization of the inventory of both radioactive and non-radioactive contaminants.

The effluent and influent streams from the disposal sites and the emissions to the air.

Information on the geotechnical stability of the sites, erosion, stability of the current containment, if any, and the design details of the containment.

To develop the understanding of a site an appropriate monitoring and surveillance plan must be set up including specifications of where to sample, how to sample, and how many samples must be taken, etc. The use of the recently acquired instruments and equipment should be incorporated into these plans.

The decision regarding in-situ stabilization or relocation of residues such as tailings should be based on the results obtained on basis of the new data.

• Very varied public and social attitude toward the legacy sites. The health and environmental risks presented by the legacy sites are perceived very differently by the various stakeholders.

The local populations near the legacy sites are often too careless regarding health hazards.

Concerned groups working on the site are too narrowly focused on subtle details of

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the impact of the legacy sites, which are incomprehensible to the local population.

Examples from Taboshar, Tajikistan: Complacency of local people used to the uranium mining and milling objects.

Below a large tailings pile at the top of a valley, directly on the stream that carries the periodic seepages from the pile, a small farm is operating. A local shepherd sees no problems in grazing his animals directly on the tailings and waste rock piles overgrown with grass. Materials from the tailings ponds are used for construction purposes by the local population.

Non pragmatic activities of concerned groups at the site.

At the same site concerned environmentalist groups are carrying out studies of genetic changes in the fauna and flora of the site.

To deal with situations like this requires considerable work with all stakeholders and an extensive information campaign targeting the local population.

• Inadequate legislative and regulatory framework for mine closure and environmental remediation.

Since independence, a major handicap in the Central Asian countries has been the fact that there was no adequate technological and regulatory infrastructure in place. The requirement to assess, monitor and, if justified, remediate the legacy sites must come from a consistent set of legal health and environmental protection requirements and from the mining law. A set of legal acts, decrees and regulations, which rule the remediation are in place and are being applied in Kazakhstan. An understanding of the complexity of the remediation issues, prompted by the case of Mailuu-Suu, is developing in Kyrgyzstan. In the present situation, the regulatory procedure does not request environmental assessments (EAs) in a sense as practiced in the classical uranium mining countries, not even for situations of considerable potential hazard. A consistent set of practical regulations based on an environmental and risk assessment approach is highly recommended for adoption in the Central Asian countries. This should include the use of the relevant international standards and guidelines. This could, ultimately, also facilitate the availability of international funding.

The introduction of good regulatory procedures and practice of constructive interaction with the remediation proponent (operator) could be facilitated by involvement of experienced external experts.

• Lack of personnel with uranium mining and milling experience or knowledge of remedial works.

This problem concerns all levels, the government administration that provides the funding, the regulators checking and approving the permit requests and the operators implementing the remedial works. Personnel responsible for raising international funds and cooperation with the funding agencies, steering the national remediation program, organizing the projects and controlling the implementation would need training on the job, supported by experienced international experts.

• Shortage of state of the art equipment and machines.

Besides the tools needed for data collection, evaluation and interpretation, which will be dealt with in the section on monitoring, there is a lack of state-of-the-art machinery used in mining and remediation. There is little suitable computer software, no GIS and plotters available for preparation of remediation plans, no laser scanning surveying instruments to support remediation work, no proper drilling rigs and sampling devices for investigation of the sites. A particular problem is going to be the lack of machines (e.g. bulldozers and scrapers) capable of working on steep slopes, e.g. for building of covers. No large size (100+ tonne) haulage trucks

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are available for relocation of waste rock or tailings. The available machinery is old and small in size (often dating back to the 1980s), which does not allow efficient implementation according to international standards. Unless large scale investments can be made into machinery, the remediation plans must consider the slower pace of work and the international funding agencies must be made aware, and take account, of this.

An important role which can be played by the IAEA in overcoming the constraints to remediation, is the collection and dissemination of up-to-date information on latest technological advances and know-how in this area; preferably disseminating the information directly into these countries.

In a conclusion it may be also note that in the Central Asia countries, as in most of other developing and transition countries, the regulatory basis for uranium mining and processing (as for other ore mining and its processing activities) is not covered by regulations addressing other types of radioactive waste. Therefore, it is important to continue assistance for this countries to identify specifically the legislative and regulatory provisions in which are applicable toremediation of the uranium mining and processing facilities.

Beyond facilitating the use of internationally relevant and acceptable set of considerations imponderable for successful mining and milling wastes reclamation projects, sharing of cross-country experience, dissemination of knowledge, information and good practice examples by summarizing the relevant information and case studies and helping to understand how to deal with the legacy of the uranium mining in the now independent countries of Central Asia, the overall aim of the further stage of cooperation is also to facilitate cooperation among the participating project partners, to help them in developing sound environmental and social legislation and regulations, thus opening the way to a sustainable development of the uranium mining regions in the future.

