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CONTENTS OF VOLUMEXXII(1984)

Jerold . Frakes TheAncientoncept f

asus anditsEarlyMedievalnterpretations 1

Paul M.J.E. ummers Albertus agnus View n the Anglewith pecial Emphasis n HisGeometry nd Metaphysics 35

JoelBiard L unit u Monde elonGuillaume Ockham 63

BooksReceived 84Thomas . Maloney RogerBacon on Equivocation 85

P Marijke an Der Biji Petrus erchorius edivivus LesSermons e Bersuire 113

John . Doyle Prolegomena o a Study f ExtrinsicDenominationn the Work fFrancisSuarez, .J. 121

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VivariumXII,1 1984)

The AncientConceptof casusand its EarlyMedievalInterpretations

JEROLDC.FRAKES

The essential conflictn Boethius'De Consolationehilosophiaes thatbetweenthe principlesofdivineorder and random events. The prob-lematic is articulatedprimarily n terms of the relationshipbetweenthe BoethianPrisonerand the personifiedFortuna, the traditionallyfickle ontroller f earthlygoods.UltimatelyFortuna (and fortuna1)sdeniedany intrinsicvalue,2as well as any independentcontroloverworldlyaffairs, ince she is subjectedto fatum the manifestation fdivine ordo n the material world, and thus also to divineprouidentiaitself.Bythismeans Fortunais integrated nto the divine ordoand theseemingdisordercausedby fortuna n the world may be explainedasthe result of man's epistemologicallimitations: instances of themetaphysicalhierarchywhich exist on a higher level than man arebeyondhis powersofcomprehension.3Evenafter hePrisonerhas ac-ceptedPhilosophia'sspecific rguments concerning ortuna, owever,he is not yet prepared to acceptthe abstractprinciplenecessitatedbythis analysis:i.e. that the all-encompassingdivine ordo recludestheexistenceof any and all random events.

Thus Boethiuspresents in Cons.V, pr. 1 a brief analysisof theabstractconceptof casus. This treatment s heavilydependenton theAristotelian nd post-Aristotelian nalyses,but Boethius omits much

1AterminologicalistinctionetweenFortuna',hepersonificationndsometimedeity, nd fortuna'thegeneralonceptf fortunes maintainedn thefollowingpages.2Thisdenialfvaluesbasednthreerguments:)Fortunainabilityograntheone rue ood,he ummumonmII,pr. v,25); 2)the ack f alue nmaterialoods,duetotheirnherentphemeralitynd rbitraryain nd oss,.e.withoutegardomeritII, pr. v-pr.viii); )fortuna'sltimateubjectiono he ivine rder nd husteleologica ,f pistemologicallybscure,ctionIV, pr.vi).Referencesre o he di-tion f he ConsolatioyLudwigieler, CL94,Turnhout957.3Onthe pistemologicalestrictionsmposedyBoethius'metaphysics,eemyDieRezeptioner euplatonischenetaphysikes oethiusurchlfrednd otkern:BeitrgeurGeschichteerdeutschenprachendLiteratur,061984).

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of the traditional material and incorporates ubtle alterations nto hisargument, especiallyin changing the emphasesof the Aristotelian

presentation, resulting to a certain degree in a new definition ofchance.The concept naturallyundergoesfurthermodifications n thepost-Boethiantradition. The first ttempts o assimilatethe systemfthe Consolation the vernacular were the translationsby Alfred theGreat in the ninth century nto Old Englishand by Notker Labeo atthe turn of the eleventhcentury ntoOld High German. Theyfurthermodify he tradition derivedfrom antiquity, not only by translatingthe text of the Consolatiotheir principlesourcefor that tradition,butalsoby attempting o translate Boethius' systemof thought n suchafashionas to render it accessibleto their own cultures. The presentstudy nvestigates heconceptof casus as it is developed byBoethius,Alfred and Notker n the context of the tradition. The analysismustthen beginby establishing hiscontext, nd thus Aristotle'sdiscussionofthe topicmust be briefly reated, ince his wasthe first ull xamina-tion ofthe problem,which then throughBoethius'adaptationbecamethe basis for medievalanalyses.

Aristotle evotes three haptersofhisPhysicsII, 4-6)to the problemof chance, the first f which deals with the conceptas treated by hispredecessors, especially Democritus.4Various partial theories ofchanceare mentioned n II, 4onlyto the extent necessary o show thata full nalysisof the problemhad notyetbeenconducted.Manyofthepre-Socraticphilosophersdenied the existence ofchance, an opinionstrongly efuted y Aristotle n II, 5: "For weknowthat things f thiskind are due to tuch nd things due to tuch re of this kind"(1965-17).5His argument is a detailed analysisof the nature ofchance events.He first distinguishesbetween three kinds of events:the necessary, the usual and the unusual (1960-15).Amongthe

4On Aristotle'sonceptf chance,ee Vincenzoioffari, ortunendFateromDemocritusoSt. ThomasquinasDiss.Columbia935),1-32;Friedricholmsen,Aristotle'systemf hehysicalorldthaca, Y1960, 02-108;ugustinansion,n-troductionlaphysiqueristotlicienne,nded.,Louvain946, 92-314;W. D.Ross,Aristotle5thed.,London1949,75-81;HeleneWeiss,Kausalittnd ufalln derPhilosophieesAristotelesBasel 1942.Fora discussionfchancenDemocritus,eeCyrilBailey,TheGreektomistsndEpicurusOxford 928rpt.NY1964),121 &139-143,ndCioffari,-15,sp.his ritiquefBailey'snterpretation,.6ff. enryChadwickrieflyharacterizesristotle'sonceptf hancendBoethius'nterpreta-tion f t, nBoethiusThe onsolationsfMusicLogicTheologyand hilosophyOxford1981,19&244.5CitedccordingoAristotlePhysicsed. W. D.Ross,OxfordyJb. ranslationstthis nd all other assagesitedn the ollowingagesremy wn.

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unusual events are those which are to be called chance events,characterized lsoby theiroccurrenceper ccidenskata umbebkos, i.e.incidental to the final cause

(196b23-24).6 Additionally,and

despitethe fact hat they re unexpectedand unintended,chanceeventsservea purposeand thushaveteleological mport1967-22).The examplegivenis of a man who decidesto go to the market, whichhe rarelydoes,and while there meets one of his debtors,whohappensto havejust madesomecollectionsofhis own and is thus able to repayhis owndebt (196b33- 197a5). The repayment was neither expected nordirectly ought at that time, but it was indeed a teleologicalevent,since it serveda purposeand wouldhavebeensought,had it beenan-

ticipated.As Vincenzo Cioffaripoints out in reference o another ofAristotle's xamplesofa chanceevent,thediscovery f the buriedgold{Metaphysics, 30; 1025al4-19),7the farmer's discoveryof the gold,whileplowinghis field s attributable o chance,whilehis finding eadleaves wouldnot be, sinceit wouldhaveneitherpositivenor negativevalue.8Finally,chance isbynature nconstant 197a30-32).Aristotle'spreliminary efinition f chance (tuche)s thus: "It isevidentthen thattuchs an incidental ausein connectionwith hoseactions for he sakeof somethingwhich involves a deliberate choice (kata proairesin"(197a5-6).In PhysicsI, 6, however,Aristotle roposesa twofolddistinction nthe conceptof chance, hitherto onceived as aunity:9between tuchand automaton. he distinction s not altogether lear as elucidatedbyAristotle,since automaton as twosignifications:1) it is the genericterm ignifying hanceeventsin general,includingtuchs a subclass(197a36- 197),and 2) it denotes the speciesof chance events whichaffect nanimateobjects,beasts and children all of whichparticipatein nature phusisbut not in intelligencenous) i.e. their acts are notdeliberateand purposeful197b6-13).Tuch on theotherhand, has todo withthose events whichcomeabout as a result of the intention frationalbeings thosewhichparticipatenot only in phusisbut alsoinnous197-6and 1978-22).106On the xceptionalnd ccidentalaturef hancevents,eeRoss,Aristotle75 ndCioffari,8-24.7Ed.byW. D.Ross,Oxford924.8Cf.Cioffari,3.9Thedistinctionsalreadyintedt n I, 5 197a6-8)nthe inkingf ucheproairesisanddianoia.10Here he istinctionsbetweenhusisndproairesis197b22);nd ater t sbetweenphusisnddianoia198a4)ndphusisndnous198a5-6ndMetaphysics, 8 1065b4).

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In additionto this analysisof the physicalnature of chance,Aristo-tle also examinesits metaphysicalnature in order to determine ts

causalfunction. n II, 5 he alreadynotesthat chance is no morethanan incidentalcause: 4'and tuchs an incidentalcause,but strictly t isthe cause of nothing" (197al3-14).Tuch nd automatonre in fact n-cidentalto the two efficient auses alreadymentioned:

Nowthasbeen xplainedhat utomationnd uchre ndhowheyifferromeachother. oth elongothe ype fcauseswhich ealswith hemannerfchanges,or ither naturalr n ntelligentgentsalwayshe ause,ut hereis aninfiniteumberf uch auses.198a -5)

This beingthe case, tuch nd automatonnly simulate the teleologyof

the efficient auses,sincethey produceresultswhichostensiblymighthave been produced by nousand phusis and in fact are causedbythem), respectively 198a5-6);the simulationis due to the essentialcharacter of tuch nd automatons unintentional, ndeterminate ndincomprehensible.To takethe instanceof the buried goldas an exam-ple: the burier of the goldhid the treasure efficient ause) with he in-tention f ater recoveringt final cause); the farmer ughis field effi-cientcause)with the intention f planting final cause). His discoveryof the gold is thus incidental to both final and both efficient auses,which is however,not to say withoutcause: that the goldwas in hisfieldand that he plowedhis fieldeachhas a clearlydiscernible ausalseries.That the two 'accidentally'coincideis chance.As Ross aptlysummarizes,4'chance issimplya name for the unforeseenmeetingoftwo chainsof rigorouscausation."11

Thus Aristotle integrates even chance events into his systemofcausality.In doingso, he points beyondthe mmediatepurposesof hisargument, as in indicatedat the end of II, 6:

But inceutomatonnd uchre auses f ffectsorwhichousrphusis ightethe ause whenomethingomesocause heseame ffectsncidentally),ndsince othinghichs ncidentalsprior othatwhichspere it s clear hat oincidentalausesprioro causeere.Thusutomatonnd uchreposterioronousndphusisconsequently,omatter owmuch utomatonay ethe ause ftheheavens,ousndphusisrenecessarilyrior ausesfboth he niversendmany ther hingsn t. 198a5-13)

Just as substancemust alwaysbe antecedentto 'accidents'(attributes

In each ase thedistinctionsbetween aturalmpulsendthought,ndRossed.Physics518) suggestshat ianoiandproairesisreused ynonymouslyn this ense.11Aristotle78.Rossterminologyeres similaro hat sed n ater evelopmentsthe radition:x onfluentibusausisnCons., pr. , 13;seebelow,p.8-10.

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and relations),12o mustdeterminate nd teleological causality alwaysunderliechance events.The cosmosand all events and acts contained

by it are causedand purposeful.This cosmicorder, onlyhinted at inAristotle'stechnicalanalysisofchance,becomesBoethius'overridingconcernand determineshis methodof dealingwith chance and incor-poratingcasusnto his metaphysical ystem.

