Table of Contents -Letter from the Secretary-General

-Letter from the Under-Secretary-General

-Introduction to first agenda item: Examining the Constitutional Authority of the Venezuelan Government on the Crisis in Venezuela and Setting Strategies to Alleviate the Economic Imperfections in Venezuela

- Brief history of Venezuela

- The uprising of Hugo Chavez

- The presidency of Nicolas Maduro

- The following situations after Maduro

a) Humanitarian crisis

b) Political crisis

c) Economic crisis

-The current situation in Venezuela

- UNSC involvement and attempts

-Countries and organisations regarding the situation

- Possible solutions

- Useful links

Esteemed participants,

I am Gün Karabıdak, the Secretary-General of Beylikdüzü Sosyal Bilimler Lisesi Model United Nations 2019. I feel more than honored to be welcoming you to the 3rd session of our school’s tradition , BSBLMUN’19 is eager to reach wide range of attendants from high schools to universities who are deeply interested in diplomacy, international relations, politics and the United Nations itself while constituting a unique experience of debating and socializing at the same time. We as a team value quality over quantity so our committees this year are selected after careful consideration and our six committees are definitely more than what meets the eye.

The academic team embraces an understanding of content which concerns actual and urgent problems that the world faces currently in order to create awareness of the facts touched upon over the youth to which it addresses. Delegates in the most powerful body of the United Nations will be discussing the topics below:

- The Constitutional Authority of the Venezuelan Government on the Crisis in Venezuela and Setting Strategies to Alleviate the Economic Imperfections in Venezuela

- Examination of the Maritime Border Dispute Between Somalia and Kenya. The academic content and the structure of the committee have been prepared by the well known Under-Secretary-Generals Adnan Cem Kıral and Sacit Can Soyen. Carrying out their work outstandingly, they have accomplished the preparation of the study guide thoroughly and detailed enough to give you honorable delegates a clear understanding of the topic.

I advise the participants of this well-prepared committee to read the provided guide thoroughly. You may also go over further readings and key documents which you may find on our website with the study guide. For any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me via gkarabidak@gmail.com.

Best regards

Gün Karabıdak

Secretary-General of Beylikdüzü Sosyal Bilimler Lisesi Model United Nations 2019

Letter from Under-Secretary-General,

Dear participants,

I have the utmost pleasure and honor of welcoming you to the 3’rd annual session of BSBLMUN. My name is Sacit Can Soyen, a 1’st grade Bioengineering student at the Yıldız Technical University. It’s my honor to serve as the Under-Secretary-General responsible for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) committee with my esteemed partner Mr. Adnan Cem Kıral. I have been participating in MUN conferences for 4 years now and this will be my 22’nd conference.

In this Security Council, you will have the opportunity to discuss the burning topic of the Venezuelan Crisis. The Venezuelan crisis raises multiple issues at the core of today’s world values: democratic elections, the right to self-determination, humanitarian action and Human rights generally speaking. Various member states of the Security Council recently called for a resolution of this body to bring a response to this crisis. We are hoping you will do a magnificent job on this topic with a good resolution solving the chaos in Venezuela.

As you know the other topic is the Examination of the Maritime Border Dispute Between Somalia and Kenya. Lots of piracy issues have been occupying east and West sides of Africa and these countries suffer most from them. The pirates interacting with important ships make it an international problem that the UNSC should solve with giving priority. Mr. Kıral will be handling with this topic and I’m sure that you’ll also handle this topic successfully.

I thank once again the BSBLMUN team for organizing this conference and giving us the possibility to propose you a four days debate on one of the most important topics the international community have to face today.

Yours sincerely, Sacit Can Soyen

Under-Secretary-General of UNSC

Introduction to first agenda item: Examining the Constitutional Authority of the Venezuelan Government on the Crisis in Venezuela and Setting Strategies to Alleviate the Economic Imperfections in Venezuela

Since the beginning of the XXI century, we have seen an escalation in tension regarding Venezuela and its political situation, almost bringing the country to the brink of a civil war in 2017. This is due to the strong opposition of a part of the Venezuelan population towards the current political class, led by President Nicolás Maduro, who took up the office in 2013.

Since Maduro became President, Venezuela is living a condition of instability and political turmoil that exploded on March 30, 2017, when the Supreme Court divested the Parliament. This produced an immediate response by the opposition parties, which took to the streets in protest that often turned violent: on August 8, 2017, TeleSur reported a death toll of at least 124 people among protestors and supporters of the government (Chavistas), bystanders and policemen.

Along with the political crisis, there is a humanitarian crisis. Because of the protests and growing poverty, Venezuela is facing a humanitarian crisis: there’s little or no food, the little there is extremely expensive; almost no medicines and basic necessities like toilet paper and hygienic products are lacking. President Nicolas Maduro

(April 19’th 2013 - ……)

This is due to the ongoing economic crisis. Venezuela’s economy relied mostly on oil but with the collapse of crude oil’s price, the country has found itself with its income reduced to a third of the 30bln available. Venezuela is now estimated to possess around 10.5bln. While the government did not carry out measures to expand the other branches of its economy, it used the proceeds from oil sales to try to improve the population’s living conditions (schools, hospitals, social housing).

Many Venezuelans have fled the country, creating the “Venezuelan Diaspora”.

The situation has been evolving and changes can be expected.

Brief history of Venezuela

For centuries the

indigenous peoples of Venezuela lived by farming but also by hunting and fishing. Then in 1498, Christopher Columbus became the first European to reach Venezuela. In 1499 a Spaniard named Alonso de Ojeda led another expedition to the area. He called it Venezuela, meaning little Venice, after seeing huts on stilts. The Spanish founded their first town in Venezuela in 1521. They also began importing African slaves. However, Venezuela was relatively unimportant to the Spanish.

On 5 July 1811, a national assembly declared Venezuela independent. However, it was short-lived. After a year Spanish forces were in control once again. Venezuela was finally liberated by Simon Bolivar in 1821. At first, Venezuela was joined with Colombia and Ecuador as part of a state called Gran Colombia. However, Gran Colombia soon broke up and Venezuela became completely independent in 1830.

During the 19th century, Venezuela was ruled by military dictators called Caudillos. The first was Jose Antonio Paez. He ruled Venezuela until 1848. Venezuela then suffered civil wars. General Antonio Guzman Blanco was caudillo from 1870-1888 and he restored order.

