WT WP 1 European Social Model What Kind of Existence Ankara

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Peter Herrmann: European Social Model – Existence, Non- Existence or Biased Direction



What Kind of European Social Model

2

Peter Herrmann

European Social Model – Existence, Non-Existence or Biased Direction1

My dear Adson , I am afraid, however, the truth is never

what it appears to be in a particular point in time.

(Umberto Eco)

Introduction – Models and Reality ........................................................................................3 Being Social and Social Being ................................................................................................. 4

Practice – Appropriation and Appropriateness ..................................................................7

The Economy and the Social ................................................................................................... 8

A “European State”.................................................................................................................. 9

The development of European Social Policy Orientations...............................................13 Treaties of Rome .......................................................................................................................13 The Single European Act and a “European Renaissance”......................................................14 Tightening the Bonds ................................................................................................................14 The Trap of Success ..................................................................................................................15

Lisbon.........................................................................................................................................15 OMC – dual strategy ..............................................................................................................17

Outlook .....................................................................................................................................19

Postscript..................................................................................................................................19

Editorial Note ......................................................................................................................................21

I want to express my special thanks to SIBEL KALAYCIOGLU and Kezban Celik for the hospitality and

support in getting to and staying in Ankara.

1

This text goes back to a public lecture given in February 23rd, 2007 at the Convention Centre of the Middle East TechnicalUniversity, Ankara. Due to the fact that this text is meant to be an edited version of the notes of the lecture I limit myself in

referencing; main references are made to some of my own works where further references can be found.



Peter Herrmann

3

Introduction – Models and Reality

It is somewhat problematic to simply speak of a European Social Model, as the term model itself is not

clearly defined. In one or another way we are dealing with an aspirational concept. We have to

distinguish at least three different meanings of the term.First, we are concerned with models as theories, as blueprints, not least being based on a set of

norms and wishful thinking. With respect to a European Social Model this would mean to reflect on

rules of living together that are considered to be ‘valuable’ and/or in theory appropriate to guarantee a

society that brings the norms to life. The norms themselves, the definition of the social is not

considered other than on normative grounds. In allusion to Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, model in

this sense is the absolute Idee (absolute idea) of what should be.

Second, a model is a supposed entity or structure emerging from a tradition – the “absolute idea” of

what is seen as worthwhile and valuable to be kept, continued and further purified from the past into

the future. In broad terms, points of reference for the European (Social) Model in this sense are

commonly the ancient Roman and Greece empires and the European enlightenments, especially

following the English, French and German lines. Employing a game with words, though containing

some truth, one could grasp this as the step from the absolute idea to Immanuel Kant’s Kritik der reinenVernunft (critique of pure reason), continuing to his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (critique of

practical reason).

A third approach is the analysis of existing societies and the simple extrapolation of certain key

features. Commonly mentioned for the European Social Model are in this respect values and systems as

* respect of fundamental social rights

* respecting the individual and their diversity

* integrating economic and social policy

* securing inclusion of everybody

* solidarity based social insurance systems.

One can link this in terms of social and philosophical traditions to the shift to “positive thinking”,

especially founded in the work of Isidore Marie Auguste François Xavier Comte and his Plan de

traveaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société (Plan of Scientific Studies Necessary for

the Reorganisation of Society) from 1822. Taking the philosophical references serious we find that the

intellectual development with respect to models is reflecting a movement from seeing models as means

of defending a perishing class, moving on to seeing models as means of enforcing claims of a newly

emerging class – the bourgeoisie and citoyenitée, later emerging to the model as defence of an

established class – a class that is by and large only interested in securing its own proprium.

– It may appear as irony of history to base the criticised development on the reflection of tone of the

mentors of the development. It had been Comte who divided intellectual development into three stages,

namely

* the theological stage

* the metaphysical or abstract stage

* the positive stage

If operating with the idea of model building as method of political research, there are at least three

general challenges.A first question concerns the dynamics. At least on the first sight, models seem to be static. The

challenge is to find a way of generalisation that allows not just the adjustment of the external borders –

this is an important question for instance when it comes to processes of enlargement. In such a case, the

model itself could actually be static whereas the ‘newcomer’ would have to adapt to the rules.2

However, a more difficult momentum is if the borders of such a model, the norms themselves can be

dynamic. Whereas it is frequently stated that this is not possible, I suggest to see theories as being a

matter of appropriateness. Thus, it is possible to see a dynamic aspect in terms of changing theories and

norms due to changes of the external and internal conditions.3

Whereas it seems to be not a major problem to see models as dynamic rather than static, a more

profound problem is that any kind of typology is based on generalisation. This means that we are in

actual fact dealing with an analytical process of condensation, Verdichtung in the understanding of

2 Especially relevant in the cases 1 and 2 from above3 Most relevant for case 2 and 3 from above




4

dialectics. The challenge is how to maintain within such a process the diversity – and possibly even

contradictions – amongst he element of the model. I do not suggest that valid and valuable typologies

are not possible; but it is necessary to consider this challenge when it comes to the debate of

methodologies.4

The most difficult task is to choose relevant points of reference.5

Looking at the European model, it

had been quite simple as long as this had been concerned with the small group of originally 6 countries.

However, with an increasing number of countries the borders are blurred and actually countries thathad been explicit outsiders in earlier times are now insiders. This is getting especially relevant in the

case of Turkey as the “old Europe” frequently claimed to be based on the definition of Christianity.6

However, the two points arising now are around the acceptance of a non-Christian country. And

furthermore, actually the initial internal borders are questioned as a serious debate would now require

to reinvestigate the coherence of the Christian tradition itself - for instance by looking at Christianity

and Orthodox Judaism. The rough distinction between the European model and the Northern American

and Asian countries is as helpful as one of the Rough Guides – the tourist book that brings you there, it

brings you around and on return you do not have much more than some nice picturesque impressions,

far away from real life that you can only explore yourself.

Despite the mentioned problems of model building, there are good reasons for not disapproving such

an approach. Without discussing this further, modelling approaches can help understanding the deeper

meaning of the debates on social policy in respect to both, processes of deepening and enlargement.Reason for this is the fact that it is actually the debate on the vagueness that requires and allows the

debate on matters of normative settings that translate into concrete measures and determine

developments. It requires, first, to develop an understanding of what actually the social is and, second,

to reflect on its pre-legal momentum, in the words of Hans F. Zacher the

‘vorrechtliche Norm des Sozialen’

(Zacher, Hans F. Das ‘Soziale’ als Begriff des deutschen und des europaeischen

Rechts; unpublished, Munich 20.2.2006: 2; see as well on more general issues of

this question with regard to comparative research on social legislation: Zacher,

Hans F.: Vorfragen zu den Methoden der Sozialrechtsvergleichung in: Zacher,

Hans F.: Abhandlungen zum Sozialrecht; Eds.: Baron von Maydell,

Bernd/Eichenhofer, Ebehard; Heidelberg: C.F.Mueller Juristischer Verlag, 1993:

329-375)

i.e. social norms preceding legislation and being as such constitutive. In other words, an important part

of the proposed approach is to consider the debates on the normative factors as underlying previous and

determining future processes of “state-building”.7

With this approach, extensively ruled by

prerequisites, it is intended to contribute as well to some methodological, in particular epistemological

questions of the debate on European integration and more particular theories used. This requires to

shed some light on key concepts which are seen in the definition of

* modernisation

* inclusion

* state and

* empowerment.

In other words, the particular normative and political definitions of these terms and concepts are seen

as crucial with respect of future EU-state building, the definitions being what just had been called with

Zacher vorrechtliche Norm des Sozialen.

