Battle of Kursk

The Battle of Kursk was a Second World War engage-ment between German and Soviet forces on the EasternFront near Kursk (450 kilometres or 280 miles south-west of Moscow) in the Soviet Union during July and Au-gust 1943. The German oensive was code-named Op-eration Citadel (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle) andled to one of the largest armoured clashes in history,the Battle of Prokhorovka. The German oensive wascountered by two Soviet counter-oensives, OperationPolkovodets Rumyantsev (Russian: -) and Operation Kutuzov (Russian: ). For theGermans, the battle represented the nal strategic oen-sive they were able to mount in the east. For the Soviets,the victory gave the Red Army the strategic initiative forthe rest of the war.The Germans hoped to weaken the Soviet oensive po-tential for the summer of 1943 by cutting o a largenumber of forces that they anticipated would be in theKursk salient.[22] The Kursk salient or bulge was 250kilometres (160 mi) long from north to south and 160kilometres (99 mi) from east to west.[23] By eliminat-ing the Kursk salient, the Germans would also shortentheir lines of defence, nullifying Soviet numerical superi-ority in critical sectors.[24] The plan envisioned an envel-opment by a pair of pincers breaking through the north-ern and southern anks of the salient.[25] German dictatorAdolf Hitler thought that a victory here would reassertGerman strength and improve his prestige with his allies,who were considering withdrawing from the war.[26] Itwas also hoped that large numbers of Soviet prisonerswould be captured to be used as slave labour in the Ger-man armaments industry.[24]

The Soviets had intelligence of the German intentions,provided in part by the British intelligence service andTunny intercepts. Aware months in advance, that the at-tack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the So-viets built a defence in depth designed to wear down theGerman panzer spearheads.[27] The Germans delayed theoensive, while they tried to build up their forces andwaited for new weapons, mainly the new Panther tankbut also larger numbers of the Tiger heavy tank.[28][29][30]This gave the Red Army time to construct a series ofdeep defensive belts. The defensive preparations includedmineelds, fortications, artillery re zones and anti-tank strong points, which extended approximately 300km (190 mi) in depth.[31] Soviet mobile formations weremoved out of the salient and a large reserve force wasformed for strategic counter-oensives.[32]

The Battle of Kursk was the rst time a German strate-

gic oensive had been halted before it could breakthrough enemy defences and penetrate to its strategicdepths.[33][34] The maximum depth of the Nazi advancewas 812 kilometres (5.07.5 mi) in the north and 35kilometres (22 mi) in the south.[35] Though the SovietArmy had succeeded in winter oensives previously,their counter-oensives following the German attack atKursk were their rst successful strategic summer oen-sives of the war.[36]

1 Background

German soldiers in Orel pass by the Church of the Intercession,early 1943.

As the Battle of Stalingrad slowly ground to its conclu-sion the Soviet army moved to a general oensive inthe south, pressuring the exhausted German forces whohad survived the winter. By January 1943, a 160 to300 km (99 to 186 mi) wide gap had opened betweenArmy Group B and Army Group Don, and the advanc-ing Soviet armies threatened to cut o all German forcessouth of the Don River, including Army Group A oper-ating in the Caucasus.[37][38] Army Group Center cameunder signicant pressure as well. Kursk fell to the Sovi-ets on 8 February 1943, and Rostov on 14 February.[39]The Soviet Bryansk, Western, and newly-created CentralFronts prepared for an oensive which envisioned the en-circlement of Army Group Center between Bryansk andSmolensk.[37][40] By February 1943 the Wehrmacht wasin danger of a general collapse.Hitlers belief in his own iron will as the deciding factor inthe conict resulted in German forces being left tied downin a rigid defence that did not permit them the liberty tomove.[41][42] Since December 1942 Field Marshal Erichvon Manstein had been strongly requesting unrestricted

1

2 1 BACKGROUND

operational freedom to allow him to use his forces ina uid manner.[43] Hitlers policy of holding at all costsmay have averted a general collapse in the winter of 1941-42, but thereafter it consistently resulted in forces hold-ing ground until their position became cuto, resulting intheir inevitable destruction.[44] The 6th Army isolated inthe Stalingrad pocket surrendered 2 February.On 12 February 1943, the remaining German forces werereorganised. To the south, Army Group Don was re-named as Army Group South and placed under the com-mand of Manstein. Directly to the north, Army GroupB was dissolved, with its forces and areas of responsibil-ity divided between Army Group South and Army GroupCenter. Manstein inherited responsibility for the massivebreach in the German lines.[45] On 18 February, Hitler ar-rived at Army Group South headquarters, at Zaporizhia,hours before the Soviets liberated Kharkov. Hitlers dis-trust of the General Sta and traditional ocer corps,and of Manstein in particular, put him at odds with thehigh command of the Wehrmacht.[43][46] Though Hitlerdesired to relieve Manstein and blame him for the fail-ure at Stalingrad,[47] he concluded he could ill aord tolose the man called Hitlers most able general by theAmerican media.[48][42] Instead, Hitler grudgingly gavehim the freedom he had requested.[43] The II SS PanzerCorps had arrived from France in January 1943, rettedand up to near full strength.[49] Armoured units from the1st Panzer Army of Army Group A had pulled out of theCaucasus and further strengthened Mansteins forces.[50]Once given freedom of action, Manstein explained howhe intended to utilize these forces in making a series ofcounterstrokes into the anks of the Soviet armoured for-mations, with the goal of destroying them while retakingKharkov and Kursk.[45][51]

Waen-SS soldiers aboard a Panzer IV in Kharkov, March 1943

The Third Battle of Kharkov commenced on 19 February,spearheaded by the three SS divisions of the II SS PanzerCorps. Mansteins oensive cut o the Soviet spear-heads, and then encircled and destroyed the main force.The Germans retook Kharkov on 15 March and Belgorodon 18 March.[51] The German oensive wrested the ini-tiative from the Soviets. A Soviet oensive launched on25 February by the Central Front against Army GroupCenter had to be abandoned by 7 March to allow the at-

tacking formations to disengage and redeploy to the southto counter the threat of the advancing German forces un-der Manstein.[52][53] Exhaustion of both the Wehrmachtand the Red Army coupled with the loss of mobility dueto the onset of the spring rasputitsa resulted in the cessa-tion of operations for both sides by mid-March.[54] Thecounteroensive left a salient extending into the Germanarea of control, centered around the city of Kursk.[54]

1.1 German plans and preparation

German plan of attack

The heavy losses sustained by the Heer since the open-ing of Barbarossa had resulted in a shortage in infantryand artillery.[55] Units were in total 470,000 men under-strength. For the Germans to undertake an oensive in1943, the burden would have to be carried by the panzerdivisions. In view of the exposed position of Army GroupSouth, Manstein proposed that his forces should take thestrategic defensive. He anticipated that a Soviet oensivewould attempt to cut o and destroy Army Group Southby a move across the Donets River toward the Dnieper.In February, he proposed waiting for this oensive todevelop and then delivering a series of counterattacksinto the exposed Soviet anks.[56] Hitler, concerned aboutthe political implications of taking a defensive stance,and preoccupied with holding the Donbass, rejected thisplan.[57] On 10 March, Manstein presented an alterna-tive plan whereby the German forces would pinch o theKursk salient with a rapid oensive commencing as soonas the spring rasputitsa had subsided.[58][59]

1.1 German plans and preparation 3

On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5,which authorised several oensives, including one againstthe Kursk salient.[60][61] As the last Soviet resistance inKharkov petered out, Manstein attempted to persuadeGnther von Kluge, commander of Army Group Centre,to immediately attack the Central Front, which was de-fending the northern face of the salient. Kluge refused,believing that his forces were too weak to launch such anattack.[59] Further Axis advances were blocked by Sovietforces that had been shifted down from the Central Frontto the area north of Belgorod.[59][51] By mid-April, amidpoor weather and with the German forces exhausted andin need of retting, the oensives of Operational OrderNo. 5 were postponed.[50][62]

On 15 April, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6,which called for the Kursk oensive operation to be-gin on 3 May or shortly thereafter. The talented, re-sourceful Kurt Zeitzler, the OKH Chief of Sta, providedthe logistical planning for the operation.[63] The oen-sive was codenamed Zitadelle (Citadel).[64] For the of-fensive to succeed it was deemed essential to attack be-fore the Soviets had a chance to prepare extensive de-fences or to launch an oensive of their own.[65][66] Ac-cording to some military historians, the operation envi-sioned a blitzkrieg attack;[lower-alpha 10] other military his-torians and the German participants who wrote about itafter the war, including Manstein, make no mention ofblitzkrieg in their accounts of the operation.[lower-alpha 11]Historian Pier Battistelli asserts that the operational plan-ning marked a change in German oensive thinking awayfrom blitzkrieg.[67]

Operation Citadel called for a double envelopment, di-rected at Kursk, to surround the Soviet defenders and sealo the salient. Army Group Centre would provide Gen-eral Walter Model's 9th Army to form the northern pin-cer. It would cut through the northern face of the salient,driving south to the hills east of Kursk, securing the railline from Soviet attack.[68] Army Group South wouldcommit the 4th Panzer Army, under Hermann Hoth,and Army Detachment Kempf, under Werner Kempf, topierce the southern face of the salient. This force woulddrive north to meet the 9th Army east of Kursk.[69][70][71]Von Mainsteins main attack was to be delivered byHoths 4th Panzer Army, spearheaded by the II SS PanzerCorps under Paul Hausser. The XLVIII Panzer Corps,commanded by Otto von Knobelsdor, would advance onthe left while Army Detachment Kempf would advanceon the right.[72] The 2nd Army, under the command ofWalter Weiss, would contain the western portion of thesalient.[73][71]

On 27 April Model met with Hitler to review and ex-press his concern for reconnaissance information whichshowed the Soviets constructing very strong positions atthe shoulders of the salient and having withdrawn theirmobile forces from the area west of Kursk.[74] He arguedthat the longer the preparation phase continued, the lessthe operation could be justied. He recommended com-

