Women Running for Judge: The Impact of Sex on Candidate Success in State Intermediate Appellate...

Women Running for Judge: The Impact ofSex on Candidate Success in StateIntermediate Appellate Court Electionsn

Brian Frederick, Bridgewater State College

Matthew J. Streb, Northern Illinois University

Objective. This article will examine whether candidate sex impacts electoral out-comes in judicial elections. Methods. We examine the success of male and femalecandidates in contested, nonretention elections for state intermediate appellatecourts (IACs) from 2000–2006 using OLS and logistic regression analysis.Results. We find that there is no systematic bias against women candidates in IACraces over this period. In fact, there is some evidence that women may actuallyperform slightly better than men. Conclusions. Contrary to the claims of somescholars, these results suggest judicial elections do not hinder diversity on the stateappellate bench.

Although women continue to be numerically underrepresented in electedoffice in all areas of government at all levels of government, the conventionalwisdom in the field of women and politics is that this disparity is not causedby direct discrimination against female politicians by the voters. Most re-search on the role of sex in campaigns shows that, despite this chronicunderrepresentation, when women run for public office they win at the samerate as men, all else equal (Burrell, 1994; Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994;Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton, 1997). However, virtually none of thisresearch focuses on the role of sex in judicial elections. The study of therelationship between candidate sex and success in judicial elections is im-portant for two reasons. First, the presence of women on a court may lead tosubstantive differences in the outcomes of cases (Peresie, 2005; Songer andCrews-Meyer, 2000). Second, judicial candidates may be evaluated differ-ently than candidates for other offices, especially given the low-informationenvironments in which most judicial elections occur. Voters are more likelyto rely on heuristics and schema in low-information elections, some ofwhich may benefit and others of which may hurt female judicial candidates.For instance, judges regularly deal with criminal justice issues that in the eyesof many voters are better handled by male politicians (Huddy and Terkilsen,

nDirect correspondence, including requests for data and coding information, to BrianFrederick [email protected]. We thank the anonymous reviewers for theirhelpful comments. Of course, we are responsible for any errors.

SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Volume 89, Number 4, December 2008r 2008 by the Southwestern Social Science Association

i:/BWUS/SSQU/592/[email protected]



1993a, 1993b; Lawless, 2004). Therefore, one cannot assume that sincefemale candidates are not disadvantaged because of their sex in other elec-tions, the same can be said for judicial elections.

According to the American Bar Association, as of 2006, women com-prised approximately 30 percent of all lawyers in the United States.1 More-over, women are steadily increasing their numbers on state courts comparedto a generation ago (Bonneau, 2001). As the supply of potential candidatescontinues to expand and women enter more races for the judiciary, genderparity in states that use an elective system ought to eventually materialize ifthe electoral playing field is not slanted against women candidates. Thisstudy addresses whether female judicial candidates are at a disadvantage byexamining the success of male and female candidates in contested, nonre-tention elections for state intermediate appellate courts (IACs) from 2000–2006. This data set provides an unprecedented comparison of male andfemale candidacies for state judgeships over several election cycles in anumber of different states. We find that there is no systematic bias againstwomen candidates in IAC races over this period, and that there is evidencethat women may actually perform slightly better than male candidates. Infact, rather than standing as an impediment to the advancement of womenas some have argued (Henry et al., 1985; Bratton and Spill, 2002), systemsthat elect judges to the bench may help to facilitate increased genderdiversity on the courts at the state level.2

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, it surveys theliterature on women candidates in the electoral arena more generally and injudicial elections more specifically. Second, it provides the aggregate electionresults in state IAC contests broken down by sex. Next, it presents the resultsof multivariate models testing the impact of sex on candidate success in IACraces. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of theresults for the future electoral prospects of women candidates in judicialelections and whether this instrument of judicial selection stands as a barrierto a more diversified state court system.

Support for Women Candidates

Women have made noticeable strides in achieving political representationover the past few decades. Although they still lag far behind their malecounterparts, women have steadily made gains in holding elective office atvirtually all levels of government. The general scholarly consensus that hasemerged is that holding other factors constant, female candidates perform

1As reported by American Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession(2006).

2Whether judicial elections do this better than other selection methods is not of concern tous here.

938 Social Science Quarterly

just as well as their male colleagues when election returns are examined(Burrell, 1994; Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994; Seltzer, Newman, andLeighton, 1997). Although Republican women may face a systemic disad-vantage at the primary stage (Cooperman and Oppenheimer, 2001; Kingand Matland, 2003; Matland and King, 2002), and women may be chal-lenged more frequently than men (Lawless and Pearson, 2008; Milyo andSchosberg, 2000; Palmer and Simon, 2006), overall the available evidenceindicates that women win about as often as men do when they run for office,all else equal. Absent widespread discrimination against women candidates,as more women run for office and as more male incumbents relinquish theirpositions, women will continue to increase their presence in elected office.However, most of this research has been conducted for legislative officeswhere the policy-making responsibilities differ from what is expected ofmembers of the judicial branch. Races for the bench present conditions thatdo not apply in campaigns for other offices.