However, in 1902 Venezuela failed to pay interest on loans from Britain, Germany and Italy. As a result, those 3 nations sent their navies to blockade Venezuelan ports. However, in 1914 oil was discovered in Venezuela. Oil became Venezuela's most important export. Then in 1945, a dictator was overthrown and the interim government promised to hold elections. A new constitution was introduced in Venezuela in 1947 and elections were held. However, a coup took place in 1948. Marcos Perez Jimenez became a dictator of Venezuela. He was overthrown in turn in 1958.

After 1958 Venezuela became a democracy. However, in 1998 Hugo Chavez was elected president. Chavez introduced a left-wing regime in Venezuela. Chavez was re-elected in 2006. He allied Venezuela with Cuba. However, Chavez died in 2013. He was replaced by Nicolas Maduro.

Today the population of Venezuela is 31 million. Today Venezuela relies heavily on revenue from oil but poverty persists. In 2016 Venezuela suffered a very high rate of inflation and the economy contracted. There are also shortages of consumer goods and medicines. Venezuela also suffers from a very high crime rate. Not surprisingly in recent years, Venezuela has suffered a 'brain drain' as many wealthy people have fled abroad. In 2017 there were many protests in Venezuela. Today the economic crisis continues. In 2018 the population of Venezuela was 32 million.

The uprising of Hugo ChavezAs you know Venezuela entered the democracy age in 1958 and the military dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez came to an end. And after that Venezuela was dominated by two political parties: Acción Democrática (left-wing) and COPEI (right-wing); their respective leaders, Carlos Andrés Pérez for AD and Rafael Caldera for COPEI. Caldera won the 1968 elections, but in 1973 Pérez took his place as President.

In 1992, Pérez government experienced a coup d’état called “Operation Zamora, led by Hugo Chávez, a soldier supporting socialist ideals,” that had the objective of reinstalling Caldera as President, due to Carlos Andrés Pérez Rafael Caldera a growing opposition from the population to the economic measures taken by Pérez. The coup failed, but Chávez popularity

had already been growing among the population, who saw him as a fighter against the corrupt political class. He was sentenced to prison along with the men who took part in the coup.

In 1993 Pérez was impeached for corruption and Caldera took his place. He soon freed Chávez and his men, giving them back their political rights. They promptly set off for a trip around South America, rallying support for the Bolivian cause. When Chávez came back, he became critical of Caldera’s actions and ran for the 1998 elections.

Soon Chávez gained support from the population, especially the poor and lower classes, and won the election with almost 60% of the votes. He carried out a series of economic reforms to improve living conditions; repairing houses, roads, hospitals etc.and introduced the idea of reforming the Constitution. The referendum he organized to support his idea was a success, with almost 90% of the people supporting him. In the drafting process of the Constitution, the opposition criticized Chavez’s changes, which in their opinion were borderline dictatorship, as they made censorship easier and gave the executive branch more power. Nevertheless, in the referendum to approve it in 1999 Chavez won 72% of the votes. Hugo Chavez (1954-2013)

In the 2000 elections, Chávez was reconfirmed as president but in 2002 another coup d’état took place. On April 9, a strike was called by the CTV labor union (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela) after Chávez appointed political allies in prominent places in Venezuela's national oil company, PDVSA. On April 11, in Caracas, up to 1.000.000 Venezuelans marched in protest. At one point during the march, opposition leaders redirected the protestors to the presidential palace, where government supporters were holding their own rally. The two parties confronted each other and by evening 19 people, both supporters and protesters were dead. In the span of 3 days, Chávez lost his power, was almost tried but eventually regained his position as President.

Following this event, the PDVSA administration fires almost 20.000 employees to pressure Chávez for new elections, but they soon begin the production of oil again with the remaining employees loyal to Chávez. Unemployment rises from 5% to 20%. All these attempts to overthrow his government were unsuccessful but radicalized Chávez even more, whose object was to build “socialism of the 21st century”, following Fidel Castro’s ideas. In 2006 elections, Chávez was once more elected, creating a new constituent assembly and drafted a new constitution.

The presidency of Nicolas Maduro

In 2012 Chávez became ill and sought cancer treatment in Cuba, appointing Nicolás Maduro as his successor. On March 5, 2013, he’s declared dead, soon after having entrusted the role of interim president to Nicolás Maduro, vice-president of the republic, pending new elections. The early presidential elections were held on April 14, 2013. Nicolas Maduro was elected with 50.75% of the vote, against 48.98% for the Socialist Henrique Capriles Radonsky single candidate of the opposition.

Starting from February 2014, protests and riots occurred regularly, protesting the measures taken by the government and the poor living conditions of the majority of the population. the arrest of protestor Leopoldo López is fundamental, he took to the streets in protest on February 12 with many others. He became the first political prisoner of the Maduro regime.

In the parliamentary elections of December 2015, the opposition won a large majority of seats in the National Assembly. Subsequently, the Supreme Court ruled that the Assembly was in contempt and that all of its actions were null and void. In 2017, a National Constituent Assembly was established through elections in which the opposition parties did not participate. The National Constituent Assembly took over key functions of the legislative branch and undertook a process of constitutional reform that remains inconclusive and is not recognized by the opposition parties. At that point, there were more than 5000 inmates and 72 political prisoners. Opponents and international political leaders condemned the Maduro regime as a dictatorship, while others expressed their support for the government.

In January 2016, the Supreme Court suspended the election of four legislators -three that were enrolled with the opposition and one with the ruling party -for alleged voting irregularities. The opposition accused the court of trying to strip them of their super-majority and went ahead and swore in three of the legislators in question. In response, the Supreme Court ruled that the entire National Assembly was in contempt and all decisions it made would be null. The deadlock continued when the court suspended a stay-or-go referendum against Maduro and postponed regional elections until 2017.

The incumbent President Nicolás Maduro was re-elected as president in the 2018 Venezuelan presidential election; however, the results of that election were disputed, largely because of irregularities in the way the election was called. The dispute came to a head in early 2019 when the National Assembly of Venezuela stated that the results of the election were invalid and declared Juan Guaidó as the acting president, citing several clauses of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution. National protests were then organized by the opposition against Maduro's election and his ruling coalition.

Shortly after the National Assembly's declaration, various Venezuelan groups, foreign nations, and international organizations made statements supporting either side to the conflict, with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and the Arab League leading the support for Maduro while the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union both supported the National Assembly.