Ernst-Georg Buchterkirch (left) in discussion with General Model

pletely abandoning Citadel, allowing the army to awaitand defeat the coming Soviet oensive, or radically re-vising the plan for Citadel.[75][76] Though in mid-AprilManstein had considered the Citadel oensive protable,by May he shared Models misgivings.[76][65] He assertedthat the best course of action would be for the Germanforces to take the strategic defensive, ceding ground toallow the anticipated Soviet forces to extend themselvesand allow the German panzer forces to counterattack inthe type of uid mobile battle they excelled at.[77] Con-vinced that the Red Army would deliver its main eortagainst Army Group South, he proposed to keep the leftwing of the army group strong while moving the rightwing back in stages to the Dnieper River, followed bya counterattack against the ank of the Red Army ad-vance. The counteroensive would continue until the Seaof Azov was reached and the Soviet forces were cut o.Hitler rejected this idea; he did not want to give up somuch terrain, even temporarily.[77]

In early May, Hitler called his senior ocers and advi-sors to Munich for a meeting. Hitler spoke for about 45minutes on the current situation and the plans for the of-fensive. Model then spoke, and produced reconnaissancephotos revealing some of the extensive preparations theSoviets had made in preparation for the attack.[78] A num-ber of options were put forth for comment: going on theoensive immediately with the forces at hand, delayingthe oensive further to await the arrival of new and bet-ter tanks, radically revising the operation or cancellingit all together. Manstein spoke against the oensive,but not forcefully. Albert Speer, the minister of Arma-ments and War Production, spoke about the diculties ofrebuilding the armoured formations and the limitationsof German industry to replace losses. General HeinzGuderian argued strongly against the operation, statingthe attack was pointless.[79] The conference ended with-out Hitler coming to a decision, but Citadel was notaborted.[76][80][81] Three days later, OKW, Hitlers con-duit for controlling the military, postponed the launchdate for Citadel to 12 June.[81][82][83]

Following this meeting, Guderian continued to voice his

4 1 BACKGROUND

Guderian being transported to the Eastern Front, 1943

concerns over an operation that would likely degrade thepanzer forces that he had been attempting to rebuild. Heconsidered the oensive, as planned, to be a misuse of thepanzer forces, as it violated two of the three tenets he hadlaid out as the essential elements for a successful panzerattack.[lower-alpha 12] In his opinion, the limited German re-sources in men and materiel should be conserved, as theywould be needed for the pending defence of Western Eu-rope. In a meeting with Hitler on 10 May he asked,

Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, andindeed in the east this year at all? Do you thinkanyone even knows where Kursk is? The entireworld doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not.What is the reason that is forcing us to attackthis year on Kursk, or even more, on the East-ern Front?

Hitler replied, I know. The thought of it turns mystomach. Guderian concluded, In that case your re-action to the problem is the correct one. Leave italone.[84][lower-alpha 13]

Despite reservations, Hitler remained committed to theoensive. He and the OKW, early in the preparatoryphase, were hopeful that the oensive would revitaliseGerman strategic fortunes in the east. As the challengesoered by Citadel increased, he focused more and moreon the expected new weapons that he believed were thekey to victory: principally the Panther tank, but also theElefant tank destroyer and greater numbers of the Tigerheavy tank.[28] He postponed the operation in order toawait their arrival.[75][85] Receiving reports of powerfulSoviet concentrations behind the Kursk area, Hitler fur-ther delayed the oensive to allow for more equipment toreach the front.[86] With pessimism for Citadel increas-ing with each delay, in June, Alfred Jodl, the Chief ofSta at the OKW, instructed the armed forces propa-ganda oce to portray the upcoming operation as a lim-ited counteroensive.[87][81][88] Due to concerns of an Al-lied landing in the south of France or in Italy and delaysin deliveries of the new tanks, Hitler postponed again,this time to 20 June.[lower-alpha 14] Zeitzler was profoundlyconcerned with the delays,[89] but he still supported the

oensive.[76][60] On 1718 June, following a discussionin which the OKW Operations Sta suggested abandon-ing the oensive, Hitler further postponed the operationuntil 3 July.[90][87][91] Finally, on 1 July, Hitler announced5 July as the launch date of the oensive.[90][91][92]

A Raupenschlepper Ost, designed in response to the poor roadsof Russia, moves material up shortly before the Kursk oensive.

A three-month quiet period descended upon the EasternFront as the Soviets prepared their defences and the Ger-mans attempted to build up their forces. The Germansused this period for specialised training of their assaulttroops.[93] All units underwent training and combat re-hearsals. The Waen-SS had built a full-scale duplicateSoviet strong point that was used to practice the tech-niques for neutralizing such positions. The panzer divi-sions received replacement men and equipment and at-tempted to get back up to strength. The German forcesto be used in the oensive included 12 panzer divisionsand 5 panzergrenadier divisions, four of which had tankstrengths greater than their neighboring panzer divisions.However, the force was markedly decient in infantry di-visions, which were essential to hold ground and to se-cure the anks.[94] By the time the Germans initiated theoensive, their force amounted to around 777,000 men,2,451 tanks and assault guns (70 percent of the Germanarmour on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 guns and mor-tars.[73][95][lower-alpha 15]

1.2 Soviet plans and preparationIn 1943 an oensive by the Soviet Central, Bryansk andWestern Fronts against Army Group Centre was aban-doned shortly after it began in early March, when thesouthern ank of the Central Front was threatened byArmy Group South.[37][53] Soviet intelligence receivedinformation about German troop concentrations spottedat Orel and Kharkov, as well as details of an intendedGerman oensive in the Kursk sector through the Lucyspy ring in Switzerland. The Soviets veried the in-telligence via their spy in Britain, John Cairncross, atthe Government Code and Cypher School at BletchleyPark, who clandestinely forwarded raw decrypts directlyto Moscow.[96][97][98] Soviet politician Anastas Mikoyanwrote that on 27 March 1943, Soviet dictator Joseph

1.2 Soviet plans and preparation 5

Stalin notied him of a possible German attack in theKursk sector.[99] Stalin and some senior ocers were ea-ger to strike rst once the rasputitsa ended,[100][101] but anumber of key ocers, including Deputy Supreme Com-mander Georgiy Zhukov, recommended a strategic de-fensive before going on the oensive. In a letter to theStavka and Stalin, on 8 April, Zhukov wrote:

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov, 1941.

In the rst phase the enemy, collectingtheir best forcesincluding 1315 tank divi-sions and with the support of a large num-ber of aircraftwill strike Kursk with theirKromskom-Orel grouping from the north-eastand their Belgorod-Kharkov grouping from thesouth-east... I consider it inadvisable for ourforces to go over to an oensive in the near fu-ture in order to forestall the enemy. It wouldbe better to make the enemy exhaust himselfagainst our defences, and knock out his tanksand then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go overto the general oensive which would nally n-ish o his main force.[102][103]

Stalin consulted with his frontine commanders and se-nior ocers of the General Sta from 12 to 15 April1943. In the end he and the Stavka agreed that the Ger-mans would probably target Kursk.[104] Stalin believedthe decision to defend would give the Germans the ini-tiative, but Zhukov countered that the Germans wouldbe drawn into a trap where their armoured power wouldbe destroyed, thus creating the conditions for a majorSoviet counteroensive.[105] They decided to meet theenemy attack by preparing defensive positions to wearout the German groupings before launching their ownoensive.[103][106] Preparation of defences and fortica-tions began by the end of April, and continued until theGerman attack in early July.[107][104] The two-month de-lay between the German decision to attack the Kursksalient and its implementation allowed the Red Army am-ple time to thoroughly prepare.[82][83]

General Nikolai Vatutin

The Voronezh Front, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin,was tasked with defending the southern face of thesalient. The Central Front, commanded by KonstantinRokossovsky, defended the northern face. Waitingin reserve was the Steppe Front, commanded by IvanKonev.[108][109] In February 1943, the Central Front hadbeen reconstructed from the Don Front, which had beenpart of the northern pincer of Operation Uranus and hadbeen responsible for the destruction of the 6th Army atStalingrad.[110][111]

The Central and Voronezh Fronts each constructed threemain defensive belts in their sectors, with each sub-divided into several zones of fortication.[112] [113][114]The Soviets employed the labour of over 300,000civilians.[lower-alpha 16] Fortifying each belt was an inter-connected web of mineelds, barbed-wire fences, anti-tank ditches, deep entrenchments for infantry, anti-tankobstacles, dug-in armoured vehicles, and machine-gunbunkers.[115] Behind the three main defensive belts werethree more belts prepared as fallback positions; the rstwas not fully occupied or heavily fortied, and the lasttwo, though suciently fortied, were unoccupied withthe exception of a small area in the immediate environsof Kursk.[116][117] The combined depth of the three maindefensive zones was about 40 kilometres (25 mi). Thesix defensive belts on either side of Kursk were 130150kilometres (8193 mi) deep.[117] If the Germans man-aged to break through these defences they would stillbe confronted by additional defensive belts to the east,manned by the Steppe Front. These brought the to-tal depth of the defences to nearly 300 kilometres (190mi).[116]

The Voronezh and Central Fronts dug 4,200 kilome-tres (2,600 mi) and 5,000 kilometres (3,100 mi) oftrenches respectively,[118] laid out in criss-cross patternfor ease of movement.[115] The Soviets built more than686 bridges and about 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) ofroads in the salient.[118] Red Army combat engineerslaid 503,663 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnelmines, with the highest concentration in the rst maindefensive belt.[113][115] The mineelds at Kursk achieveddensities of 1,700 anti-personnel and 1,500 anti-tankmines per kilometre, about four times the density used

6 1 BACKGROUND

If the 4,200 km of trenches dug by the Voronezh Front had beendug in a straight line, they would have stretched from Moscow toMadrid.

in the defence of Moscow.[119][120][121] For example, the6th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, was spreadout over nearly 64 kilometres (40 mi) of front and wasprotected by 69,688 anti-tank and 64,430 anti-personnelmines in its rst defensive belt with a further 20,200 anti-tank and 9,097 anti-personnel mines in its second defen-sive belt.[112][122][123] Furthermore, mobile obstacle de-tachments were tasked with laying more mines directly inthe path of advancing enemy armoured formations.[124]These units, consisting of two platoons of combat en-gineers with mines at division level and one companyof combat engineers normally equipped with 500700mines at corps level, functioned as anti-tank reserves atevery level of command.[125]

In a letter dated 8 April, Zhukov warned that the Germanswould attack the salient with a strong armoured force:

We can expect the enemy to put [the] great-est reliance in this years oensive operationson his tank divisions and air force, since his in-fantry appears to be far less prepared for oen-sive operations than last year ... In view of thisthreat, we should strengthen the anti-tank de-fences of the Central and Voronezh fronts, andassemble as soon as possible.[103]

Nearly all artillery, including howitzers, guns, anti-aircraft and rockets, were tasked with anti-tankdefence.[125] Dug-in tanks and self-propelled gunsfurther strengthened the anti-tank defences.[115][125]Anti-tank forces were incorporated into every levelof command, mostly as anti-tank strong points withthe majority concentrated on likely attack routes andthe remainder amply spread out elsewhere.[125] Eachanti-tank strong-point typically consisted of four tosix anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank ries, and veto seven heavy and light machine guns. They weresupported by mobile obstacle detachments as well asby infantry with automatic rearms.[126] Independent

tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regimentswere tasked with cooperating with the infantry duringcounterattacks.[126]

A Soviet machine gun in action during the Battle of Kursk.

