Taiwan HS Case Neg Master Doc

Strategy NotesRemember that this is the one that resolves strategic ambiguity in favor of ROC – so its nice to ROC and not nice to PRC.

Advantage Frontlines

Frontline v. Containment Advantage1. Turn – Containment of China by siding with ROC only fuels mistrust and increase tensions, amplifying the risk of unnecessary war – Squo solves better Kim, Jihyun 2015 (assistant professor in the Institute of International Studies at Bradley University, IL, where she teaches courses on US-East Asian relations and problems on contemporary Asia, in addition to the Institute’s most widely offered general education course, Fundamentals of Contemporary East Asian Civilizations. Dr. Kim holds a PhD in political science from the University of South Carolina, where she specialized in international relations and comparative politics. Her major research interests include regional security and major power interactions in East Asia, Chinese and Korean politics and foreign policy, and nuclear security and nonproliferation) “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Implications for Security in Asia and Beyond”, Strategic Studies Quarterly Summer 2015, pp.107-141 // DDI - CS

As a rising (or reemerging) power, China has an increasing interest in terms of showing its strength and safeguarding its pride. Thus, it is more inclined to retaliate with force, if provoked, even though it may still be reluctant to initiate and enter into a military conflict with any of its neighbors. In this sense, the supreme irony of Washington’s Asia-Pacific pivot, which is often seen as “an American reprise of Cold War ‘contain- ment’ now directed at China, fueling an arms race and U.S. alliance structure that is a growing threat to China,” is that it has encouraged a list of countries in the region, including “the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as Japan, to oppose and challenge China, and to decline to ne- gotiate in good faith to resolve disputes,” testing the limits of Beijing’s restraint with US-led “defensive” alliances and partnerships, which are deemed to be offensive in the eyes of Beijing.26 In conjunction with the rise of nationalist competition in the region, this may further facili- tate the process of Beijing’s shifting focus from economic to geopolitical concerns, which in turn would expedite self-reinforcing cycles of aggres- sion among all sides locked in the disputes. Nonetheless, “conflict is a choice, not a necessity,” although enduring disputes are more likely if established countries like the United States (with its regional allies and friends) treat every advance in China’s mili- tary capabilities as a hostile act or China, as a rising power, disregards “the tenuous dividing line between defensive and offensive capabilities” and overlooks “the consequences of an unrestrained arms race.”27 Un- der the circumstances, both China and its neighbors, supported by the United States, may create the self-defeating “Thucydides trap.”28 This implies that a deadly combination of the growth of Chinese power and the anxiety that this caused in America (and its allies and friends in the region) may evolve into mutual distrust and turn their healthy rivalry into conflict and unnecessary war. Interesting in this analysis is that Chi- na’s increasing assertiveness regarding issues like the South China Sea is not as important in itself as a sign of things to come—that being the potential danger of China, the United States, and other claimants in the disputes falling into dangerous and destructive zero-sum competition. At present, America’s strategic concerns include losing its hegemonic status and being gradually pushed out of Asia. On the one hand, there is China’s fear of being militarily encircled by an outside power aligned with inside powers, capable of impinging on China’s territory or intervening in its own “regional” affairs. Under the circumstances, “just as Chinese influence in

surrounding countries may spur fears of dominance, so ef- forts to pursue traditional American national interests can be perceived as a form of military encirclement.”29

2. NO impact - Their own 1AC author says: US and China war over Taiwan is highly unlikely.Xinbo, 2014 (Wu, Professor, Ph. D., Fudan University Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan University Executive Dean, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, “Agenda for a New Great Power Relationship”, The Washington Quarterly, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24674/uploads // DDI LR)

Even though the two militaries are preparing for a worst-case scenario, a major military conflict between China and the United States is highly unlikely. First, the Taiwan issue—the most likely source of serious military confrontation between the two powers—is well under control as relations across the Taiwan Straits have improved since 2008. This is when the Kuomintang (KMT) came to power and adopted a new agenda for cross-strait relations, namely, forging closer economic ties with the Chinese mainland and building political trust with Beijing. Second, the economic interdependence between the United States and China is so high that neither side can afford a rupture in bilateral ties. Third, the two sides have the political wisdom to control the negative strategic dynamics and avoid a major conflict. Given this, the real challenge is how to secure more positive and cooperative bilateral military relations and reduce factors that give rise to distrust and frictions. In an era when war between major powers is increasingly unlikely, the Chinese and U.S. militaries should devote more resources to providing international public goods—such as protecting sea lanes of navigation, offering disaster relief, and providing humanitarian assistance. Rising non-traditional security challenges like natural disasters, transnational crimes, and terrorism offer plenty of potential areas of cooperation between them. Once the PLA and U.S. Army pay more attention to expanding cooperation, rather than posturing for a conflict with each other, the mood between the two will surely improve.

3. Their Zhongqi 03 evidence is old and talking about roc arms sales means that the plan doesn’t solve or empirically denies that the advantage.

4. no internal link ROC insignificant to US China relationsGlaser, 2015 (Charles L., Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political¶ Science at George Washington University., International Security, Spring 2015, google scholar UT, pg 40-90)

A second counterargument is that Taiwan is no longer the key issue straining¶ U.S.-China relations. Consequently, focusing on Taiwan is misguided. As discussed¶ earlier, cross-strait relations have been improving for many years. At¶ the same time, China’s disputes with its neighbors in the South China and¶ East China Seas have become more intense, and increasingly define day-to-day¶ tensions in the region. Possibly most worrisome, Sino-Japanese relations¶ have become increasingly strained in the past few years, taking the spotlight¶ off Taiwan.¶ Two

rejoinders help to put this counterargument into perspective. As I have¶ already argued, the dangers generated by the U.S. commitment to Taiwan go¶ well beyond the immediate possibility of the United States fighting China to¶ protect Taiwan and, therefore, are not adequately captured by focusing solely¶ on the cross-strait relationship. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is among the¶ key factors fueling Chinese doubts about U.S. motives in the region and¶ Chinese worries about a war over Taiwan make control of the Northeast Asian¶ SLOCs far more important. These worries contribute to military competition¶ and strained political relations, thereby increasing the probability of conflict¶ over the longer term. Second,

a grand bargain would deal fully with this¶ counterargument by requiring resolution of these other disputes.Arms sales not strategic ambiguity key to Chinese assertiveness – means that the aff can’t solve because doesn’t get rid of arms sales – and proves that the plan more likely to cause war

5. no internal link and no solvency ROC biggest challenge in US-China relations –arms sales Freeman III, 2015 (Charles, Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution and a Senior Advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: CHALLENGES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, March 2015, http://www.nbr.org/DOWNLOADS/PDFS/OUTREACH/NBR_BRIEFINGSERIES_PRIORITIESFORTHE114THCONGRESS_030315.PDF#page=18, DDI TM)

Taiwan The Occupy Central protests and their aftermath also have had an impact on attitudes in Taiwan regarding its long-term relationship with

Beijing. Beijing has long articulated a cross-strait policy that calls for reunification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland based on a version of Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” model that would grant relative political autonomy for Taiwan. The election restrictions handed down by Beijing for Hong Kong did

little for Beijing’s cause with the people of Taiwan. In spring 2016, Taiwan will hold presidential elections that will largely be a referendum on the policies of President Ma Ying-jeou, which have built closer economic ties between China and Taiwan. If, as many analysts predict, the opposition Democratic People’s Progressive Party candidate is successful in defeating the candidate of the ruling Kuomintang Party, that could signal a rechilling of relations between Beijing and Taipei, and tensions in the region could spike. Taiwan has always been the biggest challenge to U.S.- China relations. The United States is obligated by the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with the opportunity to acquire arms to defend itself in the event of an attack from the mainland . If the relationship between Beijing and Taiwan sours badly, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will be closely scrutinized for the degree to which they embolden those who advocate de jure independence from Chinese rule. Congress will invariably be drawn into the debate on arms sales. It will be important for policymakers to understand and weigh in on what package of arms will contribute to stability across the Taiwan Strait. There is an element of symbolism to exactly what weapons Taipei

requests (and what it actually purchases if those requests are approved). Getting the package right will take considerable technical and diplomatic skill. Whatever the outcome of the Taiwan election in 2016, Congress should be at the forefront of international efforts to support the continued impressive evolution of democracy on this island of predominantly Chinese-origin citizens. In particular, the long history of inter-parliamentary relations between Congress and

the Legislative Yuan in Taipei merits rekindling. More frequent exchanges between members of Congress and their counterparts in Taiwan would be an important demonstration of the U.S. commitment to democracy in a Chinese context.

6. no impact US will not go to war with China over Taiwan – risks too high White 15 (Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, "Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808, AG)

These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be

sure to back off before a crisis over Taiwan became a conflict. US leaders must therefore ask what happens if Beijing does not back down as a crisis escalates. At what point would they back down instead? What would be the damage to US global leadership if Washington brought on a confrontation with China and then blinked first? What could happen if Washington didn't blink first? Is Taiwan's status quo worth a global

economic collapse? It is worth a real risk of nuclear war with China? These are the questions America's leaders would have to confront in considering military action to defend Taiwan, and their answer would very likely be that the status of Taiwan is not worth risking nuclear war or economic collapse over. And that means American leaders and policy analysts must confront these questions now, as they decide whether to maintain the old commitments to defend Taiwan. The promises that America was willing and able to keep in 1979 might not be ones it is willing or able to keep now. What about America's allies and friends in Asia? Wouldn't they help America defend Taiwan, if only because they are so worried themselves about China? Many

Americans seem to assume they would. But even Australia, America's most reliable ally in Asia, is uncertain about this. And if Australia is uncertain, it is pure wishful thinking to expect the likes of India, Singapore, Vietnam or even the Philippines to offer anything more than mild diplomatic support to America over Taiwan. The exception is Japan, which under Shinzo Abe might be expected to join the fight, especially after last week's visit to Washington. But does Mr. Abe really speak for Japan? Will future Japanese leaders take the same view? And even if they did, how exactly would that help America? How would Japan's support change the answers to the hard questions posed above, and increase the chances that America would indeed come to Taiwan's aid? So no one should lightly assert that America or its allies would help defend Taiwan from China. But should they? This is a big subject. Suffice to say here that the question is not answered simply by using the word “appeasement” to invoke the memory of Munich.

7. And even if they win a risk of a war breaking out, it won’t escalate – Chinese leaders prefer deterrence because PLA not equipped for warBlasko 15 (Dennis, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired) served 23 years as a Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Officer specializing in China. graduated from the United States Military Academy and Naval Postgraduate School and is an author, "Ten Reasons Why China Will Have Trouble Fighting a Modern War," War on the Rocks, http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/ten-reasons-why-china-will-have-trouble-fighting-a-modern-war/, AG)

The introduction of new weapons and platforms into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has captured the attention of much of the world for well over a decade.

However, new equipment is only one element of the PLA’s long-term, multi-dimensional modernization process. There is much to be done and no one understands this better than the Chinese themselves. Based

on what PLA commanders and staff officers write in their internal newspapers and journals, the force faces a multitude of challenges in order to close the perceived gaps between its capabilities and those of advanced militaries . New weapons, increasing defense

budgets, and recently corruption tend to generate headlines in the Western press, but at least 10 other factors raise serious questions about the PLA’s current ability to fight a modern war against an advanced enemy (some of which are discussed in a new

RAND report, to which I contributed a collection of sources): 1. Shared Command Responsibility From company level to the PLA’s highest headquarters, commanding officers share responsibility for their units’ actions with political officers who are responsible for “political work,” which involves insuring the PLA’s loyalty to the party through ideological training, officer promotions, the prosecution of the “three

warfares” of psychological, media, and legal war, and maintaining morale and discipline. In the eyes of Western military officers, this situation violates the principle of war of “unity of command,” in which “all force operate under a single commander.” A major training trend over the past decade has been to improve political officers’ tactical

proficiencies in the military tasks their units must conduct. In theory, commanders alone are authorized to make immediate tactical and operational decisions when necessary. However, at times there may be friction between commanders and their political counterparts. That situation may be exacerbated if corruption has permeated down to operational unit commanders and political officers. This shared responsibility system may suffice in peacetime situations, but it has not been tested under the stress of fast-moving, modern combat operations. 2. Army-Dominated Chain of

Command and Force Structure Despite Beijing’s declaration that “China is a major maritime as well as land country,” the PLA’s force structure and leadership continue to be dominated by the Army. Based on numbers provided by the Chinese government, the Army (including the independent branch of the Second Artillery, the PLA’s nuclear and conventional missile force) comprises over 72 percent of the 2.3 million active duty force, with about 10 percent in the Navy and 17 percent in the Air Force. In mid-2014, China’s Army had 24 full generals (who wear three stars), the Navy had three full admirals, and the Air Force five. Currently, in the Central Military Commission (the highest military command and policy organization), the Army occupies six of the 10 seats for senior military leaders, while the Air Force has two, and the Navy and Second Artillery one each. These numbers may vary slightly over time, but the vast majority of the PLA’s senior leadership still wears green. Only Army officers have commanded the PLA’s seven military regions. Though China recognizes threats from the maritime direction have increased and its future campaigns will most likely have major naval or aerospace components, it has yet to modify its command structure to prepare for these realities. Changes to the PLA’s size, structure, and joint operations command system were announced in November 2013, but the details have yet to be revealed. Whatever changes are proposed, it is likely they will take several years to implement and trouble-shoot, likely causing disruptions and discontent along the way for those people and organizations who lose power and authority in these bureaucratic struggles. 3. Too Many Non-Combatant Headquarters Of the approximately 1.6 million personnel in the Army, 850,000 are assigned to the 18 group armies and a number of independent combat divisions and brigades, which comprise the Army’s main combat force. This means that roughly 750,000 Army personnel are found in local force units (mainly static border defense units), logistics units, schools and training bases, and an extensive system of provincial military district, military subdistrict, and county-level people’s armed forces department headquarters. These local headquarters are under the dual leadership of the PLA and the local civilian governments at the same level and oversee reserve and militia units and are responsible for conscription/enlistment, demobilization, and wartime mobilization. They were created decades ago when China’s transportation and communication infrastructure was underdeveloped and it was necessary to have military representatives physically present at every level of local governments. Currently tens of thousands of field grade officers are assigned to these headquarters. Because of improvements in China’s transportation and communication systems it may no longer be necessary for so many non-combatants to be stationed throughout the country. A significant reorganization and decrease in these local headquarters could help reduce the size of the PLA and, perhaps just as importantly, reduce the number of mid-level and lower-level officers tempted by opportunities for graft and corruption. Such a reorganization would likely face opposition from those who would lose their relatively cushy rear

area jobs in the process. 4. Inexperienced Commanders and Staff As the PLA has stressed the need to improve its capabilities in combined arms and joint operations, a common criticism has been that “some”

commanders and staff officers are not adequately prepared for the tasks of integrating multi-service and multi-arms operations. As a result, much training is conducted according to the slogan “A strong army first needs strong generals; before training the troops,

first train the officers.” In particular, the PLA currently emphasizes command of joint operations at division and brigade/regiment level compared to most previous joint operations, which were commanded by Army officers at army or military region headquarters. Only in the past two years have Navy and Air Force officers commanded joint exercises. In late 2014, the PLA announced it has decided on a program “for the selection, training, evaluation and appointment of joint operation commanding officers, so as to improve the training of joint operation commanding officers.” However, nurturing qualified commanders and staff officers is a long-term process involving education, training, and experience gained through assignments at different organizational levels. 5. Understaffed Battalion Headquarters As the PLA has experimented with

conducting combined arms operations at battalion level over the past decade it has learned that current regulations do not provide for enough personnel at battalion headquarters to adequately command and control supporting units , such as

artillery and engineer units, assigned to reinforce infantry or armored battalions. Therefore, units throughout the PLA are attempting to find solutions to the problem by assigning officers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to assist the battalion commander in his operational duties. Increasing the size of the staff is necessary before the reinforced, combined arms battalion can become the “basic tactical unit” in the Army capable of executing independent operations as envisioned in many PLA writings. 6. NCO Corps Still Under Development In the late 1990s, the PLA initiated a program to create a professional NCO corps to assist the officer corps in leading troops and performing administrative duties. Over the past decade, NCO selection, education, and training have been emphasized and NCOs replaced officers in many duty positions. Roughly ten years after the start of this program, in 2009 the PLA announced it was adjusting the system by adding an additional senior NCO rank increasing the number of ranks from six to seven. Selected units are currently experimenting with assigning “master chiefs” battalion and brigade headquarters and trying to determine exactly what the duties of senior NCOs should be and how they relate to the officers above them. It is likely that a generation will pass before the PLA NCO corps becomes the “backbone” of the force, as NCOs are considered in other armies. 7. Multiple Generations of Equipment in Units Because of its size, the PLA faces the challenge of units in all services being equipped with multiple generations of weapons and systems. New equipment generally is introduced to units gradually over time so that some subordinate units have advanced equipment while other units have much older gear. For example, nearly half of over 6,500 tanks in Army are Type-59 or their variants (based on the Soviet T-55). This frequently leads to problems in interconnectivity in communications and computer systems. Moreover multiple generations of equipment in one unit complicates training, tactics, and especially supply and repair/maintenance. Units must constantly revise their tactics and methods of operation based on the technology available to them. Though the PLA has the goal of increasing standardization and interoperability among units, the fact of multiple generations of equipment greatly complicates achieving their development goals. 8. Insufficient Realism in Training Continuing the trend of the past 15 years, increasing realism in training is a major objective for the PLA. Chinese military writers frequently criticize “formalism” in training and “training for show” as undermining the value of exercises. Several “professional blue forces” have been created to serve as enemy units in confrontational training exercises in joint– and single-service exercises as well as mock combat between services. A major goal in nearly all training is to expose problems so that they can be overcome in future training. Despite the progress that the PLA has made in these efforts, the PLA leadership is aware of the force’s continuing shortcomings in training. Moreover, increasing realism in training will require additional funds, particularly for fuel and maintenance expenses and for more and better training areas and training simulators. 9. Air-to-Ground Support Still Under Development One of the most important examples of joint operations is air support to ground operations. As new aircraft, precision guided munitions, and means of communications are entering the PLA, the force continues to experiment in how to best conduct air-to-ground attack operations. Units appear still to be testing techniques for frontline ground units to control fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in attacking enemy units in close proximity to their own positions, a function known as close air support. In 2014, the Air Force conducted its first public demonstration of an armed unmanned aerial vehicle executing a ground attack mission. Naval aviation units and the Air Force are just beginning to conduct joint operations with each other. 10. “The Peace Disease”: Lack of Combat Experience The PLA’s last major campaign against a foreign enemy, the short 1979 war with Vietnam, involved only the Army. The PLA considers the amphibious landing to capture Yijiangshan Island from Kuomintang forces in 1955 as its first and only joint combat experience.

