Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket

For the computer game with a similar name, see DecisiveBattles of WWII: Korsun Pocket.

TheKorsun–Shevchenkovsky Offensive led to theBat-tle of the Korsun–Cherkasy Pocket which took placefrom 24 January to 16 February 1944. The offensivewas part of the Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive. In it,the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, commanded, respec-tively, by Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev, trapped Ger-man forces of Army Group South in a pocket near theDnieper River. During weeks of fighting, the two RedArmy Fronts tried to eradicate the pocket. The encir-cled German units broke out in coordination with a re-lief attempt by other German forces, with “roughly twoout of three” encircled men succeeding in escaping thepocket,[17] “and almost one third of their men ... dead orprisoners.”[18]

The Soviet victory in the Korsun–Shevchenkovsky Of-fensive marked the successful implementation of Sovietdeep operations. Soviet Deep Battle doctrine envisagedthe breaking of the enemy’s forward defences to allowfresh operational reserves to exploit the breakthrough bydriving into the strategic depth of the enemy front. Thearrival of large numbers of U.S. and British built trucksand halftracks gave the Soviet forces much greater mobil-ity than they had in the earlier portion of the war.[19] This,coupled with the Soviet capacity to hold large formationsin reserve gave the Soviets the ability to drive deep behindGerman defenses again and again.[20] Though the Sovietoperation at Korsun did not result in the collapse in theGerman front that the Soviet command had hoped for,it marked a significant change in operations. Throughthe rest of the war the Soviets would place large Germanforces in jeopardy, while the Germans were stretched thinand constantly attempting to extract themselves from onecrisis to the next. Mobile Soviet offensives were the hall-mark of the Eastern front for the remainder of the war.

1 January 1944

In the autumn of 1943, the German forces of Field Mar-shal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South includingGeneral Otto Wöhler's 8th Army had fallen back to thePanther–Wotan line, a defensive position that in Ukrainefollowed the Dnieper river. By 1 December 1943 the linehad been broken and the Soviet Army had crossed theDnieper in force. Only two corps, the XI under Gen.Wilhelm Stemmermann, the XLII Army Corps under

Lt.Gen. Theobald Lieb and the attached Corps Detach-ment B[21] from the 8th Army were holding a salient inthe new Soviet line. The salient to the west of Cherkasyextended some 100 kilometers to the Dnieper river set-tlement of Kanev, with the town of Korsun roughly inthe center of the salient, with the 1st Ukrainian Front toits left and the 2nd Ukrainian Front to its right. Marshalof the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov realized the poten-tial for destroying Wöhler’s 8th Army with the Stalingradmodel as precedent and using similar tactics as were ap-plied to defeat Paulus’s encircled 6th Army. Zhukov rec-ommended to the Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka) todeploy 1st and 2ndUkrainian Fronts to form two armoredrings of encirclement: an inner ring around the pocket fol-lowed by destruction of the forces it contained, and an ex-ternal ring to prevent relief formations from reaching thetrapped units. Despite repeated warnings from Mansteinand others, Hitler refused to allow the exposed units tobe pulled back to safety.

A Soviet light tank carries men into battle

General Konev held a conference at his headquartersat Boltushki on 15 January with his commanders andtheir political commissars to pass on the orders receivedfrom Stavka.[22] The initial attack was to be conductedby Konev’s own 2nd Ukrainian Front from the southeastby 53rd Army and 4th Guards Army, with 5th GuardsTank Army to exploit penetrations supported by 5th AirArmy, to be joined in progress by 52ndArmy, 5th GuardsCavalry Corps and 2nd Tank Army. Additionally, fromVatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front, 27th and 40th Armies wereto be deployed from the northwest, with 6th Tank Armyto exploit penetrations supported by 2nd Air Army.[23]Many of these formations had received an inflow of newpersonnel. RedArmy planning further included extensivedeception operations that the Soviets claimed were suc-cessful, however, the German 8th Army war diary showsclearly that the German staffs were concerned with the

1

2 3 GERMAN RELIEF ATTACKS

threat at hand.[24]

2 Encirclement

The great expanse of Russia made controlling a “front line” dif-ficult

The Soviet attack started on 24 January when Konev’s2nd Ukrainian Front attacked the salient from the south-east. Breakthrough was quickly achieved, and the pen-etration was exploited by the 5th Guards Tank Armyand the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps the following day.[25]Despite the awareness of German 8th Army’s staff thatan attack was imminent, they were surprised by the ap-pearance of the 1st Ukrainian Front’s newly formed 6thTank Army.[26] The 6th Tank Army, with 160 tanks and50 self-propelled guns,[27] was inexperienced and tooklonger than expected to penetrate the western flank of thesalient. A “mobile group” from 5th Mechanized Corps’233rd Tank Brigade, under the command of GeneralSavelev, with 50 tanks and 200 sub-machine gun armedinfantrymen, occupied Lysyanka and moved into the out-skirts of Zvenyhorodka by 28 January. Here, these troopsof the 6th Tank Army met the 2nd Ukrainian Front’s20th Tank Corps. Over the next three days, the twotank armies formed a thinly manned outer ring aroundwhat was now the Korsun Pocket while another, inner,ring was formed by the Soviet 27th, 52nd, and 4th GuardArmies.[28]

Sweeping Soviet advances that created the pocket.