Soviet preparations also included increased activity ofpartisans, who attacked German communications andsupply lines.[127] The attacks were mostly behind ArmyGroup North and Army Group Centre.[28] In June 1943,partisans operating in the occupied area behind ArmyGroup Centre destroyed 298 locomotives, 1,222 railwaywagons and 44 bridges, and in the Kursk sector there were1,092 partisan attacks on railways.[113][128][129] These at-tacks delayed the build-up of German supplies and equip-ment, and required the diversion of German troops tosuppress the partisans, delaying their training for theoensive.[28] Central Partisan Headquarters coordinatedmany of these attacks. In June Soviet Air Forces (VVS)ew over 800 sorties at night to resupply the partisangroups operating behind Army Group Centre.[130] TheVVS also provided communication and sometimes evendaylight air-support for major partisan operations.[127]

Special training was provided to the Soviet infantry man-ning the defences to help them overcome the tank pho-bia that had been evident since the start of the Germaninvasion.[131][132] Soldiers were packed into trenches andtanks were driven overhead until all signs of fear weregone.[lower-alpha 17][132] This training exercise was referredto by the soldiers as ironing.[118] In combat, the sol-diers would spring up in the midst of the attacking in-fantry to separate them from the spearheading armouredvehicles. The separated armoured vehicles now vulner-able to infantry armed with anti-tank ries, demolitioncharges and Molotov cocktails could then be disabledor destroyed at point-blank range.[133] These types of at-tacks were mostly eective against the massive Ferdinandtank destroyers, which lacked machine guns as secondaryarmament.[133] The soldiers were also promised nancialrewards for each tank destroyed, with the Peoples Com-misariat of Defence providing 1,000 rubles for destroyedtanks.[134]

The Soviets employedmaskirovka (deception techniques)to mask defensive positions and troop dispositions andto conceal the movement of men and materiel.[135][136]

1.3 Contest for air superiority and air support of the ground forces 7

These included camouaging gun emplacements, con-structing dummy airelds and depots, generating falseradio-trac, and spreading rumours among the So-viet frontline troops and the civilian population in theGerman-held areas.[137] Movement of forces and suppliesto and from the salient took place at night only. Ammu-nition caches were carefully concealed to blend in withthe landscape. Radio transmission was restricted and reswere forbidden. Command posts were hidden and motortransport in and around them forbidden.[138][139]

According to a Soviet General Sta report, 29 of the 35major Luftwae raids on Soviet airelds in the Kursk sec-tor in June 1943 were against dummy airelds.[137] TheSoviet deception eorts were so successful that Germanestimates issued in mid-June placed the total Soviet ar-moured strength at 1,500 tanks.[140][141] The result wasnot only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but amisperception of Soviet strategic intentions.[138] Accord-ing to historian Antony Beevor, in contrast, Soviet avi-ation apparently succeeded in destroying more than 500Luftwae aircraft on the ground.[142]

M3 Lee lend-lease tanks at Kursk. Unpopular with its crews, theM3 was nicknamed a con for seven brothers.

The main tank of the Soviet tank arm was the T-34,considered the best all-around tank design of the en-tire war, on which the Red Army attempted to con-centrate production. The tank arm also contained largenumbers of the T-70 light tank. For example, the 5thGuards Tank Army roughly contained 270 T-70s and500 T-34s. In the salient itself the Soviets assembleda large number of lend-lease tanks. These includedU.S.-manufactured M3 Lees and British-built Churchills,Matildas and Valentines. However, the T-34 made upthe bulk of the Soviet armour.[143] Without includingthe deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front,the Soviets massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks,20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft to defend thesalient.[102][144] This amounted to 26 percent of the totalmanpower of the Red Army, 26 percent of its mortarsand artillery, 35 percent of its aircraft and 46 percent ofits tanks.[102]

1.3 Contest for air superiority and air sup-port of the ground forces

Both the Luftwae and the VVS were air forces de-signed with the primary mission of supporting their re-spective ground forces. Though the VVS was always

much larger than the Luftwae, in the early stages of thewar with the Soviet Union the Luftwae had achievedcomplete air superiority, inicting huge losses upon theSoviet Air Force. The Luftwaes extensive air supportto the German ground forces was checked only when theadvance pushed beyond the range of their forward-mostairelds.[145] However, by 1943 the Luftwaes strengthin the east had started to weaken. Resupply by air of for-ward panzer units had been a Luftwae role since thestart of the war, but the demand placed upon the Luft-wae to resupply large isolated formations during the se-vere winter of 194142 and then again over Stalingradthe following winter cost the Luftwae a great deal inequipment and pilots.[146] The Luftwae forces in the eastwere further depleted with squadrons being shifted backto Germany to defend against the increasing Allied bomb-ing campaign.[147] By the end of June, only 38.7 percentof the Luftwaes total aircraft remained in the east, withmost of them concentrated in the Kursk area.[148]

Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 ground-attack aircraft

In 1943 the Luftwae could still achieve local air superi-ority by concentrating its forces. The majority of Luft-wae aircraft left available on the Eastern Front wereslated for Citadel.[142] The changing strengths betweenthe two opponents prompted the Luftwae to make op-erational changes for the battle. Previous oensive cam-paigns had been initiated with Luftwae raids against op-posing airelds to achieve air superiority. By this point inthe war Soviet equipment reserves were extensive. TheLuftwae commanders realised that whatever aircraftthey could destroy on the ground could be replaced bythe Soviets within days, making such raids futile. There-fore this mission was abandoned.[149] In addition, previ-ous campaigns had made use of medium bombers y-ing well behind the frontline to block the arrival of rein-forcements. This mission, however, was rarely attemptedduring Citadel.[149] For Citadel, the Luftwae connedits operations to the direct support of the forces on theground.[150] In this mission the Luftwae continued tomake use of the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers. Anew development to this aircraft was the Bordkanone3,7 cm calibre cannon, one of which could be slung un-

8 2 OPPOSING FORCES

der each wing of the Stuka in a gun pod. Half of theStuka groups assigned to support Citadel were equippedwith these.[151] The air groups were also buttressed by therecent arrival of the Henschel Hs 129, with its 30 mm MK103 cannon, and the ground attack (jabo) version of theFocke-Wulf Fw 190.[152]

Luftwae ak units

The Luftwae command understood that their supportwould be crucial for the success of Operation Citadel, butproblems with supply shortfalls hampered their prepara-tions. Partisan activity, particularly behind Army GroupCenter, slowed the rate of re-supply and cut short theLuftwaes ability to build up essential stockpiles ofpetrol, oil, lubricants, engines, munitions, and, unlikethe Soviets, there were no reserves of aircraft that couldbe used to replace damaged aircraft over the course ofthe operation.[153] Fuel was the most signicant limitingfactor.[154] To help build up supplies for the support ofCitadel, the Luftwae greatly curtailed its operations dur-ing the last week of June.[152] Despite this conservation ofresources, the Luftwae did not have the resources to sus-tain an intensive air eort for more than a few days afterthe operation began.[155]

In the months preceding the battle, Luftotte 6 support-ing Army Group Center noted a marked increase in thestrength of the opposing VVS formations. The Sovietforces encountered displayed better training, and wereying improved equipment with greater aggressiveness

and skill than the Luftwae had seen earlier.[156] The in-troduction of the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5ghters gave the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luft-wae in terms of equipment. Furthermore, large num-bers of ground-attack aircraft, such as the Ilyushin Il-2Shturmovik and the Pe-2, had become available as well.The Soviet Air Force also elded large quantities of air-craft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of suppliesand ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant the So-viets would be able to conduct an extended campaignwithout slackening in the intensity of their eort.[149]

2 Opposing forcesSee also: Battle of Kursk order of battle

2.1 Germans

For the operation, the Germans used four armies alongwith a large proportion of their total tank strength on theEastern Front. On 1 July, the 9th Army of Army GroupCentre based in the northern side of the salient contained335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers); in the south,the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf,of Army Group South, had 223,907 men (149,271 com-bat soldiers) and 100,000108,000 men (66,000 combatsoldiers) respectively. The 2nd Army, that held the west-ern side of the salient contained an estimated 110,000. Intotal, the German forces had a total strength of 777,000779,000 men, and the three attacking armies contained438,271 combat soldiers.[157][95] Army Group South wasequipped with more armoured vehicles, infantry and ar-tillery than the 9th Army of Army Group Center.[158][95]The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempfhad 1,377 tanks and assault guns, while the 9th Armypossessed 988 tanks and assault guns.[157]

The two new Panther battalions the 51st and 52nd together equipped with 200 Panthers, for whichthe oensive had been delayed, were attached to theGrodeutschland Division in the XLVIII Panzer Corps ofArmy Group South. With the 51st and 52nd Battalionsarriving on 30 June and 1 July, the two units had little timeto perform reconnaissance or to orient themselves to theterrain they found themselves in. This was a breach of themethods of the panzerwae, considered essential for thesuccessful use of armour.[159][160][49] Though led by ex-perienced panzer commanders, many of the tank crewswere new recruits and had little time to become familiarwith their new tanks, let alone train together to function asa unit. The two battalions came direct from the trainingground and lacked combat experience.[161][162] In addi-tion, the requirement to maintain radio silence until thestart of the attack meant that the Panther units had littletraining in battalion-level radio procedures.[161][159] Fur-

2.4 Preliminary actions 9

thermore, the new Panthers were still experiencing prob-lems with their transmissions, and proved mechanicallyunreliable. By the morning of 5 July, the units had lost16 Panthers due to mechanical breakdown, leaving only184 available for the launching of the oensive.[163]

2.2 Soviets

The Red Army used two Fronts for the defence of Kursk,and created a third front behind the battle area whichwas held as a reserve. The Central and Voronezh Frontselded 12 armies, with 711,575 men (510,983 combatsoldiers) and 625,591 men (446,236 combat soldiers) re-spectively. In reserve, the Steppe Front had an additional573,195 men (449,133). Thus the total size of the Sovietforce was 1,910,361 men, with 1,426,352 actual combatsoldiers.