Both operations resulted in heavy PLA casualties. PLA writers commonly refer to its lack of recent modern combat experience as the “peace disease.” At present, only a very few of the PLA’s most senior officers have ever been in a combat situation ; no NCO or private has ever been in battle. The PLA’s deployments to

UN peacekeeping operations, on disaster relief missions, and to the Gulf of Aden in maritime escort activities are useful but do not substitute for combat experience. The PLA extensively studies the wars other countries have fought, but book learning or even its gradually improving training programs cannot compare to the stress of an extended deployment in a combat zone. Nonetheless, the PLA’s combat and deterrence capabilities gradually are increasing because of improvements in its personnel system, more realistic training, updated doctrine, enhanced logistics support, and the introduction of advanced weapons, communications, and computer systems. At the end of 2014, the Ministry of Defense spokesman noted, “After many years of painstaking efforts, the modernization of the Chinese armed forces has made notable achievements. But, of course, in certain areas, we are still lagging behind when compared with the most advanced militaries in the world and more efforts need to be made.” Conclusions Even taking into account the significant improvements in PLA capabilities, senior military leaders consider time and people to be more important for successful military modernization than money and equipment. Accordingly, their time horizon spans to mid-century in a multi-generational process of evolutionary development. Contrary to the assumption prevalent outside of China that PLA leaders are “hawks” urging aggressive or expansionist

action, the factors outlined above, among others, could cause senior military leaders to advise caution in the use of force in private consultations with senior Communist Party leaders. Based on their knowledge of PLA capabilities and shortcomings, most senior PLA leaders probably prefer the use of deterrent measures and non-military means to achieve strategic objectives while the PLA continues to build its strength. An example can be seen in the East China Sea where non-military government entities have taken the lead in patrolling in the vicinity of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with the PLA remaining mostly over the horizon. However, if China’s civilian leaders decide to

commit the PLA to battle before its modernization is complete, as loyal servants of the Party, the PLA leadership will seek to defeat the enemy quickly and decisively using all units and capabilities available. But it will also prepare for protracted conflict. China’s chances of success will vary according to where and when the battle is fought and who the enemy is. PLA confidence in winning will increase the closer to China it can operate and preferably if it confronts a lower-technology, less skilled enemy not backed by a powerful friend or ally.

Frontline v. US Taiwan Relations Advantage 1.their own authors conclude US heg decline inevitable proves that the plan can’t solve for long term sustainability in the region Shor 11-( Fran Shor, Francis Shor is a professor at Wayne State University, he has written books in many firlds including utopian societies and hegemony. His 2004 article,“Utopian Aspirations in the Black Freedom Movement,” in the journal, Utopian Studies, won an award for best journal article of that year, 7-25-2011, "Declining U.S. Hegemony + Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conflict? by Fran Shor," No Publication, http://www.stateofnature.org/?p=4541)

While it remains unclear what the ultimate outcome might be of growing competition and conflict between the United States and

China, it is very clear that the U.S. is a dying empire with declining hegemonic power in the world. Whether that hegemonic power is replaced is an open question. There are those who see the emergence of a multi-polar world where China and other regional powers supersede U.S. global hegemony. [33] In this scenario, Washington, recognizing the detrimental domestic and foreign effects of imperial overstretch, accommodates itself to such a multi-polar world. Along with others, however, I cannot envision any tendency within the political governing elite who would be prepared to eschew continuing U.S. global dominance and measuring U.S. geopolitics in the discourse and practice of the “necessity” of “strategic alliances.” [34] Certainly, there are divisions in the governing political elite over geostrategic operations. However, as Gary Dorrien’s study of

neoconservative political forces demonstrates, there are underlying delusions and imperatives, shared by rulers and ruled alike of various ideological tendencies, about U.S. exceptionalism and the essential deployment of military neo-imperialism. [35] In effect, unless and until there are radical changes in how the U.S. is governed and how it operates militarily in the world, permanent war and geopolitical conflict, including at some level with China, will be a defining feature of the global role of the United States.

2. NO Internal Link: Their Glaser 16 evidence concludes only that Taiwan missing out on “timely access to medical information” not that exclusion has an impact. 3. No impact The Casedevall generic disease impact in context of bioterror – no ev they solve.

4. No internal link – ROC won’t increase relations with the US because will further risk alienating China Lingwall 15 (Noah Lingwall, student at the Schreyer Honors College of the Pennsylvania State University and an intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 8-8-2015,“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It”, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/#)

No Panacea The concept of a U.S.-China grand bargain offers a creative attempt at a strategy to resolve some of the most

intractable issues hindering improved cooperation between the two countries. Even if implemented, this proposed strategy would not serve as a panacea to all the issues facing the United States and China. Any bargain would face serious pitfalls that would cast doubt over the longevity of its provisions. In light of the contentious land disputes in the South China Sea and continuing tension over the unresolved question of Taiwan, an idealistic resolution might seem a productive step forward.

The Taiwan problem is deeply entrenched within China and Taiwan’s political culture and it cannot be solved in one fell swoop. A grand bargain is an encouraging, yet illusive notion. The framework of a grand bargain might serve as a useful blueprint for future cooperation, but the current status quo already acts as a positive foundation for future China-Taiwan relations and should remain in place. As Taiwan’s March 2016 presidential election rapidly approaches, the concept of a grand bargain appears particularly ill-

conceived. In all likelihood, neither party’s candidate will risk alienating public support by pushing a radical plan for unification or separation. Increased economic cooperation will continue to maintain the equilibrium between the two nations and could even mitigate the most contentious issues that bedevil U.S.-China and China-Taiwan relations. While it is possible that these issues may pose a future threat, the current Taiwan problem is not broken, and there is no need to fix it.

5. No internal link : US- Taiwan cooperation happening now ambiguity doesn’t change that Volkhonsky 11 (Boris, Head of the Asia Sector of the Asia and Middle East Center, Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, “Taiwan to ruin US-China relations sales”, The Voice of Russia, 9/14/11 accessed 7/14/16 at http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2011/09/16/56271568.html; DDI- NB)

On Thursday, The Washington Times reported that President Obama has finally made a decision on the long-pending issue of arms sales to Taiwan. According to an unnamed official, the administration has approved the arms package worth $4.2 billion . The package is likely to include upgrading F-16 A/B fighter aircraft, but not the supply of 66 advanced F-16 C/D model aircraft requested by Taiwan. The formal announcement of the volume and content of the arms package is expected shortly. Thus, the President’s decision appears to be a dubious one – on the one hand, it reflects the a dministration’s determination to continue military cooperation with Taiwan, while on the other hand, it is very cautious and meant not to irritate China too much. In fact, the dubious nature of Obama’s decision reflects even a much greater number of contradictions – both internationally and domestically. The issue of arms sales to Taiwan has long been a stumbling block in U.S. – China relations. In 2008, China even cut off its exchanges with the Pentagon after the U.S. announced an arms package. Lately, the administration has been willing to show that it favors a thaw in bilateral relations, and President Obama has been showing his unwillingness to approve the new package for several months. Definitely, a direct military confrontation between the two powers is out of question, since it would be suicidal for both. But the dominant strategy in the post-World War II period has been that of proxy wars rather than direct confrontation. And in this context Taiwan plays an important role in the U.S. strategy in Asia – Pacific. But with the growing military might of mainland China, the disparity between it and the tiny island which China considers part of its territory, is becoming more and more obvious. At present, Taiwan has only 388 fighter aircraft compared to 1,680 of China. China, in its turn, would be an obvious loser in the case of a direct military confrontation with the U.S., but it possesses a tool that may be even more ruinous than weaponry – that is, the $3 trillion U.S. debts it holds. Withdrawing even a small portion of it would be disastrous for

the already debt-stricken U.S. economy with unpredictable consequences for the rest of the world. Also, the issue of arms sales to Taiwan has become an important one for the U.S. domestic politics, and has especially aggravated in view of the approaching elections. There, the contradictions lie along two axes – one, between the administration and the Congress, another one, within the administration between the Pentagon and the State Department. The Pentagon and the military insist that increased arms sales to Taiwan would mean more jobs for Americans, and this view is ardently supported by the majority of congressmen and senators. The State Department prefers not to spoil the relationship with China, and earlier this week it became known that for the first time ever no State Department representative would address the annual U.S. – Taiwan industry conference on defense and security ties. Apparently, the State Department’s stance has a stronger influence on President Obama. The whole story may also have an impact on Taiwanese presidential elections scheduled for January 2012. The present Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou, elected in 2008, has based his policy towards mainland China on the principles of bringing the two sides closer through commercial ties, and by doing this; he managed to bring tensions between the two countries to their lowest level since 1949. His main opponent, Tsai Ing-wen has adopted a more hawkish approach towards mainland China, and according to the Financial Times newspaper, American officials have already expressed “distinct doubts about whether she (Ms. Tsai) is both willing and able to continue the stability in cross-strait relations.” The policy of wibble-wobble in relations with China demonstrated by Barack Obama throughout all two and a half years of his presidency is hardly favorable for the “hawkish” Taiwanese presidential candidate. And even if she ultimately wins the elections, it would make her task to stick to the policies much more complicated

6. They don’t solve -- Their Schmitt ev doesn’t assume the plan – ending strategic ambiguity isn’t the same thing as ending the one china policy and Their internal link evidence is about recognition of ROC NOT ending ambiguity – and the US alone wouldn’t be able to solve this adv – it would rquire all the other countries in the world that don’t recognize ROC to do so.

Solvency Frontlines1. ROC doesn’t want the plan – economic and political ties Lingwall 15 (Noah Lingwall, student at the Schreyer Honors College of the Pennsylvania State University and an intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 8-8-2015,“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It”, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/#)

Myth #2: Taiwan Can Serve as a Bargaining Chip The effectiveness of a bargaining chip is predicated on whether or not the other party fears losing control of that bargaining chip. From China’s point of view, its claim over Taiwan is indisputable. So why would China make concessions over a bargaining chip it believes it already owns? China already has a powerful economic hold over Taiwan. In addition to economic interdependence, the past several years have also witnessed an increase in direct flights and sea

transportation between the two nations. Businesspeople commonly make one-day trips across the Taiwan Strait. An effective unification is already well underway in the economic realm. In addition, the Taiwanese prefer the status quo of de facto, but not de jure independence. Repeated opinion polls indicate that while more Taiwanese favor independence over unification, a majority of Taiwan’s people prefer to maintain the status quo. Meanwhile, the threat of Chinese military force acts to dissuade Taiwan from attempting to break away from the mainland. As the Taiwanese gaze across the strait, they are greeted by a massive arsenal of 1,600 ground-to-ground missiles. Chinese anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities act as a potential deterrent to U.S. involvement in the event of an armed conflict between China and Taiwan. This military mismatch between the two sides serves as a potent deterrence to Taiwan attempting a hasty move for independence or even using the threat as a bargaining chip with the Chinese.

China is also an increasing presence in Taiwan’s political system by mobilizing support for China-friendly politicians and making extensive donations to pro-China political actors. All in all, the notion of Taiwan as a “bargaining chip” fails to take into account China’s existing influence over Taiwan and complicates the possibility of a grand bargain.

2. Strategic ambiguity solves better to deter conflict than the alternative Rapp-Hooper 13 (Mira Rapp-Hooper, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 8-26-2013,“ ‘Strength’ or Strategy in the Taiwan Strait?”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/strength-or-strategy-the-taiwan-strait-9310?page=show)

In his recent commentary, Elbridge Colby argues that a report from Taiwan’s National Ministry of Defense that highlights the shifting cross-Strait military balance, should be of grave concern to the United States. While Colby acknowledges that there is “no silver bullet on the Taiwan question,” he argues that if the United States is to uphold its alliance commitments to Taiwan and other states in the region, it should project unambiguous strength, defined in terms of investment in specific military capabilities (primarily those associated with AirSea Battle). Colby is of course correct that the report is noteworthy, and that Washington must remain attuned to

allies’ defense concerns, particularly in the Pacific region. What his analysis misses, however, is that the China-Taiwan conflict is fundamentally a political dispute with a military dimension. For more than three decades, the United States’ policy of “Strategic Ambiguity” towards Taiwan has been remarkably successful, precisely because it has recognized this fact. A cross-Strait policy that is primarily focused on building up for AirSea Battle could potentially undermine this carefully-calibrated balance, and with it, broader US interests in the region. The United States’ policy of Strategic Ambiguity towards Taiwan was adopted in in 1979, with the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act. An Act of Congress, the TRA effectively replaced a longstanding mutual-defense treaty between Washington and

Taipei, which was abrogated as part of the Nixon administration’s historic decision to open diplomacy with China. The TRA

states that any efforts to determine Taiwan’s fate by nonpeaceful means will be considered a threat to the “peace and security of the Western Pacific,” and “of grave concern” to the United States. It also

guarantees that the United States will continue to sell Taiwan military hardware so that it may provide for its own defense. The history of this act is important, because it was an effort to wrestle with several complex political goals. First, despite having formally ended the security treaty, the United States was interested in deterring any efforts by Beijing to settle the Taiwan conflict with force, and ensuring that Taiwan could defend itself it did. Second, Washington wanted to support Taipei while also encouraging restraint—the language of the TRA is not as strong as most US mutual-defense treaties. Third, the TRA was born in the first place because the United States had decided to pursue rapprochement with China. Had recognition of and cooperation with Beijing not been politically important, Washington could have kept up the mutual-defense treaty and none of these calculations would have been necessary. But US presidents from Nixon onwards have

recognized that Washington has a fundamental interest in a working relationship with Beijing, and this more ambiguous stance over Taiwan created the space necessary to pursue that. This arrangement struck many as tenuous balancing act when it was first implemented, and this triangular relationship has certainly

seen its ebbs and flows. But it has been remarkably successful at ensuring the United States’ three strategic

cross-Strait goals.

Continuing commitment in Taiwan is not what benefits the US- US should end commitment to Taiwan to decrease US debt and improve US-China relations.Kane 11 (Paul, November 10, 2011, a former international security fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, is a Marine who served in Iraq, “To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/opinion/to-save-our-economy-ditch-taiwan.html?_r=0 // DDI LR)With a single bold act, President Obama could correct the country’s course, help assure his re-election, and preserve our children’s future. He needs to redefine America’s mindset about national security away from the old defense mentality that American power derives predominantly from our military might, rather than from the strength, agility and competitiveness of our economy. He should make it clear that today American jobs and wealth matter more than military prowess. As Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared last year, “The most significant threat to our national security is our debt.” There are dozens of initiatives President Obama could undertake to strengthen our economic security. Here is one: He should enter into closed-door negotiations with Chinese leaders to write off the $1.14 trillion of American debt currently held by China in exchange for a deal to end American military assistance and arms sales to Taiwan and terminate the current United States-Taiwan defense arrangement by 2015. This would be a most precious prize to the cautious men in Beijing, one they would give dearly to achieve. After all, our relationship with Taiwan, as revised in 1979, is a vestige of the cold war. Today, America has little strategic interest in Taiwan, which is gradually integrating with China economically by investing in and forming joint ventures with mainland Chinese firms. The island’s absorption into mainland China is inevitable. But the status quo is dangerous; if Taiwanese nationalist politicians decided to declare independence or if Beijing’s hawks tired of waiting for integration and moved to take Taiwan by force, America could suddenly be drawn into a multitrillion-dollar war. There will be “China hawks” who denounce any deal on Taiwan as American capitulation, but their fear of a Red China menacing Asia is anachronistic. Portraying the United States as a democratic Athens threatened by China’s autocratic Sparta makes for sensational imagery, but nothing could be further from reality. The battle today is between competing balance sheets, and it is fought in board rooms; it is not a geopolitical struggle to militarily or ideologically “dominate” the Pacific. In fact, China and the United States have interlocking economic interests. China’s greatest military asset is actually the United States Navy, which keeps the sea lanes safe for China’s resources and products to flow freely.

China would want a deal on Taiwan for several reasons. First, Taiwan is Beijing’s unspoken but hard-to-hide top priority for symbolic and strategic reasons; only access to water and energy mean more to Chinese leaders. Second, a deal would open a clearer path for the gradual, orderly integration of Taiwan into China. Third, it would undermine hard-line militarists who use the Taiwan issue to stoke nationalist flames, sideline pro-Western technocrats and extract larger military budgets. And finally, it would save China the considerable sums it has been spending on a vast military buildup. Jeffrey Lewis, an East Asia expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, estimated that

one-fourth to one-third of China’s defense spending goes to forces in the vicinity of Taiwan — at a

cost of $30 billion to $50 billion a year. A deal for the resolution of Taiwan’s status could save China $500 billion in defense spending by 2020 and allow Beijing to break even by 2030, while reducing America’s debt and serving our broader economic interests. The Chinese leadership would be startled — for a change — if the

United States were to adopt such a savvy negotiating posture. Beyond reducing our debt, a Taiwan deal could pressure Beijing to end its political and economic support for pariah states like Iran, North Korea and Syria and to exert a moderating influence over an unstable Pakistan. It would be a game changer.

The deal would eliminate almost 10 percent of our national debt without raising taxes or cutting spending; it would redirect American foreign policy away from dated cold-war-era entanglements and toward our contemporary economic and strategic interests; and it would eliminate the risk of involvement in a costly war with China. Critics will call this proposal impractical, even absurd. They will say it doesn’t have a prayer of passing Congress, and doesn’t acknowledge political realities. They might be right — today. But by pursuing this agenda, Mr. Obama would change the calculus and political reality. And Congress should see a deal with China as an opportunity to make itself credible again. Debt is not in itself bad, when managed, but today’s unsustainable debt will suffocate our economy, our democracy and our children’s futures. By tackling the issue of Taiwan, Mr. Obama could address much of what ails him today, sending a message of bold foreign policy thinking and fiscal responsibility that would benefit every citizen and be understood by every voter.