The Soviets were optimistic over the progress of the op-eration. Stalin was promised a second Stalingrad, and

he expected it. Konev wired: “There is no need toworry, Comrade Stalin. The encircled enemy will notescape.”[29] Inside the pocket were nearly 60,000 menfrom six German divisions, operating at about 55% oftheir authorized strength, along with a number of smallercombat units. Among the trapped German forces werethe 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking, with the attached5th SS Infantry Brigade Wallonien, the Estonian SS in-fantry battalion Narwa, and “several thousand” Rus-sian auxiliaries.[30] General Wilhelm Stemmermann, thecommander of XI Corps, was placed in command ofthe forces in the pocket. These forces were desig-nated Gruppe Stemmermann. The 5th SS Panzer Divi-sion, with some 11,400 personnel,[31] had 30 operationalPanzer III/IV tanks and assault guns left, and six more inrepair.[32] The division further had 47 artillery pieces, ofwhich 12 were self-propelled guns.[33]

3 German relief attacks

The relief attempt begins. Tanks and halftracks of 1st PanzerDivision begin movements towards the pocket, early February1944[34]

Manstein moved quickly, and by early February the IIIand XLVII Panzer Corps were assembled for a relief ef-fort. Hitler intervened, however, and ordered the attackbe transformed into an effort to counter-encircle the twoSoviet army groups.General Hermann Breith, commander of III Panzer

3

Corps requested the relief formations be united to at-tempt to force a corridor to the trapped Gruppe Stem-mermann. This request was refused, and the counter-encirclement of the Soviet forces was attempted. The at-tack by the XLVII Panzer Corps’ 11th Panzer Division onthe southeastern flank of the pocket quickly stalled. Theveteran division had only 27 tanks and 34 assault guns op-erational, therefore its contribution was limited.[35] TheIII Panzer Corps’ attempt continued until 8 February,when it became undeniable that the effort had failed.[36]Manstein ordered the corps to instead drive directly tothe relief ofGruppe Stemmermann. Pulling the III PanzerCorps back and reorganizing for the new attack 15 kilo-meters south of Boyarka took three days.[37]

On 11 February Breith began a push with the 16th and17th Panzer Divisions driving toward the Gniloy TikichRiver. They initially made good progress. The 1st PanzerDivision and 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH covered thenorthern flank of the drive. As they drove deeper intothe Soviet positions Zhukov ordered Vatutin to assemblefour tank corps with the goal of cutting off the attack-ing German spearhead.[38] The weather warmed, turn-ing the roads to a soft mud and bogging down Germanprogress. Here the liabilities of Germany’s wheeled ve-hicles became evident. The Soviet forces had been pro-vided lend-leaseU.S. built four-wheel and six-wheel drivetrucks. These were largely able to get through, whereasGerman two-wheel-drive vehicles were not.[38]

Konev issued orders for the 4th Guards Army and 5thGuards Cavalry Corps to attempt to split the pocket on thenight of 5–6 February. The strike was to fall where thetwo German corps bordered.[39] As fighting progressedthe Soviet goal became clear to Stemmermann and Lieb.Stemmermann ordered the 5th SS Division’s armor to thescene. Together with the 72nd Infantry Division the So-viet attack was brought to a halt, buying the defenderstime.[39] Red Army efforts were renewed between 7–10February. This effort was hobbled by shortages in supply.III Panzer Corps’ penetrations toward the Gniloy TikichRiver made the supply lines for Soviet formations such asVatutin’s 6th Tank Army much longer.[40] The Red AirForce attempted to resupply some units, using the Po-2 aircraft.[41] Despite supply difficulties, units from the2nd Ukrainian Front were able to close in on Korsun by10 February, collapsing the pocket to an area of six byseven miles.[27]

4 Surrender demand and Germanmaneuver within the pocket

On 11 February, III Panzer Corps continued its drive east.The exhausted force reached the Gniloy Tikich streamand established a small bridgehead on the eastern bank.III Panzer Corps could advance no further, Group Stem-mermann would have to fight its way out.[42]

Panzer IVs carry infantry, January 1944

Both antagonists realized that the Wehrmacht relief ef-forts had come to a critical stage. Despite heavy Sovietpropaganda inducements, very few German soldiers andno Waffen-SS men in the cauldron had surrendered.[43]Zhukov thus decided to send parlementaires under a whiteflag with surrender demands.[35] A Red Army lieutenantcolonel, translator and bugler arrived in an Americanjeep and presented letters for both Stemmermann andLieb signed by Marshal Zhukov and Generals Konev andVatutin. The German officer on headquarters duty, amajor at Corps Detachment B and a translator, receivedthe emissaries.[44] After cordial talks, refreshments anda handshake, the Soviets departed without an answer –the “answer would be in the form of continued, bitterresistance.”[45]

Ju 52s at Korsun airfield, Ju 87s in formation above (January1944).