2.3 Comparison of strength

2.3.1 Operation Citadel

2.3.2 Soviet oensive phase

2.4 Preliminary actions

German penetration during the Battle of Kursk

Fighting started on the southern face of the salient on theevening of 4 July 1943, when German infantry launchedattacks to seize high ground for artillery observation postsprior to the main assault.[170] During these attacks, a num-ber of Soviet command and observation posts along therst main belt of defence were captured. By 16:00, el-ements of the Panzergrenadier Division Grodeutsch-land, 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions had seized the vil-lage of Butovo and proceeded to capture Gertsovka be-fore midnight.[171][172][170] At around 22:30, Vatutin or-dered 600 guns, mortars and Katyusha rocket launchers,of the Voronezh Front, to bombard the forward Ger-man positions, particularly those of the II SS PanzerCorps.[173][171][174]

To the north, at Central Front headquarters, reports ofthe anticipated German oensive came in. At around02:00 5 July, Zhukov ordered his preemptive artillerybombardment to begin. The hope was to disrupt Germanforces concentrating for the attack, but the outcome wasless than hoped for. The bombardment delayed the Ger-man formations, but failed in the goal of disrupting theirschedule or inicting substantial losses. The Germansbegan their own artillery bombardment at about 05:00,which lasted 80 minutes in the northern face and 50 min-utes in the southern face. After the barrage, the groundforces attacked, aided by close air support provided bythe Luftwae.[175][171][176][177]

German motorised troops prepare to move out.

In the early morning of 5 July, the Soviet Air Forcelaunched a large raid against German airelds, hop-ing to destroy the Luftwae on the ground. Thiseort failed, and the Soviets suered considerablelosses.[lower-alpha 19][178][171] The Soviets lost 176 aircraftin 5 July, compared to the 26 aircraft lost by theLuftwae.[179][178] The losses of the Soviet 16th AirArmy operating in the northern face were lighter thanthose suered by the 2nd Air Army.[180] The Luftwaewas able to gain and maintained air superiority over thesouthern face until 1011 July when it began shifting inSoviets favor,[178][181] but the control of the skies overthe northern face was evenly contested until the SovietAir Force began to gain air superiority on 7 July, whichit maintained for the rest of the operation.[182][183]

10 3 OPERATION ALONG THE NORTHERN FACE

3 Operation along the northernface

Models main attack was delivered by XLVII PanzerCorps, supported by 45 Tigers of the attached 505thHeavy Tank Battalion.[184] Covering their left ank wasXLI Panzer Corps, with an attached regiment of 83Ferdinand tank destroyers. On the right ank, XLVIPanzer Corps consisted at this time of four infantry di-visions with just 9 tanks and 31 assault guns.[184] To theleft of XLI Panzer Corps was XXIII Army Corps, whichconsisted of the reinforced 78th Assault Infantry Divi-sion and two regular infantry divisions. While the corpscontained no tanks, it did have 62 assault guns.[184] Op-posing the 9th Army was the Central Front, deployed inthree heavily fortied defensive belts.[112]

Model chose to make his initial attacks using infantrydivisions reinforced with assault guns and heavy tanks,and supported by artillery and the Luftwae. In doingso he sought to maintain the armoured strength of hispanzer divisions to be used for exploitation once the So-viet defences were breached. Once a breakthrough hadbeen achieved the panzer forces would move through andadvance towards Kursk.[184] Jan Mschen, a major inModels sta, later commented that Model expected abreakthrough on the second day. If a breakthrough didoccur the briefest delay in bringing up the panzer divi-sions would give the Soviets time to react. His corps com-manders thought a breakthrough extremely unlikely.[185]

Tiger I tanks spearhead the assault in the northern sector.

Following a preliminary bombardment and Sovietcounter bombardments, the 9th Army opened its attackat 05:30 on 5 July. [186] Nine infantry divisions and onepanzer division, with attached assault guns, heavy tanks,and tank destroyers, pushed forward.[185] Two companiesof Tiger tanks were attached to the 6th Infantry Divi-sion, and were the largest single grouping of Tigers em-ployed that day.[187] Opposing them were the 13th and70th Armies of the Central Front.[185]

The 20th Panzer and 6th Infantry Divisions of the XLVIIPanzer Corps, working in close cooperation, spearheadedthe advance of the XLVII Panzer Corps. Behind them

the remaining two panzer divisions followed, ready toexploit any breakthrough.[187] The heavily mined terrainand fortied positions of the Soviet 15th Rie Divisionslowed the advance. By 08:00 safe lanes had been clearedthrough the mineeld.[187] That morning information ob-tained from prisoner interrogation identied a weaknessat the boundary of the 15th and 81st Rie Divisionscaused by the German preliminary bombardment.[188]The Tigers were redeployed and struck towards this area.The Soviets countered with a force of around 90 T-34s.In the resulting three-hour battle, the Soviets lost 42 tankswhile the Germans lost two Tigers and a further vemore immobilized with track damage.[188] While the So-viet counter-attack was defeated and the rst defensivebelt breached, the ghting had delayed the Germans longenough for the rest of 29th Rie Corps of the 13th Army initially deployed behind the rst belt to move for-ward and seal the breach.[189] Soviet mineelds were cov-ered by artillery re, making eorts to clear paths throughthe elds dicult and costly. Goliath and Borgward IVremote-controlled engineer mine-clearing vehicles metwith limited success. Of the 653rd Heavy PanzerjgerBattalion's 45 Ferdinands sent into battle, all but 12 ofthem were immobilized by mine damage before 17:00.Most of these were later repaired and returned to ser-vice, but the recovery of these very large vehicles weredicult.[190]

On the rst day, the XLVII Panzer Corps penetrated 6 mi(9.7 km) into the Soviet defences before stalling,[191] andthe XLI Panzer Corps reached the heavily fortied smalltown Ponyri, in the second defensive belt, which con-trolled the roads and railways leading south to Kursk.[192]In the rst day, the Germans penetrated 5 to 6 mi (8.0to 9.7 km) into the Soviet lines for the loss of 1,287 menkilled and missing and a further 5,921 wounded.[193][191]

Soviet KV-1 heavy tanks prepare to counter-attack.

Rokossovsky ordered the 17th Guards and 18th GuardsRie Corps with the 2nd Tank Army and 19th Tank Corp,

11

backed up by close air support, to counterattack the Ger-man 9th Army the following day on 6 July. However dueto poor coordination, only the 16th Tank Corps of the 2ndTank Army commenced the counterattack on the dawnof 6 July after the preparatory Soviet artillery barrage.The 16th Tank Corps, elding about 200 tanks, attackedthe the XLVII Panzer Corps and ran into the Tiger tanksof the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion, which knocked out69 Soviet tanks and forced the rest to withdraw to the17th Guards Rie Corps of the 13th Army.[194] Later thatmorning, the XLVII Panzer Corps responded with its ownattack against the 17th Guards Rie Corps entrenchedaround the village Olkhovatka in the second defensivebelt. The attack commenced with an artillery barrage andwas spearheaded by the 24 serviceable Tigers of the 505thHeavy Tank Battalion,[195] but it failed to break the Sovietdefence at Olkhovatka, and the German suered heavycasualties.[196][197] Olkhovatka was on a high ground thatprovided a clear view of much of the frontline.[198] At18:30, the 19th Tank Corps joined the 17th GuardsRie Corps further bolstering Soviet resistance.[196][197]Rokossovsky also decided to dig in most of his remainingtanks to minimize their exposure.[199] Ponyri, defendedby the Soviet 307th Rie Division of the 29th Rie Corps,was also concertedly attacked on 6 July by the German292nd and 86th Infantry, 78th Assault Infantry and 9thPanzer Divisions, but the Germans were unable to dis-lodge the defenders from heavily fortied village.[200]

Over the next three days from 7 to 10 July, Modelconcentrated the eort of the 9th Army at Ponyriand Olkhovatka, which both sides considered as vitalpositions.[201][202] In response, Rokossovsky pulled forcesfrom other parts of the front to these sectors.[203] [204][205]The Germans attacked Ponyri on 7 July, and captured halfof the town after intense house-to-house ghting. A So-viet counterattack the following morning forced the Ger-mans to withdraw, and a series of counterattacks ensuedby both sides with control of the town being exchangedseveral times over the next few days. By 10 July, theGermans had secured most of the town, but Soviet coun-terattacks continued.[206] The back and forth battles forPonyri and the nearby Hill 253.5 were battles of attri-tion, with heavy casualties on both sides. It became re-ferred to by the troops as mini-Stalingrad.[192] The wardiary of the 9th Army described the heavy ghting as anew type of mobile attrition battle.[207] German attackson Olkhovatka and the nearby village of Teploe failed topenetrate the Soviet defences; including a powerful con-certed attack on 10 July by about 300 Germans tanks andassault guns from the 2nd, 4th and 20th Panzer Divisions,supported by every available Luftwae air power in thenorthern face.[208][209]