Being Social and Social Being

As insinuated, though the discussion on these issues is going through most of contemporary social

science approaches, we have actually to deal with their more specific interpretation. This will follow a

dialectical and historical approach and I dare to say that it is based on a materialist interpretation of the

world we live in. What is important for us here, is the fact that this implies the orientation on different

4 With relevance especially in case 3 from above5 In particular important again in cases 2 and 3 from above6

This played for instance a particular role in the debates around the Constitutional Treaty of the EU.7 Here, state is understood in a wide sense, reflecting pre-modern formations in the same way as current (likely) state-to-be

constellations as the supranational formation of the European Union.



Peter Herrmann

5

actors and although we are talking about the welfare state, the social state et altera, the state is actually

not much more than the incarnation or institutionalisation of different interests and their relative power.

So far, this sounds rather broad, vague and possibly even superficial; however, linking it more closely

to a complex economic theory of accumulation regimes, we arrive at a view on rather complex

mechanisms of regulations.8

At its core stands the interpretation of development as process of

increasing socialisation, i.e. the creation of complex relationships of mutual dependencies.9

Point of

departure is the Aristotelian thesis of seeing the human being as social being that realises him/herself only in relation to and action with others.

As Aristotle writes in his Politics. A Treatise on Government:

And when many villages so entirely join themselves together as in every respect to

form but one society, that society is a city, and contains in itself, if I may so speak,

the end and perfection of government: first founded that we might live, but

continued that we may live happily. For which reason every city must be allowed

to be the work of nature, if we admit that the original society between male and

female is; for to this as their end all subordinate societies tend, and the end of

everything is the nature of it. For what every being is in its most perfect state, that

certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house:

besides, whatsoever produces the final cause and the end which we desire, must

be best; but a government complete in itself is that final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident that a city is a natural production, and that man is naturally a

political animal, and that whosoever is naturally and not accidentally unfit for

society, must be either inferior or superior to man: thus the man in Homer, who is

reviled for being ‘without society, without law, without family.’ Such a one must

naturally be of a quarrelsome disposition, and as solitary as the birds.

(Aristotle: The Politics [A Treatise on Government]; Translated by William Ellis;

New York: Prometheus Books, 1986: 3 f.)

However, reference is not the simple reproduction of interdependencies amongst individuals. Instead,

we are dealing with a process of appropriation.

For one very expressive assertion, we can refer to Karl Marx who states in the Introduction to a

Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy

Individuals producing in a society – hence the socially determined production by

individuals is of course the point of departure. The individual and isolated hunter

and fisherman, who serves Adam Smith and Ricardo as a starting point, is one of

the unimaginative fantasies of eighteenth-century. Robinsonades which, contrary

to the fancies of historians of civilisation, by no means signify simply a reaction

against over-refinement and a reversion to a misconceived natural life. No more

is Rousseau's contrat social, which by means of a contract establishes a

relationship and connection between subjects that are by nature independent,

based on this kind of naturalism. This is an illusion and nothing but the aesthetic

illusion of the small and big Robinsonades. It is, rather, the anticipation of

‘bourgeois society’, which began to evolve in the sixteenth century and was

making giant strides towards maturity in the eighteenth. In this society of free

competition the individual seems to be rid of the natural, etc., ties which in earlier

historical epochs made him an appurtenance of a particular, limited aggregationof human beings. The prophets of the eighteenth century, on whose shoulders

Smith and Ricardo were still standing completely, envisaged this 18th

-century

individual – a product of the dissolution of feudal forms of society on the one

hand and of the new productive forces evolved since the sixteenth century on the

other – as an ideal whose existence belonged to the past. They saw this individual

not as an historical result, but as the starting point of history; not as something

evolving in the course of history, but posited by nature, because for them this

8 See for instance Herrmann, Peter: Developing a Methodology Based on the History of Ideas for Social Professions – The

Meaning of the Founding of the State. Meta-Theoretical Perspectives for Developing a Methodology for an International

Approach; New York: Nova, forthcoming for further exploration of the regulationist stance that is proposed.9

Further explored in Herrmann, Peter/Herrenbrueck, Sabine: Producing or Reproducing the Social – a Review of Professional Practice from a Social Quality Perspective. Presentation during the Federal Congress of Social Work in

Muenster 2005; Muenster 2006; http://www.bundeskongress-soziale-arbeit.de/AG_14_Herrmann_Herrenbrueck.pdf




6

individual was the natural individual, according to their idea of human nature.

This delusion has been characteristic of every new epoch hitherto. Steuart, who in

many respects was in opposition to the eighteenth century and as an aristocrat

tended rather to regard things from an historical standpoint, avoided this naive

view.

The further back we go in history, the more does the individual, and accordingly

also the producing individual, appear to be dependent and belonging to a larger whole. At first, he is still in a quite natural manner part of the family, and of the

family expended into the tribe; later he is part of a community, of one of the

different forms of community which arise from the conflict and the merging of

tribes. It is not until the eighteenth century, in bourgeois society, that the various

forms of the social nexus confront the individual as merely means towards his

private ends, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint,

namely that of the isolated individual, is precisely the epoch of the hitherto most

highly developed social (according to this standpoint, general) relations. Man is a

Zoon politikon [political animal] in the most literal sense: he is not only a social

animal, but an animal that can isolate itself … only within society. Production by

an isolated individual outside society – something rare, which might occur when

a civilised person already dynamically in possession of the social forces isaccidentally cast into the wilderness – is just as preposterous as the development

of language without individuals who live together and speak to one another.

(Marx, Karl [1857/58]: Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58 [First Version of

Capital]: in: Karl Marx. Frederick Engels. Collected Works. Volume 28: Marx:

1857-1861; London: Lawrence&Wishart, 1986: 17 f.)

In a materialist perspective, this is of course first and foremost a matter of production and the

constitution of property in the economic sense; in a sociological perspective it is from here that we can

understand it in a wider sense as matter of appropriateness. A most crucial point is that socialisation

and individualisation are becoming understandable as matters of establishing and enhancing long

chains of interaction and dependencies – in sociology this is widely known as an approach for which

the foundations had been made explicit by Norbert Elias in his outstanding work on The Process of

Civilisation. Again, this provides a more specific approach to

* modernisation

* inclusion

* state

* empowerment

as we are now concerned with the development of individuals in society and as such the view on

individualisation as socialisation and socialisation as individualisation – a matter which is highlighted

by the Social Quality Approach (s. e.g. Herrmann, Peter: Social Quality and the European Social

Model. Opening individual well-being for a social perspective; in: Alternatives. Turkish Journal of

International Relations 4/4; Published and Edited by Bulent Aras; Istanbul: Faith University.

Department of International Relations, Winter 2005: 16-32 (http://www.alternativesjournal.net/;

http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume4/number4/herrmann.pdf).

Taking up the title of this sub-chapter which points on the difference between Being Social and

Social Being, the approach used here is concerned with an understanding of the social though not asmatter sui generis, but a genuine matter of concrete interacting individual beings. This excludes an

interpretation of something undefined, mystical, given by any kind of divine or natural law. Instead, it

is the actual and concrete individual being, acting under certain historical circumstances (see Sève,

Lucien: Man in Marxist Theory and the Psychology of Personality; Translated from the French by

John Mc Greal; Sussex/New Jersey: The Harvester Press/Humanities’, 1978: in particular 61-173).