The German air force mounted an aerial resupply op-eration to both the encircled forces and the Germanrelief columns. On 28 January, the VIII AviationCorps (Fliegerkorps) began operations that eventually sawthe use of 832 transport aircraft, 478 bombers (fromwhich supplies were dropped at low altitude), 58 fighterbombers, and 168 fighters. Over the course of the op-eration, only 32 transport aircraft, 13 bombers, and fivefighters were lost.[10] After the Korsun airfield was aban-doned on 12 February, deliveries had to be dropped inby parachute. Fuel drums and ammunition crates were

4 5 BREAKOUT THROUGH HELL’S GATE

dropped into snowbanks by transports flying just abovethe deck.The Luftwaffe effort succeeded in delivering 82,948 gal-lons of fuel and 868 tons of ammunition plus four tons ofmedical supplies to the encircled forces and 325 tons ofammunition, 74,289 gallons of fuel and 24 tons of foodto spearheads of the relief formations, as well as evacu-ating 4,161 wounded while the Korsun airfield remainedoperational.[46] But even this effort had only met abouthalf (78 tons) of the daily requirements (150 tons) of theencircled troops as estimated by the German 8th Armyheadquarters.[10]

Stemmermann began withdrawing troops from the northside of the pocket, reorienting the thrust of the escapedirection, and attacking south to expand toward the re-lief forces on the north bank of the Gniloy Tikich. Thefrenetic maneuvering within the pocket confused the So-viets, convincing them that they had trapped the major-ity of the German 8th Army. The trapped forces werenow to capture the villages of Novo-Buda, Komarovka,Khilki and Shanderovka at the southwestern perimeterof the pocket to reach a favorable jump-off line for thebreakout.[47]

On 11 February Major Robert Kästner’s 105th GrenadierRegiment of the 72nd Infantry Division captured Novo-Buda in a night assault.[48] The following night Ko-marovka fell in similar fashion.[49] On the evening of 15February the 105th Regiment again, using its last reservesand with two assault guns, secured Khilki, defeating a So-viet counterattack supported by armor.[50] However, ofall the German divisions in the pocket, the 5th SS PanzerDivision “did more than any other to ensure the continuedsurvival of Gruppe Stemmermann ...”[51] Since the 5th SSDivision was the only truly mobile force inside the pocket,the division’s tracked units were repeatedly shifted fromone end of the pocket to the other to shore up crumblinglines.The pocket had “wandered” south and half-way towardits rescuers and rested on the village of Shanderovka. Thesettlement was heavily defended by the Soviets; had beencaptured by 72nd Infantry troops, was retaken by unitsof the Soviet 27th Army and recaptured by the Germa-nia regiment of 5th SS Panzer Division. By nightfall on16 February, III Panzer Corps fought its way closer tothe encircled formations, the spearheads were now sevenkilometers from Group Stemmermann.[52]

5 Breakout through Hell’s Gate

The northward thrust toward the pocket by the III PanzerCorps had been halted by Red Army determination, ter-rain, and fuel shortages. After several failed attemptsby German armored formations to seize and hold Hill239 and advance on Shanderovka, Soviet counterattacksby 5th Guards Tank Army forced III Panzer Corps into

Congestion on the road

costly defensive fighting. 8th Army radioed Stemmer-mann:

Capacity for action by III Panzer Corps limitedby weather and supply situation. Gruppe Stem-mermann must perform breakthrough as far asthe line Zhurzintsy–Hill 239 by its own effort.There link up with III Panzer Corps.[53]

