x2005 Remedial Law RedNotes

8/11/2019 x2005 Remedial Law RedNotes

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R E M E D I A L L A W

2005CENTRALIZEDBAROPERATIONS

MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

EFFECT OF AMENDMENT TO A PLEADINGIngr anDefendant through his lawyer, filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the complaint that the landwas acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the former owners thereof.

Subsequently, the defendant changed his lawyer and, with leave of court, amended the answer. In the

amended answer, the abovementioned admission no longer appears; instead, the alleged ownership of the land by theplaintiff was denied coupled with the allegation that the defendant is the owner of the land for the reason that hebought the same from the plaintiffs parents during their lifetime.

After trial, the egional !rial "ourt rendered a decision upholding the defendants ownership of the land.#n appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his original

answer.Is the contention of plaintiff correct$ %hy$

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO,because pleadings that have been amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings andcease to be &udicial admissions. %hile they may nonetheless be utili'ed as against the pleader as e(tra&udiciaadmissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. )Director of Lands vs. Court of

Appeals, 196 SCRA 94)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

YES, because an admission in the original pleading does not cease to be a &udicial admission simply because itwas deleted in an amended pleading. !he original answer, although replaced by an amended answer does not cease tobe part of a &udicial record, not having been e(punged therefrom. )Dissenting opinion in Torres vs. Court ofAppeals, 11 SCRA !4)

REMEDIES OF A PARTY DECLARED IN DEFAULT

%hat are the available remedies of party declared in default*+. -efore the rendition of &udgment; +

/. After &udgment but before its finality; and /0. After finality of &udgment$ /

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

!he available remedies of a party declared in default are as follows*+. -efore the rendition of &udgment

)a he may file a motion to dismiss under oath to set aside the order of default on the grounds ofraud, accident, mista1e or e(cusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense ) Sec. 02b3of ule 4 ; and if reconsideration is denied, he may file the special civil action of certiorari fograve abuse of discretion tantamount to lac1 or e(cess of &urisdiction ) Sec. + of ule 56 ; or

)b he may file a petition for certiorari if he has been illegally declared in derfault e.g. during the

pendency of his motion to dismiss or before the e(piration of the time to answer. ) 7atute v. "A/5 S"A 859; Acosta:#falia v. Sundial, 96 S"A +/ .

/. After &udgment but before its finality, he may file a motion for new trial on the groundsof fraud, accident, mista1e, e(cusable negligence or a motion for reconsideration on gh ground oe(cessive damages, insufficient evidence or the decision or final order being contrary to law ) Sec. / ofule 08; and thereafter, if the motion is denied, appeal is available under ules < or +, whichever is

applicable.

0. After finality of the &udgment, there are three ways to assail the &udgment, which are* )a a petition for relied under ule 09 on the grounds of fraud, accident, mista1e or

e(cusable negligence;

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)b annulment of &udgment under ule 8 for e(trinsic fraud or lac1 of &urisdiction;)c certiorari if the &udgment is void on its face or by the &udicial record. )

-alangcad vs. =ustices of the "ourt of Appeals, >.. ?o. 90999, @ebruary +/,+44/, /


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)a 7otion for e(ecution denied.Although the defendant died after the &udgment had become final and e(ecutory, it cannot be enforced by

a writ of e(ecution against the estate of the deceased which is in custodia legis. !he &udgment should be filed as aproven money claim with the !" of Bampanga. )(aredes vs. o%a, 61 SCRA #!')

)b ?o, since the levy on e(ecution was duly effected on defendants parcel of land a day before the defendant

died, it was valid. !he land may be sold for the satisfaction of the &udgment and the surplus shall be accounted for bythe sheriff to the corresponding e(ecutor or administrator. )Sec. '*c) of Rule 9)

COUNTERCLAIM

F filed an action for damages against ! arising from the latters tortuous act. G filed his Answer with acounterclaim for damages suffered and e(penses incurred on account of Fs suit. !hereafter, F moves to dismiss thecase since he lost interest in the case. G did not ob&ect. !he court dismissed the action without pre&udice. G movedthe to set the reception of his evidence to prove his counterclaim. If you were the &udge, how would you resolve themotion$ (plain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

I would deny the motion. Inasmuch as Gs counterclaim for damages incurred on account of Fs suit cannotremain pending for independent ad&udication, G should have ob&ected to the dismissal of the complaint. is failure toob&ect deprived him of the right to present evidence to prove his counterclaim. ) Sec. ! of Rule 1'$ +notorio v. Lira1! SCRA 69 ).

ADJUDICATION OF CASES WITHOUT TRIAL

"an civil and criminal cases be ad&udicated without trial$ (plain

SUGGESTED ANSWER"ivil "ases may be ad&udicated without trial, such as in the following rules*a. Summary =udgmentb. =udgment on the Bleadings

c. Summary Brocedured. Sec. 0 of ule +8

"riminal cases as a rule may not be ad&udicated without trial. Some e(ceptions are thefollowing*

a. Blea of guiltyb. 7otion to quash on the ground of double &eopardy or e(tinction of criminal action or liabilityc. 7otion to dismiss on the ground of violation of the right to a speedy trial.

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; WHEN MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION NOT NECESSARY

Is the failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the lower court as a condition precedent for the granting of

the writ of certiorari or prohibition always fatal$ (plain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO, because there are e(ceptions, such as the following*a. !he question of &urisdiction was squarely raised before and decided by the respondent courtb. Bublic interest is involvedc. "ase of urgencyd. #rder is patent nullitye. Issue is purely of lawf. Deprivation of right to due process

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EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS

%hen is e(tra:territorial service of summons proper$

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(traterritorial service of summons is proper when the defendant does not reside and is not found in theBhilippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the sub&ect of which is, propertywithin the Bhilippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which therelief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in e(cluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property ofthe defendant has been attached within the Bhilippines. )Sec. +8 of ule + It is also proper when the defendantordinarily resides within the Bhilippines, but is temporarily out of it. )Sec. 1& of Rule14)

RES JUDICATA

velyn filed a complaint for a sum of money against =oan but the complaint was later dismissed for failure toprosecute Hwithin a reasonable length of time. !hereafter, velyn filed another case based on the same facts against=oan. =oan moved to dismiss the same on the ground that the cause of action therein is barred by a prior &udgment)res &udicata. velyn opposed the motion claiming that re &udicata has not set in since =oan was not served with

summons and the complaint in the first case was earlier dismissed, so that the trial court never acquired &urisdictionover her person and, consequently, over the case. ow would you decide the motion of =oan$ (plain.

SUGGESTD ANSWER:!he motion to dismiss is denied. #ne of the essential requisites of res &udicata is &urisdiction over the parties.

Inasmuch as =oan was not served with the summons in the first case which was earlier dismissed, the court did notacquire &urisdiction over her person and, hence, the dismissal was without pre&udice to the filing of another actionagainst her. )epublic Blanters -an1 vs. 7olina, September /9, +499

LIFE SPAN OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

%hat is the life span of a temporary restraining order issued by a trial court$ 7ay this life span be e(tended$(plain fully

SUGGESTED ANSWER:!he life span of a restraining order is twenty days. !his life span may not be e(tended.

A preliminary in&unction may no longer be granted without notice to the adverse party. owever, if it appearsthat great or irreparable in&ury would result to the applicant before his application for preliminary in&unction could beheard on notice, the &udge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life span of twenty days from date ofissue. If no preliminary in&unction is granted within said period, the temporary restraining order would automaticallye(pire on the /


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SUGGESTED ANSWER:

!here are three ways by which a final and e(ecutory &udgment may be attac1ed or set aside, namely*a. -y petition for relief from &udgment under ule 09 on the grounds of fraudaccident, mista1e or e(cusable negligence within si(ty days from learning of the &udgment and notmore than si( months from its entry

b. -y direct to annul or en&oin the enforcement of the &udgment when the defect isnot apparent on its face or from the recitals contained in the &udgment;

c.) -y direct action, such as certiorari, or by a collateral attac1 against the &udgmentwhich is void on its face or when the nullity of the &udgment is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. Maka!"#k!$ %. P&'($&)* H'+&*!& a" H'*!"# C'/(., 01 SCRA 2134

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; SELF-ADJUDICATION; SUMMARY SETTLEMENT

ene died intestate, leaving several heirs and substantial property here in the Bhilippines.

