Vivarium - Vol Xliii, No 1, 2005

8/9/2019 Vivarium - Vol Xliii, No 1, 2005

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONALJOURNALFOR THE PHILOSOPHY

AND

INTELLECTUAL

LIFE OF

THE

MIDDLE

AGES

AND

RENAISSANCE

vivariums devotedn

particular

o he

rofane

ide f

mediaeval

hilosophy

and

he ntellectualife

f he

Middle

ges

nd

Renaissance.

EDITORS L.M.

de

Rijk,Leiden)

H.A.G.

Braakhuis,

Nijmegen)

C.H.

Kneepkens,

(Groningen)W.J.

ourtenay,Madison)

E.P.

Bos,

Leiden)

D.

Perler,

(Basel)

M.G.M. an

er

oel,

Nijmegen).

Secretary

f he

ditorialoard:

rof. .H.

Kneepkens.

All

ommunications,

xcept

hose

f business

ature,

houlde

addressed

to

C.H.

Kneepkens,

ijksuniversiteit

roningen,

aculteit

er

etteren,

akgroep

Mediaevistiek,

.O. Box

16, 700ASGroningen,heNetherlands.

ADVISORY

Tullio

regory,Rome)

Albert

immermann,

Cologne)J.E.

Murdoch,

COMMITTEE

(Cambridge,

A).

PUBLISHERS

Brill,eiden,

heNetherlands.

PUBLISHED

Twice

early.

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3/215

Realism n theLaterMiddleAges

an

Introduction

ALESSANDRO

D. CONTI

Medieval realism nd nominalism re thetwomajor theoretical lterna-

tives

oncerning

he

reality

f

generalobjects

universais,

ccording

o the

medieval

terminology):

ealists elieved

n

the

objectivity

f real

species

and common

natures;

nominalists id not.

n

their

urn,

ealists

isagreed

over

the

ontological

tatusof such

common

natures,

nd

the

relationship

etween hem

and

the

individuals

n

which

they

re

present.

In

particular,

ccording

o the so-called

moderate ealist" iew

endorsed

by

authors uch as

Albert he

Great,

Thomas

Aquinas,

John

Duns

Scotus,

and Walter

Burley

before

1324),

universais

re not self-subsistent

hings

(or entities),

ut exist

only

n

singular hings,

s universais ave no

being

outside the

being

of their

particular

nstantiations.What is

more,

the

being

of

universais oincideswith

the

being

of their nstantiationss

indi-

viduals,

so that

universais an be said to be

everlasting

ecause of the

succession f these

ndividuals,

ot because of a

peculiar

kind of esse.But

whereas

n

Albert's nd

Aquinas's opinion

universais xist n

potentia

ut-

side the

mind,

nd in actu

within he

mind,

on Duns

Scotus's and

Burley's

account

they

exist n actuoutside the

mind,

since for Duns

Scotus

and

Burley henecessary nd sufficientondition ora universal o be in actu

is the

existence f at least one individual

nstantiating

t. On the other

hand,

according

o all these

thinkers,

niversais nd

individuals,

f

con-

sidered as

properly

universais nd

individuals,

re

different

rom

each

others,

ince no universal

ua

such

is an

individual,

nor viceversa.

In

the third

decade of the fourteenth

entury,

n

his

commentaries

n

the

Categories

nd the De

interpretatione

nd

in

the first

art

of

his Summa

logicae

ckham

argued

that the

common realist ccount of the relation-

ship

betweenuniversais nd individualswas

inconsistent ith he standard

definitionf real identity:funiversais re something xistingnre,really

identicalwith

their ndividuals onsidered s instances f a

type e.g.,

the

universalman

qua

man is

identicalwith

Socrates),

but differentonsid-

ered as

properly

universais nd

individuals

e.g.,

man

qua

universal

s

Koninklijke

rill

V,

Leiden,

005

Vivarium

3,1

Also

vailablenline www.brill.nl


4/215

2

ALESSANDRO. CONTI

differentrom ocratesconsidered ua individual), henwhatever s pred-

icated of the

individualsmust be

predicated

of theiruniversalis

oo,

and

so a

unique

general object (say,

the human

nature)

would

possess

con-

trary

ttributes

imultaneously

ia the

attributes f differentndividuals.

Later

medieval realistswere

persuaded

that

Ockham's criticismwas

sufficiento show that he

traditionalealist ccount

of the relation

etween

universalisnd

particulars

was

unacceptable,

but not

that realism as a

whole

was

untenable.

Thus,

they

ried o

remove he unclear nd

aporetic

points

stressed

by

the Venerabilis

nceptor

y

two fundamental

trategies:

the real distinction etween universais nd

individuals;

2> new

notions

of

identity

nd

distinction. he first

trategy

s that

of Walter

Burley,

who

in

his later

years after1324)

many

times

claimed that uni-

versais

fully

xist

outsidethe

mind

and

are

really

distinct rom

he indi-

viduals

n

which

they

re

present

nd of

which

they

re

predicated.

The

second

strategy

s that

most

commonly

developed

in

the later

Middle

Ages

all

over the

Europe.

The

present

ssue

of Vivarium

ollects ix arti-

cles

concerning

he

latter orm f later

medieval realism

nd

some of its

main

doctrinal ources.

Fabrizio Amerini

xamines he

reply

o Ockham's

ontological

rogram

that

two Italian

Dominican

masters,

ranciscusde

Prato and

Stephanus

de

Reate,

elaborated rom

more

traditional,

ealist

oint

of view

derived

from

Hervaeus

Natalis's works.

n

order to avoid that a

universal

nd

any

of ts

ndividualswere

considered o be

the same

thing, hey egarded

identity

s an

intersection f

classes of

things,

o that t

was

possible

to

say

that two

things

were

really

dentical

without

aying

hat

they

lso

are

the same

thing.

n

this

way

they

also

allowed that

two

things

ould be

considered s not really denticalwithout ntailing hattheywere also

really

non-identical

nd hence

really

different.

The other

rticles eal

with he most

mportant

school"of

atermedieval

realists,

naugurated

y

John

Wyclif,

he

so-called

OxfordRealists"

besides

Wyclif

himself,

he

Englishmen

Robert

Alyngton,

William

Milverley,

William

Penbygull,Roger

Whelpdale,

and

John

Tarteys,

s

well as the

German

Johannes

harpe,

nd the

talianPaul

of

Venice),

nd

the

Scotistic

roots of their main

logico-metaphisical

heories.

According

to

all

these

authors 1>

universais nd

individuals

were

really

denticalbut

formally

distinct,nd predicationwas a real relationbetween hings.n par-

ticular,

Wyclif

revised Duns

Scotus's

notion of formal

distinction,

nd

developed

a

formof

intensional

ogic

where

the main

relation

between

beings

s

exactly

hat one of

formal

distinction,

ntended s

the measure


5/215

REALISMN THE LATERMIDDLE

AGES 3

of the coincidence f themetaphysicalomponentsftwo res. onsequently,

starting

rom he definition f

being

as what can be

signified y

a com-

plex expression,

Wyclif

built

up

a

metaphysics

f essences

culminating

in an

ontological

nd

epistemological rimacy

f

universais ver

any

other

kind of

beings), by

which

the

subsequent

Oxford

Realists were to

be

inspired.

ModifyingWyclif

s

doctrine,

hey

introduced

new

type

of

predication,

ased on

a

partial

dentity

etweenthe

entities or

which

the

subject

and

predicate

tood,

called

predication

y

essence

praedicatio

secundumssentiam

,

and

redefined

he traditional

post-

ristotelian

categories

f essential nd accidental

predication

n termsof this

partial

identity.