It is important to note that this opens as well the view on the “un-social” as being a matter of the

individual that is deprived from social interaction and thrown back on a relationship between

individuals. Capitalist competition, consumerism etc. are typical examples. And a wording referring to

people being socialised into competitive behaviour shows that social science still didn’t overcome the

old aporias.



Peter Herrmann

7

Practice – Appropriation and Appropriateness

Coming back to the debate on the European Social Model, a further crucially important issue, implied

in the orientation on discussing the ‘vorrechtliche Norm des Sozialen’ exists in respecting the

epistemological meaning of practice – encompassing the simultaneity of the societal, social and

individual dimension. Practice has to be seen as key feature in overcoming the dichotomy between

structure and action as it is suggested in mainstream social science, and the convulsive efforts of overcoming it by introducing concepts as agency etc. .

Relevant for us is what Hans F. Zacher put into the following words.

Looking at the societal, political and juridical practice, only a limited range of

challenges is getting manifest. This range is closely linked to the horizon of such

interventions that can actually be imagined.

(Zacher, Hans F.: Das soziale Staatsziel; in: Handbuch des Staatsrechts der

Bundesrepublik Deutschland; eds.: Josef Isensee und Paul Kirchhof. Volume II:

Verfassungsstaat; Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag20043: 659-784; here: 661)

This means that such practice is emerging (a) from needs arising from the conditions of appropriation

and (b) the objective conditions (material constellation, resources, available technical knowledge and

facilities etc.). Ergo, we can see here that any social model actually deals with the question of

appropriateness in terms of balancing different interests and concerns in a permanent power battle – thedrafting of a Constitutional Treaty, the debate of this Draft in the public and the results of the referenda

in some member states, the dealing with accession to the European Union, but as well the various

“social reforms” are a matter of relevance here, although they are frequently presented as matters of

technical construction and decisions.

However, it is important to link this to the concepts mentioned above, and here in particular

empowerment. At least in the understanding following the tradition of enlightenment, any societal

development is fundamentally built around empowerment which consequently is a key concern of the

Social Quality Theory as well (see Herrmann, Peter: Empowerment – the Core of Social Quality; in:

The European Journal of Social Quality; volume 5; New York/Oxford: Berghahn Journals, 2005: 292-

302). Now, important is that empowerment has three dimensions.

* The first meaning is to look at it as being a matter of power in the understanding of a zero-sum

game, i.e. a constellation in which the power gained by one is limiting the power of somebody else.

* A second meaning of empowerment is concerned with the process of enabling individuals with

respect to the process of social integration – enhancement of personal capacities is also a matter as

the orientation of mechanisms that allow developing self-esteem, secure some kind of social

inclusion and maintain a certain degree of security. However, so far the two concepts of

empowerment are actually concerned (a) with the power of individuals and maintaining power

imbalances and (b) a process of empowerment from above – which is by definition a paradox.

* So, a third perspective on empowerment is concerned with social empowerment, defined by being

concerned with the means and processes necessary for people to be capable of actively participating

in social relations and actively influencing the immediate and more distant social and physical

environment (see ibid.).

As such, it is about the enhancement of the action perspective of individuals with respect to

establishing and managing their genuine own relationship as position within society and in relation

to their social, material and natural environment.As it can be seen, social empowerment has a passive and an active dimension, the first being concerned

with gaining the power as “element of the personality”, the capacity to do something; the active

dimension being concerned with an environment that factually allows to “be changed”, i.e. social and

societal conditions that are responsive.

This means that the entire process of empowerment – understood as a core of society building and

modernisation, and thus at least as core of the claims of the European Social Model in the tradition of

enlightenment – is about enhancing people’s control over their own life and at the same time over

society (building). As much as the first goes far beyond the availability of sufficient material resources,

the second goes far beyond the individuals’ control over their own personal life.




8

The Economy and the Social

From here, the question of the relationship between the economic (policy) and the social (policy) has to

be asked and the answer, though it cannot be developed in depth, will be somewhat different to the

mainstream reactions. Actually, the approach of defining the social in the above proposed way with

reference to Aristotle and Marx provides in principle already the answer to the question on the

relationship between economy and social – and furthermore by and large the three principle approachescan be seen as three principle social models in the context of EUropean debates.

* First, economic development and policy are seen as the core and in itself accepted as generators of

“social relationships” sui generis. However, in the liberalist interpretation of the constitution of

social relationships via the economic sphere this follows not as matter of enhancing processes of

appropriation. Instead this perspective is based on the constitutive power of market relationships.

Thus it is a fundamentally individualist approach, founded in contracts among individuals. At the

end, complex social relationships are in this view nothing else than a series of contracts amongst

various individuals in their combination. In other words, in this perspective the social is nothing else

than an aggregation of individual relationships. It is the classical liberalist strategy according to

which social policy is actually not necessary since social relationships are favourably result of

processes of economic self-regulation, leaving the need at most for some additional “corrective

measures”.* Second, we find an approach that follows the same economic perspective, though being different as

regards as it sees “social policy” actually as an important part of the process. Social policy is meant

to be a productive factor – and as such it is actually not necessarily10

seen as public task. Rather, it

can be “investment of individual enterprises”;11

or it would be a public task.12

* Third, we find a different approach that focuses on social relationships and “situations” as point of

reference. Although again economic processes, the process of production is suggested to be at the

heart, the major difference is that it is here not a matter constituting contracts amongst individuals.

Rather, this process is here concerned with producing social relationships amongst which supply

with material goods, the exchange of goods on the market in order to secure social security is one

aspect only. In terms of development, a wider understanding is underlying this orientation, not least

being concerned with (a) the engagement of the socially empowered individuals and (b) an active

intervention by the state.

Taking these three patterns as foundation, we arrive at the three principal models of (a) an undoubtedly

(neo-)liberalist model of an activating welfare-state, (b) a modified liberalist model with extended

intervention as what might be called active welfare-state and (c) a socialisation approach that orients on

an empowering welfare-state or better: welfare societies rather than a different form of welfare state.

Linking this to TRUDI, i.e.

a multi-functional state that combines the Territorial State, the state that secures

the Rule of Law, the Democratic State, and the Intervention State

(Zuern, Michael/Leibfried, Stephan: A New Perspective on the State.

Reconfiguring the National Constellation; in: European Review, Vol. 13, Supp.

No. 1, 1–36 [2005]: 1-36; here: 3)

the most important changes can be seen as follows.

First, the reference to territory is at least qualified, though not (yet) entirely suspended. As far as it

still exists it is meaningful only with respect to administrative purposes and the necessity to politicallydecide on how to design national policies in the light of global relationships.

Second, the reference to the rule of law is in tendency as well qualified; nonetheless it means that we

have to accept some ambiguity and contradiction. On the one hand, the rule of law is increasingly

meaningful, for instance due to the importance of social rights that become a focus of society building.

On the other hand however, we are confronted with an increasing meaning of common law in the

understanding of a law tradition that claims to be “people’s law”. The ambiguity and contradiction

reflects the fact that this reference to people’s law is more to be understood in the sense of non-court

law than being really people’s law. One important example can be seen in the fact that especially

10 or even: in principal not11 This would follow the approach of classical factor theories but as well the Austrian School from Carl Menger, Eugen von

Böhm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises or Friedrich Hayek. 12 An approach that would more likely comply for instance with orientations of Keynesianism, theories of public goods, and

in political science public choice theories.



Peter Herrmann

9

European (law) decision makers outsource more and more decisions – we can take the social dialogue

as example par excellence. In that case, the state will only then define legal means if the participants of

the negotiations outside of the justice system fail to reach binding agreements. Though not fully in

place in legal terms as far as other areas are concerned, it is a general pattern. I t is also justified to take

the increasing number of green and white paper debates as relevant matter in this respect of a shift of

legislative power.

