Wonka, Arndt - Decision Making Dynamics in the European Commission, Partisan, National or Sectoral

Decision-making dynamics in theEuropean Commission: partisan,national or sectoral?Arndt Wonka

ABSTRACT Its monopoly power to formulate policy proposals and setthe European Union’s (EU’s) legislative agenda guarantees the European Commis-sion considerable prominence in EU legislative studies. It is commonly conceptual-ized as a unitary actor, acting cohesively – often in its own supranational interest –in EU decision-making. Recent theoretical developments and empirical studies,however, cast doubt on this conceptualization. This paper takes up these mattersand investigates the decision-making mechanisms and dynamics of the Commis-sion’s executive politics. Two case studies show that the formal division of poweralong portfolios puts formally responsible Commissioners in a privileged positionto influence the content of legislative proposals in internal decision-making. Thisinfluence, however, is circumscribed by the opposition of other Commissioners.At least in the cases studied here, Commissioners’ position-taking and conflict ininternal decision-making follow a national and, to some extent, a sectoral ratherthan a partisan pattern.

KEY WORDS Commissioner; European Commission; internal decision-making;legislative politics.

1. INTRODUCTION1

Two conceptualizations of the Commission’s behaviour in European Union(EU) legislative politics dominate the literature. The first portrays the Commis-sion as a non-majoritarian institution without politics and primarily concernedabout efficient policy solutions (Moravcsik 1998: 67–77; Thatcher and StoneSweet 2002; Majone 2001). Commission legislative behaviour, therefore, issaid to aim at some ‘optimal long-run policy’ (Majone 2001: 112). Thesecond perspective, dominating EU policy-making and legislative decision-making studies, conceptualizes the Commission as a bureaucratic actoraiming at expanding its influence by pushing the expansion of the EU’s legisla-tive scope. These aims, the argument runs, are at odds with member state gov-ernments (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; Cram 1997: 154–8; Pollack 2003:36; Horl et al. 2005: 594, 598–9; Thomson et al. 2006). Building on theseearlier studies, recent contributions deal explicitly with factors driving theEuropean Commission’s behaviour in EU legislative politics (Ross 1995;

Journal of European Public PolicyISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online # 2008 Taylor & Francis

http://www.informaworld.com/journalsDOI: 10.1080/13501760802407656

Journal of European Public Policy 15:8 December 2008: 1145–1163

Thomson 2008; Wonka 2007; Egeberg 2006; Hug 2003; Crombez 1997;Doring 2007). It is to this burgeoning literature that this article contributes.

It does so by discussing legislative decision-making in the European Commis-sion along four analytical scenarios. The analytical focus is on Commissionersand the motives driving their actions.2 This analytical focus constitutes a depar-ture from a large part of the literature on the European Commission whichfocuses on the Commission’s administrative staff. That literature analyzeshow national, partisan and organizational factors shape the attitudes of Com-mission administrators (Hooghe 2001) and behaviour on the Commission’sadministrative level (cf. Michelmann 1978; Egeberg 1996; Christiansen1997). While national and partisan factors are shown to be of prime importancein shaping Commission administrators’ attitudes (Hooghe 2005: 887–8), theirinfluence on administrators’ interaction patterns is mixed (cf. Michelmann1978: 492–4; cf. Egeberg 1996: 730–1). From a rationalist neo-institutionalperspective (Hall and Taylor 1996) the latter finding is not surprising.Formal institutional rules rather than culturally motivated self-selection deter-mine who interacts with whom in policy formulation. Likewise, studies inthis tradition do not explicitly discuss how administrators’ attitudes andtheir interactions relate to the Commission’s behaviour in EU legislativedecision-making.

This article’s discussion of internal decision-making puts Commissionerscentre stage. This analytical simplification comes with the assumption thatthey, rather than Commission administrators, shape the Commission’s legisla-tive behaviour. There are good reasons for making this assumption: Commis-sioners are political heads of the Directorates General (DGs) and formallytake decisions in the College of Commissioners. Administrative staff thereforemust win the active political support of a Commissioner for a proposal to suc-cessfully make it upwards through the Commission and into the EU’s legislativegame (Spence 1997: 111–17). Quite a number of systematic descriptionsprovide valuable information on the Commission’s internal institutionalmake-up and its decision-making rules (Nugent 2001; see the review byTallberg 2007: 197). So far, however, Egeberg’s contribution is the only sys-tematic discussion of decision-making dynamics inside the Commission(2006). I shall therefore discuss it in some detail below.

2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: FOUR SCENARIOSOF DECISION-MAKING DYNAMICS IN THE COMMISSION

The factors that shape the Commission’s legislative behaviour can be analyti-cally understood as two-dimensional: a horizontal dimension capturesdecision-making dynamics inside the Commission. These dynamics will be dis-cussed below on the basis of four decision-making scenarios. A vertical dimen-sion captures governments’ central role in the appointment of Commissionersand the political links established through appointment (Crombez 1997; Hug2003; Doring 2007; Wonka 2007). Since the Commission is a powerful

1146 Journal of European Public Policy

actor in EU legislative decision-making, governments have an incentive tonominate individuals who share their policy preferences and whom they cantrust to defend their political interests once appointed. Such an appointmentstrategy reduces the risk that Commission proposals will inflict political andmaterial costs on governments and their constituencies. Empirical findingssupport this reasoning and demonstrate that governments employ theirformal appointment powers to influence Commission behaviour in EU legisla-tive politics (for discussion and empirics, see Wonka 2007): governments pre-dominantly appoint Commissioners affiliated to a party represented in theappointing government. Appointees had also already proved themselves reliablein important political posts. National parties therefore play an important rolein the political link between governments and Commissioners.