Stephen

Dumont

investigates

uns

Scotus's notion

of formaldistinc-

tion,

the

main tool that the

Oxford Realists utilised

n

buildingup

their

philosophical

ystem.

umont's

study

xamines

cotus's

Parisian

definition

of

the formal

istinction,

nd shows that

this aterformulation

f the

for-

mal distinction oes

not

absolutely rohibit

n assertion

f formalities

s

correlates

f the formal

istinction,

ven

in

the case of

the divine

Person,

so long as theirnon-identitys properlyqualified

a result that

goes

against

the

traditional

nterpretation

f both

modern

and medieval

com-

mentators

f Scotus's

thought,

who had

seen Scotus's

Parisian treatment

of

the formal

distinction

s less

realistthan

the

preceding

ones,

in

the

sense that

t would

deny any

extra-mentallyeparate

formalities.

Giorgio

Pini

explores

Scotus's

legacy

to

late

medieval debates

on the

ontological

tatus

f the

categories.

n

his

paper,

Pini shows

how Scotus's

thesis f

a real distinction

f

the ten

Aristotelian

ategories,

nd his

way

of

articulating

t

into

a

comprehensive

metaphyisical

octrine

are

two

innovative nd not secondary ontributionso the latermedievalrealist

ontology.

Paul

Vincent

Spade

and

Laurent Cesalli

analyse Wyclif's

main meta-

physical

heories.

Wyclif

s one

of the

most

important

nd

authoritative

thinkers

f

the late

Middle

Ages

and the

starting-point

f the

new forms

of realism

t the

end of the

Middle

Ages.

The chief

haracteristics

f his

own

form

f

realism,

o

which all

his contributions

an

be traced

back,

are the

trust

n

the

scheme

object-label

s

the undamental

nterpretative

key

of

any

semantic

problem,

nd

a

strong

ropensity

owards

hypostati-

zation:Wyclif< 1 methodicallyeplaces ogicaland epistemologicalules

with

ontological

criteria

and

references,

2>

tries

to

find

ontological

grounds

or

ny

kind of

logical

distinction

e

introduces,

nd devel-

ops

his

system

f

logic

as a sort of

componential

nalysis,

where

things


6/215

4

ALESSANDRO. CONTI

substitute or lexemes and ontologicalproperties orsemantic features.

Nevertheless,

s

Paul Vincent

Spade

shows

in

his

article,

he cannot be

described s "ultrarealist"

n

his

theory

f universais.

pade distinguishes

two common medievalnotions f a universal:

he

Aristotelian-Porphyrian

one

in

terms f

predication

nd

the Boethianone

in

terms f

being

meta-

physically

ommon to

many.

On

neither

pproach

does

Wyclif's heory

of universais

ostulate

new and non-standard ntities

esides those rec-

ognized by

more usual versions

f

realism,

o thathis

theory

f universais

is less

extreme han Walter

Burley's.

Laurent Cesalli

goes

into

Wyclif's

an-propositionalismi.e.,

the claim

that whatever s y

proposition)

nd

theory

f

propositional

ruth nd

falsity.Wyclif's heory

f

proposition

erivesfromGrosseteste's

octrine,

that he

interprets

n

the

light

f his

notionof

being

as

significabileer

com-

plexum.

n

Wyclif's

view,

a

proposition

s

a well

formed nd

complete

speech,

which

signifies

he

trueor the

false,

nd

can be

perfectly

understood. ike

Grosseteste,

e claims

that

every linguistic)

roposition

has a

twofold

ignification:

atural nd

artificial.

n

its natural

ignification

a propositionmeans nothingbut its own existence, nd thereforet is

always

true;

n

its artificial

ignification

proposition

ignifies

hat is

or

what is

not,

and

it

may

therefore e true or

false.

According

o

Wyclif,

there re fivekindsof

propositions:

1>

mental,

2>

spoken,

3> writ-

ten;

real,

and the

signified

ropositions et quinta

roposicio

st

sic esse sicut

roposicio

ignificai

.

The

real

proposition

s

nothing

but

any

individual

hing

n

the

world,

while the

signified roposition

eems

to be

any

actual

situation

onnected

with

ndividual

hings.

n

the first

art

of

his

paper,

Cesalli,

starting

rom

Wyclif's

fivefold

ropositional

ypology,

analyses the threedifferentinds of real predication; 2> the dis-

tinction etween

primary

nd

secondary

ignification

f a

proposition

the

latter

eing

an

instantiationf the

former);

3> the

status f

ogical

truth

as

opposed-to,

ut

depending-on,metaphysical

ruth;

nd

the rela-

tionship

between

Wyclif's

notion of ens

ogicm,

s intermediate

etween

statements nd

facts,

and

Burley'spropositio

n re

The second

part

of

Cesalli's

study

deals with two

semantic nd

metaphysical

mplications

f

the

pan-propositionalism:

1>

the

extended notion of

being,

and

the relationbetween

contents f the

divine mind

as

"archi-truth-makers"

and eternal s well as contingentruths.

Finally,

n

my

article offer n

overview f

Johannes

Sharpe's

ontol-

ogy,

together

with an

analysis

of his

theory

f

meaning.

Sharpe

is the

most

mportant

nd

original

uthor

mong Wyclif's

ollowers: is seman-


7/215

REALISM

N THE

LATERMIDDLEAGES

5

tic and

metaphysical

heoriesare the end

product

of the two, main

medieval

philosophical

raditions,

ealism

and

nominalism,

or

he con-

tributed

o

the new

form f

realism

naugurated

y Wyclif,

ut

was

recep-

tiveto

many

nominalist

riticisms.

n

fact,

harpe

substantially

haresthe

metaphysical

iew

and

principles

f

the other

Oxford

Realists,

ut

he rel-

egates

the

common

realist

requirements

or the

generality

or

universal-

ity

n his

terminology)

f

terms

o a

minor

position

within

his semantics

and

substantiallyccepts

the

nner ense

of

nominalist

riticisms.

e

communissime,

2>

communiter

t

strictissime.

Communissime,

rout

e extendit

d

quodcumque

uod

non st

nihil

uod

ncludit

contradictionem,t solumllud,uia lludxcluditmnesse xtrantellectumt n ntel-lectu.

uod

enimst ic ncludensontradictionemicut on

potest

sse xtranimam,

ita non

potest

sse

liquid

ntelligibile

t

aliquod

ns

n

anima,

uia

numquam

ontra-

dictorium

um ontradictorio

onstituit

num

ntelligibile,

eque

icut

biectum

um

biecto

neque

icut

modus

um biecto.1.2>

Alio

modo icitur

ihil

uod

nec st

nec

sse

otest

aliquod

ns

xtra

nimam.

1.1>

Ens

rgo

el

es sto

rimo

odo

ccipitur

mnino

om-

munissime,

textendit

e

ad

quodcumque

uod

non ncludit

ontradictionem,

ive

it ns

rationis,

oc

est

praecise

abens

sse

n

ntellectu

onsiderante,

ive it

ns

reale

abens

aliquam

ntitatem

xtra onsiderationem

ntellectus.

1.2>

Et

secundo,

ccipitur

n isto

membro

inusommuniter

ro

nte

uod

habet

el

habere

otest

liquam

ntitatem

on

ex consideratione

ntellectus

...].

Secundo

modo

ccipit

oethius

istinguendo

em

contra

odum

ei,

icut

oquitur

e Trinitate

...].

Vult

rgo

istinguere

em ontra

ir-

cumstantiam,tsic, ecundumum,ola ria enerasubstantia,ualitastquantitas

rem

monstrant,

lia

vero

ei ircumstantias.

oc

ergo

nomen

res',

n secundo

embro

acceptum,

icit

liquod

ns

bsolutum,

istinctum

ontra

ircumstantiam

ive

modum,

ui

dicit

abitudinem

nius

d alterum.

3>

Tertius

odus

abetur

Philosopho

...].