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SECTION C: SCOPE OF APPLICATION The report does not apply to the safety of spent fuel management since Tajikistan has no nuclear facilities. Uranium heritage of Tajikistan begins from 1944 y, when the production of uranium concentrated products in pilot plant of Gafurov city started to operate. This pilot plant started to extract radium. From 1945 on the territory of Soghd Oblast 6 plants on extraction of uranium oxide were constructed. These plants were constructed within the inhabited territories as Taboshar, Adrasman, Gafurov, Khudjand, Khudjand district and Chkalovsk. At the end of 60th just one plant operated and after reconstructions which took place in 80th this plant processed up to 1.000.000 tons of ore per year and sulphuric solution, containing up to 200 g/l. of uranium. The plan produced up to 2000 ton of uranium oxide-protoxide per year. High-quality uranium oxide was shipped to Glazovo city of Udmurtnya Republic of RF for further reprocessing. Tajikistan declares that during 45 years in the territory of 6 regions of Soghd oblast there are 55 million radioactive wastes that contains only naturally occurring radioactive material. They are accumulated in 10 uranium tailing dumps with total area 170 hectares. Total activity is more than 6,5 thousands Curie. Tajikistan declares Tajikistan has no military or defense programmes that produce radioactive wastes.

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SECTION D: INVENTORIES AND LISTS Tajikistan is a non-nuclear country and has therefore no spent fuel subject to this convention. Disused sources are stored under the control of Regulatory Authority on the user’s premises until shipped to the Republican Waste Disposal Site (RWDS) in 50 km distance from Dushanbe. As it was already mentioned a new joint project with USA started which is financed by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The objective of this project is to make an inventory of all available ionizing radiation sources (sealed, unsealed, generators and associated equipment) and input them to the database. The inspectors of the Department of License and Inspection of NRSA started to compare existing inventory (from 2005) with currently available sources. Under this project there were several inspections to the organizations which are using in their activity the sources of ionizing radiation. These inspections were carried out in the North and Directly Ruled Districts (West) of Tajikistan. In the nearest time under this project, inspectors of NRSA will start inspections of organizations in remaining parts of the country (South, East). All the collected data of sources will be inputted to register of sources of ionizing radiation. This database is RASOD. The uniqueness of RASOD is that the program automatically determine the current activity and categorization of the source (categorization is made in accordance with IAEA-Safety Guide-No RS-G-1.9, – Recommended categories for sources used in common practices). RASOD is an information system which allows inputting, store and processing the data of ionizing radiation sources. RASOD is worked out for regulatory authorities on issues of nuclear and radiation safety. RASOD 1.3.1 version which is introduced in NRSA AS RT has the following functions:

• Input, delete and editing of information regarding sources of ionizing radiation • Input, delete and editing of information regarding enterprises, organization and

institutions which are using sources of ionizing radiation. • Input and editing of additional information, which is contained in additional tables. • Formation of requests and production of reports. • Administration

The items of information system are:

• Sealed sources (S) • Unsealed sources (U) • Generators of ionizing radiation (G) • Facilities, containing sources (sources which are located inside the facilities) (A)

RASOD was created taking into account the structure of RAIS database (IAEA). It gives maximum opportunity to easily exchange the information between RAIS and RASOD. In accordance with inventory carried out in the North and Directly Ruled Districts of Tajikistan (West) there are 936 sealed sources, 35 unsealed sources and 569 generators of ionizing radiation. Most of them are not in use and in the nearest time under the joint project with IAEA disused sources from North and West will be transported for long-term storage to the Republican waste Disposal Site (RWDS). There are high level wastes - 4 Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG’s) in RWDS. The Republic of Tajikistan as well as other Soviet countries used RTG’s as energy sources in remote mountainous out-of-the-way areas for autonomous hydro- and meteo- navigation equipment. During the Soviet Union the RTG’s were under permanent control but after the collapse of Soviet Union, hundreds of these RTG’s, equipped with high radioactive sources were out control. It is defined that on the territory of Russian Federation there are 1000 RTG’s and about 30 RTG’s on the territory of other countries. Presumably 1500 RTG’s were manufactured at Soviet Union period. Operational period is 10 years. All RTG’s available nowadays on the territory of CIS should be decommissioned. In Tajikistan RTG’s were used in

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TajikHydroMet. In accordance with unofficial sources of information, during the Soviet Union 15 RTG’s were imported to TajikHydroMet (Tajik Hydrometereological Service) of Tajikistan. After operational period these RTG’s were decommissioned and sent back o the manufacturer. The control over the remaining RTG’s was lost during the Civil war. The employees of Ministry of Extraordinary Situations and Civil Defense (MES CD) of the Republic of Tajikistan suddenly revealed RTG’s at emergency situation within the territory of coal storage of TajikHydroMet in Dushanbe city. The reason for that emergency situation was the lost of one RTG’s i.e. there was an attempt to get the capsule from inside. The dose rate at 1 m distance was 180 microzivert/h.