Though sex plays a secondary role in most electoral outcomes, voters dopossess stereotypes about women candidates that may benefit or harm thecandidacies, especially in judicial elections. Although not as potent as factorssuch as partisanship and incumbency, a vast collection of studies reveal thatgender stereotypes influence vote choice and the evaluation of female can-didates (Alexander and Anderson, 1993; Dolan, 1998, 2004; Huddy andTerkilsen, 1993a, 1993b; King and Matland, 2003; Koch, 2000; Matlandand King, 2002; McDermott, 1997, 1998; Paolino, 1995; Sanbonmatsu,2002). This research suggests that women candidates and officeholders areperceived as more liberal than are men in the same positions (Alexander andAnderson, 1993; Koch, 2000; McDermott, 1997, 1998). For instance, Koch(2000) compares voters’ perceptions of female U.S. Senate candidates andtheir ideologies and discovers that these women are considered to be moreliberal than their actual records and positions on the issues reflect. In thecontext of judicial campaigns, this propensity may cast women in a negativelight and impair their chances for electoral advancement, particularly amongvoters who support the death penalty and harsher sentencing or are skepticalof the prospect of a more liberal, activist judicial branch in general.

Another empirical regularity unearthed in studies focusing on gender andelections is that sex differences exist in the traits voters assign to male andfemale politicians. These distinctions in the qualities voters associate withmen and women in the election process could both aid and underminefemale judicial candidates. In general, men are thought of as stronger lead-ers, possessing a higher level of self-confidence and more assertive, whilewomen gain the edge on compassion, empathy, and trustworthiness (Burr-ell, 1994; Huddy and Terkilsen, 1993a, 1993b; King and Matland, 2003;Lawless, 2004; Leeper, 1991; Matland and King, 2002; Rosenwater andDean, 1989). In the process of evaluating judicial candidates, voters may seea male judicial candidate as more likely to fit the image of someone with thestrength and leadership needed for this position. As one scholar describes it,

Impact of Sex on Success in Intermediate Appellate Court Elections 939

‘‘the role of ‘judge’ may be perceived as a ‘man’s job’’’ by the voters (Reid,2004b:188). On the other hand, perceptions that women are more trust-worthy than men may mean that female candidates are viewed by voters asbetter suited to be judges because they would administer justice in a moreimpartial fashion.

Evaluations of which kind of candidates are better suited to deal withcertain issues also break down along the lines of sex. Here, the issue en-vironment may not favor female judicial candidates. Women tend to holdan advantage on handling education, social welfare, and gender equity issuesin contrast to male candidates, who voters stereotypically see as beingstronger in areas such as crime and national security (Burrell, 1994; Huddyand Terkilsen, 1993a, 1993b; Lawless, 2004; Leeper, 1991). Criminal jus-tice issues occupy a central place in contests for seats on most state courts(Caufield, 2007). Furthermore, in judicial elections, higher murder ratestend to depress the vote share of incumbent candidates (Bonneau, 2007b;Hall, 2001). If some voters express misgivings about the ability of women todeal effectively with criminal justice matters, then they may be less successfulthan male judicial candidates.

Based on this previous research, two theoretical expectations can be ap-plied to the question of how women candidates will fare in judicial elections.First, because they are seen as weaker on candidate traits, such as leadership,and issues like crime that are critical aspects of the policy portfolio for whichjudges are responsible, female judicial candidates will perform worse thanmale candidates, all else equal. Second, female candidates will fare betterthan male candidates in judicial elections since they are perceived as morehonest and trustworthy and more likely to be impartial once they reach thebench. Of course, all these factors could cancel each other out and there willbe no perceptible differences in the performance of male and female can-didates in campaigns for judge. Although our data do not allow us to test thereasons why male or female judicial candidates do better, they do allow us totest whether differences exist in the success rates of these candidates.

Women in Judicial Elections

Before testing these competing hypotheses regarding candidate success, itis necessary to give a brief discussion of the literature that currently existsregarding female judicial candidates. Most of the research on the subjectlooks at whether different selection methods lead to different outcomesregarding diversity; it does not examine the success rates of potential femalejudges compared to potential male judges (Alozie, 1990, 1996; Hurwitz andLanier, 2001, 2003; Bratton and Spill, 2002; Williams, 2007). The typicaldependent variable is the percentage of seats on a court held by women;method of selection, then, is used as an independent variable.


Much of the research on the gender composition of state judiciaries hasuncovered no significant relationship between the number of women servingon the court and the method of judicial selection (Alozie, 1996; Hurwitzand Lanier, 2001, 2003). As Hurwitz and Lanier (2003:345) note, variationsin the means by which judges are selected ‘‘do not affect judicial diversitysystematically.’’ Although these findings indicate that a system of electingjudges is not any less inimical to women gaining additional opportunities toserve on the judiciary than a strictly appointive system, the results cannotdefinitively rule out the possibility that women are at a disadvantage in theelectoral process. Women may not experience any less success achievingrepresentation on the judiciary in an elective system than in a merit system,but they may still win at lower rates than men. Indeed, women may doequally poorly across all systems.