Ens

ergo,

ive

impliciter

ive

otissime

ictum

et

hoc sive

it

nalogm

ive

nivocum

accipit

bi

Philosophusro

nte

ui

per

e et

primo

onvenit

sse,

uod

st

ubstantia

ola.

Sic

ergo

ub

primo

membro

ommunissime

ontinentur

nsrationis

t

ens

quodcumque

reale;

ub

ecundo,

ns

eale t

absolutum;

t sub

ertio,

ns

reale

t absolutum

t

per

e

ens".

ee

Henninger

989

above,

.

12),

0-1.

he

nterpretation

f his

assage

as

been

the

bject

f

ome

ontroversy.

ee

O.

Boulnois,

tre t

reprsentation.

ne

nalogie

e a

mtaphysique

oderne

l'poque

e

Duns

cot

XIIIe

XIVeicle

,

Paris

999,

44-52.

27

Duns

Scotus,

uodlibet

q.

3,

n.

2,

in:

Opera

mnia

XV,

114:

In secundo

utem

membrostiusrimimembriicitures uodhabereotestntitatemxtranimam.t

isto

modo ide

ur

oqui

Avicenna

Metaphysicae

cap.

5,

quod

ea

quae

sunt

ommunia

omnibus

eneribus

unt

es t

ens.

Nec

potest

llud

ntelligi

e

vocabulis

n una

ingua,

quia

n

unaquaque

ingua

st

unus

onceptus

ndifferens

d omnia

lia

quae

sunt

xtra

animam:

onceptus

nim

unt

idem

pud

mnes,

Penhermeneias

et ommuniter

n

qualibet


83/215

82

GIORGIO

INI

Thus,what s merely ossible s not ncluded n any category. omething,

in

order

to

be

in a

category,

mustbe

real

in

a

strong

ense,

.e.

as some-

thing

hat

s or

can be

extramental.

eing

a

thing

n

this

sense

amounts

to

having

an essence.

Thus,

Scotus,

by distinguishing

ategorial

being

from

what

is

logically ossible,

makes clear

that

not

everything

hat

s or

can be

conceived

of

(which

for

Scotus

coincides

with

what

is

logically

possible)

has an essence.

Merely

conceivable

entitiesdo

not

have an

essence

and

are not

included

n a

category.

n

theological

erms,

cotus

expresses

his

point

by saying

hat

things

o

not

have

an essence

by

the

simple

factthatGod thinks r can think f them:this s a

necessary

ut

not

a sufficient

ondition

o be

real

in

the

strong

ense

that

categories

are real.

Only

when

something

s the

object

of

God's creative

ower

does

it

acquire

an essence

and become

real.28

In

this

sense of

'thing5

nd

'being',

all the

categories

re

things

nd

beings

n

the

same

sense,

for

they

are ill

extramental,

ccording

o the

standard

ealist

ssumption.

ubstance,

uality,

Quantity,

ut

also Relation

and

all the non-absolute

ategories

re extramental

hings

n

the

same

sense of thing':

As this

istinction

hows,

heres

no

difficulty

bout he

uestion

Is a relation

thing?"

f

thing'

e taken

n

the

econd

ndthird

ense

i.e.meaning

c)

and

d)],

for relation

s

neither substance

or n absolute.

nly

he irstense

resents

difficulty,

hough

ot s

regards

onceptual

eing

i.e.

meaning

a)],

for t s clear

that

relationan

be

thought

fwithout

ontradiction.

ere

hen he

uestion

s

whether

thas xistence

r s a

thing

aving

real

ntity

f

ts

wn utside

he oul.

To

this

answer,

t

s a

thing

. ]

From

hat asbeen

aid t s

clearwhat

ind

of

hing

his

elations.

For

f

t s

a

singular

hing

hent

s eitherbsolute

r rel-

ative.

ormally

t

s relative

r

"being

o

another."

either

oes his etermination

"to nother"

ilitate

gainst

his

meaning

f

thing'

i.e.

s

extramental],

or

n

this

sensething'snot ontrastedith mode rrelationshiprcircumstancef thing,

but

t covers

hem

ll.29

trans.

olter-Alluntis

odified,

3-64.)

lingua

stunum

omen

mpositum

ali

onceptui

ommuni,

ualiscumque

it

lia com-

munitasive

nalogiae

ive nivocationis".

he

English

ranslation

s taken

with

ome

modifications)

rom

ohn

uns

cotus,

od nd

reatures.

he

uodlibetal

uestions.

ranslated

with n

ntroduction,

otes,

nd

Glossaryy

F. Alluntis

ndA.B.

Wolter,

rinceton,

.J.

1975,

2.

28

On Scotus's

onception

f

possibility,

ee

Duns

Scotus,

rd.

,

d.

36.

q.

unica,

n:

Opera

mnia

I,

ed.Commissio

cotistica,

ivitas

aticana

963,

71-97.

ee S.

Knuuttila,

Modalities

nMedieval

hilosophy

London-New

ork

993, 38-49;

d,

Duns

cotusnd he

Foundationsf ogicalodalitiesin: L. Honnefelder,. Wood,M. Dreyereds), ohnuns

Scotus,

etaphysics

nd

EthicsLeiden-New

ork-Kobenhavn-Kln

993,

127-43;

T.

Hoffmann,

reatura

ntellecta.

ie deen nd

ossibilien

ei uns

cotus it

usblick

uf

Franz

on

Mayronis,

ondusnd

MastriusMnster

002.

29

DunsScotus

uodlibet

q.

3,

n.

3,

in:

Opera

mnia

XV,

115:

Ex

ista

disnctione


84/215

SCOTUS'S

EALIST ONCEPTION

F

THE CATEGORIES

83

This is the core of Scotus'srealism oncerning ategories.Of course,by

this

claim Scotus

does

not mean

that

all the

categories

elong

to

ust

one

kind of

things.Quite

the

contrary,

he

categories

re

ten diverse

kinds

of extramental

tems.

Thing'

and

'being5

re transcendental

erms,

which

as such do

not refer

o

a

single

kind of essence.

There

is no

super-cat-

egory

f

extramental

eing.

What

is one

is the sense

of

thing'

nd

'being'

according

o

which

categories

re said

to be

things

nd

beings,

but

the

kinds

f extramental

hings

re ten

and

irreducible

o one

another.

cotus

is

acutely

ware of

what

has been called

the

sense

kind onfusion'.

aying

that

thing'

has one

meaning

s differentrom

aying

thatthere s

just

one

kind of

things.

Accordingly,

aying

hat there

re ten

kinds

of

things

is

fully

ompatible

with

saying

hat

thing'

has

just

one

meaning.30

Some

of the

different

ays

in which

things

elonging

o

different

at-

egories

xist

re

captured

by

meanings

c)

and

(d)

of

thing',

which refers

respectively

o

absolute

categories

Substance,

Quality

and

Quantity)

nd

to

Substance

alone.

Sometimes

by

'thing'

we

only

mean

absolute

cate-

gories

or even

only

substances.

But there

is still

a

meaning

of

'thing'

accordingto whichall the categories re things n the same sense,i.e.

as extramental

ntities.

According

to

this

meaning 'being

a

thing'

is

equated

to

'being

extramentaP

r

'mind-independent'.

cotus

holds

that

this

s the

meaning

to take

into

account

when

positing

he

categories

s

a real

classification,

.e. as

a classification

f

things.

What

kind of

things

re

categories?

Are

they

universal

r

particular?

Scotus

maintains

hat,

properly

peaking,

n

the extramental

world

the

only

independent

tems are

particulars

alling

nto one

of the

ten cate-

gories.

Each

particular

tem,

however,

s constituted

y

two

elements,

common ssence nd a principle f ndividuationhat ctualises hepoten-

tial

character

f

the essence

and makes

an

individual

out

of it.

Neither

patet

uod

quaestio

i

relatioit

res,

ullam

ifficultatem

abet e

re tertio

odo

cci-

piendo

el

ecundo

odo,

uia

non st ubstantia

eque

d se.