The definitionof chance in Boethius' Consolatioas legitimatelybeenlabelled Aristoteliann itsgeneral plan.That it strictly dheres toAristotle's nalysis,however,as H. R. Patchsuggests, s untenable.13Boethius'argumentalsomakes useof post-Aristotelian hought, nd

his definition f the conceptof casus at least in the Consolatiois muchlessdetailed than Aristotle's.This brevitymust not be understood asan indicationof disregard, however. The discussionof casus is setrather n the context f the whole of the Consolatiowithwhich t formsa unity and from whichit indirectly erivesfurther efinition.For-tuna, traditionally he vacillatingcontroller f the material realm, isreducedto a low-level ministern the divineorder, responsiblefor hedistribution f material goods, bymeansof which men are rewarded,punished,corrected r tested.14Casusn the popularsenseof causelessevents is denied by Boethius, since the divine order permeates allaspectsof the material realm. His technical analysis,set in this con-text, has different oints of emphasis and proceedssomewhatdif-ferently han does Aristotle's.

The first ndication that suchan analysisof the physical conceptofchance is in the offing omes in IV, pr. v, after Philosophiahaspresentedher casefor he problemof evil and the ultimatepunishmentof the wicked n their nability o attain the summum onmIV, pr. iv).Here the Prisoner once more voices his dissatisfaction withPhilosophia's recurring rgument n favor of a beneficent rderingofevents. His complainthere seems todiffer nly in degreefromhis in-itial emotionallament in I, m. i:

12Aristotelisateeoriae,d.L.Minio-Paluello,xford 949, ap. V-V Ib25-4bl9).13Patchrgueshat oethius'ortunasmerelyhe personificationfAristotle'sin-cidentalause'whichsultimatelyubservientoa rationaleity" TheTraditionfBoethiusAStudyfHismportancenMedievalultureNewYork 935, 18].CertainlytheBoethianortunand hance ould erelatedn ome uchmanneralthoughherelationshipsactually uchmoreomplex),ut he dentificationfAristotelianndBoethianhances naccurate.14IV,pr.vii, .FortunassubordinateodivinerovidencehroughhemediationffatumIV, pr.vi,11&19)

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"Now greatly onder hy hesehingsre hangedround, iceersaand hepunishmentshichreduethewickedppresshegood,while hewickedeizethe ewardsue he ood,nd wouldike o earn rom ouwhatmightppearto be the xplanationf uch njust onfusion."IV, pr. v, 4)

But the difference s in factmuch greater than merelyone of degree,for the Prisoner no longercomplainsof his personal' 4fortunes,' butinquires into the nature of a philosphical concept,which he, theerudite student of philosophy,has found in all systemsof ancientthought.Philosophia's argumentationhas shown that the confusion frandomevents,ruledbyfortunadoesnotobtain;rather, rigid ystemof divine order regulatesthe cosmos.The acceptanceofthistenetdoes

little to placate the Prisoner's inquietude, however: "since he fre-quently grants delights othe goodand unpleasant things o the wick-ed, and at other times, grants the wicked theirwishes,whilemetingout harshnessto the good,why shouldGod's rule seem any differentfrom that of random chance (

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immediatelythat chance exists at all, if defined as random eventswithout cause: "If indeedanyone were to define casus as anevent

(iuentusproduced by random motion (temerario otu) nd not by acausalnexus,then would declare that casus snothing t all" (V, pr.i, 8). The initial argument presented concerns the all-embracingdivine order: "For what placecan remain for randomness(temeritatiwhen God imposesorder on all things?' (V, pr. i, 8). Secondly,Philosophiacalls on ancientphilosophicalauthority n the use of thephrasenihil xnihilos a denialof chance events V, pr. i, 9). Her useof this topos is strikinghere since it has a novel application.In thephilosophicalradition, ts applicationhad alwaysbeento the originof

matter,whichnecessarilyxisted withoutbeginning nd end, wherebycreatiox nihilos denied.15The Christiandoctrineof divine creationofmatter adamantly opposessuch a tenet, of course, and as AugustHildebrandhas pointedout, Boethiuswas oftencastigated by Chris-tian interpreters or followingthe pagans here.16 But Philosophia'spurposeat this point is obviouslyquite different rom any denial ofdivine creatio x nihilo.Rather, using the phrase in a new sense- concerningcausality she emphasizeseven more strongly he il-legitimacy f a conceptof chance whichis based on the principleofcauseless events.In addition, by using the phrase, she manages atleastindirectly oderivesome semblanceofauthority rom he ancientphilosophers.

The dissatisfaction f the Prisoner with this total denial of chance isexpressed in words which already hint at the conclusion ofPhilosophia's argument:"Well then, is there nothingwhichcan pro-perlybe called chanceor accidental(casus uelfortuitum)? r is theresomething o whichtheseterms re appropriate,althoughhiddenfromcommonpeople?" (V, pr. i, 11). This query calls forth he third ofPhilosophia'sargumentsconcerningchance, this time based directlyonAristotle, s Philosophiaherself ndicates:"My Aristotle efined tsuccinctlynd near the truth n hisPhysics (V, pr. i, 12).17The initialdefinition ivenis indeeddrawn from PhysicsI, 5, but it is alsoclearthat the definition s strippedof a number of ts essentialcomponents:

15 eeJoachim ruber, ommentaru Boethiuse consolationehilosophiaeBerlin1978),79-80ntheuse of his oncept rior o Boethius.16August ildebrand,oethiusndeinetellungumChristentmeregensburg885,90-93.17Gruberites xamplesromhepre- ndpost-Aristotelianraditions,he atter fwhichmayhavebeen f mportancenBoethius'nalysispp.380-81).

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' 'Wheneversomething s done for he sake of some particularpurpose,and for certain reasons something ccursother than what was intend-

ed, it is called casus (V, pr. i, 13). The immediatelyfollowing x-emplum, that of the golddiscoveredby the plowingfarmer, oesnotoccurin Physicsbut rather n Metaphysics.t is introduced by Boethiusas conciselyas by Aristotle:4'As, for heexample,if someonediggingin the ground in order to cultivate a field were to find a quantityofgold" (V, pr. i 13).The subsequent explanationof the exemplumis,however,not found anywhere n the worksof Aristotle,but seems tohave been derived from ancient commentaries on the Aristoteliantext:18

Nowhis s ndeedelievedohave ome boutortuitouslyfortuito),ut t doesnot esult rom othingdenihilo; for t has ts wn auses,he nforeseenndunexpectedoncurrenceconcursus)fwhich eemso haveproducedchanceeventcasum).or f he ultivatorf he ield adnot ug he round,nd f hedepositoradnot uried ismoneyn that lace,he oldwouldothave eenfound. hese rethus he auses f hat ortuitousrofit, hichsproducedycausesmeetingne anotherndcoming ogetherexobviisibi t confluentibuscausis, notby he ntentionf he gent. orneitherhe newhohid hegold,nor he newhoworkedhe ieldntendedhemoneyobefound,ut, sI said,ithappensconuenit)ndcomesboutconcurrit)hatwhere he neburiedt, heother ug. V, pr. , 14-17)

WhileAristotle'sexplanation(note 7, above)dealsonlywiththe no-tion that the finding f the treasure s incidentalto the digger tiorut-tonti, and thus by extension ncidental to the finalcause, Boethiusisconcernednot onlywith the result as incidental to the final cause (nonexgerentintentionerouenit, but also with the meetingof two streamsofcausality exobuiis ibietconfluentibusausis).Based on theexplicationofthis exemplum,Philosophiagivesher final definition f casus "Thuswemaydefinecasusas an unexpectedevent due to the conjunctionof

causes(exconfluentibusausis)withaction done for ome purpose" (V,pr. 1, 18).The onlydifference f notebetweenthisdefinition nd thatoffered n V, pr. i, 13is the phraseexconfluentibusausisa formulation

18Pierre ourcellergues or commentaryromheNeoplatonicchoolnAlexan-dria, robablyhe ommentariesySimpliciusndPhiloponusn the hysicsbasedon the nowost) ommentaryn thatworkyAmmoniusLaConsolatione hilosophiedansatraditionittraire.ntcdentst ostriteBoeceParis 967,13-19];e lsopointsoutthe imilarityetweenheBoethianreatmentf chance nd thediscussionyAlexanderfAphrodisianhis ract eJatoBoecetV cole 'Alexandriein:Mlangesd'Archologietd'Histoire,2 1935),sp.p.218].Jan ulowskiasunconvincinglyproposedorphyry'sommentaryn theTimaeuss the ourceere, inceBoethius'allother orks" sic] ependon that isciplefPlotinus"?]:Theourcesf oethiusDeconsolationehilosophiae,n:Sophia9 1961),8.

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which does not occur in Aristotle, nor does any expressionof anequivalentthought. Yet, as Cioffaripoints out, the phrase and idea

had longbeenpart of the tradition, usedby Simplicius,Themistoclesand in the Pseudo-Plutarch; in Chalcidius' commentary on theTimaeus similarphrase is found:19

Therefore,ven ortunefortunacanproperlye definedhus:ortunes the on-currencef wo oincidentausesconcursuscadentiumausarumuarum)hichderivenitiallyromn ntention;romhis oncurrenceomethingurprisingsproducedeyondhat hich as ntendedpraeterpentumdmiratione).Comm.nTim. 59)20

The significance f the phrase for Philosophiabecomesclear in the

next sentence,which puts chance, newly defined, into relationshipwith the other aspectsof the Boethian metaphysical ystem:"But theconcurrence i oncurrenand confluence confluere)f causes is effectedby that order whichproceeds bythe nevitablecausal nexus and whichdescends from heprovidential ource,ordering ll things n theirpro-per placesand times" (V, pr. i, 19).Thus, chance events arenot un-caused,but, mediatedby the hierarchy f metaphysicalnstances, n-deed causedby prouidentiatself. n fact, the explanationis reminiscentin its terminology f the discussionof the cosmic orderitself,where

prouidentiaonceives andfatum xecutes(IV, pr. vi, 7-8). In this way,casusin its reducedsense)also becomesan integrad art of the divineordo The onlyreasonfordesignating vents casuat all seems to be thatthey are unintentional and unexpected by humans. Chance is,therefore, s alreadyhinted at earlier in the prosa, a name devoidofmeaning,an inanisuoxV, pr. i, 8).

The specificetails ofAristotle'sdefinition f the conceptofchance,alreadymodified n the post-Aristotelian radition,are omitted fromthe ConsolatioThe omissionis, however,not due to Boethius' lack ofunderstanding f the conditions nherent n Aristotle'sdefinition, orhe examinesthem n detail withspecific eference o the Physics)n hiscommentary n Cicero's Topica.He notes that there are three typesofevents: 1) necessary("immutable and always, as the rising of thesun"), 2) usual ("frequently, as a horse born with four legs"), 3)unusual("rarely, as a horsewithfiveor three egs") [Intop.Cic.comm.V; PL LXIV, 1152C-D]. Amongthe unusual acts are those termed

19Cioffari,1. SeealsoGruber,81,on other imilarhrasessednthe raditionbeforeoethius.20Ed.byJ. H.Waszink,lato atinusV(London962).

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fortunae nd casus whichoccur incidentallyto the final cause: ' 'in-cidentati ause ... of effects roduced in those things done for some

purpose' (1153B).The distinctionbetween tuch nd automatonsmaintained, in that acts of fortuna ertain to events of human will(uoluntas, while casushas to do with the non-rational denatura as theterm s used here; 1153C-D).That such events are teleologicals notemphasizedby Boethius in his argument at this point, but sincechanceevents occur in the context of natural or volitionalacts, theyare by definition eleological,sinceuoluntasnd natura re necessarilypurposeful.