Third, this is of course closely linked to changes of democratic rules – and actually we see here asimilar pattern, namely an increase of the meaning of democratic rules and at the very same time a lack

of the depth of their significance. This will be tackled further in the section on the Open Method of

Coordination as it is increasingly important after its firm establishment with the Lisbon Council’s

Conclusions (see page 17).

Fourth, though there remains an interventionist pattern of state-action, this is qualified in two

regards.

a) We find a general trend which is usually seen as deregulation. Taking the patterns that had been

mentioned before, namely the specific shift in the meaning of social law and the changing pattern of

democratic rules – we have to emphasise that the process is one of regulated deregulation. In many

cases it is forgotten that whatever occurs to be regulation, is actually a highly regulated process.

b) It is as well important to recognise the shift of intervention in qualitative terms. Whereas previous

politics and policies had been in a way based on rules of solidarity,13

we find more and more therequirement of reciprocity. It is important to recognise this as a further shift towards

individualisation. The reason for this is not primarily that the individual has to take more and more

responsibility. Rather, the reason that is important in more analytical terms is the fact that the social

principle of solidarity is being replaced by the principle of individual(ist) contracts.

Of course, all this means as well, that the understanding of citizenship and demos has to be redefined.

Without being able to explore this any further, the general trend of individualisation in the

understanding of the emergence of self-reliant market citizens – market being concerned with the

economy and as well with a political market – opens a trend towards an individualised understanding

of citizenship, based on

* self-responsibility

* human and social rights that are bound to certain criteria and conditions (health insurance as

condition for availing of health services) and

* social responsibility, the requirement to take care for the community and to fulfil communal duties

(s. Ewijk, Hans van: Good quality employment: the essence of recognition; in: Herrmann,

Peter/Cathal O'Connell, Cathal/Albert Brandstaetter, Albert: Defining Social Services in Europe.

Between the Particular and the General; Baden-Baden: Nomos, forthcoming)

The crucial point is that sociability is solely shifted to the individual, rights are conditional and –

paradoxically – the social is individualised in the understanding of the reduction on individual contracts

(see above remark on the “un-social”, page 6).

A “European State”

All this gives already fundamental answers on the question of this lecture, namely the question if a

European Social Model exists or not. First and foremost, there cannot be any doubt that such a modelexists: a model in the three meanings as they had been outlined above, i.e. as blueprint, tradition and

extrapolation (see page 3).

Second, with respect to the reality of a specific way of living together and designing EUropean

policies that are relevant for this living together, the three meanings are actually merging. Then, this

model shows a very definite pattern which will be shown in concrete terms below. Here it can be

already said that the fundamental pattern is caught in the quandary of on the one hand the ultra-

liberalist approach according to which the social basically does only exist as appendix (sic! not as an

annex) of economic development and on the other hand as being considered as a productive factor. In

any case, there is only little consideration of focusing on the value of living together as central issue in

its own right. Furthermore, though the orientation on the productive role of social policy gives some

right to “the social”, this is only considered as matter of an enhanced individualist contractualism.

13 by far not equalling redistribution between classes




10

Such thesis is insofar ruled by prerequisites as it starts from the presumption that we are actually

facing a process of a state emergence on a new aggregate level – we can make reference to TRUDI and

the qualifying remarks from above (see page 8). Theoretically the processes described so far had been

centrally discussed around four conceptualisations of the state which will only briefly be mentioned by

naming the relevant catchwords.

One dimension of the debate is concerned with the differentiation between negative and positive

integration – a terminology and facet that had been mainly issued by Fritz W. Scharpf. As much as thisis concerned with the macro-economic and in the wider sense economic-constitutional dimension, a

closely related point had been brought forward by Giandomenico Majone who pointed on the fact that

a fundamental difference exists between a regulative and the (re-)distributive social-policy function of

the state.

Another dimension is concerned with the differentiation between – and shift from – the active

(welfare) state and the activating (welfare) state, orientations that are increasingly brought forward in

contemporary debates. The crucial point is a similar shift as we can see it elsewhere: the further

consolidation of the orientation on individualist contractualism.

The third dimension is basically a transposition of the supposed active-activating dichotomy and it is

concerned with a shift from solidarity to reciprocity. Probably it can be said without exaggeration that

this is the most important aspect as we are here dealing with a shift from a potentially truly social bond

and foundation of any living together to one of individualist contractualism. Sure, this has to bequalified insofar as the character of socialisation in terms of solidarity orientations in contemporary

welfare states are somewhat limited. They are very much expressions of organised exchanges, for

instance institutionalised in social insurance systems. Here compensation and mutuality are very much

matters that appear to follow solidarity principles ([re-]distribution, compensation, intergenerational

transfers); however, it is actually the current debate that shows that the understanding is more likely

one of an individual precautionary principle: a saving bank into which one pays and from where one

takes money at a later stage. Still, the social orientation standing historically at the outset should not be

underestimated. And as correct as this is, it can be said that the orientation on reciprocity is a

historically meaningful step into the direction of furthering individualist orientations, thus following a

specific understanding of the relationship between economic and social as outlined above. It could be

said that the shift from an active to an activating state is actually the most fundamental and meaningful

as the only up to hitherto existing truly social dimension is finally suppressed.

What is worthwhile to be explored as fourth dimension is the change of patterns of democratic

ruling which can be described as shift from government to governance – later this will be exemplified

by a brief look at the Open Method of Coordination.

Contemporary debates on (welfare) state comparison are by and large dominated by referring to

Gøsta Esping-Andersen and his work on the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, presented in the

early 1990s. However, despite the many shortcomings of Esping-Andersen’s proposals (for instance

fading out the role of informal work), a meaningful aspect that is neglected in his work and as well in

the critique thereof is concerned with the lack of consideration given to administrative issues in the

widest sense. It is important to recognise that we are in general concerned with at least three levels of

policymaking, namely

* governing, i.e. the process that is by and large expressed in the structure of the separation of powers

* administering, i.e. the process of executing political decisions and accomplishing programmes and

* implementing, i.e. the process of the political interpretation during the process of executing politicaldecisions and at the same time – through this – influence further policy making.

14

It seems to be a new convention that the entirety of these three dimensions is now brought together

under the term of governance. What is meant is, broadly speaking, the idea that these three areas are

closely interlinked, moreover: that they have to be seen as entity. As such, the aim of the political

debate on governance is to bring together in a conscious and planned way. As defined in the European

Commission’s White Paper

‘Governance’ means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which

powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness,

participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.

(Commission of the European Communities: European Governance. A White

Paper; Brussels, 25.07.2001 . COM[2001]428: 8)

14 It is important to acknowledge that there is a fine line between administering and implementing which is not really getting

clear in the English language.



Peter Herrmann

11

The Commission concentrates on four areas where changes are suggested, namely

* enhancing involvement (s. ibid.: 11 ff.)

* improving the regulation and delivery of policies (s. ibid.: 18 ff.)

* covering global governance (s. ibid.: 26 ff.) and

* refocusing policies and institutions (s. ibid.: 28 ff.).

Of course, this is a double-edged sword.

* On the one hand, this is very much a creditable approach as it is! opening a process to a wider group of actors;

! formalising matters that are already shaping the process, thus moving them out of their

uncontrolled shadow-existence and at the same time going beyond the mechanisms of “formal

parliamentary democracy”;

! bringing the diversity of life situations closer to the political process.