The message did not specify that Zhurzintsy and the hillwere still firmly in Soviet hands—a failure that causedGroup Stemmermann severe casualties during the Ger-man breakout of the pocket. Lt.Gen. Theobald Lieb wasappointed by 8th Army to lead the breakout. Only sevenkilometers lay between Group Stemmermann and IIIPanzer Corps, but in between Konev “was in the processof repositioning forces for a final crushing attack whichwould take place [on] 17 February.”[54] His formidableforce of “three armies – the 4th Guards, 27th, 52nd ...and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps” – surrounded the encir-cled German forces and “elements of 5th Guards TankArmy had recently been added ... with the most powerfulunits, in particular armor, placed between Group Stem-mermann and III Panzer Corps.”[55][56] General Stem-mermann elected to stay behind with a rearguard of 6,500men, the remaining, combined strength of 57th and 88thInfantry Divisions.[57] The pocket was now a mere 5 kilo-meters in diameter, depriving Stemmermann of room tomaneuver. Shanderovka, once seen as a gate to freedom,now became known as Hell’s Gate.[58] The Red Armypoured intense artillery and rocket fire on the area aroundthe encircled troops, with nearly every round finding a tar-get. Sturmoviks of the RedAir Force bombed and strafed,only infrequently challenged by Luftwaffe fighters. Var-ious unit diaries described a scene of gloom, with firesburning caused by Soviet night bombing with incendi-aries, destroyed or abandoned vehicles everywhere andwounded men and disorganized units on muddy roads.Ukrainian civilians were caught between the combatants.On 16 February 1944, Field Marshal vonManstein, with-out waiting for a decision by Hitler, sent a radio messageto Stemmermann to authorize the breakout. It said sim-ply:

5

Password Freedom, objective Lysyanka, 2300hours.[59]

The German breakout

With extreme reluctance, Stemmermann and Lieb de-cided to leave 1,450 non-ambulatory wounded at Shan-derovka attended by doctors and orderlies.[60][61][62] Thetroops then began to assemble at dusk into three leadingassault columns with Division Group 112 to the north,5th SS Panzer Division to the south and 72nd Divisionin the center with the reinforced 105th Regiment in thefirst echelon to provide the assault power.[63] “By 2300the 105th Regiment – two battalions abreast – startedmoving ahead, silently and with bayonets fixed. One-half hour later the force broke through the first and soonthereafter the second [Soviet] defense line.”[64] All wentwell for several battalions and regiments who reachedthe German lines at Oktyabr by 0410. Major Kästnerand his 105th grenadiers reached friendly lines by cau-tiously approaching the forward position of Panthers of1st Panzer Division of the III Panzer Corps, bringing theirwounded along and their heavy weapons, but losing thetrailing, horse drawn supply column to Soviet artillery.The 105th entered Lysyanka at 0630.[65] On the oppositefront of the cauldron, General Stemmermann and his rearguard held fast and thus assured the success of the initialbreakout.[66]

At the left flank column, a reconnaissance patrol returnedbearing grim news. The geographic feature Hill 239 wasoccupied by Soviet T-34’s of the 5th Guards Tank Army.Despite efforts to capture Hill 239, the high ground re-mained in Soviet hands and had to be bypassed. The di-rection of the German retreat had to veer off to the southtoward the Gniloy Tikich River. When daylight arrived,the German escape plan began to unravel. Very few ar-mored vehicles and other heavy equipment could climbthe slippery, thawing hillsides and the weapons had to bedestroyed and abandoned “after the last round of ammu-nition had been fired.”[66]

General Konev, now aware of the German breakout, re-solved to keep his promise to Stalin not to let any “Hit-lerites” or “Fascists” escape annihilation. Soviet intel-ligence, however, at this stage vastly overestimated thearmored strength of III Panzer Corps, and Konev there-fore proceeded in force. At this time the 20th Tank

Corps brought its brigade of the new Joseph Stalin-2's tothe Korsun battlefield.[67] Konev ordered all available ar-mor and artillery to attack the escaping units, cut theminto isolated groups and then destroy them piecemeal.[68]The two blocking Soviet rifle divisions, 206th Rifle and5th Guards Airborne, had been smashed by the Ger-man assault forces; without infantry support Soviet tanksthen fired into the escaping formations from a distance.With no anti-tank weapons in the field, T-34s com-menced to wade into unprotected support troops, head-quarters units, stragglers and red-cross identified medicalcolumns.[69][70]

What followed was a scene illustrative of warfare at itsmost savage:

Under the yellow sky of early morningand over ground covered with wet snow So-viet tanks made straight for the thick of thecolumn, ploughing up and down, killing andcrushing with their tracks. Almost simultane-ously massed Cossack cavalry wheeled awayfrom the tanks to hunt down and massacre menfleeing for the refuge of the hills: hands heldhigh in surrender the Cossacks sliced off withtheir sabres. The killing in this human huntwent on for several hours and a new roundopened on the banks of the river Gniloy Ti-kich, where the survivors of the first collision ofthe German columnwith Soviet troops draggedand fought their way.

— John Erickson, in The Road to Berlin, p.178.