+. Assuming ene left no debts, as counsel for his heirs, what steps would you suggest to settle enes estate the least e(pensive manner$

/. Assuming ene left only one heir and no debts, as counsel for his lone heir, what steps would you suggest$

0. Assuming that the value of enes estate does not e(ceed B +


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Sec. ++, provided that the accused would not be placed thereby in double &eopardy and may also require the witnessesto give bail for their appearance at the trial. ) Sec. 14, Rule 11$ Tee-anee, /r. vs. ada%ag, !' SCRA 14.

STOP AND FRISK SEARCH

%hat is a !erry search ) or so called Hstop and fris1 $ Is it &ustified under e(isting law and &urisprudence$

(plain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:A !erry search is a stop:and:search without a warrant. It is &ustified when conducted by police officers on the

bases of prior confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters. ) Aniag, =r. vs."omelec, /08 S"A / .

DOU5LE JEOPARDY

>eorge was charged with falsification. #n the date of initial trial, the fiscal moved for the postponement onthe ground that the case had been assigned to a special prosecutor of the D#= who was out of town to attend to anurgent case, and who had wires him to request for postponement. !he fiscal manifested that he was not ready for triabecause he was unfamiliar with the case. !he &udge then as1ed the accused as well as his counsel whether they were

amenable to a postponement. -oth >eorge and his counsel insisted on a trial. !he &udge ordered the case dismissed.Epon learning thereof, the special prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari under ule 56 of the ules of "ourt

alleging that the dismissal was capricious and deprived the government of due process. >eorge opposed the petitioninvo1ing double &eopardy.a. Is double &eopardy a bar to the petition$ (plain.b. Suppose that trial on the merits had in fact proceeded and the trial &udge, finding the evidence to be insufficient

dismissed the case, would your answer be the same$ (plain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a.) NO, because this is not an appeal by the prosecution asserting a dismissal to be erroneous. It is a petition forcertiorari which assails the order of dismissal as invalid and a nullity because it was capricious and deprivedthe >overnment of due process. "onsidering that this was the first motion for postponement of the trial filed

by the fiscal and the ground was meritorious, the &udge gravely abused his discretion in ordering the casedismissed. I6 7&/& !* "' %a$! !*+!**a$ '/ &/+!"a!'" '6 7& 8a*&, 7&/& !* "' a*!* 6'/ !"%'k!"# '$&9&'(a/:. ) (eople vs. 0oe2, ! SCRA !9 )

b.) NO, because in such case, the order of dismissal would be valid, even if erroneous, and would be tantamountto an acquittal.

DISMISSAL ON NOLLE PROSEQUI

%hen a criminal case is dismissed on nolle prosequi can it later be refilled$

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As a general rule, when a criminal case is dismissed on nolle prosequi before the accused is placed on trial andbefore he is called on to plead, this is not equivalent to an acquittal and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for thesame offense. * 0alve2 vs. CA, !' SCRA 6 31994 ).

FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE

During the pre:trial of a civil case, the partied presented their respective documentary evidence. Among thedocuments mar1ed by the plaintiff was the Deed of Absolute Sale of the property in litigation ) mar1ed as (h. H" .

In the course of the trial on the merita, (h. " was identified by the plaintiff, who was cross:e(amined thereonby the defendants counsel; furthermore, the contents of (h." were read into the records by the plaintiff.

owever, (h. " was not among those formally offered in evidence by the plaintiff.

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7ay the trial court consider (h. " in the determination of the action$ %hy$

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

YES, because not only was the Deed of Absolute Sale mar1ed by the plaintiff as (h. " during the pre:trial, itwas identified by the plaintiff in the course of the trial and the plaintiff was cross:e(amined thereon by the

defendants counsel. @urthermore, the contents of (h." were read into the records by the plaintiff. ence, the triacourt could properly consider (h." in the determination of the action even though it was not formally offered inevidence. !his is an e(ception to the rule that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formallyoffered. * Sec. # of Rule 1!)

PAST RECOLLECTION REVIVED

F states on direct e(amination that he once 1now the facts being as1ed but he cannot recall them now.%hen handed a written record of the facts, he testifies that the facts are correctly stated, but that he has never seenthe writing before.

Is the writing admissible as past recollection recorded$ (plain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

?#, because for the written record to be admissible as past recollection recorded, it must have been written orrecorded by F or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any othertime when the fact was fresh in his memory and he 1new that the same was correctly written or recorded. ) Sec. +5 ofule +0/ -ut in this case F has never seen the writing before.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

a. >ive three instances when a Bhilippine court can ta1e &udicial notice of a foreign law.b. ow do you prove a written foreign law$c. Suppose a foreign law was pleaded as part of the defense of defendant but no evidence was presented to

prove the e(istence of said law, what is the presumption to be ta1en by the court as to the wordings of

said law$

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a. !he three instances when a Bhilippine court can ta1e &udicial notice of a foreign law are*+. %hen the Bhilippine courts are evidently familiar with the foreign law/. %hen the foreign law refers to the law of nations ) Sec. + of ule +/40. %hen it refers to a published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on the sub&ect of law if the court

ta1es &udicial notice of the fact that the writer thereof is recogni'ed in his profession or calling onthe sub&ect. ) Sec. 5, ule +0erry is being tried for rape. !he prosecutions evidence sought to establish that at about 4*


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house, >erry forcily dragged =une towards the banana grove behind the mar1et where he was able to have carnal1nowledge with =une for about an hour. =une did not immediately do home thereafter, and it was only in the earlymorning of the following day that she narrated her ordeal to her daughter Ji'a. Ji'a testified in court as to what =unerevealed to her.

a. Is the testimony of Ji'a hearsay$

b. Is it admissible in evidence against the ob&ection of the defense$SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a. GS, Ji'as testimony is hearsay. A witness can testify to those facts which he 1nows of his persona1nowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception e(cept as otherwise provided in therules ) Sec. 05 of ule +0


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the acquisition of &urisdiction over the persons of the defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired &urisdictionover them, a new service of summons for the amended complaint is required.

UNITED HOUSING CORPORATION %*. DAYRIT, ET AL.G.R. N'. 03=11. Ja"a/: 11, >@.?

A udgent upon coproise -ic- is a udgent e"od%ing a coproise agreeent entered into "%t-e parties in -ic- t-e% ae reciprocal concessions in order to terinate a litigation alread% instituted is notappeala"le, is iediatel% e:ecutor% and -as t-e effect of res udicata.A &udgment rendered upon a compromiseagreement, not contrary to law or public policy or public order has all the force and effect of any other &udgment, itbeing a &udgment on the merits, hence, conclusive upon the parties and their privies. As such, it can be enforced bywrit of e(ecution.

5A FINANCE CORPORATION %*. RUFINO CO, ET AL.G.R. N'. . Ma: 13, B


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of rig-t$ and t-e proceedings "eginning fro t-e order of default don to t-e default udgent itself s-ould "econsidered null and void and of no effect. !hus, upon a showing that a separate notice of pre:trial was not servedeither upon a party or his counsel of record or upon both, the "ourt has consistently nullified and set aside the order ofdefault. In addition, the "ourt remands the case for pre:trial and trial before the trial court, ordering the latterthereafter to render &udgment accordingly.

QUE5RAL %*. CA a" UNION REFINERY CORP.G.R. N'.


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respondent Baramount became a necessary party in the petitionerLs original cause of action see1ing a declaration othe e(istence and validity of the ownerLs duplicate copy of the sub&ect certificate of title in the possession of thelatter, and an indispensable party in the action for the declaration of nullity of the titles in the name of respondentBaramount. Indeed, there can be no complete relief that can be accorded as to those already parties, or for acomplete determination or settlement of the claim sub&ect of the action, if we do not touch upon the necessaryconsequence of the nullity of the new duplicate copy of the sub&ect certificate of title. !he ules of "ourt compels the

inclusion of necessary parties when &urisdiction over the person of the said necessary party can be obtained. ?on:inclusion of a necessary party when there is an opportunity to include him would mean waiver of the claim against suchparty.