3. Turn – plan would erode US China relations and coop on other issues ** this the link card on XI good Da in the this case neg too so don’t read twice Glaser, 2015 (Charles L., Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political¶ Science at George Washington University., International Security, Spring 2015, google scholar UT, pg 40-90)

States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue¶ should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic¶ distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations¶ concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming¶ American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s domestic affairs¶ and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a¶ clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar vein, their report argues¶ that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as¶ pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will¶ disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China’s power position¶ is secondary to America’s.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “most Chinese¶ see strategic motives at the root of

American behavior. They believe that keeping¶ the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”69 Similarly, a¶ prominent Chinese analyst argues: “The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan¶ issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines¶ the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.”70 Xu Hui, a professor¶ at China’s National Defense University, holds that “U.S. policies toward¶ Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment¶ among the Chinese public. . . . I assure you that a posture change of the¶ U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-tomilitary¶ relations and

also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning¶ the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.”71 In short, ending the U.S.¶ commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China¶ relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other¶ issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.¶ Second, ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan could greatly moderate¶ the

intensifying military competition between the United States and¶ China, which is adding to strains in their relationship.72 Most directly,¶ the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily to undermine the U.S. ability¶ to come to Taiwan’s aid.73 The impact of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on¶ China’s military requirements and capabilities, however, arguably reaches¶ much further. China worries that in a conflict over Taiwan the United States¶ will interrupt its SLOCs. This vulnerability would leave China open to U.S. coercion¶ during severe crises and conventional wars.74 The United States dominates¶ the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and still enjoys¶ signiªcant military advantages in the South China and East China Seas. The¶ requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs¶ during a crisis or war creates a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the¶ U.S.-China relationship. There is no military-technical solution to this security¶ dilemma, however, because two countries cannot control the same space.75¶ A decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan could¶ moderate this security dilemma in two important ways. By eliminating the¶ scenario that is most likely to bring the United States and China into a large¶ war, accommodation should significantly reduce the importance that China¶ places on controlling its SLOCs. Although China would likely still find U.S.¶ control undesirable, the military threat the United States posed to China’s security¶ would be greatly reduced. In addition, as explained above, U.S. accommodation¶ could signal that U.S. goals in the region are limited, which should¶ contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship by increasing China’s assessment¶ that U.S. motives are benign, which would in turn further reduce¶ the severity of the security dilemma.76

Off Case 1NC Arguments

Security K 1nc The portrayal of China as a rising threat that only increased military commitment can solve, the 1AC securitizes China’s growth as threatening to the USPan 12(Chengxin Pan, Deakin University, Australia, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics”, https://www.academia.edu/2023977/Knowledge_Desire_and_Power_in_Global_Politics_Western_Representations_of_Chinas_Rise, 2012) CJun

In Chapters 4 and 5, I probe into the nexus between knowledge, desire, and power in the ‘China threat’ paradigm and argue that the production of this particular body of knowledge has been linked to the political economy of fear. With a specific focus on the US, I will examine both how the ‘China threat’ paradigm is integral to the functioning of the military-industrial complex and military Keynesianism , and how military Keynesianism in turn contributes to the vibrancy of the ‘China threat’ knowledge industry. In short, this knowledge is both in the service of power and underpinned by it. Furthermore, often taken as objective truth, this paradigm informs a confrontational policy on China. By helping provoke nationalistic and realpolitik responses from China , such a policy makes the ‘China threat’ more likely in reality. In this way, as will be outlined in Chapter 5, the ‘China threat’ paradigm can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Chapters 6 and 7 then turn to the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm. In Chapter 6, I argue that although the ‘China opportunity’ imagery often justifies a policy of engagement, its built-in normative objective of converting China is ultimately a false promise, which sets itself up for eventual disillusionment. In Chapter 7, I will examine how this ‘China opportunity’-induced disillusionment is partly complicit in the recent hardline turn in Western policy on China. Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion on what China knowledge (and IR knowledge in general) means and entails epistemologically and methodologically. On the one hand, it urges China watchers to critically reflect on both the Western self-imagination upon which their China knowledge is predicated and the political economies of their knowledge production and application. On the other hand, it stresses the need to engage with Chinese subjectivities and discourses through ongoing dialogue. Together, it gestures towards a more self-conscious, ethically responsible way of knowing China as a being-in-the-world. Though the book does not prescribe any concrete advice to policy makers on how to make better China policy, some broad policy implications of this study should become clearer as one reads through.

Securitization imposes itself as the nexus of state activity causes worldwide wars in the name of security, leading to extinction.Agamben, 2002

(Giorgio, Prof of Aesthetics @ U of Verona, Security and Terror, Theory and Event 5:4, Muse)

Neither Turgot and Quesnay nor the Physiocratic officials were primarily concerned with the prevention of famine or the regulation of production, but rather wanted to allow for

their development in order to guide and "secure" their consequences. While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening and globalisation; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security wants to intervene in ongoing processes to direct them. In a word, discipline wants to produce order, while security wants to guide disorder. Since measures of security can only function within a context of freedom of traffic, trade, and individual initiative, Foucault can show that the development of security coincides with the development of liberal ideology. Today we are facing extreme and most dangerous developments of this paradigm of security . In the course of a gradual neutralisation of politics and the progressive surrender of traditional tasks of the state, security imposes itself as the basic principle of state activity . What used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth century, now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation. Security reasoning entails an essential risk. A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; i t can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic . We should not forget that the first major organisation of terror after the war, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) was established by a French General who thought of himself as patriotic and who was convinced that terrorism was the only answer to the guerilla phenomenon in Algeria and Indochina. When politics, the way it was understood by theorists of the "Polizeiwissenschaft" in the eighteenth century, reduces itself to police, the difference between state and terrorism threatens to disappear. In the end it may lead to security and terrorism forming a single deadly system in which they mutually justify and legitimate each others' actions. The risk is not merely the development of a clandestine complicity of opponents but that the hunt for security leads to a worldwide civil war which destroys all civil coexistence. In the new situation -- created by the end of the classical form of war between sovereign states -- s ecurity finds its end in globalisation: it implies the idea of a new planetary order which is, in fact, the worst of all disorders. But there is yet another danger. Because they require constant reference to a state of exception, measures of security work towards a growing depoliticization of society. In the long run, they are irreconcilable with democracy. Nothing is therefore more important than a revision of the concept of security as the basic principle of state politics. European and American politicians finally have to consider the catastrophic consequences of uncritical use of this figure of thought. It is not that democracies should cease to defend themselves, but the defense of democracy demands today a change of political paradigms and not a world civil war which is just the institutionalization of terror. Maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies (ecological, medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent them. On the contrary, we can say that politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies. It is the task of democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which lead to hatred, terror, and destruction -- and not to reduce itself to attempts to control them once they occur.

The alternative is a critical application of security theory. We interrogate the interpretative power of policy elites to control threat perception of the world by opening up security discussions to dissenting voices and analyzing securitization outside the narrow realm of the nation-stateCharrett 09(Catherine, masters in IR at the London School of Economics, “A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security”, December 2009,

International Catalan Institute for Peace, [http://icip.gencat.cat/web/.content/continguts/publicacions/workingpapers/arxius/wp7_ang.pdf], DOA 7/14/16, DDI HRM) The capacity to create ‘truth’ regarding threats and the ability depict what are deemed the necessary means to manage such threats awards the securitizing actor, the state elite, an advantaged and position over the securitization of an object . Krebs and Lobasz offer a thorough examination of the securitization of terrorism, post-9/11 in the United States, which they affirm demonstrates the capacity of state elites to fix meanings and dominate policy. They argue that by virtue of his institutional position as president, Bush enjoyed an advantaged place in the rhetorical competition over the ‘meaning of 9/11’. His bureaucratic power allowed for the ‘rhetorical coercion’ of the dissenting voices of the Democrats, thus allowing for the particular securitization of terrorism that later paved the way for the invasion of Iraq (Krebs and Lobasz 2007). The critical application of securitization discussed here, therefore, is one in which the power over the production of meaning is dismantled and assessed. The security analyst does not merely observe existing security actors, rather they critically evaluate the advantaged position of the actor and critically engage with the securitization processes that may result from this monopoly over the definition and construction of threats and security discourses. Without this critical application of securitization the security analyst is at risk of reproducing negative forms of securitization. Endowed with this critical approach to securitization, the analyst can question security policy based on it being a production of institutional power and can then proceed with searching for and evaluating alternative approaches to securitization. Apart from deconstructing the power relations inherent in the securitizing speech act, it is argued that the security analyst must actively seek out those who may be uttering alternative modes of securitization or those who may be attempting to counter-securitize existing moves or measures. This critical approach assists the securitization analyzer in overcoming the normative dilemma of writing security by opening up the rhetorical control over security . This not only helps to prevent negative securitization processes but it also assists in fostering more productive and positive securitization acts. Foucault vitally reminds us that “in power relations there is necessarily the possibility of resistance because if there were no possibilities of resistance […] there would be no power relations at all” (Campbell 1998: 511). Many who have engaged with the CS theory of securitization have said that more attention needs to be paid to the dissenting voices within securitizing process, as well as to acts that counter

securitization attempts occurring in everyday politics and social interactions. (Aradau 2004; Abrahamsen 2005; Risley 2006; Bigo 2002). In his discussion of the securitization of immigration, Bigo points out such spaces for resistance, whereby the securitization of migration finds itself at a point of tension between globalization and territorialized devices of control. This space makes way for local as well as transnational resistant movements in response to transnational security technologies; he identifies the struggle against deportation in international zones of airports as such a point of tension (Bigo 2002: 82). The role of the critical security analyzer would thus be to actively seek out such points of resistance and examine how they may be used to counter the securitizing moves of state elites . In order to assuage the normative dilemma of writing security the critical security analyzer would thus disclose the power relations within the securitizing process and recognize resistant movements, thus endowing the marginalized with a voice that may go unnoticed with an uncritical application of ST. This critical approach would therefore, help prevent negative securitization processes by allowing the security analyst to counter traditional exclusionary and power saturated securitization moves with those providing alternative or dissenting approaches. For example, Bellamy et al. stress the importance of addressing moderate Muslim leadership´s proposed modes to countering violent extremism. It is asserted here that by sincerely considering alternative manners to tackling violent religious extremism, as well as by addressing the arguments of those who have strongly disagreed with the GWoT as a specific mode of securitizing terrorism, a less negative form of securitization than the one currently being carried out can be developed. Bellamy et al. argue that the GWoT as a specific mode of securitization served to explicitly exclude dissenting approaches (Bellamy et al 2008: 23). Now that now that the rhetorical control of the securitizing actor, in this case the elite security class of the US, has been deconstructed, a critical securitization analyst can engage with alterative utterances of security in order to construct a more holistic and inclusionary approach to securitizing violent, religious extremism. Critics of the CS’ conceptualization of securitization have noted that its focus on successful securitization instances, usually voiced by state elites, causes the CS to miss out on failed or partially successful speech acts (Risley 2006) as well as situations in which an actor finds him or herself incapable of voicing security needs (Hansen 1999). A critica l application of securitization allows the analyst to observe instances where securitization may be located at a different level, such as at the individual, community, or global level. The security analyst seeks out instances that may be voiced by environmental groups requesting greater awareness regarding ecological issues or minorities concerned with racial profiling at border controls, for example. The security analyst will also look for instances where security measures may be required but are not voiced. Hansen discusses such situations in her investigation into the social position of women in Pakistan, who, she argues, are generally incapable of voicing the threat that honor killings pose to their individual security due to the fear of exacerbating the situation. Hansen states that in such instances the securitization move is witnessed through body, but the “silenced utterances” of security should not go unnoticed (Hansen 1999). The critical securitization analyst is able to locate oppressed or “imagined referents” and discuss how they might be securitized. This critical

approach to securitization opens up space for greater discussion on securitizing processes by shifting the focus to securitization moves found at sub- and supra-state levels and security needs being demonstrated in typically marginalized areas. This broadened perspective assists the security analyst in overcoming the normative dilemma of analyzing securitization processes by introducing approaches to security expressed by alternative actors, which may have more constructive or positive outcomes.

TPP DA 1nc TPP will pass during the lame duckCorsi 7/4 (Jerome Corsi: Harvard Ph.D., author of No. 1 N.Y. Times best-sellers, “Obama advances stealth plan to pass TPP,” 7/4/16, http://www.wnd.com/2016/07/obama-advances-stealth-plan-to-pass-tpp/, Accessed: 7/12/16, RRR)

NEW YORK – The Obama administration is betting on a stealth plan to secure final passage of the

massive Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP , before Obama leaves office by pushing the bill through Congress in the “lame duck ” session between Election Day Nov. 8, and Jan. 6, 2017, the date the new Congress is sworn

in, despite growing voter opposition that now has Hillary Clinton joining Donald Trump in opposing the bill. Tactically, the Obama administration has decided to postpone a TPP vote until after the election, concerned that pushing TPP passage now would risk damaging Clinton’s chances, given her enthusiastic support for

TPP during her tenure as secretary of state. The push to pass TPP is consistent with a New York Times report published Sunday by Mark Landler in his “White House Letter,” indicating President Obama plans to travel this week to North Carolina, where he joins Hillary Clinton, campaigning with her for the first time this year; and to Europe, where he

joins Britain’s lame-duck prime minister David Cameron, who ended his political career opposing Brexit. In both trips, Obama is expected to press the globalist message that “Americans and Europeans must not forsake their open, interconnected societies for the nativism and nationalism preached by Donald J. Trump or Britain’s Brexiteers.”

Obama needs all his PC to get it doneHufbauer, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, ‘15 (Gary Hufbauer, Will Congress Unravel the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, Oct 16 2015, The Dialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/resources/will-congress-unravel-the-trans-pacific-partnership/)

Gary Hufbauer, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics: “While Hillary Clinton may have reversed her prior enthusiastic support of the TPP, if elected president, she can rediscover the geopolitical virtues that led her to embrace the TPP project when she served as secretary of state. And Clinton can toss in a couple of ‘side agreements’—reminiscent of NAFTA—to

nudge the TPP closer to her concept of a gold standard. But between now and 2017, the TPP must survive a perilous journey through Congress . The timelines specified under Trade Promotion Authority mean that the soonest

President Obama could sign the TPP text will be late January 2016. Meanwhile, Obama will need to agree with his Congressional counterparts — Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and probable House Speaker Paul Ryan —on the text of the TPP implementing legislation, including any ‘sweeteners’ inserted to attract the votes of wavering congressmen. Then, in the midst of the presidential election campaign, the House and Senate must vote the implementing legislation up or down, without amendments. If he sees no clear shot at reaching ‘yes’, President Obama can elect to not submit implementing legislation to Congress, and instead

leave the task of securing ratification to his successor. On balance, it appears that President Obama will use every ounce of his dwindling political capital stock to secure Congressional approval of the TPP in 2016 and, at the same time, secure his own historic legacy . But if the critical vote is postponed until 2017—when ratification seems all but certain, provided that Sanders and Trump remain far from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue—the TPP will still enjoy a fine launch into the annals of path-breaking trade agreements.”

The plan costs PC—Engagement with China causes intra-party factions amongst Democrats and spurs Republican oppositionGries 14[Peter Hay Gries, the Harold J. & Ruth Newman Chair in U.S.-China Issues and director of the University of Oklahoma's Institute for U.S.-China Issues, The Politics of American Foreign Policy, 2014.]// Reemz

Both the Democratic and Republican Parties are internally divided over China. On the left, some Democrats argue for a pro-China policy of engagement to better integrate China into the global economic, political, and security orders. Other Democrats, concerned about human rights issues, advocate for tougher China policies. For instance, California congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, quoted above, has been a frequent critic of Chinese human rights abuses. Yet other Democrats on Capitol Hill, many from heavily blue collar districts, join Big Labor in condemning unfair Chinese trade practices and advocating tougher U.S. trade policies towards China. On the right, Republicans in Washington are equally divided on China policy . Business conservatives have historically promoted a friendlier China policy conducive to increased trade, investment, and profits. For instance, the U.S.-China Business Council and AmCham China, which lobby on behalf of U.S. companies doing business with China, have worked closely with many Republicans on the Hill to support pro-China and block anti-China legislation. Military hawks and Christian conservatives, however, usually argue for tougher China policies. Congressman Randy Forbes of Virginia, quoted in the epigraph, serves on the House Armed Services Committee and cochairs the House’s China Caucus, and frequently promotes tougher positions on China. New Jersey congressman Christopher Smit h , who has held dozens of hearings on Capitol Hill to deplore China’s lack of religious freedoms, has also advocated a tougher U.S. China policy, but for very different reasons.

TPP key to US climate leadership—solves global warmingRichardson 16-[Bill Richardson, Bill Richardson is a former governor of New Mexico and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, 5-31-2016, "Congress should ratify the Trans- Pacific Partnership agreement," miamiherald, http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article80915612.html] [MB]

If you’re following the 2016 election campaigns, you might be under the impression that international trade is an unmitigated disaster and it’s time for America to turn inwards. But as former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, I know that trade and economic relationships are the foundation for U.S. influence abroad. So as Congress considers whether to vote on President Obama’s major trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), they should turn off the cable news and consider the cost of inaction, because it is far more significant than you might think. Recently, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) released its economic impact report on TPP. After an extensive, 6-month, independent review, the report confirms that President Obama’s trade agreement with 11 Pacific Rim countries, representing 40 percent of world GDP, will open new markets, set fair rules of trade, and drive demand for “Made in America” products. But TPP’s benefits reach beyond wage and job gains for the U.S. economy. It also furthers important U.S. interests like higher labor standards, reduced wildlife trafficking, and cooperation to combat climate change. Access to clean energy technology is a

cornerstone to solving the global climate change problem. TPP will boost international adoption of clean energy by cutting tariffs on renewable energy technologies and committing member countries shift to low-emission economies. TPP will eliminate taxes on wind turbines, solar panels, and other renewable energy products : making it cheaper and easier for these growing economies to switch to clean energy and reach their climate change goals. In an increasingly complex global economy, governments must be empowered to put in place regulations that account for climate change. TPP does this by securing the right of each member country to create laws and regulations in the public interest, like addressing carbon pollution and climate change. Countries need the freedom to take decisive action on climate change and the TPP protects its members rights to do so. But most importantly, combatting climate change requires leadership. Last year, President Obama led the world to a groundbreaking global climate agreement in Paris. American leadership, including significant domestic policy achievements like the Clean Power Plan, allowed the United States to bring other major world powers to the table and achieve this landmark deal. TPP is another opportunity to exert American leadership. It fosters strong economic and trade relationships in the fast-growing Asia Pacific region, home to countries responsible for over 25 percent of global carbon emissions. Deepening ties to the region renews U.S. commitment to its Asian allies, and adopting the same standards as its TPP counterparts establishes U.S. credibility as a global leader to advance other international issues, like climate change initiatives.