Gruppe Stemmermann had paid a staggering price in ca-sualties for the vagueness of the radio message that hadordered the breakout from the pocket.By mid-day, the majority of the now intermingled di-visions had reached the Gniloy Tikich stream, turbulentand swollen to a breadth of 15 meters and a depth of twometers[31] by the melting snow. Despite the fact that the1st Panzer Division had captured a bridge, and engineershad erected another, the panicking men saw the river astheir only escape from the rampaging T-34s. Since themain body was away and south of the bridgeheads, thelast tanks, trucks and wagons were driven into the icywater, trees were felled to form makeshift bridges andthe troops floundered across as best as they could, withhundreds of exhausted men drowning, being swept down-stream with horses and military debris. Many others suc-cumbed to shock or hypothermia. Groups of men werebrought across on lifelines fashioned from belts and har-nesses. Others formed rafts of planks and other debris totow the wounded to the German side, at all times underSoviet artillery and T-34 fire. Gen. Lieb, after establish-ing a semblance of order at the banks throughout the af-ternoon, crossed the Gniloy Tikich swimming alongsidehis horse.[71] When the 5th SS Panzer Division comman-der Herbert Gille attempted to form a human chain across

6 7 ASSESSMENT

the river, alternating between those who could swim andthose who could not, scores of men died when the chainbroke. Several hundred Soviet prisoners of war, a troupeof Russianwomen auxiliaries andUkrainian civilians whofeared reprisals by the Red Army, also crossed the icywaters.[72] Toward the end phase of the breakout, en-gineers had built several more bridges and rear guardunits of 57th and 88th Infantry Divisions crossed the river“dry”, including “20 [horse drawn] panje wagons with ...about 600 wounded” aboard.[73]

That so many reached the German lines at Lysyanka wasdue in great measure to the exertions of III Panzer Corpsas it drove in relief of Group Stemmermann. The cuttingedge was provided by Heavy Armored Regiment Bäke(Schweres Panzer Regiment Bäke), named for its comman-der Lt.Col. Dr. Franz Bäke. The unit was equipped withTigers and Panthers and an engineer battalion with spe-cialist bridging skills.[74]

6 Outcome

The Red Army encirclement of Cherkasy–Korsun in-flicted serious damage on six German divisions, includ-ing the 5th SS Panzer Division. Though most of the menescaped, they had to leave nearly all of their heavy equip-ment behind. These units had to be withdrawn, requir-ing rest and near complete re-equipping. The escapedwounded were transported from collection points nearUman to rehabilitation areas and hospitals in Poland, andwere then sent on leave to their home towns.In a U.S. Army brief written following the war, GeneralLieb commented:

I assumed command of what was left ofForce Stemmermann. By now the situationwas the following: The 72nd and Wiking Divi-sions were completely intermingled. No longerdid they have any tanks, artillery, vehicles orrations. Many soldiers were entirely withoutweapons, quite a few even without footgear.Neither division could be considered in anyway able to fight. One regiment of Task ForceB was intact and still had some artillery sup-port. However, this regiment also had no ve-hicles and no rations left. All wounded, es-timated at about 2,000, were being graduallysheltered in the houses of Lisyanka, and laterwere evacuated by air.

For lack of vehicles and fuel, III PanzerCorps was unable to reinforce its units in thearea of Lisyanka and Oktyabr. The corps com-mander, with whom I conferred by telephone,informed me that he had been forced to as-sume the defensive against heavy Russian at-tacks from the northwest in the area immedi-ately west of Lisyanka. He had no extra sup-

plies of any kind, and his forward elementswere unable to provide rations for the troopsemerging from the pocket. Thus I had to or-der the pocket force in its miserable conditionto move on westward, while I requested supply,evacuation of casualties by air, and the bringingup of vehicles and weapons from the rear.

— General Theo-Helmut Lieb[71]

With German armoured reserves drawn to the KorsunPocket, the Soviets struck Army Group South in twoother sectors. The 13th and 60th Armies (GeneralVatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front) advanced south of thePripiat' Marshes, capturing the remnants of the GermanXIII Corps at the Battle of Rovno [75] and advancing toLutsk. To the south, the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts(Generals Malinovsky and Tolbukhin) attacked along thebend of Dnepr River, capturing Kryvyi Rih.[12]

General Stemmermann was killed during the breakoutwhen his command car was fired upon and hit by a Sovietantitank gun.[76] General Lieb survived the war. GeneralVatutin was shot by Ukrainian Nationalist UPA insur-gents on 29 February 1944 and died on 15 April 1944.[12]The commander of 2nd Ukrainian Front, General Konev,was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union for his victoryat Korsun. Konev also survived the war.

7 Assessment

Soviet forces in Ukraine, 1944

The battle around Korsun was a Soviet victory.[1][2][77]The German forces became trapped, and as the pocketcollapsed the forces inside were forced to retreat throughgaps in the Soviet forces surrounding them, resulting insignificant losses in men and tremendous losses in equip-ment. However the details of the battle make it clear thatboth sides committed significant mistakes.Hitler’s insistence on holding the exposed salient stronglylimited the options of German field commanders.[78]Once the Soviets had encircled the German forces, theGerman relief efforts produced mixed results. The ef-fectiveness of the German counterattack was limited byHitler’s plan for splitting his strength to attempt a counter

