Walsh - Kant's Criticism (Art.) Horiz.

8/11/2019 Walsh - Kant's Criticism (Art.) Horiz.

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Kant's Criticism of

Metaphysics

W. H. Walsh

Published by: Cambridge University Press on

behalf of oyal !nstitute of Philosophy

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Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics: !

"uthor#s$: W. H. Walsh

evie%ed %ors$:

ource: Philosophy( )ol. *+( ,o. -- #ul.( */0/$( pp. 0*01

02-

Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of

oyal !nstitute of Philosophy

table U3: http:44%%%.5stor.org4stable406+7*8+

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Kant's Criticism of Metaphysicsi: !

WHAT is the Critique of Pure Reason about? The

terminology of the work is so perplexing, its argument so

obsurely expresse!, that the or!inary rea!er may be forgi"en

if he puts it !own at the en! "ery muh in the !ark as to what

it all means# He will ha"e seen that in it $ant has attempte! toestablish ertain onlusions% the sub&eti"ity of spae an!

time, the existene an! ob&eti"e "ali!ity of a number of a

priori onepts or ategories, the falsity of the arguments use!

to !efen! the metaphysial system most wi!ely fa"oure! in

'erman learne! irles in the eighteenth entury( but though

he has graspe! all this he may yet ha"e faile! to make sense of

the work as a whole# )t is the ol! story of not seeing the woo!

for trees( an! in this ase the fault is more exusable than in

most, for the in!i"i!ual trees eah !eman! so muh attention

an! are so !iffiult to get roun! that it is all too easy to forget

the "ery existene of the woo!# At the worst, one may think

that there is no woo! at all( only a misellaneous aggregate of

in!i"i!ual trees whih ha"e nothing to !o with eah other#

*et this onlusion, if true, woul! be a strange one,

ontra!iting not only ommon expetation +for it is

reasonable to expet that a work on whih its author spent so

muh trouble woul! ha"e a unitary theme, but also the

impliations of expliit statements of $ant himself# The

Critique of Pure Reason is presumably itself a pro!ut of pure

reason, an! pure reason, as $ant is onstantly telling us, iiis a

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unity( or again, the Critique is a piee of +immanent

metaphysis, iii an! metaphysis, as $ant un!erstan!s it, is

nothing if not systemati# )t is true that $ant says that the

Critique is not itself the system of reforme! metaphysis

whih his philosophy is to make possible(i"but there is little

!oubt that the ontents of the first part of the latter +the

metaphysi of nature as oppose! to the metaphysi of morals

woul!, if it ha! e"er been written, ha"e onsiste! of little but

the onlusions establishe! in its so-alle! .propae!euti#."

)t is the least we an !o, then, to assume that the

Critique is the answer to a single question or set of questions#

The problem next arises% what is this question to whih $ant/s

work is the answer? $ant himself says in a passage in the

seon! e!ition )ntro!ution +0 )1% .The proper problem of

pure reason is ontaine! in the question% how are syntheti a

priori &u!gments possible?. )n the first e!ition Prefae +A x"ii

he says% .The hief question is always simply this% what an!

how muh an un!erstan!ing an! reason know apart from all

experiene?. These two statements are not quite alternati"e

formulations of the same problem# The seon! puts a general

question, whih the first partiulari2es( an! the

partiulari2ation is at the same time a beginning of a solution

of the !iffiulty# The general question onerns the extent ofour a priori knowle!ge% it asks what knowle!ge human beings

an aquire in!epen!ently of sense-experiene or

introspetion# "i 3any philosophers, an! partiularly in the

eighteenth entury, ha"e belie"e! that there are ertain

propositions whih we an know to be true in!epen!ently of

the e"i!ene of the senses% the propositions of mathematis

an! many metaphysial propositions were allege! to be of this

type# Clearly it is important for any philosopher who aepts

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this general position +as $ant !oes to ask after the extent an!

nature of our knowle!ge of these propositions# )t is this

problem whih $ant has before him throughout the Critique,

an! if we go through the work with some suh formula in our

min!s as .What an we know by simply thinking?. or better,

.What an we know by other means than sense-experiene?.

we shoul! be able to see what it is about# 0ut we shall fin!

that $ant himself is more apt to use the other formula, .How

are syntheti a priori &u!gments possible?.4 an! this shoul! be

explaine!# )n the famous passage in the )ntro!ution to the

Critique +0 )5 6 A 7 ff# $ant !istinguishes between two typesof &u!gment, analyti an! syntheti# Analyti &u!gments are all

a priori( they are what we an onlu!e from the &u!gments

we know alrea!y by analysing their sub&et-onepts in

aor!ane with the priniple of ontra!ition# 8o analyti

&u!gment, therefore, gi"es us new or what might be alle!