Warming causes extinction. Flournoy 12 -- Citing Feng Hsu, PhD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center. Don Flournoy is a PhD and MA from the University of Texas, Former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University, Former Associate Dean @ State University of New York and Case Institute of Technology, Project Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, Currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications @ Ohio University (Don, "Solar Power Satellites," January, Springer Briefs in Space Development, Book, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth,

writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming ,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in

monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of

polar ice cap melting . After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanit y . No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is

overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of

greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show

with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply.

“This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species , a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 )

Xi GoodUniqueness Xi has enough political capital to push through economic reforms now, but only if he maintains an anti-western, nationalist stanceSheehan ‘15, Matt is a China correspondent for the WorldPost.. "What You Need To Know About China’s Strongman President." Huffington Post. N.p., 20 Sept. 2015. Web. 3 July 2016. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ chinese-president-xi-jinping_us_55fed862e4b08820d918ff14>.

Strongman Xi has quickly emerged as maybe the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.

China’s previous leaders largely shunned the spotlight, portraying themselves as part of a group ruling by consensus. Xi has

instead built a huge personal brand by employing strongman tactics at home and abroad. In China,

Xi has consolidated enormous personal power through a blistering crackdown on both corrupt officials and civil society activists. The prosecution of powerful officials (many who happen to be Xi’s political rivals) and the detention of civil rights lawyers have shocked China-watchers in their audacity and depth. Some scholars argue that the twin crackdowns reveal Xi’s vision for China’s future: not a liberal, electoral democracy, but an efficient authoritarian state with a

strong leader at the helm. Abroad, Xi has asserted China’s contentious territorial claims by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Over the objection of the United States and its allies, China has managed to build airstrips and

outposts in waters also claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. Xi has also expanded Chinese influence in Southeast and Central Asia by founding new international organizations and pledging huge money for infrastructure

investments abroad. Reformer? Those stances have built popularity and political capital that Xi may spend on broad-ranging economic and environmental reforms. In 2013 the Chinese leadership announced its intention to kick-start sputtering economic reforms, shrinking the role of the state by giving market forces a “decisive role” in the economy. Those reforms are meant to power the Chinese economy through a tough transition: away from traditional sources of growth (cheap exports and heavy industry) and toward a new economy built on services,

consumption and innovation. That’s a monumental task, and so far the record on reform is mixed. Early progress was made on thorny issues of restructuring local government debt and wrenching the Chinese economy away from high-polluting industries such as steel and cement. Sudden drops in Chinese coal consumption also laid the groundwork for last fall’s landmark climate change agreement with the U.S. But this summer, the government fumbled on several fronts. When a politically expedient stock market bubble began to burst, the leadership pumped in money in a desperate attempt to keep

the party going. That move and a sudden devaluation of the RMB fueled speculation that Xi may sacrifice deep reform in hopes of propping up short-term growth. GREG BAKER VIA GETTY IMAGES President Xi Jinping is striving to push reforms at home and assert Chinese preeminence in the Asia-Pacific. Revival Xi has branded his administration with the trademark phrases “the Chinese dream” and “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” That branding reinforces a narrative that the Chinese Communist Party has been preaching for decades: after a “century of humiliation”

characterized by foreign invasion and domestic strife, China is finally returning to its rightful place of prominence in the world. Xi is striving to take ownership of that revival narrative by pushing reforms at home and asserting Chinese preeminence in the Asia-Pacific. He has appealed to nationalism with an enormous military parade, and to hopes for clean governance by cracking down on lavish official expenditures and corrupt officials. Taken together, Xi has attempted to build a public image as a strong leader devoted

to the people. While there are few reliable gauges of public opinion, surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest Xi remains immensely popular at home. Dangerous Road Ahead. But ahead lie enormous challenges for China as a

whole and Xi in particular. Can he transform the Chinese economy without generating massive unemployment? Can he truly root out corruption while also quashing the sprouts of independent civil society? Can he crack down on official perks without provoking a mutiny

within the Chinese Communist Party? Can China expand its influence abroad without driving other countries into the arms of the United States? We won’t know the full answer for years, but when two of the most powerful people in the world sit down next week, these are the questions and currents that will be driving the conversation.

Plan would crush Xi’s position – China view of ROC as key element to stand against US Glaser, 2015 (Charles L., Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political¶ Science at George Washington University., International Security, Spring 2015, google scholar UT, pg 40-90)

States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue¶ should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic¶ distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.- China relations¶ concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming¶ American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s domestic affairs¶ and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a¶ clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar vein, their report argues¶ that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as¶ pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will¶ disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China’s power position¶ is secondary to America’ s. ”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “most Chinese¶ see strategic motives at the root of

American behavior. They believe that keeping¶ the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”69 Similarly, a¶ prominent Chinese analyst argues: “ The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan¶ issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines¶ the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.”70 Xu Hui, a professor¶ at China’s National Defense

University, holds that “U.S. policies toward¶ Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment¶ among the Chinese public. . . . I assure you that a posture change of the¶ U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-tomilitary¶ relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning¶ the hearts and

minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.”71 In short, ending the U.S.¶ commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China¶ relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other¶ issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.¶ Second, ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan could greatly moderate¶ the intensifying military competition between the United States and¶ China, which is adding to strains in their relationship.72 Most directly,¶ the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily to undermine the U.S. ability¶ to come to Taiwan’s aid.73 The impact of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on¶ China’s military requirements and capabilities, however, arguably reaches¶ much further. China worries that in a conflict over Taiwan the United States¶ will interrupt its SLOCs. This vulnerability would leave China open to U.S. coercion¶ during severe crises and conventional wars.74 The United States dominates¶ the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and still enjoys¶ signiªcant military advantages in the South China and East China Seas. The¶ requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs¶ during a crisis or war creates a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the¶ U.S.-China relationship. There is no military-technical solution to this security¶ dilemma, however, because two countries cannot control the same space.75¶ A decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan could¶ moderate this security dilemma in two important ways. By eliminating the¶ scenario that is most likely to bring the United States and China into a large¶ war, accommodation should significantly reduce the importance that China¶ places on controlling its SLOCs. Although China would likely still find U.S.¶ control undesirable, the military threat the United States posed to China’s security¶ would be greatly reduced. In addition, as explained above, U.S. accommodation¶ could signal that U.S. goals in the region are limited, which should¶ contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship by increasing China’s assessment¶ that U.S. motives are benign, which would in turn further reduce¶ the severity of the security dilemma.76

Xi’s capital is key to reforms – Perception of international strength is critical to holding off nationalist challenges to his domestic economic agendaLieberthal 13 (Kenneth Lieberthal, 3/14, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development on PBS News Hour, interview with Judy Woodruff, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june13/china_03-14.html)

KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: Well, he's already tried to change the style by being much more of a kind of lively politician than his

predecessor was. But I think Gordon is right. We have to look to see whether he can forge the kind of consensus

to make deep structural reforms in China that the country deeply needs if it's going to move forward.

JUDY WOODRUFF: For example? KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: For example, they need to shift from an export-oriented and investment-focused economy to one that's much more focused on domestic consumption as a

driver of economic development, which requires expanding the services sector, increasing incomes and so forth. That runs against huge vested interests in China. So the question is whether he's going to be able to really rework incentives through this system so that he can build the services sector, build incomes, reduce huge capital-intensive infrastructure projects and reduce dependence on exports. JUDY WOODRUFF: So, looking at him, Gordon Chang, from the United States, what will we see that looks different, do you think? GORDON CHANG: I think the one thing we have been concerned about is all that, although he's been in power for only a few months, since last November, when he became general-secretary of the party, China has engaged on some very provocative maneuvers against the Japanese, because the Chinese claim sovereignty over the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. People say that Xi Jinping is actually leading China's foreign policy on this issue, and if so, we're in trouble, because this is a very troubled area. JUDY WOODRUFF: And do you believe, Ken Lieberthal, that that's a primary

priority of his? KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: I think his real priority is domestic. What he needs is stability abroad in order to undertake reform domestically. But his big problem is that he -- that the Communist Party has really nurtured very ardent nationalism domestically, and he can't allow himself to get on the wrong side of that or he won't have the political capital to carry out reforms. So he's trying to walk a tightrope. He has to be seen as strong in international affairs. But I don't think he's looking for trouble internationally. He'd rather avoid if it if he can.

Economic reform failure leads to Chinese adventurism and lashing out in the south and east China seas. Carpenter, 15 Ted Galen, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The National Interest, The National Interest, “Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War?”, 9/6/15, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784?page=2, 6/24/16

Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock market and mounting evidence that China’s economic growth is slowing dramatically. Moreover, the contagion appears to be spreading, characterized by extreme volatility and alarming declines in America’s own equity markets. Those worries are compounded because there always have been doubts about the accuracy of Beijing’s official economic statistics. Even before the current downturn, some outside experts believed that Chinese officials padded the results, making the country’s performance appear stronger than it actually was. If China is now teetering on the brink of recession, the political incentives for officials to conceal the extent of the damage would be quite

powerful. The focus on the possible wider economic consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is understandable, since the ramifications could be extremely unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies. But we should also be vigilant about how such economic stress might affect Beijing’s diplomatic and military behavior. It is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.” China’s leaders likely feel increasingly uncomfortable. The implicit bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has been that if the public does not challenge the Communist Party’s dominant political position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for the people. The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what happens if the Party’s position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often double

digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface. Beijing might refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export markets, and access to those markets would

be jeopardized by war. However, the need to preserve and strengthen national unity and distract the public from mounting economic troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at least three areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations that could lead to war. One issue is the South China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily broad territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent of that body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval patrols and the building of

artificial islands. Those policies have brought Beijing into acrimonious disputes with neighbors such as

Vietnam and the Philippines, which have rival territorial claims, and with the world’s leading maritime power, the United States, which resists any manifestation of Chinese control over the South China Sea and the crucial commercial lanes that pass through it. The conditions are in place for a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have already stressed the country’s alleged historical claims to the area, and made it clear that it will not tolerate being subjected to humiliation by outside powers. Such arguments are designed to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of the country’s long period of weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s. A second issue is Taiwan. Beijing has long argued that Taiwan is rightfully part of China and was stolen from the country in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although Chinese leaders have exhibited patience regarding the issue of reunification, relying in large measure on growing cross-strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to eventually accept that outcome, Beijing has also reacted very sharply

whenever Taiwanese officials have pushed an agenda of independence, as during the administration of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008. The danger or renewed confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that the nominee of Chen’s old party, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, will be Taiwan’s next leader. A new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely serious, since the United States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese efforts at coercion as a “grave breach of the peace” of East Asia. Yet there is little doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a stern response by the Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be more political danger to the regime if it did

not take a strong stance on that issue. The third possible arena for crisis is the East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which are under Japanese control. From China’s perspective, those islands were stolen by Imperial Japan at the

same time that Tokyo took possession of Taiwan following the 1895 war. And ginning up public anger against Japan is never difficult. China just finished celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which is touted in China as “the Chinese People’s War of

Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.” Recalling Japan’s invasion of China, and the resulting atrocities, was a prominent theme of the various commemorative events. But the animosity is not

based solely on historical grievances. Anger at Japan over the ongoing East China Sea dispute and other matters has already produced anti-Japanese riots in Chinese cities, characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and automobiles. There is a powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising stance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku feud, confident that the Chinese people will back such a stance. All of this suggests that the United States and its allies need to proceed cautiously about dealing with China, especially on these three issues. Now is not the time to press a Chinese leadership that likely feels beleaguered by the country’s economic woes.

The last thing we should do is give those leaders further temptation to distract the Chinese people with a foreign policy confrontation. Such a strategy entails the grave risk of miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for all concerned

Territorial conflicts in the East China Sea escalate to nuclear useAyson and Ball 14 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University, and Desmond, Emeritus Professor in the Strategic and Defense Studies Center at the Australian National University, “Escalation in North Asia: A Strategic Challenge for Australia,” November 2014, http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2318%20Web.pdf)

There is no guarantee that China and Japan will be able to keep their bilateral military interactions in the East China Sea below the threshold of armed violence, even if it is their continuing preferences to do so. This event would not necessarily ruin Asia’s long record for the avoidance of major interstate wars. The downing of a plane or the sinking of a coastguard vessel would not automatically spell the beginning of a catastrophic conflict. But

Asia’s relative peace has induced a tendency to assume that war of almost any sort is largely unthinkable

because it would be so costly, including for economic reasons. It is important to question any prevailing assumptions that this logic will remain robust in a serious Sino-Japanese crisis which could well be just around the corner. There may also be a corresponding assumption that Japan would not be the first to use force because of long-standing constitutional and moral restraints. Again this should be questioned. Some years back, when the transformation of the Japanese Coastguard (JCG) was already becoming evident, Richard Samuels observed that in contrast to the Maritime Self Defense Force (which ‘is denied authority to fire on enemy ships unless fired on first’) the JCG ‘is now allowed by law to initiate armed conflict under conditions that are vaguely defined and easily justifiable in retrospect. Local commanders are now authorised to use force under the conditions of “justifiable defense” and during an “emergency.”’ 2 M. Taylor Fravel has argued that China tends to restrict its use of force in territorial disputes to situations when its claim is weak.3 But this limitation is of little comfort whenever the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is seen as one of those weaker claims. Should minor hostilities eventuate, either accidentally or by design, a good deal would then depend on the political temperature of the Sino-Japanese relationship. In the event of any public coverage,

nationalist sentiment in both countries would likely put both governments in a difficult position, even if restraint was their preferred option. The paucity of ongoing political contact between China and Japan at the highest level (in contrast to Sino-US relations under Xi and Obama) might make an agreement on restraint harder to agree, as would the absence of the maritime communications mechanism that the two countries are currently discussing. There is little sign that Sino-Japanese strategic relations constitute what Coral Bell once called an adverse partnership which the Cold War superpowers had already begun to develop by the time they found

themselves in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The absence of a similar mutually chastening experience is probably one reason today’s North Asia lacks a ‘consciousness between the dominant powers, that they have solid common interests as well as sharp conflicting interests.’4 Something Small May Escalate Very Quickly Whatever the evolving atmospherics of the Xi-

Abe relationship, it is difficult to avoid the view that Japan and China are locked in one of Asia’s closest approximations

to a zero-sum-game over status and prestige. An ascendant China is bad for Japan’s status and a more vital Japan is

a direct challenge to China’s aspirations. These dynamics play out in their East China Sea contest. And even if

an improved political environment in North Asia can be reached with more amicable Japan-China relations, perverse military-technical incentives for the rapid escalation of conflict could still be viciously destabilising in the event of even a minor outbreak of violence. Perhaps the most pernicious of these escalatory dynamics is the duality of China’s strategic predicament. On the one hand China’s growing assertiveness in the East China Sea is a sign of greater national confidence that the People’s Republic now has the power to revise the regional conditions that it has hitherto had to put up

with. On the other hand, China’s growing military presence in Asia’s maritime theatres is the visible tip of a military iceberg characterised by severe vulnerabilities in C4SIR—Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance— and inexperience in operating effectively beyond the first island chain. If Beijing thought for some reason, rightly or wrongly, that a more significant use of force against the PLA by Japan was imminent, the pressures to preempt by way of China’s own escalation would be very significant. If Japan’s knowledge of China’s military weaknesses were accompanied by a Chinese underestimation of Japan’s surveillance power, any hint of Chinese breakout could be a very hazardous moment in their strategic relationship. In an excellent study, Avery Goldstein has pointed to the real dangers of crisis instability between the China and the United States.5 But more scholarly and official attention needs to be directed to crisis instability problems between China and Japan. Of course it cannot be expected that any such escalating Sino-Japanese conflict will necessarily remain between the two

of them. The United States, Japan’s alliance guarantor, will likely face some very early decision points about whether to enter the fray. In some senses at least, a degree of American involvement seems almost automatic. There are intimate links between Japan’s and America’s armed forces and C4SIR systems in North Asia, including

their cooperation in underwater Sound Surveillance Systems (SOSUS) facilities.6 It is difficult to imagine Washington having anything less than a front seat in the evolving violent drama. This raises the costs of China’s escalation in a way that might first be thought to generate great caution in Beijing; for the disablement of Japanese systems is also likely to impinge on America’s military eyes and ears in Asia. China would need to think

twice about escalating a bilateral conflict with Japan because of the distinct possibility of direct US military involvement. But

knowing the resources that Japan’s ally could bring to bear, China could in fact face incentives to escalate very quickly against Japan before America made that fateful decision. And if for some reason Beijing believed that the United States was unlikely to come good on its confirmation that the Mutual Security Treaty applies to Japan in the context of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the deterrence of

Chinese escalation could in fact be weakened. There is at least some speculation that China might exploit an emerging crisis with Japan in an attempt to force the United States to blink.7 Beijing could well be uncertain about what Washington would do. But in the pressure and confusion of an already serious crisis, China’s leaders only need to think that American involvement is a possibility to face some additional escalatory pressures. The PLA would be operating in the knowledge that its vulnerable C4SIR systems would be among the very first targets of American military action to defend its alliance partner. China would therefore face at least two types of escalatory pressures. The first one is more general: to use what forces it has available over which it may lose effective command should its control systems be disabled. In this way the possibility of American involvement may, through China’s preemptive moves, become an absolute certainty. The second pressure is more specific: China would find it too tempting not to target American C4SIR systems including America’s satellite capabilities. A Nuclear

Exchange is Also Possible In this sequence, the move from a small and even accidental use of force involving China and

Japan to a much more serious and damaging triangular conflict with United States participation suddenly

seems plausible. By no means is it too much to imagine China’s early resort to anti-satellite attacks, its

exploitation of asymmetric advantages with its growing missile capabilities to target America’s aircraft carriers, and an acceleration in Chinese cyber-attacks for military purposes. Nor in response, or in anticipation, is it implausible to envision devastating American and Japanese attacks against China’s C4SIR and missile systems. All three parties would very likely be aiming to keep this escalating exchange in the conventional domain (and only two of them have nuclear weapons that

might be used). But there are strategic and material factors which suggest that nuclear escalation is less unlikely than some might wish to presume. An outwardly confident but inwardly vulnerable China may resort to nuclear threats against Japan as a form of intimidation. That would immediately require America’s closest attention. Nuclear weapons

remain for China the great equaliser. But this also means that as prized assets, China may want to use its nuclear weapons early if it feels that its ability to retain the capacity to do so is at risk. Two material issues surface here to make this

hugely destabilising situation possible. The first is that China lacks separate tactical and strategic C4SIR systems. This raises the prospect that American (and Japanese) conventional attacks designed to degrade China’s control of its conventional forces may also reduce Beijing’s confidence in its ability to retain a nuclear deterrence capability. China may face a horrible dilemma such that if it wants to retain a nuclear option, it has to use it early rather than as a last resort. The second is that, because of basing

arrangements, China may assume that an American conventional attack will also remove some of its land based nuclear missiles and sea based nuclear systems. This is also a perverse incentive to nuclear escalation.