* However, at the same time it closes the process to the extent

! to which it follows a stakeholder approach. The stakeholder approach is borrowed from economic

management theories, aiming on representing “all interested people and groups” – however

recognising the differences of the weight of interests. – Such recognition of differences is, of

course, important. The problem however is that there is no clear rule of how this weighing

actually takes place. In practical terms, the “number of stakes” is, of course, depending on

economic and political power. Then, to take just a single example and looking for instance at thenumber of lobby organisations from different sectors and as well at the character of lobby

organisations of one sector it is obvious that there is a definite limitation of such an approach is

getting clear as well. It is the well-known Matthew Effect and can as well be found in terms of

political decision making:

For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but

from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath."

(Matthew XXV:29, KJV – quoted from WIKIPEDIA -

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_effect - 04/03/07; 7:08).

! Another problem is that the openness is still limited as there is an agenda-setting role by certain

actors. In concrete terms this role is shifting more and more in favour of executive bodies of the

statutory system, thus the opening means increasingly that it is a politically uncontrolled body

that defines policies.

The structural shortcoming of the approach has to be seen in the fact that – contradicting its claim of a

formational turn – the governance approach, as proposed by the Commission continues to foster a top

down perspective, presuming a fundamental “dissection of citizen and city”. So we find the important

acknowledgement of a

widening gulf between the European Union and the people it serves

(Commission of the European Communities: European Governance. A White

Paper; Brussels, 25.07.2001 . COM[2001]428: 7)

However, what is stated in the following has nothing to do with the real politics and policies. Instead,

the following analysis, suggested in the White Paper, points on

* ‘perceived inability of the Union to act effectively’

* the lack of ‘proper credit for its actions’

* the assumption that ‘Member states do not communicate well what the Union is

doing’ * the believe that ‘many people do not know the difference between the

Institutions.’

(ibid.)

In other words, the debate is not geared towards actually policy making, to the actual role – and power

– of the citizens. Instead, the document orients on lack of knowledge and information and supposes

wrong perceptions. With this, the role of a servant is questioned, caught in a logical short-circuit as it

suggests that not politics and policies are wrong; instead, wrong is the communication of politics and

policies.15

Moreover and importantly this shows that (a) a reductionist approach as suggested by welfare

regime analysis is limited in terms of grasping issues that are relevant for social modelling and (b) the

opening of real political processes towards governance is dangerous as it is extremely difficult to

15 In a side remark: thus the European Commission’s governance strategy shows the danger of developing a political strategy

on Habermasian thoughts.




12

guarantee democratic representativity and legitimacy. The main point in question is the blurring of

borders between the administrative and the political system. In order to get a better grasp, it is

necessary to consider the more fundamental understanding of what is seen as state in the different

national approaches – it is such conceptualisation that provides the framework for analysing as well the

different welfare systems. Own research showed that a rather promising and fundamental approach has

to be oriented along historical lines. Methodologically, the suggestion is to start the analysis (a) from

focusing on state building and (b) to base this analysis on the question of how the understanding of thestate is actually founded in a certain accumulation regime and going hand in hand with a specific mode

of regulation. Without exploring this in detail (see e.g. Jessop, Bob: State Theory: Putting the

Capitalist State in its Place; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) and without presenting a tentative

historical perspective (see Herrmann, Peter: Developing a Methodology Based on the History of Ideas

for Social Professions – The Meaning of the Founding of the State. Meta-Theoretical Perspectives for

Developing a Methodology for an International Approach; New York: Nova; forthcoming), it is

proposed to concentrate on the following patterns – patterns that can actually be found as tensional

lines along and between which the European Social Model is being built. These are the following.

First, a competitive-paternalist approach can be found, purely following individualist

contractualism. Social law follows such pattern of individualist contractualism, and – as far as it is

concerned with the “provision of security” at all – such provision is strictly based on the idea of

obligations in form of a conditional system of rights.Second, a competitive-caring model can be defined, being to some extent based on the same

principles of individualist contractualism, but at the same time modifying such an approach by means

of introducing a productivist orientation: the competitive orientation, being self-reflexive, introduces

social policy as a “productive factor”. The introduction of social policy is based on an investment

strategy, producing “healthy workforce”, sufficiently and appropriately trained and maintained over

time. In other words, social policy is based on the principles of the factor theory in political economy;

thus, it is legally based on the two different patterns of the individualist contract on the one hand, on

solidarity-based contracts on the other hand.

Third, a mutualistic-solidaristic-equality oriented system can be seen in a pattern in which we find

on the one hand as well the link between economic performance and social security; however, in this

case, the point of departure is not the economic systems as such; instead, we are dealing with the

orientation starting from the individual needs, and then looking for the appropriate means. This means

as well that the individual is actually not a passive recipient of welfare nor a co-producer. Instead, the

social, social provisions and social security are not defined as part of an exchange relationship. On the

legal side we might see something of a truly common-law based setting ,democratically organised by

the people.

Fourth, a solidaristic-patenalistic approach can be found as pattern which is rights-based, defining

rights in an unconditional way but at the same time seeing social policy primarily as matter of

provisions rather than being concerned with self-organisation. One could speak of a common-Roman-

law tradition, prevailing the system.

– Actually, all these four models can closely be linked back into the mainstream approaches of

political economy. Further investigation is needed on how this links into different administrative

systems – the following table may give another stimulating view on topics in question – matters that

play a role as well in terms of merging into a European welfare system.

Key Features of Four State Traditions

Anglo-

Saxon Germanic French Scandinavian Is there a legal

basis for the

"State"? No Yes Yes Yes State-society

relations pluralistic organicist antagonistic organicist Form of

political

organization limited

federalist integral/

organic

federalist jacobin, "one

and

indivisible" decentralized

unitary Basis of policy

style incrementalis

t "muddling

through"

corporatist

legal technocratic

consensual



Peter Herrmann

13

legal Form of

decentralizatio

n

"State

power" (US);

local

government

(UK) cooperative

federalism regionalized

unitary state strong local

autonomy Dominantapproach to

discipline of

public

administration

political

science/

sociology public law public law public law(Sweden);

organization

theory

(Norway)

Countries UK; US;

Canada (but

not Quebec);

Ireland

Germany;

Austria;

Netherlands;

Spain (after

1978);

Belgium

(after 1988)

France; Italy;

Spain (until

1978);

Portugal;

Quebec;

Greece;

Belgium (until

1988)

Sweden,

Norway,

Denmark

(Loughlin, J. 1994. Nation, State and Region in Western Europe. In:

Beckemans, L. [ed.]: Culture: The Building-Stone of Europe, 2004. Brussels:

Presses Interuniversitaires; quoted from: Peters, Guy: Administrative Traditions;

December 2000; on: The World Bank Group [ed.]: Administrative & Civil

Service Reform; here:

http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/traditions.htm -

26.10.2003)

The development of European Social Policy Orientations

With respect to the concrete development of the orientations of European social policy the usual

imputation is, that actually not much is taking place, i.e. that social policy measures simply do notexist. There is, of course, some truth in such an interpretation. However, as said there is without any

doubt a European Social Model – and as much as this is true, it is also true that there is a substantial

body of definitive rules (in legislature, political declarations and legislation) that are in one way or

another relevant in terms of social policy. One challenge with regard to verifying such statement is to

understand social policy not in the limited way of “traditional social policy measures” (social

insurance, social security, provision of services for children, elderly etc.). Another challenge is to make

within the area of social policy a distinction complementing within this sector the one being made with

respect to the economic area, namely the distinction between negative and positive integration. This

presupposes that social policy is a set of regulating and distribution rules and at the same time a policy

of ordering social spaces by intervention and non-intervention. – In the following a few moments of the

development will be highlighted.