Tantum

rgo

ifficultas

estde

primo

membro.

ed nec

de ente

ationis,

uia

patet uod

relatio

st

ntelligibilis

sine

ontradictione.

st

rgo

ic ermo

i

habeat sse

ive it

es

habensntitatem

ealem

propriam

xtranimam.

t de hoc

dico

uod

st es

...].

Ex

hoc

pparet

uae

res

psa

sit,

uia

i

sit es

ingularis,

el st

d se vel

d alterum.

psa

formaliter

st es

d

alterum.

Nec

stadeterminatio

ad alterum"

pugnt

i

quod

estres sto

modo

oquendo,

uia

istomodo esnon istinguiturontra odmelhabitudinemel ircumstantiamei, ed

includit

m".

The

English

ranslation

s taken

with

ome

modifications)

rom

ohn

uns

Scotus,

od nd

Creatures

transi.

lluntis

ndWolter

above,

.

27),

3-4.

30

On the

ense/kind

onfusion

ee

G.B.

Matthews,

ensesnd

inds

in:The

Journal

f

Philosophy,

9

1972),

49-57.


85/215

84

GIORGIO

INI

of these two constituentss capable of independent xistence;onlythe

particular

tems

falling

n

one

of the

ten

categories

re.

Since

the

analy-

sis

of

a

particular

nto

two

constituents

an

be

repeated

at different

levels

of

generality

i.e.

at the

ndividual

evel

for

particulars,

t

the

specific

level

for

pecific

ssences,

p

to the

most

general

evel

for

ategorial

on-

cepts),

each

category

an

be seen

as the

ordered

set of

all

the items

of

a certain

kind.

i.e.

the

individuals

nd

their

constituents

ncapable

of

independent

xistence

but

nevertheless

rovided

of

some

kind

of

mind-

independent nity:

In

every

ategorial

ierarchy

here

recontained

ll that

ertain

o

that

ierarchy,

disregarding

verything

lse hat

s

not

omething

elonging

ssentially

o

that

ier-

archy.

This

s

proved

ecause

ny

wo uch

ierarchies

re

primarily

iverse,

nd

so

nothing

elonging

o

the

ne

does

o

through

he

ther's

ierarchy.)

ut

ust

s

there

elongs

o that

ierarchy,

nsofar

s it

s imited

t both

he

op

ndthe

ot-

tom

...],

a first

redicate,

fwhich

othing

lse

s

predicated,

o

too here

elongs

to t

lowest

ubject,

owhich

othing

lse s

made

ubject.

herefore,

n

every

at-

egorial

ierarchy

he

ingular

r

ndividual

snot

stablished

hrough

nything

elong-

ing

o

any

ther

ierarchy.31

trans.

pade,

9-80.)

So, accidents re not dependent n substances or their ndividuality.n

each

category,

o

matter

what

category

t

is,

there

are

individual

tems,

such

as

individual

uantities,

ualities

or

relations,

hat

re individual

ust

because

they

are

extramental

hings

n

the

world

belonging

o

a

certain

kind.

4.

Categories

s

Really

istinct

Scotus

makes

clear

that

a

rigorous

nderstanding

f

the

claim

that cat-

egories re a classificationfthingsmplies hat thing'mustbe taken n

the

same

sense

for

all the

categories.

Accordingly,

di the

categories

re

things

n the

same

sense,

i.e.

as extramental

ntities.

Now,

in

order

to

31

Duns

cotus,

rd.

I,

d.

3,

p.

1,

q.

4,

n.

89,

n:

Opera

mnia

II,

433-434:

.

in

qualibet

oordinatione

raedicamentali

unt

mnia

ertinentia

d

illam

oordinationem,

circumscriptouocumque

lio

quod

non

st

liquid

llius oordinationis

ssentialiter

hoc

probatur,

uia

oordinationes

uae unt

rimo

iversae,

t

ta

nihil nius

st ale

er

oor-

dinationem

lterius);

ed d

coordinationem

llam

n

quantum

initast

t

n

sursum

t

n

deorsum

...],

sicut

ertinet

rimum

raedicatum,

e

quo

nihil

raedicatur,

ita

pertinet

infimumubiectum,uinihilubicitur;gituringulareel ndividuumstnqualibetoor-

dinatione

er

nihil licuius

lterius

oordinationis".

he

English

ranslation

s taken

rom

Five

extsn

he ediaeval

roblem

f

Universals.

orphyry,

oethius,

belard}

uns

cotus

Ockham.

Translated

nd Edited

y

P.V.

Spade,

ndianapolis

994,

9-80.

ee also

Lect.

I,

d.

3,

p.

1,

q.

4,

n.

91,

n:

Opera

mnia

VII,

258.


86/215

SCOTUS'S

EALIST

ONCEPTIONF THE

CATEGORIES

85

provehis strong ealism, cotus mustdemonstratehat thisclaimimplies

that the

categories

re

really

distinct

rom ach

other and

that no

one

can be

reduced

to

any

other.This is

his

anti-reductionisthesis.

Scotus's

demonstration s

based on

his

notion of

real

distinction.

According

o

Scotus,

x

andjy

are

really

distinct

f

and

only

f

a)

both x

and

y

are

extramental

hings

nd

(b)

it is

logicallypossible

for at least

one of them

to exist

without he

other.

Clause

(b)

usually

called

the

'separability

riterion'

or

really

distinct

hings

is

worth

noticing.

cotus

holds that

the

separability

riterion

s

not

necessarily symmetrical

ela-

tion,even

thoughquite

often t is. x and

y may

be

really

differentfx

can exist

without but

y

cannot exist

without . This will

play

an

impor-

tant role

in

Scotus's

way

of

distinguishing

etween

absolute and non-

absolute

categories.32

By

his

distinctionf

the different

eanings

f

thing',

cotus has

estab-

lished that

clause

(a)

holds for the

categories,

namely

that all

the cate-

gories

re

extramental

hings.

e must till

emonstrate

hat he

separability

criterion olds for

the

categories,

amely

that,

for

any

two

categories,

t

least one of them can existwithout he other.This claim is particularly

controversial s far

as Relation is

concerned,

for t does not

seem that

Relation

adds

anything

eal to its

foundation nd that

accordingly

t is

really

distinct rom t.

So,

it is to

Relation that Scotus

devotes a

very

articulated reatment

o show that t is

really

distinct

rom ts

foundation.

Specifically

gainstHenry

of

Ghent,

Scotus

demonstrates

y

several

rgu-

ments hat t is

not

contradictory

orthe

foundation f a

relation o exist

without he

relationfoundedon it.33 n

addition,

Scotus shows

n

some

32

cotus

ormulateshe

eparability

riterionor eal

istinction

n

Ord.

I,

d.

1,

q.

5,

nn.

00-204,

n:

Opera

mnia

II,

ed. Gommissio

cotistica,

ivitas aticana

973, 01-3,

in

part.

n.

200-1,

01-2:

. nihil

st dem

ealiter

licui,

ine

uo potest

sse ealiter

absque

ontradictione

quia quod

dem ns

it ealitert non it

ealiter,

idetursse

oppositumrimi

rincipii,

x

quoprincipiorimo

idetur

tatmoncludi

iversitas

ntium;

quia

i

de

aliquibus

ontradictoria

icantur,

o

modo

uo

dicunture

eis,

videnturon

idem,

t ta

i contradictoria

sse t non-esse

icanture

eis,

videntur

ssenon dem

n

esse el

n

re,

ive on dem ns". ee

alsoLed.

I,

d.

1,

q.

5,

nn.184-7n:

Opera

mnia

XVIII,

d.

Commissio

cotistica,

ivitas aticana

982,

1-2;

Ord.

I,

d.

2,

p.

1,

q.