On 9 July a meeting between Kluge, Model, JoachimLemelsen and Josef Harpe was held at the headquartersof the XLVII Panzer Corps.[192] It had become clear tothe German commanders that the 9th Army lacked thestrength to obtain a breakthrough, and their Soviet coun-

terparts have also realized this, but Kluge wished to main-tain the pressure on the Soviets in order to aid the south-ern oensive.[210]

While the operation on the northern side of the salient be-gan with a 45-kilometre-wide (28 mi) attack front, by 6July it had been reduced to 40-kilometre-wide (25 mi).The following day the attack frontage dropped to 15-kilometre-wide (9.3 mi), and on both the 8 and 9 Julypenetrations of only 2-kilometre-wide (1.2 mi) occurred.By 10 July, the Soviets had completely halted the Germanadvance.[211]

On 12 July the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov, theircounter-oensive upon the Orel salient, which threat-ened the ank and rear of Models 9th Army. The 12thPanzer Division, thus far held in reserve and slated to becommitted to the northern side of the Kursk salient,[212]along with the 36th Motorized Infantry, 18th Panzer and20th Panzer Divisions were redeployed to face the Sovietspearheads.[213]

4 Operation along the southernface

At around 04:00 on 5 July, the German attack com-menced with a preliminary bombardment. Mansteinsmain attack was delivered by Hoths 4th PanzerArmy, which was organized into densely concentratedspearheads.[157] Opposing the 4th Panzer Army wasthe Soviet 6th Guards Army, which was composed ofthe 22nd Guards Rie Corps and 23rd Guards RieCorps.[159] The Soviets had constructed three heavily for-tied defensive belts to slow and weaken the attacking ar-moured forces.[112] Though they had been provided su-perb intelligence, the Voronezh Front headquarters hadstill not been able to pinpoint the exact location wherethe Germans would place their oensive weight.[112]

Wespe self-propelled artillery battery in position to provide resupport

12 4 OPERATION ALONG THE SOUTHERN FACE

4.1 XLVIII Panzer CorpsThe panzergrenadier division Grodeutschland, com-manded by Walter Hrnlein, was the strongest singledivision in the 4th Panzer Army. It was supportedon its anks by the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions.[159]Grodeutschlands Panzer IIIs and IVs had been supple-mented by a company of 15 Tigers, which were used tospearhead the attack. At dawn on 5 July, Grossdeutsch-land, backed by heavy artillery support, advanced on athree-kilometre front upon the 67th Guards Rie Divi-sion of the 22nd Guards Rie Corps.[159] The Panzer-fsilier Regiment, advancing on the left wing, stalled ina mineeld and subsequently 36 Panthers were immobi-lized. The stranded regiment was subjected to a barrageof Soviet anti-tank and artillery re, which inicted nu-merous casualties. Engineers were moved up and clearedpaths through the mineeld, but suered casualties in theprocess. The combination of erce resistance, mineelds,thick mud and mechanical breakdowns took its toll. Withpaths cleared, the regiment resumed its advance towardsGertsovka. In the ensuing battle, heavy casualties weresustained including the regimental commander ColonelKassnitz. Due to the ghting, and the marshy terrainsouth of the village, surrounding the Berezovyy stream,the regiment once more bogged down.[214][215][160]

Panzer IIIs and IVs advance against the southern face of thesalient.

The panzergrenadier regiment of Grodeutschland, ad-vancing on the right wing, pushed through to the villageof Butovo.[216] The tanks were deployed in a classic arrowformation to minimise the eects of the Soviet Pakfrontdefence, with the Tigers leading and the Panzer IIIs, IVsand assault guns fanning out to the anks and rear. Theywere followed by infantry and combat engineers.[216] At-tempts by the VVS to impede the advance were repulsedby the Luftwae.[217]

The 3rd Panzer Division, advancing on the left ankof Grodeutschland, made good progress and by theend of the day had captured Gertsovka[72] and reachedMikhailovka.[218] The 167th Infantry Division, on theright ank of the 11th Panzer Division, also made su-cient progress, reaching Tirechnoe by the end of the day.By the end of 5 July, a wedge had been created in the rst

belt of the Soviet defences.[219]

4.2 II SS Panzer Corps

The commander of a Tiger I attached to 2nd SS Panzer DivisionDas Reich

To the east, during the night of 45 July, SS com-bat engineers had inltrated no-mans land and clearedlanes through the Soviet mineelds.[220] At dawn, 5 July,the three divisions of II SS Panzer Corps SS Panz-ergrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SSPanzergrenadier Division Das Reich and the 3rd SS Panz-ergrenadier Division Totenkopf attacked the 6th GuardsArmys 52nd Guards Rie Division. The main assaultwas led by a spearhead of 42 Tigers, but in total 494tanks and assault guns attacked across a twelve-kilometrefront.[220] Totenkopf, the strongest of the three divi-sions, advanced towards Gremuchhi and screened theright ank. The 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division ad-vanced on the left ank towards Bykovka. The 2ndSS Panzer Division advanced between the two forma-tions in the center.[220] Following closely behind the tankswere the infantry and combat engineers, coming forwardto demolish obstacles and clear trenches. In addition,the advance was well supported by the Luftwae, whichgreatly aided in breaking Soviet strong points and artillerypositions.[221]

By 09:00 hours, the II SS Panzer Corps had brokenthrough the Soviet rst belt of defence along its entirefront.[222][223] While probing positions between the rstand second Soviet defensive belts, at 13:00, the 2nd SSPanzer Divisions vanguard came under re from two T-34 tanks, which were quickly dispatched. Forty moreSoviet tanks soon engaged the division. The 1st GuardsTank Army clashed with the 2nd SS Panzer Division in afour-hour battle, resulting in the Soviet tanks withdraw-ing. However, the battle had bought enough time forunits of the 23rd Soviet Guards Rie Corps, lodged inthe Soviet second belt, to prepare itself and be reinforcedwith additional anti-tank guns.[224] By the early evening,2nd SS Panzer Division had reached the mineelds thatmarked the outer perimeter of the Soviet second belt ofdefence.[225] The 1st SS Division had secured Bykovka by

4.3 Army Detachment Kempf 13

16:10. It then pushed forward towards the second belt ofdefence at Yakovlevo, but its attempts to break throughwere rebued. By the end of the day, the 1st SS Divisionhad sustained 97 dead, 522 wounded, and 17 missing andlost about 30 tanks.[225] Together with the 2nd SS PanzerDivision, it had forced a wedge far into the defences ofthe 6th Guards Army.

Two Tiger tanks of Totenkopf and a StuG assault gun carryinginfantry

The 3rd SS Panzer Division was making slow progress.They had managed to isolate the 155th Guards Regiment,of the 52nd Guards Rie Division (of the 23rd GuardsRie Corps), from the rest of its parent division, but itsattempts to sweep the regiment eastward into the ankof the neighbouring 375th Rie Division (of the 23rdGuards Rie Corps) had failed when the regiment wasreinforced by the 96th Tank Brigade. Hausser, the com-mander of II SS Panzer Corps, requested aid from the IIIPanzer Corps to his right, but the panzer corps had nounits to spare. By the end of the day, the 3rd SS Divisionhad made very limited progress due in part to a tributaryof the Donets river. The lack of progress undermined theadvance made by its sister divisions and exposed the rightank of the corps to Soviet forces.[226] German crews,working in boiling tanks in sweltering weather condi-tions, frequently suered from heat exhaustion.[227]

The 6th Guards Army, which confronted the attack bythe XLVIII Panzer Korps and II SS Panzer Korps, was re-inforced with tanks from the 1st Tank Army, the 2ndGuards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps. The51st and 90th Guards Rie divisions were moved up tothe vicinity of Pokrovka (not Prokhorovka, 40 kilome-tres (25 mi) to the north-east), in the path of the 1stSS Panzer Division.[219] The 93rd Guards Rie Divisionwas deployed further back, along the road leading fromPokrovka to Prokhorovka.[185]

4.3 Army Detachment KempfFacing Army DetachmentKempf, consisting of III PanzerCorps and Corps Raus (commanded by Erhard Raus),were the 7th Guards Army, dug in on the high ground onthe eastern bank of the Northern Donets. The two Ger-man corps were tasked with crossing the river, smashing

German soldiers move along an anti-tank ditch, while pioneersprepare charges to breach it.

through the 7th Guards Army and cover the right ankof the 4th Panzer Army.[228] The 503rd Heavy Tank Bat-talion equipped with 45 Tigers was also attached tothe III Panzer Corps, split up so that one company of 15Tigers was attached to each of the three panzer divisionsof the corps.[228] Although the river was bridged duringthe night of 4 July, the crossing points were bombardedby Soviet artillery.[228]

At the Milkhailovka bridgehead, just south of Belgorod,eight infantry battalions of the 6th Panzer Division assem-bled to make a crossing. They were subjected to heavyartillery re during the Soviet defensive bombardment,but most of the infantry got across to the eastern bank.An eort was made to cross a company of Tigers fromthe 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion, but the bridge was bom-barded and destroyed before the entire company could getacross. The remainder of the 6th Panzer Division wasforced to cross further south.[228] Clemens Graf Kage-neck, a battalion commander, described it thus:

Suddenly, a red sunrise arose on the farside as hundreds of Stalins organs hurled theirrockets exactly onto the crossing site. Thebridge was totally demolished and the engi-neers, unfortunately, suered heavy losses.Never have I hugged the dirt so tightly as whenthese terrible shells sprayed their thin frag-ments just above the ground.[228]

The diversion to the south pushed the 6th Panzer Divi-sion behind schedule, and the problem was aggravatedwhen the new crossing became clogged with trac. Fail-ing to nd another crossing, the rest of the division re-mained on the western bank of the river throughout theday.[228] Those units of the division that had crossed theriver launched an attack led by Tigers on Stary Gorod,which was repulsed due to poorly cleared mineelds andstrong resistance.[229]

To the south of the 6th Panzer Division, the 19th PanzerDivision crossed the river but was delayed by mines thatdamaged some of the Tigers spearheading the advanceand division had moved forward 8 kilometres (5.0 mi)

14 4 OPERATION ALONG THE SOUTHERN FACE

Soviet PTRD anti-tank rie team, during the ghting

by the end of the day.[229] Luftwae He 111s bombedthe bridgehead in error, wounding 6th Panzer Divisioncommander Walther von Hnersdor and Hermann vonOppeln-Bronikowski of the 19th Panzer Division.[230]Further south, infantry and tanks of 7th Panzer Divisionmanaged to cross the bridges but these bridges were notheavy enough to support the weight of the Tiger tanks at-tached to the 7th Panzer Division. Eventually, engineersconstructed a heavy bridge enabling the Tigers to cross,where they joined the force on the far side.[231] Despite apoor start, the 7th Panzer Division eventually broke intothe rst belt of the Soviet defence and pushed on betweenRazumnoe and Krutoi Log, advancing about 10 kilome-tres (6.2 mi) during the day, the furthest advance by ArmyDetachment Kempf of the day.[232]

The conditions during the battle were hot and humid. Here, Al-fred Kurzmaul, of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, drinks wa-ter aboard a Tiger I during a lull in the ghting.