From 1998 to 2000 all 4 RTG’s were transported for temporary storage to the Republican Waste Disposal Site (RWDS). The emergency RTG was transported in 1998 and three remaining RTG’s were transported on 2000. The emergency RTG was located to the special equipped concrete container. Taking into account the possibility of RTG application as “dirty bomb” it would be expedient to export them to the Russian Federation. Besides the Republican Waste Disposal Site’s (RWDS) capacity does not allow storing such high radioactive sources. Radioactive substance which is located inside of these RTG’s can be used as source of radiation dispersion. Exploring one of these “dirty bombs” the terrorist can contaminate quite big area. Taking this fact into account a joint project was initiated with US department of Energy. Under this project, the tower for militarized security was constructed in RWDS. Also under this project in the building №20 (where RTG’s are temporarily located) the alarm system and radio communication is established. The building №20 was fully reconstructed and wall barrier around this building was constructed. The vehicle “NIVA”-2121 was also purchased under this project for operational availability of guardians of this site. In the nearest time strengthening and upgrading the Republican Waste Disposal Site in accordance with international standards is planned. Recently a new project started with UK Government on upgrading the RWDS. A new building for storage of medium activity sources will be constructed as well as other RWDS infrastructure components will be upgraded under this project.

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SECTION E: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY SYSTEM Since the Republic of Tajikistan is a young member of IAEA and the established regulatory authority is functioning just four years there are currently 4 Laws and 6 regulations are worked out for ensuring the radiation safety in Tajikistan and new regulations are under the process of development. Mainly radiation safety in Tajikistan is based on the Law on Radiation Safety (June, 2003); Law on Utilisation of Atomic Energy (November, 2004), «Law on Licensing the separate kinds of activity» (adopted in 2004). The Law on Radiation Safety, in regulating social relations in the field of radiation safety of the public, for the purposes of protection of health from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation, allows and takes into account that:

The use of ionizing radiation in medicine, industry, scientific research and other branches of human activity brings with it great benefit.

Exposure to ionizing radiation can have a harmful effect on the human body; For the purposes of health protection and public safety, and in order to create conditions

for the useful application of ionizing radiation, appropriate legislation regulating the use of radiation sources must be adopted.

Details regarding regulation of radioactive wastes are mentioned in the item “Radioactive waste management policy”on pages 4-5. REGULATORY AUTHORITY As defined in the Law on Radiation Safety (article 6) – the state regulation in the radiation safety field shall be implemented by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan shall designate authorized State bodies, and determine the procedure for their interaction and delimitation of their functions as regards:

Protecting the health of the public from the effects of ionizing radiation; Ensuring radiation safety and licensing types of activity involving the use of nuclear

energy; Averting radiation contamination of the environment and monitoring natural sources of

ionizing radiation. In accordance with the Law on Radiation Safety (article 6) – The Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan (NRSA AS RT) is assigned by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan as authorized executive state regulatory authority for ensuring radiation safety and as a body to implement a unified State policy, co-ordinate the work of other authorized bodies. The responsibility and functions of the NRSA AS RT are:

License types of activity involving the use of nuclear energy; Establish standards and regulations relating to radiation safety, physical protection,

emergency planning, and accounting and control of nuclear material and ionizing radiation sources

Supervise compliance with radiation safety standards and regulations an Licensing conditions;

Prescribe the required qualifications for personnel employed at facilities using nuclear energy;

Determine types of activity with regard to the handling of ionizing radiation sources subject to licensing

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SECTION F: OTHER GENERAL SAFETY PROVISIONS ARTICLE 21: Responsibilities of the License Holder. The prime responsibility for the safe management of radioactive sources including radioactive waste management rests with the owner of the installation (the license holder) according to the Law on Utilisation of Atomic Energy (November, 2004). This includes the responsibility to ensure that the disused sealed sources are handled in a safe manner and disposed of in legal way accepted by the regulatory authority. According to the article 17 of the Law:

The license holder is fully responsible for safety of nuclear installation, sources of ionizing radiation, storage as well as appropriate management with nuclear materials and radioactive sources

The responsibility is valid in case if the license cancellation and handing site over to another owner or until obtaining the new license

The license holder must: Have necessary financial, material and technical and human resources, appropriate for

ensuring the safety in all activity stages during the use of atomic energy sites; Foresee the measures and ensure funds for work implementation connected to

decommissioning of atomic energy utilization sites, territory rehabilitation, radioactive wastes disposal, liquidation of emergency situation consequences, harm compensation to live and health of population, environment as well as population and organizations property.