Two scholars have come closer to our analysis, but both are limited bywhat they can say regarding the success of female judicial candidates. Hall(2001) has undertaken the most extensive longitudinal analysis of femalecandidates in judicial elections in her landmark study of state supreme courtelections from 1980–1995. This research disclosed that women and mi-nority candidates tended to receive fewer votes, but the relationship did notreach the conventional threshold for statistical significance in any of themodel specifications formulated for the study. The problem with drawinginferences about the role of sex in judicial campaigns from Hall’s models isthat she did not distinguish between candidates who are women and can-didates who are racial minorities. The models combine minority and femalecandidates into one variable rather than separating the effects of the twogroups. Hall’s null finding, then, may be misleading if women tend to farebetter than minority candidates or vice versa. Due to this measurementissue, there is simply no way to discern confidently whether there was anymeaningful impact of sex in state supreme court elections during this period.

In a pair of more recent studies, Reid (2004a, 2004b) looked directly atthe performance of women candidates in North Carolina trial court elec-tions from 1994–1998. Although women tended to raise and spend moremoney than male candidates in these races, for the most part their vote sharewas not significantly different than it was for male candidates after con-trolling for other variables.3 Whether these findings hold for women run-ning in judicial elections in other states is still an open question. Althougheach of these studies sheds some light on the influence of sex in judicialelections, they are limited in their utility to enhance scholarly understandingof this question. To fully parse out whether women candidates are less proneto experience electoral success in judicial elections, it is essential to conduct acomparative state analysis of male and female candidates for the bench overa period of time, disaggregating women from other types of candidates.

3 Reid (2004a) does find that status as a female candidate was negatively related to voteshare in open-seat races, but this conclusion was based on just 14 cases.


This study fills this empirical void by examining the electoral performanceof more than 300 candidates in contested, nonretention state IAC racesfrom 2000–2006.4 Over this period, 17 states5 had some form of contestedelection for an intermediate-level court seat.6 This data set allows for a cross-state comparison and avoids relying on generalizations from a single-statedesign, which has been the case in other studies of women and judicialelections (Reid, 2004a, 2004b). Of the 370 candidates running in contested,nonretention IAC elections over this period, 35 percent were female.7 Can-didate sex was determined through searches of IAC websites and state andlocal media coverage as reported by Lexis-Nexis.

Besides the comparative advantage they provide, state IAC elections occurunder conditions where examining sex as a political variable may carryadded weight. Due to the meager media coverage they receive, informationcosts for voters in judicial elections can be quite high (Schaffner andDiascro, 2007). IAC races are classic low-information affairs where votersusually have scant knowledge of who the candidates are and where theystand on the issues. In fact, Baum (2003) has deemed IAC elections to bethe least visible of all state court elections. Since voters use sex as a voting cuein more high-profile contests, this kind of low-information environment cancreate even greater impetus for voters to reach for informational shortcutslike sex to make judgments about the candidates (McDermott, 1997, 1998).Though not as reliable as party affiliation, a candidate’s sex can supplyinformation about the types of policies the candidate would endorse. Thestereotypes that voters apply to women candidates may either help or hinderthese candidates. Therefore, IAC races are an excellent domain for a robusttest of the hypotheses concerning the influence of sex on the outcomes ofjudicial elections.

Statistics on IAC Candidate Success by Sex, 2000–2006

Before presenting the multivariate results testing for sex effects in IACraces, it is instructive to look at some aggregate data on these contests.Figure 1 displays the contestation rates of incumbent/challenger and

4In the multivariate analysis conducted for the study, six candidates in Ohio were notincluded because campaign finance data were not available. However, all aggregate data onelection returns in contested races are included in the analysis.

5Eighteen states held some form of nonretention elections, but none of the IAC candidatesin Idaho faced an opponent over this period. Therefore, the multivariate models tested in thisstudy includes candidates from only 17 states.

6Nonretention elections were selected for this analysis for two primary reasons. First, therewas remarkably little variation in the outcomes of IAC retention elections during the courseof this study (see Streb, Frederick, and LaFrance, 2007). Second, nonretention elections moreclosely resemble elections for other offices, providing a more legitimate test of whetherwomen fare differently in judicial elections than in campaigns for other offices.

7Women comprised about 32 percent of the candidates in all nonretention IAC elections.


open-seat IAC races by gender. Female incumbents are opposed at a rate ofjust over six percentage points higher than male candidates, 32.3 percent and26.0 percent, respectively. The difference in contestation rates for femalecandidates in open-seat races is about five percentage points. Although therates of contestation for female candidates are slightly higher, they are notstatistically significant. This finding lends limited support to the propositionthat female IAC candidates face more challenging electoral environmentsthan do male candidates, as has been documented in U.S. House elections(Lawless and Pearson, 2008; Palmer and Simon, 2006).