7

envelopment. The XLVII Panzer Corps’ attacks were in-effective due to the weakness of its divisions. Thoughthe III Panzer Corps was far more effective, the corpswasted a week on a failed attempt to encircle the Sovietforces.[37] When III Panzer Corps was finally given themission of driving to relieve Gruppe Stemmermann, theGermans were unable to provide Bäke’s heavy tank reg-iment with adequate fuel supplies, leading Bäke to stopthe advance on Hill 239 because one group of his tankshad run out of fuel.[79] This logistical failure was com-pounded by the vagueness of the radio message to Gen-eral Stemmermann ordering the breakout attempt. Hill239 remained under Soviet control, resulting in signifi-cant casualties among Stemmermann retreating force.The Soviet performance was also beset by errors. Sovietintelligence on German forces in the pocket was faultyin overestimating their strength.[3] At the same time, theSoviets underestimated German capability for a counter-attack and had to hurriedly move more forces forward tobolster the strength of their encircling rings.[80] The So-viet air force was unable to significantly hinder the Ger-man aerial resupply effort.[10] Ultimately, the encirclingforces were unable to prevent a German breakout, allow-ing a significant portion of the trapped Germans to es-cape. Given the initial circumstances of the battle, thedegree of Soviet losses makes clear that while the Sovi-ets won at Korsun, it was a victory that came at a highprice.[1]

German losses indicate that of the 60,000 men originallyinside the pocket, their number had shrunk to less than50,000 by 16 February. 45,000 of these took part in thebreakout, resulting in 27,703 German soldiers and 1,063Russian auxiliaries breaking out unscathed. In addition7,496 wounded reached the III Panzer Corps, with anadditional 4,161 wounded evacuated from the pocket byair. Left behind were a total of 19,000 dead, wounded,captured or missing. Total casualties killed, wounded ormissing, were 31,000.[81] German documents list total es-capees as 40,423, including the wounded flown out of thepocket and evacuated from Lysyanka.[82]

Soviet sources give total losses of 80,188 casualties forthe 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, with 24,286 killed andmissing, and 55,902 wounded or sick. These losses wereincurred over the period of 24 January – 17 February1944.[6]

8 Propaganda and historiography

Both sides hailed the events at Korsun as a victory.Marshal Konev claimed to have inflicted 130,000 Ger-man casualties, an assertion the German official historyhas dismissed as being in the “realm of fantasy”.[9] Soviethistorian Sergey Smirnov described the victory at Korsunas a “Stalingrad on the Dnieper”. Marshal Zhukov wasless pleased in his memoirs, noting that on 18 February

1944, official honors were given in Moscow to the 2ndUkrainian Front—but not the 1st Ukrainian Front. ". .. an unforgivable error of the part of the supreme com-mander" was Zhukov’s unhappy verdict.[83]

On the part of the Germans, the counter-attack was de-picted as a glorious success in which one group of braveGerman soldiers freed their equally heroic comrades whohad been trapped in the pocket. General von Vormann,who commanded the relief attempt of the XXXXVIIPanzer Corps, bitterly noted that “The troops who tookpart were astonished and unbelieving when they weretold they had won a great victory at Cherkassy in theUkraine in 1944.” The German high command, however,was relieved that so many troops were able to escape.Even Adolf Hitler, who was known to launch into furi-ous tirades over any reversal on the Eastern front, onlycomplained briefly about the amount of equipment thathad to be left behind.[84]

One of the initial historiographical works on the fightingat Korsun was a 1952 U.S. Army publication, DA Pam-phlet 20–234, Operations of Encircled Forces: GermanExperiences in Russia. This work was written in the con-text of NATO’s Cold War confrontation with the SovietUnion, and authors were highlighting historical experi-ence of the Wehrmacht that may have proven useful toNATO forces had a war between the Soviet Union andNATO broken out.[85] Like most of the English-languageworks on the Eastern Front of this era, it was written fromthe German point of view.John Erickson’s 1983 The Road to Berlin and DavidGlantz’s 1995When Titans Clashed covered events on theentire Eastern Front from a German and Soviet perspec-tive, and also devoted several pages to the fighting in theKorsun Pocket. Erickson did not question Soviet claimsregarding German casualties, and Glantz questioned theveracity of German claims regarding the total of escapeesfrom the pocket.[86] Glantz has also translated the SovietGeneral Staff Study on the Korsun Operation into Englishas The Battle for the Ukraine: the Red Army’s Korsun'-Shevchenkovkii Operation, 1944.More recently, the 2002 work by U.S. Army historianDouglas Nash, Hell’s Gate: The Battle of the CherkassyPocket, January–February 1944, took issue with So-viet claims that Korsun was another Stalingrad.[87] Sim-ilarly, the Swedish historians Niklas Zetterling and An-ders Frankson disputed the assertions of the Soviet Gen-eral Staff Study of the Korsun Operation in their 2008work, The Korsun Pocket. The Encirclement and Break-out of a German Army in the East, 1944, using statementsto describe the staff study such as “anything but accurate”and “completely unreliable.” Yet, both Nash and Zetter-ling/Frankson conclude that Korsun was a Soviet victoryeven as all three authors took issue with Soviet character-izations of the battle.[1][2][88]