ARTICLE 22. Human and Financial Resources: The Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan has a total staff off currently 40 persons. The income of the NRSA AS RT is made up of a grant from the Tajikistan Government through the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan. Most of technical staff members of the NRSA AS RT hold higher university degree. ARTICLE 23: Quality Assurance.

Currently the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan is not pursuing the accreditation according to international standards due to lack of budget and lack of developed infrastructure. For the laboratories, by the help of IAEA, Tajikistan intends to develop the program and to implement the QA/QC systems for application of analytical techniques in national wide environmental radiation monitoring in accordance with internationally accepted quality standards (ISO/IEC 17025, ISO 9001).

ARTICLE 24: Operational Radiation Protection

Requirements for radiation safety in Tajikistan.

When State bodies, local government bodies (hukumats) and organizations implementing activities which involve the use of ionizing radiation sources are planning and implementing measures and taking decisions in the radiation safety field, a radiation safety assessment must be carried out.

The radiation safety assessment shall be carried out on the basis of:

• The characteristics of radioactive contamination of the environment;

32

• An analysis of the implementation of radiation safety measures and compliance with standards, regulations and hygiene standards in the radiation safety field;

• The probability of radiation accidents and their scale

• The level of preparedness for effective clean-up of radiation accidents and their consequences;

• An analysis of the exposure doses received by individual groups of the public from all sources of ionizing radiation;

• The numbers of persons exposed above the established exposure dose limits.

The results of the radiation safety assessment are analyzed by the State Licensing authority.

In accordance with article 16 of the Law on Radiation Protection, when handling ionizing radiation sources, for the purposes of radiation safety, organizations implementing activities involving the use of ionizing radiation sources shall be obliged to:

Comply with the requirements of this law and other normative legal acts in the radiation safety field;

Plan and implement measures to ensure the radiation safety and security of ionizing radiation sources;

Carry out work to substantiate the radiation safety of new (modernized) products, materials and substances, technological processes and plants which are sources of ionizing radiation;

Perform systematic production monitoring of the radiation situation at workplaces, in premises, on the sites of organizations and in controlled zones, and of releases and dumpling of radioactive substances;

Carry out regular control and accounting of individual exposure doses received by personnel;

Provide training and certification for responsible officers and personnel, specialists from the process radiation monitoring services, and other persons who regularly or temporarily perform work with ionizing radiation sources;

Organize preliminary (on entry into service) and periodic medical examination for personnel;

Keep personnel regularly informed of ionizing radiation levels at their workplaces and the extent of the individual exposure doses they have received;

Notify in a timely manner the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, and State bodies authorized to carry out State regulation, supervision and control in the radiation safety field, of emergencies and breaches in operating procedures constituting a threat to the radiation safety of the public;

Implement the conclusions, decisions and instructions of responsible officers and authorized State bodies carrying out State regulation, supervision and control in the radiation safety field;

Ensure that the rights of citizens are upheld in the radiation safety field.

NRSA AS RT inspectors carry out inspections on sites on compliance with above mentioned items.

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ARTICLE 25: Emergency preparedness.

In accordance with article 23 of the Law on Radiation Protection, to ensure emergency preparedness, organizations where radiation accidents could occur must have:

A list of potential radiation accidents with a prediction of their consequences and a prediction of the radiation situation, agreed with the authorized State body;

Criteria for taking operational decisions when a radiation accident occurs and for adoption of intervention levels, agreed with the authorized State body;

A plan of measures for protecting personnel and the public from a radiation accident and its consequences, agreed with the local government regulatory bodies and the authorized State bodies carrying out State regulation, supervision and control in the radiation safety field;

Means of notification and clean-up of the consequences of a radiation accident; Medical resources for prophylaxis of radiation injuries and means of providing medical

assistance to victims during a radiation accident; Emergency and rescue teams drawn from the personnel

NRSA AS RT inspectors carry out inspections on sites on compliance with above mentioned items.

Currently the NRSA AS RT and Committee of Emergency Situation and Civil Defense underthe Government of the Republic of Tajikistan have intention in the nearest future to:

1) Develop a National Emergency Response Plan. The NRSA interacts with the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense on this problem but expert assistance of IAEA is extremely necessary. The specific actions are undertaken under the IAEA Regional project RER9/091 ““Establishment of National Capabilities for Response to a Radiological and Nuclear Emergency” (TSA-5).”