The following situations after MaduroThe situation in Venezuela is cause for serious concern. The protracted crisis in the country has had a grave impact on the population, with high levels of political polarization, growing humanitarian needs and serious human rights concerns. The economic situation in the country has become dire. Repeated efforts to bring the Government and the opposition to the negotiating table have not led to concrete agreements.

The situation has both an economic and a political dimension. The population has been affected in a systemic way. Nearly all 30 million Venezuelans have been affected by hyperinflation and the collapse of real salaries; shortages of food, medicine and basic supplies; the deterioration of health and education services; and the deterioration of basic infrastructure, such as water, electricity, transport and urban services. Drastic reductions in production capacities in the agricultural, pharmaceutical and other sectors have aggravated the supply situation.

2/3 of the country's revenue comes from oil. When the price of oil collapses, it drives the Venezuelan economy in its downfall. Social programs must be sacrificed, further undermining Maduro's popularity. The drop in oil prices recorded in recent years continued in 2018, with a decrease of approximately half a million barrels per day from 2017 and a consequent fall in revenues. The International Monetary Fund reported that the inflation rate hit 1.37 million per cent last year and has projected a fall in the real gross domestic product of negative 18 per cent in 2019. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, between 2015 and 2017 there were 3.7 million undernourished people in the country. Infant mortality rates have doubled in recent years. According to United Nations estimates, over 3 million Venezuelans are now living abroad, including approximately 2.3 million who have left the country since 2015, going mostly to other South American countries. Most of them go to Colombia and Peru. Although Venezuelans have been leaving their country for several years, these population movements have increased in 2017 and their magnitude has accelerated further in 2018, according to the UN. According to the estimates of UNHCR and IOM, about 5,500 people left the country every day in 2018. Images of caravans of migrants en route to the United States travel around the world.

And so the problems that construct the Venezuelan crisis today can be split into three categories: economic, political, and humanitarian.

a) Humanitarian crisisAlejandro Werner of the IMF writes, “The collapse in economic activity, hyperinflation, and

increasing deterioration in the provision of public goods as well as shortages of food at subsidized prices have resulted in large migration flows, which will lead to intensifying spillover effects on neighbouring countries,” as Venezuela’s economic state led to a full-blown humanitarian crisis on different fronts. With no motivation for production within the country, since the inflation and price controls allows for no profit, there are massive shortages of even the most basic necessities like food and medicine. The fixed exchange rate and the United State of America’s embargo also means it is not possible to import supplies. Furthermore, it is also not possible for Venezuela to borrow money as the international community have slapped heavy sanctions to condemn the Maduro government.

Lack of food and medicine accelerated the decline in health. Current estimates show that over 11% of children under age five are severely malnourished. Almost one-third of Venezuelans admit to eating two or fewer meals per day, over 85% say they eat less than before, and 44% say they’ve gone at least one full day without eating. Illness arising from these problems go untreated as doctors and hospitals face an acute shortage in medicine and related supplies. Moreover, diseases like Diphtheria, that one thought had been eradicated, has returned due to the lack of immunity and adequate vaccination. Malaria has also infected people at a rate that hit a 75-year high.

The prevalence of malaria has risen for similar reasons and has infected enough people to hit a 75-year high. In just one week in October 2017, 32 people died from the disease as waiting rooms overflowed and doctors attempted to treat the illness without medicine. Doctors are reported to have left the country as they say they cannot treat patients anymore, which has contributed to an increasing brain drain.

The average citizen too flees the country as a migration crisis looms large. The UN estimates that 2.3 million Venezuelans have fled since 2015 and Colombian authorities predict another 2 million could follow by 2020. The majority have crossed the border into Colombia and spread on to Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and even Brazil. Plenty of people have also fled to Spain and the United States of America to seek asylum. So far in 2018, half a million have arrived in Ecuador and just in the first half of August 2018, the migration seems to have accelerated with 43,000 Venezuelans arriving in the

Ecuadorian city of Tulcán. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees fears the number could 100,000 by the end of August 2018.

The mass migration, with numbers beyond imagination, has also created problems for the host countries as they struggle to take in thousands of refugees. Latin American countries have recently introduced measures strengthening their borders to halt refugee influx. Demanding passports at borders is one of the new measures, which has proved successful as many Venezuelans lack passports due to the situation at home. Unrest in refugee camps has also increased across the continent with a Brazilian camp recently being lit on fire by the locals after the Venezuelans allegedly robbed a restaurant. Massive protests have also broken out in Ecuador to protest the influx of refugees as the local population fear a loss of jobs. The Venezuelan exodus shows no sign of slowing down and many, who have fled, fear a peaceful solution is not possible anymore due to the increasing political crisis.

c) Political crisisPerhaps President Maduro also thinks a peaceful solution is not possible as he continues to

drown out of the slightest of dissent with strict authoritarian measures. By establishing a Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution and absolving the opposition-controlled National Assembly, Maduro continues to claim more power for himself and is well on the path to dictatorship. The regime and the military react violently to protests by the public, charge opposition leaders with treason, and suppress the freedom of press.

The Venezuelan streets are often filled with protestors and even the most peaceful of demonstrations end in tear gas and casualties. In mid-2017, there were more than 120 deaths as policemen shot at the marchers mercilessly. This repression of dissent has manifested itself in the form of extreme consequences for the public and the opposition members as torture and extreme forms of punishments and retribution have become more common. In July 2017, protests and public gatherings were banned with a maximum sentence of 5 years. Maduro continues to take new measures, in 2017 he had several opposition members arrested and charged, indicating he is willing to do anything to protect his political power. Venezuelan politics has become increasingly unstable, with its economic and refugee crisis, and it is time to address this issue that threatens both the sanctity of democracy and the wellbeing of millions of Venezuelans.

d) Economic crisisThe drop in oil prices and the subsequent depletion of government reserves forced Maduro to

simply print more money to pay workers. The hyperinflation in Venezuela is a result of that monetary incontinence. The inflation currently rising at a staggering 3% every day. The International Monetary Fund predicts the inflation will skyrocket to 1 million per cent by the end of the year as the government continues to print money. The IMF reports compare the situation to Germany in 1923 or Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe in late 2000s. Oil prices have picked up recently. Yet underinvestment dating back years has crippled Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A, the state oil company and it struggles to raise production levels. Production is down 35% since 2015, crashing to less than 1.69 million barrels per day. This is less than half the production since Chavez took over in 1999.