In the Consolatioon the other hand, there s no explicitanalysisof

any of the three conditions. In V, pr. i, 13 (quoted above, p. 8),it s indicatedthat a chance event s one whichoccurs nsteadof the n-tended outcome of an action; but that the chance event is itselfteleologicalis not explicitly tated. The reason for this 4'omission'maybe found, however, n the context of the discussion: since casus sno more than an 4'event due to a confluenceofcauses" (euentusxcon-fluentibusausis, and these causes derivefrom rouidentiathen casussbydefinition eleological,sinceguidedbythe ultimateorderingprinci-ple. The exceptionaland accidental characterof chanceevents s alsoimplicit n the contextof the Consolatiothey re exceptionalsincetheyseem o occuroutside the controlof divine ordo IV, pr. v); they re ac-cidentadnsofar s theyresult x onfluentibusausis ndnot from clear-ly discernibleefficient ause.

Further, Boethius doesnot explicitly analyze the distinctionbe-tweentuch nd automatonwhich was soimportant o the Aristotelianconceptof chance, and which was retained in the post-Aristoteliantradition, including Boethius' commentary on Cicero's Topica(1153C-D),with few exceptions.The traditionalLatin equivalentsoftheAristotelian erms alsousedby Boethius n hiscommentary n theTopicaarefortuna tuchnd casus automatonas is seen inChalcidius'commentary n the Timaeus.There casus s retained n the Aristoteliansense,applyingto non-rationalbeingsand things: "Thus casuswillbethe concurrence concursus, at one and the same time, of accidentalcauses without plan ( accidentiumine ratione ausarumin inanimatethings or inarticulate animals" (Comm inTim. 159).The useoffor-tuna also strictly ristotelian, s seenin the passagequotedabove(p.

9)from the same

chapterof Chalcidius'

commentary.Chalcidius

does not, however, retain Aristotle's subordination of the incidentalcauses casus andfortuna o the efficient auses phusisand nous,but

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rather ubjectsthem both to fatum.21 nd, as has alreadybeen noted,Boethius'practicehere is similarto Chalcidius',sincehe attributes ll

earthly vents to the directcontrolof atum and thus ultimately o thecontrol of prouidentia. o explicitdistinctionbetween the operativeareas of Aristotle's two incidentalcauses isattempted. It is for thisreasonthat Jan Sulowskidespairsat Boethius'confusionof casus andfortuna.22here is no confusion,however;Boethius'argument, s ex-pressedby Philosophia,is clear, despitethe factthat n V, pr. i it dif-fersfromAristotle's n PhysicsI and fromhisown in the commentaryon Cicero.In the Consolatioe is concernedspecificallywiththe argercontextof the metaphysicalordo nd views theproblemof casusfrom

that perspective. n this context he main issue is that whichalso con-cerns Aristotleat the end of PhysicsI, 6: the ultimate order of allevents,eventhosewhichoccurostensiblywithout ause. The explica-tion of this order need not incorporatethe Aristotelianprinciplesofphusisand nous since it deals primarily with divine providence,towhichboth casus andfortuna re subject.23Viewed from hisperspec-tive, there may or may not be two different ssentialcauses,depen-ding on ontologicaldistinctions, but that is not the point. TheAristoteliandistinction s, therefore, mitted here. Casus issubjecteddirectly o the singlecausaefficienswhichis prouidentia.

Yet, whileomitting heAristoteliandistinctionbetweenfortuna ndcasus sincidental ausesin the technicalanalysisin V, pr. i, Boethiusmaintains,during the whole of the Consolatiothe two as discreteen-tities n essentially hesamecontrastive onstellation s that found nAristotle: ortunas never used in any context n which the technicalconceptof chanceis the subject.On the other hand, the terminologyused in this technicaldiscussionis not that which is used in theanalysisof the goddessFortuna, the goodsunder her control,or thestateeffected y her goods.Additionally,based on thespecific ontentof the Boethiandiscussionoffortuna nd casus there is an implicitdistinction etweenthembased ontheir perativefields: ortunasusedin reference o those events which have applicationto the realm ofhuman activity nd valuation (i.e. the granting and loss ofwealth,power, publicoffices,gloryand pleasure),whilecasusappliesto themechanics ofnatural events(i.e. the courseof rivers, the locationofmaterialevents(i.e. the courseof rivers, the locationof material ob-

21OnChalcidius'ystem,eeCioffari,sp.71-78.22Sulowski,7-88.23Cf.note 4above.

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jects and their reaction to natural laws). All essentialaspectsof theAristotelian definitionof chance are thus maintainedby Boethius,

althoughtheyundergoa majorchangeofemphasis,due to his concernwiththe largercontextof the metaphysicalorder, rather han with hedetailsof the specificmanifestation f that order.

The conceptof chance is expressedprimarilywith the use of thethree termsfortuita ortuitustemeritasand its derivative forms theadverb temerend the adjectivetemerrius) nd casus.The threeprimaryterms are often found together n one sentencein various combina-tions of adjectiveand noun forms,without learcut ndividual distinc-tion in meaning. Both temerariusnd fortuitus an modify asus "Doyou think, then, that the world is governed by random and chanceevents temerariis fortuitisqueasibus, or do youbelieve thatsomera-tional principle regimenationis)ules it?" (I, pr. vi, 3). The chanceevent is contrasted through each term with the rule of reason.Temerariusould wellbe interpreted n its usual sense,"without direc-tion or plan," whilefortuitus rovidesa similarcontrast o regimena-tionisn the commonand rather non-specificense which t stillhas inmodernEnglishfortuitous24n the sentence mmediately ollowinghisexample, the terms seem almost to be "remixed," and it becomesclear that ortuitusnd temerariusemeritatusre not to be interpreted scontrasting erms:"Certainly I could neverbelieve thatevents of suchregularity re due to fortuitous emerity fortuita emeritate" (I, pr. vi,4). The contrast s rather obe foundbetween the combinedsignifica-tion of this groupof terms of the semantic field "chance" and that of"divine order." The in-depth nalysis of chance in V. pr. i makes useof all three terms. But in the two definitionsof chance given byPhilosophia,the term casusalone appears: the term which had tradi-

tionallybeen used in Latin to render Aristotle's automatonnd which

was to becomethe standard term for chance in subsequentmedievalLatin analyses.25

The question remains, however, what significancethe Boethiandistinction etween thetwo terms ortunand casusmighthave. It is notas simple as Patch and Cioffari maintain that casusis merelythetechnical term for the underlyingprincipleof causless events(Patchspecifies"chance" as conceivedby Aristotle),whilefortunas the per-sonification f thisprinciple.26ortunas usedin a number of verydif-

24ThesaurusinguaeatinaeLeipzig 926),VI/1,1172-75nfortuitus." Ibid.Leipzig 906-1912),II,576-70 n casus.26Patch, 18;Cioffari,9.

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ferent enses: as the name of the personifiedFortuna, but also inreference o her gifts nd to the state of happinesswhichthese gifts

cause. Casussignifies he confluenceof causes which, dependentonprouidentiaproduces events in the world which are unexpectedorunintentional.The Aristoteliandistinction eems not to be applicablein a strict ensefor he same reasons- fortuna as a widerspectrumofsignificationsthan is present in Aristotle's analysis.27The basicdistinctionbetweenthem is that fortuna s applicableto the realm ofhuman affairs, nd casusto the mechanics ofnatural events.

The Aristotelian analysis of chance, which Boethius greatlymodifies, is further dapted in Alfred's work. The source of thegeneral argument concerningchance is identifiedby Alfred in histranslation of Cons.V, pr. i as Fisica(140, 9),28but none of theAristotelian onditionsnecessaryfor n event to be termed apotuchesall but one of whichwere omittedfrom explicitmention in the Con-solatio,re analyticallyreatedby Alfred.Yet here, as in Boethius'text,it is the case that the Aristotelian conditions are in fact present,although n radicallymodifiedform.The unexpectedresult unwenungagebirede140, 10-11)of an act is similar to Aristotle's rare/unusualevent. That chanceis not an efficient ause, but only incidentalto anefficient ause, is present n Alfred's denial that anything ccursout-side ofGod's ultimatecontrol.Andthat such eventsare teleologica sassumed in this subjectionto God's beneficent order. Aristotle'sdistinction between tuch nd automaton nd their operative areas,essentiallyretained by Boethius in the concepts fortuna nd casus(althoughnot specificallynalyzedas by Aristotle), re abandonedbyAlfred n his restructuring f the Boethianmethaphysical ystem.Dueto the magnitudeof this restructuring, brief xplicationof the Alfre-dian modifications, s it bears on the conceptof casus is inorder.27Thelater evelopmentf tuches, however,n many espectsimilaro(andpossiblynfluentialn)the emanticevelopmentf ortunaespeciallyn ts iteraryuse.SeeW. C.Greene, oiraFateGoodand vil nGreekhoughtCambridge,ass.1948.28Alfred'sexts cited ypage nd inenumber,ccordingothe dition yW.J.Sedgefield,ing lfred'sld nglishersionfBoethiusDeconsolationehilosophiae,1899,rpt. armstadt968).hetextualroblemsnAlfred'sranslationf heCon-solatioremanifold,ue speciallyo heCotton ire f 1731,whicheverelyamagedthe arliest anuscript:ondonMCottonthoA.VI.Sedgefieldupplementedhereadingsf hismanuscriptasbasetext)with eadingsrom xford, odleian80(2079)ndprintedheattern talicnhis onflateddition.hereadersreferredoSedgefield'sditionor his extualnformation.

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In his prefaceto the translationof Gregory'sLiberregulaeastoralisAlfred xplainshis method of translation s "hwilum word be worde,

hwilum andgit of andgiete" ('sometimesword for word, sometimesmeaning for meaning').29His translation of Boethius' Consolatioadheresto the atter principleevenin rendering hegeneralargumentof the work, for Alfred'stext s muchlessa translation hanan inter-pretiveparaphrasewith commentary.He abandonsto a greatextentthe dialecticalprogressof the Boethian argument, since he acceptsboth Philosophia'sultimate denial of the independentontroloffortunaover human affairs nd the affirmation f the incontrovertible ivineordond then mposeshis owninterpretation f this philosophicalposi-tion onto the work even in the early stages of his translation.30HeeliminatesFortuna, the grantor f materialgoods,from he work andsubstitutes hepersonifiedWisdom,an attribute f divineprovidence( godcundeoreponcin that role (17, 11-14).When strippedof its activeroleas grantor, ortunas reducedto little morethan 4the stateof one'sfortunes' or 'lot'. This state is essentiallythe same asfatum themanifestations f the providentialplan in the materialworld. This be-ingthe case,whenAlfred ranslates ortunan the sense of lot', heusesthe same term s he does for atum wyrd.zxince casusas theprincipleof randomeventsopposedto the manifestation f divineorder, can bedealtwithonlyin relation to that order, a brief xcursuson wyrdmustbe includedhere.32