T – engagement 1nc a. Interpretation: Engagement is a processCrocker 9 Chester A. Crocker, professor of strategic studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, was an assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989. 9-14-09 New York Times Terms of Engagementhttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html

There is no cookie-cutter formula for making it work, however. In southern Africa in the 1980s, we directed our focus toward stemming violence between white-ruled South Africa and its black-ruled neighbors. This strategy put a priority on regional conflict management in order to stop cross-border attacks and create better conditions for internal political change. The United States also engaged with the Cubans in an effort aimed at achieving independence for Namibia (from South Africa) and at the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. In Mozambique, engagement meant building a constructive relationship with the United States, restraining South African interference in Mozambique’s internal conflicts and weaning the country from its Soviet alignment.More recently, the Bush administration’s strategy for engagement with Libya ultimately led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the elimination of that country’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.While the details differ, each case of engagement has common elements. Engagement is a process, not a destination. It involves exerting pressure, by raising questions and hypothetical possibilities, and by probing the other country’s assumptions and thinking. Above all, it involves testing how far the other country might be willing to go. Properly understood, the diplomacy of engagement means raising questions that the other country may wish to avoid or be politically unable to answer. It places the ball in the other country’s court.

B. Violation – the plan only has the USFG end its policy of strategic ambiguity with the People’s Republic of China – there is no material engagement with the PRC and no process undertaken by the aff c. prefer our interp and vote neg for competitive equity:1. predictable limits – the aff justifies any policy that effects the region and therefore the PRC to be engagement with the PRC. AND they justify any change by adding or subtracting a policy. NO ability o prepare or have effective ground under this interp 2. Effects T – at best they are effects T if they win that the clarification of the strategic ambiguity in favor of ROC will get the PRC to the table on something. Independent voting issue.

A. T is a voter for pedagogical reasons – it’s the only way we can learn to rigorously test ideas and respond to rigorous testing

Case Extensions

Containment Advantage Frontline Extensions

No invasion coming extensions China invasion of Taiwan unlikely – political and economic pressures checkRapp-Hooper 13 (Mira Rapp-Hooper, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 8-26-2013,“ ‘Strength’ or Strategy in the Taiwan Strait?”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/strength-or-strategy-the-taiwan-strait-9310?page=show)

So what does the recent NMD report mean for those goals? If it is true that by 2020, Beijing may have “the comprehensive military capability to deter any foreign aid that comes to Taiwan’s defense,” US defense planners must take this seriously, as it could undermine the first goal of opposing a change in Taiwan’s status by force. Defense analysts have been grappling with this shifting balance for several years, however, and have proffered multiple ways that Washington and Taipei might seek to offset these shifting

forces. More important than any particular technology or tactic, however, is the expert assessment that even with the military balance in its favor, an invasion of Taiwan would be “a bold and possibly foolish gamble on Beijing’s part.” If Beijing was able to establish air superiority, an invasion of Taiwan would still require a large and costly amphibious assault in which Taipei would possess the defensive advantage. A war like this one could decimate the PLA, in which China’s leaders have been investing for decades. And perhaps most importantly, after invading and destroying Taiwan, Beijing would then have to rule

it—hardly a propitious solution to a decades-long national political dispute. In contrast to the grim realities of what a China-Taiwan war might look like, however, cross-Strait relations are currently at an all-time high. Of course, this fact could change on short notice. But the basic point is that even a militarily superior Beijing with the ability to impede US access to the theater would still have ample reason to pause before choosing this kind of conflict. And ultimately, even if China is capable of deterring foreign aid to Taiwan that does not presume that Beijing effectively employs those capabilities or that

the United States stands down as a result. Deterrence is not a unilateral military endeavor, but is fundamentally a strategic and political one.

No japan war Impact ExtensionsNo ECS war or miscalc – power balance, deterrence, and economic interdependence Beauchamp 14 (Zack Beauchamp, ThinkProgress , “Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China,” 2/7/14, Beauchamp is an editor of TP Ideas and a reporter for ThinkProgress.org. He previously contributed to Andrew Sullivan’s The Dish at Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also written for Foreign Policy and Tablet magazines. Zack holds B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from Brown University and an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of Economics, http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/02/07/3222021/china-japan-war/) GG

One of the easiest ways to evaluate the risks of Sino-Japanese war is by reference to three of the most important factors that shape a government’s decision to go to war: the balance of power, economic incentives, and ideology. These categories roughly correspond to the three dominant theories in modern international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism), and there’s solid statistical evidence that each of them can play a significant role in how governments think about their decisions to use military force. So let’s take them in turn. The main source of tension is an East China Sea island chain, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyus in China. While there are other potential flashpoints, the current heightened tensions are centered on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Japan currently controls the islands, but China claims them, and the Chinese military has made increasingly aggressive noises about the islands of late. But there’s one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons. The tagline for World War I in 1914 — “The War To End All Wars” — would have a decidedly different meaning in 2014, as war’s end would be accomplished by the world’s end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they could win the war decisively, East Asia’s great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton University’s Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the “preemption temptation;” nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands. That also helps explain why the most commonly-cited Senkaku/Diaoyu spark, accidental escalation, isn’t as likely as many suggest. When The Wall Street Journal’s Andrew Browne writes that there’s a “real risk of an accident leading to a standoff from which leaders in both countries would find it hard to back down in the face of popular nationalist pressure,” he’s not wrong. But it won’t happen just because two planes happen across each other in the sky. In 2013, with tensions running high the whole year, Japan scrambled fighters against Chinese aircraft 433 times. Indeed, tensions have flared up a number of times throughout the years (often sparked by nationalist activists on side of the other) without managing to bleed over into war. That’s because, as MIT East Asia expert M. Taylor Fravel argues, there are deep strategic reasons why each side is, broadly speaking, OK with the status quo over and above nuclear deterrence. China has an interest in not seeming like an aggressor state in the region, as that’s historically caused other regional powers to put away their differences and line up against it. Japan currently has control over the islands, which would make any strong moves by China seem like an attempt to

overthrow the status quo power balance. The United States also has a habit of constructive involvement, subtly reminding both sides when tensions are spiking that the United States — and its rather powerful navy — would prefer that there be no fighting between the two states. Moreover, the whole idea of “accidental war” is also a little bit confusing . Militaries don’t just start shooting each other by mistake and then decide it’s time to have a war. Rather, an incident that’s truly accidental — say, a Japanese plane firing on a Chinese aircraft in one of the places where their Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) overlap — changes the incentives to go to war, as the governments start to think (perhaps wrongly) that war is inevitable and the only way to win it is to escalate. It’s hard to envision this kind of shift in calculation in East Asia, for all of the aforementioned reasons. It’s wrong to talk about incentives to go war in purely military terms. A key component of the Senkaku/Diaoyou is economic: the islands contain a ton of natural resources, particularly oil and gas. But far more valuable are the trade ties between the two countries. China is Japan’s largest export market, so war would hurt Japan more than China, but it’d be pretty painful for both. Proponents of the World War I parallel find a lot to criticize about this point. They like to cite Norman Angell, a pre-World War I international relations theorist famous for arguing that war was becoming economically obsolete. Angell is now often used interchangeably with Dr. Pangloss in international relations talk, a symbol of optimism gone analytically awry. But Angell gets a bad rap. He didn’t actually say war was impossible; he merely claimed that it no longer was worth the cost (if you remember the aftermath of World War I, he was right about that). The real upshot of Angell’s argument is that, unless there’s some other overwhelming reason to go to war, mutually profitable trade ties will serve as a strong deterrent to war. Despite a year of heated rhetoric and economic tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, bilateral trade has been recovering nicely of late. Angell may have been wrong about Europe, but he’s probably right about East Asia. M.G. Koo, a political scientist at Chung-Ang University, surveyed several Senkaku-Diaoyu flareups between 1969 and 2009. He found that economic ties between the two countries played an increasingly large role in defusing tensions as the trade relationship between the two countries deepened. The 1978 crisis over the islands is a good example. Bilateral trade had grown substantially since the end of the last big dispute (1972), but they had entered into a new phase after Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms began in 1978. A key part of the early modernization plan was the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) with Japan, a diplomatic treaty that (among other things) “facilitated a rush of Japanese firms into the Chinese market.” According to Koo, “policy circles in China and Japan” had “increasingly recognized that the [Senkaku/Diaoyu] sovereignty issue could possibly jeopardize the PFT negotiations, thus undermining economic gains.” The leadership tamped down tensions and, afterwards, “shelving territorial claims for economic development seemingly became the two countries’ diplomatic leitmotif in the treatment of the island dispute.” There’s reason to believe today’s China and Japan aren’t bucking the historical pattern. Despite a year of heated rhetoric and economic tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, bilateral trade has been recovering nicely of late. Quartz’s Matt Phillips, looking over the numbers, concluded that “the China-Japan trade war is pretty much over.” Sure, Chinese business leaders are making some nationalistic noises, but Phillips points out that the “lack of mass, nationalistic protests in China suggests the powers-that-be have decided there’s no need for that to hurt an important business relationship.” Trade really does appear to be calming the waves in the East China

Sea. The last thing people worried about war between China and Japan cite is ideology. Specifically, a growing nationalism, linked to the history of antagonism between the two traditional East Asian powers, that threatens to overwhelm the overwhelming military and economic rationales that militate against war. “At its root,” Asia experts Tatsushi Arai and Zheng Wang write, “the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is an identity-based conflict in which the divergent memories, perceptions, attitudes, and aspirations of the two national communities combine in volatile combinations.” The gist of the problem is that both countries believe they have historical claims to the islands that extend at least back to 1895; Chinese books date its control way back in the Ming Dynasty. Japan claims it formally annexed the Senkakus after World War II; China claims that Japan should have handed the Diaoyus back as part of its post-World War II withdrawal from Chinese territory. This historical conflict cuts across modern lines of tension in particularly dangerous ways. Japan, always threatened by China’s overwhelming size, is baseline skeptical of China’s military and economic rise. Aggressive moves in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute suggest to Japanese citizens that China’s plan is to eclipse and ultimately dominate Japan. China, by contrast, still has deep, visceral memories of the brutal Japanese occupation during World War II, and its history books cast Japan as the enemy responsible for its subordinate status in the past two centuries of global politics. Japanese defenses of the Senkakus come across as, once again, an attempt to keep China down. Anti-Japan protestors in Hong Kong on the anniversary of Japan's WWII surrender.Anti-Japan protestors in Hong Kong on the anniversary of Japan’s WWII surrender.CREDIT: VINCENT YU/AP IMAGES To some observers, the risk that these nationalist impulses pressure leaders into military escalation during a crisis is the greatest risk of war. The “toxic mix of two rising nationalisms and unresolved mutual resentments” makes “the risks of an accidental conflict becomes uncomfortably real,” Isabel Hilton writes in The Guardian. Time’s Michael Crowley agrees, writing that “national pride and historical grievance” threaten “to drag in the U.S.” into a Pacific war. But the importance of nationalism as a driving force on both the Chinese and Japanese side has been overblown. In fact, a deeper look at the prevailing ideological winds in both China and Japan suggest much more pacific forces are likely to carry the day. First, while it’s easy to see China as an aggressive expansionist power bent on retaking its “rightful place” in East Asia by force, that’s simply inconsistent with China’s track record to date. In an influential 2003 article, Iain Alasdair Johnston, a professor of “China in World Affairs” at Harvard, argued that there’s overwhelming evidence China is more-or-less happy with the current international order. Johnston tested various measures of Chinese interest in upending the global order — like its willingness to work inside the U.N. and internal dialogues within PRC strategists about overtaking the United States — and found very little evidence of China seeking to overturn the global structure, including the U.S.–Japan–Korea alliance system that sets the terms in East Asia. “The regime appears to be unwilling,” according to Johnston, “to bear the economic and social costs of mobilizing the economy and militarizing society to balance seriously against American power and influence in the region, let alone globally.” The Chinese leadership’s ideology is better understood, in Johnston’s view, as centering on expanding China’s power inside the international order rather than overturning through gambles like military aggression in the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain. In the face of 2013’s flurry of headlines about a newly aggressive China, Johnston revisited his thesis. He found basically no evidence that the Chinese leadership had changed its tune. Panicked writers, in Johnston’s analysis, were focusing on minor changes

in Chinese policy to the exclusion of major continuities (like continued and deepening economic ties with the United States). They were also consistently misinterpreting Beijing’s thinking during major so-called aggressive moves. Take the 2010 Senkaku-Diaoyu flareup, after a Chinese trawler tried to ram some Japanese coast guard ships near the islands. Johnston found no evidence of serious Chinese escalation — the most serious such step reported, an embargo on shipping “rare earth” metals to Japan, was either very weakly enforced or never happened. Moreover, Beijing took explicit steps to tamp down anti-Japanese nationalism, placing anti-war editorials in major party outlets and shutting up the most anti-Japanese voices on the Chinese web during the most diplomatically sensitive time in the dispute. In short, China’s track record in the past ten years suggests the government doesn’t share the hardline nationalist sentiment it occasionally indulges in. Rather, the Chinese government is interested in very moderate regional advances that stop well short of war, and is capable of shutting down the sort of nationalist outburst from its population that might goad the government into war well before such protests might start affecting policy. What about Japan? It’s true that Abe himself holds some fairly hardline nationalist views. For instance, he won’t admit that Japan waged an aggressive war during World War II, which is a pretty gobsmacking bit of revisionism if you think about it. In December, Abe visited a shrine that honors (among others) Japanese war criminals from that era, a move that contributed to the recent bout of nationalistic strife. 56 percent of Japanese voters supported seeing the treaty as prohibiting “collective self-defense” (meaning defense of its allies when attacked). A miniscule 7 percent wanted to see Japanese troops “fighting on the frontlines with the U.S. military.” But there are a number of reasons to think that the resurgent Japanese nationalism Abe represents isn’t going to force war during a crisis. For one thing, his government’s coalition partners would do their damndest to block escalation. New Komeito, whose support keeps Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in power, is an odd duck: pacifict. Buddhist libertarians is way oversimplified, but it gets the point across. Regardless, they are extremely serious about their pacifism — it’s at the core of their political identity, and it inclines them towards a more generous stance towards Beijing. They’d exert a calming pressure in any crisis. Now, there are rumblings that the LDP and New Komeito may part political ways. But the cause of the split — a disagreement over rewriting or reinterpreting Article 9, the pacifist article in Japan’s constitution — reveals the broadest check on Japanese nationalism. Simply put, the Japanese people still retain much of the nation’s post-World War II pacifist core, and Abe’s government has governed accordingly. Mike Mochizuki, the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair at George Washington University, took a hard look at Japanese opinion about militarization in the Abe era. He and his coauthor, Samuel Porter, found enormous Japanese opposition to anything resembling a significant return to active military status. For instance, 56 percent of Japanese voters supported seeing the treaty as prohibiting “collective self-defense” (meaning defense of its allies when attacked). A miniscule 7 percent wanted to see Japanese troops “fighting on the frontlines with the U.S. military.” So why did they support Abe’s aggressive LDP? In a word, the economy. Japan’s citizens aren’t deeply aligned with the LDP philosophy — “83 percent,” according to Mochizuki and Porter, “felt that a party that can effectively oppose the LDP is necessary” in government. Rather, they threw out the previous government because the economy was in tatters. Sixty percent of Japanese voters want Abe to focus on the economy, while only 9 percent see foreign policy as the priority. Abe’s government, nationalist stunts aside, isn’t unaware of this reality. Because China is Japan’s

number one trading partner, “reviving Japan’s economy will be inordinately difficult if fractious political relations with China are allowed to damage Japan–China economic relations,” Mochizuki and Porter argue. “If Sino–Japanese relations were to deteriorate further and lead to a more precipitous drop in Japanese exports to China, this would jeopardize Abe’s growth strategy and thereby threaten his political survival.” As a consequence, they conclude, the Prime Minister’s approach to the Senkaku dispute “will be measured and will not entail full-blown militarization,” let alone short term escalation. Abe and the LDP rank militaristic nationalism a distant second to the nation’s economic health. Of course it’s possible that, at one point in the future, all of this changes. Chinese hard power continues to grow, Japan remilitarizes in a big way, and the United States pulls back it security guarantee. In that world, a combination of security competition and nationalist fever might well swamp the economic incentives against war. But it’s important to remember that we’re nowhere close to that reality. Too often, our political discourse dramatically inflates the threats facing the United States, leading to distorted, paranoid policy responses when something more measured would do. There’s a lot going in East Asia that matters to American policymakers. We should focus on solving those real problems, not the ephemeral specter of a vanishingly unlikely war.

Extensions No US China war NO IMPACT: No China-U.S. WarSwaine 15 (Michael D. Swaine, Nicholas Eberstadt, M. Taylor Fravel, Mikkal Herberg, Albert Keidel, Evans J. R. Revere, Alan D. Romberg, Eleanor Freund, Rachel Esplin Odell, Audrye Wong. Carnegie Endowment for Intentional Peace, “Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic Net Assessment”, April 2 2015, p. 186 http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/02/conflict-and-cooperation-in-asia-pacific-region-strategic-net-assessment/i560) GG

As with the Pacific Asia-Pacific environment, direct conflict between the United States and China is unlikely. In fact, this is probably the least likely environment that could emerge over even the long term. This is in part because both nations are nuclear-armed powers and will almost certainly remain so during the period under examination. Any direct use of conventional force between these powers would run the risk of escalation to a nuclear conflict, especially in the context of an Asia-Pacific Cold War. Leaders in both capitals are acutely aware of this danger and will remain so. Moreover, neither nation is likely to witness the rise to power of the kind of risk-accepting leadership that would threaten the fundamental interests of the other in a way that could trigger a deliberate, direct, and sustained use of force. The possibility of such leadership emerging in China or the United States or both is more likely in the context of an Asia-Pacific Cold War environment, with all the dangerous features and trends noted in the above discussion, than at present. Yet a transition from an Asia-Pacific Cold War environment to a direct U.S.-China hot war would almost certainly require a series of serious miscalculations and misperceptions regarding intentions, capabilities, and behavior on one or both sides over time. This would lead to a very severe crisis or incident of the type described above, a fairly rapid escalation to conflict, an inability to deescalate from a limited level of conflict, and a subsequent commitment to employ force on an episodic basis. Although such enormous mistakes on the part of both states cannot be ruled out, they are not likely. Unfortunately, the possibility of other types of sustained, episodic conflict (for example, between China and U.S. allies) is marginally more likely than a direct U.S.-China conflict. This places a very high premium on the need for Beijing and Washington to avoid such indirect clashes and to prevent them from escalating to more severe, prolonged conflict.