Operating to the south of 7th Panzer Division, were the106th Infantry Division and the 320th Infantry Divisionof Corps Raus. The two formations attacked across a32 kilometres (20 mi) front without armour support andmade little progress. The advance began well, with thecrossing of the river and a swift advance against the 72ndGuards Rie Division. The Soviet defenders were takenby surprise with the speed of the advance.[232] Raus laterwrote:

The advancing infantry surprised them andhad no diculty ferreting them out. But when

the infantry reached the two to ve-kilometredeep zone of the battle positions prepared inthe preceding months, they had to make ex-tensive use of hand grenades in order to mopup [a] maze of densely dug-in trenches andbunkers, some of which were a dozen or morefeet deep. At the same time, artillery and akred counter-battery missions against the en-emy heavy weapons that had resumed re fromrear positions. They also red on reserves in-ltrating through the trench system, as well asagainst [Soviet] medium artillery.[232]

After a erce battle, involving some hand-to-hand ght-ing, Corps Raus took the village of Maslovo Pristani,penetrating the rst Soviet belt of defence. A Sovietcounter-attack supported by about 40 tanks was beateno, with the assistance from artillery and ak batteries.Having suered 2,000 casualties since the morning andstill facing considerable resistance, the corps dug in forthe night.[233]

The thrust of Army Detachment Kempf had been slowed,allowing the Soviets time to prepare their second belt ofdefence to meet the German attack on 6 July.[233] The7th Guards Army, which had absorbed the attack of IIIPanzer Corps and Corps Raus, was reinforced with tworie divisions from the reserve. The 15th Guards RieDivision was moved up to the second belt of defence, inthe path of the III Panzer Corps.[233]

4.4 Further German progress

Thunderclouds over the battleground. Intermittent heavy rainscreated mud and marsh that made movement dicult.

By the evening of 6 July, the Voronezh Front had com-mitted all of its reserves, except for three rie divisionsunder the 69th Army; yet it could not decisively con-tain the 4th Panzer Army.[233][234] The XLVIII PanzerCorps along the Oboyan axis, where the third defensivebelt was mostly unoccupied, now had only the Soviet sec-ond defensive belt blocking it from breakthrough intothe free Soviet rear.[235][236] This forced the Stavka tocommit their strategic reserves to reinforce the VoronezhFront: the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies, bothfrom the Steppe Front, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps

4.5 Battle of Prokhorovka 15

from the Southwestern Front.[237][236] Ivan Konev ob-jected to this premature piecemeal commitment of thestrategic reserve, but a personal call from Stalin silencedhis complaints.[238] In addition, on 7 July Zhukov orderedthe 17th Air Army the air eet serving the Southwest-ern Front to support the 2nd Air Army in serving theVoronezh Front.[236][239][240] On July 7, the 5th GuardsTank Army began advancing to Prokhorovka. 5th GuardsTank Army commander, Lieutenant General Pavel Rot-mistrov, described the journey:

By midday, the dust rose in thick clouds,settling in a solid layer on roadside bushes,grain elds, tanks and trucks. The dark reddisc of the sun was hardly visible. Tanks, self-propelled guns, artillery tractors, armouredpersonnel carriers and trucks were advancingin an unending ow. The faces of the soldierswere dark with dust and exhaust fumes. It wasintolerably hot. Soldiers were tortured by thirstand their shirts, wet with sweat, stuck to theirbodies.[199]

The 10th Tank Corps, then still subordinate to the 5thGuards Army, was rushed ahead of the rest of the army,arriving at Prokhorovka on the night of 7 July, and 2ndTank Corps arrived at Korocha, 25 miles (40 km) south-east of Prokhorovka, by morning of 8 July.[241] Vatutinordered a powerful counterattack by the 5th Guards, 2ndGuards, 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, in all elding about593 tanks and self-propelled guns and supported by mostof the Fronts available air power, which aimed to de-feat the II SS Panzer Corps and therefore expose theright ank of XLVIII Panzer Corps. Simultaneously, the6th Tank Corps was to attack the XLVIII Panzer Corpsand prevent it from breaking through to the free Sovietrear. Although intended to be concerted, the counterat-tack turned out to be a series of piecemeal attacks dueto poor coordination.[242] The 10th Tank Corps attackbegan on the dawn of 8 July but ran straight into the anti-tank re of the 2nd and 3rd SS Divisions, and it was dev-astated. Later that morning, the 5th Guards Tank Corpsattack was repelled by the 3rd SS Division. The 2nd TankCorp joined in the afternoon and was also repelled.[242]The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, masked by the forest aroundthe village Gostishchevo, 10 miles (16 km) north of Bel-gorod, with its presence unknown to the II SS PanzerCorps, advanced towards the 167th Infantry Division.But it was detected by German air reconnaissance justbefore the attack had materialized, and was subsequentlydecimated by German ground-attack aircraft armed withMK 103 anti-tank cannons and at least 50 tanks weredestroyed.[243][244] This marked the rst time in militaryhistory an attacking tank formation had been defeatedby air power alone.[245][246] Although a asco, the Sovietcounterattack succeeded in stalling the advance of the IISS Panzer Corps throughout the day.[247][246]

By the end of 8 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had ad-

vanced about 29 kilometres (18 mi) since the start ofCitadel and broken through the rst and second defen-sive belts.[248][249][250][251] However, slow progress by theXLVIII Panzer Corps caused Hoth to shift elements ofthe II SS-Panzer Corps to the west to help the XLVIIIPanzer Corps regain its momentum. On 10 July the fulleort of the corps was shifted back to its own forwardprogress. The direction of their advance now shifted fromOboyan due north to the northeast, toward Prokhorovka.Hoth had discussed this move with Manstein since earlyMay, and it was a part of the 4th Panzer Armys plan sincethe outset of the oensive.[252][253] By this time, however,the Soviets had shifted reserve formations into its path.The defensive positions were manned by the 2nd TankCorps, reinforced by the 9th Guards Airborne Divisionand 301st Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, both from the33rd Guards Rie Corps.[254][255]

Though the German advance in the south was slower thandesired, it was much faster than the Soviets expected.On 9 July, the rst German units reached the Psel River.The next day, the rst German infantry crossed the river.Despite the deep defensive system and mineelds, Ger-man tank losses were low.[256] At this point, Hoth turnedthe II SS Panzer Corps from a northward heading di-rected toward Oboyan to a northeast heading towardsProkhorovka.[257][258] The main concern of Manstein andHausser was the inability of Army Detachment Kempfto advance and protect the eastern ank of the II SSPanzer Corps. On 11 July, Army Detachment Kempfnally achieved a breakthrough. In a surprise night at-tack, the 6th Panzer Division seized a bridge across theDonets.[259] Once across, Breith made every eort topush troops and vehicles across the river for an advanceon Prokhorovka from the south. A linkup with the II SSPanzer Corps would result with the Soviet 69th Armybecoming encircled. It appeared the hoped for break-through was at hand.[260]

4.5 Battle of Prokhorovka

Main article: Battle of ProkhorovkaHausser had expected to continue his advance on

German Panzer IV and Sdkfz 251 halftrack

16 5 ALLIED INVASION OF SICILY AND TERMINATION OF OPERATION CITADEL

Prokhorovka, and late on the evening of 11 July issuedorders for a classic manoeuvre battle for the attack thenext day. The attack would begin north of the Psel River,with the 3rd SS Panzer Division driving northeast un-til reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road. Oncethere, they were to strike southeast to attack the Sovietpositions at Prokhorovka from the rear. The 1st and 2ndSS Panzer divisions were to wait until Totenkopfs at-tack had destabilised the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka.Once the Soviet position at Prokhorovka was under attackfrom the rear, the Leibstandarte was to move forward, ad-vancing through the main Soviet defences dug in on thewest slope before Prokhorovka. To the Leibstandartesright, the 2nd SS was to advance eastward to the highground south of Prokhorovka, then turn south to roll upthe Soviet line and open a gap.[261] Unknown to Hausser,on the night of 11-12 July Rotmistrov had moved his5th Guards Tank Army to an assembly area just behindProkhorovka in preparation for a massive attack the fol-lowing day.[262][263] At 5:45 Leibstandarte headquartersstarted receiving reports of the ominous sound of tank en-gines as the Soviets moved into their assembly areas.[264]Soviet artillery and Katyusha regiments were redeployedin preparation for the counterattack.[265]

A Waen-SS Tiger I in action

At around 08:00, a Soviet artillery barrage began. At08:30, Rotmistrov radioed his tankers: Steel, Steel,Steel!", the order to commence the attack.[266][267][268]Down o the west slopes, before Prokhorovka, came themassed armour of ve tank brigades from the two So-viet tank corps. The 1st SS had just started to advance,when it was taken largely by surprise.[269] As the Soviettanks aggressively advanced down the corridor, they car-ried the infantrymen of the 9th Guards Airborne Divisioninto battle mounted on the tanks with the paratroopersholding onto rails.[270] Amid the swirls of dust, a highlyconfused tank battle began. To the north and east, the3rd SS was engaged by the Soviet 33rd Guards RieCorps. Tasked with destabilising the Soviet defences be-fore Prokhorovka, the unit rst had to beat o a numberof attacks before they could go over onto the oensive.Most of the divisions tank losses occurred late in the af-ternoon as they advanced through mine elds against well-hidden Soviet anti-tank guns. Although the 3rd SS suc-

ceeded in reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road,their hold was tenuous and it cost the division half of itsarmour. The majority of German tank losses suered atProkhorovka occurred here. To the south, the Soviet 18thand 29th Tank Corps, of the 5th Guards Tank Army, hadbeen thrown back by the 1st SS acting alone. Meanwhile,the 2nd SS was holding a line to the south against the 2ndTank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.[271]

Exhausted German soldiers pause during the ghting.