2) Create the system of radiation monitoring with modern and up-to-date equipment

ARTICLE 26: Decommissioning: This article does not apply to Tajikistan. SECTION G. SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT. This section containing articles 4-10 is not applicable to Tajikistan. SECTION H. SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT ARTICLE 11. GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ARTICLE 12. EXISTING FACILITIES AND PAST PRACTICES. All those who have a license from the regulatory authority to own the radioactive substances are obliged to take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive waste management individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological and other hazards. (Article 16 “Law on Radiation Safety” – prescribed above). ARTICLES 13-17

34

In accordance with article 16 “Law on Utilization of Atomic Energy” – The Basic requirements for site selection and construction of nuclear facilities, sites for storage and disposal of nuclear materials and radioactive sources.

The selection of sites, construction of nuclear facilities, sites for storage and disposal of nuclear materials and radioactive sources should be implemented on the basis of norms and rules in the field of atomic energy utilization and in the field of environmental protection.

The decision of construction of nuclear installation and sites for storage and disposal of nuclear materials and radioactive sources, are taken by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan taking into account:

• The necessity of such constructions for economical tasks solution and separate regions of the country.

• The availability of appropriate conditions, which is in compliance with norms and rules in the field of atomic energy utilization, for location of indicated sites.

• Absence of security threat to indicated site from located nearby civil and military sites;

• Possible social and economic consequences of indicated site location for industrial, agricultural, social, cultural and household development of the region;

• The draft documents of the indicated sites without fail pass through the State ecological, sanitary and technical examination and expertise.

SECTION I. TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT The shipment of radioactive sources to and from Tajikistan is subject to the international requirements concerning transport of dangerous goods. The main method of transport is by aair-cargo. Tajikistan does not import any radioactive waste and it is not the State of origin of any radioactive sources. Carriers operating between Tajikistan and other countries are subject to the international regulations on the shipment of dangerous goods.

Cross border regional problems related to the former uranium facilities in Central Asia Countries

The cross border issues of monitoring and remediation of the former uranium facilities in the region are rather sensitive because the most of former uranium facilities are located near the borders of the adjacent states. The water pathways are the main factor that is related to the cross border aspects of the problem.

Syr-Daria River is the main artery of potential contaminant transfer as the watershed spreads from Kyrgyzstan and flows through the Fergana Valley where a significant number of uranium residue and tailings piles are situated (Fig.1). Consequently, the integrated monitoring of water contamination with radionuclides and chemical elements due to possible impact of the former uranium facilities is a real issue of international significance.

35

Fig. 1. The Navruz project observational network at the rivers of the Central Asia countries

During recent years the cross border river monitoring project NAVRUZ has been realized in the region, its observations covered the contents of radionuclides in the waters of Syr-Daria River with a wide spectrum of pollution (Fig.1)

The Navruz Project addresses three main goals: (1) to help increase capabilities in Central Asian countries for sustainable water resources

management; (2) to provide a scientific basis for supporting nuclear transparency and non-proliferation

in the region, and (3) to help reduce the threat of conflict in Central Asia over water resources, proliferation

concerns, or other factors. The following organizations took part in the project: Kazakhstan Institute of Nuclear Physics, Kyrgyzstan Institute of Physics, Tajik Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency, Uzbekistan Institute of Nuclear Physics, and Sandia National Laboratories in the United States. Data obtained in the project are shared among all participating countries and the public through an website and are available for use in further studies and in regional cross border water resource management efforts.

36

Fig. 2. The results of observations for beta- and alpha activity in the water of the rivers of Central Asia. Locations Tj-13 and Tj-14 related to observational points at the territory of Tajikistan, Uz-05 ( Uzbekistan) and К-1 – К-19 are related to Syr-Daria River crossing the territory of Kazakhstan (Navruz Report, Sandia National Laboratories, 2002) Observations were conducted at 15 river basin locations in the territory of each country.

They show that along the Fergana valley (Syr Daria River main flow) there is clearly a spatial increase of the gross alpha- and beta activity in the water. Increases of water activity in the samples was observed in the direction of flowing from the Tajik part of the river and further increase of water activity in the lower samples along the Kazakh observation points from K-07 to K-015.

These singular trends are difficult to interpret, since the trends may have been affected by local contamination sources, it might be the matter of uncertainty or mistakes as result of insufficiently harmonized methods of activity determination in the different national laboratories. The other data from the NAVRUZ report show that an increase of water contamination in some seasons is related to seasonal features of water discharge in the drainage systems of irrigated areas during the autumn period and is connected with other natural and technogenic factors.

The issues of integrated cross border monitoring of waters in Syr Daria River and exchange of information between the countries in the region regarding the state of the environment and remediation activities at the former uranium facilities of the Fergana Valley states have to be a priority focus of regional collaboration.