Containment BAD ExtensionsMixing engagement and containment best – sole focus ensures miscalculation. Internal political divisions in China will prevent a true challenge otherwise.Kurth, James. (James Kurth is a Senior Fellow in FPRI’s Center for the Study of America and the West and a member of the Orbis Board of Editors. He is Professor of Political Science Emeritus and Senior Research Scholar at Swarthmore College. He is the author of over 120 professional articles and editor of three professional volumes, in the fields of U.S. foreign and defense policy, international politics, and the comparative politics of America and Europe. His recent publications have focused upon the interrelations between the global economy, cultural conflicts, and U.S. foreign and defense politics. Professor Kurth received his A.B. in history from Stanford University and his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University, where he also taught as an assistant and associate professor of government. He has been a visiting member of the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, NJ), visiting professor of political science at the University of California at San Diego, and visiting professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, where he received the Department of the Navy medal for Meritorious Civilian Service. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia), where he has served as the Chair of its Study Group of America and the West and as Editor of its journal, Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), and of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London).) Confronting a Powerful China with Western Characteristics - Foreign Policy Research Institute. (2016). Retrieved from http://www.fpri.org/article/2012/01/confronting-a-powerful-china-with-western-characteristics/ July 13 // DDI - CS

The rapid rise of Chinese economic and military power has produced the most fundamental change in the global system since the end of the Cold War, and it poses vital questions about China's future direction. Many Western analysts argue that China's great power will cause it to become more like the West, i.e., like Western great powers. Other Western analysts believe that China will continue to be the same, i.e., like the China of the past few decades. An alternative interpretation, however, is that China's new power will enable it to become even more Chinese than it is now, i.e., to become more like the traditional and imperial China that existed before the Western intrusions of the 19th century. This China was the “Central State” of a distinctive Chinese world order, operating with distinctive conceptions about diplomatic relations, military strategy, and economic exchange. However, the new China will be unlike the old China in at least two important ways. It will be a naval, and not just a land, power, and it will be a financial, and not

just a trading, power. In other words, it will be a powerful China with Western characteristics. As a formidable naval and financial power, China will present fundamental challenges to the United States and to both the long-standing U.S. security order in the Western Pacific and the long-standing “Washington Consensus” about the global economic order. There was once a great power, one so great that its power not only reached all around the world, but it was recognized as the world's leading power. Its economic practices, political system, and conceptions of international law provided the models and set the standards for numerous other powers. And at the core of its power, and backing up its models, was a special form of military power—the greatest navy in the world—and a special form of economic power, the greatest financial system in the world. That great power was Great Britain, that navy was the Royal Navy, that financial system was centered in the City of London, and that era was just a century ago. However, the greatness of British power had been established almost a century before that, after Britain's victory in the Napoleonic Wars. That victory had largely been won with the advantages provided by the Royal Navy and the Bank of England. The Old Great Power and the New I: Britain, Germany, and America But at the beginning of the 20th century, the old established great power was challenged and confronted by two rising ones. One of these was Germany, and the other was the United States.1 Britain responded to the challenges posed by these two quite different rising powers in two very different ways. Toward Germany, Britain essentially pursued a policy of containment. As the Germans rapidly built a large and advanced navy and deployed it in their two adjacent seas, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, the British responded by building up their own navy, so that it was even larger and more advanced than it had been before. The tensions and alarms produced by this naval arms race spilt over into other arenas where there were disputes – diplomatic (e.g., alliances), colonial (e.g., the Boer War), and economic (e.g., trade competition). Britain's actions in all of these arenas were shaped by its containment policy toward Germany, and Germany's actions in all of these arenas were shaped by its determination to break out of this containment. In the end (1914), Germany did break out, Britain did try once more to contain it, but this time with military force, which resulted in the greatest war in Western history (called at the time the Great War). In contrast, toward the United States, Britain essentially pursued a policy of appeasement. As the Americans rapidly built up a large and advanced navy and deployed it in two of their adjacent seas, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, a number of incidents and disputes occurred between Britain and the United States with respect to this region, culminating in the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895. In this case, however, Britain backed down, and, over the course of the next decade, it steadily withdrew its military forces and ceded its leading role in the region to the United States. The mentality of accommodation provided by this military appeasement spilt over into other arenas where there had been disputes—

diplomatic (e.g., new treaties), colonial (e.g., the new Panama Canal project), and economic (e.g., a new preponderant role for American trade and finance in the region). In the end (1917), the United States had come to such a mutuality of interests with Britain that it came to its aid not only in the Great War or First World War, but also in the Second World War. The Old Power and the New II: America and China Of course, in our own time, there is once again a long-established and world-leading great power, indeed superpower. Its economic practices, political system, and conceptions of international order have provided the models for numerous other powers. And at the core of this power, and backing up its models, has been a special form of military power: the greatest navy in the world and a special form of economic power: the greatest financial system in the world. That power has been the United States, that navy has been the U.S. Navy, that financial system has been centered in Wall Street, and that time has been the past 70 years, or ever since America's victory in the Second World War. But now, in the second decade of the 21st century, the old established great power is challenged and confronted by a rising one, China.2 The big question for U.S. foreign-policy and national-security officials is how should the United States respond to this challenge. And to this question, foreign-policy and national-security analysts and advisors have given two very different answers.

As it happens, these two answers for the U.S. policy response toward the rising power of China today correspond to the two different policy responses of Britain toward the two rising great powers of a century ago. In essence (although, of course, not in

name), these responses are a policy of containment versus a policy of appeasement. The Two Views from the West and the View from China From a different, more academic angle, these two answers or policies also correspond to two different theories or schools of international relations, the Realist School, which thinks in terms of military power and of containment policies, and the Liberal Internationalist (now really liberal globalist) School, which thinks in terms of economic interdependence and accommodation policies. The Realists and containment advocates often point to pre-1914 Germany as a prototype for contemporary China. Conversely, the Liberal Internationalists and accommodation advocates often point to 20th-century Anglo-American cooperation as a prototype for contemporary Sino-American relations. Whatever their differences, however, the two theories and the two policies agree on one big thing, and that is that as China becomes even more powerful—both in economic strength and in military strength, it will become more Western, i.e., it will become more like some Western power of the past. For whatever their differences, both Germany and the United States were both Western powers, as was, of course, Great Britain itself, which, as we have seen, had provided the very models of what a Western power should be (including both the naval model and the financial one). In particular, the Realists and containment advocates see China becoming a naval power (and serious threat), like other Western nations (and Japan) once did, but unlike China in the past, which had always focused upon land forces and ignored naval ones.3 On their part, the Liberal Internationalists and accommodation advocates see China becoming a financial center (and “responsible stakeholder”), like other Western nations (and Japan) have been, but unlike China in the past, which had always focused upon trade relations and ignored financial ones. But of course, there is a third academic school which only deals with China, consisting of the professional China specialists or experts, be their formal academic Ph.D. degree in history, political science, or economics. These China experts often insist that, whatever the level of economic and military development that China achieves, it will essentially remain Chinese. Western intrusions and influences have come and gone, but Chinese identity and behavior has endured. When some China experts turn their attention to military forces, they often emphasize China's tradition as a land power, and indeed as a defensive one (“the Great Wall mentality”).4 When other China experts turn their attention to economic relations, they often emphasize China's tradition as a trading economy, indeed one engaged in cooperative exchange. There is, however, a possible variation on this view of what China's already-great economic power and its consequent rising military power might mean for its conception of itself. It is that China's new power will enable it to become even more like its old self. In particular, earlier historical and traditional Chinese conceptions of her place in the world, and of the strategies and tactics which can maintain or advance this place, will return and will provide the guidelines for China's objectives, strategies, and tactics in the future. The interpretation in this article will largely conform to views held by China experts, that as China continues to gain in economic and military power, it will remain Chinese. Indeed China will be able to become even more Chinese than it was able to be anytime during the past 170 years, or since the First Opium War. But as China becomes more Chinese in some ways, it will also be a China with Western characteristics in other ways. And with regard to these latter ways, the two schools that see China becoming Western will also have something to add. The Discrediting of the Western Model and the Crediting of the Chinese Model There are good reasons that have become especially strong in the past two or three years, to believe that something like this development is now underway. The global economic crisis, which began in the United States in 2008 and which quickly spread to the rest of the West, has thoroughly discredited the “Washington Consensus” American economic model. The ensuing partisan polarization and policy paralysis in the United States has similarly discredited the American political model of liberal democracy. And the recent U.S. budget crisis and reduced military spending portend a period of military austerity and diminished U.S. military strength. At the same time, however, China's response to the economic crisis (a kind of Keynesian policy of vast spending on infrastructure and capital projects) has made it the most robust large economy in the world. Since the world depends upon it even more than before, the attractiveness of the Chinese alternative economic model, the “Beijing Consensus,” has been enhanced.5 Moreover, China's continuing political stability (including the impending transition in 2012 from the “fourth generation” of political leadership to the “fifth generation”) and policy effectiveness has also increased the attractiveness to developing countries of the Chinese political model of an authoritarian regime ruling a market economy, a sort of market-Leninism as the successor to Marxist-Leninism. Further, China's continuing increase in military spending and procurement of advanced weapons systems is producing impressive Chinese military strength that must now be taken into account. Finally, the conjunction of all of these recent changes means that, from a Chinese perspective, the contemporary global crisis has produced an “auspicious moment,” perhaps a “tipping point” and “strategic opportunity” in the grand historical drama of the decline of Western, and particularly of American, power and the supplanting rise of Chinese power.6 The Chinese Conception of Space: The Central State and the World Order As is well known, China's traditional conception of itself (and one that largely corresponded to reality for two thousand years from the 210s B.C.E. to the 1700s C.E.) was as the “Central Kingdom” or Central State. China was by far the largest country, the most powerful state, and the most advanced civilization in the world which was seen by the Chinese (even if that world was largely the region of East Asia and South East Asia). Surrounding the Central State was a series of much smaller countries or “tributary states,” several of which were also smaller versions of the political and cultural model provided by China; these were Korea; Lu-Chu (the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa); and Annam (Vietnam). Together, these tributary states composed a sort of “string of pearls” around the Central State.7 At the center of this Central State and Chinese world order was the capital city of Beijing (“Northern Capital”), at the center of Beijing was the imperial palace compound (‘the “Forbidden City”), and at the center of the imperial palace was the Emperor. The Emperor radiated authority and power, right and might, out of the imperial palace through the “Gate of Heavenly Peace” to Beijing, to China, and to the rest of the world. However, although Beijing was normally the imperial capital and center of China and the Chinese world order, the original capital and center was Xi’an, some 600 miles to the southwest of Beijing. Xi’an was established as the capital by Qin Shohuang, the original Qin (or Ch’in) Emperor, from whom China took its name. If one draws a great circle with Xi’an at its center, it nicely includes all the lands which the Chinese traditionally saw as part of their world order. As it happens, this circle largely corresponds to the boundary of China plus its tributary states during the late Qing or Manchu dynasty, i.e., the late 18th century (see Figure 1). Figure 1. Political map of Asia in 1890, showing late-Qing China. Figure 1. Political map of Asia in 1890, showing late-Qing China. The Chinese Conception of Time: Historical Cycles and China's Destiny The Western conception of Western history (at least since the Enlightment's “doctrine of progress”) has largely been linear. Western history begins in a primitive state followed by a “Dark Age” and then advances steadily upward, (admittedly with occasional setbacks such as the Thirty Years War or the two World Wars), through successive stages of higher technological, economic,

and political development. The Western conception of Chinese history has been somewhat similar: Chinese history begins with an impressive level of culture, but also with an authoritarian political system, one characterized by extensive cruelties, frequent turmoil, and periodic civil wars. The early Chinese encounters with the West issue in a long period of especially acute turmoil and war for China, but in the end—especially when America became the undisputed leading Western power—Western ideas and practices have at last put China on an upward path, similar to that which the West itself has taken. In contrast, the traditional Chinese conception of its history has largely been cyclical (as in the theory of the “dynastic cycle”). Chinese history begins at an already civilized level and after a period of political turmoil and Warring States (475-221 B.C.E.), the Qin Emperor unites China into one great Central State (221 B.C.E.). Forever after, China's destiny is to remain one great state and one great civilization. Particular dynasties will rise and fall, according to the dynastic cycle, and there will be periods of schism and disunion. But, in the end, the unity of China's state and of China's central place in the world will be restored. These two conceptions of history—the Western and the Chinese—have several elements in common, but, in essence, they are different and even contradictory. They can be combined, however, into a new one, which might be described as the Chinese historical conception with Western characteristics. That is, there has indeed been a long series of dynastic cycles, but successive cycles have, in large part, played out at successively higher levels of development. At its height (the 18th century), the Qing (Ch’ing) dynasty reached a stage even higher than that reached by its predecessor, the Ming (the 15th century). The subsequent decline of the Qing was so deep and the ensuing time of troubles was so grave that it could accurately be called “the 100 Years of Humiliation.” However, in 1949, China under the leadership of the Communist Party, began a new period of unity and advance, and this period is taking China to the highest level of development in its entire two-and-a-half millennial history. The culmination of China's dynasties and the fulfillment of China's destiny means that the China of the 21st century will not only become more like the China of the 18th century and before, but that China will become even more Chinese than it was before, because China will be realizing its potential more fully. Moreover, it will be doing so by incorporating all the benefits of Western science and technology, and on an even wider scale by extending the Chinese definition of the world order from East Asia to the world beyond—a world order which ultimately will include, in some still indistinct sense, the West itself. The Chinese Conception of Military Power and Strategy: Power Projection over Land In the traditional Chinese conception of military power, a strong and effective military force was indeed at the core of the Central State and of imperial power.8 However, the idea was that the military should rarely be used in addressing a strategic problem, and never as the first resort. Rather it was best held in reserve, and used as a last resort. Again however, it would be best if other rulers and potential adversaries knew that this reserve of military power actually existed and could be deployed when the Chinese rulers deemed it necessary. In the meantime, it would also be best if the actual realities of unequal power were clothed with a symbolic veil of reciprocal respect and cooperation. The imperial military was a sort of “cannon behind the curtain,” which every party knew was there, but which was discreetly covered. In the fullest realization of this conception, military power was a center of gravity, a solid and weighty mass which radiated outward gravitational lines of force, which gently, but firmly and steadily, bent the will of other rulers—and of potential adversaries—so that they would more and more be inclined and conformed to Chinese designs and priorities. In the long course of China's history, this concept of military power was, for the most part, only applied to the use of armies, i.e., the gravitational force lines were only projected across land. However, there had been a few rare exceptions when that power was also projected across the sea. The most important of these cases was Taiwan. (There were also two abortive invasions of Japan, undertaken by the Yuan or Mongol dynasty, and the epic, but temporary, voyages of Admiral Zheng He, undertaken during the Ming dynasty). The Chinese Conception of Military Operations and Tactics: Encirclement and the Sudden Blow These ideas about the center of gravity, the last resort, and the cannon behind the curtain were elements of the traditional Chinese conception of strategy. But the Chinese also have had a traditional conception of what might be seen as operations and tactics. Here, the focus has been on the steady and persistent accumulation of positions of strength, of peripheral bases of gravity in addition to the above mentioned core center of gravity.9 Over time, these accumulated bases add up and amount to an encirclement of the diminishing positions of strength of a potential adversary or target. Finally, there comes a time when the Chinese positions or bases are so strong vis-à-vis those of the opponent that everyone, including the opponent, can draw the obvious and sensible conclusion that the opponent should accept the realities and conform to the Chinese design, i.e., to accept his appropriate place within the Chinese world order. This acceptance of military realities is also clothed with the appearance that the opponent submits willingly, because he sees this to be the course that is most reasonable and in conformity with the world order, an order that is best for all. Of course, there will also be occasions when the opponent does not act upon these obvious military realities. In such cases, the Chinese tactic has been to await an auspicious moment, one in which the opponent is especially vulnerable, and then to strike a sudden blow, one that is both dramatic and effective. This in itself creates a new reality so that everyone, including of course the opponent, can draw the same obvious and sensible conclusion that the opponent could, and should, have accepted before. The realities have now been demonstrated with a stark clarity that could leave the opponent humiliated, but the Chinese tactic will often include some element (such as the quick withdrawal of the victorious Chinese military force to nearby positions) which will allow the opponent to retain some degree of respect (i.e., “face”). The Chinese Conception of Economic Power and Strategy: Exchange of Goods through Trade The traditional Chinese conception of economic power was analogous. A healthy and productive economic base was also at the core of the Central State and of imperial power. But here, the idea was that the economy should frequently be used in addressing a strategic problem, and often as a first resort. It would be best if other rulers and potential adversaries were well aware of the advantages to them of peaceful economic relations with China, particularly the exchange of goods through trade. However, the foreign rulers, with their small economies and inferior cultures, would need Chinese goods far more than the Chinese rulers would need theirs. Therefore, it would also be best if the actual realities of unequal attractiveness were balanced with foreign rulers also giving the Chinese signs and symbols of deference to the Chinese conception of the world order, with the Chinese Emperor at its center. This was important to the Chinese notion of imperial legitimacy, thus the famous “kowtow” ritual at the imperial court in Beijing. In the fullest realization of this conception, economic power was also a center of gravity, a solid and weighty mass which radiated outward gravitation lines of force, which gently but firmly and steadily shaped the will of other rulers—and of potential adversaries—so that they would more and more be inclined and conformed to Chinese designs and priorities. In the long course of imperial history, this Chinese conception of economic power was, for the most part, only applied to the exchange of goods, i.e., the gravitational force lines were only projected through trade. However, there had been occasional exceptions, when that power was also projected through China's supply of precious metals, i.e., through finance. This review of traditional Chinese conceptions of China's geography, history, and destiny can be useful in interpreting contemporary perspectives and objectives in the minds of Chinese leaders and, indeed, of some of the wider Chinese population. And the similar review of traditional Chinese conceptions of the strategy, operations, and tactics needed to achieve Chinese objectives can be particularly useful in explaining recent actions of the Chinese government and anticipating its future moves. Current events require a special focus on actions and moves in two arenas: The naval arena of China's three littoral seas—the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea—and the financial arena of China's massive holdings of U.S. currency and debt and the resulting status of being the world's leading creditor state. These are the very arenas which many scholars think have no real precedents in China's history and which are supposed to be arenas of Western history. The Three China Seas and Chinese Naval Power China has not been a dominant naval presence in its three littoral seas—the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea—for more than 170 years, i.e., ever since the arrival of the British navy in force during the First Opium War. Instead, a succession of foreign navies has dominated these seas, first the British, then the Japanese, then ever since World War II, the American. Moreover, even before the arrival of foreign navies to dominate these seas, China itself for centuries had not operated much of a navy there. It has been natural, therefore, for historians of Chinese strategy and its military to not only think that China is a land power, but that it is only a land power. And this view has been largely accurate—up until now. However, there is an alternative