Treaties of Rome

To begin with, the Treaties of Rome did not make explicit reference to social policy. The emerging

entity was explicitly designed as economic community – with three exceptions.

* Being afraid of disadvantages arising from competition, the then French government insisted on

including policies on equal opportunities and gender: In this sense, gender policy has to be

understood as policy to compensate for higher French national investment in the area of equal

opportunities.

* The second exception was the establishment of a funds-policy in order to compensate for

consequences arising from industrial changes – not least this aimed at retraining workforce that had

been made redundant by the restructuration of heavy industries (steel, coal mining, ship building

industry).

* A third area can be seen in the common agricultural policy (CAP) – a set of artificial price controls

in the then still central sector of the economy.




14

At the end, to speak of an economic community meant not least that social policy had been understood

as establishing an area of “community building”, i.e. the coming together of people – first the elites,

then others – in order to develop a new normative system within which a legal system and a system of

legal provisions can arise. The means of this can be seen as kind of “negative integration” in the area of

social policy.16

The Single European Act and a “European Renaissance”

Although we cannot really speak of a fundamental shift, there had been some meaningful change of the

orientation with the debates in the early/middle of the 1970s and later the Single European Act

(1986/1987). The key issue is the explicit recognition of the fact that economic integration needed to be

flanked by political measures – broadly speaking this was an answer on the lack of legitimacy on

grounds of various economic developments (e.g. oil crisis, enlargement). Important is that this was the

start not least for some social policy measures, in particular with respect to start some programmes in

the social area, centrally the programmes combating poverty.

The actual important point has to be seen in the fact that – at least at the beginning of this phase –

Commission and Council alike embarked in particular by acting in the area of combating poverty on a

policy area for which no competencies did exist. One could go even a step further – and this would be

supported by the later judgement of the European Court of Justice with which the original fourth

program to combat poverty, with the acronym PROGRESS had been blocked – and say that these programmes had been concerned with policies which had been explicitly taken out of the European

remit. Consequently, all these measures had been undertaken without a genuine legal basis – the

Treaties did not give any other legal basis yet, and policies had been based on the competence-

competence clause of the Treaties, i.e. the provision that, the Commission could undertake actions in

areas which would be considered as important by the Council, provided unanimity of the vote. As

much as this had been a step backwards in actual activities, it had been a step forward as this

judgement forced policy makers to take a clear stance and to admit European responsibility for some

kind of social policy and to define the social policy they wanted or now to explicitly deny any explicit

responsibility in this area – later this will be taken up again.

Tightening the Bonds

This lack of explicit responsibility still did not change with the White Paper on Growth,Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21

st Century

(COM[93]700, December 1993 – http://europa.eu.int/en/record/white/c93700/contents.html;

12.4.2004-7.41 a.m.), which had been presented under the Commission Presidency of Jacques Delors.

This orientation, as can be already seen from the sequence of the issues mentioned in the title of the

White Paper, was driven by a strict orientation on economic progress, namely the establishment of the

Single European Market. As such, it meant to further ensure the four fundamental freedoms, namely

* the free movement of capital

* the free movement of goods

* the free movement of services and

* the free movement of persons.

Related to this, the European Commission launched in 1993 a Green Paper on Social Policy and a

subsequent White Paper (European Social Policy – A Way Forward for the Union; COM[94]333; July

199417 ). It had been at this time that the then Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs,

Padraig Flynn, celebrated the arrival of the “Civil Dialogue” – alongside of the “Social Dialogue”. It

can be debated if such a civil dialogue is at the end real progress to more influence of distinct social

actors or if it is a distraction, the provision of a p laying field for civil society organisations without any

legal rights.18

16 Further elaboration of negative integration as used by Fritz W. Scharpf and the way as it is used here as well as the

relationship between “negative integration” in the area of social policy on the one hand and regulative and distributive

policies, as presented by Giandomenico Majone is necessary but cannot be delivered here.17 It can be seen as symptomatic that the Delors White Paper is easily accessible via Internet whereas the other documents

mentioned in the following are not published on that site.18

See already Herrmann, Peter: Socialism for the Poor? Reflections on the EC-Programme ‘Poverty 3’ (Sozialismus für die Armen? Gedanken zum EG-Programm ‘Armut 3’); in: Neue Praxis. Zeitschrift für Sozialarbeit, Sozialpädagogik und

Sozialpolitik; Neuwied: Luchterhand, Issue 5/95: pp 441-456



Peter Herrmann

15

Another issue, gaining importance at this stage (although it is entering the public debate only much

later) is the one of public services, later explicitly formulated as matter of social services of general

(economic) interest. This is another matter that cannot be issued here. However, it is important to note

at least that it is here where the provision of social services – in which ever way they are finally defined

– are definitely pushed into the direction which had been discussed before in general terms: assessed in

a consequential perspective they are emerging as nothing else than a contractual relationship between

individuals.

The Trap of Success

Without going into any debate on this, I want to point on a next step of the development and with this

on at least one aspect of the “dilemma of progress”. The Treaties of Maastricht (1993) and Amsterdam

(1999). On the positive side mention has to be made of the fact that for the first time three central social

policy areas had been included in the quasi-constitutional legal framework, namely

* the Employment Title IVa of the Treaty of Amsterdam;

* the Antidiscrimination Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, allowing to take appropriate action to

combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or

sexual orientation;

* and the Subsidiarity Principle, further defined in the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of

Subsidiarity and Proportionality, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Especially the latter was bymany organisations considered as being important for their work as it meant to recognise the

importance of the local, regional and national conditions and moreover the competence of national

actors on the different levels from the local to the national level.

The “trap of success” (or, alluding to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s “cunning of reason” one can

speak of the cunning of unreasonableness) is that the factual recognition of a genuine social policy role

means at the same time the limitation of its scope, namely the definition of social policy strictly in

terms of employment policy. In other words, we find a definition that is largely an appendix of

economic policies – above the role of an appendix had been already mentioned with respect to the so-

called productive role of social policy (see e.g. Commission of the European Communities:

Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the

Committee of the Regions: Social Policy Agenda; Brussels: 28.6.2000 [2000(379)]).

Lisbon

The well known conclusion from the Lisbon Council in March 2000 says that

the Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become

the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world,

capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater

social cohesion.

(Council, 2000: Lisbon European Council. Conclusions, March23rd/25th , 2000)

There are different readings of this statement. The one – and this is the official version – suggests a

balanced relationship between the three angles of economic policy, employment policy and social

policy. These are suggested as policy mix, providing progress of integration. It based on

interdependence and mutuality, however as well on the notion of different foci of the three angles.

What is more, there is no common focus of the three areas – the Social Policy Agenda visualised this in

the following way.




16

(Commission of the European Communities: Communication to the Council, the

European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of

the Regions. Social Policy Agenda; Brussels 28.6.2000; COM(2000) 379 final:

6)

Another reading basically agrees, though it suggests that over time an increasing imbalance between

the factors emerged. From there it is suggested that a rebalancing exercise is needed, taking due

consideration of the interests of various groups of disadvantaged people – it is an approach that is

mainly advocated for by NGOs in the social field.

Both views are getting clear if one looks at documents of the European Councils. For instance, the

summit of Barcelona concluded in March 2002:

The European social model is based on good economic performance, a high level

of social protection and education and social dialogue. An active welfare state

should encourage people to work, as employment is the best guarantee against

social exclusion.