Cross border aspects and identification of specific sources of water contamination has to be considered in every country of the region. For example, mine water of the former mines near the foot of Mogoltau mountain at Khudjand have provided immediate direct input to the Syr-Daria River pollution. Potentially the contaminated water from Degmai tailings can also affect the river quality. Contaminated waters from Taboshar tailings discharge to Utken-Suu River, which becomes lost in the ground on the way to Fergana valley and most probably cannot affect Syr-Dariya River.

Therefore, the quality of water in the Syr-Daria River has to be in the focus of the monitoring programs in the region. Monitoring data should characterize pH and water temperature, its mineralization, contents of sulphates, carbonates main macro ions, main trace metals and also the content of radionuclides in the uranium series. Therefore IAEA experts suggest extending the observations on Syr-Daria River and its main tributaries because the waters of the river are used for the purposes of irrigation and other types of water use. This could lead to special studies of actual and potential radiation risks for the population due to exposure to the aquatic pathways for the countries in Fergana valley.

In the territory of Sogd oblast in Tajikistan the largest lake of the region, the Kair-Kum Reservoir, is situated. The reservoir receives water from Syr-Daria River after draining through the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic and also partly from Uzbekistan where several former uranium mining and milling facilities are located. Therefore, it is reasonable to establish regular observations on the contents of radionuclides of the uranium series in the waters at the border of the river between Republic of Uzbekistan (Kanibadam), on the dyke of hydropower station in Kairak-Kum and also on the border with Uzbekistan near town Bekabad. Data exchange about water quality in these countries would reduce the social tensions in the region and will provide more trust in the region.

Since most of the trace toxic elements, including the natural radionuclides are present in the river in both phases (dissolved and particulate) it is possible to monitor the long-term impact to the environment using information on the vertical structure of the deposited materials in the bottom sediment of the reservoir. As has been shown by the result of the bottom sediment core analysis there is an opportunity to reconstruct the chronology of uranium and radium input into

37

the reservoir from the territories of the neighboring countries situated in the upper part of the watershed, such as Mailuu-Su River in Kyrgyzstan. The bottom sediment core which was procured by IAEA may help to provide the studies of structure and forms of the bottom sediment contamination over the whole Kair-Kum Reservoir.

38

SECTION J. DISUSED SEALED SOURCES. Article 28. In accordance with article 23 of the “Law on Radiation Safety”: Ensuring the security of radioactive and nuclear materials in all stages of their life cycle is obligatory for users. Ensuring the security of radioactive and nuclear materials foresees the single planning system and realization of technical and organizational complex of measures directed to:

• Prevention of unauthorized access to the territory of radioactive and nuclear material location as well as their theft and damage

• Regaining Control, recovery and return of lost or theft radioactive and nuclear materials.

Control and inspections over ensuring the security of radioactive and nuclear materials are carried out by authorized state authority on surveillance over safe work implementation in industry and mountainous industry surveillance under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan. The order of ensuring the security of nuclear and radioactive materials is determined by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan. No manufacturing or remanufacturing of sealed sources takes place in Tajikistan. That’s why after disused sources are stored and disposed in the Republican Waste Disposal Site (RWDS) until decayed. The RWDS is central facility for long-term storage of radioactive waste that serves the whole country. It is a former Soviet Union Radon prototype II facility located in a mountainous area about 50 km east of Dushanbe, near the town Faizabad. The site was established in 1960, started operations in 1962. The construction of second part of the site was started in 1979 and started to operate in 1986. The facility is under the control of the Central administrative board of Dushanbe city but is secured by the forces of the Ministry of Interior. The Facility consists of a buffer area and a restricted area (6 hectares) where the radioactive material is stored, partly in above ground buildings, partly in underground disposal sites In case of orphan sources, the procedure is for the regulatory authority to take control of sources, to ensure its safe storage and find the owner if possible. A legal action may be taken towards the owner if circumstances warrant such an action. Starting 2006 there is a joint project of regulatory authority (NRSA) and Sandia National Laboratories (operated for US Department of Energy). For successful implementation of this project several sets of equipments were delivered to the country on behalf of the Global Search and Secure Program to the Republic of Tajikistan. Training on performing site searches utilizing the delivered equipment and technique was performed in the orphan source training. The specialists of NRSA, industrial and medical organizations which involve the use of ionizing radiation, Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan (CES CD RT) and other organizations were trained by US specialists. Besides under this project the specialist of NRSA together with specialists from Republican Chemical and Radiometric Laboratory of CES CD are carrying out searches of orphan sources in all territories of Tajikistan. Searches in the North, West and South of Tajikistan are already finished. Also the search team carries out monitoring of previous soviet military bases. After the collapse of Soviet Union a lot of orphan sources are remained in the territory of their location. In the residence of former soviet military bases radioactive sources were found and were transported for disposal to the Republican Waste Disposal Site. The searches are continuing. Now specialists will monitor East of Tajikistan. More than 500 hundred orphan sources have already found. They belonged to the enterprises which bankrupted or not operational now. In order to prevent unauthorized access or damage to, and loss, theft or unauthorized transfer of, radioactive sources, so as to reduce the likelihood of accidental harmful exposure to such sources or the malicious use of such sources to