interpretation of the place of these three littoral seas in the Chinese mind. The reason that China for centuries did not deploy a significant navy in them was that in those times there was no significant foreign navy which posed a threat there. A Chinese naval presence was therefore unnecessary. Then, when the British navy arrived, it immediately overwhelmed Chinese forces and established a dominant presence. This dominance by foreign navies continued in an unbroken chain down until contemporary times. A Chinese naval presence was therefore impossible. However, the three littoral seas have never been excluded from the Chinese conception of the Central State and the world order. (For example, they are included within the great circle's delineation of China's proper realm – Figure 1.) The Chinese have always assumed that these three seas should be understood to be “Chinese lakes,” as much dominated and secured by Chinese power as is Chinese land. Of course, Taiwan the large island which connects two of these seas, the East China Sea and the South China Sea – must be Chinese because it is both Chinese land and central to the Chinese lakes. And so, it is natural for the contemporary Chinese leadership to think that the proper destiny of these three seas, the seas between the Chinese mainland and the “First Island Chain,” will only be fulfilled when they are dominated by Chinese military power. This will include not only naval power narrowly defined, but also land-based aircraft and missiles which can project power and denial capability over these seas. It is therefore only a matter of time—a time that could arrive with an auspicious moment and strategic opportunity—until China's destiny in these seas will be realized. In the meantime, China will steadily and persistently seek to accumulate positions of strength in these seas, and some of these positions will add up to a kind of encirclement of sections within them. These positions will include islands, even very tiny ones, which are scattered around the seas. Such islands might appear trivial from a practical perspective, although some are in or adjacent to deep sea oil fields, such as the Spratly (or Nansha) Islands, in the South China Sea. However, from a strategic perspective, they are important symbols and can become markers or even bases for encirclement of the seas. This is particularly the case, given the vigorous Chinese use of the international law concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends 200 miles out from recognized land territory. This is one way to interpret the series of recent Chinese naval and diplomatic actions over such islands in each of the three seas. Beginning in the Spring of 2009 (and at the time when the global economic crisis had put the United States into substantial disarray), China created a succession of naval and diplomatic incidents, and these have continued down through the Summer of 2011. These incidents have occurred over (1) U.S. naval maneuvers in support of South Korea in the Yellow Sea; (2) the Senkaku Islands claimed by Japan in the East China Sea; and (3) the Paracel (Xisha) and Spratly (Nansha) Islands in the South China Sea. Each of these encounters has directly challenged some state which also claims jurisdiction over the island or surrounding section of the sea. By now, the list of these challenged states adds up to (from north to south) South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, i.e., every state which borders on the vast maritime realm stretching from the southern part of the Yellow Sea through the East China Sea, to the northern part of the South China Sea. However, also it is evident that each of these encounters has indirectly challenged the United States, as a formal ally of most of these states (South Korea, Japan, the Philippines) or as a potential protector of the others (Taiwan and

Vietnam). One of the Chinese purposes has been to test the U.S. resolve to protect the interests of the challenged states, particularly those interests which could be seen to be as trivial as the islands themselves – and perhaps to demonstrate to everyone, particularly to the challenged state – that, given the new strategic realities of the current period, the United States is not really a reliable ally and protector after all. By now, after two years of such challenges, China has not definitively achieved its purposes. The islands and the waters around them remain disputed, and, because of its generally firm statements and consistent support, the United States remains a plausible ally or protector. At the present time, it seems that the period 2009-2011 has not been an auspicious moment for China after all. However, the traditional Chinese response to such developments (or lack of them) is to simply return to being patient, while awaiting the eventual arrival of the next auspicious moment. In the meantime, China is building other kinds of positions of strength with a massive build-up of advanced weapons systems which can project power over, and deny access to, the three littoral seas. These include, most dramatically, procurement and deployment of a large fleet of surface vessels, including China's first aircraft carrier. However, although this surface fleet has a good deal of symbolic meaning, it does not have much substantive importance. China's surface fleet by itself will not pose a significant threat to the U.S. Navy for many years – if ever. Instead, the real, substantive, threat to the U.S. Navy comes first from China's large number of advanced attack submarines and second, and even more ominous, from the thousands of surface-to-sea missiles which the Chinese are deploying. The most threatening of these is the rapid development by the Chinese of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).10 The U.S. surface fleet – including its magnificent and splendid aircraft carriers – now has no effective defense against an ASBM threat, and there is no such defense in the now-foreseeable future. Given China's future objectives and capabilities in its three littoral seas and over Taiwan, what can be the U.S. policy response? Here, we will consider three strategic options: (1) containment, likely turning into confrontation; (2) appeasement, likely turning into marginalization; and (3) a conjunction of regional appeasement and global containment. Containment and Confrontation The obvious, or at least the conventional, response for the United States to China's challenge in the three littoral seas and Taiwan is to simply continue and

update the policy of containment, which it has pursued there for more than 60 years, in one form or another, ever since the outbreak of

the Korean War. Just as China modernized its military forces in the region, so too would the United States modernize its military forces there. In particular, this would entail enhanced anti-missile defenses for the U.S. surface fleet, especially the aircraft carriers; enhanced capabilities to destroy Chinese missiles at their land locations; and, most importantly, enhanced capabilities to conduct and prevail in cyberwar conflict with the Chinese. Although the weapons systems would be new, the strategic objective—

containment—would remain the same. The U.S. would deny China the capability to exercise dominance over these three seas, as well as over Taiwan, and it would deny China the capability to deny U.S. free military and commercial access to and through the three seas (what can be termed Denial 2). This containment policy obviously evokes the experience of other maritime containment policies in the past. Some were successful, i.e., they achieved their objective of denying dominance to a rising challenger without ending in war. These cases include not only the successful U.S. maritime containment of China up until now—despite several tense confrontations and crises over the years—but also the successful U.S. maritime containment of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, and 1980s. It then seemed that the Soviets’ build-up of their own maritime forces might enable them to dominate not only their own littoral seas, the Baltic Sea, the Barents Sea, and the Black Sea, but also to deny U.S. access to adjacent seas, the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. When the U.S. Navy confronted this threat, it developed a comprehensive and systematic “Maritime Strategy” and also built toward a “600-ship Navy” to back-up the strategy.11 Other maritime containment policies, however, were less successful as the previously mentioned British containment policy toward Germany before 1914, which ended in a catastrophic war (although the immediate causes of that war did not involve maritime issues and naval forces). However, the impending maritime confrontation between the United States and China will be shaped by the distinctive features of both of these powers in the contemporary era. In other words, it would probably be U.S. containment with Chinese characteristics. Given the earlier analysis, China's conception of its proper destiny and its acquisition of a formidable naval capability probably

means that China will see itself as an irresistible force, one which moves patiently but persistently and which anticipates an auspicious moment and strategic opportunity. At the same time, America's diminished military and economic capability to sustain a successful maritime containment policy probably means that the United States and its Navy are ceasing to be an immovable object. However, Americans, or at least important elements

amongst them, may still think of themselves as strong and resolute, i.e., as immovable. In such a conjunction of rising Chinese capabilities and expanding ambitions on the one hand, and declining American capabilities but stubborn positions on the other, misperceptions and miscalculations are inevitable. A small confrontation could easily and quickly escalate into a major crisis, and then escalate into a big war. Earlier in the outbreak of this war, we would likely see something like “the sudden blow” against the U.S. Navy. The most dramatic possibility would be an attack by Chinese conventional anti-ship missiles against one or more U.S. aircraft carriers.12 The destruction of one of these magnificent ships would mean not only the decapitation of an entire U.S. naval battle group, but also the death of more than 5000 American sailors. And this disaster—like the Japanese carrier-aircraft attack on the magnificent U.S. battleships at Pearl Harbor 70 years ago—would be only the first tragedy in what would then probably become a great war, a war which would be mutually catastrophic. Appeasement and Marginalization Hypothetically, one could imagine a very different policy response for the United States to China's challenge in the three littoral seas and Taiwan, and that is the classic alternative to containment, its very opposite— i.e., appeasement (although it might be termed accommodation). As we have seen, this was the policy which Britain followed toward the United States in its two adjacent seas of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean in the 1890s-1900s. The policy was an ambiguous success, issuing on the one hand in alliance with the United States during World War I and after, and on the other hand not only the end of British power in the Western Hemisphere, but also, after World War II, effectively the world-wide end of British power. (Of course, the most notorious case of appeasement was that of Britain against Germany in the 1930s, which issued in World War II). If the United States adopted a policy of appeasement or accommodation toward China in the three littoral seas and Taiwan, it would gradually but discernibly reduce both its actual naval operations and its formal security commitments there. The pace and direction of this reduction might be understood by China to be consistent with its own conceptions of patience and persistence. In other words, it could possibly be U.S. appeasement with Chinese characteristics. Again, however, some Americans would still think of themselves as strong and resolute, and they would always be contesting this policy, making its application inconsistent

and confusing and therefore again making for misconceptions and miscalculations. However, if the appeasement or accommodation policy were carried out to its logical conclusion, there would be a massive realignment of the long-established U.S. alliance system in the Western Pacific, i.e., involving not only the states bordering the three littoral seas and west of the “First Island Chain,” but also involving Japan, which is a major component of that chain and a principal power in the region. In other words, the loss of the three littoral seas would likely issue in the loss of the U.S. dominance in the waters that lie between the First and the Second Island Chains. In the end, the United States could be reduced to being a secondary, or even marginalized, power in the Western Pacific. Indeed, some Chinese military figures are beginning to raise the idea of a partitioning of the Pacific between China and the United States, along a line roughly corresponding to the Second Island Chain. Regional Appeasement and Global Containment Given the economic and military dynamics now underway in China (and the absence of such dynamics in America), it might seem that the Chinese will inevitably displace the United States from its dominant position in the three littoral seas and replace it with its own. The time and the way that this will happen is unknown, but the eventual outcome can be discerned. If so, whatever might be the name, the result would be appeasement or accommodation in this regional arena. However, regional appeasement does not inevitably entail global appeasement, i.e. appeasement in other arenas. When Britain gave up its strategic position in the Western Hemisphere to the United States, it did not then give up its strategic position in the rest of the world. It continued to remain the leading maritime power in all of the oceans and seas of the Eastern Hemisphere for the next thirty years. This suggests that were the United States to relinquish its dominant position in the three littoral seas or even in the Western Pacific, it still could retain its dominant position elsewhere. This could be true not only in the obvious case of the Eastern Pacific (where the United States would have strategic advantages comparable to those that China has in the Western Pacific), but in other oceans and seas around the world. The most important of these—and a strategic counterpoint to the three littoral seas—is the Indian Ocean.13 In this regard, the traditional naval concept of a “distant blockade” might become useful. A “near blockade” seeks to prevent an adversary from using his littoral waters for his naval and commercial purposes. This requires that the blockading power have a great naval superiority over the adversary. In contrast, a distant blockade allows the adversary the use of his littoral waters, but denies him the use of the waters beyond. If the adversary is largely self-sufficient (as was the Soviet Union and its alliance system in many respects) a capability to impose a distant blockade upon him will not be a major factor in his strategic calculations. However, if the adversary relies a great deal upon seaborne commerce, its SLOCs (sea lanes of commerce or, in the conventional notation, sea lines of communication) will be a major strategic factor. Traditional, imperial China was supremely self-sufficient. In this respect, it was thoroughly Chinese. However, contemporary China is very dependent upon seaborne commerce, upon both its enormous exports of industrial products and its enormous imports of the raw materials that are necessary for the continuing functioning of its economy (and the continuing stability of its social system). In this sense, contemporary China certainly has Western characteristics. This vital seaborne commerce passes, of course, through the three littoral seas. But much of it, including the necessary raw materials and especially the necessary oil, also passes through the Indian Ocean. If China acquires a dominant position—and denial capability—in the three littoral seas or even in the Western Pacific, the United States can retain a dominant position—and denial capability—in the Indian Ocean and in other seas beyond, through which passes China's vital exports and imports. In short, if China acquires a dominant position in the Western Pacific, it will only be the beginning of a grand and protracted bargaining process, engaging both China and the United States and involving both the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean and both the regional and the global arenas. In the end, there might be constructed an explicit and effective system of mutual deterrence, based upon such concepts as red-lines, salient thresholds, and tit-for-tat actions and reactions. Holdings of U.S. Currency and Debt and Chinese Financial Power China now has the largest foreign exchange reserves, and particularly the largest holdings of U.S. currency and debt, in the world, making it the world's leading creditor state. Yet, historically China did not see itself as a financial power, and it did not have a large and powerful financial sector within it. In this respect, it differed from a number of Western great powers, whose power included being a leading creditor state and major financial power. These have been, successively, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States, and on occasion France has also been a major financial power (as well as, briefly in the 1980s, Japan). An important question, therefore, is how one might expect China to convert its financial power into strategic power and thereby advance its regional and global ambitions, since it has had very little experience in doing so. And here, it is once again useful to look at traditional Chinese conceptions of

strategy, operations, and tactics. First, it would be natural for the Chinese to extend their historical practices in the arena of trade to the arena of finance. China's financial strength could frequently be used in addressing a strategic problem and often as a first resort, so long as this did not contradict other strategic objectives. For example, China's setting of the exchange rate between the yuan (RMB) and the dollar steers a course between the two objectives of (1) advancing Chinese industry through promoting exports and (2) avoiding social discontent by managing the inflation rate. In the fullest realization of this strategic conception, China's enormous financial reserves become a center of gravity, a solid and weighty mass which radiates outward gravitational lines of force, which gently but firmly and steadily shapes the will of debtor nations, and potential adversaries, so that they will more and more be inclined and conformed to, or at least accepting of, Chinese designs and priorities. The most important of these potential adversaries, and the most important of China's debtor nations, is of course the United States. One would expect that China will not readily resort to the “financial nuclear option,” i.e., quickly dumping large amounts of dollars on the global foreign-exchange markets; that would also inflict severe economic damage upon the Chinese. Rather, the most likely course is for China to use the less dramatic but still discernable option of not renewing its purchases of U.S. government debt as it matures. And these moments of non-renewal—a non-event which can have as much as an impact and influence as an event—could coincide with those moments when China is engaged in a dispute with the U.S. government on some issue in a completely different strategic arena, e.g., in one of the three China seas. In the meantime, China will steadily and persistently seek to accumulate positions of strength in the financial arena, and some of these positions will add up to a kind of encirclement of the American financial position. In particular, one could expect the Chinese to draw the developing economies and neighboring states of Southeast Asia into a dense network of debt dependency. The debt network could even extend beyond to other regions, where historically the United States has been the major creditor state. Indeed, this is already beginning to happen in Africa and Latin America, and given the current great financial instability and vulnerability of countries in Southern Europe, it is even beginning to happen there. A Passive U.S. Strategic Option: Waiting Out the Chinese Regime The discussion thus far has assumed a continuing rise in Chinese power—on both its economic and its military dimensions—far into the future, or at least for the next two or three decades. But of course, the Chinese themselves have traditionally thought in terms of Yin and Yang, and of the simultaneous coexistence and continuing interplay between both strength and weakness. (A contemporary version is thinking in terms of the dialectic.) And the contemporary Chinese leadership is very much focused upon China's weaknesses, as well as its strengths.14 In particular, they are concerned about the “three inequalities”—inequality between the rich and the poor, between the cities and the countryside, and between the Eastern coastal areas and the Western hinterlands. These three inequalities obviously overlap and reinforce each other; together, they give rise to much social discontent and numerous “mass demonstrations” (more than 70,000 annually, by official count). The Chinese leadership believes that this discontent can best be met with economic benefits, i.e., a continuing rise in China's economic growth with special attention to broadening the scope of the benefits (to include more of the poor, the countryside, and the Western hinterlands) and to controlling the rate of inflation. However, effective government management of the benefits and burdens, of the opportunities and risks, of China's complex and dynamic economy poses its own serious challenges. Consequently, one strategic option for the United States would be to

adopt a feature of the Chinese strategic mentality, and that is its emphasis on patience and persistence. U.S. policymakers could work on the assumption that eventually the social tensions in China will grow to the point that they will weaken the Chinese regime and disrupt its strategic objectives in the three littoral seas and elsewhere. After all, the United States has had considerable experience and success with this approach. Patience and persistence in containment was essentially how a succession of U.S. policymakers dealt with the Soviet Union, even though it required 40 years before unambiguous success was achieved. And