According to currency these amounts of Venezuela Bolivar are worthless.

Nicolas Maduro introduced the Petro, a cryptocurrency that will be backed by oil, and it will be an official currency in August 2018. In August, he also raised the minimum wage by 3000%, shed five zeros off the bolívar, devalued it by more than 90%, and announced that the bolívar will now be backed by the Petro. The Venezuelan economy shrank 30% between 2013 and 2017 and the IMF predicts it to shrink another 18% in 2018. Generally, such a situation would force a nation to turn to the IMF for a bailout, but Venezuela severed ties with the multilateral lender in 2007. Although the economy is not the only problem, it is evident how the dire situation leads to other issues.

Maduro introducing Petromoneda

The current situation in VenezuelaThe situation escalated rapidly in January 2019. Maduro was inaugurated for his sixth term in office on January 11th, having been declared the winner of the presidential election of May 2018. However, the process and results of the election had been widely disputed, and a day before the opposition party declared Juan Guaido as the acting president instead. The state department of the USA and the UK foreign office, along with other government representatives, declared that they did not recognise Maduro as president.

Guaido was briefly detained by Venezuelan security forces on 13th of January, with each side claiming the other party was responsible; Maduro's supporters claimed the arrest was staged while Guaidó called the arrest an attempt to stop the National Assembly from assuming power. Guaido was sworn in as interim president on the 23rd January, during violent protests which led to two deaths. On the 24th January, the US, Canada, Brazil and Argentina and the UK declared their support for him and recognised him as the rightful president of Venezuela.

On the 26th January, the UN Security Council met to discuss events in Venezuela, but could not agree on a solution to the crisis.

Acting president Juan Guaido

UNSC involvement and attemptsAttempts to bring about political dialogue started as early as May 2016, through an initiative facilitated by three former Presidents from the Dominican Republic, Panama and Spain, under the auspices of the Union of South American Nations. Despite some initial progress, no concrete agreements were reached through that initiative, which was suspended by the beginning of 2017. By mid-2017, there were efforts to resume dialogue, and formal talks

began in September 2017, hosted by the Dominican Republic and with international accompaniment. The talks ended in February 2018, without agreements having been reached. One of the major areas of disagreement was the electoral calendar and guarantees to ensure free, transparent and credible elections. Subsequently, the Government went ahead with presidential elections in May 2018. President Nicolás Maduro Moros was declared the winner over two other candidates. Most of the opposition did not participate in elections or recognize the results.

On January 26th, 2019, the UNSC held a meeting concerning the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. “Following widespread protests and political upheaval in Venezuela, all actors must exercise maximum restraint and avoid any further escalation”, said a senior United Nations official during this emergency meeting. Although both the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly did not vote a lot of resolution on this crisis, it is worth using international law, including the United Nations Charter, to deal with such situations.

On February 10th, 2019, the US presented a resolution project to the UNSC pledging for a peaceful transition towards free presidential elections and reasserting its preoccupations concerning the misuse of force by the Venezuelan police towards protesters. On February 14th, Moscow condemned this incitation to perpetrate a coup d’état and proposed to respect the institutions installed by Maduro, saying that any interference in the country could be considered as political meddling.

Countries and organisations regarding the situationThe Organization of American States (OAS): a continental organization founded on 30 April 1948, for the purposes of regional solidarity and cooperation among its member states. They tried two times to pass a resolution to help the crisis: on both occasions, it did not reach the quorum to pass. Delcy Rodriguez, ex-Venezuelan Foreign Minister now running for the Constituent National Assembly, stated that her country would "not recognize any resolution coming out of it."

The United States of America (USA): Although Hugo Chavez began his rule with the USA as a friendly ally; relations quickly deteriorated as the US failed to alert him about a brewing revolution. Chavez’s anti-USA rhetoric, friendship with Iran and Cuba, and sanctions from the USA led to sour relations between the two nations. Venezuela and the United States maintain the contentious relationship under President Maduro as both States continued to frequently expel diplomats. In 2015, President Barack Obama issued a presidential order declaring Venezuela “a threat to national security" and ordered sanctions against seven Venezuelan officials. President Donald Trump in August 2017 said he is “not going to rule out a military option” to confront the Maduro regime.

The European Union (EU): The EU condemns President Maduro’s repression of opposition members and believes the recent elections were neither free nor fair, which led to sanctions against multiple Venezuelan officials by issuing travel bans and freezing their assets. The bloc targeted names including former Vice President Tareck El Aissami because he is “responsible for serious human rights violations ... including arbitrary detention, politically motivated investigations, inhumane and degrading treatment, and torture,” and current Vice President Delcy Rodriguez. The EU continues to keep an eye on the economic and humanitarian situation and has committed to supporting Venezuela to find peaceful and democratic solutions.

Eastern coalition: Countries such as China and Russia are used to working together both because of their history and because of the authoritarian nature of their regimes. Their interests may tend to collude if they remain aligned with national priorities.

Possible Solutions

- Diplomatic relationships are sure to be maintained and non-military solutions must be tried.

- Humanitarian help has to be given as soon as possible and provide the population with basic necessities such as food and medicines.

- Ways to liven up the economy have to be found, aiming at an expansion and diversification of the industrial production.

- Cooperation between government supporters and the opposition must be sought in every way, in order to bring further stability to the political situation

- Financial plans have to be established in order to alleviate the Venezuelan international debt. (Economic reforms)

-Democratic and free elections and Venezuelan’s sovereignty

Useful links

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.8452

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19652436

https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292121430533264.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-un/u-s-pushes-u-n-security-council-to-back-venezuelas-guaido-idUSKCN1PJ1ZR

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/26/us-venezuela-sanctions-nicolas-maduro

http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/21/americas/venezuela-crisis-explained/index.html

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/HCReportVenezuela_1April-31July2017_EN.pdf

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/world/americas/venezuela-crisis-what-next.html

https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Heres-Your-Guide-to-Understanding-Protest-Deaths-in-Venezuela-20170422-0016.html

http://www.dw.com/en/south-american-nations-divided-on-venezuela-crisis/a-39320956