39

cause harm, to individuals, society or the environment a new joint project recently started with IAEA on transportation of found “orphan” sources to Republican Waste Disposal Site. This project helps a lot to regulatory authority to regain control over orphan sources. For this we would like to thank Sandia National Laboratories (operated for US Department of Energy). Tajikistan made political commitment to the IAEA document “Code of Conduct on the Safety and security of Radioactive Sources” as well as its Supplementary Guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources. National contact point as well as self-assessment form were submitted to the IAEA. Tajikistan fulfils the provisions of that the code and currently Republic of Tajikistan is conducting negotiations with Regulatory Authority of Russian Federation (ROSATOM) on sending back 3 RTG’s to the manufacture since the condition of the 4th RTG does not allot its transportation.

40

SECTION K. PLANNED ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE SAFETY. There is a general goal of the regulatory authority to continuously improve safety and enhance radiation protection in all activities involving ionizing radiation. With regard to radioactive waste it has been decided that inspections are focus more on waste aspects of practices using radioactive substances raising awareness among license holders on their responsibilities regarding radioactive waste arising from their activities. The scientists of the regulatory authority elaborated two methods for second reprocessing of radioactive wastes located in uranium tailing dumps. Two dissertations were defended on that theme. These methods help to solve two problems. First is ecological and second is uranium extraction which is very valuable raw for Nuclear Power Plants. The regulatory authority of the country fruitfully cooperates with number of international organization on improving the situation especially in the North of Tajikistan. The rehabilitation of the territories contaminated from former mining and milling activities is priority one for the country.

41

Annex-1 Disused sealed radioactive sources in Tajikistan as of 1 October 2008

Kind of waste Radionuclide Activity ActivityUnit From

55 million tons of radioactive wastes

Uranium chain 65 kCi Industrial

4 RTG Sr-90 70 kCi Hydrometeorology stations

Calibration source Cs-137 200 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Cs-137 200 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 6800 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 242 uCi Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 14500 kBq Industrial

Calibration source Cs-137 199 MBq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 120 GBq Industrial

Humidity meter Ni-63 11500 kBq Industrial

Humidity meter Pu-239 185 MBq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 290 MBq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 290 MBq Industrial

Humidity meter Pu-239 250 MBq Industrial

Densitometer Ni-63 1150 MBq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 98 uCi Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 91 uCi Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 98 uCi Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 98 uCi Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 150 mCi Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 150 mCi Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 150 mCi Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 1900 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

42

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 1900 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 1900 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 1900 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 1900 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 1900 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 620 MBq Industrial

Densitometer Cf-252 75000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cf-252 163000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Pu-239 4480000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Pu-239 11000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Pu-239 15700 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Pu-239 5070000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Pu-239 523000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Pu-239 5450000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Pu-239 4710000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Pu-239 4710000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Pu-239 970000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Tm-170 17500000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Tl-204 25600000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Fe-55 19000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 24000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 390000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 390000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 390000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 120 kBq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

43

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 170 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 170 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 190 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Reference source H-3 180 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Am-241 471000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Am-241 8040000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Am-241 3720000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Am-241 21400000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Am-241 7960000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Tm-170 23500000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Tm-170 23500000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 42000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 42000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 240000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 240000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 240000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 228000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 235000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cd-109 234000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Fe-55 110000 Bq Industrial

44

Densitometer Tl-204 2000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-57 21500000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 143000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 143000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 143000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 143000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 143000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 143000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 143000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 143000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 143000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 143000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 42300000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 25000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 1,89E-06 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Co-60 42000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cs-137 1280000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cs-137 3050000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer Cs-137 212000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Sr-90/Y-90 1360 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Sr-90/Y-90 5200 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 2530 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 36000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 35000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 35200000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 34400000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 4000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 4000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 400 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 300 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 37000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 30000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 34600000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 3700000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ra-226 3700000 Bq Industrial

NDT source Cs-137 214600000000 Bq Industrial

NDT source Cs-137 480000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 710 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Am-241 2500000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Am-241 2500000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 240 Bq Industrial

45

Calibration source Co-60 182 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 249 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 380 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 380 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 640 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Cd-109 12000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 217 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 380 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 120 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 160 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 120 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

46

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1600 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 160 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 120 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 120 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 120 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 120 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1000 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

47

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Smoke detector Am-241 1800 Bq Industrial