Despite being challenged slightly more frequently than male IAC can-didates, female judicial candidates at the intermediate appellate court levelhave higher success rates. According to Figure 2, female incumbents winapproximately 95 percent of the time compared to 91 percent for male IACincumbents, although this difference is not statistically significant. In con-tested races, the advantage for female incumbents is even greater, with fe-male incumbents winning close to 84 percent of their races compared to 66percent for males (po0.05). Female challengers emerge victorious at a rateof 32.4 percent compared to 26.9 percent for males, although this differenceis statistically insignificant. Particularly striking is the huge sex disparitypresent when examining the success rates of IAC candidates in open-seatraces. Male candidates won 51.8 percent of the races they entered over theperiod of this study, while female candidates won an impressive 77.6 percentof the races they entered. This gap of nearly 26 percentage points is highlysignificant at the 0.001 level. In sum, though IAC judges may deal with avariety of criminal justice issues that traditionally favor male candidates,female IAC candidates do not appear to be disadvantaged at the polls.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

FemaleIncumbents

MaleIncumbents

Female Open-Seat Candidates

Male Open-Seat Candidates

FIGURE 1

Contestation Rates for Male and Female IAC Candidates, 2000–2006


Female judicial candidates at this level appear to be running credible cam-paigns, which has translated into an environment where women can achieveimpressive success when they do run.

Figure 3 provides more evidence that female judicial candidates do notperform worse than their male counterparts. It displays the average per-centage of the vote for incumbents, challengers, and open-seat candidates incontested IAC races by sex over the course of this study.8 In each category,female IAC candidates attract a higher degree of support from the votersthan do males running for the bench. Female incumbents perform roughlytwo points better than male incumbents, 55.6 percent and 53.5 percent,respectively (although the difference is not statistically significant). Femalechallengers average 47.9 percent of the vote, while male IAC challengersreceived 45.5 percent of the vote (po0.052). Once again, the most pro-nounced difference is found in open seats; women outpace men in thiscategory of races by more than six percentage points, with averages of 54.2percent and 48.1 percent, respectively (po0.001). These findings confirmthat women in IAC races are, at the very least, not handicapped by their sex.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

FIGURE 2

Percentage of IAC Candidates Winning by Sex

8Candidates who ran unopposed are excluded from this analysis. To adjust the results inmultimember races so that they are commensurate with the results in single-member races,we employ the method devised by Jewell (1982). This approach involves dividing eachcandidate’s votes by the total number of votes and then multiplying the result by the totalnumber of seats within the district. This method has been used in previous studies of judicialelections as well (Hall, 2001; Bonneau, 2007b).


The next section of this article investigates the impact of sex with a moreextensive set of controls for other variables that shape outcomes in IACraces.

Multivariate Models Estimating the Impact of Sex

To better understand the impact of sex in IAC elections, we must estimatethis relationship in a more fully specified multivariate model. To do so, it isessential to control for other factors that could determine the electoral for-tunes of IAC candidates aside from sex. Although many studies of electoralcompetition use the seat as the unit of analysis, we select the candidate. Thisapproach is consistent with Bonneau’s (2007a) analysis of campaign fund-raising in judicial elections and other studies examining the role of candidatesex in the election process (Hogan, 2007; Werner and Mayer, 2007). Theproblem with using the seat as the level of analysis is that it is not possible toestimate the probability of candidate victory in open seats. Furthermore,since it is candidate characteristics that we are interested in, specifically thesex of the candidate, the candidate is an appropriate unit of analysis in thistype of study. We test two models. In the first model, the dependent variableis the percentage of the vote received by the candidate, while in the secondmodel, the dependent variable is whether the candidate won or lost (coded 1

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

FemaleIncumbents

MaleIncumbents

FemaleChallengers

MaleChallengers

Open-SeatFemale

Candidates

Open-SeatMale

Candidates

FIGURE 3

Average Percentage of the Vote for IAC Candidates by Sex, 2000–2006


for victory and 0 for defeat). In the first model, given the continuous natureof the dependent variable, we employ ordinary least squares regression. Inthe second model, logistic regression is utilized because the dependent vari-able is a discrete binary outcome. Consistent with other multistate com-parative studies of judicial elections (e.g., Hall and Bonneau, 2006), bothmodels presented here are estimated using robust standard errors clusteredby state.

The independent variables in the models include a range of institutionaland candidate-specific factors that are likely to influence the percentage ofthe vote a judicial candidate receives, as well as whether he or she wins orloses. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for these variables.

Individual Candidate Characteristics

The primary independent variable in the models, sex, is coded 1 if theIAC candidate was female and 0 if the candidate was male (FEMALE). Othercandidate characteristics need to be taken into account as well. Incumbentofficeholders tend to hold enormous advantages over other candidates forpublic office. For instance, reelection rates for U.S. House incumbents havesoared to well over 90 percent in the past few decades (Jacobson, 2004).Incumbent reelection rates in nonretention judicial elections are not quite ashigh, but incumbent judges typically enjoy a tremendous level of electoralsuccess as well (Hall, 2001, 2007; Streb, Frederick, and LaFrance, 2007).Thus, it is necessary in any model of IAC candidate electoral performance toaccount for incumbency status. Hence, the models include a variableindicating whether the candidate was a sitting incumbent, coded 1; 0otherwise (INCUMBENT).