2,

in:

Opera

mnia

II,

nn.

92-3,

196-8.

ee

McCordAdams

987

above,

.

1),

16-9;

Henninger

989

above,

.

12),

1-2;

King

003

above,

.

3),

21-2.

33Duns cotus, rd.I, d. 1.q. 5,nn.188-120,n:OperamniaII,94-120,npart,

nn.

200

and

205,

101-4: . nihil

st dem

ealiter

licui,

ine

uo potest

sserealiter

absque

ontradictione;

ed multaeunt

elationesine

uibus

undamenta

ossunt

sse

absque

ontradictione;

rgo

multaeunt elationes

uae

non

unt ealiterdem um un-

damento.

.

]

Minor

tiam

pparet

n

omnibus

elationibus

uarum

undamenta

ossunt


87/215

86

GIORGIO

INI

detailthat the othercategories re reallydistinct rom ach other n his

Questions

n

the

Metaphysics.

n

the

latter

work,

however,

he

does

not

use

the

separability

riterion;

e

demonstrates

hat

hings

elonging

o

different

categories

are

really

distinct

because

they

have

primary

ontradictory

properties.

his,

in

Scotus's

opinion,

mounts

o

showing

hat

categories

are

really

distinct

rom

ach

other,

ince

the

same

thing

annot

bear

two

primarily

ontradictory

roperties.

pecifically,

cotus

demonstrates

hat

Quantity

nd

Quality

are

really

distinct

rom

ubstance,

hat

Relation s

really

distinct

rom

ts

foundation,

hat

Action,Passion,When, Where,Position nd Habit are

really

distinct rom

Relation,

that

Where is

really

distinct

from

place,

that

When is

really

distinct

from

time,

and

that

Position s

really

distinct rom

When.34

Scotus

does

not

provide

a

general

demonstration

hat

the

categories

are

really

distinct

rom

each

other.

His

defenseof

anti-reductionism

s

piecemeal.

It

could

not

have

been

otherwise.As

Scotus

remarks,

ny

demonstration

hat

the

categories

re

not

reducible

one to

another

nd

that

consequently

heir

number

s

sufficient

annot

be of a

logical

nature,

i.e. itmustbe based on thewaythings re in theextramental orld,not

on

the

way

we

understand

he

categories.35

ut such

a

demonstration

s

impossible

or

two

reasons.

First,

f

t

were

possible,

t

would

demonstrate

the

opposite

of

what

it is

supposed

to

demonstrate,

amely

that

the

cat-

egories

are

the

primary

istinction

f all

real

things.

or

such a

demon-

stration

would

be

based

on

general

features

uch as

'being

in

itself'

nd

'being

n

something

lse',

which,

n

order

to act

as

middle

terms,

hould

be

common to

more

than

one

category

nsofar

s

the

categories

re

real

kindsof

things

n

the

world.

Consequently,

here

would

be a

division

f

things according o therelations f being n itself' nd 'being n some-

thing

lse'

prior

to

the

division

nto

categories.

Thus,

the

division

nto

esse

ine

erminis,

icut

st

n

omnibus

elationibus

equiparantiae

sicut

unt

imile,

equale

et

huiusmodi):

i

enim

oc

lbum

it t

llud

lbum

on

it,

oc

lbum

st ine

imilitu-

dine,

et si

aliud

lbum

iat,

n

hoc

lbo

st

imilitudo;

otest

gitur

sse ine

sto

t

cum

isto.

imiliter

st n

multis

elationibus

isquiparantiae:

i enim

ste it

homo,

t

talis t

nullus

lius

ubsit

otestad

uae,

rit

ine

ominatione,

et

pse

tiam

otest

sse

domi-

nus,

ervorum

ccessione,

icut

icit

oethius;

t ta

st e

multis

liis,

e

quibus

mnibus

non

portet

xempla

dducere".

ee

also

Led.

I,

d.

1,

q.

5,

nn.

164-221,

n:

Opera

mnia

XVIII,53-75;Quodl.q. 3,nn.4-20,n:OperamniaXV,115ff.eeHenninger989

(above,

.

12),

1-8,

7-97.

34

Duns

cotus,

uaest.

n

Metaph.

,

q.

5-6,

nn.

81-103,

n:

Opera

hibsophica

II,

466-

71.

See Pini

002

above,

.

24),

144-68.

35

ee

above,

.

23.


88/215

SGOTUS'S EALIST

ONCEPTIONF

THE

CATEGORIES 87

categorieswould not be primary, ecause the categorieswould not be

diverse

things

hat do not have

anything

n

common.

Second,

such

a

demonstration ould

not

show

what t s

supposed

o

demonstrate,

amely

that

being

is divided nto

exactly

en kinds and that these kinds

are the

most basic division f

being.

For such

a

demonstration ould

show that

being

is divided nto two or three

most

general

kindsbefore

descending

into

the

categories,

ot that

being

is divided nto

exactly

en

categories:

Note: herere everal

ays

or

howing

he

ufficiency

f he

ategories,

hich

ll

seem o sindoubly.irst,ecauseheyrovehe pposite,amely,hat he ivisionof

being

nthese en s not

primary.

or f

prior

o t s thedivisionnto

being

in

itselfnd

a

being

ot

n

itself,

nd

further,

hat ne memberf these

s sub-

divided,

rthat oth

re,

hen

itherachdivisionill e

only

f n

equivocal

erm

into ts

quivocates

which

roves othing,

ecause ames re

applied

t

will),

r

that ome f hoseen

all

nder

more ommon

oncept

oremmediateo

being,

and hus

eing

s not

mmediately

ividednto en. o

give

n

example:

ssume

hat

by ubdividing

he

ategory

f ubstance

any

imes

n the

enera

f ubstancene

finally

omes o tenmost

pecialpecies,

hese

ould otdivideubstance

rimar-

ily.

econdly,

the

ways

or

howing

he

ufficiency

fthe

ategories

in>because

all these

ays

f

dividing

o not

prove

what hould e

proved>;

or newould

have

o

prove

hatwhat s divided

s

thus

ivided,

nd

precisely

n

this

way,

nd

this o the ssue thand, amelyhat hedividendsonstitutehesemost enerals

.36

trans.

tzkorn-

olter

odified,,

411-2.)

Accordingly,

cotus does not

provide

ny general

demonstration

hat the

categories

re irreducible

ne to another and

that there are

only

and

exacdy

ten kindsof

things.

he

sujkientiaraedicamentorum

as it was

called,

can be

argued

for

only by

way

of

particular

rguments:

ubstance

is

really

distinct

rom

Quantity

nd

Quality,

and so

on.

Just

because

the

categories

re the mostbasic

structuref the extramental

orld

they

an-

not be reduced

to a more

general

framework:

36

Duns

cotus,

uaest.

n

Metaph.

,

q.

5-6,

nn.

73-75,

n:

Operahilosophica

II,

464:

"Nota:

ariae unt iaedivisivaestendendi

ufficientiam

raedicamentorum,

uae

viden-

tur

upliciter

eccare:

rimo,

uia

stendunt

ppositumropositi,

cilicet

uod

ivisio

ntis

in haecdecern on it

prima.

i enim

rius

iat

n ens

per

e et

n ensnon

per

e,

et

ultra num

membrumubdividatur

el ambo: ut

quaelibet

ivisiorit antum

ominis

aequivoci

n

equivocata,

uod

nihil

st

robare

quia

nominauntd

placitum;

ut

liquo

istorum

ecernrit

onceptus

ommunior

mmediatior

nti,

t ta

nsnon mmediate

ivi-

ditur

n

decern.

xemplumatet:

onendouod er

ivisiones

ultasubordinatas

n

genere

substantiaeandem

eveniretur

d decern

peciespecialissimas,

llaenon

primo

ivide-

rent ubstantiam.ecundo,uiaomnesllae iaedivisivaeonprobant.porteretnim

probareuod

divisumic

dividitur,

t

praecise

ic,

t hoc ad

propositum,

cilicet

uod

dividendaonstituant

eneralissima".

he

English

ranslationstaken

with

ome

modifications)

from

uestions

n he

Metaphysics

f

Aristotle

y

ohn

uns cotus.

ranslated

y

G.J.

tzkorn

and

A.B.