Yet, how do these ‘vertical’ national partisan links between governments andCommissioners play out ‘horizontally’, i.e. regarding the dynamics of decision-making inside the Commission? I propose four decision-making scenarios todiscuss this question: the ‘national party scenario’ (I), the ‘transnational partyscenario’ (II), the ‘national agent scenario’ (III), and the ‘portfolio scenario’(IV) (see Figure 1). Regarding their propositions about Commissioners’ beha-viour, the ‘national agent scenario’ and the ‘portfolio scenario’ basicallymatch the ‘portfolio role’ and ‘country role’ sketched by Egeberg (2006:5–6). While the ‘national agent scenario’ follows from the theoretical consider-ations on the vertical political link between governments and Commissioners,the ‘portfolio scenario’ represents the standard account in the literature (seebelow). Moreover, while Egeberg sketches a general ‘party role’, I distinguishbetween a ‘national’ and a ‘transnational party scenario’. They follow directlyfrom the vertical party link between governments and Commissioners and tiein with the wider discussion on EU partisan politics (Marks and Wilson2000; Hix et al. 2007). Finally, Egeberg conceives of institutions as a ‘normative(role) structure that imposes codified expectations as regards the decision beha-viour of the various role incumbents’ (2006: 3). He therefore sees Commis-sioners primarily as proponents of their DG’s interests (2006: 5–6). In linewith the rationalist version of neo-institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996),this paper analytically separates institutions from actors’ political motives.This analytical distinction allows us to conceptually differentiate betweenthe factors considered relevant for the dynamics of decision-making andthe setting in which these dynamics take place. The underlying theoreticalreasoning for the four scenarios therefore differs significantly from Egeberg’s(2006).

The respective mechanisms leading to different dynamics in the four scenariosare discussed along three analytical dimensions: the positions that Commis-sioners take, the rationale behind Commissioners’ position-taking and theresulting coalitions and conflicts, i.e. potentially observable dynamics in Com-mission decision-making (cf. Figure 1). The theoretical importance of nationalparties along the vertical dimension directly translates into the partisandynamics of the two party scenarios.

A. Wonka: Decision-making dynamics in the Commission 1147

(I) National party scenario

In the national party scenario Commissioners take their national parties’ pos-itions in Commission decision-making. Commissioners may be induced todo so as national party leaders’ office distribution powers may threaten theircareer ambitions if they decide not to defend their national parties’ positionsinside the Commission. The selective reappointment of Commissioners and

Figure 1. Four scenarios of decision-making in the European Commission


their selective appointment to domestic political posts after they leavethe Commission support this reasoning empirically (Wonka 2007: 183–4).The national party leadership may have an incentive to mandate their Commis-sioners with a position for proposals relating to a party’s programmatic coreconcern and affecting its core constituencies. They can thus use Commissionpolitics to score in domestic partisan politics. This may hold despite the rela-tively low salience of EU issues in election campaigns (Pennings 2006),because national parties may want to avoid public opposition from interestgroups which are part of its core constituency. Finally, national parties andtheir Commissioners may want to introduce EU legislative proposals via theCommission in order to sidestep blockade by domestic opposition parties. Ifnational party positions drive Commissioners’ actions, coalitions as well as con-flicts in internal decision-making should change according to national partyinterests on a given subject. If Commissioners co-operate on a proposal, it isa result of the joint interests of their national parties rather than a result oftransnational party family alliances.

(II) Transnational party scenario

In the transnational party scenario, Commissioners whose national partiesbelong to the same party family agree on a transnational party position andalign along transnational partisan lines in internal decision-making. Commis-sioners may have an incentive to build stable coalitions to reap the policybenefits from such long-term co-operation. The ideological cohesiveness ofnational parties from the same party family (cf. Marks and Wilson 2000)may facilitate the alignment of Commissioners along partisan lines. At thesame time, stable transnational party coalitions may force individual nationalparties to compromise their position in order to maintain stable transnationalparty alignment. To reap policy benefits more effectively, transnational partyactivities may even extend across EU institutions and include Members of theEuropean Parliament (MEPs).3 If the transnational party scenario is a validmodel of decision-making in the Commission, we should observe neitheropen conflict among Commissioners from the same party family nor coalitionschanging within or between proposals and forming across party family lines.Rather, transnational party coalitions among Commissioners should mostlikely form in proposals that pit capital against workers’ interests and are thusof high salience to party families’ respective constituencies.

(III) National agent scenario

The national agent scenario postulates that Commissioners’ positions inCommission decision-making are in line with the preferences of broad domesticcoalitions. These are made up of a member state’s governing and oppositionparties and domestic interest groups which try to fend off legislative interven-tions which negatively affect their country’s economic competitive position


vis-a-vis other member states and third countries (Moravcsik 1993: 483–96;Heritier et al. 1996; Horl et al. 2005: 596–7). For decisions with economicimplications, such broad domestic coalitions may be politically opportune asleftist parties’ attempts to protect the interests of unions and their membersmay converge with those of conservative parties regarding employers’ interests.In addition, government and opposition parties may have strategic incentives toagree on a common position to increase their bargaining weight at the EU level(Putnam 1988). The fact that large member states – almost without exception –nominated a ‘grand coalition team’, i.e. one Commissioner from a governingparty and one Commissioner from an opposition party (Wonka 2007:179–80), can be interpreted as an indication of national parties’ politicaleffort to facilitate broad ‘national’ coalitions as stipulated in this scenario.Decision-making along these lines results in intergovernmental dynamics withCommissioners forming proposal-specific coalitions depending on domesticpolitico-economic interests in their member states. National parties are import-ant in this scenario as they forge political bonds between governments andCommissioners. Yet, unlike in the national party scenario, Commissionersand their national parties in this scenario are part of a broad domestic coalition.They do not use Commission politics to score in domestic partisan politics.