TABLE 1

Descriptive Statistics for the Multivariate Analysis

Variable Mean Min Max SD

Female 0.33 0 1 0.48Incumbent 0.32 0 1 0.48Appointed 0.15 0 1 0.35Open seat 0.36 0 1 0.48District 0.64 0 1 0.48Partisan 0.51 0 1 0.50Candidate spending (log) 11.06 1.10 15.01 1.71Opponent spending 11.07 1.10 15.01 1.722000_2001 0.29 0 1 0.452002_2003 0.29 0 1 0.462004_2005 0.15 0 1 0.37

N 5 364.


Unlike other officeholders, sitting appellate judges are routinely elevatedto their position through appointment rather than election. Newly ap-pointed judges are at a distinct disadvantage compared to judges who havebeen previously elected. New appointees tend to receive a lower percentageof the vote (Bonneau, 2007b; Hall and Bonneau, 2006) and win less fre-quently (Bonneau, 2005a). To capture the weakened electoral position ofthis group of candidates, a variable indicating whether the incumbent wasnewly appointed is entered into each model (NEW APPOINTEE).

Although not as successful as incumbents, open-seat candidates confrontan electoral landscape more favorable than challengers (Jacobson, 2004).Indeed, open seats tend to produce more highly competitive elections thanincumbent-challenger contests for all types of offices (Bonneau, 2006; Gad-die and Bullock, 2000; Hall, 2001; Streb, Frederick, and LaFrance, 2007).Therefore, the models include a dummy variable coded 1 if the candidateran in a race absent an incumbent and 0 otherwise (OPEN-SEAT CANDIDATE).

Furthermore, the candidates’ levels of campaign spending have the capacityto shape outcomes of IAC races (Bonneau, 2007b). Though not a linearrelationship, as candidates spend more, their odds of victory tend to increase.Conversely, the spending of the opposition candidate corresponds with a de-cline in support for a candidate. Two variables measure spending effects inthese models—the log of spending by the candidate (CANDIDATE SPENDING) andthe log of spending by the opposing candidates in the race (OPPONENT SPEND-

ING).9 A log transformation is the customary approach in most studies esti-mating spending effects in judicial elections in order to properly model therelationship between spending and electoral success (Bonneau, 2005b).

Institutional Factors

IAC elections can occur in a variety of different institutional contexts.These variations may contribute to an IAC candidate’s vote percentage andlikelihood of victory. Two of these variables include whether the race ispartisan or nonpartisan and whether it took place in a district or on a state-wide basis. Previous studies of judicial elections demonstrate that partisanelections tend to be more competitive than nonpartisan elections (Bonneau,2004, 2007b; Dubois, 1980; Hall, 2001, 2007). The models here controlfor this relationship with a dummy variable coded 1 if the IAC candidatewas in a partisan race and 0 if the candidate was in a nonpartisan race(PARTISAN).10

9A small percentage of IAC elections occur in multimember districts and in these casesopponent spending includes the total amount of spending by all other candidates in the racedivided by the number of opponents.

10Though judicial candidates in Michigan are nominated at a party convention and ju-dicial candidates in Ohio are selected in a party primary, both are coded as being nonpartisansince the candidates’ party affiliations are not listed on the ballot in the general election. Testsin which both were coded as partisan yielded substantively similar results.


IAC elections occur in both districts and at the state level. Because theytend to encompass smaller, more politically homogenous territory, judicialelections in districts tend to produce less competition than state-wide con-tests (Hall and Bonneau, 2006). Hence, IAC candidates running in districtsmay have an edge over candidates running on a state-wide basis. As a result,we include a variable indicating whether the race occurred in a district,coded 1; 0 otherwise (DISTRICT).

Temporal Effects

Finally, since this data set covers more than one election cycle it is vital tocapture any temporal variation present in IAC races over this period. Thus,dummy variables representing various election cycles are also included in themodels.11

Results

Table 2 presents the results of both models. As expected, in the candidatevote share model, incumbents and open-seat candidates outperform chal-lengers (po0.05). When candidates expend additional sums of money, theirvote share improves (po0.01). Conversely, when their opponents spendmore, their vote percentage diminishes (po0.05). The variables for ap-pointed incumbent, partisan election, and district election are all statisticallyinsignificant.

Turning to the main variable of interest in this study, sex is a statisticallysignificant predictor of candidate vote share (po0.05). The coefficient forthe variable representing female status indicates that after controlling for allother variables in the model, women IAC candidates perform about 3.4percent better than do their male counterparts. This result confirms thefindings presented earlier showing that female candidates tended to have anadvantage in IAC races over the course of this study. To put this 3.4 percentgap in perspective, according to this model the impact of incumbency statusis just over seven points, all else equal. These results indicate that femalecandidates in low-profile judicial elections are not at a fundamental disad-vantage because of their sex.