29King lfred's estaxon ersionfGregory'sastoralare, d.Henryweet, ETS45 &50 1871;rpt. ondon 958),.30OnAlfred'sestructuringf heBoethianrgument,eemyDieRezeption31Joseph osworth nd T. N. Toller AnAnglio-SaxonictionaryOxford 882,1287-88nd uppl. yT. N.TollerOxford921),51]istwhat appens,ate,or-tune, hance'sthe eneralignificationsfwyrd.hetermsused nnumerousar-ticularenses:. glossfLatin asuseventus,atum,ors,ortuna,orsII.fate,he ther-wise hanumanlyppointedrder f hings;II. in personalense,ne f he ates('Weird isters', arcae);lia, asa personification,ate, ortune;V. anevent: )with he pecialdea f hatwhichappensy he eterminationfprovidencerfate,2)in generalense,nevent,ccurence,ircumstance,ncident,act, hatsdone,adeed,naction; . what appenso person,ate,ortune,ot, ondition;a.fate,death; I. chance,ccident.heusagen Alfred'soethiusranslationssomewhatmoreestrictive,swill e demonstratederecf.however,osworth-Toller'sitationofAlfredianassagesromheBoethiusranslationn upportf ignificationsI, III,IV2,V).32Acomprehensivenalysisfwyrdannot eattemptedere. eeE.G.Stanley'scollectionfmaterialn the cholarlynterpretationfwyrdTheearchor nglo-SaxonPaganismCambridge964,2-122;erdWeber,Wyrd:tudienumchicksalbegrijferaltenglischenndltnordischeniteraturBerlin969;adislausMittner, urd: as akraleinderltgermanischenpik. ern 955;nd he ibliographicalnformationistednder

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generalacceptanceofnon-native nfluence n the Old Englishconceptof fate and fortune an, however, ead to extreme nterpretations lso,

as inJ. D. A. Ogilvy'sdenialof all non-Christian onnotations n OldEnglish wyrdand other Old English terms).39Studies of Alfred's use of wyrdn his translation f the Consolatiox-

hibit the same variety of interpretations s those found in generalstudies of wyrd nd analysesof the term n other works. F. A. Paynemaintains that wyrd s a force4'other than God's whoseextensive n-fluenceAlfredrecognizes."40She alsocontends that the Latin con-ceptsof atum ndfortuna ave 'little f ny relevance toa definition"ofwyrdsincethey re 4'colored... in medieval contexts y Boethius"(p.91). Yet it is preciselybecauseatum ndfortuna re Boethian and theirmedievalinterpretations ave a Boethianbasis thatthey re of the ut-mostrelevanceto a definition f wyrdespeciallywhenweareconcern-ed, as with Alfred, with a translation of the Consolationd of thesespecificconceptsby the Old Englishterm wyrdl urt Otten arguesinhis excellentstudy of Alfred's translation that Alfredopposes wyrdthroughout the work and denies the concept a place in hiscosmology.41n the most comprehensive tudy of wyrd odate, GerdWeber demonstrates that the influence of Romano-Christianliterature on Old Englishsemanticswas so profoundthat the late-antique conceptsof fate and Christian predestinationpermeatedtheintellectual nd spiritualworld of the iterateAnglo-Saxonsto such anextent, that the importanceof wyrdn Old Englishliterature 200 oc-currences) mightwellstem from this influence lone.42 Thus Weberrejectsthe notion that a pagan Germanicconcept,wyrdwas 'diluted'by Christianity othe extent hat t occurs only rarely n medievaltextsin the old pagan sense.Rather, he sees the semanticdevelopmentofthe term

proceedingfrom he

verygeneralGeschick'to a

progressive-ly more fatalistic ignification, ue to the ever increasing nfluence fthe late-antiqueLatin tradition f fatum ortuna. e thus emends B.J.Timmer's conclusion " Wyrd had lost all associationswith the

Augustinusder oethius?eschichtsschreibungnd pischeichtungmMittelalternd nderNeuzeitBerlin967-76.39Beowulf,lfredndChristianityin: Saints, cholarsnd Heroes:StudiesnMedieval ulture nHonor f CharlesW.Jones, d. M. H.King ndW. M.Stevens,ollegeville,N1977,9.40KingAlfredndBoethiusAnAnalysisf he ldEnglishersionf he onsolationfPhilosophy,adison968,9.41Knig lfredsoethiusTbingen964,4& 68-70.42Wyrd18-21.

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heathen belief in a superhuman, blind and hostile power whichdestines the lot of men" (Timmer, p. 30) to "Wyrddoesnot how ny

associations..." (Weber, p. 66). This statement shows the generaltendency f Weber's study, whichseeks todisprovethe traditionalno-tion that Alfred's wyrdhad any pagan associations;Weber ac-complisheshis purposeby arguingthat wyrd unctionsn Alfred's textas a translationof Boethius'fatum fortuna nd casus without furtherconnotations.43His conclusionsreflect this tendency: wyrdhas thegeneral significationsGeschick' and 'zufalligesGeschehen', whichhave four specific spects: 1)a singleevent, 2) the cosmicprocess,3)the fate ofan individual,4) an activegrantor f fate including wyrds

nomengentisf Fortuna)[pp. 65-66].The first hree categoriescorres-pond to Boethianfatum the last to BoethianFortuna; casusas such islackingin Weber's explanatoryschema(unlessit is subsumedunderone of the other categories,whichwouldobscure itsbasic, traditionalsignification).Weber's analysisof the particularaspectsof Geschick'seems,however,not to correspondto the Alfredian use of wyrd: hesemanticcategories active grantor' and casus are not representedbywyrdn the text.

As notedabove,Alfred ubstitutesWisdom forBoethius' Fortuna nthe active role as the grantor f material goods,and it is alsoWisdomwhoassumes Fortuna'sprosopopoeiain II, pr. ii (whichis of seminalimportancefor Boethius'personification f Fortuna). WhileBoethiusnever denies Fortuna the role as grantor but only stipulatesthat shefunctions n this role as a mediator between prouidentiand men),Alfred'sWisdom neverattributes his powerto wyrd.Weber's argu-ment p. 23) that wyrds the grantor n 27, 18-23is untenable, sinceWisdomspecifieshat Mod onlysays cwyst)hatwyrds responsibleforthe gifts; heimplication s that Wisdom denies that they are grantedby wyrd: Hwaethaefst u aetam gif e Jdu wyst seo wyrd eowgife" ('What doyouhavefrom he giftswhichyou saywyrd ives you'27, 21-22).In the entire work there are only two brief passagesinwhich t seems that wyrdmayfunction s grantor f the goods"aesil-can is to wenanne to eall daemgesaelume seowyrdbrengdissesandweardan lifes"('the same isto be thought of all the goodswhichwyrdbrings in this present life' 37, 30-38, 1) and "be eall )woruldgesaeldume seo wyrd brengd" ('concerningall the worldly

43Seeesp.p.42,whereWeber, araphrasingtten p.62)argueshat lfred's yrdcloselypproximatesheLatinortuna.

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goodswhichwyrd rings*39,10).44Yet by this point in Alfred'stext,Wisdom had already been establishedas the grantor of material

goods,and Boethius'Philosophiahasalready deemphasizedFortunatrole as agent and begun to concentrate on the material goodsthemselves nd the 'state of fortune' which the goodseffect Cons.II,pr. vi).45The corresponding erm n the Boethiantext at this point isindeedfortuna but it does not signify he goddess, as the contextshows:' 'Finallywemaydraw the same conclusionconcerningfortuneas a whole,in which, t is clear, there s nothingworth eekingand nointrinsicgood;it is not alwaysassociatedwith goodmen, nor doesitmake thosegoodwith whomit is associated"(II, pr. vi, 20). In thiscontext, the Alfredian"1seowyrd brengd" signifiesno more than'quas sors fert,' with no connotationof a granting gent.46

Yet Wisdomneverdeniesthe existenceofwyrd'7hisonlyconcern sto establish its subjugationto providentialcontrol, corresponding oPhilosophia'sconcernwith atum ndfortuna. or this reason,the deathat wyrd s a forceoperatingoutside the bounds of divine ordo s re-jected as consistently y Wisdomas by Philosophia.In Mod's initialcomplaint,God's control of wyrd s assumed: "Hwy '>ula Drihtenaefrewoldestp seo wyrd swa hwyrfan ceolde" ('Why, Lord, wouldyouever want wyrd ochangeso' 10, 17-18= fortuna, m. v, 29).It isonly God's allowingwyrd o be capriciousthat is at issue here, notwyr independenceof divine control. Further along in the samemetrm,fortuna s again translated with wyrd 10, 23-25), and hereagain divine control is emphasized,since the independentpowerofwyrdspresented s a hypothetical onstruct nd not an existent ntity.In his translation of the followingprosa, Wisdom summarizesthereasons for Mod's 'exile' from his native land (of Wisdom/

philosophy),one of whichis:

"[u]wendest

>seo weord

asworuld

44The formerassages cited yBosworth-Tollers anexamplef lia, 'a per-sonification,ate, ortune,'. 1288.45Elsewherenthe ext, lfredonsistentlyenies yrdhe owerf ranting aterialgoods:.g.25,28-31nd27,21-22,whereoethiusttributeshe oodso ortunafor-tneteonaII,pr.v,2).The St.GallAnonymousommentaryntheConsolatiolossesfortunaes deeEinsiedeln79, 21a).Alfredlearlyvoidsny uchnterpretationndevenny mbiguity hich ould ermituch n interpretation.46Cf.however, eberp. 23),who rgueshatwyrds here die Gabenverteilerin'Fortuna'.. zumindestnallegorischerorstellungsweise."47Otten bjectshat lfred'sf)[)wewyrd atad"'thatwhich e allwyrd128, 8= IV,pr.vi,10)has sits urposehe enial f he ctualityfwyrdsinceWisdomdoesnot ay"f>J> yrd id"('thatwhich yrds');infact, lfred's ords irectlytranslateoethius'atumocetur.

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wende heoreagenes donees butonGodes geeahte 7 his afunge 7monnagewyrht" '[You] thought hat wyrd overnedthis world ac-

cordingto itsownorderand outside God'sorder, his permission, ndthe meritsof men' 11, 5-7).There is no corresponding tatement nthe Consolatio,nd Alfred's insertion f this commentfurther tressesdivine controlof wyrd.Other similar nstancesare: "Gelefstdu 1 eowyrd wealdeisseworulde,odde auht godesswa geweordan maegebutan aem wyrhtan? .. Ne gelyfe .." ('Do you believethat wyrdgoverns this world or that anything good can occur without thecreator? .. I do not believe [it] 12, 16-18);"du saedestb >uwendebiosslidnewyrddas woruld wende butonGodesgeeahte" ('You said

that you thought hiscruelwyrd overnedthis worldoutside of God'sorder' 13, 24-25);"nu du geliefast sio wyrd urh hie elfebutanGodes geeahte as weoruld wendan ne maege" ('now youbelievethat wyrd annot governthis worldby itself, utside of God's order'13, 30-32).Weber argues (pp. 37-38)that in these passages wyrdsignifies oth Fortuna and the generalrandomnessof events. Yet innoneof the Boethianpassagesis the subjectFortuna: the first s I, pr.vi, 3 (cf. above,p. 12):the second "You think hese alternations ffortunes Jortunarumices)vacillate without governor" (I, pr. vi, 19);the third "We have the greatest ekindler f yourhealth n yourtruebeliefconcerning hegovernanceof the world: that t is subjectnot tothe haphazards of chance (casuumtemeritat)ut to divine reason(( iuinae ationi" (I, pr. vi, 20). Only in the secondpassageisfortunapresent,but its plural form an only signify one's fortunes' nd notFortuna;the other twopassagesdealwithcasus. t is clear that Mod atone time thought that wyrd ontrolled{wealdewende)arthly eventswithoutGod's ultimate control,but there is no evidencein the textthat Mod conceivedof wyrd s an activeagent, in the manner of For-tuna, and certainlynonethat Wisdom (or Alfred)wouldsupportsuchan opinion.That wyrds equivalentto casus ndthus signifies andomevents s equallyunsupportedby the text, since in each case Wisdomemphasizesthat it is inaccurate to think that wyrd ontrols earthlyevents, f wyrds thought o act independently f divinecontrol butonGodesepeahte)cemwyrhtan.48But, as Alfredconsistently rgues, it is

48The"butan" clausesave anequivalentnly n the econdBoethianassagewhereortunarumicesndnot asuss the ubject,.e. wherehe raditionalonceptfcasuss randomventssnot mmediatelyresent;therwised,he 'butan-clause sAlfred'sdditionothe ext.