ANDAYA %*., A5ADIA, ET AL.G.R. N'. 2.?

=urisdiction over sub&ect matter is essential in the sense that erroneous assumption thereof may put at naughtwhatever proceedings the court might have had. ence, even on appeal, and even if the parties do not raise the issueof &urisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that it has no &urisdiction over the case. It iselementary that &urisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties or even by the &udge. Itis also irrefutable that a court may at any stage of the proceedings dismiss the case for want of &urisdiction. @or thismatter, the ground of lac1 of &urisdiction in dismissing a case is not waivable. ence, the last sentence of Sec. /, ule4, ules of "ourt, e(pressly states* K%henever it appears that the court has no &urisdiction over the sub&ect matter, itshall dismiss the action.K

OFELIA HERRERA-FELIX %*. CAG.R. N'. 1>. J"&


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lucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, "hief =ustice 7oranstates* Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of &ustice for the enforcement or protection of a right, orthe prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one see1s to establish the status orright of a party, or a particular fact. ence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is aformal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or

fact. %here a party litigant see1s to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. %here his purposeis to see1 the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact orstatus of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.

GARCIA %*. LLAMASG.R. N'.


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concomitantly, their failure to include the ob&ection in their answer did not result in the waiver thereof since theob&ection is neither a negative nor an affirmative defense. !o clarify, non:compliance with the requirement ofcertification does not give rise to an affirmative defense, i.e., the allegation of new matter by way of confession andavoidance, much less a negative defense since the underta1ing has nothing to do with the operative facts required tobe alleged in an initiatory pleading, such as allegations on the cause of action, but with a special pre:requisite foradmission of the complaint for filing in court.

GUMA5ON VS. LARINGR N'.


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rights of the parties concerned would then be ad&udicated in one proceeding. !his is a rule of procedure and does notcreate a substantial right. ?either does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant.2+63 !hisright to file a third:party complaint against a third:party rests in the discretion of the trial court. !he third:partycomplaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint, such that were it not for therule, it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint.

T-e t-ird;part% coplaint does not -ave to s-o it- certaint% t-at t-ere ill "e recover% against t-e

t-ird;part% defendant, and it is sufficient t-at pleadings s-o possi"ilit% of recover%. >n deterining t-esufficienc% of t-e t-ird;part% coplaint, t-e allegations in t-e original coplaint and t-e t-ird;part% coplaintust "e e:ained.3!! A t-ird;part% coplaint ust allege facts -ic- pria facie s-o t-at t-e defendant isentitled to contri"ution, indenit%, su"rogation or ot-er relief fro t-e t-ird;part% defendant.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

SECRETARY OF JUSTICEvs.HON. RALPH C. LANTIONG.R. N'. =3. Ja"a/: ?

15
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/may2005/#_ftn15http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/may2005/#_ftn22http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/may2005/#_ftn15http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/may2005/#_ftn22


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"onstitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited throughquestioning by the authorities, but given in an ordianry manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committedthe crime.

ESQUIVEL %*. THE SANDIGAN5AYANG.R. N'.


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GR N'.


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SALES VS. SANDIGAN5AYANGR N'.


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7uestions t-roug- t-e investigating officer. >n fact, a preliinar% investigation a% even "e conducted e:;partein certain cases.

YUSOP VS. SANDIGAN5AYANGR N'. -3@, F&/a/: 11, 1@@


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1B0 SCRA 1=

After the case has been filed in court, any pardon made by the private complainant, whether by swornstatement or on the witness stand, cannot e(tinguish criminal liablilty.

PEOPLE VS. ESCANO2=> SCRA 30=

!he acquittal on appel of certain accused based on reasonable doubt benefits a co:accused who did not appelor who withdrew his appeal.

PEOPLE VS. MADERAS2@ SCRA @=

%here the accused escapes from actual custody or flees from constructive custody, the "ourt may motuproprio or on appellees motion dismiss the appeal for abandonment.

EVIDENCE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EVANGELINE GANENAS %UR5ANO

G.R. N'.


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shall be sub&ect thereafter to +/ per annum interest until the amount due is fully paid, conformably to our ruling thatwhen an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e. a loan or forbearance of money,the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. In the absence of such stipulation, the rateshall be +/ per annum computed from default, i.e. &udicial or e(tra&udicial demand. /6 In this case, the rate ofinterest was not stipulated in writing by the petitioner, the private respondent and -oni "o. !hus, the applicableinterest rate is +/ per annum.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT PCGG4 %*.G.R. N'. >. !he Supplemental "omplaint was accompanied by the Affidavits ofwitnesses as well as by a host of other supporting documents, all of which M ta1en together M established probablecause.

>t s-ould "e noted t-at t-e Rules on =vidence recogni2es different fors of evidence G o"ect,docuentar% or testionial G it-out preference for an% of t-e in particular. 5-at s-ould reall% atter aret-e eig-t and t-e sufficienc% of t-e evidence presented.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES %*. CARLITO MARAHAY : MORACAG.R. N'*. . Ja"a/: 1B, 1@@2?

%hile the father:daughter relationship of accused:appellant and the victims, 7ylene and -elinda, remainsundisputed, the minority of the victims, though alleged, was not satisfactorily established. It is the burden of the

prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below +9 years of age when the rape was committed inorder to &ustify the imposition of the death penalty.

In the recent case of Beople vs. 7anuel Bruna y amire' or rman Bruna y amire', this "ourt laid down thefollowing guidelines in appreciating age, eit-er as an eleent of t-e crie or as a 7ualif%ing circustance@K+. !he best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificateof live birth of such party.K/. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate andschool records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.K0. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwiseunavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victimLs mother or a member of the family either by affinity orconsanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the e(act age or date of birth of theoffended party pursuant to Section


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!hus, although the defense does not contest the age of the victim, it is still essential that the prosecutionpresent independent proof thereof, pursuant to ?o. 6 of said guidelines. As a matter of fact, the minority of the victimmust be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Ender Section , ule +0< of the ules onvidence, a birth certificate is the best evidence of a personLs date of birth. In the instant case, the prosecution didnot present the certificates of live birth of both 7ylene and -elinda or other similar authentic documents to prove

their ages. ?ot even the victimsL mother or the victims themselves, or any other relative qualified to testify on mattersrespecting pedigree, were presented by the prosecution to establish the victimsL ages at the time the crimes werecommitted. Such failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden constrains this "ourt to hold that the qualifyingcircumstance of minority cannot be appreciated in these cases.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES %*. MARLON MORALDEG.R. N'.


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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES %*. SATURNINO TUPPALG.R. N'*. B1-B. Ja"a/: eneral counters that findings of the trial court during the bail hearing were but apreliminary appraisal of the strength of the prosecutionLs evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether

appellant is entitled to be released on bail during the pendency of the trial. ence, we agree with the #S> that saidfindings should not be construed as an immutable evaluation of the prosecutionLs evidence. It is settled that theassessment of the prosecution evidence presented during bail hearings in capital offenses is preliminary and intendedonly for the purpose of granting or denying applications for the provisional release of the accused.

TEODORO K. KATIG5AK %*. THE SANDIGAN5AYANG.R. N'.


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Accused:appellant further argues that the prosecution did not present enry ualde because his testimonywould be adverse to the case. %e are not persuaded. It is the prosecution that determines who among its witnesses areto testify in court, and it is neither for the accused nor the court to override that prerogative. "orollarily, the failureof the prosecution to present a particular witness does not give rise to the presumption that evidence willfullysuppressed would be adverse if produced, where that evidence is at the disposal of both parties or where the only

ob&ect of presenting the witness would be to provide corroborative or cumulative evidence.@inally, accused:appellant contends that the trial &udgeLs intervention during cross:e(amination of theprosecution witnesses was pre&udicial to him. owever, a scrutiny of the questions propounded by the trial &udge, failsto disclose any bias on his part which would pre&udice accused:appellant. !he questions were merely clarificatory. !hetrial court &udge is not an idle arbiter during a trial. e can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order toferret out the truth. !he impartiality of a &udge cannot be assailed on the ground that he as1ed clarificatory questionsduring the trial.