United Nations Security Council

I. Introduction

A. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS MECHANISMS

1. Introduction

2. Founding elements

3. Mandate and specific characteristics

4. Composition

II. Agenda item: Examination of Maritime Border Dispute Between Somalia and Kenya

A. Introduction to Agenda item BB. Historical Background of the ConflictC. Continental Shelf Submission

C.1. Maritime Delimitations C.2. Somali Continental Shelf

D. Maritime Boundaries’ Recognition in LawE. Protection of the Official Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of the Republic

F. Diplomatic Tensions in Kenya and SomaliG. Decisions from the International Court of Justice on the Maritime Border Claims

of Two CountriesH. The postponement from the International Court of Justice I. Memorandum of Understanding

I.1. Submission from Kenya I.2. Submission from Somalia

J. Summary of Judgement ProcessK. UNSC Stance on This Issue

III. Points Should be Addressed

IV. Bibliography

Letter from Under-Secretary-General

Distinguished Participants of BSBLMUN 2019,

First of all, it is a great honour for me to serve the prestigious conference that has proven its successes from the previous editions names BSBLMUN 2019 as an Under-secretary-General. My name is Adnan Cem Kıral, I am the student and candidate diplomat in Political Science and International Relations Department at Yeditepe University. Since 2015, I have been part of countless conferences in many different positions at plethora kind of the committees. Nevertheless, crisis committees with the fruitful debates in its inclusion have always been significant for me particularly United Nations Security Council, Reformed Security Council and NATO Military Committee. In our committee UN Security Council we will examine two crucial topics which are the Venezuelan Economic Crisis and Maritime Border Disputes between two African states in an international law perspective. Our goal should be to use the past efficient implementations and the possible efficient implementations in the right form and the correct order.

For handling the crisis phases, diplomatic negotiation process and document submission parts; each and every member states of the committee should be fully aware of the authorities and accomplishment of United Nations Security Council and their mandotaries and authorities and systematic which have been finding at the inclusion of the study guide. Delegates of this committee should also be taken into account possible upcoming events regarding, directly and indirectly, the agenda item. For instance, we will usually check the charter of Economic and Social Council plus UN Convention on Law of Sea for our procedure

I hope we will have fruitful debates and crisis management process during the conference.

Last but not least I would like to present some appreciations that I have seen necessity because of the excellency of members during the process; thanks academic unit of our conference for their contributions for their adopt plus hard work particularly my CO-USG Mr. Sacit Can Soyen for his limitless help during the process, our AcAs Ms. Pelin Baran for her considerable efforts on the committees and Distinguished Member of Secretariat Mr. Berkay Çınar for limitless effort on

academic arrangements. Also biggest thanks to our one and only Director General ms. Feyza Çakır who has given much more than considerable effort for sustaining the existence of that kind of highly qualified establishment with her limitless positive energy, her academic and organizational skills that I undoubtedly trust on.

If you have any further inquiries; please do not hesitate to contact me via e-mail;

adnancem.kiral@std.yeditepe.edu.tr

I. Introduction

A. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS MECHANISMS

1. Introduction

The United Nations Security Council is the most powerful additionally capable to direct decision-making body. is fundamentally taken purpose to maintain international peace and security by solution-focused negotiations regarding the crucial issues all across the globe. There are five powerful countries name Republic of China, Russian Federation, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America which are the permanent members of the Security Council. They have obtained this power by the reason of World War II. They have the power to veto (in the other word ‘cancel’) any and all decisions as a substantive vote to the resolution. Especially the votes from the permanent countries are essential in case of the majority under the 2/3 in the house. Ten non-permanent members are elected in several terms due to processes which are two years according to the current parliamentary procedure. Since the UN Security Council is authorized as a most powerful body; the decisions which are taken behind closing doors and capable for the inclusion of the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action. Additionally the capability of this council includes the implementation of additional measures which are not limited to armament to strengthen ‘’previous decisions that may include complete or partial interruptions of the economic and diplomatic relations and means of communication such as blockades, economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, travel bans, and severance of diplomatic relations’’ by the aim of ‘’ eliminate not only threats to international security, but also civil wars, natural disasters, and terrorism’’ according to the Chapter VII, Article 41 of the official Charter of United Nations.

2. Founding elements

The authorized units of United Nations such as Secretariat of UN have been setting an assembly like Global Policy Forum in order to control the controversial process of membership elections which inquiries membership to the United Nations Security Council. Tables and the Charts of the Security

Council are the prioritized elements at the United Nations Security Council’s Negotiations. The council has also counted as an informal consultation section because of its power as a UN Body. In accordance with the situation; sanctions based on peacekeeping data, peacekeeping reforms and democratic reforms that found at the United Nations’ Diplomatic and Military accomplishments are all including the United Nations Security Council.

3. Mandate and specific characteristics

- The upper unit of UNSC is UN Secretariat-General.- Regulation of military actions, application of economic sanctions, regulation of armament or

diplomatic interventions have been finding at the characteristics of UNSC’s decision making content.

- Management of the UNSC authorized with provisional rules of procedure requests resolutions, documents, press statements, monthly reports from the presidency of council in accordance with the result of the negotiations during the meeting at the urgent situations and ordinary meetings.

- Permanent five (P5) countries also called permanent member states have right to VETO for the resolutions or the decision papers implied from UNSC in order to the rigid provisional rules of procedure of the council. These countries are United States of America, Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France.

- Each and every Non-Permanent Members and rarely observers who are selected or appointed in two-year terms have one seat in the council. Non-Permanent Members have one vote right on the documents however observers do not have the right to vote although they can express their approaches during the caucuses of the UNSC.

4. Composition

- Undersecretariat- Presidency- 5 Permanent Member States (P5 Countries)- 10 Non-permanent Member States- Observer States

II. Agenda item: Examination of Maritime Border Dispute Between Somalia and Kenya: Introduction to Agenda item B

BRIEF INFORMATION ABOUT THE CASE: Chronic instability along the Kenya – Somalia Maritime Border has been supplying a great cultural significance. This cultural

diversity establishes dispute causes violence and lack of law between countries takes place hereabout. To avoid this, several prevention method improvements and the establishment of Sanctions are overwhelmingly released from the interventions of international organizations and particularly. But these preventions usually don’t give the desired result. This is being understood by the headline of the local newspapers headline: ‘’Even polices are never safe here.’’ Hereupon, these sorrowful events also concern thousands of civilian natives, periodically. It is believed that ICJ will make a decision in the best way asserts under customary international law by peacekeepers. Then it has occurred the agreement names ‘UNCLOS’ submitted by ICJ for the maritime border negotiations between the Somalia and Kenya. This agreement has been the focus on the point entitled ‘’Settlement of disputes’’. Accordingly, the Court next examines the relevant provisions of Part of UNCLOS.