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epistemologicalimitations:man is by nature incapableofunderstan-ding the divine order "Ac hit nis nanum men alefedaethe maege

witan eall p God getiohhodhaefd,ne eac areccan b he geworhthaefd" 'But it is grantedto no one to know all that God has plannednor to explainthat which he has done' 135, 6-8;the passageexpandson IV, pr. vi, 56).

In his translation f Boethius' technicalanalysisof chance in V, pr.i, Alfreddenies thatany eventstakeplaceby chance:"hit nis nauht pmon cwid, >aenig ingweasgebyrige" ('it is nothingthat men say,that anythinghappensby chance' 140,3-4).WhilePhilosophiabasesher argument V, pr. i, 8)on the all-encompassingordond the notion

of nihil xnihiloAlfred'sreasonsfordismissingrandom events s quitesimple and his argument quite circular: "Foraaelcing cimd ofsum ing, for it ne bid weasgebyred" (Tor everythingcomesfrom some cause, since it does not happen by chance' 140, 4-5).Boethius'argument s in generaldrastically educed;in fact ittle ur-vives intact xcepttheexemplumofthe buried gold (140, 9-17),whichAlfreduses to illustrate he principlethat chance (weasgebyred)ignifiesno more than unexpectedevents ( unwenungaebirede).o other con-ditionsare presented.That the discoveryof the goldis nonethelessacaused event isclear, but the ustification s not made in terms of exconfluentibusausis r ineuitabilionexioneCons.V, pr. i, 18-19).Wisdomseesthe causalityrather o be simply hepervasivedivine ordogovern-ed by providence:"Ac siogodcundeforetiohhung aerdeone e hewolde{he goldhydde, 7 eft done e he wolde hit funde" ('Butdivineprovidencetaught the one whomhe wished to hide the gold,and afterwards he one whom hewished to find t' 140,15-17= deprouidentiaeonte , pr. i, 19).49No intermediary ausesbetween God andearthly events, such as Aristotle'sphusis nd nous or even Boethius'fatum are admitted here, and no term 'chance' can any longer belegitimately sed: it was only 'formerly' used ('gio' 140, 10)and hasnowceasedevento be a 'sound without ignificance'inanisuoxWpr.i, 8), not translatedbyAlfred,but retained n se nama 'the name' 140,7), which translates Boethius' uocabulaV, pr. i, 11). Only in thereduced sense unexpectedor inexplicableevent' (which s nonetheless

49Theninth-centuryatin ommentaryn the onsolatioyRemigiusfAuxerrelsotendsnthe irectionf rouidentias the nly ause:rdosglossedambitusisposi-tions ei. xtra uem, tpraeteruemnihil mquamuit. st. ut rit" 'the rbit fGod'sorder, eyondndoutsidefwhichothingverwas,sor will e'Paris, Nlat.15090,5r).

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governed by providence)does casussurvive, and this only in thegeneral Alfredian term wyrd:" we onne hatad wyrd, x>nnese

gesceadwisaGod, 1aelces monnes dearfewat, hwaetwyrcd oddegeafad aese wene wenad" ('This then we call wyrd.when the ra-tional God, who knows the need of each person, does or permitssomethingwhichwe do not expect' 132,20-22).

As the text citations n the foregoing nalysisdemonstrate,Alfredrelies on twoterms n his discussionof chance: wyrd nd weas.50 et ashas been argued above, wyrd s the term used by Alfred for themanifestation f the providentialplan in theworld.Howthencan wyrdrender Boethian casus or the traditionalconceptof chance?Timmer

maintainsthat wyrd as "the secondarymeaningofchance,that whichhappens accidentlly." 51Gerd Weber argues similarly: "'Wyrd'[wird]zumInbegriff er 4Wandelbarkeitder Welt' schlechthin."52 nthe other hand, Payne, Otten and LudwigHelbigdenythat wyrd asanything to do with mutabilityor chance events,53nd in a certainsense this assessment is valid, although not for the reasons theygive they see wyrd s the Germanic powerof fate, whichby naturecould not be mutable, since inexorable. But, as has been arguedabove,wyrd as not a paganGermanicfate; t isessentially quivalentto Boethius'fatum nd fortuna as 'lot'), under divine control. Thuswyrd s never used by Alfred as the translation of casusunless it isqualified bya clausewhichhypothesizes direct ontrast etween wyrdand the providentialordoe.g. casusmay be translatedby "weord ...buton Godesgeeahte" (anevent ... outside of God's order' 11,6-7)and "wyrd ... butan aemwyrhtan" 'an event .. without he creator'12, 16-17),but not by wyrd lone, sincewyrd lwaysparticipates n thedivineordo128, 28-30).The "butan "-clausesignifies heimaginaryrandomnesswhich would obtain wereGod's controlnot to apply, andwyrd ccompaniedby the 4'butan "-clause accuratelyrenders casus.

In his translation f the technical analysisof casushowever,Alfreduses only the term weas 139, 19-140,17 = V, pr. i). Its direct cor-respondenceto the semantic value ofcasus is seenin the fact that

50v. weasnBosworth-Toller,. 1178:bychance,y ccident,ortuitously.'si WyrdnAnglo-Saxonrosend oetry30.52Wyrd31. He cites28, 9asevidence,.e.thevery assagewhichubordinateswyrdoprovidencecitedbove, . 20)53Payne, ing lfrednd oethius83;Otten, nigAlfredsoethius,1-62;udwigHel ie:, tenglischechlsselbepriffenden ugustinusnd oethiusearbeitungenlfredsesGroenDiss. Franfurt959,7.

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Alfred ranslates asuswithout dditionaltermsofqualificationn OldEnglish i.e. without4'butan" -clausesor the ike).Only in the first se

of the phraseis there any explanationof it, and there t is clearlyforthe purpose of defining a newly introduced technical term (125,12-14).The distinctionbetween wyrd nd weas isshownin Alfred'stranslationof Philosophia'slist of topics remainingto be discussed(IV, pr. vi, 4), whichincludes defati serie'the chain of fate') and derepentinisasibus'unexpectedevents'); Alfredtranslates "hwaetwyrdsie 7 hwaet weas gebergie" ('What wyrd s, and what happens bychance' 127, 19).In the chapterswhichfollow this ist, Alfred ncor-porateswyrdnto his systemof divineorder and reducesweas to a no-

tion of historical interest, since it was only legitimatelyused gio('formerly'). The pervasive divine order renders the conceptuntenable and the term superfluous.

Notker' treatment f the problemof casus ischaracteristic f hisworkingmethod n general:he reorders he Latin text d erudiendumc-cordingto establishedprinciplesof ordonaturalisconforming o theprincipleselucidatedin the St. Gall tractate, "Quomodo VII cir-cumstantie rerum in legendo ordinande sint".54 Following thereordered Latin text is a phrase-by-phraseor sentence-by-sentencetranslation nto Old High German. Technicaltermsof the Latin textare often rephrased' in Latin and incorporated nto Notker's text.This pedagogicalMischprosaossiblyreflects he usage of Notker'sclassroom.55Notker's Mischprosahas serious consequencesfor ananalysisofhis interpretation f any philosophicalconceptor semanticfield, since the translator is thereby freed from the obligation toestablish consistent ystem f terminologyn thevernacular despite

54t snot learwhetherotkersthe uthorf he reatise,ontainednBrusselss.10615-10729ndeditedyPaulPiper, ieSchriftenotkersnd einerchuleFreiburg1882-83,, xiii-xlix.n hisrecenttudy f Notker'smethodf translationn Mar-ianusCapella'sDenuptiishilologiaeturii, erbert ackesemonstrateshatNotker'seorderingf he atin extnaccordanceith he rinciplesf rdoaturalisisnotmerelysimplificationf he ext or he onveniencefhispupils,ut athersitself scholarlynalysisf theLatin yntax ymeans f ts reorganizationf thephrasallementsf heLatin ext: ieHochzeitesMerkursnd er hilologieSigmar-ingen982.hetractates nfour arts, fwhichnly he irst ay roperlyegiventhe itle Quomodo.." (cf.Backes,2).55ThistheorysadvancedyErnst chaumann,tudienuNotkersischprosain:JahresberichtesGymnasiumserk.-k.TheresianischenkademienWien1911),38.

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all Old High German 4synonyms given, the Latin term is always'dfinitive'. 6

Followingthe translation, Notker often adds commentsand ex-planations, some of which take the formof short excurses of severalpages.The commentsand excurses neverblatantly Correct' the doc-trine of the Boethian text, since, as Ingeborg Schrblerpoints out:" NotkerwillnichtBesserungvon etwasMiliebigem geben,sonderner ist berzeugt von der Rechtglubigkeitseines Textes oderwenigstens:er gibt keinem Zweifel daran Raum."57 YetNotker'smethod s that of an exegeticalcommentator the Consolatios seen aslatently Christian and demands exegesis in order to reveal andelucidate its hidden Christian meaning. This exegesis ultimatelyresults in major alterations n the Boethian text, often to the extentthat the Boethiansystem s scarelyrecognizablein Notker' transla-tion.58

In his translation f the technicalanalysisof casus nV, pr. i, Notkerdoes not initially ttempt translation f casusbut rather retains theterm n his Old High German text. But this is only one of the threediscussions of thegeneral concept.Longbeforehand,Philosophiaandthe Prisonerbroach the subject,as the atter first oicesconcernaboutthe lack of order in the world. In his translation of I, m. v, 45,"hominesquatimurfortunae alo" ('We men are buffeted y the seasof fortune'), Notker glosses fortuneretained in his translation)withuuluundigi'variability withina brief ime period'),59ndicating hat

56Jrgen aehrlingomments:DerBezugauf die lat. TerminologieerschafftNotkerlso inerseitsenRaum,ndem r prachschpferischtig erden ann ishin zumsprachlichenxperiment,hne da ihn bei ederAbweichungon derprzisenbersetzunger Vorwurf erUngenauigkeitreffenann.Dielat. Ter-minologieewahrthn ndererseitsavor, ineUbersetzungm edenPreis u ver-suchen, .h. um den Preis einerungenauender sprachlichichtkorrektenWiedergabe"Die hilosophischeerminologieotkerses eutschenn einerbersetzungerAristotelischenategorienBerlin969, 40].Heimplieshus hatNotkerr Notker'sGermanorboth)was sometimesncapablefpreciselyxpressingoethius'extnOldHighGerman,n argument hichNotkers creative ranslationonsistentlyrefutes.57NotkerII. von t. Gallenls bersetzernd ommentatoron oethiusDeconsolationePhilosophiae,ermaea.s.2(Tbingen953),.58Herbertolenderiscussesn detailNotkers methodf ommentarynd dapta-tion,modifyingchrbler'sdea f nterpretadohristianaSchrber,-20)nhisNotker'sConsolatio-ezeptionlswiderpruchsfreieraktikEineHypotheseBeitrgeurGeschichtederdeutschenprachendLiteratur,021980),25-38. headaptationsremorepronouncednthemetaphysicalystemhan n the onceptf asus.59Notker'sext s cited ypage nd inenumberf he dition yE. H.Sehrt nd

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hisinterpretation f the Prisoner'scomplaintextendsbeyondFortuna,the personality, o the abstractproblemof unordered events.60

Philosophia's responseto the Prisoner I, pr. vi) initiates hediscus-sionofchance assuch,and Notker ntroduceshere manyof the termswith which he willhandle the conceptthroughout he work:

Putasneuncmundumgitemerariist fortuitisasibus?ncredisnesse iullumegimenationis?unest udiseuurltlicheneskhteerlzenerennde tzzelingin?ideuunest udr-nausen ehinahti fter edo?('Doyou hinkhat hese ordlyventsroceedithoutontrol,nd trandom,ordoyou hinkheresany ationalrdern them' 1,7-11).