In 2007, Volume 8 of the German semiofficial history ofthe war (The German Reich and the Second World War)

8 10 REFERENCES

was published, and part of the work authored by Karl-Heinz Frieser addressed the events at Korsun. This workalso doubts Soviet claims regarding the German casual-ties while discussing the situation of the German forcesin detail, using available data from the German archives.However, while German casualties in this work are takenfrom German archives, it bases its assessment of SovietAFV and gun losses (uncritically) on German wartimeclaims.[89]

In 2011, May, author and historian Jean Lopez pub-lished, on Economica Edition (ISBN 2717860290, ISBN978-2717860290 )a book named “Le chaudron deTcherkassy-Korsun ", which cover extensively this battle.

9 See also

• Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket order of battle

10 References[1] “Nevertheless, the Soviet position, relative to the Ger-

mans, was stronger after the battle than before, so Kor-sun may be viewed as a Soviet victory, even though it wasbought at a considerably higher price than it ought to havebeen.” (Zetterling & Frankson, p. 298)

[2] Nash, p. 382

[3] Frieser, p. 397

[4] Frieser, p. 400

[5] Frieser, p. 399

[6] Krivosheev, p. 109

[7] Numbers of Soviet AFVs, aircraft, and guns taken fromFrieser, p. 395

[8] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 277

[9] Frieser, p. 416

[10] Frieser, p. 405

[11] ГрылевА. Н. Днепр—Карпаты—Крым. —М.: Наука,1970. (Anatoly Nikolayevic Grylev. Dniepr-Carpath-Krym. Moskva. Nauka

[12] Glantz & House, p. 188

[13] Erickson, p. 179

[14] Glantz & House, p. 298

[15] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 283 (citing The Korsun-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 41 and 52; Krivosheev, p.109)

[16] Frieser, p. 417

[17] Nash, p. 366

[18] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 280

[19] Liddell-Hart 1970, pp. 664-665.

[20] Willmott 1984, p. 180.

[21] Corps Detachment B was organized as an infantry divi-sion with six infantry battalions and normal supporting di-visional units. The unit had been formed from elementscontributed by the 112th, 255th, and 332nd Infantry Di-visions. Tessin, pp. 26–27.

[22] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 37

[23] Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 37–39

[24] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 39

[25] Glantz & House, p. 187

[26] The 6th Tank Army had been formed on 20 January 1944.Dunn, Hitler’s Nemesis

[27] Erickson, p. 177

[28] Erickson, p. 177; Glantz & House, p. 187; and Frieser,p. 396

[29] Konev, Battles Hitler Lost, quoted in Nash, p. 200

[30] Nash, p. 27

[31] Frieser, p. 424

[32] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 335

[33] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 336; a total of 242 artillerypieces were inside the pocket.

[34] Image description abbreviated from nearly same image inNash, p. 161

[35] Perrett, p. 167

[36] Frieser, p. 354

[37] Frieser, p. 402

[38] Nash, p. 162

[39] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 180

[40] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 184

[41] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 185

[42] Group Stemmermann essentially consisted of six divi-sions: 57th, 72nd, 88th, 389th divisions, Corps Detach-ment B (Division Group 112), all infantry formations withno armored components; and the 5th SS Panzer Divisionwith the attached 5th SS Infantry Brigade and the NarwaBattalion. The only units considered still capable of ag-gressive, offensive operations were 72nd Infantry and 5thSS Divisions. (Department of the Army Pamphlet 20–234, pp. 19–20)

[43] Nash, p. 194

[44] DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 22

[45] Nash, p. 198

9

[46] Nash, Appendix 8, p. 399

[47] DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 19

[48] The regiments of this division were raised in the city ofTrier and the Mosel valley in western Germany

[49] Nash, pp. 212–214

[50] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 245

[51] Nash, p. 369

[52] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 255

[53] Nash, p. 258

[54] Nash, p. 287

[55] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 244

[56] Nash, p. 296, map of disposition of forces during thebreakout

[57] Carell, p. 418

[58] Nash, p. 280

[59] Carell, p. 417

[60] Perrett, p. 168

[61] Nash, p. 283

[62] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 242

[63] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 257

[64] DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 27

[65] Nash, p. 300

[66] DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 40

[67] Nash, p. 267. Editor’s note – Soviet tank corps did nothave organic heavy (JS-2) tank brigades. Nash may bereferring to one of the independent heavy tank regimentsthat were assigned to the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