The IOC (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO) is recognized through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a body for marine science. There was an agreement called ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ that was ratified by Kenya and Somalia on 2nd March and 24th July 1989, respectively, and the Convention entered into force for the Parties on 16 November 1994. This agreement includes ‘extending 200 nautical miles’ at the maritime border between Somalia and Kenya. State parties were in favor with the “through a general, regional or bilateral agreement’’ that comprises “settlement of disputes’’ by any peaceful means of their own choice. But Somalia signed this agreement without giving up from 200 nm of the territorial sea, which takes place on the maritime boundary.

The dispute over the maritime border by the two countries is further buttressed by the oil resources, which abound in the disputed areas. Kenya has 20 oil blocks in the Indian Ocean and risks surrendering three which lie in the contested area should it lose in the case.

With the spilling of oil and gas deposits in the Indian Ocean, there has been a growing unease within the Somalia government since October 2011, when Kenya unilaterally embarked on a military expedition in Somalia and Nairobi’s subsequent influence. In addition to that Kenya's large military force existence in Somalia is the part of the African Union force supporting by the country's fragile government. In this case, the one that is victimized because of the situation in Somalia.

By the mid-1990s, portions of Northeast Kenya and portions of South Somalia were considered to be more lawless and insecure than the Somali side of the border. Spill-over effects which worsened insecurity on the Ethiopian side of the border were also significant, though not as serious as Kenya’s crisis in North Eastern Province. The internationally-backed government in Mogadishu hopes to claw back authority over Somalia's territorial waters, including the area bordering Kenya that is potentially rich in oil and gas deposits. The government of Kenya, however, wants the sea border to go in a straight line east, giving it more sea territory as it is emphasized at the clarifications at the international affairs of the Kenyan government. Somalia also requests the maritime border to continue along the line of the land border, to the southeast diagonally and says a horizontal border would be unfair. That

is the Reason Somalia had been the applicant to the International Court of Justice based on the facts, proceeding and examined pros - cons. Some of the sample arguments from Somalia as a ‘’STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS’’ are: (1) ‘’Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that is responsible from the foreign affairs of Somalia, come together and constitute Ministerial for International Cooperation. It has on May 7, 2009, and the negotiation was about the entered into Memorandum of Understanding with Kenya. After that; Somalia TFG had formally registered International Court of Justice (ICJ) for the determination of resolve on the basis of International Law; single maritime boundary dispute between the Kenyan government and the Somali government. ‘’ (2) ‘’Somalia TFG actually believes that there is unfairness according to the procedure at the ICJ rules at the maritime border on Africa. Somalia’s Attorney General, Dr Ahmed Ali Dahir remarked that it is against for the international law to the usage of unilaterally sign agreements with oil and gas companies for explorations in the home country’s territorial waters. Somalia emphasized the apportioning the borders and the sources, in an equal value for every nation. Finally, the Somalia government let the decision regarding this issue to the presidency of the ICJ and its concluded by instability.’’ (3) ‘’Since Somalia had rejected the MoU with Kenya, the UN refused to endorse it, terming it “non-actionable” on March 12, 2010. After declining Kenya’s overtures, the Somali government filed a case against the latter in the International Court of Justice in February 2017.’’

Historical Background of the Conflict

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has ratified by Somalia, afterwards the reference of “the Convention”, on 24 July 1989. The Convention did gain the legitimacy from Somalia on 16 November 1994. Article 4 of Annex II to the Convention stipulates ‘’that where a coastal State intends to establish’’, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, it should submit particulars of such limits to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”, along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible, but in any case within ten years from the entry into force of the Convention for that State.

In 2001 the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Convention decided that in the case of a State Party for which the Convention entered into force before 13 May 1999, it is understood that the ten-year time period referred to in article 4 of Annex II to the Convention shall be taken to have commenced on 13 May 1999 (document SPLOS/72, paragraph (a)). This decision applied to Somalia. Consequently, in the case of Somalia, the ten-year time period referred to in article 4 of Annex II of the Convention expired on 13 May 2009.

The Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Convention also decided that the general issue of the ability of States, particularly developing States, to fulfil the requirements of article 4 of Annex II to the Convention be kept under review (document SPLOS/72, paragraph (b)). Due to lack of financial and

technical resources, relevant capacity and expertise, or other similar constraints, many developing countries were facing particular challenges in meeting these requirements.

In June 2008 the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention therefore decided that it is understood that the ten-year period condition referred to in article 4 of Annex II to the Convention may be satisfied by submitting preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, together with a descriptive report on the status of preparation and intended date of the final submission (document SPLOS/183, paragraph 1 (a)).

Due to a lack of financial and technical resources and relevant capacity and expertise, Somalia was among the developing States that faced particular challenges in fulfilling the requirements of article 4 of Annex II to the Convention. Moreover, Somalia continues to experience a number of other constraints relating to the political and security situation in the country, substantially hindering the fulfilment of these requirements.

On this basis, in October 2008, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for Somalia (SRSG), Mr. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, initiated the preparation of preliminary information, as defined above, regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf of Somalia beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, with the aim of submitting this to the Secretary-General in accordance with the decision set out in SPLOS/183. In order to prepare this material, the SRSG accepted an offer of assistance from the Government of Norway.

On 14 April 2009, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Republic of Somalia submitted such preliminary information to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. In August 2009, at the request of the TFG, the Norwegian Government agreed to proceed with providing assistance towards the preparation of a full submission. The work has been carried out jointly by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Mapping Authority, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and GRID-Arendal. This submission fulfils the obligations Somalia has under article 76 and article 4 of Annex II.

Continental Shelf Submission

The Current submission fundamentally inquiries outer limits establishment of Somalia. Both countries Somalia and Kenya emphasized their sovereign size of maritime sea has been the breadth of the territorial sea is measured is defined at the low-water line along the coast, unless specifically stipulated otherwise in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Convention, and with the assistance of satellite imagery, the Norwegian Mapping Authority has identified a total of 608 baseline points along the coast of Somalia from the border with Djibouti in the north to the starting point of Kenya-Somalia maritime boundary. Characterised narrow of the continental shelf had been the issue for both countries. Continental Shelf Submission is done for the legalization process of maritime delimitation with neighbouring States is based on the international law of the sea and are in keeping with the settled

jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice on maritime delimitation specifically between Republic of Somalia and Kenya.