Most of the findings of the second model (whether the candidate won orlost) track closely with the results of the first model. Once again, the femalevariable coefficient is statistically significant and positively related to whetherIAC candidates won their races. To measure the magnitude of the effect ofcandidate sex, Figure 4 plots the predicted probabilities of success for maleand female incumbents, male and female challengers, and male and female

11The 2006 election cycle serves as the reference category in each of the models.


open-seat candidates, holding all the continuous variables in the model attheir means and the indicator variables at their modes. The predicted prob-ability of victory for male incumbents in this sample is 0.72 compared to0.87 for female IAC incumbents. The disparity is even greater in the open-seat context, where the predicted probability of winning for female candi-dates is 0.65, about 25 percentage points higher than for male open-seatcandidates. A similar 22 percentage point edge exists for female challengers.These results illustrate that sex in IAC elections has a substantive impact onwhether candidates win. Ceteris paribus, female IAC candidates have ahigher probability of victory than do male candidates. These numbers fur-ther negate the idea that women face a more treacherous electoral climate injudicial elections than they would in races for other offices.

TABLE 2

Regression Model Predicting Candidate Success in IAC Races, 2000–2006

Independent Variable Candidate Vote Share Candidate Won/Lost

Female 3.433 n 0.984 n n n

(1.208) (0.206)Incumbent 7.166 n 1.966 n n n

(2.825) (0.521)Open-seat candidate 2.651 n 0.646 n

(0.815) (0.298)Appointed incumbent � 3.205 � 1.277

(2.200) (0.740)Candidate spending (log) 1.196 n n 0.525 n n

(0.364) (0.175)Opponent spending (log) � 0.992 n � 0.495 n n

(0.366) (0.174)Partisan � 0.279 � 0.076

(0.407) (0.113)District � 0.081 � 0.139

(0.461) (0.146)2000–2001 0.416 0.040

(0.297) (0.086)2002–2003 0.546 0.094

(0.382) (0.086)2004–2005 0.293 0.030

(0.509) (0.109)Constant 43.923 n n n � 1.192 n

(2.226) (0.515)Adjusted R2 0.225Pseudo R2 0.215N 364 364

npo0.05; n npo0.01; n nnpo0.001.

NOTE: In the first column, the dependent variable is the percentage of the vote received by theIAC candidate. In the second column, the dependent variable is coded 1 if the IAC candidatewon and 0 if the candidate lost. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.


Discussion and Conclusion

This study has explored the electoral fate of women candidates in judicialelections. As with other elected positions, candidate sex does not seem to be ahindrance in obtaining office. There does not appear to be anything distinctiveabout campaigns for the judiciary that inhibits women from sitting on thebench. If any verdict can be reached on the role of sex in the outcomes ofjudicial elections, then it is that women might receive a modest boost at thepolls. In the IAC elections studied here, women candidates actually fared betterthan male candidates both in terms of vote share and whether they win. At-tempts to diversify state court systems can occur through the electoral process aslong as women are willing to throw their hats into the ring. As male incumbentsretire and more women run for open-court seats, state judiciaries should see anincrease in the number of female judges serving on the bench. Although theremay be many negative consequences of holding judicial elections, the resultshere indicate one positive effect of such elections. The concerns of scholars whoworry that judicial elections lead to a less diverse court—at least in terms ofgender—seem to be misplaced. Of course, given the results of studies finding nosignificant relationship between gender diversity and method of judicial

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

FemaleIncumbent

MaleIncumbent

FemaleChallenger

MaleChallenger

Open-SeatFemale

Candidate

Open-SeatMale

Candidate

Pre

dict

ed P

roba

bilit

ies

FIGURE 4

Predicted Probabilities of IAC Candidate Success

NOTE: Predicted probabilities calculated by holding the continuous variables at theirmeans and the indicator variables at their modes. Bars represent the 95 percentconfidence intervals for the estimated probabilities. All predicted probabilitiescalculated using CLARIFY software (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King, 2003).


selection (Alozie, 1996; Hurwitz and Lanier, 2001, 2003), it is likely that meritselection does not inhibit judicial diversity either (but see Williams, 2007).

The chief constraint of this study is that it can provide only limitedempirical insight into why women candidates appear to hold a slight ad-vantage—and certainly are not discriminated against—in judicial elections.Is it because female IAC candidates are perceived to be more ethical andimpartial than male candidates by voters in these elections? Since IAC elec-tions usually fly below the radar, voters may be applying a stereotype thatfemale judicial candidates would demonstrate more honesty and integrity ifthey reached the bench. This relationship seems plausible based on previousresearch of women candidates. However, to more fully corroborate thishypothesis it would require individual-level survey data to ascertain whyvoters made their decisions in these elections.

Another explanation is that since women comprise a small share of thecandidate pool in IAC elections, there may be a winnowing process whereonly the strongest female candidates are running in these races. Women mayface discrimination from political elites at the entry stage of the campaignprocess, as they do in state legislative races (Niven, 1998, 2006; Sanbonmatsu,2006), which leads to a situation where only the most effective female can-didates enter IAC races. Therefore, most of the women running have to bebetter than their male colleagues in the election process (Lawless and Pearson,2008). Hence, if women did run for judicial offices at the same rate as domen, the results in this study may not hold. Further research into the re-cruitment of judicial candidates is essential to gain further analytical leverageon this question. Overall, however, the state of the political environment forwomen in appellate court races that emanates from this study is one that isextraordinarily positive if you are committed to diversity on the bench. As theranks of female attorneys continue to swell, so should the number of femalejudges in states that hold judicial elections. If political equality between thesexes is to be achieved, then women must make gains in all elected officepositions, including the judiciary. The absence of female judges on the benchundermines the policy interests of women. Judges are policymakers and fe-male judges may make a substantive difference in the outcomes of cases thatcome before the court system (Peresie, 2005; Songer and Crews-Meyer,2000). Considering that no systematic bias emerged against women runningfor the state appellate bench in this study, there is the prospect that paritybetween the sexes can gradually occur as more openings for these positionsbecome available and the qualified pool of women candidates continues togrow. Ultimately, this development will produce greater descriptive repre-sentation of women in the judicial branch of government at the state level.