Wolter,

vols.,

t.

Bonaventure

997-98,,

411-2.


89/215

88

GIORGIO

INI

Therefore,fwehold he ivisiono besufficient,t muste said hathis,iz. he

division

f

being

nto

enera

s

the irst.either

reother

wo

membered,

r three-

memberedivisions

rior

o

t;

nor

anthis e

proved.

or ne

annot

rove

ither

that he ividends

re ontained

nder hat

s divided

since

here

ay

e

an mme-

diacy

here),

or hat

hey

rediverse

becausehey

re

primary

iverse,

s are heir

primary

egatives

hich

eny

ne of the

thers),

or hat hese lone re under

what

s

divided,

ecause

ll

mmediacy

f he

ivisors

re

proved

y

ontradiction,

the

irstf

whichs "not o

have

n

intermediary,"

hich

rocedure

ere s

inap-

plicable,

ince

he irstivision

s nto en.37

trans.

tzkorn-Wolter,,

412-3.)

Scotus's

statement hat

t

is

impossible

o

demonstrate

hat there re ten

categoriesbecause it is impossible o reduce them to some more basic

modes

of

being

sounds

radical

and

unprecedented.

cotus

moves

against

a

long

tradition f

attempts

o

ustify

ristotle'sistof

categories y

reduc-

ing

them to some basic

modes

of

being

or

of

predicating.

cotus's

posi-

tion, however,

s

simply

he

consequence

of his

strong

ealist

onception

of

categories

s

the

primary

hings

nto

which the extramental

orld

s

divided.

From

a

metaphysical

oint

of

view,

there

s

nothing

more

basic

and fundamental

han

categories.Reality

s not divided nto

being per

se and

being

n

something

lse;

it is

immediately

ivided

nto

ten

distinct

kinds of things,whichhave absolutelynothing eal in common.This is

the reason

why

the distinction

nto the

categories

annotbe demonstrated

but

must be assumed

as

primary.

All

that Scotus

can

give

is

a

demon-

stration hat

a

single category

s

really

distinct rom he

other

ones,

by

appealing

to the

separability

riterion.

The

strategy

hat

Scotus

adopts

in

the

Questions

n the

Metaphysics

o

demonstrate

hat one

category

s

really

distinct

rom nother eems

to be

objectionable,

owever.

As we have

seen,

thereScotus demonstrates

hat

a

certain

category

s

distinct

romthe other

ones not

by

an

appeal

to

the

separability

riterion, ut

by showing

hat each

category

has some

properties

hat the other

ones do not have.

But,

according

to Scotus's

ontology,

howing

hat two entities

ear

contradictoryroperties

s not

sufficiento demonstrate hat

they

re different

hings.

or

Scotus main-

tains that

things

re not the

only

property-bearers.

t is

part

of Scotus's

37

Duns

cotus,

uaest.

n

Metaph.

,

q.

5-6,

n.

76,

n:

Operahilosophica

II,

465: Ideo

tenendo

ivisionemsse

ufficientem,

sset icendum

uod

psa

est

prima.

ec

aliqua

bimembriseu trimembris

rior

a;

nec

probari otest.

uia

nec

quod

dividentiaub

divisoontineantur,um it mmediatiobi.Nec uod int iversa,uia untrimoiversa,

et

negativarima

egando

numb alio.Nec

quod

ola int ub

iviso,

uia

omnismme-

diatio ividentium

robatur

er

ontradictionem,

uius st

primo

nonhabere

medium',

quae

viahicnon

alet,

x

quoprimo

st

n

decern".

he

English

ranslations taken

rom

Questions

n he

etaphysics

transi.tzkornndWolter

above,

.

36),

,

412-3.


90/215

SCOTUS'S EALIST

ONCEPTIONF THE

CATEGORIES

89

doctrine funiversais nd the formaldistinctionhat,within ach thing,

there

are

some

property-bearers,

ormally

on-identical o each

other.

Accordingly,

cotus holds

that the

same

thing

can

have

contradictory

properties,

s

long

as the

bearers of

these

properties

re two

formally

non-identical

ntities. or

example,

within

he same

individual

here re

two

formally

on-identical

onstituents,

common

nature and an

indi-

viduating

rinciple.

These

two entities ave

contradictoryroperties,

or

the

nature s

common to several

ndividuals

nd the

individuating

rin-

ciple

is

proper

to

only

one

individual.

Thus,

the same

individual eems

to have

contradictory

roperties,

ccording

to whether t is considered

with

regard

to its nature

or to its

individuating

rinciple.Consequently,

Scotus cannot

demonstrate hat

the

categories

re

really

distinct rom

each other

only by showing

hat

they

have

contradictoryroperties.

or

the

categories

ould have

contradictory

roperties

ven

if

they

were for-

mally

non-identical ntities

within he same

thing.38

Scotus could

answer that this

objection

fails to

take into account the

distinction etween

primary

nd

non-primary

ontradiction. or it seems

to be partof his notionofformal istinctionhattheproperties ossessed

by

formally

on-identical

ntities re not

primarily ontradictory

roper-

ties.

Because two

formally

on-identical ntities

onstitutehe same

thing,

the

properties

hey

have are

contradictorynly

in

a

qualifiedway,

i.e.

formally,

ot

primarily.39

o,

for

example,

one could

contend that the

property

f

being

common and

non-common re not

primarily

ontra-

dictory

nd that

accordingly hey

can

be

possessed by

the

same

thing,

provided

hat that

thing

be considered rom

different

spects. Something

is

common insofar s

it

is

considered

ccording

to its common

nature,

even though he same thing s not common when considered ccording

to

its

ndividuating

eatures.

y

contrast,

he

contradictoryroperties

hat

are true of

one

category

ut not of

another re

primarily ontradictory:

theypertain

o a

category

without

ny qualification,

ot because of one

of ts

formally

on-identicalonstituents.

t

is

doubtful,

owever,

hat uch

an

answerwould

convince

anybody.

For it seems to

presuppose

what it

must

demonstrate,

amely

hat

primary

ontradiction olds between

hings

38

A

similar

oint

was raised

y

Ockham

gainst

he

formal

istinction

n

generell:

accordingoOckham,f he ormalistinctions admittednontology,heresnoway

to

argue

or he eal

distinctionetween

hings.very

roperty-bearer

ould e

merely

formally

istinct.ee William

ckham,

rd.

,

d.

2,

q.

6,

n:

Operaheologica

I,

174. ee

McCord

dams 987

above,

.

1),

,

49-52.

39

ee McCord dams

987

above,

.

1),

,

49.


91/215

90

GIORGIO

INI

and not betweenformalities.cotus's criterion o demonstratehatone

category

s

really

distinct

rom

nother

seems

ultimately

o

require

the

separability

riterion.

In

any

case,

it

is

a

fact

worth

noticing

hat

Scotus

resorts o

formally

non-identical

ntities

nly

when he

must

account

for the

hierarchical

ordering

f

things

within he

same

category.

ecause

of

his

endorsement

of

realism,

he holds

that

the

categories

re

things,

nd

this

prevents

im

from

using

the

formal

istinction

o

account

for

ategorial

iversity,

ince

by

definition

he formal

distinction

pplies

to

entities

within

the

same

thing.

5.

Categories

s

Simple

ssences

So,

Scotus's

realism

oncerning

ategories

s

the

straightforward

osition

of

ten

and

only

ten

kinds of

things

n

the

extramental

orld.