Nokter's Prisonerthendenies(justas didBoethius')that the cosmosisruled

by chance andaffirms he beneficent ivine order. After havingestablished the fact of God's rule, Philosophia'squestioningof thePrisonerconcerningthe governanceof the cosmosleadsher to delvefurther nto the actual meansof control:quibusubernaculis.he phraseis most reasonablyto be understood in this passage in the generalsense 'by what means [of governance]' Notker translates as mtuulemoodere'with what kind of rudder' 52, 6-7)and adds thecom-ment: "S uulta in lren dz prospera nde aduersa dero uurltegubernaculasnt" ('She wanted to teach him that properous and

adversethings re the governors f the world'52, 7-8).In thiscontext,rodermay wellhave no signification eyondthe Boethian'means ofcontrol', but one can alsoargue that Notker understoodgubernaculanthe alternate ense of rudder', associatedthe referencewiththe cono-graphicallywell-known udderofFortuna, and inferred reference yBoethiushere to "prospera et aduersa fortuna" as God's toolsofcon-trol n the world i.e. accordingto Boethius' finalpositionconcerningfortuna' placein the divineorder).61The incorporation ffortuna ntothe divinehierarchyunder God's control ater in the work is not loston Notker, and he expandson that notion and managesto include it

Taylortarek, otkerses eutschenerke, ATB32-34Halle/Saale933-34),ere 5,19-20.60OtherechnicaleferencesounorderedventsretranslatedyNotker ithoutstrictlyonsistentocabulary:'fortuitisebus.. teuuesldn"'fleetingortunes'86,22-24)nd inhisfortuitisebus.. an disnuueligningen"'inthese ncer-tain hings'4,21-23).hese ermsavepecificeferenceeitheroFortunaor othe bstractonceptf asusbut athereferimplyo he eneralonceptf nevitablechange.61Thevariousymbolsssociated ith ortunare llustratednddiscussedyR.Peter, ortunan:Ausfhrlichesexikoner riechischenndmischenythologieed. W. H.Roscher,eipzig886-90,/2, 503-58.

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here, wherethe Boethiantext makes no reference, ven implicitly, ofortuna.

After he Prisoner has acceptedPhilosophia'sprotracted rgumentconcerning heruleof the cosmosby a beneficent rder, thereremainsa doubt about howone is to understand the seemingisorderof dailyevents.The Prisoner xpressesthisprincipleof disorder gainwith hewords fortuitis asibus(IV, pr. v, 5-6). Notker translates with innguissneskihten'in indefinite vents' 289,26)andfinedienuulouuan-chign eskihten vacillatingevents' 290, 7-8);in each case, the ad-jectiveexpressesthe uncertainty nd ephemerality f chance events.Notker then followsBoethiusin opposingthe Prisoner'sobjectionbyyet again reaffirming od's rule and declaringman epistemologicallylimited, sincehe is unable to recognizethe divine order: "quoniambonus mundum rector emperai. uunda ber got rhtare st . trdia uurlt mtemt" ('but becausethe governorwhoordersthe worldis good'290, 13-17).This exchange promptsPhilosophiato launch in-to the discussionof metaphysics,which dominates most of the re-mainderof the work.

The initialpresentation f the technicalsubjectof casusn V, pr. iseeminglyraises some difficulties or Notker, since there was ap-parentlyno singleterm n his vocabularywithwhichhecouldpreciselyrender the unifiedconceptof casusas inheritedfrom ntiquity), andhe introduces no new Old High German term, adapted to thissignification. he retention f the Latin term n his translationwouldnot have lessened thisdifficulty, ad it not been the case that theBoethiantext also seeks to define casus As it is, however,Notkermaysimply translate as literally as possible, retain the Latin term asdefinitive, rovide synonyms'whennecessary,and thus mark off heboundariesof the semanticfield n Boethian fashion.

The Boethian denialof the existenceof casus if defined s causelessevents (V, pr. i, 8), is translated directlyby Notker: "be omanheizet casum . ina stuzzelingnuurtena geskht nde ne llerodingo mchunga ... S chdo ih pldo . dz casus neht nes" ('Ifanyone calls casusan event occurring at random and without thecausalityof all things ... then I would say confidently hat casus snothing' 332, 20-23).If understood n this sense,casusmustbe calledsimply "einen bren nmen . ne bezichennisseda"('an empty

name, without ignification' 32, 24-25;cf. Boethius'inanis oxV pr.i, 8). It is an emptysign, a signifierwithouta signified.Notker then inserts a lengthy comment on the nature of the

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definition hus far, first riefly xplaining the idea of causation andlackof it:

Causast oconexao dero uentu. onediu dz man ht emerario otunde ine ausa lde ine onexioneausarum dz is l in"('Thecause salwaysoinedo the vent. hus t s that ne ays byrandommotion"nd"withoutause"orwithout"causalnexus."Theyre llof neandthe ameor332,26-333,).

There follows listof synonyms'for he puzzlingconceptofcauselessevents 333, 1-6).62Continuingwith the idea that casus conceived ascauseless eventss an empty ign, Notkerconcludes: "Uuirmugenizsprechen uuir nefndn s o neht" (We maysay it, but we cannot

find 333, 7-8).The idea of temeritass reduced to the state of deceitand sin: "Temeritas ist mbe-dncheda. nde ngeuurehit ndeghscrcchi nde nordenhfti fruali . nnderskit nrhti"('Temerity is imprudence,indiscretion,rashness, irregularity, rror,confusion,disorder* 33, 8-10).63The reasons for his ack of significa-tionby and existenceof casuss, ofcourse,the absolutecontrolby Godofallevents:"Uur mgtz sn . dzmanchtstzzelingn nde r-dingn . nde ne rhti . gte llu ding tuungentemoze rhti?"('Whencecan that come,that one calls at random, causeless,without

order, when God imposesorder on all things?' 333, 16-18).64The treatment f the nihil x nihilo assage,whichNotker translateswith "fne nehtenehteuurden('nothingcomes fromnothing' 333,62Thepassages: "Tz cht llezstuzzelingnrdingnnddrftesnerhabneUrspringne culdenerde. .. slbuugalde lbhuiihminolsodzist besh eht ne mo lbemorhuet ndefne mo lbemo uirdet"333,1-6).OnstzzelingnndrdingnseeH. G. Reinmuth,bstractermsnNotkersBoethiusA SemanticndEtymologicaltudyDiss. Northwestern937,29-30andSchrbler,13,who rawsconnectionetweentzzelingnnd rchaic odern er-man tutz.heterm rdingnsused arlierlsonthe enial f auselessvents303,27).ndrftesignifieswithoutecessity,'.e. withoutcausalnexus. heterm rhabisderivedromhe ootf he erb n-heffennd s used onsistentlyyNotkernthesense f ausawhichtretainednto heMiddleHighGermaneriodSchrbler,8).rsprngs founds the ranslationf rtus1726-7334,18-19)nd ausa310,11-13;335, 2-23).s uch,he ermscloselyonnectedith he ivineriginnd ontrolftheworld;ne rsprngould henmplyhat ventshus aking lacewould avenosuch onnectionith ivineausality.cldppearsn he ensef ausanly ne thertimenNotker'soethius,nd wicen he lossesoNotker'ssalmsc.63,6 & .68,5,ed.Piper).Rdasthe ranslationf ausas foundnly wicenthework utsidethis assage290,1-6&285,13-17),whilet soften sed s the ranslationfratio.Thetwo ermslbuugand lbhuire xplainedyNotkers events hoseriginswithinhemselves,ithoutxternalausalitythe atters a hpl.).63SeeSchrbler,15-18 n these erms.64Thefinal hrasesa 'dative bsolute' hich enders oethius'blativebsolute:"cohercentenordinemuncta eo"(V, pr. , 8).

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20), is quite interesting, orNotker seems to betray an acquaintancewith the tenets of Epicureanism,as Schrblerpoints out, possibly

throughLucretius'De rerum atura.65 ut it s more ikely hat Notker'scomments temfrom he commentaries n the Consolatio.emigiusof-fers lengthy ommenton the phrase, mentioningEpicurusby nameand givinga precisof the relevant doctrinal position(Paris BN lat.15090,74r).Asnotedabove,Boethiuspointsout that the nihil x nihiloconcept as not intendedby the ancients to refer o the originsof thecosmos,but rather dealt with material objects(dematerialiubiecto,pr. i, 9). Notker's explanationof the problemadherescloselyto thetenor of Boethius' argument,explaining n terms f the undamentumf

natural substances,the four universal elements,etc. The phrase dematerialiubiectos interpreted nd translatedby Notkerwith he phrasefne mhftemoinge 'concerningseminalthings' 333,26).66The con-cept demandsexplanation,and Notkeradds:

Tiu snt mhftediu men bentnde nednuurdenemgen. ar-boresint ndeherbe nde llu nimantiaTuhizentubiectaquiasubi-ciunturccidentibusuis.('Thosehingsre eminal hich ave eeds,ndwithouthatseed]heyannotcome obe.Thusaretrees ndgrass,nd allanimatehings. hey recalled

subjects,ecause

heyre

subjectotheir ccidentalttributes'33,26-334,

)The smenas the essentialaspect of substance is certainly akin toLucretius' seminaerumDererum at. , 150-184).67The purposeofthisdigressionis to put into context the argument concerning causality,and sincecausality necessarilydeals withsubstance smhfteing), heconceptmust be explicated.Then Notker again proposesthe argu-ment againstcasus, incecausalityin the senseust defineddeniesanyrelevanceto the conceptof chance, for ll events,acts and objectsarecaused:

Nature arboresnt ndeherbe nde llu orporade neuurdentehtstuzzelingnsiehbenttelicha ateriamdnnn iuuurdenttahizetrfundamentum.eskhetnuh eht ts st telhausa.Tu st ber undamen-tm.Etelh atio st o tugenulde ffenu uuz irofundamentum .uunnn iuuurdnldeuunn n eht eskhe.('Thustrees ndherbsnd ll bodiesrenaturalnd hey o not ome bout trandom.hey ave certain aterial,rom hichheyrise;t s called foun-dation. f nythingappensothem,thassomeause,whichs,however,he

65Schrbler,07-12.66SchrbleraintainshatNotkerstranslatingglossn the ext ere, atherhanthe ext tself,nd hus e lso dds he xplanatoryomment hich ollowsp. 109).67Cf. alsoAristotle,hysicsI, 4(196a24-b5).