REFERENCES

Alexander, Deborah, and Kristi Anderson. 1993. ‘‘Gender as a Factor in the Attributions ofLeadership Traits.’’ Political Research Quarterly 46:527–45.


Alozie, Nicholas O. 1990. ‘‘Distribution of Women and Minority Judges: The Effects ofJudicial Selection Methods.’’ Social Science Quarterly 71:315–25.

———. 1996. ‘‘Selection Methods and the Recruitment of Women to State Courts of LastResort.’’ Social Science Quarterly 77:110–26.

American Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession. 2006. A CurrentGlance at Women in the Law 2006. Available at hhttp://www.abanet.org/women/CurrentGlanceStatistics2006.pdfi.Baum, Lawrence. 2003. ‘‘Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter’sPerspective.’’ Ohio State Law Journal 64:14–41.

Bonneau, Chris W. 2001. ‘‘The Composition of State Supreme Courts.’’ Judicature 85:26–31.

———. 2004. ‘‘Patterns of Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition in State Su-preme Court Elections.’’ Justice System Journal 25:21–38.

———. 2005a. ‘‘Electoral Verdicts: Incumbent Defeats in State Supreme Court Elections.’’American Politics Research 33:818–41.

———. 2005b. ‘‘What Price Justice(s)? Understanding Campaign Spending in State Su-preme Court Elections.’’ State Politics and Policy Quarterly 5:107–25.

———. 2006. ‘‘Vacancies on the Bench: Open-Seat Elections for State Supreme Courts.’’Justice System Journal 27:143–59.

———. 2007a. ‘‘Campaign Fundraising in State Supreme Court Elections.’’ Social ScienceQuarterly 88:68–85.

———. 2007b. ‘‘The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections.’’Political Research Quarterly 60:489–99.

Bratton, Kathleen A., and Rorie L. Spill. 2002. ‘‘Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection:The Role of the Appointment Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State SupremeCourts.’’ Social Science Quarterly 83:504–18.

Burrell, Barbara C. 1994. A Woman’s Place is in the House: Campaigns for Congress in theFeminist Era. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Caufield, Rachel P. 2007. ‘‘The Changing Tone of Judicial Election Campaigns as aResult of White.’’ In Matthew J. Streb, ed., Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial,and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections. New York: New York University Press.

Cooperman, Rosalyn, and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. 2001. ‘‘The Gender Gap in the House ofRepresentatives.’’ In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Recon-sidered, 7th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Darcy, Robert S., Susan Welch, and Janet Clark. 1994. Women, Elections and Representation,2nd ed. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Dolan, Kathleen. 1998. ‘‘Voting for Women in the Year of the Woman.’’ American Journal ofPolitical Science 42:272–93.

———. 2004. Voting for Women: How the Public Evaluates Women Candidates. Boulder,CO: Westview Press.

Dubois, Phillip L. 1980. From Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections and the Quest for Account-ability. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Gaddie, Ronald Keith, and Charles S. Bullock. 2000. Elections to Open Seats in the U.S.House: Where the Action Is. Washington, DC: Rowman and Littlefield.


Hall, Melinda Gann. 2001. ‘‘State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing theMyths of Judicial Reform.’’ American Political Science Review 95:315–30.

———. 2007. ‘‘Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections.’’ InMatthew J. Streb, ed., Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes ofJudicial Elections. New York: New York University Press.

Hall, Melinda Gann, and Chris W. Bonneau. 2006. ‘‘Does Quality Matter?Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections.’’ American Journal of Political Science50:20–33.

Henry, M. L., Estajo Koslow, Joseph Soffer, and John Furey. 1985. The Success of Women andMinorities in Achieving Judicial Office: The Selection Process. New York: Fund for ModernCourts.

Hogan, Robert E. 2007. ‘‘The Effects of Candidate Gender on Campaign Spending in StateLegislative Elections.’’ Social Science Quarterly 88:1092–1105.

Huddy, Leonie, and Nayda Terkilsen. 1993a. ‘‘The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes forDifferent Levels and Types of Office.’’ Political Research Quarterly 46:503–25.

———. 1993b. ‘‘Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates.’’American Journal of Political Science 37:119–47.

Hurwitz, Mark S., and Drew Noble Lanier. 2001. ‘‘Women and Minorities on State andFederal Appellate Benches.’’ Judicature 85:84–92.

———. 2003. ‘‘Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability of Women and Mi-norities to Attain Seats on State Supreme Court and Appellate Courts.’’ State Politics andPolicy Quarterly 3:329–352.