(http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/71025.pdf : 8 – 12/03/07

- 8:05

From there it stated As far as the social front is concerned, this includes

! increasing the involvement of workers in changes affecting them …

! enhancing the qualitative aspects of work …

(ibid.)

The European Council held in March 2006 in Brussels, stated even more clearly

For the European social model to be sustaianable, Europe needs to step up it

efforts to create more economic growth, a higher level of employment and

productivity while stengthening social inclusion and social protection in line

with the objectives provided for in the Social Agenda.

(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/06/1&format=

HTML&aged=0 &language=EN&guiLanguage=en: 23 – 12/03/07 - 8:11)

All these statements as well as the concrete negotiations and decisions as for instance during the

Informal Council Meeting of Employment, Social and Health Ministers in Helsinki, which took place

on the 6th

to the 8th

of July, 2006 clearly show the imbalances and their structural foundation. The

actual focus is on growth and competitiveness and a wording as Health and Functional Capacity as

Human Capital as it had been used in the minutes of the Helsinki-meeting clearly show that

subordination and orientation on functionality in terms of the economic system is shaping social policy

under the Lisbon strategy.

Consequently I want to suggest another reading, starting from the interpretation that this new

strategy is everything else than new. Instead, we can see it very much as a new edition of what had

been said in the White Paper issued by Jacques Delors in 1993. There is, however, a slight shift in as

far as the Lisbon strategy starts from the focus on competition whereas Delors’ proposal started from

the growth as focal point. This implies that the Lisbon Strategy was to a large extent – at least on the

vocalised level – driven by the fear of globalisation and the said need of finding an answer on the

globalisation challenge.



Peter Herrmann

17

To state this, is important first in terms of assessing the measures taken. They had been mainly

based on a strategy of “regulated deregulation” and following a line of cost reduction: wage cuts,

increasing stress at the work place and the privatisation of social costs including different patters as

social insurance and increasing precarity.19

A second reason for the importance of such a statement is the shift we can make out as part of the

mid-term review. Although it would be problematic to overemphasise the changes, the mid-term

review brought with it the increasing recognition of challenges coming from within, being based on theinternal social dynamic of the EU. These are as different as the necessity to deal with further

enlargement, demographic changes, in particular aging, changing gender roles due to the increased

rates of women in employment, shifts to a service economy, new forms of exclusion and precarity of

employment but moreover of the entire life situation. – Actually it is interesting that most of the points

issued, had been already discussed and highlighted for a long time as common social concerns and can

be traced back as explicit and coherently elaborated body of apprehension at least to the debate on the

Green and White Paper on Social Policy from the mid-1990s.

Coming back to the third reading of the new strategy, it is suggested here that it is wrong to speak of

a balanced approach. There had been always an imbalance because issues of the social had been

actually removed by defining them as matter of a “separate”, solitary policy domain. They had been

posed in competition with policies on economic growth and employment (see for a more detailed

presentation of this interpretation J. Baars/W. Beck/P. Herrmann/L.J.G.van der Maesen/A.C. Walker:Social Quality. A Sustainable Project for Europe. Briefing Paper for the Round Table of the European

Commission; Amsterdam: The European Foundation on Social Quality, November 2003). In short, the

supposedly balanced triangle is in actual fact structurally competition-driven.

OMC – dual strategy

Despite being important in terms of the focus of future policy orientations the Lisbon Summit had been

meaningful in terms of defining as well the future strategy, which had been already discussed in

general terms under the heading of a shift from governing to governance (see above, page 10). In

Lisbon, this new orientation was clearly spelled out and defined as a key instrument in further

developing policy making.20

The background for such a new instrument is the ongoing difficulty of gaining a real European

identity – and with this we are facing an interesting methodological paradox: Saying on the one hand,

there is a strong economic power and entity – the latter is metaphorically getting clear by looking at the

replacement of the “Made in …” France, Germany, or Italy by the “Made in the EU” as a supposed

quality indicator – we can see that law in general follows on the foot, but at the same time social-

policy-making is lagging far behind.

We have to be careful in developing this argument. On the one hand we are dealing with a

somewhat delicate issue of developing and shifting patterns of “governance” in a very general way –

we can probably speak of secular patterns, following from processes of modernisation (see Herrmann,

Peter: Ruling between God, Government and People; lecture in Cork at the Department of Public

Administration – available in the sideway-section of the website http://william-thompson.ucc.ie). As

part of this process, policy-making shifts towards an institutionalised system, implying what has been

mentioned above as rule of law in the framework of the definition of the modern state as TRUDI (see page 8). This is a twofold process as it means the increasing clarity of processes in terms of the said

institutionalised system and at the same time the increasing ambiguity of the system as the institutions

themselves have now to deal with previously external moments – the supposed eternal and externally

19 It should be mentioned that precarity, lowering wages and worsening labour conditions have to be interpreted as social

costs although we are facing by and large a privatisation of these costs.20 The more technical dimension is explained in the glossary of the EU website

(http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/open_method_coordination_en.htm - 04.03.07; 7:59); see as well Herrmann, Peter:

Open Method of Coordination in the European Union: A Trojan Horse – But who is the rider? In: Social Work & Society,Volume 4, Number 2 [2006-12-16] http://www.socwork.net/2006/2/agora/documents/herrmann/herrmann.pdf - 04.03.07;

7:58)




18

given natural law is increasingly replaced by the discursively defined positive law, defined as a

complex and reflexive set of rules.21

However, on the other hand and going beyond the secular development, we are dealing with the

specific issue of a failing EUropean government (sic!) – failing in establishing an equilibrium between

the different levels of policy-making. Consequently, Anton Hemerijk interprets the Open Method of

Coordination as representing

a ‘doubly engaging’ policy process par excellence in that it seeks to interlink domestic policy making and EU coordination, combining common action and

national autonomy beyond the traditional and inflexible Community method and

the rather formal and defensive deployment of the subsidiarity and

proportionality principles in EU policy making.

(Hemerijk, Anton: Joining Forces for Social Europe. Reinventing the Lisbon

Imperative of “Double Engagement”; Lecture to the Conference “Joining Forces

for a Social Europe”, organised under the German Presidency of the European

Union during the first half of 2007, in Nuremberg, 8/9 February 2007: 1022 )

With reference to (Sabel, 2004 - unreferenced) he states that as such,

the spirit of “double engagement”, in short, takes the form of an agreement to

agree, on terms yet to be specified in an engaging bootstrapping policy process

(ibid.: 11)Sure, this is an alluring strategy in as far as it promises openness and opens processes to a wider range

of policy makers. Especially it has the potential of including informal and small-scale actors into the

process. At the same time, a deeper analysis makes us alert. The OMC, as many other instruments of

so-called direct democracy implies a dangerous shift of responsibility.

* On the one hand we find a shift to the executive. Policies under the OMC

is dominated by a new class of high civil servants and EU officials

(ibid.: 14)

and we face the

danger that open coordination ends up in a ritual of ‘dressing up’ existing

policies

(ibid.)

* On the other hand, the shift to individualist and particularist policy making and negotiation has to be

recognised. If we look for instance at the lobby organisations in Brussels, we find that in all policy

sectors some strong, economically powerful actors find at least much easier access than small

organisations and representatives of interests and groups that are not part of mainstream debates. It

would be dangerous not to accept that social policy is part of this power-game.

Furthermore, a momentum that is frequently faded out is the fact that the OMC is based on the

principle of a strong agenda setting role for certain groups, especially the mentioned new class of

high civil servants and EU officials. This implies a buffering role that makes it nearly impossible to

include issues that are not part of official politics and strategies.