[68] One such isolated group of stragglers from theWallonienbrigade was set upon by a “swarm of Cossacks” [Carell,p. 430]. The vengeful cavalry hacked at the escapees withtheir sabers in “an orgy of slaughter” [Perrett, p. 169]

[69] Nash, p. 308

[70] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 267

[71] DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 31

[72] Carell, p. 430

[73] Zetterling & Frankson, p. 272

[74] Perrett, p. 169

[75] Haupt, pp. 211–212

[76] Nash 1995, p. 132

[77] Nash 1995, pp. 3, 141–142

[78] Frieser, p. 394

[79] Frieser, p. 404

[80] Nash 1995, pp. 149–150

[81] Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 277–278

[82] Nash, p. 398

[83] Frieser, p. 418

[84] Frieser, p. 419

[85] DA Pamphlet 20–234, p. 1

[86] Glantz & House, p. 188. In this work, Glantz is skepticalof German accounts, writing “Although German accountsclaim that 30,000 troops escaped, the Soviet version is farmore credible...”

[87] “There was no Stalingrad on the Dnieper, as the Sovietsclaimed...” (Nash, p. 382)

[88] For example, U.S. Army historian Douglas E. Nash pointsto Soviet claims as being exaggerated; e.g., the Soviet 5thCavalry Corps and 4th Guards Army “claimed that theyhad practically wiped out most of Wiking [on 6 February1944], though this was not remotely close ... In fact,Wik-ing’s biggest battles in the pocket were yet to come” (Nash,p. 110). The Soviets claimed “to have downed more than329 aircraft” during the aerial supply operation; that num-ber would have been more planes than the Luftwaffe hadoperational in its Korps area during this entire period and“should be regarded as an example of the degree of exag-geration to which the Soviets were prone. This would notbe the last wildly inflated claim they would make” (Nash,p. 120).

[89] Frieser, pp. 394–419

11 Bibliography• Armstrong, Richard N. Red Army Tank Comman-ders: The Armored Guards. Atglen, Pennsylvania:Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1994. ISBN 0-88740-581-9.

• Carell, Paul. Scorched Earth. New York: BallantineBooks, 1971. ISBN 0-345-02213-0.

• Department of the Army Pamphlet 20–234. Oper-ations of Encircled Forces: German Experiences inRussia. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print-ing Office, 1952.

• Dunn, Walter S. Hitler’s Nemesis The Red Army1930–1945. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books,2009.

• Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin, New Haven:Yale University Press, 1999.

• Frieser, Karl-Heinz. Das Deutsche Reich und derZweite Weltkrieg, Volume 8. München: DeutscheVerlags-Anstalt, 2007. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2.

10 13 GALLERY

• Glantz, David & House, Jonathan M. When Ti-tans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. ISBN0-7006-0717-X

• Haupt, Werner (1998). Army Group South: TheWehrmacht in Russia 1941–1945. Atglen, PA:Schiffer Military History. ISBN 0-7643-0385-6.

• Krivosheev, G. F. Soviet Casualties and CombatLosses in the Twentieth Century. London: GreenhillBooks, 1997. ISBN 1-85367-280-7.

• Liddell Hart, B. H.History of the SecondWorld WarNew York, NY: Putnam, 1970.

• Nash, Douglas E. No Stalingrad on the Dnieper (Pa-per written for the Command and General Staff Col-lege of the U.S. Army), Fort Leavenworth: 1995

• Nash, Douglas E. Hell’s Gate: The Battle of theCherkassy Pocket, January–February 1944 . South-bury, Connecticut: RZM Publishing, 2002. ISBN0-9657584-3-5

• Perrett, Bryan. Knights of the Black Cross, Hitler’sPanzerwaffe and Its Leaders. New York: St. Mar-tin’s Press, 1986. ISBN 0-7090-2806-7

• Shukman, Harold, ed. Stalin’s Generals. New York:Grove Press, 1993. ISBN 1-84212-513-3

• Tessin, Georg. Verbände und Truppen der deutschenWehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939 – 1945, Vol. 14,Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1980. ISBN 3-7648-1111-0.

• Willmott, H. P. June, 1944. New York, N.Y.:Blandford Press, 1984. ISBN 0-7137-1446-8

• Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders. The KorsunPocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a GermanArmy in the East, 1944. Drexel Hill (Philadelphia),Pennsylvania: Casemate Publishers. 2008. ISBN978-1-932033-88-5.

12 External links

• forum.axishistory.com photos of the battlefield

• Terrain view of the Korsun Pocket area

• Satellite view of the German escape route

13 Gallery

• Dispatch rider from a heavy tank battalion ... as aTiger I passes by, February 1944 (description ab-breviated from same image in Nash, p. 238)

• Gunners from Art.Rgt. 188, 88th Inf. Div. (de-scription abbreviated from same image in Nash, p.145)

Coordinates: 49°25′10″N 31°16′38″E / 49.4194°N31.2772°E

11

14 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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12 14 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

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