Jacobson, Gary C. 2004. The Politics of Congressional Elections, 6th ed. New York: PearsonLongman.

Jewell, Malcom E. 1982. Representation in State Legislatures. Lexington, KY: University Pressof Kentucky.

King, David C., and Richard E. Matland. 2003. ‘‘Sex and the Grand Old Party: AnExperimental Investigation of the Effect of Candidate Sex on the Support for a RepublicanCandidate.’’ American Politics Research 31:595–612.

Koch, Jeffrey W. 2000. ‘‘Do Citizens Apply Gender Stereotypes to Infer Candidates’ Ideo-logical Orientations?’’ Journal of Politics 62:414–29.

Lawless, Jennifer L. 2004. ‘‘Women, War and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping inthe Post September 11th Era.’’ Political Research Quarterly 57:479–90.

Lawless, Jennifer L., and Kathryn Pearson. 2008. ‘‘The Primary Reason for Women’sUnderrepresentation? Reevaluating the Conventional Wisdom.’’ Journal of Politics 70:67–82.

Leeper, Mark Stephen. 1991. ‘‘The Impact of Prejudice on Female Candidates: An Exper-imental Look at Voter Inference.’’ American Politics Quarterly 19:248–61.

Matland, Richard E., and David C. King. 2002. ‘‘Women as Candidates in CongressionalElections.’’ In Cindy Simon Rosenthal, ed., Women Transforming Congress. Norman, OK:University of Oklahoma Press.

McDermott, Monika L. 1997. ‘‘Voting Cues in Low-Information Elections: CandidateGender as a Social Information Variable in Contemporary US Elections.’’ American Journalof Political Science 41:270–83.


———. 1998. ‘‘Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections.’’ Political ResearchQuarterly 51:895–918.

Milyo, Jeffrey, and Samantha Schosberg. 2000. ‘‘Gender Bias and Selection Bias in HouseElections.’’ Public Choice 105:41–59.

Niven, David. 1998. The Missing Majority: The Recruitment of Women as State LegislativeCandidates. Westport, CT: Praeger.

———. 2006. ‘‘Throwing Your Hat Out of the Ring: Negative Recruitment and the GenderImbalance in State Legislative Candidacy.’’ Politics and Gender 2:473–91.

Palmer, Barbara, and Dennis Simon. 2006. Breaking the Political Glass Ceiling: Women andCongressional Elections. New York: Routledge.

Paolino, Phillip. 1995. ‘‘Group-Salient Issues and Support for Women Candidates in the1992 Senate Elections.’’ American Journal of Political Science 39:294–313.

Peresie, Jennifer L. 2005. ‘‘Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decision Making inthe Federal Appellate Courts.’’ Yale Law Journal 114:1759–90.

Reid, Traciel V. 2004a. ‘‘Assessing the Impact of a Candidate’s Sex in Judicial Campaignsand Elections in North Carolina.’’ Justice System Journal 25:183–207.

———. 2004b. ‘‘The Competitiveness of Female Candidates in Judicial Elections: AnAnalysis of the North Carolina Trial Court Races.’’ Albany Law Review 67:829–42.

Rosenwater, Shirley M., and Norma G. Dean. 1989. ‘‘Gender Role and Political Office:Effects of Perceived Masculinity/Femininity of Candidate and Political Office.’’ Psychology ofWomen Quarterly 13:77–85.

Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. ‘‘Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice.’’ American Journal ofPolitical Science 46:20–34.

———. 2006. Where Women Run: Gender and Party in the American States. Ann Arbor, MI:University of Michigan Press.

Schaffner, Brian F., and Jennifer Segal Diascro. 2007. ‘‘Judicial Elections in the News.’’ InMatthew J. Streb, ed., Running for Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal Stakes ofJudicial Elections. New York: New York University Press.

Seltzer, Richard A., Jody Newman, and Melissa Voorhees Leighton. 1997. Sex as a PoliticalVariable: Women as Candidates and Voters in U.S. Elections. Boulder, CO: Lynne RiennerPublishers.

Songer, Donald, and Kelly A. Crews-Meyer. 2000. ‘‘Does Judge Gender Matter? DecisionMaking in State Supreme Courts.’’ Social Science Quarterly 81:750–62.

Streb, Matthew J., Brian Frederick, and Casey LaFrance. 2007. ‘‘Contestation, Competition,and the Potential for Accountability in Intermediate Appellate Court Elections.’’ Judicature91:70–78.

Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. 2003. CLARIFY: Software for Interpretingand Presenting Statistical Results, v. 2.1 Cambridge: Harvard University. Available at hhttp://gking.harvard.edui.Werner, Timothy S., and Kenneth R. Mayer. 2007. ‘‘Public Election Funding, Competition,and Candidate Gender.’’ PS: Political Science and Politics 40:661–67.

Williams, Margaret. 2007. ‘‘Women’s Representation on State Trial and Appellate Courts.’’Social Science Quarterly 88:1193–1204.


Women Running for Judge: The Impact of Sex on Candidate Success in State Intermediate Appellate...

Documents

Transcript of Women Running for Judge: The Impact of Sex on Candidate Success in State Intermediate Appellate...