.positi"e. knowle!ge# .Positi"e. knowle!ge is always

expresse! in syntheti &u!gments# 8ow it is lear that the sort

of knowle!ge aquire! in!epen!ently of sense-experiene

whih interests $ant is that expresse! in syntheti &u!gments(

so that for him the question whether we know anything

in!epen!ently of sense-experiene is simply the question

whether we know any true syntheti a priori propositions,

sine a priori means aquire! in!epen!ently of sense-

experiene# $ant belie"es that the answer to this question is

.yes.( that we know propositions of this sort in mathematis

an! e"en in physis, the fun!amental presuppositions of whih

are not !rawn, as are the propositions making up the bo!y of

the siene, from sense-experiene( an! that metaphysiians

laim to know propositions of this nature also# He therefore

proposes to set about answering his general question, .What

an we know in!epen!ently of sense- experiene?. by asking

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another question, .What are the on!itions of our knowing

syntheti a priori propositions?. 9or it seems to him lear +an!

it is surely not an unreasonable position that an in"estigation

of the syntheti a priori knowle!ge we un!oubte!ly ha"e will

throw light on the nature an! extent of syntheti a priori

knowle!ge in general#

9rom all this it shoul! be lear that the sub&et of the

Critique is the same as that of so many other philosophial

treatises% an in"estigation of the soures of knowle!ge open to

human beings# 5nly $ant is partiularly intereste! in the

suggestion that reason or intelligene is a soure of

propositions whih are both true an! .positi"e.( an! his main

aim is to estimate the "alue of this suggestion# That is why his

work is a .ritique of pure reason.-a ritial estimation of the

powers of pure reason, i#e# of the intellet by itself# The ob&et

is to say what pure reason both an an! annot !o# The

existene of ertain propositions whose apriority, syntheti

harater, an! ob&eti"e "ali!ity are all regar!e! as ertain by

$ant shows that reason +in a wi!e, non-tehnial sense has

some powers( the existene of metaphysis shows that some

philosophers laime! other, apparently more signifiant,

powers for it# As a result of the Critique, $ant will be in a

position to pronoune on the laim# An! in!ee! it is to makethis pronounement that the whole inquiry is un!ertaken% the

ob&et of the work is to !etermine the possibility of

metaphysis, a siene the "ery onept of whih, as we are

tol! in the Prolegomena +? ), implies that its soures annot

be empirial# 3etaphysial knowle!ge, if suh a thing is

possible, is the supreme example of non-empirial knowle!ge%

is there any metaphysial knowle!ge?

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This question of the possibility of metaphysis is one

whih ha! a partiularly strong interest for $ant# )t intereste!

him both as a tehnial philosopher an! as an or!inary man# )n

tehnial philosophy his hief aim, from the /sixties onwar!s,

seems to ha"e been to !etermine whether metaphysis in the

tra!itional sense is possible, an!, if not, what sort of

metaphysis oul! be legitimate# Again an! again he !isusse!

points onnete! with this sub&et, treating of it partiularly in

the Tra:me an! the inaugural ;issertation# His

pronounements in the Critique an! the Prolegomena show

that he thought that metaphysis oupie! a quite peuliarposition among the sienes# )t was a siene whih .oul!

ne"er ease to be in !eman!, .) a siene whih respon!e! to

a natural want in human beings# To eliminate metaphysis

altogether woul! be impossible( the most that oul! be !one

woul! be to abolish ertain illegitimate types of metaphysis,

making room for a new .sientifi. !otrine# )s not the aim of

the elebrate! .Copernian. re"olution in philosophy !elare!

to be the setting of metaphysis on the sure path of siene?eibni2ian terminology, there

is a fun!amental !ifferene between .truths of reason. an!

.truths of fat,. so that a transition from the first to the seon!

+the kin! of transition whih all rationalists hope! for was

impossible# 0ut though this was plain enough to $ant himself,it is not always plain from his language# +What $ant !i! in

fat was show that .truths of reason. were presripti"e# 5f

ourse not all >eibni2ian .truths of reason. purporte! to be

suh, e#g# .'o! is#. 0ut $ant thinks that the truth of a

proposition like this annot be !etermine! by any intelletual

proess# All .truths of reason. whih are "ali! are presripti"e

in harater-among others, the propositions of logi an!

mathematis, an! the general law of ausality#

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