Each

one

of

them

s

simple,

because it is

not

composed

of ratio

nd esse

or

of

res

and

ratio

r an

essence

and a

mode

of

being:

a

category

s

simply

res

i.e. an essence of a certainkind.Admittedly,hisessence can be ana-

lyzed

nto

different

ormally

on-identical

onstituents,

n

order

o

account

for

the

hierarchically

rdered

concepts

that can

represent

t,

from

ndi-

viduals to

the

most

universal

enera.

But

these

two

formally

on-identi-

cal

constituents

re

inseparable

from

each

other.

The

very

fact

that a

category

s

somehow

composed

of

these

non-identical

ntities

xcludes

any

sort of

real

distinction

ithin

he

category

tself.

This

was

not an

uncontroversial

osition.

As I

have

mentioned,

efore

Scotus

it was

commonly

held

that

each

category

was

constituted

y

two

elements nsofar s it was a category.Quite often,t was even assumed

that

something,

n

order

to be in

a

category,

ad

to

be

composed

of

two

really

distinct

tems,

.e.

matter

nd

form.Of

course,

his

posed

the

prob-

lem of

the

categorial

status

of

immaterial

nd

simple

beings,

such

as

angels

and

God.40

Thanks

to his

radical

realism,

cotus

gets

rid of

this

problem.

Each

category

s a

simple

essence.

For

example,

n

the

case of

Substance,

no

composition

s

required

n

order

to

be

classified s a

sub-

stance.

The

only

necessary

equirement

s

to be a

real,

absolute

and

per

se

thing.

Scotus

of

course

does not

mean

to

say

that

no

substance

can

be composed of two differenthings, uch as formand matter: his s

40

ee

A.

Tabarroni,

Utrum

eus it

n

praedicamento":

ntological

implicity

nd

Categorial

Inclusion

in:

Biard

nd

Rosier-Catach

003

above,

.

13),

71-87.


92/215

SCOTUS'S

EALIST ONCEPTION

F

THE CATEGORIES

91

actuallythe case of all materialsubstances.Scotus is only sayingthat

being composed

of two

distinct

hings

s not

a

necessary equirement

or

belonging

o

any

category,

not even

to

Substance.

Substances

may

or

may

not be

composed

of matter

nd form.

What is essential

s that

they

are

things er

e.

Insofar

s

they

re

substances,

hey

re

simple

essences

and

things.

f

they

are also

composed

of matter

nd

form,

his

s not

because

they

re substances

ut because

they

are

material.41

Scotus

holds the

same

position

bout accidents.

Accidents

re not

com-

posed

of

different

hings

uch

as matter

nd form.

Of

course,

each

acci-

dent can be conceivedof

according

to different

egrees

of

universality

and this

possibility

s accounted

for

by

the

presence

of

formally

on-iden-

tical entities

within

he

same

thing.

nsofar

s

they

are

categories,

cci-

dents

are

simple

essences.

Remarkably,

here

Scotus

straightforwardly

appeals

to the

principle

f

parsimony.

No

multiplicity

hould

be

posited

when

it is not

necessary.

Thus,

if

something

an be

explained

without

positing

real

composition,

o real

composition

hould be

posited:

Otherwise,

t s

said o

the

uestion

whether

ccidents

re

ompounded

rom

hings

essentiallyiverse]hat aucity ustlwayse assumedhenhrought he ppear-

ances

re aved

...].

And

herefore,

he

ssumption

f

plurality

ught

lways

o

state

ome

manifest

ecessity

ecause

f

whichhat

many

re

postulated;

ut

noth-

ing ppears

n accidents

ecause

fwhich

newould

ave o

assume

hey

re

om-

posed

f wo ssential

arts,

enerally

peaking

...].

Therefore,

uch

omposition

s

generally

enied.42

trans.

tzkorn-Wolter,

I,

349.)

It

may

be

surprising

o

find

cotus

openly

ndorsing

he

principle

f

par-

simony,

sually

ssociated

with

nominalism,

hen

presenting

is doctrine

of

categories,

which

is one

of the

main

tenetsof

Scotus's

realism.

At a

closer

ook,however,

his

appeal

to

the

principle

f

parsimony

s not so

surprising.

or Scotus'srealism

oncerning

he

categories

onsistsn

get-

ting

rid

of such

semi-things

s esse

nd rationes

n order to

account

for

the distinction

mong

the

categories.

Admittedly,

cotus

posits

no

fewer

than

ten

kindsof

things;

ut

all

these

kinds re

things

n

the

same

sense

of the

word

thing'.

There

is no

need for

dditional

ypes

f

entities

uch

as

mods

of

existence

r the

like.

So,

Scotus's

doctrine

f

the

categories

amounts

to

a

dramatic

ontological implification:

ll the

categories

re

41 ee Duns cotus, uaest.nMetaph.,II,q. 19,n.73, n:OperahilosophicaV,edd.

R. Andrews

t

l.,

St.

Bonaventure,

Y

1997,

79.

42

Duns

cotus,

uaest

in

Metaph

, VIII,

q.

1,

n.

22,

n:

Operahilosophica

V,

403-404.

Forthe

English

ranslation,

ee

Questions

n

the

Metaphysics

transi. tzkorn

nd

Wolter

(above,

.

36),

I,

349.


93/215

92

GIORGIO

INI

things nd are reallydistinct rom ach other because anythinghatis

extramental

s

a

thing

and

everything

hat is

a

thing

s

really

distinct

fromother

things.

6. Inherencend

Non-Absolute

ccidents

Since

all the

categories

re

things

n

the

same sense of the term

thing5,

how can

Scotus account

forthe

inherence f

accidents

n

substances

nd

for

the

asymmetry

etweenabsolute

and

non-absolute ccidents?

A

sup-

porter

of the standarddoctrine f the

composition

f the

categories

an

easily explain

both

facts. The

inherence of

accidents

in

substance

is

explained

by appealing

to the

special

nature of the

mode of existence

constituting

ccidents,

.e.

being

in or

inhering

n

something

lse.

This

accounts for the

accident's

dependence

on substance.

The

asymmetry

between

bsolute

accidents ike

Quality

and

Quantity

nd the

remaining

non-absolute ccidents

s

explained

by

referring

o the existence

f

only

three

kinds of

things,

ubstances,

ualities

and

quantities.

Non-absolute

categories re composedof a thingof one of the first hreecategories

and

a

mode

proper

to

them.

Accordingly,

on-absolute

ategories

re

not

things

distinct

rom

their foundations.

his

explains

why

non-absolute

accidents

annot whereas

absoluteaccidents

an be conceived

of

and

on

special

occasions

even

exist)

without heir

ubjects.

Scotus's realist

doctrine

f the

categories

s an

all-encompassing

iew

in

which these

two

problems

re

straightforwardly

ealt with.

He

needs

to

posit

no

exception

to

his

general

theory

of

categories

n

order to

account for them.

As to the first uestion,Scotus quite simplymaintains hat nherence

is not

a

component

f accidental

categories; y

contrast,

t

is a

thing

n

its own

right,

.e.

an accident

belonging

o a certain

category.

Scotus

holds

that inherence

belongs

to one of

the last six non-absolute

ate-

gories, pecifically

o

either ction or

passion.43

Accordingly,

he nature

43

Duns

cotus,

rd.

V,

d.

12.

q.

1,

n.