Maritime Delimitations

In accordance with the discussion of Advancing Sustainable Fisheries Establishment’s approach: ‘’In recent years, the Federal Government of Somalia has made significant progress toward defining its maritime boundaries. It first declared its territorial sea boundary out to 200 nautical miles (NM) in 1972. In 1989, Somalia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which contains guidelines for claiming territorial waters out to 12 NM from shore and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) out to 200 NM or the median line between two countries’ coastlines.’’

‘’Following civil unrest in the 1900s and 2000s, the Federal Government of Somalia officially declared its EEZ in 2014, continuing the process that began decades earlier. Maritime boundary claims will be completed when disputes filed by Kenya and Yemen over the placement of the boundary are settled.’’

‘’In addition to declaring their EEZ in 2014, the Federal Government of Somalia extended their territorial waters from 12 to 24 NM in their revised Somali Fisheries Law to expand the area reserved for Somali fishers.’’

The law states: ‘’The protection zone that protects coastal fishermen and in which fishing vessels are not permitted to enter is up to 24 nautical miles. Only coastal fishermen are allowed to fish within 24 nautical miles.’’

‘’This protection of coastal fishing grounds is beneficial to communities that rely on fishing. Though it is clear that the nearshore areas are reserved for Somali fishers by federal law, foreign vessels are known to fish within the EEZ and even within territorial waters. The designation of boundaries does not prevent illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, but it gives Somalis legal tools to combat IUU fishing and hold illicit vessels accountable for their actions.’’

‘’The confusion over who has access rights to fish within 24 NM from shore has resulted in competition for the fisheries in that zone. Clashes on the water between Somali artisanal fishers and foreign commercial fishers have resulted in gear destruction and

violence. A revised version of the federal fishing law that harmonizes the existing federal and state laws could go a long way toward alleviating this conflict.’’

Somali Continental Shelf

Continental Shelf is particularly based on the certain shapes:

Maritime Boundaries’ Recognition in Law

Legal grounds on the case:

Article 15 of UNCLOS, which states:

Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.

a) In interpreting the MoU, the Court applies the rules on interpretation to be found in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, which it has consistently considered to be reflective of customary international law.

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states:

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;

(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of

the treaty or the application of its provisions;(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes

the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

Article 83; paragraph 1 of UNCLOS, which states:

1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.

Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS:

8. Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION: The court has jurisdiction over (the dispute between the Governments of Somalia and Kenya) in accordance to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court which the (Somalia and Kenya) have

accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Article 36(2) of the Statute states “ The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:

a. the interpretation of a treaty;

b. any question of international law;

c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;

d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

Protection of the Official Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of the Republic

According to the ICJ’s statement, the conclusion will be contributed as soon as possible regarding the certain long-running quarrel maritime border dispute which countries aimed to control the resource-based rich zones. However instead of the interventions of deteriorations at the court verdicts; because of the instability any of them had been satisfying from the situation. There is 100,000 kilometres square disputed area between two states. Somalia saying it should extend in the same direction as its land border. This fundamental disagreement led Somalia, in 2014, to call on the ICJ in The Hague to resolve the dispute. The hearing has now been set for June 2020. Kenya has tried to convince Somalia to drop the case and settle the matter outside of court. It sees the dispute as an existential threat that is about more than potential oil and gas deposits but its access to the Indian Ocean. Somalia has resisted this pressure. As the weaker party and with fewer regional backers, it believes its best interests lie in the international legal system. Encouraged by nationalist sentiment in the country and the diaspora, it has stuck to this strategy. This disagreement has led to growing tensions. Many are concerned about what might happen following the ICJ ruling. While the court’s decision is final and binding under international law, it cannot enforce it. ICJ rulings have been ignored in the past and there is no guarantee both parties will accept it.

Diplomatic Tensions in Kenya and Somali

The maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia has much wider implications for both countries than the obvious economic and territorial issues. For Kenya, the case is relatively simple: a legal win that secures its border claims will be a solid victory. However, Somalia stands to lose out whatever the verdict in September will be. The problem for Somalia is its dependence on Kenya in the war against Al-Shabaab. With AMISOM troops withdrawing from the country and Somalia’s military still unprepared to defend itself against the terrorist group, the US and Kenya are Somalia’s most important military allies. In this regard, Somalia needs Kenya more than the reverse. Al-Shabaab is targeting Kenya because the country’s troops support the Somali government’s war against the militant group. If Kenyan soldiers weren’t involved in the war against al-Shabaab, it’s likely deadly terrorist attacks such as the Garissa University and Westage shopping mall attacks never would have happened. In reality, Kenya can’t simply withdraw its troops from Somalia and leave the government at the mercy of a resurgent al-Shabaab. It’s in Kenya’s own security interests that Somalia’s government is able to defeat the militant organisation and stabilise security in the country. However,

the power of leverage Kenya has over Somalia in this regard can’t be ignored. And, the growing involvement of the US military in Somalia’s efforts against al-Shabaab could give Kenya more space to utilise this leverage. We’ve already seen tit-for-tat diplomatic moves from Kenya in response to the territorial fallout and Somalia has been the more aggressive party over the border dispute so far.

Decisions from the International Court of Justice on the Maritime Border Claims of Two Countries

After many judiciary phases have done in the court: the judges came mostly the same points. It was the postponement. The main achievement for the decision is the public hearing clarification as well as possible even both countries are not satisfied with the situation. Kenya overwhelmingly supports this topic’ irrelevance because of the ICJ’s rigid content. However, addressing the UN General Assembly in New York, Somalia's President Mohamed Farmaajo rejected President Uhuru Kenyatta’s call for talks, saying that the court should be the ultimate arbiter.