(IV) Portfolio scenario

The portfolio scenario sees Commissioners as advocates of their DG’s interests.Commissioners may decide to act that way because their success ‘is measuredagainst their achievements as department heads’ or because of personal ambitionto increase the competences of their portfolio (cf. for ministers Bergman et al.2003: 179). These effects may be amplified by Commissioners’ identificationwith their field of responsibility (Egeberg 2006: 5) and the establishment of‘policy networks’ between a DG and other private and public actors operatingin the respective sector (Hooghe 2001: 26–7). Note, however, that Commis-sioners in this scenario possibly need to defend their DG’s interests on a particu-lar proposal vis-a-vis their colleagues. DG administrative staff thus need to seektheir Commissioner’s active support for any proposal. This renders ‘bureau-cratic government’ (Laver and Shepsle 1994: 5–6), in which the Commissioneris no more than a puppet on administrators’ strings, an unrealistic option.Conflicts between Commissioners in this scenario run along sectoral lines.They can occur for proposals which affect the portfolios of a number of Com-missioners – and on which their interests diverge. Following from the above,the vertical party bonds between Commissioners and their governments andthe horizontal partisan bonds between Commissioners do not affect thequality of politics inside the Commission in the portfolio scenario. The standardaccount in the literature of a Commission striving for ‘more Europe’ andopposing national governments’ interests is based on this scenario (Cram1997: 154–7; Pollack 2003; Horl et al. 2005).


Note that decision-making in the Commission in this article is not expectedto always be conflictual. For a substantial number of proposals Commissioners’positions may not diverge. This seems to be the case in most legislative proposalsformulated during the term of the Prodi Commission (1999–2004): Only 230of 1,324 legislative proposals (17.4 per cent) made it to the College of Commis-sioners to be adopted through the oral procedure (Wonka 2008: 150, 138).4

Egeberg is thus mistaken in concluding ‘that the role most frequently evokedin the College is the “portfolio role”’ and that ‘Commissioners tend to cham-pion the interests that are inherently linked to their respective briefs [portfolios]’(Egeberg 2006: 11; my emphasis). Rather, the frequency that he reports,based on six interviews, most likely reflects the lion’s share of conflict-freeproposals. In these cases Commissioners dutifully and routinely contribute tothe Commission’s division of labour, which is institutionally divided betweenthe different DGs.

Non-conflictual cases, however, cannot tell us anything about the internaldynamics of decision-making. Only in those cases where Commissioners dohave diverging positions leading to internal conflict is it possible to identifythe factors driving these conflicts. Note that, in some situations, the mechanismsoutlined in the scenarios may lead to observationally equivalent dynamics, thuspreventing a clear-cut empirical assessment of the scenarios’ relative analyticalleverage: across member states, national parties from the same party familiesmay take the same positions. The resulting dynamics would then simultaneouslyfit those described in the national and the transnational party scenarios. More-over, a Commissioner may take a position promoting his DG’s sectoral interestsbut at the same time corresponding to his party’s position or to the positiontaken by a broad domestic coalition in his country. In such a case, discrimi-nation between the national party, the national agent and the portfolio scenariosis hardly possible. Whether these analytical ambiguities in the form of observa-tional equivalence will materialize can only be established empirically.

3. EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES

The two cases studied below are legislative proposals formulated and adopted bythe (Prodi) Commission between 1999 and 2004. Holding constant the indi-viduals serving during the formulation and adoption of cases reduces thelikelihood that possible differences in decision-making dynamics between thetwo will be caused by any idiosyncratic characteristics of individual Commis-sioners. The cases to be discussed are REACH (COM 2003(644-1)), which(re-)regulated EU chemicals legislation, and the Takeover Directive (COM2002(534)), which laid down measures that firms and their owners mayemploy to fend off takeovers. Both proposals made it to the College of Commis-sioners and were adopted by oral procedure, indicating that their formulationand adoption caused conflicts during formulation and adoption in the Commis-sion. Yet, the cases were not selected with any advance knowledge of a specificconflict pattern in internal decision-making. The selection of two proposals


dealing with socioeconomic left–right issues makes them the most likely candi-dates for either of the two party scenarios. Thus, if partisan dynamics cannot beobserved here, they will be unlikely to shed light on political dynamics inside theCommission.

A good way of analysing internal Commission decision-making would be toacquire information on the positions taken by all Commissioners. Since proto-cols of internal debates and the (few) votes5 which Commissioners take are notpublicly available, however, this option, which is standard practice for theEuropean Parliament (EP) and Council, is precluded. Moreover, the usefulnessof personal interviews is restricted by the relative need for secrecy and discretionby Commission officials when it comes to reporting internal position-takingand conflicts over policy decisions. This may explain why most studies focuson the general attitudes of Commission employees (cf. Hooghe 2001) oroffer an assessment of Commissioners’ ‘frequent’ behaviour (cf. Egeberg2006) rather than report on their behaviour in particular decisions. Thissecrecy and the non-availability of protocols and voting records may furtherexplain why, unlike for the EP and Council, there is so little empirical infor-mation on decision-making dynamics in the Commission (for an exception,see Ross 1995). Yet information on conflict inside the Commission does leakout and is reported in the media. Newspaper articles were therefore used asempirical sources on position-taking and conflicts on the policy decisions ana-lysed in this paper. Drawing on the British Financial Times (FT) and theGerman Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) helped to avoid national biasesin the reports. The reliability of the information on actors’ positions takenfrom media reports is reinforced by drawing on official documents and officialpolicy statements as the second main source for the relevant information.

Reach

The Commission’s proposal ‘concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Author-ization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a EuropeanChemicals Agency and amending Directive 1999/45/EC’ (Commission2003) aimed at simplifying chemicals regulation in the EU by replacing 40existing EU laws (Commission 2001: 5–6; 2003). A second major ambitionof REACH is to increase the level of protection for both consumers and theenvironment by stepping up control requirements for chemical substancesbefore they enter the market. The political impetus for the reformulation ofEU chemicals legislation did not come from an entrepreneurial environmentCommissioner but from member state governments. In April 1998, attheir informal Environment Council in Chester, environment ministersasked the Commission to develop ideas on a new chemicals policy. TheCommission consequently issued a working document (Commission 1998),and staged a brainstorming session on EU chemicals legislation with 150individuals representing private actors as well as representatives from memberstates (Council 1999). It also presented the White Paper ‘Strategy for a


Future Chemicals Policy’ which outlined details of the planned regulation(Commission 2001).