GRACE J. GARCIA vs. REDERICK A. RECIOG.R. N'.


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S". 8. Substituted service. M If, for &ustifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within areasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected )a by leaving copies of thesummons at the defendantLs residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,or )b by leaving the copies of defendantLs office or regular place of business with some competent person incharge thereof. * Anc-eta vs. Anc-eta, 0R? 14#', arc- 4, !4 )

Q. %hen can the court resort to substituted service$

In 7iranda v. "ourt of Appeals, we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in orderthat the court may acquire &urisdiction over the person of the defendant. !hus, it is only when a defendantcannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating theefforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that sucheffort failed. !his statement should be made in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court bythe sheriff. !his is necessary because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It hasbeen held that substituted service of summons is a method e(traordinary in character; hence, may be usedonly as prescribed and in the circumstances categori'ed by statutes. * Anc-eta vs. Anc-eta, 0R? 14#',arc- 4, !4 )

Q. Are indispensable parties required to be &oined$

YES. Section 8, ule 0 of the ules of "ourt, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be &oined asplaintiffs or defendants. !-e oinder of indispensa"le parties is andator%. 5it-out t-e presence ofindispensa"le parties to t-e suit, t-e udgent of t-e court cannot attain real finalit%. Strangers to a caseare not bound by the &udgment rendered by the court. !he absence of an indispensable party renders alsubsequent actions of the court null and void. Jac1 of authority to act not only of the absent party but also asto those present. !he responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitionerOplaintiff.) Doingo vs.Sc-eer.

Q.%ill the non:&oinder of an indispensable party be a ground for the dismissal of the petition$NO.!he non:&oinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Barties may

be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action andOorsuch times as are &ust. If the petitionerOplaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order ofthe court, the latter may dismiss the complaintOpetition for the petitionerOplaintiffs failure to complytherefor. /Doingo vs. Sc-eer)

Q. A case for collection of sum of money was filed by respondent against herein petitioner. !he sheriff failed to servethe summons intended for the petitioner because the former could not locate the petitionerLs address as indicated inthe complaint. !hereafter, petitioner filed a 7otion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lac1 of &urisdiction overhis person. !he court denied said motion and ordered the issuance of alias summons on the petitioner. Is the deniaand issuance of alias summon proper $

YES. !he trial court was merely e(ercising its discretion under ule +5, Section 0 of the +448 ules of"ivil Brocedure when it denied the petitionerLs motion to dismiss. Ender said rule, after hearing the

motion, a &udge may dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or order the amendment of thepleading. !he trial court denied the motion to dismiss based on its finding that the issues alleged bythe respondent in its complaint could not be resolved fully in the absence of the petitioner. In itsdesire to resolve completely the issues brought before it, the trial court deemed it fitting to properlyacquire &urisdiction over the person of the petitioner by ordering the issuance of alias summons on thepetitioner. vidently, the trial court acted well within its discretion. * Te- vs. CA, 0R? 14'&, April!4, ! )

Q. %hen will the rule on forum shopping apply$

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T7& /$& '" 6'/+ *7'((!"# a(($!&* 7&/& 7& &$&+&"* '6 $!!* (&"&"!a a/& (/&*&" '/ 7&/& a6!"a$ 9#+&" !" '"& 8a*& !$$ a+'" ' /&* 9!8aa !" 7& '7&/. es &udicata applies only where&udgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first. *David vs. Spouses ?avarro)

Q. %ill subsequent compliance with the requirement to file a certificate of non:forum shopping cure the defect to filethe same in the first instance$

NO. !his "ourt held in 7elo vs. "ourt of Appeals, et al., that the requirement underAdministrative "ircular ?o. rounds not assigned as errors but affecting &urisdiction over the sub&ect matter;)/ 7atters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within

contemplation of law;)0 7atters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a

&ust decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of &ustice or to avoiddispensing piecemeal &ustice;

) 7atters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are

matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raiseor which the lower court ignored;

)6 7atters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and)5 7atters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question

properly assigned, is dependent. / Iiron Transpo. Is. CA, 0RH11'!,April 4, !)

Q. Is it a ministerial duty for the sheriff to e(ecute the &udgment of the court$

Y&*. T7!* C'/ 7a* 8'"*!*&"$: 7&$ 7a 7& *7&/!66* : ' &&8& a 9#+&" !* +!"!*&/!a$. Apurely ministerial act is one Kwhich an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed

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manner, in obedience to the mandate of the legal authority, without regard to the e(ercise of his own&udgment upon the propriety of the act done.K /E)ero vs( 0aa%i Ci%* S,eriffs.

Q. %hat are the grounds to annul the &udgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the !"$

An original action in the "ourt of Appeals under ule 8 of the ules of "ourt, as amended, to annul a

&udgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the !" may be based on two grounds* )a e(trinsicfraud; or )b lac1 of &urisdiction. If based on e(trinsic fraud, the remedy is sub&ect to a condition precedentnamely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are nolonger available through no fault of the petitioner. !he petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinaryremedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from &udgment, under ule 09 of the ules of "ourt are nolonger available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails toavail of the remedies of new trial, appealor relief from &udgment through her own fault or negligence beforefiling her petition with the "ourt of Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under ule 8 of the ules;otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault ofher own. !he petitioner must also e(plain and &ustify her failure to avail of such remedies. !he safeguard wasincorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy. Access to the courts is guaranteed. -ut theremust be limits thereto. #nce a litigantLs rights have been ad&udicated in a valid final &udgment of a competentcourt, he should not be granted an unbridled license to sue anew. !he prevailing party should not be ve(ed bysubsequent suits.

Q$ In a petition for annulment of &udgment under ule 8, is it always necessary to allege that the ordinary remedy ofnew trial or reconsideration is no longer available$

It depends on what ground the petition is based. An original action in the "ourt of Appeals under ule8 of the ules of "ourt, as amended, to annul a &udgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the!" may be based on two grounds* )a4 &/!"*!8 6/a; '/ 4 $a8k '6 9/!*!8!'". If based on e(trinsic fraudthe remedy is sub&ect to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petitionfor relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. !hepetitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from&udgment, under ule 09 of the ules of "ourt are no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the

petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from&udgment through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the "ourt of Appeals, she cannotresort to the remedy under ule 8 of the ules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.>n a case -ere a petition for t-e annulent of a udgent or final order of t-e RTC filed under Rule 4'of t-e Rules of Court is grounded on lac of urisdiction over t-e person of t-e defendantJrespondent orover t-e nature or su"ect of t-e action, t-e petitioner need not allege in t-e petition t-at t-e ordinar%reed% of ne trial or reconsideration of t-e final order or udgent or appeal t-erefro are no longeravaila"le t-roug- no fault of -er on. !his is so because a &udgment rendered or final order issued by the!" without &urisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct actionor by resisting such &udgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invo1ed, unless barredby laches. * Anc-eta vs. Anc-eta, 0R? 14#', arc- 4, !4 )

Q. %hat is the nature of a &udgment on the question of ownership in e&ectment cases$

Brefatorily, in e&ectment cases, the issue is the physical or material possession )possession de factoand any pronouncement made by the trial court on the question of ownership is provisional in nature. A&udgment rendered in e&ectment cases shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to theland and shall not be conclusive as to the facts found therein in a case between the same parties upon adifferent cause of action involving possession of the same property. * lorencio vs. de leon, 0R? 149#',arc- 1!, !4 )

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Q.7ay an interlocutory order be sub&ect of a petition for certiorari under ule 56 of the ules of "ourt$

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NO.S87 '/&/ !* +&/&$: a" !"&/$'8'/: '"& a" 7&/&6'/& "' a((&a$a$&. N&!7&/ 8a" ! & 7&*9&8 '6 a (&!!'" 6'/ 8&/!'/a/!.Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by anappeal from the &udgment after trial. Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in casethere is grave abuse of discretion or lac1 of &urisdiction on the part of the lower court, or body, it would be abreach of orderly procedure to allow a party to come before the appellate court every time an order is issued

with which a party does not agree. ence, as a general rule, there must first be a &udgment on the merits ofthe case before it may be questioned via a special civil action for certiorari.!he remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses the

ob&ections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate theentire case by appeal in due course. owever, the rule is not ironclad. Ender certain situations, recourse tocertiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, )a when the trial court issued the order without orin e(cess of &urisdiction; )b where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, )c appealwould not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve adefendant from the in&urious effects of the patently mista1en order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless actionand compelling the defendant needlessly to go through protracted trial and clogging the court doc1ets byanother futile case. /Ca)alles vs( ere23Sison.