Postponement from International Court of Justice

‘’Press Release Unofficial No. 2019/41 18 October 2019

Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya)

The Court has decided to postpone to 8 June 2020 the public hearings due to open on 4 November 2019 THE HAGUE, 18 October 2019. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has decided to postpone to the week beginning 8 June 2020 the oral proceedings in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), which had been due to take place between Monday 4 and Friday 8 November 2019. The Court took this decision having duly considered the views and arguments of the Parties to the case regarding a request of Kenya to postpone the hearings. A new press release will be issued later regarding the admission and accreditation procedures for members of the public and media representatives. Accreditation requests received for the November 2019 hearings will be disregarded and journalists will need to reapply. History of the proceedings The history of the proceedings can be found in paragraphs 127-139 of the Court’s Annual Report for 2018-2019 and in press releases Nos. 2019/36 and 2019/37, which are available on the Court’s website; Note: The Court’s press releases are prepared by its Registry for informational purposes only

and do not constitute official documents. ; The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was established by the United Nations Charter in June 1945 and began its activities in April 1946. The Court is composed of 15 judges elected for a nine-year term by the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. The seat of the Court is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). The Court has a twofold role: first, to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States (its judgments have binding force and are without appeal for the parties concerned); and, second, to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized United Nations organs and agencies of the system.’’ (International Court of Justice, October 2019)

Memorandum of Understanding

Submission from Kenya

Agent of the Republic of Kenya claimed that the approaches from the Federal Republic of Somalia is including the full of unlawful conduct in accordance with the settlement of court jurisdiction. The reason for the preliminary objection from Kenya has been relying on Kenya’s current reservation and attempts and the capability to use the appropriate diplomatic channels in order to find the solutions.

Submission from Somalia

The Federal Republic of Somalia as an applicant unit claims the necessity of the negotiations because of the doubtful situation as a maritime border delimitation. According to Somalia’s view these are the prior topics to talk: ‘’Moreover, the negotiations were expressly intended to enable the Parties to "reach a consensus on the potential maritime boundary line acceptable to both countries". 13 To this end, "[t]he negotiations commenced focusing on: (a) Kenya's departure from the equidistance methodology adopted by [Kenyan legislation]; (b) starting point for the determination of the maritime boundary; (c) the appropriate baselines and base points; and (d) potential maritime boundary line". 14 The two delegations engaged in "a thorough discussion of principles of international law, including the principles of equidistance, equity and good faith" and "continued to negotiate for two consecutive days". ~’’ (MoU from Somalia, 2014)

Summary of Judgement Process

Based on Kenya’s argument of court jurisdiction lack: the present case resulted with compulsory jurisdiction of the court with excluding the disputes and the methods of settlement. MOU does not render Kenya’s reservation to its optional clause declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute applicable in the present case, it will then address Kenya’s submission that the case falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction because of the provisions of Part XV of UNCLOS. The subject-matter of the sixth paragraph of the MOU relates to “[t]he delimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute, including the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles . . .”. The use of the word “including” implies that the Parties intended something more to be encompassed by delimitation in “the areas under dispute” than delimitation in respect of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The Parties have explicitly given a meaning to the term the “area under dispute” as the area in which the claims of the two Parties to the continental shelf overlap, without differentiating between the shelf within and beyond 200 nautical miles. In addition, the text as a whole makes it apparent that the MOU was concerned, in so far as it addressed delimitation, solely with the area of the continental shelf, both within and beyond 200 nautical miles from the two States’ respective coasts. The sixth paragraph, therefore, relates only to the delimitation of the continental shelf, “including the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”, and not to the delimitation of the territorial sea, nor to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone. Accordingly, even if, as Kenya suggests, that paragraph sets out a method of settlement of the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute, it would only apply to their continental shelf boundary, and not to the boundaries of other maritime zones. The Court turns to the question of whether the sixth paragraph, by providing that the delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties “shall be agreed . . . on the basis of international law after the Commission has concluded its examination of [their] separate submissions . . . and made its recommendations . . .”, sets out a method of settlement of the Parties’ maritime boundary dispute with respect to that area.

UNSC Stance on This Issue

This maritime border dispute is officially declared as a threat to the peace and the stability of the region at a certain place. United Nations secretariat general has acted for the end of these regional issues that inquiries whole world particularly the African Continent. United Nations Security Service has informed the embassies of Somalia and Kenya regarding the cruciality of this instability and decision to offer for auction oil blocks within Kenya’s territory. The negotiations are periodically sustaining.

III. Points Should be Addressed

- Which methods could be used or what kind of implementations can be activated in order to find ways to cease maritime border dispute between Somalia and Kenya?

- How can the implementation of the UN Convention on Law of Sea be evaluated in order to solve certain maritime issues?

- Will the decisions of the International Court of Justice, UNSC, African Union and International Maritime Organization have shown the relevance and connection in order to find common or almost common solutions? How? Why?

- By staying at the International Law Perspective; what kind of ways should be watched from the states of Kenya and Somalia for conduct the common profit?

- What can be alternative for the postponement of the Jurisdiction and the Negotiations on this certain agenda item?

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

https://www.change.org/p/the-somali-federal-parliament-defend-our-territorial-sea-stick-to-law-no-37

https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en

https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/som74_14/

Somalia_Executive_Summary_2014.pdf

https://securefisheries.org/somali-coastal-resources/maritime-boundaries

https://africanarguments.org/2019/10/30/kenya-somalia-maritime-dispute-one-winner-two-losers/

https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=39499&rehref=%2Fibru%2Fnews

%2F&resubj=Boundary+news+Headlines

https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Kenya-somalia-sea-row-icj-agrees-to-delays-case-further/

4552908-5315504-view-asAMP-n2j160/index.html

https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/161/161-20191018-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf

https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/161/19242.pdf

https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/161/19240.pdf

https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/161/19342.pdf

https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/mobile/amp/article/2001330323/kenya-somalia-border-dispute-on-

un-agenda

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/functions-and-powers

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members

https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council.html

Further Readings:

https://enoughproject.org/files/MenkhausKenyaninterventionSomalia.pdf

http://legal.un.org/icjsummaries/documents/english/220.pdf

http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%20Newsletter%20(2015).pdf

https://www.google.com.tr/search?q=judgement+requested+by+Somalia+kenya&ei=H3zEWarFPJGiwAKBkIrIAQ&start=30&sa=N&biw=1344&bih=736

http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/161/19342.pdf

http://www.oilnewskenya.com/maritime-delimitation-case-in-the-indian-ocean-somalia-v-kenya-analysis/

http://www.eabjournal.com/en/east-africa-business-blog/589-somalia-and-kenya-face-off-in-maritime-boundary-oil-dispute.html