The Commission’s working papers were duly noted by member states andpositively commented on by the (Environment) Council (Council 1998,1999). The publication of the White Paper, however, triggered a huge lobbyingcampaign by environmental groups, on the one hand, and industry groups andunions, on the other (Wonka, in preparation). Consumer groups took an inter-mediate position (Lindgren and Persson 2008). Moreover, there was strongopposition from the governments of the UK, France and Germany – countrieswhich are home to large chemical industries (Wonka, in preparation) – whilethe Scandinavian countries generally welcomed the new chemicals regulation(Nordic Council 2004). Not only did the governments of the former countrieswork together with the relevant industry associations and unions to comeup with public position statements against REACH (Bundesregierung derBundesrepublik Deutschland 2002; UK Government 2002; Chemical IndustryAssociation 2002), their heads of government – Blair (Labour), Chirac (Unionfor a Popular Movement) and Schroder (Social Democratic Party (SPD)) –wrote a common position paper to the then Commission President, RomanoProdi, asking for the proposal to be watered down. Specifically, they wantedthe Commission to:

ensure that the [REACH] proposals do not disadvantage legitimate EUbusiness interests in the global market by imposing requirements which arenot pertinent to protecting health and environment.

(Tony Blair et al. 2003)

To deal with this political opposition, the Commission staged two more stake-holder conferences with industry, the unions and non-governmental organiz-ations (NGOs) as well as member state representatives, and carried out alarge-scale internet consultation before submitting its proposal to the EP andthe Council. On 29 October 2003 the Commissioners adopted the REACHproposal. On 18 December 2006 the decision-making process ended with theEP and the Council signing the regulation.

The Commission’s extensive consultation with private and public actorsmakes it highly unlikely that executive dynamics in this case were affected byinformation asymmetries between responsible Commissioners, their fellowCommissioners and/or member state governments. Commissioners were suffi-ciently informed to be able to interfere. How then did the huge politicalcontroversy around REACH play out in Commission decision-making onREACH?

The responsibility for both the formulation of the White Paper and the leg-islative proposal was shared by Swedish Environment Commissioner Wallstromand Finnish Enterprise Commissioner Liikanen. Both were members of theircountry’s Social Democratic Parties. According to the national party scenario,we would expect Commissioners to represent their party’s position and useREACH to sharpen their national party’s profile vis-a-vis national opposition


parties. The transnational party scenario, on the other hand, predicts a close pol-itical alliance between the Social Democratic Commissioners responsible fordrafting the proposal and political opposition from Christian Democratic andConservative Commissioners. According to the national agent scenario, wewould expect the Commissioners of those countries which most activelyopposed REACH, i.e. the German, British and French Commissioners, tofight for their country’s interests in internal Commission decision-makingwithout party politics playing a role. Finally, according to the portfolio scenario,executive politics inside the Commission should be marked by a strugglebetween Wallstrom and Liikanen, not least because their respective constituen-cies (environmental and consumer groups/industry groups and unions) mobi-lized heavily to influence the content of REACH.

During the formulation of the legislative proposal the two Commissionersresponsible for drafting it took opposing positions. While Wallstrom foughtfor comprehensive high-level standards as regards the protection of the environ-ment as well as consumers, Liikanen took the industry position, mainly arguingfor a watering-down of the proposal and moderate standards to safeguard theEuropean chemical industry’s competitiveness vis-a-vis its business rivals fromthe US and Japan. Pascal Lamy, the French Trade Commissioner, sided withLiikanen in internal decision-making, asking for a watering-down of the propo-sal with an eye to the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and transatlantictrade relations (FT London 2003c). Thus, conflicts inside the Commission tookon a sectoral character and the pattern closely matches the dynamics outlined inthe portfolio scenario. At the same time, however, ‘Mrs Wallstrom’s high-profilecampaign to crack down on dangerous chemicals, for example, is heavilyinformed by the Swedish government’s line on the issue’ (FT London 2002).Moreover, Lamy’s critical position on REACH coincides with the argumentthat French President Chirac raised vis-a-vis Commission President Prodi inthe common position paper with Blair and Schroder. Lamy’s and Wallstrom’sbehaviour is thus at the same time in line with the national agent scenario. Thisobservational equivalence renders it impossible to attribute analytical superiorityto the national agent scenario or the portfolio scenario in accounting for thedynamics during the formulation of REACH inside the Commission.

The national agent scenario would further lead us to expect interventionsfrom at least the German and British Commissioners. There are, however, noreports of such interventions by other Commissioners which could be inter-preted as evidence against the explanatory power of the national agent scenarioon REACH. However, Commissioners may have refrained from interveningbecause they could rally behind either Wallstrom or Liikanen, who had toagree on a position. Given the different positions taken by the competentCommissioners and their need to find a compromise proposal, other Commis-sioners may have considered their chances of demanding further changes asslim, and settled with taking sides with one of the competent Commissioners.Matters changed, however, with the new Barroso Commission. After Verheugenwas appointed to the Enterprise and Industry portfolio he ‘inherited’


co-responsibility for REACH. Before officially taking office, he stated that ‘hewas ready to make adjustments in the draft legislation to ensure that companies,especially smaller ones, “do not collapse under the weight of REACH”’ (FTLondon 2004) – a position which is in line with the position of the GermanChancellor. Two points follow from this: first, portfolio assignment is offundamental importance for internal Commission politics, since it providesthe Commissioner holding the respective portfolio with a formal say and thelegitimacy to take the political lead on matters falling into his or her field ofresponsibility. Second, positions vary with Commissioners, showing thatthere are no structurally determined ‘institutional roles’ that Commissionersacquire on taking office in a specific portfolio.