By early afternoon, it was clear that Rotmistrovs attackhad failed.[272] Luftwae local air superiority over thebattleeld also contributed to the Soviet losses, partly dueto the VVS being directed against the German units on theanks of II SS Panzer Corps.[273] By the end of the day,the Soviets had fallen back to their starting positions.[274]

The battle is considered a tactical defeat for the RedArmy due to the heavy tank losses, but operationally wasa draw or a Soviet victory.[253][275] Neither the 5th GuardsTank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplishedtheir objectives. Though the Soviet counterattack failedand they were thrown back onto the defensive, they didenough to stop a German breakthrough.[276] Tank lossesduring the battle have been a contentious subject. Soviettank losses have been estimated from 200 to 822, but So-viet records show about 300 complete losses and as manydamaged. The Soviets claimed enormous German losses,stating they had destroyed at least 400 tanks, including100 Tiger tanks and inicting 3,500 deaths.[277] Germanrecords indicate 3 to 5 of their own tanks destroyed, andbetween 40 and 70 damaged. Their manpower losses areestimated at 500 killed.[278][253][279][280]

5 Allied invasion of Sicily and ter-mination of Operation Citadel

On the evening of 12 July, Hitler summoned Klugeand Manstein to his headquarters at Rastenburg in EastPrussia.[281] Two days prior, the Western Allies hadinvaded Sicily. The threat of further Allied landings inItaly or along southern France made Hitler believe it wasessential to move forces from Kursk to Italy and to dis-continue the oensive. Kluge welcomed the news, as

17

he was aware that the Soviets were initiating a massiveoensive against his sector, but Manstein was less wel-coming. Mansteins forces had just spent a week ghtingthrough a maze of defensive works and he believed theywere on the verge of breaking through to more open ter-rain, which would allow him to engage and destroy theSoviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle. Mansteinstated, On no account should we let go of the enemy untilthe mobile reserves he [has] committed [are] completelybeaten.[282] Hitler agreed to temporarily allow the con-tinuance of the oensive in the south part of the salient,but the following day he ordered Mansteins reserve theXXIV Panzer Corps to move south to support the 1stPanzer Army. This removed the force Manstein believedwas needed to succeed.[283]

On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line.The following day, OKH ordered the II SS Panzer Corpsto be withdrawn and transferred to Italy.[284][285] Thestrength of the Soviet reserve formations had been greatlyunderestimated by German intelligence, and the Sovietssoon went onto the oensive.[283]

5.1 Controversy

Following the war, a number of German generals werehighly critical of Hitlers decision to call o the oper-ation at the height of the tactical battle.[286] This criti-cism has been echoed by ocers in the post-war GermanArmy,[287][288] and by a number of historians.[289] Antic-ipating that the Western Allies would conduct some formof operation in Western Europe, both Manstein and Gud-erian had argued prior to the battle for forces to be con-served and redeployed as a reserve. Once committed tothe operation, it made little sense to pull them out at theclimax, especially since they could not reach Italy in timeto impact events there. Manstein argued pulling forcesout of Army Group South in the midst of the battle, shift-ing away Luftwae support, and transferring his reserveforce deprived his Army of its striking power at what hebelieved was the decisive point of the battle.[290] The ac-curacy of Mansteins assertion is debatable. The extent ofSoviet reserves was far greater than he realised. These re-serves were used to re-equip the mauled 5th Guards TankArmy, which launched Operation Rumyantsev a coupleof weeks later. However, rebuilding this formation didtake time. The essential thing was to concentrate theavailable force for a decisive action; Hitlers unwilling-ness to accept risk resulted in his commanders being un-able to do so. Further, he restricted them from ghtingthe type of mobile battle they wanted, despite Mansteinssuccess in this type of action only a few months before atthe Third Battle of Kharkov.[291][292] The result was a bat-tle of attrition they were ill prepared for and which theyhad little chance of winning.[293]

6 Soviet counteroensives

6.1 In the north: Operation KutuzovMain article: Operation KutuzovSoviet oensive operations for the summer of 1943 were

Soviet soldiers in Orel pass by the Church of the Intercession, 5August 1943.

planned to begin after the strength of the German forceshad been dissipated by their Kursk oensive. As the Ger-man momentum in the north slowed, the Soviets launchedOperationKutusov on 12 July against Army Group Centrein the Orel salient, directly north of the Kursk salient. TheBryansk Front, under the command of Markian Popov,attacked the eastern face of the Orel salient while theWestern Front, commanded by Vasily Sokolovsky, at-tacked from the north. The Western Fronts assault wasled by the 11th Guards Army, under Lieutenant Gen-eral Hovhannes Bagramyan, and was supported by the1st and 5th Tank Corps. The Soviet spearheads sustainedheavy casualties, but pushed through and in some areasachieved signicant penetrations. These thrusts endan-gered German supply routes and threatened the 9th Armywith encirclement.[294][295] With this threat, 9th Armywas compelled to go over fully to the defensive.[296][213]

The thinly stretched 2nd Panzer Army stood in the wayof this Soviet force. The German commanders had beenwary of such an attack and forces were quickly withdrawnfrom the Kursk oensive to meet the Soviet oensive.Operation Kutuzov reduced the Orel salient and inictedsubstantial losses on the German military, paving the wayfor the liberation of Smolensk.[297] Soviet losses wereheavy, but were replaced.[298] The oensive allowed theSoviets to seize the strategic initiative, which they re-tained for the remainder of the war.

6.2 In the south: Operation PolkovodetsRumyantsev

Main article: Operation Polkovodets RumyantsevOperation Polkovodets Rumyantsev was intended as the

main Soviet oensive for 1943. Its aim was to degrade

18 7 RESULTS

Soviet troops follow their T-34 tanks during a counterattack.

the 4th Panzer Army and cut o the extended south-ern portion of Army Group South.[299] After the heavylosses sustained by the Voronezh Front, during Opera-tion Citadel, the Soviets needed time to regroup and ret,delaying the start of the oensive until 3 August. Di-versionary attacks, launched two weeks earlier across theDonets and Mius Rivers into the Donbass, drew the atten-tion of German reserves and thinned the defending forcesthat would face the main blow.[300] The oensive was ini-tiated by the Voronezh Front and Steppe Fronts againstthe northern wing of Army Group South. They drovethrough the German positions, making broad and deeppenetrations. By 5 August, the Soviets had liberated Bel-gorod.By 12 August, the outskirts of Kharkov had been reached.The Soviet advance was nally halted by a counter-attackby the 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions. In the ensuingtank battles, the Soviet armies suered heavy losses inarmour.[301][302] After this setback, the Soviets focusedon Kharkov. After heavy ghting the city was liberatedon 23 August. This battle is referred to by the Germansas the Fourth Battle of Kharkov, while the Soviets referto it as the BelgorodKharkov oensive operation.[303]

7 ResultsThe campaign was a strategic Soviet success. For the rsttime, a major German oensive had been stopped beforeachieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite usingmore technologically advanced armour than in previousyears, were unable to break through the in-depth Sovietdefences and were caught o guard by the signicant op-erational reserves of the Red Army. This result changedthe pattern of operations on the Eastern Front, with theSoviet Union gaining the operational initiative. The So-viet victory, however, was costly, with the Red Army los-ing considerably more men and material than the GermanArmy. However, the Soviet Unions larger industrial po-tential and pool of manpower allowed them to absorb andreplenish these losses, with their overall strategic strengthunaected. Guderian wrote:

With the failure of Zitadelle we have suf-

Prokhorovka Cathedral, on the former battleeld, commemo-rates the Red Army losses and victory.

fered a decisive defeat. The armoured for-mations, reformed and re-equipped with somuch eort, had lost heavily in both men andequipment and would now be unemployablefor a long time to come. It was problem-atical whether they could be rehabilitated intime to defend the Eastern Front ... Needlessto say the [Soviets] exploited their victory tothe full. There were to be no more periodsof quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on,the enemy was in undisputed possession of theinitiative.[304]

With victory, the initiative rmly passed to the RedArmy. For the remainder of the war the Germans werelimited to reacting to Soviet advances, and were neverable to regain the initiative or launch a major oensiveon the Eastern Front.[305] The Western Allied landings inItaly opened up a new front, further diverting German re-sources and attention.[306]

Though the location, plan of attack, and timing were de-termined by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his GeneralSta. Unlike Stalin, who gave his commanding gener-als the liberty to make important command decisions,Hitlers interference in German military matters progres-sively increased while his attention to the political as-pects of the war decreased.[307] The opposite was truefor Stalin; throughout the Kursk campaign, he trusted thejudgment of his commanders, and as their decisions led

8.1 Soviet losses 19

to battleeld success it increased his trust in their militaryjudgment. Stalin stepped back from operational plan-ning, only rarely overruling military decisions, resultingin the Red Army gaining more freedom of action duringthe course of the war.

8 Casualties and lossesThe casualties suered by the two combatants are dif-cult to determine, due to several factors. In regard tothe Germans, equipment losses were complicated by thefact that they made determined eorts to recover and re-pair tanks. For example, tanks disabled one day oftenappeared a day or two later repaired.[308] German per-sonnel losses are clouded by the lack of access to Ger-man unit records, which were seized at the end of thewar. Many were transferred to the United States nationalarchives and were not made available until 1978, whileothers were taken by the Soviet Union, which declined toconrm their existence.[309]

8.1 Soviet losses

A German soldier inspects a knocked out T-34 during the Battleof Kursk.