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foundation.ith egardo ach rinciple,t s alwaysitherbscurermanifest,what ts oundations,whencet omesrwhenceomethingappenso t' 334,10-16).

Notker eemslittledisturbedbythe relationship etweenthe Christiandoctrine f God's creatioxnihilond the Boethian affirmation f nihil xnihilon relation to substance. Yet the passagedrew much attentionfrom he ninth-century ommentators n the Consolatio. he St.GallAnonymousmakesthe Christian dogmaexplicit:"conditor ex nihilocuncta creauit" ('the creator created all things from nothing' Ein-siedeln179, 173b). Remigiusoffers wo comments: "a deo omnia exnihilo facta sunt" ('all thingswere madeby God fromnothing' ParisBN Lat.

15090,74v)and "sciebant enimilli

quodconditor ex nihilo

cuncta crearet" ('For they know that the creator created all thingsfromnothing' bid.).Here Notkerhas goneinto much moredetail con-cerningmaterialcausalitythan did Boethius,yet withoutoffering heinterpretatiohristianahich s otherwise haracteristic f his translation,and for whichthere were also models in the commentary raditions.

His rendering of Boethius' arguments concerningcasus is quitedirect,preserving heexemplumof the discoveredgoldand the salientaspectsof the definition. Chance events are incidental to the final

cause: "So man chd er teuur mbe teuuz tot ... Unde drteuunnn eht nderes keskhet tnne dr-mbe man iz tot ...Tz heizetcasus" ('Thus one saysthat he does somethingfor pur-pose ... and for some reason somethingelse happens than that forwhich it was done ... That iscalled casus335, 11-15);unusual(sinceunexpected):"N moz hchdangeskhtuusen . dz ngeuundogebret" ('Now I mustcall that casuswhichtakesplace unexpectedly'336, 21-23);and they result ex confluentibusausis "Fne zesminegeullenn dingen. diu man mbe eht tot" ('from the concurrence

of things, which one doesfor some purpose' 336, 24-25).68The effi-cient cause of this confluence f causes isthe same as that postulated nthe Consolationd in Alfred'stranslation: "diu ordena . s. fati diu-dirchmentiu fne gtes prouidentia" ('the order, i.e. of fate, whichcomes from God's providence'336, 27-28 = V, pr. i, 19). In thiscause, the teleologyof chance events is guaranteed. Boethius' finalcomment on the inevitable chain of causality, dependenton prouiden-tia promptsNotkerto givea precisof the metaphysicalhierarchybymeansofwhichallevents takeplacein their properorder: "Prouiden-68Remigiusemarksn theBoethian efinitionV, pr. , 18):UERADEFINITIOCASUSParis, N lat.15090,5r).

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tia uuiz tu dng sment . fatum rcchet siu efnzn" ('providencecomprehends the things simultaneously; fate executes them in-

dividually'337,3-4).The exemplumusedto illustrate hisprinciple sagain the hiding and the discoveryof the gold, whichactionsGoddirects,whilefateexecutes;and since thefirst woprovidentiallyaus-ed actions the hiding of the goldand the farmer's digging occur,the third sboundbythe necessity f the divineplanto takeplace "dogeskhfone den notedaz trtta" 'then the third ookplaceofnecessi-ty' 337, 8).

This idea, that so-calledchance eventsare not onlycaused,but evennecessary, is taken up again in the translation of the followingmetrum, which llustrates he redefined onceptofcasusand to whichNotker adds a commentwhich further estricts asus.Sincehe has in-corporatedcasus ntothe chain ofdivinecausalityunderfatum he con-tends that so-called chance eventsare themselves bound to a causalnexus. The final inesof the metrum concerning hecourses takenbythe Tigris and Euphrates)and the translation re:

Sicquaepermissisluitareideturabenisorsatitur renospsaqueegemeat.('Thuschancefors), hicheemso wander ith oosedeins,ubmitsothereins nd tself roceedsccordingoa law.'V, m. , 11-12).So fretasuspeduungentr ir nchetrenmbe-dungenndeneanefretr.('Thuscasus, hicheemsoyou ooccurwithoutestriction,roceedsnderconstraint.. and tdoesnot ccur utside heaw'338,11-13).

Notkercomments:

Causde asummchntte uungentn de zzentmo a.Fne iust zfors nde asus ndenopinatusuentustz ie ausemchntoffeneldetugene.('Thecauseswhichroduceasustheyontrolt nd mposenorder n t. Thusthat sfors'fortune'),asusandunexpectedvents hichhese ausesroduce,eithermanifestlyr obscurely'38,14-17).

Once again the causal order even law is emphasized, and allsemblance ofrandomness hasbeeneliminated. ThusNotkerdisposesofchance in almost the same manner as didBoethius,addingexplana-tions and comments,but not changingthe ultimate reason for the il-legitimacyof the concept God's controland the chain of causalitywhich extends from God's providencethrough fate to individualevents in the world.

The Old High German term most often employed by Notker intranslationsof Boethiancasusis geskihtYet the prevailingscholarlyopinionthat casus n the sense of chance' isrenderedby Notker with

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geskihter seis inaccurate.JrgenJaehrlingmaintains thatgeskihton-sistently enderscasus nthe sense of chance' inNotker's translationof

Aristotle'sCategories.9Yet the term in variousgrammaticalforms)is in fact found in the Categoriesonsistently n the sense 'event/ 'to

happen' or in reference o grammaticalcase.70In Notker's D inter-pretationthe standardtranslation quivalentisagainfound:allegeskiht= quejiunt'that whichhappens').71The usagein Notker' Consolatiois consistentwiththat f his otherworks. n 51, 7-11 quotedabove,p.25),geskihtunctionsn the phrasediseuurlt-icheneskihtewhichtakenas a unit translateshunemundumgi i.e. 'thoseevents whichtakeplacein the world.' Geskihtignifiesno more than euentus,which is the

generalsignification roposedby Schrblerfor heterm, n addition to"das Geschehen"and "quae ... acciderunt."72n fact,geskihtsrarelyNotker'stranslationfor asusn the sence'chance', unlessualifiedbyan adjectivewhichmodifies hebasicsignificationsf the term euentus)toward the signification 'causeless events.' In 41, 15-17 andelsewhere,geskihtsusedwithout djectivalmodification nd translateseuentus.n 79,2-9it appearsin a commentby Notkeras thetranslationof casusused as the designationfor one of the methods of rhetoricaldefense.73Even here, however, a qualifier is necessaryin order tospecifymore clearlythe meaningof the Latin term:ngeuundiueskiht'unexpectedevent' 79, 5).

To render the concept 'chance', geskiht lmost always takes aqualifierwhichindicatesrandomness: "de repentinis asibus . Fneghngeskhten" ('concerning unexpectedevents' 295, 7-8) and "simisceriomniafortuitis asibus crederem be ih llu ding kelubtiturn in nguissneskhten"('If I believed allthingsto be confusedby uncertain events' 289, 24-26). Most clearly illustrativeof thenecessity f qualifyinggeskihtn order to render casus as 'chance' is astatementby Notker himself: "be dzngeuundo geskhet tugeskihtheizet casus" ('If that happensunexpectedly, heevent s call-

69Jaehrling,2.Healsoconsidersasusn the enseZufall' non-philosophicalusage,whilenthe ensefgrammaticalase,t s philosophical?1.70n 100, 1-15 factast' 00, 7-20 grammaticalaseamr);00, 5-27 factaest94,23-25 ab liquouiusmodiunetelcheroeskihteed.J. .King.DieWerkeNotkerses eutschen, 73 Tbingen 972).71Ed.byJ. .King, ieWerkeotkerses eutschenI,ATB81Tbingen972), 0,12-13.72Schrbler,12.73The othermethodsmentionedre necessitasiot 'necessity')nd imprudenza/nuuzenhit'ignorance'9,6-9).

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ed casus338,4-5).onlywhensomething ccurs geskihet)nexpectedlymay it be called 'chance'.74 Thispractice correspondsto Alfred's use

of a''butan" -clause withwyrdn order to translate casus.As notedabove, Notker most often retains the Latin term casus n

his German text duringthe technicaldiscussion ofcasus.5Toward theend of the analysis,however,he renders the term twicewithgeskihtwithout adjectivalmodification,but only after the definition f casushas beenreduced to "improuisusinopinatusqueconcursus"('unfore-seen and unexpectedconcurrence'335, 23-24)and "inopinatuseuen-tus" ('unexpectedevent' 336, 21); casus nolonger signifies chance'whengeskihts so used, andgeskihthussignifies o morethan an euen-

tus caused by prouidentiand beyond the epistemological powersofmen.The otherterms n the short passage,51, 7-11,are equally impor-

tant for the discussionof chance in the remainder of the work. Thesemanticsignificance f "temerariiset fortuitis asibus" is translatedby uerlzenend stuzzelingn,he first f which emphasizesthe lack oforder in temerariiswhilethe latter in Old High German usedonlybyNotker)is a commontranslationof temerrius nd its derivativeformselsewhere n the work: "productum euentumtemerariomotu ... inastuzzelingnuurtena geskiht" (332, 18-21);"temerario motu ...stuzzelingn" (332,27-333,2); "temeritas ... stuzzelingn" (333,15-17).

Just as in the Boethian passage,one finds n Notker's translationconcern for he establishment f clearlydefined,opposingcategories forder and disorder: ratiovs. temerrius etfortuitus asusand rdovs.uerlzene inde tzzelingn eskihte.he Prisoner affirms he rule ofGod's ratio nd denies the control of disorder: "Atqui inquamnullomodo existimauerim.ut tam certa moueantur fortuita temeritate.Truuo chdih . tz nechme nomr n mnensin . tz sgussiu ding. frn fter uunchelnero nrhti" ('Cerainly, I said, it never oc-cured to me that such certain hings ccurredaccordingto a vacillatinglack oforder' 51, 11-15).Later in the same discussion,the opposition74Furthervidencef he asic ignificationf eskihtay eseenn Notker'sseofmsseskht'misfortune'),term oundnlynNotker's orks.t translatessperitasor-tuneeuientis'harshnessfragingortune'6,9-10),duersaortuna'adverseortune'42,4-6)nd duersitasortune^'adversityffortune'8,10-12).n each ase,herefore,it xpresseshe tate f bad uck,henegativespectfwhichmay etaken romheLatinsperitasaduersitasndtheOldHighGermanmi'ssi-.f.Alfred'sseofunwyrd(50,17)as a translationf ortunaectibus'bytheblows ffortune'II,pr. , 2).75331,20;332,20&23;334,22;335,1.

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is further larified by the use of different ermsto translate he Latin:4'quod non credis earn [sc. gubernationem mundi] subditam

temeritati asuum .i. temerariis asibus . sed diuine rationi .. dz tsia neuunst ndertna nrdenhftn geskhten . nube gtesuushite"('that you do not believeit [the governanceof the world]tobe subjectto unregulatedevents,but rather o divineintelligence'55,16-21).Again there is the opposition between divine order anddisorder, the latter expressed by temeritatiasuum nd translated bynrdenhftneskhten

In the further iscussions of the concept,Notker often mphasizesdivine control, even when Boethius doesnot. Divine wisdom,per-sonifiedby Alfred s the principleof providentialorder, appears in acommentby Notkeras the guarantorofthe cosmicorder. Philosophiamentions he ratiowhichgovernsthe heavens;Notkercomments Turda ist ktes uustom" ('this reason isGod's intelligence'177,25).Just as forAristotle,Boethius andAlfred, here s for Notkeran orderwhichgovernsall events.