Moreover, the conflict between Social Democrats Wallstrom and Liikanenand the opposition to their proposal by German Social Democrat Verheugenshow that horizontal party family bonds between Commissioners were notstrong enough to allow agreement on a common position and prevent publicdisputes. Thus, the transnational party scenario provides no analytical leverageto shed light on the politics around REACH in the Commission. Finally, inGermany REACH led to domestic partisan conflict between Environment Min-ister Trittin (Greens), who published an open letter with Swedish EnvironmentMinister Sommestad, demanding strict environmental and consumer protec-tionist standards in REACH (Frankfurter Rundschau 2004), and ChancellorSchroder (SPD). However, there are no reports of German CommissionerSchreyer (Greens) following Trittin’s line and thus extending national partypolitics into the Commission as depicted in the national party scenario.

Takeover Directive

Before the European Commissioners adopted the Takeover Directive (Commis-sion 2002) on 2 October 2002, the decision was preceded by intense politicalcontroversies: already in 1996 the Santer Commission had submitted a directive‘on company law concerning takeover bids’ (Commission 1995). After morethan five years of intensive political struggles, the successful conciliation com-mittee compromise negotiated by Council and EP representatives failed inthe EP in June 2001. The vote was split with 273 Parliamentarians voting infavour and 273 against the directive. The failure in the EP was mainlybecause of heavy lobbying by the German government under ChancellorSchroder: 95 German MEPs voted against the directive and only one MEPvoted in favour (Hix et al. 2007). After this defeat, Dutch Internal MarketCommissioner Bolkestein was responsible for redrafting a proposal which wassubmitted to the Council and the EP in October 2002.

At this point, the conflicting interests of all actors participating in thedecision-making process were common knowledge. With respect to both thenational party scenario and the national agent scenario, knowledge aboutother actors’ positions allowed national parties and governments to mandatetheir Commissioner to take their positions in the Commission. Thus, after


their successful intervention in the final EP decision on the earlier version of theTakeover Directive, German parties and the German government could,according to these scenarios, be expected to intervene in the formulation ofthe directive through their Commissioners. Moreover, it allowed Commis-sioners sharing the same party affiliation to organize a common position andact accordingly in the internal formulation of the proposal – as stipulated bythe transnational party scenario. Thus, Social Democratic Commissionerscould have lined up to prevent an EU-wide liberalization of takeover regulationby their liberal Dutch internal market colleague Bolkestein.

To meet earlier criticism, Bolkestein formed the so-called ‘Winter Group’, anexpert group headed by the Dutch lawyer Jaap Winter. Their task was to comeup with suggestions for an effective EU takeover law. Bolkestein did includesome of the Winter Group’s suggestions in his proposal, yet still allowed excep-tions such as ‘multiple voting rights’ and ‘golden shares’ which are importantdefensive measures, especially in France and the Scandinavian member states(Callaghan and Hopner 2005: 310–11). They allow public shareholders toblock takeovers without holding majority ownership in the respectivecompany. As a consequence, the German government under Schroderrenewed its attacks on the Commission and on Bolkestein in particular,demanding the creation of a truly level playing field for takeover bids in theEU (Callaghan and Hopner 2005: 310–11). It saw its industry disadvantagedby the Bolkestein proposal, since defensive measures allowed by Germancompany law would have been prohibited, while defensive measures appliedin southern and northern European member states were to remain unaffected.

In the run-up to the decision, German Commissioners Schreyer (Greens) andVerheugen (SPD) brought up their government’s concern in the Commissionand tried to change the content of Bolkestein’s proposal (FAZ 2002: 13). On2 October 2002, Verheugen and Schreyer, as well as the French Trade Commis-sioner Lamy, voted against Bolkestein’s proposed text in the College of Com-missioners (EurActiv 2002). Yet, the proposal was adopted with minorchanges which did not meet the German Commissioners’ criticism. Thenational party scenario does not provide analytical leverage to understandingthe decision-making dynamics in this case since in Germany, the onlycountry publicly opposing Bolkestein’s plans, parties were united in their oppo-sition. The same is true for the portfolio scenario: at least for Schreyer andVerheugen, who held the Budget and the Enlargement portfolios, it is not plaus-ible to argue that their interventions were driven by their portfolios’ interests.Moreover, the transnational party scenario can hardly account for the observedconflict pattern. If the transnational party scenario were a correct description, wewould have observed the 11 Social Democratic Commissioners building anabsolute majority in the Commission by that time, siding with Verheugen,Schreyer and Lamy in opposing the plan by their liberal adversary Bolkestein.

Instead, the dynamics of internal decision-making on the takeover proposalclosely match the national agent scenario. The political constellation in theCommission matched the situation in the Council, with German


Commissioners being isolated in their opposition to Bolkestein’s proposal andlacking (absolute) majority support to force Bolkestein to make changes to hisproposal. With respect to Bolkestein’s behaviour in this case, it would perhapsoverstretch the argument to maintain that he acted as his country’s agent, notleast because the original proposal was initiated by the Commission quitesome time before he was appointed as Commissioner. His very active politicalsupport for the proposal is in line with the portfolio scenario. However, at thesame time, Bolkestein’s position on the Takeover Directive is in line with theposition of the Dutch government, since ‘[t]he Dutch government has alwaystaken a non-protectionist stance when it comes to foreign control of Dutchlisted companies. There are, in contrast to many other countries, virtually norestrictions based on public or national interest’ (International Financial LawReview 2004). Thus, Bolkestein’s possible ‘portfolio’ interests did not collidewith possible ‘national’ interests.