Russian military historian Grigoriy Krivosheyev, whobased his gures on the Soviet archives, is consid-ered by historian David Glantz as the most reliablesource for Soviet casualty gures.[310] His gures are sup-ported by historian Karl-Heinz Frieser.[311] Krivosheyevcalculated total Soviet losses during the German of-fensive as 177,877 casualties.[310] The Central Frontsuered 15,336 irrecoverable casualties and 18,561medical casualties, for a total of 33,897 casualties. TheVoronezh Front suered 27,542 irrecoverable casualtiesand 46,350 medical casualties, for a total of 73,892. TheSteppe Front suered 27,452 irrecoverable casualties and42,606 medical casualties, for a total of 70,085.[280]

During the two Soviet oensives, total casualtiesamounted to 685,456 men. During Operation Kutu-zov, Soviet losses amounted to 112,529 irrecoverablecasualties and 317,361 medical casualties, for a total

loss of 429,890 men.[312] The Western Front reported25,585 irrecoverable casualties and 76,856 medical ca-sualties. The Bryansk Front suered 39,173 irrecov-erable casualties and 123,234 medical casualties. TheCentral Front lost 47,771 irrecoverable casualties and117,271 medical casualties.[312] Soviet losses during Op-eration Polkovodets Rumyantsev totaled 255,566 men,with 71,611 listed as irrecoverable casualties and 183,955as medical casualties. The Voronezh Front lost 48,339irrecoverable casualties and 108,954 medical casualties,for a total of 157,293. The Steppe Front lost 23,272 ir-recoverable casualties and 75,001 medical casualties, fora total of 98,273.[313]

Memorial Teplovskys Hills in Ponyri region in honour of thememory of the fallen on the northern face of the Battle of Kursk

Soviet equipment losses during the German oensivecame to 1,614 tanks and self-propelled guns destroyedor damaged[18] of the 3,925 vehicles committed to thebattle. The Soviet losses were roughly three times largerthan the German losses.[314][315] During Operation Ku-tuzov, 2,349 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost outof an initial strength of 2,308; a loss of over 100 per-cent. During Polkovodets Rumyantsev 1,864 tanks andself-propelled guns were lost out of the 2,439 employed.The loss ratio suered by the Soviets was roughly 5:1 infavour of the German military.[316] However, large Sovietreserves of equipment and their high rate of tank produc-tion enabled the Soviet tank armies to soon replace lostequipment and maintain their ghting strength.[314] TheRed Army repaired many of its damaged tanks; many So-viet tanks were rebuilt up to four times to keep them in theght. Soviet tank strength went back up to 2,750 tanks by3 August due to the repair of damaged vehicles.[317]

According to historian Christer Bergstrm, Soviet AirForces losses during the German oensive amounted to677 aircraft on the northern ank and 439 on the south-ern ank. Total casualties are uncertain. Bergstrms re-search indicates total Soviet air losses between 12 Julyand 18 August, during the German oensive and the Op-eration Kutuzov counteroensive, were 1,104.[318]

20 8 CASUALTIES AND LOSSES

8.2 German losses

The grave of Heinz Khl (1915-43), a German soldier killed atKursk

Karl-Heinz Frieser, who reviewed the German archiverecord, calculated that during Operation Citadel 54,182casualties were suered. Of these, 9,036 were killed,1,960 were reported missing and 43,159 were wounded.The 9th Army suered 23,345 casualties, while ArmyGroup South suered 30,837 casualties.[9] Through-out the Soviet oensives, 86,064 casualties were suf-fered. In facing Operation Kutuzov, 14,215 men werekilled, 11,300 were reported missing (presumed killedor captured) and 60,549 were wounded.[319] DuringPolkovodets Rumyantsev, 25,068 casualties were in-curred, including 8,933 killed and missing. Total casu-alties for the three battles were about 170,000 men.During Operation Citadel, 252 to 323 tanks and assaultguns were destroyed. By 5 July, when the Battle of Kurskstarted, there were only 184 operational Panthers. Withintwo days, this had dropped to 40.[320] On 17 July 1943after Hitler had ordered a stop to the German oensive,Guderian sent in the following preliminary assessment ofthe Panthers:

Due to enemy action and mechanicalbreakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidlyduring the rst few days. By the evening of 10

July there were only 10 operational Panthers inthe frontline. 25 Panthers had been lost as totalwriteos (23 were hit and burnt and two hadcaught re during the approach march). 100Panthers were in need of repair (56 were dam-aged by hits and mines and 44 by mechani-cal breakdown). 60 percent of the mechanicalbreakdowns could be easily repaired. Approx-imately 40 Panthers had already been repairedand were on the way to the front. About 25still had not been recovered by the repair ser-vice... On the evening of 11 July, 38 Pantherswere operational, 31 were total writeos and131 were in need of repair. A slow increase inthe combat strength is observable. The largenumber of losses by hits (81 Panthers up to 10July) attests to the heavy ghting.[320]

By 16 July, Army Group South claimed 161 tanks and14 assault guns lost. Up to 14 July, 9th Army reportedthey had lost as total writeos 41 tanks and 17 assaultguns. These losses break down as 109 Panzer IVs, 42Panthers, 38 Panzer IIIs, 31 assault guns, 19 Elefants,10 Tigers and three ame tanks.[321] Before the Germansended their oensive at Kursk, the Soviets began theircounteroensive and succeeded in pushing the Germansback into a steady retreat. Thus, a report on 11 August1943 showed that the numbers of total writeos in Pan-thers swelled to 156, with only 9 operational. The Ger-man Army was forced into a ghting retreat and increas-ingly lost tanks in combat as well as from abandoning anddestroying damaged vehicles.[322] Across the entire East-ern Front 50 Tiger tanks were lost during July and August,with some 240 damaged. Most of these occurred duringtheir oensive at Kursk.[323] Some 600 tanks sustaineddamage in the period from 5 July to 18 July.[12]

The total number of German tanks and assault guns de-stroyed during July and August along the entire East-ern Front amount to 1,331. Of these, Frieser estimatesthat 760 were destroyed during the Battle of Kursk.[319]Beevor writes that the Red Army had lost ve armouredvehicles for every German panzer destroyed.[10]

Frieser reports Luftwae losses at 524 planes, with 159lost during the German oensive, 218 destroyed dur-ing Operation Kutuzov, and a further 147 lost dur-ing Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev.[324] In review-ing the reports of the quartermaster of the Luftwae,Bergstrm presents dierent gures. Between 5 and 31July, Bergstrm reports 681 aircraft lost or damaged (335for Fliegerkorps VIII and 346 for Luftotte 6) with a totalof 420 being written o (192 from Fliegerkorps VIII and229 from Luftotte 6).[16]

21

9 Notes[1] After Kursk, Germany could not even pretend to hold the

strategic initiative in the East. (Glantz & House 1995, p.175).

[2] With the nal destruction of German forces at Kharkov,the Battle of Kursk came to an end. Having won the strate-gic initiative, the Red Army advanced along a 2,000 kilo-metres (1,200 mi) front. (Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 171).

[3] The breakdown as shown in Bergstrm (2007, pp. 127128) is as follows: 1,030 aircraft of 2nd Air Armyand 611 of 17th Air Army on the southern sector(Voronezh Front), and 1,151 on the northern sector (Cen-tral Front).(Bergstrm 2007, p. 21).

[4] The breakdown as shown in Zetterling & Frankson (2000,p. 20) is as follows: 1,050 aircraft of 16th Air Army(Central Front), 881 of 2nd Air Army (Voronezh Front),735 of 17th Air Army (only as a secondary support forVoronezh Front), 563 of the 5th Air Army (Steppe Front)and 320 of Long Range Bomber Command.

[5] Operation Citadel refers to the German oensive from 4to 16 July, but Soviet losses are for the period of 523July.

[6] The breakdown as shown in Frieser (2007, p. 154) is asfollows: 9,063 KIA, 43,159 WIA and 1,960 MIA.

[7] The whole Battle of Kursk refers to the period of the Ger-man oensive (Operation Citadel) and the subsequent So-viet counteroensives, from 4 July to 23 August.

[8] The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev (1997, pp. 132134) is as follows: Kursk-defence: 177,847; Orel-counter:429,890; Belgorod-counter: 255,566.

[9] The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev (1997, p. 262)is as follows: Kursk-defence; 1,614. Orel-counter; 2,586.Belgorod-counter; 1,864.

[10] Some military historians consider Operation Citadel, orat least the southern pincer, as envisioning a blitzkrieg at-tack or state it was intended as such. Some of the his-torians taking this view are: Lloyd Clark (Clark 2012, p.187), Roger Moorhouse (Moorhouse 2011, p. 342), MaryKathryn Barbier (Barbier 2002, p. 10), David Glantz(Glantz 1986, p. 24; Glantz & House 2004, pp. 63, 78,149, 269, 272, 280), Jonathan House (Glantz & House2004, pp. 63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280), Hedley Paul Will-mott (Willmott 1990, p. 300), and others. Also, NiklasZetterling and Anders Frankson specically consideredonly the southern pincer as a classical blitzkrieg attack(Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 137).

[11] Many of the German participants of Operation Citadelmake no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterizationof the operation. Several German ocers and comman-ders involved in the operation wrote their account of thebattle after the war, and some of these postwar accountswere collected by the U.S. Army. Some of these o-cers are: Theodor Busse (Newton 2002, pp. 327), Er-hard Raus (Newton 2002, pp. 2964), Friedrich Fan-gohr (Newton 2002, pp. 6596), Peter von der Groeben

(Newton 2002, pp. 97144), Friedrich Wilhelm vonMellenthin (Mellenthin 1956, pp. 212234), Erich vonManstein (Manstein 1958, pp. 443449), and others.Mellenthin stated: The German command was commit-ting exactly the same error as in the previous year. Thenwe attacked the city of Stalingrad, now we were to at-tack the fortress of Kursk. In both cases the GermanArmy threw away all its advantages in mobile tactics,and met the Russians (sic - Soviets) on ground of theirown choosing. (Mellenthin 1956, p. 217) Some of themilitary historians that make no mention of blitzkrieg intheir characterization of the operation are: Mark Healy(Healy 2008), George Nipe (Nipe 2010), Steven Newton(Newton 2002), D