Q. %hat do you mean by lac1 of &urisdiction, e(cess of &urisdiction and grave abuse of discretion$ %hen will thespecial civil action for certiorari lie$

T7& /!"a$ a8* !7' 9/!*!8!'" !6 ! '&* "' 7a%& 7& $a$ (/('*& ' &&/+!"& 7& 8a*&;7&/& !* &8&** '6 9/!*!8!'" 7&/& 7& /!"a$, &!"# 8$'7& !7 7& ('&/ ' &&/+!"& 7& 8a*&,'%&/*&(* !* a7'/!: a* &&/+!"& : $a, T7&/& !* #/a%& a*& '6 !*8/&!'" 7&/& 7& /!"a$ a8* !"a 8a(/!8!'*, 7!+*!8a$, a/!/a/: '/ &*('!8 +a""&/ !" 7& &&/8!*& '6 !* 9#+&" a" !* &!%a$&" '$a8k '6 9/!*!8!'". It was incumbent upon the private respondent to adduce a sufficiently strongdemonstration that the !" acted whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to, and even decide of,the controversy before certiorari will lie. A *(&8!a$ 8!%!$ a8!'" 6'/ 8&/!'/a/! !* a /&+&: &*!#"& 6'/ 7&8'//&8!'" '6 &//'/* '6 9/!*!8!'" a" "' &//'/* '6 9#+&".%hen a court e(ercises its &urisdiction, anerror committed while so engaged does not deprive it of its &urisdiction being e(ercised when the error iscommitted. *C-ing vs. Court of Appeals)

Q.%hat should the sheriff include in his enforcement of the writ of attachment$ %hat are the remedies in case thesheriff fails to attach the right properties$ %hat is the procedure followed by the court$

S7&/!66 +a: aa87 '"$: 7'*& (/'(&/!&* '6 7& &6&"a" a#a!"* 7'+ a /! '6 aa87+&" 7a*&&" !**& : 7& 8'/.%hen the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and sei'es the property of athird person in which the said defendant holds no right or interest, the superior authority of the court whichhas authori'ed the e(ecution may be invo1ed by the aggrieved third person in the same case. Epon applicationof the third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether thesheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the e(ecution of the writ ofattachment, more specifically if he has indeed levied on attachment and ta1en hold of property not belongingto the plaintiff. If so, the court may then order the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy andto return the same to the third person. In resolving the motion of the third party, the court does not and

cannot pass upon the question of the title to the property with any character of finality. It can treat thematter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. If the claimantLsproof does not persuade the court of the validity of the title, or right of possession thereto, the claim will bedenied by the court. !he aggrieved third party may also avail himself of the remedy of KterceriaK by e(ecutingan affidavit of his title or right of possession over the property levied on attachment and serving the same tothe office ma1ing the levy and the adverse party. Such party may also file an action to nullify the levy withdamages resulting from the unlawful levy and sei'ure, which should be a totally separate and distinct actionfrom the former case. !he abovementioned remedies are cumulative and any one of them may be resorted toby one third:party claimant without availing of the other remedies. *Bng vs. Tating$ C-ing vs. CA)

Q. %hat will be the effect if no supersedeas bond has been filed on appeal to stay the e(ecution$

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C'/ !* +a"a& ' !**& a /! '6 &&8!'", conformably to Section +4, ule 8< of the ules of"ourt, as amended. *David vs. Spouses ?avarro)

Q. %hether or not the petitioner in a petition for review on certiorari can raise questions of facts$

It bears stressing, however, that in a petition for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raisedin said petition. !he &urisdiction of this "ourt in cases brought to it from the "ourt of Appeals is confined toreviewing and reversing the errors of law ascribed to it, findings of facts being conclusive on this "ourt. !he"ourt is not tas1ed to calibrate and assess the probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trialall over again. /+ In those instances where the findings of facts of the trial court and its conclusions anchoredon said findings are inconsistent with those of the "ourt of Appeals, this "ourt does not automatically delveinto the record to determine which of the discordant findings and conclusions should prevail and to resolve thedisputed facts for itself. !his "ourt is tas1ed to merely determine which of the findings of the two tribunalsare conformable to the facts at hand. // So long as the findings of facts of the "ourt of Appeals are consistentwith or are not palpably contrary to the evidence on record, this "ourt shall decline to embar1 on a review onthe probative weight of the evidence of the parties.*Superlines Transpo vs. >CC)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Q. "an unmar1ed sworn statements be used to convict an appellant$

NO. Brivate complainantLs Sworn Statements, which formed part of the records of the preliminaryinvestigation, cannot be used to convict appellant, because they do not form part of the records of the case inthe !". !hey were not mar1ed, much less formally offered before it. vidence not formally offered cannot beta1en into consideration in disposing of the issues of the case. )(eople of t-e (-ils. vs. Raire2, 0R?1#'9;&, /une 1#!4 4

Q.Should cases where an improvident plea of guilt is entered be remanded always to the trial court$

NO. Improvident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are involved should beavoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty withouthaving fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his plea. !he trial court convicted theappellants of robbery with homicide on the basis of their plea of guilty during their rearraignment. O/!"a/!$:7& 8a*& *7'$ & /&+a"& ' 7& /!a$ 8'/ 6'/ 7& (/'*&8!'" a" 7& a((&$$a"* ' a8& 7&!//&*(&8!%& &%!&"8&*. H'&%&/, 7& /&8'/* *7' 7a &*(!& 7& ($&a '6 #!$: '6 7& a((&$$a"*, 7&(/'*&8!'" a8& !* &%!&"8&. !he appellants li1ewise adduced their evidence to prove their defenses.T7& C'/ !$$ /&*'$%& 7& 8a*& '" !* +&/!* !"&(&"&" '6 7& ($&a '6 #!$: '6 7& a((&$$a"* /a7&/7a" /&+a" 7& 8a*& ' 7& /!a$ 8'/. (eople vs. Daniela, 0.R. ?o. 19!. April !4, !)

Q. Is an accused deprived of his right to cross:e(amine a witness when the cross e(amination of such witness was notconducted due to his counsels own doing$

NO. ight to cross:e(amine is a constitutional right anchored on due process. It is a statutory rightfound in Section +)f, ule ++6 of the evised ules of "riminal Brocedure which provides that the accused hasthe right to confront and cross:e(amine the witnesses against him at the trial. owever, the right has alwaysbeen understood as requiring not necessarily an actual cross:e(amination but merely an opportunity to e(ercisethe right to cross:e(amine if desired. %hat is proscribed by statutory norm and &urisprudential precept is theabsence of the opportunity to cross:e(amine. !he right is a personal one and may be waived e(pressly orimpliedly. !here is an implied waiver when the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross:e(aminean opposing witness but failed to ta1e advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. If by hisactuations, the accused lost his opportunity to cross:e(amine wholly or in part the witnesses against him, hisright to cross:e(amine is impliedly waived. * (eople vs. =scote, 0.R. ?o. 14'#6. April 4, ! )

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Q. %ill the reinstatement of a case which was dismissed by the lower court without &urisdiction or with grave abuse odiscretion amounting to lac1 or e(cess of &urisdiction constitute double &eopardy$

NO. !he "ourt of Appeals also erred in ruling that the reinstatement of the case does not place theprivate respondent in double &eopardy. !his "ourt ruled in Saldana vs. "ourt of Appeals, et al. +0 that*

%hen the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due processis thereby violatedto raise the defense of double &eopardy, three requisites must be present* )+ a first &eopardy must haveattached prior to the second; )/ the first &eopardy must have been validly terminated; and )0 the second&eopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.Jegal &eopardy attaches only )a upon a valid indictment, )b before a competent court, )c after arraignment,)d a valid plea having been entered; and )e the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without thee(press consent of the accused )Beople vs. Glagan, 69 Bhil. 96+. !he lower court was not competent as it wasousted of its &urisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.In effect, the first &eopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearingandOor trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first &eopardy, and does note(pose the accused to a second &eopardy.