With respect to the political dynamics inside the Commission in theTakeover Directive, it is interesting to analyse the changes applied after theEP’s Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market proposed amend-ments to Bolkestein’s proposal. These changes provide further evidence in favourof the national agent scenario. The amendments proposed by the German MEPand rapporteur Klaus Lehne (Christian Democratic Union; CDU) aimed atcreating a level playing field for company takeovers in the EU by renderingillegal defensive measures provided by company law in any member state(European Parliament 2003: 23). This is especially true for provisions effectivein northern and southern member states, i.e. multiple voting securities andgolden shares. These provisions, most likely to secure these countries’ votes inthe Council were not touched on by Bolkestein’s proposal. Consequently, theEP’s amendments were opposed by governments of the southern and northernmember states (Callaghan and Hopner 2005: 310–11; FT London 2003a: 1).In the ‘common position’ adopted by the Council, governments accepted largeparts of the EP’s amendments – but added one crucial paragraph that made theEP’s amendment on multiple voting rights ineffective, since member statescould maintain their respective status quo in takeover regulation that providescompanies with different legal means to fend off hostile takeovers. WithSpain abstaining, the Council unanimously adopted its amended text. Theapproval of the EP finally led to the successful conclusion of the legislative pro-cedure on takeover bids in the EU in April 2004.

After the Council and the EP adopted the text, Bolkestein declared that hecould not accept the Takeover Directive as adopted by the Council (Council2003) since he considered it an ineffective instrument to liberalize takeoverlaw in the EU (FAZ 2003: 12). He therefore wanted to withdraw the proposal.Yet in the meeting of the College of Commissioners in which his initiative wasdealt with, Bolkestein lost the vote to withdraw the proposal (FAZ 2004: 11; FTLondon 2003b: 20). Bolkestein’s defeat is remarkable as it points to a decisivecoalition shift among Commissioners during the two years that had passed fromthe adoption of the proposal in the Commission to the vote on its withdrawal: at


the beginning, the two German Commissioners were isolated and unable toorganize sufficient support against Bolkestein that would have allowedchanges to the text of the proposal. At the end of this period Bolkesteinhimself failed to organize the support of a sufficient number of Commissionersthat would have allowed him to withdraw the proposal. Again, this patternreflects the political constellation in the Council and as described in the nationalagents scenario – but to the disadvantage of the Commissioner responsible fordrafting the original proposal.6

4. CONCLUSION

To understand the internal decision-making dynamics of the Commission, thenational agent scenario and, to some extent, the portfolio scenario provide mostanalytical leverage. Based on the case studies above, the observation that Com-missioners formally responsible for drafting a proposal act as agenda-setter(s) ininternal decision-making supports the portfolio scenario. When drafting aproposal they may – but need not – take into account possible objections bycolleagues.7 At the same time, the ‘shadow of a vote’, i.e. the threat to take aproposal to the College of Commissioners, allows other Commissioners toeffectively restrict the political leeway of formally responsible Commissioners.Thus, Bolkestein did take into account his colleagues’ preferences to win absol-ute majority support when formulating the Takeover Directive. Moreover, theintervention by the German Commissioners in the Takeover Directive illus-trates that Commissioners did not restrict their political activities to proposalswhich were within their area of responsibility or which affected their portfolio’ssectoral interests. Instead, their actions represented the interests of Germanindustry and the consensus position among German political parties. This,together with the fact that responsible Commissioners’ political discretion tobring a proposal in line with the interests of their country’s party politicalelites and economic constituencies, limit the analytical purchase of the portfolioscenario, which posits that Commissioners restrict their political actions tofurthering their DG’s sectoral interests, and instead support the nationalagent scenario. Consequently, the institutional environment in which a Com-missioner is ‘embedded’, his DG, does not provide ‘roles’ or ‘norms’ sufficientto determine the way in which Commissioners exercise their portfolio compe-tencies. Verheugen’s actions after ‘inheriting’ the REACH proposal from hispredecessor Liikanen attest to this. Partisan politics, as illustrated in the nationalparty scenario, did not play a role in the cases studied here. Moreover, conflictsin the cases analysed above cut across party (family) lines. In the case of theTakeover Directive, coalitions even changed during the passage of one singlelegislative proposal. Thus, the transnational party ties driving the transnationalparty scenario also do not provide analytical leverage in explaining the dynamicsof the two decisions studied in this paper. Given that the cases deal with socio-economic left–right issues, they constitute ‘most likely’ candidates for partisan


politics. It therefore seems unlikely that partisan political dynamics play animportant role in Commission decision-making.

The empirical findings of this paper support the literature which questionsthe dominant conceptualization of the Commission in the legislative politicsliterature. Conventionally, and in line with the neo-functionalist integrationliterature, the Commission is presented as a cohesive unitary actor driven bya ‘supranational’ self-interest for further integration to increase its own compe-tences. Rather, the national dynamics identified in the cases studied correspondto recent findings by Thomson (2008), who analysed the position ofthe Commission on 70 legislative proposals and found ‘that Commissioners’country affiliations are an important guide to their behavior. This contrastswith the view of Commissioners as being insulated from national pressures’(Thomson 2008: 188; see also Ross 1995: 58). Unfortunately, however, theDecision-making in the European Union (DEU) data used by Thomson(Thomson et al. 2006) does not allow taking internal decision-making dynamicsinto account. In addition, this study supports Egeberg’s (2006: 11) conclusionthat Commissioners’ behaviour is driven by multiple factors, among which theirformal responsibility and their nationality range prominently. Yet, as notedabove, there is no support for Egeberg’s central finding that ‘Commissionerstend to champion the interests that are inherently linked to their respectivebriefs’ (2006: 11). Instead, how formally responsible Commissioners positionthemselves in internal Commission decision-making is itself a product oftheir national political ties and the intra- and inter-institutional political situ-ation that they face rather than ‘role structures’ institutionally codified by DGs.