A side-remark is worthwhile: Many of these processes are by no means in principal new. They confirm

patterns that are already working for a long time and can be seen on the national level as well. New is

that with the firm definition of internal and external borders, the definite distribution of power positions

on a multi-level and multi-spherical system a new stage of strictness of power relations is reached. It is

actually this new firmness of power distribution that allows – and requires – to open the structures insome regards.

– It is always forgotten that compared with the medieval tyrant the Machiavellian Prince meant

progress although it had been a long way from the new despot of the Renaissance to the enlightened

prince as permeated by Frederick II (see the “Anti-Machiavel” from 1740). But it is not less forgotten

that even the enlightened prince was … – a prince.

21 As consequence we have to deal with a specific institutional shift in policy making, namely the increasing meaning of

High Courts, not least the European Court of Justice as actual policy makers although their original role was meant to be

one of an institution that controls policy makers and policy making.22

Quoted is the version as distributed during the conference; there is a slightly different version available on the Internet at http://www.eu2007.bmas.de/EU2007/Redaktion/Englisch/PDF/2007-02-08-kraefte-buendeln-presentation-

netherlands,property=pdf,bereich=eu2007,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf - 1.3.2007; 22:48



Peter Herrmann

19

Outlook

So we are in some way back to square one: the European Social Model claims to be successor of

“European traditions”, going back to ancient times, having its roots in the Greek and Roman empires.

The mentioned shift to individualist and particularist policy making and negotiation is in actual fact

not much else than a “modern form” of the principle, which is well known from ancient times, namely

the one of divide et impera. And on this ground, negotiations about enlargement, accession etc. remind a little bit at the old

European saga.

According to the Greek myth, Zeus, the Thunder-God residing on the Olympus, in

the shape of a bull abducted Europa, the daughter of the Phoenician king Agenor

and carried her over the sea to Crete. Agenor sent his sons out to search for their

sister. One of them, Kadmos, landed in Greece and was told by the oracle of

Delphi that he should wander around, armed with his spear till he reached the

cowherd Pelagon in the land of Phokis. He should kill Pelagon – the man of

earth, “born to die” – and choose the cow with the sign of the moon on both her

flanks and follow her, till she would lie down, with her horns on the ground. On

this hill he should kill and sacrifice her to the earth Goddess and then found a big

city on this spot, Thebes. Kadmos followed the oracle and became the founder of Thebes. He married

Harmonia, the daughter of Ares, the War God, and Aphrodite (…). It is not clear

from the myths whether he killed the moon-cow, obviously his sister Europa, or

not. In any case, one does not hear of her again. She, the raped and abducted

woman was only the means to lead the warrior and new culture hero into the

foreign land and to his greatness.

(Maria Mies: Europe in the Global Economy or the Need to De-Colonize Europe;

in: Peter Herrmann (Ed.): Challenges for a Global Welfare System: Commack,

New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.; 1999: 153-171; here: 160 f.)

Though many opportunities do exist, there is on the other hand the real development that the

enlargement strategy is mainly one of creating “internal peripheries” and the tendency of bringing them

partially closer to the centre first creates new external peripheries that are in a second step

“internalised” – or, using a clearer language – overtaken and imperialistically subordinated (see in this

context as well Herrmann, Peter/Tausch, Arno: Globalization and European Integration; New York:

Nova Science, 2001). A spiral, not entirely new, however, with the concentration of power in three

blocks, namely Asia, Europe and the USA, and the lack of a real counter-power gains ground. With

this, the meaning of such imperialist division of the world gains a new dimension, consisting of

* the refeudalisation of the political system

* the regulated deregulation and

* the ambition of establishing a strategic world superpower.

Postscript

Social provision is particularly challenged and coined by the dialectic betweenindividual and general, society and state – and by this it is logged into

contradictions … Social provision manifests itself in the correspondence of

solidarity of provision and solidarity of performance, the correspondence of times

of provision and times of performance. Subsequently it requires a behaviour that

follows rules. …. Individualisation consequently requires a new equilibrium

between collective provision and individual self-responsibility.23

23 Original:

Soziale Vorsorge wird in besonderem Masse von der Dialektik von Individuum und Allgemeinheit,

von Gesellschaft und Staat gefordert, geprägt – und in Widersprüche verwickelt. … Soziale Vorsorge

realisiert sich in der Korrespondenz zwischen der Solidarität der Vorsorge und der Solidarität der

Leistung, zwischen den Zeiten der Vorsorge und den Zeiten der Leistung. Sie setzt deshalb einregelhaftes Verhalten voraus. … Individualisierung erfordert deshalb ein neues Gleichgewicht

zwischen kollektiver Vorsorge und individueller Selbstverantwortung.




20

(Zacher, Hans F.: Das soziale Staatsziel; in: Handbuch des Staatsrechts der

Bundesrepublik Deutschland; eds.: Josef Isensee und Paul Kirchhof. Volume II:

Verfassungsstaat; Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag20043: 659-784; here: 696 f.)

This quote from the work of Hans F. Zacher marks the framework within which we have to assess the

European Social Model – as said, the question is not if something as the ESM does exist; the question

is what kind of model we find. The individualisation Zacher mentions is fundamentally different from

that which is currently found in reality. The one mode of individualisation is based on “internalcommunitarian solidarity” – the establishment and maintenance of a community, of which the rules are

set by the given society. The other mode of individualisation is based on forced solidarity, following

from setting external borders – the establishment of a fortress that has to decide on the “we” and “the

other”. Such a division is reproducing itself internally, i.e. in the given community/society, all these

being entities without genuine own identity.

Coming back to the question of the different meanings of the term model, we are currently at a stage

where there is still a model in terms of an ideal, following the value-orientation of the enlightenment,

the values of the French revolution of liberté, égalité, fraternité – and probably one can say that this

ideal is seen by many as a “real historical heritage”. In other words, it is seen as the common tradition.

However, the fact that this heritage is inherently contradicting, is faded out from these views. The same

contradiction, that stood at the outset of enlightenment is still venomous: it is the contradiction between

citoyen and bourgeois.It is the challenge for Europe to build a positive identity that does not depend on fortress building

but that focuses on social quality

as the extent to which people are able to participate in the socio-economic,

cultural, juridical and political life of their communities under conditions which

enhance their well-being and individual potentials for contributing to societal

development as well.

(Herrmann, Peter: Social Quality and the European Social Model. Opening

individual well-being for a social perspective; in: Alternatives. Turkish Journal

of International Relations 4/4; Published and Edited by Bulent Aras; Istanbul:

Faith University. Department of International Relations, Winter 2005: 16-32;

here 21 – http://www.alternativesjournal.net/;

http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume4/number4/herrmann.pdf)

Any social policy will take a different shape in this light.



Peter Herrmann

Editorial Note

i The William-Thompson-Working-Paper-Series is edited by the European Social

Organisational and Science Consultancy for University of Cork, Department of Applied

Social Studies and meant to offer a space for publications of occasional documents. One aim

amongst others is to offer a space for publication of work by colleagues of the Department of

Applied Social Studies at University of Cork.

The work is edited and supervised for publication by Peter Herrmann, ESOSC.

The papers will only be published as PDF- or word-file on the website http://william-

thompson.ucc.ie.

Requests for publication can be sent to ESOSC at herrmann[at]esosc.eu and will be accepted

for publication after collective assessment (peer-reviewers will be listed on the website

without reference to concrete documents).

The copyright is still with the authors so that the documents are free to further publication.

WT WP 1 European Social Model What Kind of Existence Ankara

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