Humidity meter Pu-238 280000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pm-147 190000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pm-147 190000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Sr-90/Y-90 345000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Sr-90/Y-90 87000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Sr-90/Y-90 3310 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Sr-90/Y-90 83000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Am-241 3810000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Am-241 3810000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Am-241 3400000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Am-241 3810000000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 7500 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 7500 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 10000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 10000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Co-60 39 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Ce-144 0,03 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 560 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 1600 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 560 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 1820 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 394 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 2670 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 69000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 160000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 380 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 200000 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 408 Bq Industrial

Calibration source Pu-239 418,3 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 75000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 69000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

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Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

49

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Densitometer-Level gauge

Cs-137 3700000000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 907,2 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 90 Bq Industrial

Reference source Co-60 42700000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Co-60 97300 Bq Industrial

Reference source Co-60 19950 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 370480 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 817,2 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 720 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 370480 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 8287,2 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 140000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 243 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-235 580 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 4000000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 700000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 413 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 4110000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Cd-109 370000000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 4300000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Am-241 22000000000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Am-241 22000000000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 4400000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 340000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 4200000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 4070000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Cd-109 370000000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 320000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 4110000 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-235 1600 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-235 480 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-235 548 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-235 760 Bq Industrial

50

Reference source U-235 1200 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-235 560 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 792 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-230 441 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 1600 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 794 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 688 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 794 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 6100 Bq Industrial

Reference source Tl-204 4100 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 445 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 560 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 1820 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 394 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 428 Bq Industrial

Reference source Ra-226 267000 Bq Industrial

Reference source C-14 24480 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 325000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 563 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 772 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 15400 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 71 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 900 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 74000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 774 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 774 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 305 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 28300 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 2170 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 301 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 126 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 77300 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 778 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 774 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 3640 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 219 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 1280 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 328 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 84 Bq Industrial

Reference source Sr-90/Y-90 22000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 120000 Bq Industrial

51

Reference source Pu-239 120000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 120000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 2710 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 172000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 380 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 240 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 23700 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 6500 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-234 427 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 1820 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 660 Bq Industrial

Reference source Tl-204 520 Bq Industrial

Reference source Tl-204 680 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 1650 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-230 380 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 2000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Am-241 4080000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Am-241 418,4 Bq Industrial

Reference source Am-241 94000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 68000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-234 56000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Am-241 88000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Am-241 10100 Bq Industrial

Reference source Am-241 9000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 65,7 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-238 45,5 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 67 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 58700 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 1760 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 650 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 452 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 158 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-238 26,3 Bq Industrial

Reference source U-238 28,7 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 147 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 174 Bq Industrial

Reference source Tl-204 19584 Bq Industrial

Reference source Tl-204 45000 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 19500 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 1580 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 145 Bq Industrial

52

Reference source Pu-239 16,6 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 229 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 239 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 23,7 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 25,5 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 1790 Bq Industrial

Reference source Pu-239 1620 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 4490000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge C-14 46000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 57100000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 57100000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 60000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 37030000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 37030000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 37030000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 37030000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 37030000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 37030000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 37030000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 37030000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Co-60 70400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 70400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 70400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 70400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 70400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 70400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 70400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 70400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 70400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 70400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 68200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

53

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 3349000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 63100000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 63100000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 37030000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 322300000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62200000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6220000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Fe-55 1708000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Fe-55 1708000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Am-241 6830000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Am-241 6830000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

54

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 29820000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 57100000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 57100000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 57100000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 57100000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 57100000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 57100000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 57100000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 57100000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 60000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 60000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 60000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 60000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 60000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 60000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 60000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 60000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 60000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 123000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 61000000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 810000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 33000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 240000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 660000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 410000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 350000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 310000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 90000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 400000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 660000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 700000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 690000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 54000 Bq Industrial

55

Level gauge Cs-137 600000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 120000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 98000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 4100 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 700000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 68000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 430000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 90000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 74000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 350000 Bq Industrial

NDT source Am-241 680 Bq Industrial

NDT source Am-241 1400 Bq Industrial

NDT source Am-241 780 Bq Industrial

NDT source Pu-238 680 Bq Industrial

NDT source Pu-238 418 Bq Industrial

NDT source Pu-238 44000 Bq Industrial

NDT source Pu-238 16000 Bq Industrial

NDT source Pu-238 540 Bq Industrial

NDT source Pu-238 960 Bq Industrial

NDT source Pu-238 13000 Bq Industrial

NDT source Pu-238 880 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6000000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 600000 Bq Industrial

Level gauge Ir-192 4440 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Ir-192 4440 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 18GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

56

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 6100 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

57

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 62 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

58

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 66.5 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 610 MBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

59

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial

Level gauge Cs-137 122 GBq Industrial