Q. %hether or not an information for Blunder which contains bribery )Article /+< of the evised Benal "odemalversation of public funds or property )Article /+8, evised Benal "ode and violations of Sec. 0)e of epublic Act)A ?o. 0raft and "orrupt Bractices Act and "ode of "onduct andthical Standards for Bublic #fficials and mployees.K)Serapio vs. Sandigan"a%an, )

Q. %hat is the remedy of the party whose motion to quash has been denied$

"ase law has it that a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying a motion to quash the information is aninterlocutory order and hence, not appealable. ?or can it be the sub&ect of certiorari. !he remedy availableto petitioners after their motion to quash was denied by the Sandiganbayan was to proceed with the trial ofthe case, without pre&udice to their right to raise the question on appeal if final &udgment is renderedagainst them.)Torrres vs. 0arc-itorena, 0R? 1#666, Dece"er !', !! )

Q. Accused are public officials who are charged with violation of the Anti >raft and "orruption Jaw for having allegedlycaused the reclamation of a piece of land registered in the name of the respondent. !hereafter, the Solicitor >eneralinstituted a civil case for the reversion of the sub&ect land to the State. !he accused now prays that the criminal caseagainst them be suspended on the ground of a pre&udicial question. !hey contend that it behooved the Sandiganbayanto have suspended the criminal proceedings pending final &udgment in the "ivil "ase because a &udgment in that casethat the property sub&ect of the charge is foreshore land will belie the respondents claim that its proprietary rightover the sub&ect property had been violated by the accused when they had the sub&ect property reclaimed. Is thecontention of the accused tenable$

?B. A preudicial 7uestion is understood in la as t-at -ic- ust precede t-e criinal action and-ic- re7uires a decision "efore a final udgent can "e rendered in t-e criinal action it- -ic- said

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7uestion is closel% connected. T-e civil action ust "e instituted prior to t-e institution of t-e criinalaction. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in "ivil "ase?o. 8+5< filed by the State with the !" in "ivil "ase ?o. 8+5


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?either is the appellant entitled to acquittal merely because Sumaylo confessed, after the appellanthad rested his case, to being the sole assailant. !he trial court disbelieved SumayloLs testimony that he alone1illed the victim and that the appellant was not at all involved in the 1illing. !he "ourt of Appeals affirmed the&udgment of the trial court. It bears stressing that when Sumaylo testified for the appellant on surrebuttal, hedeclared that he did not 1now who 1illed the victim. e even declared that the appellant did not 1ill thevictim. owever, he made a complete volte:face when he e(ecuted an affidavit and testified that he alone

1illed the victim and that the appellant was not at all involved in the 1illing. %e are convinced that SumayloLssomersault was an afterthought, a last:ditch attempt to e(tricate the appellant from an inevitable conviction./ (eople vs. Cesar ontane2 and Daniel Sua%lo, 0R? 14&!#', arc- 14,!4)

Q. 7ay the trial court give retroactive application to the provisions of the evised ules of "riminal Brocedure$

YES.Alt-oug- t-e crie as coitted "efore t-e Revised Rules of Criinal (rocedure too effect, t-esae s-ould "e applied retroactivel% "ecause it is favora"le to t-e appellant. ence, the aggravatingcircumstance of nighttime should not be appreciated against him.

!he Information failed to allege the aggravating circumstance of nighttime as required by Section 9, ule ++"id.)

Q. %hat is the effect of a plea for forgiveness made by the accused to the victim andOor her family$

A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, e(ceptthose involving quasi:offense )criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer ofcompromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. ?o one would as1 forforgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feeresentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon )an

offender. (eople vs. Ale: analo, 0R? 14'4, arc- !&, !)

Q. In resolving a motion for bail, what does a trial court mandated to do$

!he trial court is mandated, in resolving a motion or petition for bail, to do the following*. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing o

the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation )Section +9, ule ++ of theules of "ourt, as amended;

6. %here bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless owhether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused isstrong for the purpose of enabling the court to e(ercise its sound discretion; )Sections 8 and 9,supra

5. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of theprosecution;

7.) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond)Section +4, supra. #therwise, the petition should be denied. * >"id. )

Q. %hat rights are involved in an application for bail$

A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but li1ewise the right ofthe State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. !hese two rightsmust be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of &ustice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his e(erciseof &urisdiction. * >"id. )

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Q.Distinguish a permanent dismissal from a provisional dismissal of the case.

A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case on the merits, resulting ineither the conviction or acquittal of the accused; to the dismissal of the case due to the prosecutionLs failure to

prosecute; or to the dismissal thereof on the ground of unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation ofthe accusedLs right to speedy disposition or trial of the case against him. In contrast, a provisional dismissal of acriminal case is a dismissal without pre&udice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissabecomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense within the periods allowed underthe evised Benal "ode or the evised ules of "ourt. * Condrada vs. (eople, 0R? 141646, e"ruar% !&,! )

Q. %hat are the e(ceptions to the rule that double &eopardy will not attach if the first case was dismissed with theconsent of the accused$

!here are two e(ceptions to the foregoing rule, and double &eopardy may attach even if the dismissal of thecase was with the consent of the accused* first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the chargeagainst him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of theaccusedLs right to speedy trial. * >"id.)

EVIDENCE

Q. Is the testimony of a single prosecution witness sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused$

YES. !he testimony of an eyewitness, coupled with the fact of the victimLs death are sufficient proof ofthe guilt of the appellants beyond cavil of doubt for murder. T-e Court -as consistentl% ruled t-at t-etestion% of a single prosecution itness, as long as it is positive, clear and credi"le is sufficient on-ic- to anc-or a udgent of conviction. Corro"orative or cuulative evidence is not a prere7uisite tot-e conviction of t-e accused.!ruth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of theirtestimonies. !he bare denial by the appellants of the criminal charge is a self:serving negative evidence whichcannot prevail over the clear, positive and categorical testimony of the eyewitness pinpointing the appellantsas the culprits. ) eo&le vs( Si)onga GR495961# 'une 1# 866.

Q. Is an alibi sufficient to prove the innocence of the accused$NO.Alibi is one of the wea1est if not the wea1est of defenses in criminal prosecution as it is easy to

fabricate and hard to disprove. @or alibi to be believed, the following requisites must concur* )a the presenceof accused at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense; and )b the physical impossibilityfor him to be at the scene of the crime. 7ore importantly, alibi cannot be given credence in light of theunwavering and positive identification by the private complainant of accused:appellant as her defiler and thefather of her child. In cases in where the offender is positively identified by the victim herself who harbored noill motive against him, the defense of alibi is invariably re&ected. )(eople vs. (agsanan 0RH19694,Dece"er !',!!)