Throughhisanalysesof ortunand casusBoethiusestablishesan in-controvertible osmicorder, n whichchance events areno more thanunexpected events. His argument moves dialectically from thePrisoner'svaguebelief n the controlof the cosmosby a principleofdisorder oward a rigid ystem f providential ontrol. The structure fhis argument s thus quitedifferent romAristotle's.The latter beginshis analyseswith a detailedinvestigation f chance andendsby plac-ing the resulting definition n the context of a principle of order.Boethius' argument is in a certain sense a mirror image of theAristotelian, n that he establishesthe larger context of divine orderbefore ncorporating briefdiscussion ofthe technicalsubjectof casusintothe analysisnear the end of the work. The metaphorof the mirroris, of course,imperfect, inceAristotle'sdiscussiontakesplacein thelarger contextof the wholetext of the Physicsand sinceBoethius,inhisanalysisof ortunadeals withthe problemofdisorder from he verybeginningof the Consolatio. ut themetaphor at least illustrates hecontrast n perspectivewhichdetermines o a greatextent heanalysesby Aristotle nd Boethius. Thedetails of Aristotle'sanalysisare notlost in the Consolatiobut merelydeemphasizedand incorporated ntothe larger context of Boethius'all-pervasive providentialorder.

Alfred'sargument carcely

resembles that of theConsolatiosinceheacceptsthe egitimacy f Boethius' ordoestablishedfinally n BookV,

and deemphasizescounter-arguments throughout the work. His

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numerous other adaptations of the work contribute also to thisrecastingand reinterpretation f the entire structure f the Boethian

argument. For Alfred, casus is non-existent;weasgebyrians a con-tradiction n terms. Wyrdythat which happens in the world,' is bydefinitionunder divine control, and argument is hardly necessary.Anglo-SaxonChristian dogma, alongwith Boethius' argumentation,has dispelledthe conceptofchance from he stockofpossible topicsofdiscussion.

In Notker* treatment of the problem, however, one sees thescholar-pedagogueat work,not actuallyexplainingor interpreting heconceptof casus somuch as commentingon and annotatingthe text

with peripherally elevant material.This is especiallythe case in hisdigressionson the nature of substance and thesmen where he in factdepartsfrom he Boethian argument o the extent hat onemight ues-tion his comprehensionof the Boethiandeemphasisof substance andphysical intrinsic) ausalityin favor of direct divine causality.Yet inthe end, his translationf the text revealsno suchmajormodifications:casus srejectedby Notkerwith he same basic dialecticalarguments sby Boethius.

Strictly peaking,one cannot commenton the retention r loss ofthe Aristotelian efinition f chance in the texts ofAlfred nd Notker,sincetheydealwith topicthrough he Consolationd without ccess tothe Physics.ven so, oneremarks hat the basic elementsofAristotle'sdefinition the incidental, exceptionaland teleologicalcharacter ofchanceevents)are present n the translations to the same extent hatthey are in the Conslatio with the additional Boethian element(inNotker's translation)of the confluence ofcauses.

Boethius transforms the Aristotelian concept through his

'metaphysical' perspective;Alfred treats Boethius' transformation

with the reverencewhich he deemedappropriatefor n ancientworkofChristianphilosophy,but in doingsotransforms heconceptagain;and Notkerpresents n annotated translation/edition. ne seesin thethree texts three quite distinctmethods and products,and thus threedifferent tages in the interpretation nd receptionof the ancientphilosophical conceptof chance.Los Angeles,UniversityfSouthernalifornia

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VivariumXII, 1 1984)

AlbertusMagnus3 View on the Angle with Special Emphasis on HisGeometrynd Metaphysics

PAUL M.J. E. TUMMERS

Albertus Magnus is not famous for his special interests inmathematics and his philosophical views concerning this subject arecommonly considered to be Aristotelian.1 He opposes, e.g. in hisMetaphysicss well as in other works, the so-called error latonis: heview that mathematics s concerned with a reality which unerlies andis the principle of physical reality.2 Nevertheless, Albert did writesome mathematical works;3as regards geometry, a commentary onEuclid's ElementsfGeometrycan be mentioned, s can the tract n 'in-divisible ines', inserted n his Physics. Moreover, in the Aristotelianparaphrases, he sometimes elaborates on the geometrical examplesgiven by Aristotle; he indicates explicitly he corresponding heoremsof Euclid, and inserts geometrical tems which are not found n Aristo-tle's text.6

One exampleof these geometrical tems s a digressionwhichAlbertgives in the chapter on quantity n his Metaphysicsthere, he discusses

*Afirst raft f his aperwasread t the Table Ronde eC.N.R.S.pour esep-time entenaire 'AlberteGrand', nstitut atholique,aris, 6-18 ct. 1980.1SeeA.G. Molland:Mathematicsn he houghtfAlbertusagnus,n:Albertusagnusand he ciences,ommemorativessays1980 ed.byJ. A. WeisheiplP. .M.S.), (=Studies nd Texts 9),Toronto 980, 63-478.2 SeeJ. A. Weisheipl: lbertusagnusnd he xfordlatonistsin: Proceedingsf heAmericanatholichilosophicalssociation,2 1958),124-139.3 B.Geyer, iemathematischechuftenesAlbertusagnusin: Angelicum5(1958),159-175.4 B.Geyer, p. it.J. E.Hofmann, berineuklid-earbeitungie em lbertusagnusugeschriebenird,n:Proceedingsf henternationalonpressfMathematicians1958, d. T. A. Todd,Cam-bridge 960, 54-566.P. M.J. E.Tummers, he ommentaryf lbertn uclid's lementsfGeometry,n:Alber-tusMagnusnd he ciences(seenote ),479-499.5 1Liber e ndivisibilibusineisui acit d cientiamibriextihysicorum'ed.Borgnet,ol.3,463-481.his s a paraphrasend ommentarynthe seudo-Aristotelianork fthe amename.6 See the ndicesf heColon, dition fAlbertus agnus'works,.v. Euclides.eealso, .g.:De celoI 2,3 ed.Colon.V/1, 131-132), etaphysicsX 4,5 ed.Colon.XVI/1, 28);X 1,5 ed.cit.436);Decausisroprietatumlementorum2,1 ed.Colon.V/2, 1-62); egeneratonet orruptione1,11 ed.Colon.V/2,120).

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view. One is from his Metaphysicsgeometriasit) deconceptiaummateriasecundumsse t eparatisecundumationem9another s from he Geometry

there mathematics s described as the philosophy onsideransormam ueest n materiamobili tarnen st conceptaum psasecundumationemif-finitivam.10 evertheless, the question remains: what signification othese words have, what objects does Albert have in mind? A look atAristotle will help us to solve this.

For Aristotle here s a distinction etween two kinds of geometricalobjects:on the one hand the ine, surface nd body, together with heirprinciple, he point; on the other hand the geometrical figures uch asthe circle and the square.11The former rovide the base, the underly-ing matter of the latter; the nature of the former s quantitas exten-sionality n one, two and three dimensions), as Aristotle ays in theMetaphysics12the latter are considered to be in the category 4quality'

Albert makes the same distinction: n his discussions of Quantity*he deals with ine, surface, body while the figures re treated in hischapters on 'quality'. Let us look at these chapters.

Albert discussesquantity n his Predicamentand in his Metaphysicsin the first ract s mensuraorporeaeubstantiaein the secondprout endetexente. n the Predicamenta3Albert says that of the praedicabilia hichbelong to the nature of the accidents of a substance, the first s quanti-ty, and he givesthe divisions of quantity; one speciesis the continous,to which belong: line, surface and body (but also the non-mathematical: tempus nd locus).Albert gives the reasons why thesethree are continuous quantities (ch. 3): the main reason is that thepoint by its fluxus generates the line, the line the surface and so on.To thishe adds that his luxus sonly ntellectual. 4Further he dwells onseveral difficulties oncerning the line, surface and body (ch. 7-8);in these chapters as well as in this whole tract on quantity) he givesthe mathematical properties f these objects and also quotes Euclid in

9MetaphysicaII 3, 1 (ed.cit. 139,65);seealsoMetaphysica1,1 (1);III 2, 13(135-137);V 1, 1 162);VI 1,2(304-305);II 1,3(549-551),ndAnal. ost. 4, 7(ed. Borgnet,ol.2, 105).10MSVienna, om.80/45, . 105rmy dition . 1).11 ee: Ian Mller,Aristotlen Geometricalbjectsin: Archiv r GeschichteerPhilosophie,2 1970),156-171;oger . Rigterink, ristotle'sonceptionfGeometrieObjectsDiss.Wisconsin,973no.73-21.176);. O'Brien,Aristotet acatgoriee aquantit.ivisionse aquantitin:Les Etudes hilosophiques,3 1978), 5-40.12MetaphysicaI 3, 1061 33.13PredicamentaII (ed. Borgnet,ol.1, 194-221).14 bidem195a-199b.

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four passages.15 In the chapters on quantity in the Metaphysics16Albert, following Aristotle, first defines quantity as that which is

divisible (in a specific manner). He also gives divisions of quantityhere. One kind of quantity s the continuous, examples of which are:line, surface and body. These belong to the quanta ecundume or betterthe secundum e quanta ecundumuam substantiam t quiditatemuia quan-titas st n ratione orum iffinitiva. fter discussionconcerning heposi-tion of tempus nd locus s quanta Albert begins with the digressiononthe angle, the subject of the third ection of this paper. As his secondchapter on quantity Albert offers digressioeclaranssse t naturam uan-titatis in which he says that the subject of the geometer s quantity as

accident. This whole digression s interesting, ut for the purpose ofthis paper I shall only mention that Albert again opposes Plato in thischapter, namely Plato's statement according to Albert that a pointconstitutes line, a line a surface, and that therefore point is themost substantial of the three. For Albert, not this, but rather ts con-verse is true: when it is said that the point constitutes y its luxus heline etc., this is meant he says secundummaginationemolam nonsecundum einaturami1 Contrary to the PredicamentaAlbert does notquote Euclid or passages from the Elements n this tract of hisMethaphysics.

Albert discusses the second kind of geometrical objects in his tractson quality. In the Predicamenta8Albert makes a distinction etween or-ma and figura explaining this with a mathematical example; in thedefinition of figura he uses the word angulus19 But figura is alsotwofold: quantitas erminatand terminatio uantitatis.20 nly in the first

15 bidem:ap.3(198b);ap.7 205bn(j206b);ap.13 219*)16Metaphysica3, 1-2ed.cit., 50-2).17 bidem:. 260,23-24.18Predicamenta8 and9(ed.cit., 59-262).19 bidem59a:Differuntutem aec, uiamodus erminationisinearumn uperficie

velcorpore eferri otest d intra, d formam cilicetubstantialem.. et sic diceturforma. otest tiam eferrid extra, dquantitatemciliceticvel ic erminatamntales el alesngulos, t sicdicitur igura.Ibidem59b: ontinerenim uod stformae on onvenit isi enereum icvel icangulatumsse cuto ngulo elrecto elhebete.20 bidem59a :Oportetutem cire uodfigura icitur upliciter:ecundumdquodest uantitaserminata,t icdiciturdquod st n genereuantitatis;st tiam igurasecundumdquoestfigura erminatiouantitatis,thocmodo on icit isi dquodest n genereualitatis,edhaec ualitasst irca