6,

n:

Opera

mnia

VII,

Paris

891,

34-5:

Et

si

quaeras

d

quodgenus ertinet

llud

uodper

e

significai

oc

quod

st ccidens

el

inhaerens?

espondeo,

d

genusliquod espectus

xtrinsecus

dvenientis.atet nim

uod

dicit espectum,uianonpotestntelligiatio ius d se.Non autem icit espectum

intrisecus

dvenientem,

uia

non

necessario

onsequentemositionem

xtremorum,

uia

[. ]

fundamentumius

t terminus

ossunt

anereine sto

espectu.

i

quaeras,

d

quodgenus?

ide

i forted

genus assionis,

t sic

passio

icat

on antum

espectum

passi

d

agens,

ed

d

formam;

el i forte

d

genus

ctionis,

t sic ctio

icat on an-


94/215

SCOTUS'S

EALIST

ONCEPTIONF

THE

CATEGORIES

93

ofinherencehas nothingmysteriousorScotus.Inherence s not a mode

of

being

or a

semi-thing

onstituting

ccidental

categories.

t

is a

non-

absolute

accident

by

which

accidentsare

related

to

substances.

ince

it

is an

accident,

nherence

tself

nheres

n

its

subject,

which

n

turn

s an

inhering

ccident.

This

view of

nherence

rovides

straightforward

olution o

the

prob-

lem

of

the

possibility

hat

absolute

accidents uch

as

quantities

nd

qual-

ities

xist

without

nhering

n

their

ubjects

as

in

the

case of

the

Eucharist).

Since

inherence s an

item

in

an

non-absolute

ategory,

t is

really

dis-

tinct rom

Quality

and

Quantity.

Therefore,

here s no contradictionor

Quality

and

Quantity

to

exist

without

nhering

n

a

substance.

This is

only

an

instanceof

the

separation

f

two

really

distinct

hings.44

Scotus's

positing

nherence s

one

accident

really

distinct

rom

he oth-

ers

is an

innovative

move.45

n

this

way,

Scotus

provides

a

new

onto-

logical

analysis

of

entities

composed

of a

substance

and an

absolute

accident,

uch

as

the

compound

entity

onstituted

y

Socrates

and

white-

ness,

.e.

Socrates-white.

uch

entities

ere

usually

onsidered s

the

result

of the combination f two entities, substance forexample,Socrates),

and a

quality for

xample,

whiteness).

ecause

it

was

thought

hat

t was

in

the

nature

of a

quality

to

inhere

n

a

substance,

he

standard

con-

ception

was

that,

s

soon

as a

substance

cting

as a

subject

for a

qual-

ity

and

that

very

quality

were

posited

n

the

world,

the

result

would be

tum

espectum

gentis

d

patiens,

ed

formae

nformantis.ed

utroque

odo

rit

espec-

tas

xtrinsecus

dveniens".

cotuslso

distinguishes

etween

ctual

nd

habitual

or

oten-

tial)

nherence.

ere

only

ocus

n

actual

nherence.

or

more

xtended

resentation

ofScotus'sositionndevolution,ee Pini 004 above, . 14), 87-310.44

Duns

cotus,

rd.

V,

d.

12.

q.

1,

n.

9,

in:

Opera

mnia

VII,

545:

"Tertia

onclu-

sio

seil.,

uod

llud

uod

denominatur

per

e

significato

ccidentis

t est

uid

bsolu-

tum

otest

sse

tnon

nesse

ubiecto

ctualiter,

ed

necessario

nest

ptitudinaliter]

robatur,

quia

ccidens

bsolutum,

nde

bsolutum,

on

equirit

erminm

ec

erminos,

uia

unc

non

sset

bsolutum.i

igitur

equirit

ubiectum,

portet

uod

it

propter

liam

epen-

dentiam

d

ipsum

ssentialem.

ed

nulla

st

dependentia

impliciter

ecessaria

licuius

absolti

d

aliquid

uod

non

st

de

essentia

ius,

ed

tantum

ausa

xtrnseca,

isi d

causam

xtrinsecam

impliciter

rimam,

cilicet

d

Deum.

ubiectum

utem on

stde

essentia

ccidentis

.

]

ergo

ependentia

ccidentis

bsolti

d

subiectum

on

st im-

pliciter

ecessaria.

oco

impliciter

ecessarium

uius

ppositum

ncludit

ontradictionem".

On

discussions

bout

he

nherencef

ccidents,

ee

S.

Donati,

Utrum

ccidens

ossit

existereineubiecto. Aristotelischeetaphysiknd hristlicheheologieneinigenngedruckten

Physikkommentaren

es

usgehenden

3.

Jahrhunderts

in:

J.A.

Aertsen-K.

mery,r.-A.

peer

(eds),

ach er

Verurteilung

on

277.

hilosophie

nd

heologu

n

der

niversitton

aris

m et-

zen

Viertel

ks 3.

Jahrhunderts.

tudien

nd

exte

Berlin-Nework

001

Miscellanea

ediaevalia

28),

77-617.


95/215

94

GIORGIO

INI

a compound entity.No additional tem was required o account forthat

combination.

y

contrast,

cotus maintains hat

ust

positing

substance

and a

quality

s

not sufficiento

accountfor he

compound ntity

ocrates-

white. For it is

logicallypossible

that both

Socrates and his

whiteness

existand that

they

do not constitute

ne

entity.

n

the late

1290s,

when

writing

is Lectura

Scotus

clearly

ormulated he

problem

but stilldid not

want to

state that nherence s a

separate

tem added

to

a

substance nd

an

accident.46

ome

years

afterwards,

n

his

Ordinatio,

e

changed

his

mind,

as we

have seen.

Something

dditional s

required

to

account for

the union between

substance nd

an

accident.This

additional

ntity

s

a

different

ategorial

tem,

.e.

inherence.

Accordingly,

cotus holds that

in a

compound entity

uch as

Socrates-white here are

actually

three

things:

ocrates,

his whiteness nd

the nherence

y

which

Socrates'white-

ness inheres

n

Socrates.

This

analysis

s

only

apparently

more

complicated

han the

standard

one. It is true that

Scotus

posits

an

additional

hing

n

order to account

for

compound

entities. ut he is able to

explain why

a

substance nd

a

qualityconstitutes unitywithout ppealingto semi-thingsonstituting

the natures f accidents

uch

as

modes of

being

or

mysterious

ntities f

that sort.

All

the basic constituents

f the world are extramental

hings.

So,

in

orderto unite

two

things,

heremustbe

a

third

hing inking

hem.

No

special

explanation

s

required.

There seems to

be

a

serious

problem

n

Scotus's

view,

however.

f

inherence

s itself n

accident,

t inheres

n

a

quality

or a

quantity y

way

of a

second inherence.

n

turn,

his econd

inherence

s an

accident;

consequendy,

t

inheres

n

the first nherence

by

way

of

a

third

nher-

ence, and so on. The way seems to be open to an infiniteegress.

Scotus s

fully

ware

of this

problem,

which

Henry

of

Ghenthad devel-

oped

into

a

critique

of the real distinction etween a

relation and its

foundation.

cotus's

solution

s

based on his treatmentf the

second

ques-

tionthat have mentioned

bove,

namely

he

asymmetry

etween

bsolute

and

non-absolute ccidents.For it is true

that Scotus holds that all the

46

ee

Duns

cotus,

ect.

,

d.

17,

.

2,

q.

4,

n.

239,

n:

Opera

mnia

VII,

d.Commissio

Scotistica,

ivitas aticana

966,

57-8:

Credo utem

uod

hocestunum

erbum

e

difficilioribushilosophiae,cilicetunitas'; ultaenim unt ccultaenitateserum,uae

nobisatent.

onsiderabam

liquando

ultoties

uomodo

omo-album

eriusaciuntnum

quam

i essent

eparata:uod

nim acitnhaerentialbedinisd

hominem,

on

st

li-

qua

realitas

ddita,

et arnen

uando

lbedo st n

homine,

unc

sthomo-album

unum',

et non

uando

unt

eparata".


96/215

SGOTUS'S

EALIST

ONCEPTIONF

THE

CATEGORIES

95

categories re extramentalhings n the same sense of 'thing5.He also

thinks, owever,

hat the

way

in

which

each

category

s an

Vivarium - Vol Xliii, No 1, 2005

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