Q.In the Jaw on vidence, is self:defense considered as a strong argument$

NO. L!k& a$!!, *&$6-&6&"*& !* a &ak &6&"*& &8a*& ! !* &a*: ' 6a/!8a&. W7&" 7& a88*&!"&/('*&* *&$6-&6&"*&, 7& 7&/&: a+!* 7a%!"# k!$$& 7& %!8!+. !he burden of proof is shifted on him toprove with clear and convincing evidence the confluence of the essential requisites of a complete self:defensenamely* )a unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; )b reasonable necessity of the means employed toprevent or repel it; and )c lac1 of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Rugasvs. (eople, 0R? 14''&9, /anuar% 14,!44

Q. %ill the testimony of young rape victims be given full credence by our courts of &ustice$

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YES. W& 7a%& 8'"*!*&"$: /$& 7a 7&/&, 7& /a(& %!8!+* a/& :'"# a" '6 &"&/ a#&, 7&!/&*!+'"!&* &*&/%& 6$$ 8/&&"8& a" *7'$ "' & *' &a*!$: !*+!**& a* a +&/& 6a/!8a!'", &*(&8!a$$:7&/& 7&: 7a%& a*'$&$: "' !$$-+'!%& ' &*!6: a#a!"* 7& a88*&. It is doctrinally settled that thefactual findings of the trial court which are supported by evidence, especially on the credibility of the rapevictim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. *(eople vs. Lios.

Q.Do inconsistencies in the testimony impair the credibility of the witness$

NO.!he victim died because of multiple wounds and the appellant is charged with murder for the1illing of the victim, in conspiracy with the other accused. In this case,the identity of the person who hit thevictim with a hollow bloc1 is of de minimis importance and the perceived inconsistency in the account ofevents is a minor and collateral detail that does not affect the substance of her testimony. !he witness hasbeen consistent in her testimony that the appellant was one of the men who stabbed the victim andsuch corroborated by the autopsy report.)(eople vs. (ilola 0RH1!1&!&, /une !', !)

Q. >ive the rationale why the trial courts are in the best position to weigh the testimony of a witness.

T7& &!#7!"# '6 7& &*!+'"!&* '6 !"&**&* !* &* $&6 ' 7& /!a$ 8'/ *!"8& ! !* !" 7& &*('*!!'" ' !*87a/#& 7a 6"8!'".!he trial &udge has the advantage of personally observing the conduct anddemeanor of witnesses, an opportunity not available to an appellate court.Absent compelling reasons, we wilnot disturb on appeal the trial courts findings on the credibility of a witness. /(eople vs. ?uguid.

Q.%hat is the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings$

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is **a"!a&%!&"8&or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.@urther, the complainants have the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in theicomplaints. /="ero vs. aati Cit% S-eriffs)

Q. Is it proper for the appellate court to disturb the finding of the court as to the credibility of witnesses$

NO. %hen the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, an appellate court will normally not disturb thefactual findings of the trial unless the lower court has reached conclusions that are clearly unsupported byevidence, or unless it has overloo1ed some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which, if consideredwould affect the result of the case. !he rationale for this rule is that trial courts have superior advantages inascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity to observe at close range themanner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. ) (eople vs. Dalag, 0.R. ?o. 1!9&9#. April , !

Q. Accused herein was convicted of ape with omicide and Attempted 7urder. e now asserts that his convictionshould not be sustained in the absence of direct evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Is his contentiontenable$

NO. %e agree with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove thathe raped and 1illed 7arilyn on the occasion or by reason of the said crime. owever, direct evidence is notindispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime charged; it may be proved by circumstantiaevidence. In Beople v. Delim, we held, thus*. . . "ircumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the e(istence ofthe main fact may be inferred according to reason and common e(perience. %hat was once a rule of ancientpracticability is now entombed in Section , ule +00 of the evised ules of vidence which states thatcircumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor fora &udgment of conviction if the following requisites concur*

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K. . . if )a there is more than one circumstance; )b the facts from which the inferences are derived have beenestablished; and )c the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyondreasonable doubt.K!he prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantialevidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without e(ception leadingby mutual support to but one conclusion* the guilt of the accused for the offense charged.

%e are convinced that, based on the evidence on record and as declared by the trial court in its decision, theprosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to prove beyond cavil that it was the appellant who raped and1illed 7arilyn on the occasion or by reason of the rape. ence, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rapewith homicide, a special comple( crime. )(eople vs. Darila%, 0R? 19'#1;#!, /anuar% !6, !4

Q. Is medical evidence a condition sine qua non in all se(ual crimes to prove that the victim is a mental retardate$

NO. "linical evidence is necessary in borderline cases when it is difficult to ascertain whether thevictim is of a normal mind or is suffering from a mild mental retardation. 7edical evidence is not a conditionsine qua non in all cases of rape or se(ual crimes for that matter to prove that the victim is a mental retardateor is suffering from mental deficiency or some form of mental disorder. owever, the conviction of an accusedof rape based on the mental retardation of private complainant must be anchored on proof beyond reasonabledoubt of her mental retardation. )(eople of t-e (-ils. vs.Dalandas, 0R? 14!9, Dece"er !', !!

Q. Is it necessary that a witness sworn statement or affidavit be consistent with his testimonyin open court$

NO. "ase law has it that* A Sinumpaang Salaysay or a sworn statement is merely a short narrativesubscribed to by the complainant in question and answer form. !hus, it is only to be e(pected that it is not ase(haustive as oneLs testimony in open court. !he contradictions, if any, may be e(plained by the fact that anaffidavit can not possibly disclose the details in their entirety, and may inaccurately describe, withoutdeponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated. -eing ta1en e( parte, an affidavit is almost alwaysincomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want osuggestions and inquiries. It has thus been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance toopen court declarations because the former are often e(ecuted when an affiantLs mental faculties are not in

such a state as to afford a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. @urther,affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because they are generallyprepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to her.(eople of t-e (-ils. vs.0arcia, 0R? 14###, arc- 14, !4

Q. "an the accused rely on the wea1ness of the evidence of the prosecution$

!he accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the wea1ness of the evidence of theprosecution; because even if the prosecutionLs evidence is wea1, the same can no longer be disbelieved. (eople vs. Caurao, 0.R. ?o. 1!!'6'. /anuar% !, !4 4

Q. %ho has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt$

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the charge is proved. !heprosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. !he prosecution must relyon its strength and not on the absence or wea1ness of the evidence of the accused. (eople vs. alate, etal., 0.R. ?o. 1!&!1. arc- 11, !4 4

M. %hat is meant by reasonable doubt$

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-y reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise but it is that doubt engendered by aninvestigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon thecertainty of guilt. * i"id.)

M. In criminal cases, if an evidence is susceptible to two interpretations how should the court appreciate the same$

If the evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused andthe other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted. !he overriding consideration is notwhether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to hisguilt.*>"id)

Q. "an a testimomny prevail over physical evidence$

A testimony cannot prevail over physical evidence. After all, physical evidence is evidence of the highestorder. It spea1s more eloquently than a hundred witnesses. *>"id.)

Q. %hat is the e(tent of the discretion of the public prosecutor in presenting the witnesses$

!he public prosecutor has the discretion as to the witnesses he will present as well as the course of presentingthe case for the prosecution. !he prosecution is not burdened to present all eyewitnesses of the crime on thewitness stand during the trial. !he testimony of only one eyewitness may suffice so long as it is credible andtrustworthy.

(eople vs. Fadaos, 0.R. ?o. 1969!. /anuar% 1#, !4)

Q. Accused 7anny Domingcil was found >EIJ!G under Sec. of Art. II, A ?o. 5/6, as amended, otherwise 1nown asthe Dangerous Drugs Act of +48/ and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. #n appeal, he contends that contrary tothe collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, he was instigated to buy mari&uana and the trial court erred innot giving credence and probative weight to his testimony and in considering the testimonies of the witnesses of theprosecution. Is the appeal of the accused meritorious$

NO.%hat is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale actuallytoo1 place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In this case, theprosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one )+ 1ilo of mari&uana toposeur:buyer SB#+ #rlando Dalusong in the entrapment operation. !he testimonies of the principaprosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a complete picture of how the appellantLs illegal sale ofthe prohibited drug transpired, and how the sale led to his apprehension in flagrante delicto. !heirtestimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous drugs were in the possession of the appellant who had noauthority to possess or sell the same. 7ore importantly, all the persons who obtained and received theconfiscated stuff did so in the performance of their official duties. Enless there is clear and convincingevidence that the members of the buy:bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properlyperforming their duty, their testimonies on the buy:bust operation deserve full faith and credit.