We need more research to consolidate our knowledge of decision-makingdynamics in the Commission and its effects on Commission behaviour in EUpolitics. Qualitative case studies are useful in improving analytical conceptual-izations of internal decision-making dynamics to help us understand Commis-sion behaviour in EU legislative politics. Thus, they can help in developing ananalytical perspective on the Commission, taking into account both Commis-sioners and administrators, thereby closing this rather inhibiting gap in theexisting literature. Case studies are also useful in further testing differentdecision-making mechanisms. In addition, we need quantitative studies todraw robust and generalizable inferences about the dynamics of internaldecision-making. A promising methodology is illustrated by the DEU project(Thomson et al. 2006), which constitutes the most comprehensive effort sofar to empirically investigate the dynamics of EU legislative decision-making.Researchers here relied on political experts to locate the positions that actorstook in a considerable number of legislative issues. Problems such as Commis-sion officials’ secrecy in reporting on internal conflicts may be overcome byasking interest group representatives involved in the decisions onCommissioners’ positions. To avoid bias and increase the reliability of results,a diverse set of interest groups should be asked for their assessment, andrecent advances in computerized content analysis of newspaper articles toprovide additional information on Commissioners’ behaviour should be


made available. Since such a quantitative strategy is resource-intensive, collectiveresearch efforts and a collaborative research project is called for.

Biographical note: Arndt Wonka is a post-doctoral researcher at the BremenInternational Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS) and affiliated asco-project leader to the Mannheim Centre for European Studies (MZES),Germany.

Address for correspondence: Arndt Wonka, Bremen International GraduateSchool of Social Sciences (BIGSSS), PO Box 33 04 40, 28334, Bremen,Germany. email: [email protected]

NOTES

1 I would like to thank the reviewers, Simon Hix, Bjorn Lindberg, Peter Mair,Bernhard Miller, Anne Rasmussen and Andreas Warntjen, for their excellent com-ments which helped to improve the paper.

2 Although an interesting topic in itself, this article does not address the Commission’srole and behaviour in the implementation of EU legislation (see, e.g., Franchino2007).

3 Centre-right MEPs (European People’s Party) are reported to selectively meetthe centre-right Commissioner responsible for drafting a particular proposal; all‘left’ Commissioners, on the other hand, have monthly meetings with SocialistMEPs and representatives from their European Party Federation (Party of EuropeanSocialists; PES) to discuss specific proposals and general ideas on possible politicalinitiatives. Information was obtained through email (European People’s Party–European Democrats) (17 and 18 December 2008) and telephone interview (PES)(19 December 2008) with the individuals co-ordinating legislative actions with theCommission for the EPP-ED and PES.

4 The application of the oral procedure is an indicator for internal conflict: ‘Wheredifferences of opinion remain at the end of interservice consultation, the only wayto obtain Commission approval of the document is by oral procedure’ (EuropeanCommission 2004: 10).

5 In an personal interview, a Commission employee of Unit SG/A/1 (Registry, OralProcedures; preparation of Commission meetings) estimated that during the fiveyear term of the Prodi Commission, Commissioners took around ten votes (Brussels,28 September 2004).

6 While Hix et al. (2007: 204) refer to inter-institutional considerations to explainBolkestein’s reluctance, my interpretation of the observed pattern is more in linewith the report that ‘his [Bolkesteins] own officials backed a deal he denouncedand the other 19 Commissioners did not agree that it was worth withdrawing thelegislation and starting again from scratch’ (FT 2003a: 20), indicating that therewas no cohesive ‘institutional’ reasoning.

7 According to the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, however, the CommissionPresident can propose amendments (Art. 8).

REFERENCES

Bergman, T., Muller, W.C., Strøm, K. and Blomgren, M. (2003) ‘Democraticdelegation and accountability: cross-national patterns’, in K. Strøm, W.C. Muller


and T. Bergman (eds), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy,Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Callaghan, H. and Hopner, M. (2005) ‘European integration and the clash of capital-isms: political cleavages over takeover liberalization’, Comparative European Politics3: 307–32.

Christiansen, T. (1997) ‘Tensions of European governance: politicized bureaucracy andmultiple accountability in the European Commission’, Journal of European PublicPolicy 4(1): 73–90.

Cram, L. (1997) Policy-making in the European Union, London: Routledge.Crombez, C. (1997) ‘Policy making and Commission appointment in the European

Union’, Außenwirtschaft 52: 63–82.Doring, H. (2007) ‘The composition of the College of Commissioners: patterns of

delegation’, European Union Politics 8: 209–30.Egeberg, M. (1996) ‘Organization and nationality in the European Commission

services’, Public Administration 74: 721–35.Egeberg, M. (2006) ‘Executive politics as usual: role behaviour and conflict dimensions

in the College of European Commissioners’, Journal of European Public Policy 13(1):1–15.

Franchino, F. (2007) The Powers of the Union: Delegation in the EU, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Hall, P.A. and Taylor, R.C.R. (1996) ‘Political science and the three new institutional-isms’, Political Studies XLIV: 936–57.

Heritier, A., Knill, C. and Mingers, S. (1996) Ringing the Changes in Europe. RegulatoryCompetition and the Redefinition of the State, Berlin: De Gruyter.

Hix, S., Noury, A. and Roland, G. (2007) Democratic Politics in the European Parlia-ment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hooghe, L. (2001) The European Commission and the Integration of Europe: Images ofGovernance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hooghe, L. (2005) ‘Several roads lead to international norms, but few via internationalsocialization: a case study of the European Commission’, International Organization59: 861–98.

Horl, B., Warntjen, A. and Wonka, A. (2005) ‘Built on quicksand? A decade of pro-cedural spatial models on EU legislative decision-making’, Journal of EuropeanPublic Policy 12(3): 592–606.

Hug, S. (2003) ‘Endogenous preferences and delegation in the European Union’,Comparative Political Studies 36: 41–74.

Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. (eds) (1994) Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Govern-ment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lindgren, K.-O. and Persson, T. (2008) ‘The structure of conflict over EU chemicalspolicy’, European Union Politics 9: 31–58.

Majone, G. (2001) ‘Two logics of delegation. Agency and fiduciary relations in EUgovernance’, European Union Politics 2: 103–22.

Marks, G. and Wilson, C. (2000) ‘The past in the present: a cleavage theory of partyresponse to European integration’, British Journal of Political Science 30: 433–59.

Michelmann, H.J. (1978) ‘Multinational staffing and organizational functioning in theCommission of the European Communities’, International Organization 32:477–96.

Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberalintergovernmentalist approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies 31: 473–524.

Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messinato Maastricht, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Nugent, N. (2001) The European Commission, Basingstoke: Palgrave.


Pennings, P. (2006) ‘An empirical analysis of the Europeanization of national partymanifestos, 1960–2003’, European Union Politics 7: 257–70.

Pollack, M.A. (2003) The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, andAgenda Setting in the EU, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Putnam, R.D. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games’,International Organization 42: 427–60.

Ross, G. (1995) Jacques Delors and European Integration, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Spence, D. (1997) ‘Structure, functions and procedures in the Commission’, in G. Edwardsand D. Spence (eds), The European Commission, London: Cartermill.

Stone Sweet, A. and Sandholtz, W. (1997) ‘European integration and supranationalgovernance’, Journal of European Public Policy 4(3): 297–317.

Tallberg, J. (2007) ‘Executive politics’, in K.E. Jorgensen, M.A. Pollack andB. Rosamond (eds), Handbook of European Union Politics, London: SagePublications.

Thatcher, M. and Stone Sweet, A. (2002) ‘Theory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions’, West European Politics 25: 1–22.

Thomson, R. (2008) ‘National actors in international organizations. The case of theEuropean Commission’, Comparative Political Studies 41: 169–92.

Thomson, R., Stokman, F., Achen, C.H. and Konig, T. (eds) (2006) The EuropeanUnion Decides, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wonka, A. (2007) ‘Technocratic and independent? The appointment of EuropeanCommissioners and its policy implications’, Journal of European Public Policy14(2): 169–189.

Wonka, A. (2008) Die Europaische Kommission. Supranationale Burokratie oder Agentder Mitgliedstaaten? Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Wonka, A. (in preparation) ‘Europeanized convergence? British and Germanbusiness associations’ European lobbying strategies in the formulation of REACH’,in J.R. Grote, A. Lang and V. Schneider (eds), Organized Business Interests inChanging Environments. The Complexity of Adaptation, Basingstoke: Houndsmills,Palgrave Macmillan.

Non-academic sources (official documents, newspaper articles)

Blair, T., Chirac, J., Schroder, G., Letter to European Commission President RomanoProdi, Berlin, 20 September 2003

Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2002) Positionspapier mit VCI undIG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie, Berlin: Bundeskanzleram.

Chemical Industry Association (2002) Guarded CIA Response to UK GovernmentPosition on EU Chemicals Policy, London: CIA.

Council (1998). 2153rd Council meeting – Environment, Brussels, 20–21 December,1998, PRES/98/453.

Council (1999) 2194. Sitzung des Rates – UMWELT – Luxembourg, den 24./25. Juni1999, 9406/99 (Presse 203).

Council (2003) 2556th Council meeting – Environment, Brussels, 22 December 2003,PRES/03/376.

EurActiv (2002) Sharp German reactions to new takeover proposal. 2 October2002; http://www.euractiv.com/en/competition/sharp-german-reactions-new-takeover-proposal/article-111911 (accessed 8 December 2007)

European Commission (1995) Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and CouncilDirective on company law concerning takeover bids, Brussels: European Commis-sion, (COM(1995)655).


European Commission (1998) Commission Working Document – Report on theoperation of Directive 67/548/EEC [. . .], Directive 88/379/EEC [. . .], Regulation(EEC) 793/93 [. . .], Directive 76/769/EEC [. . .], Brussels: European Commission,(SEC(1998)1986).

European Commission (2001) White Paper: ‘Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy’,Brussels: European Commission, (COM(2001)88).

European Commission (2002) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament andof the Council on takeover bids, Brussels: European Commission,(COM(2002)534).

European Commission (2003) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliamentand of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization andRestriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agencyand amending Directive 1999/45/EC and Regulation (EC) [on Persistent OrganicPollutants], Brussels: European Commission, (COM(2003)644–1.

European Commission (2004) Manual of Operating Procedures of the Commission,Brussels: European Commission.

European Parliament (2003) Report on the proposal for a European Parliament andCouncil directive on takeover bids (COM(2002) 534 – C5–0481/2002 – 2002/0240(COD)), Brussels: European Parliament, (FINAL A5–0469/2003).

Financial Times, London (2002) Europe’s green-fingered legislators: European Insti-tutions Part VI: Environmental laws are refined by MEPs and member states, butlobbyists need to focus on the European Commission, 16 August, p. 11.

Financial Times, and London (2003a) EU reaches takeover code compromise, 28November, p. 1.

Financial Times, and London (2003b) Watered-down EU takeover directive is a missedopportunity for open markets, 20 December, p. 20.

Financial Times, and London (2003c) Proposals spark fierce controversy: EuropeanChemical Regulations, 2.

Financial Times, and London (2004) Chemical controls: the new Commission could bethe catalyst for compromise, 4 October, p. 18.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2002) Ubernahmerecht entzweit Brussel und Berlin,30 September, p. 13.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2003) Ubernahmerichtlinie endgultig gebilligt,23 December, p. 12.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2004) Ruckzieher im Streit uber das VW-Gesetz.EU-Kommission verschiebt das Verfahren auf unbestimmte Zeit, 28 January, p. 11.

Frankfurter Rundschau (2004) Eine sichere Chemikalienpolitik fur Europa; Die EUmuss die Herstellung und Verwendung von Substanzen wirksam kontrollieren/Von Jurgen Trittin und Lena Sommestad, 26 June, p. 7.

International Financial Law Review (2004) M&A: why Dutch targets can make fortroublesome buying, February.

Nordic Council (2004) REACH. A leap forward for industry. Nordic concerns andbenefits.

UK Government (2002) New EU Chemicals Strategy. Position Statement by the UKGovernment and the Devolved Administration, London: UK Governement.


Wonka, Arndt - Decision Making Dynamics in the European Commission, Partisan, National or Sectoral

Documents

Transcript of Wonka, Arndt - Decision Making Dynamics in the European Commission, Partisan, National or Sectoral