Di" %,e %rial !our% err in no% a&&re!ia%ing %,e "efense of "enial of %,e a!!use" an" %,a% ,e as $erel* ins%iga%e" %o!o$$i% %,e !ri$e;

NO. !he appellantLs bare denial of the crime charged and his barefaced claim that he was merely instigated by#liver into procuring the mari&uana cannot prevail over the straightforward and positive testimonies of theprosecution witnesses.It is a(iomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of acredible witness but must also be credible in itself such that common e(perience and observation of man1indlead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal prosecution, the court is alwaysguided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of human e(perience andnot by mere con&ecture or speculation. !estimonies that do not adhere to this standard are necessarilyaccorded little weight or credence. -esides, instigation, or the appellantLs claim of a frame:up, is a defense

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that has been invariably viewed by this "ourt with disfavor because the same can easily be concocted and is acommon standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Is %,e &resen%a%ion )* %,e &rose!u%ion %o &resen% %,e &oli!e infor$an% as i%ness in"is&ensa)le$

NO.!he failure of the prosecution to present #liver, the police informant, does not enfeeble the case for the

prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve theirinvaluable service to the police. !heir testimony or identity may be dispensed with inasmuch as his or hernarration would be merely corroborative, especially so in this case, when the poseur:buyer himself testified onthe sale of the illegal drug. ) (eople vs. Doingcil, 0R? 146'9, /anuar% 14,!4

Q. ow should the court treat inconsistencies in a witness testimony$

It is hornboo1 doctrine that a witnessL testimony must be considered in its entirety and not bytruncated portions or isolated passages thereof. In Beople v. #rtega, we held that it is sound policy that self:contradictions in testimonies should be reconciled, if possible; contradictory statements should be consideredin light of e(planations and attending circumstances and whether inconsistencies result from misconceptions ofan innocent witness or are a result of mere willful and corrupt misrepresentation. !his "ourt has held that eventhe most candid of witnesses commit mista1es and may even ma1e confused and inconsistent statements.)(eople vs. +ong ung +uen 0R? 14#14;1#, e"ruar% 1&,!44

Q. Is the testimony of the victims mother in a ape case as to the age of her daughter sufficient to establish theaggravating circumstance of minority so as to impose the penalty of death upon the accused$

NO. In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented andoffered in evidence to prove achelLs age. !he only evidence of the victimLs age is her testimony and that ofher motherLs )Sally de >u'manLs Sinumpaang Salaysay, which was adopted as part of the latterLs directtestimony, attesting to the fact that her five:year:old daughter was raped. SallyLs testimony regardingachelLs age was insufficient, since achel was alleged to be already five years old at the time of the rape, andwhat is sought to be proved is that she was then less than seven years old. er testimony will suffice only if itis e(pressly and clearly admitted by the accused. !here is no such e(press and clear declaration and admission

of the appellant that achel was less than seven years old when he raped her. 7oreover, the trial court madeno finding as to the victimLs age.owever, SallyLs testimony that her daughter was five years old at the time of the commission of the crime issufficient for purposes of holding the appellant liable for statutory rape, or the rape of a girl below twelveyears of age. Ender the second paragraph of Article /55:-, in relation to Article /55:A)+)d of the B", carna1nowledge of a woman under twelve years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. !hus, the appellantshould be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, and not the death penalty. ) (eople vs. Antivola, 0R?19!6, e"ruar% , !4

Q. In an ordinary civil case, to whom does the burden of proof belong$

#bviously, the burden of proof is, in the first instance, with the plaintiff who initiated the action. -ut

in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, notby who is the plaintiff or the defendant. !he test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to as1which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as thebasis for the relief he see1s to obtain, and based on the result of an inquiry, which party would be successfuif he offers no evidence.In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint whichare denied by the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the material allegations in his casewhere he sets up a new matter. All facts in issue and relevant facts must, as a general rule, be proven byevidence e(cept the following*

+. Allegations contained in the complaint or answer immaterial to the issues./. @acts which are admitted or which are not denied in the answer, provided they have been

sufficiently alleged.

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0. !hose which are the sub&ect of an agreed statement of facts between the parties; as well as thoseadmitted by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case.

. @acts which are the sub&ect of &udicial notice.6. @acts which are legally presumed.5. @acts peculiarly within the 1nowledge of the opposite party.

Repu"lic vs. ?eri, 0R? 19#&&, arc- 4,!4 4

Q. %hat is the effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof$

!he effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence toovercome the prima facie case created thereby which if no proof to the contrary is offered will prevail; itdoes not shift the burden of proof. * i"id )

Q. Is direct evidence indispensable to prove the guilt of an accused$

NO. Direct evidence is not always indispensable to prove the guilt of an accused. !he prosecution may provethe guilt of the accused for the crimes charged either by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. @orcircumstantial evidence to warrant the conviction of an accused under ule +00, Sec. of the evised ulesof vidence, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following* a !here is more than onecircumstance; b !he facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and c !he combination of althe circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. @acts and circumstancesconsistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence which in weight and probativeforce, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. Enless required by law, the testimony ofa single witness, if found credible and positive, is sufficient on which to anchor a &udgment of conviction.After all, the truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. !hewitness may not have actually seen the very act of the commission of the crime charged, but he maynevertheless identify the accused as the assailant as the latter was the last person seen with the victimsimmediately before and right after the commission of the crime. )(eople vs. Rafael Calo2a /r.,0.R. ?o.1&44, /anuar% !&,!)

Q.ow can a witness be impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement$

It is done by Hlaying a predicate. -efore a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made atother times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him withthe circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be as1ed whether he madesuch statements, and if so, allowed to e(plain them. If the statement is in writing they must be shown to thewitness before any question is put to him concerning them. !he cross:e(aminer must lay the predicate or thefoundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an in&ustice to the witness being cross:e(amined. !hewitness must be given a chance to recollect and to e(plain the apparent inconsistency between his twostatements and state the circumstances under which they were made.

!his "ourt outlined the procedure in Enited States vs. -aluyot, for instance, if the attorney for theaccused had information that a certain witness say Bedro >on'ales had made and signed a sworn statementbefore the fiscal materially different from that given in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon

the attorney when cross:e(amining said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to as1 him if hedid not ma1e such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there ma1e a statement different fromthat delivered in court. If the witness admits the ma1ing of such contradictory statement, the accused has thebenefit of the admission, while the witness has the opportunity to e(plain the discrepancy if he can. #n theother hand, if the witness denies the ma1ing any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right toprove that the witness did ma1e such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce thedocument, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. !his process of cross:e(amining awitness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the American courtsHlaying a predicate for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted thatunless a ground is thus laid upon cross:e(amination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible toimpeach a witness, though undoubtedly the matter is to a large e(tent in the discretion of the court. ) (eoplevs. Castillano et. al, .0.R. ?o. 1941!, April !, !)

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Q. %hat is the nature of a sweetheart defense$ %hen will it be given credence by the court$

-eing an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof. Asweetheart defense cannot be given credence in the absence of corroborative proof li1e love notes, mementos,

pictures or to1ens that such romantic relationship really e(isted. )(eople vs. Ale: analo, 0R? 14'4,arc- !&, ! )

Q. %ould a love affair between the rape victim and the accused preclude the prosecution of rape$

!his fact would not preclude rape as it does not necessarily mean there was consent. A love affairwould not have &ustified carnal desires against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand se(ual gratificationfrom a fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon her on the prete(t of love. Jove is not a license for lust* >"id)

Q. Is the moral character of a rape victim material in the prosecution of rape$

ven assuming arguendo that the offended party was a girl of loose morals, it is settled that moral character isimmaterial in the prosecution and conviction for rape for even prostitutes can be rape victims. )>"id

Q. 7ay a child witness testify in a narrative form$

Barenthetically, under Sections +4 to /+ of the ule on (amination of a "hild %itness which too1effect on December +6, /


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