looking at Chinese history itself, one might observe that it is a Chinese characteristic that there will always be a strong centrifugal tendency toward disunity. Well aware of the Soviet precedent, as well as of China's own social tensions, the Chinese leadership is seeking to reinforce its strategy of increased economic benefits with a strategy of increased political legitimacy. Given the obvious fact that the old source of political legitimacy—Communism, including Maoism—is now believed by very few in China (including in the leadership itself), the regime has tried to come up with a new ideology or philosophy that will give it a new legitimacy. And here, it has turned to two alternatives, and particularly to a combination of them. One of these alternatives is actually very old, Confucianism, or more accurately a modernized version of traditional Chinese conceptions of identity, history, geography, and China's destiny. These are the very conceptions addressed in this essay, and the regime's turn to and reinvention of these traditional conceptions is a major reason why they are important today. The second alternative is much newer and is actually Western in origin, nationalism. But Chinese nationalism is Western nationalism very much altered by Chinese characteristics. Many Chinese think of China as a nation which should become even greater. However, since China is a nation already so much greater than its neighboring nations and states, it is a nation that is like no other. Indeed, it has been said that China is a civilization pretending to be a nation.15 Chinese nationalism seems to be a perfect case of a big enough quantitative difference becoming a qualitative difference. In any event, the strategies, operations, and tactics that contemporary China now deploys to advance its national interests and purposes are very much like those traditional ones that imperial China once deployed to advance its imperial, and civilizational, interests and purposes. The combination of a modernized Confucianism and a nationalism with Chinese characteristics has provided a robust identity and a convincing ideology or philosophy for many Chinese, particularly among the educated and professional classes. It has therefore provided a potent legitimizing formula for the Chinese regime— at least up until now. And this means that the regime will be driven all the more to fulfill its objectives— and China's destiny— in the three littoral seas, and beyond. The Real U.S. Strategic Option: Reinventing and Reviving the American Economy Underneath most of the strategic options of the United States lies a fundamental assumption —and perhaps a fatal flaw— and that is that somehow the United States will be able to maintain and modernize its military forces, particularly its naval forces, so that they can serve as a creditable counterpart to the rising Chinese military. For this assumption to remain sound, however, the United States must also maintain and modernize its economy, and particularly its industry, so that it can provide the necessary weapons systems and budgetary expenditures to support its military. After all, the dramatic growth of the Chinese economy, and particularly of Chinese industry, has been the real cause for the growing strength of the Chinese military. If over the past two decades, the Chinese economic and industrial growth rates had only been equal to those of, say, Japan or Western Europe, there would now be very little discussion of the Chinese military threat. Conversely, if over the past decade (the 2000s), the American economic and industrial growth rates had been equal to those of the previous decade (the 1990s, when the economic growth was led by the computer and telecommunications industries), there would be much more confidence that the United States would be able to address the Chinese challenge. The real U.S. strategic option —indeed, the fundamental U.S. strategic necessity— therefore, is to bring about a reinvention and revival of the American economy, particularly one based upon the development of new American industries.16 This crucially was the path not taken by the United States in the 2000s. It would require a reduction in the economic role and political power of the American financial sector and a restoration of the economic role and political power of American industrial sectors, particularly new industries based upon innovative technologies (e.g., biotechnology and clean energy), but also older industries which remain essential for a strong military (e.g., aerospace, computers, and telecommunications). Of course, this path would be rather like the path which China itself has taken over the past two decades. In other words, the United States would move more toward an American economy with Chinese characteristics. These economic considerations obviously apply to those U.S. strategic options centered upon some kind of containment. However, they also apply to the more passive

strategic option of waiting out the Chinese regime. Any great power which has had both a passive national strategy and a weak economy has soon ceased to be a great power (e.g., both Britain and France in the 1930s, when each was characterized by an appeasement policy and a depressed economy). This is because a weak economy usually produces a divisive and paralyzed political system, and this kind of system cannot take advantage of any strategic opportunities against an adversary which could arise in the course of waiting him out. In short, whatever might be a good strategic option for the next decade or so, America's real solution to the Chinese challenge for the next several decades—for the 21st century—is in one sense to become more like the Chinese have become in recent decades. But in another and more real sense, it is for America to become more like what it was in the 20th century—“the American Century.” In other words, America needs to become more American.

Over-focus on containment bad – need some element of positive incentivesStephen F. Burgess; 2016; Department of International Security Studies, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base; Contemporary Security Policy; “Rising bipolarity in the south china sea: The America rebalance to Asia and China’s expansion;” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1149968

China’s growing assertiveness in the SCS is a sign that the situation is moving away from ‘somebody’s sea’ in which the United States has maintained hegemony. China’s increasing military presence in the SCS means that it will be difficult for the United States to re-establish hegemony unless the United States chooses to risk confrontation and conflict with China. Instead, the situation appears to be moving towards ‘nobody’s sea’ in which China will continue to assertively press its claims and confront the United

States, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia with its security forces, while trying to avoid escalation to war. In a worst case scenario, it is possible that a ‘sea of conflict’—probably unplanned—will transpire if China moves too assertively and does not draw back when confrontation escalates towards war.3 Ultimately, China wants to move towards ‘somebody’s sea’ in which it eventually becomes the regional hegemon. SEA claimants would like to move towards a scenario of ‘everybody’s sea: managed mistrust’ in which UNCLOS, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Code of Conduct (CoC) and American presence are used to move China away from expansion and towards cooperation. The United States and its allies and partners are increasingly working together to dissuade China from further pressing its claims and move it to accept ‘everybody’s sea’. However, China’s rejection of the CoC and UNCLOS, harassment of American warships and aircraft, and continued expansion have so far precluded such a scenario. In regard to the establishment of stable cohabitation and a bipolar balance of power, this would require a negotiated settlement of some of China’s more vital claims as well as those of the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam and acceptance of continued American military engagement to maintain FoN and open skies. In the rebalance to Asia, the United States has increased its diplomatic efforts and sought to increase economic influence through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Washington is also stepping up its backing of the ASEAN CoC and multilateral diplomacy and international law through UNCLOS, as well as conducting more military exercises with Southeast Asian states. Engagement has been one American response to China’s rise, combined with measures to dissuade Beijing from being overly assertive. In regard to the American rebalance to Asia, the argument here is that a combination of American engagement with and balancing against China is the best way to influence China to fully accept the status quo and prevent it from trying to revise the rules governing the seas and violate the sovereignty of smaller states. Neither pure engagement nor balancing will prevent China from pursuing more assertive

policies.4 Containment is too forceful a strategy and will spur the security dilemma,5 while engagement is too weak. American sanctions against China would be counter-productive, due to the high degree of economic interdependence among the actors. While excessive coercive measures, such as blockading or occupying China’s outposts, risk escalation to conflict and generate the security dilemma, carefully calibrated coercion and shaming and offers of cooperation may help moderate behaviour. Building alliances and partnerships to balance against a challenger involves accurately calculating the potential and tendencies of the countries involved. Using relatively weak allies and partners can help in working to moderate the assertive behaviour of a stronger neighbour but can prove useful in multilateral diplomacy and shaming. Of note is the fact that China changed its position on Darfur in 2007 after threats were made by non-governmental organizations to the 2008 Olympics and after considerable engagement and persuasion by the international community.6 Balancing can produce unintended consequences, such as weak neighbours acting provocatively with the hope that their stronger ally will be dragged into conflict.7 Multilateral diplomacy, particularly through the ASEAN CoC and UNCLOS provide an

additional way to influence China’s behaviour. Offering positive gains to all involved in a dispute can assist in changing behaviour but must be combined with multilateral diplomacy and the possibility of punishment. It is likely that China will continue to rise and its power and interests will grow more rapidly than those of the United States and its allies and partners, especially in the SCS. Power transition literature that focuses on rising powers and the status quo contends that rising powers will challenge the status quo until conflict ensues. Over time, a power transition will occur in the region, which will make efforts to balance power more liable to provoke conflict. Allies and partners may switch sides and bandwagon with China. Therefore, the combination of measures and instruments of power that might work in 2020 may not be effective in 2030.8 Much depends on how fast China and its neighbours grow and how much more coercive power the United States and its allies and partners are willing and able to apply in balancing. The preceding discussion has generated propositions that will be examined in this article. First, it will be less difficult to induce a rising power such as China to moderate its behaviour in the SCS if it is driven mainly by the defense of its interests rather than by power maximization that challenges the status quo or by an expansive strategic culture and nationalism. Second, ‘soft balancing’9—the use of mainly multilateral diplomatic and economic instruments, backed by military power—is more likely to dissuade China from expanding its claims in the SCS than hard balancing with mainly the military instrument or pure engagement. Third, soft balancing is the optimal strategy in the short to medium term to moderate the behaviour of a strong regional state such as China in the SCS by the United States and weak Southeast Asian states, given the challenges of developing the regional forces that can stand up to China and devising strategy to stop expansion. The first proposition is examined through an analysis of China’s behaviour and intentions, using the prisms of defensive realism, constructivism and offensive realism. The second and third propositions are scrutinized

Containment doesn’t produce effective balancing – a mix of both strategies is bestHarding 15 (Harry Harding, 10/30/15, The Washington Quarterly, “Has US China Policy Failed?”, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_Harding.pdf, date accessed: 7/16/16, BC)

Swaine believes that this proposal will be mutually acceptable because, like Glaser, in the end he is confident that both China and the United States will act rationally with regard to both ends and means. Each will realize the costs, risks, and ultimate futility of seeking to maintain or achieve dominance in the Asia–Pacific region, and will thus be willing to strike the grand bargains both he and Glaser envision. This optimistic assumption downplays the importance of non-rational factors in international politics: the power of competing national historical narratives, the pressures from skeptical domestic publics, the controversies that surround the calculation of a shifting balance of power, and the uncertainties inherent in interpreting the actions of another and in redefining interests as new problems arise. The assessment of relative gains and losses will be extremely difficult and therefore will prove highly controversial both within and between the two countries. Deals that strike some as entirely reasonable, others will regard as “premature appeasement,” as The East-West Center’s Denny Roy has put it.53 “Toughen Up” Under the final set of proposals, whose proponents include strategists like Aaron Friedberg, University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer, and Blackwill and Tellis, the United States would give up any illusions that China will become a friendly and cooperative partner, whether those illusions stem from naïve liberal assumptions by Americans or misleading reassurances by Chinese. Instead, the United Has U.S. China Policy Failed? THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015 113 States should strengthen its military and diplomatic position in Asia and then, together with its friends and allies, increase the pressure on Beijing to moderate its ambitions and take more responsible positions on global and regional issues. Few, except perhaps for Mearsheimer, say that they are proposing to return to a policy of containing China. 54 Instead, they insist they are continuing most of the aspects of current policy, but placing a greater emphasis on balancing China in the Asia–Pacific region in a responsible but determined manner. Some go further, however: Blackwill and Tellis propose that the U.S. “rebalancing” should extend into the “Indo-Pacific” as well, and also advocate that the United States should develop offensive as well as defensive military capabilities to deal with the threats posed by China.55 Some of those who advocate a tougher posture toward China suggest additional modifications of present U.S. policy as part of “toughening up.” As already noted, both Blackwill and Tellis as well as Pillsbury argue for a careful cataloguing, and then a reduction or termination, of the various government programs that provide technical assistance to China, although not, presumably, those offered by U.S. NGOs. They also advocate strict controls over technology transfer to that country, and Blackwill and Tellis would even consider across-the-board tariff increases on U.S. imports from China, all aimed at restricting China’s growth. They also favor the indefinite exclusion of China from the TransPacific Partnership and would presumably oppose Beijing’s creation of new international institutions that might further facilitate or legitimate China’s rise. The obvious questions about a policy of balancing China are whether the United States can afford its financial costs and geopolitical risks, as well as the extent to which U.S. allies would follow such an initiative. Both of these issues would presumably become greater if China’s military and economic power relative to the United States continues to grow, and if the importance of commercial relations with China to U.S. allies continues to increase. Here, the classic dilemma inherent in alliances may become ever more salient: no country wants to face abandonment by its ally in light of a major security threat, but neither does it want to become drawn into an ally’s conflict with a country that it does not regard as threatening. Many Asian countries take what might be called the “Goldilocks

view” of U.S.–China relations, in that they want a relationship that is “not too hot, not too cold, but just right.” Pushing rebalancing too soon and too far would likely be seen as turning the relationship too cold, just as excessive accommodation would be seen as turning it too hot. How can Washington The final set of proposals places a greater emphasis on balancing China in the Asia-Pacific. H. Harding 114 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2015 prevent Beijing from securing the defection of U.S. allies from its balancing strategy, if they face increasing costs and risks from following the U.S. lead?

Off Case Extensions

Security K extensions

2NC Link Wall1. Extend Pan – the 1ac casts China as a threat lurking – the plan action sides with ROC in order to deter China and justify more US military presence in the region.

2. False hostility Link --- The depiction of China’s rise as a threat to the US is grounded in securitizing logic that falsely identifies China as hostileTurner 13

Oliver Turner *, 2-8-2013, (Hallsworth Research Fellow )"‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity," British International Studies Associationhttp://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9021307&fileId=S0260210512000599

C hina’s military and economic strengths are far greater today than at any point in the history of Sino-US relations. Yet, the ‘threat’ it presents to American security is no less a social construction than in the past. The modern day proliferation of popular and academic ‘China threat’ literatures in particular is reflective of the increasingly widespread conviction that a ‘rising’ China inevitably constitutes a real or potential danger.97 Robert Kaplan explains that ‘the American military contest with China in the Pacific will define the twenty first century’.98 He does not question if or even when China might become a threat. He emphasises its inevitability. Babbin and Timperlake provide a fictional narrative of future Sino-American tensions in which, among other things, China uses cyber warfare to shut down American defence systems. The hostile scenario they present, it is argued, ‘could easily become fact . . . The Verdict: China

means war.’99 Certainly, and as has been the case throughout history, China is not uniformly perceived in these terms. Among a significant proportion of the American population, however, the China ‘threat’ is an accepted and relatively unproblematic phenomenon. China now has the world’s largest population, the fastest growing economy, the largest army, the largest middle class, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a manned space program and a nuclear arsenal.100 Yet, all of these things do not necessarily make China a threat . Countries which share variations of these, notably the possession of nuclear weapons, a permanent presence in the Security Council and significant standing armies are not perceived in this way. Indeed, and as Director Clapper revealed in the Senate in early 2011, states like Russia with far greater stock- piles of nuclear weapons and significant additional military hardware can be viewed in less threatening terms, even when capability is cited as the critical factor.101 Further- more, the PRC has had a large population and a substantial army since its founding in 1949, nuclear weapons since 1964 and a seat on the Security Council since 1971 without consistently being interpreted as a threat. Accordingly, forces additional to those of China’s capabilities must still be implicated in understandings about the dangers it is said to present.

3. Disease link Disease rhetoric invokes the imagery of an invading foreigner, this creates a drive to exterminate all that is different, in hopes of keeping the inner-body politic cleanCampbell 98

(David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, Writing Security, p. 98-99,ET)

What has been and remains central to the logic of socio-medical discourse is thus not the biological nature of disease, but a sense that disease is always from somewhere else. As Sontag notes, 'there is a link between imagining disease and imagining foreignness. ' Indeed, when syphilis reached epidemic proportions in fifteenth-century Europe, 'It was the 'French pox' to the English, morbus Germanicus to the Parisians, the Naples sickness to the Florentines, [and] the Chinese

disease to the Japanese.'62 But 'foreignness' does not necessarily coincide with places distant and removed: t he foreign can also reside within; something that is evident when (as in the United States) disease is more readily diagnosed in the elderly, the poor, or the working class, even when other groups exhibit many more identifiably biological pathologies.63 In the same manner, we can note how various groups within American and European domestic society have been constituted as marginal through the

figurations of socio¬medical discourse. Women, blacks, and Jews have at one time or another all been understood as uniquely susceptible to certain disorders. Women were diagnosed as exhibiting a high incidence of hysteria; Jews in general were believed to be prone to psychological disorders; Jewish men were thought to

menstruate like women and thus be a source of social `pollution'; blacks were overwhelmingly considered insane. And for each of these groups, sexuality was medicalized as pathology and indicted as a threat to the integrity of the body politic." In sum, two things are particularly striking about these examples of the historical

operation of socio-medical discourse. Firstly, it has often been able to function either without any empirical referent from which its valuations are theoretically derived, or it has accomplished its task in direct contradistinction to available empirical sources . The moral characteristics of leprosy lived on after its demise; neither women, nor blacks, nor Jews were any more vulnerable to psychological disorders than any other groups; and Jewish men certainly did not

menstruate.65 Secondly, the modes of representation through which these groups are marked as social dangers effective ly blend and fuse together various stigmata of difference , such that each figuration of difference functions, not as an image derived from a correspondence relationship, but as an indicator of the various images with which it has some perceived affinity. Or, as

Hayden White suggests of metaphor generally, it 'functions as a symbol, rather than as a sign: which is to say that it does not give us either a description or an icon of the thing it represents, but tells us what images to look for in our culturally encoded Foreign policy and difference experience in order to determine how we should feel about the thing represented.'66

AT perm do the plan and embrace desecuritization

Extension – Alt resolves the cooperation and the containment advantages

AT to they say “whatever they would say”

Xi Good

2nc link wall ROC independence link Taiwan would declare independence in a millisecond if they thought they could get away with itCarpenter 6 (Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest, is the author of ten books and more than 600 articles on international affairs, 6-12-2006, "What Strategic Ambiguity?," Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/what-strategic-ambiguity)

He made the comment while responding to withering criticism by some members of the House International Relations Committee about the Bush

administration’s refusal to allow Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian to make a transit stop in the continental US. Mr Zoellick warned that Washington should not become too supportive of Taiwan, because that would encourage pro-independence forces on the island. “Let me be very clear,” he said. “Independence means war. And that means American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines.” Although his comment was clearly designed to dampen enthusiasm in Congress for

the Taiwanese cause, it is more likely to be seen as a green light by the pro-independence faction in Taiwan. For strategic ambiguity to work, both Taipei and Beijing must be uncertain of the US response to a crisis. That uncertainty supposedly

will lead to caution in both capitals. The Taiwanese could assume that the US would come to their defence if Beijing launched an unprovoked attack, but a US rescue might not occur if Taiwan provoked the mainland. Conversely, Beijing would have to worry that the US might defend the island under any circumstances. What Mr Zoellick said, however,

is that US forces would intervene even if Taiwan created a crisis by asserting its independence. Strategic ambiguity has been revealed as a fraud. Mr

Zoellick’s remark confirmed that Washington would prevent the mainland from conquering Taiwan regardless of how a conflict began. Mr Chen and the hardline elements of the Democratic Progressive Party could scarcely imagine a clearer green light for their goal of an independent Taiwan . And, given the turbulent politics in Taiwan these days, Washington has even more reason than usual to worry about what Mr Chen might do during his final two years in office. His administration is currently buffeted by an array of financial scandals that has reached his immediate family. His public approval rating is even lower than President George W. Bush’s rating in the US. With the national legislature controlled by an opposition coalition, any domestic policy agenda Mr Chen might have is dead on arrival. He may well believe that his only chance for a lasting legacy is to validate Taiwan’s independence - even given the threat of a military response from the mainland.

Sovereignty concession link The CCP derives much of its legitimacy from traditional and nationalist narratives, meaning cooperation with the United States depicts Xi as hypocritical and anti-ChineseFord 15 (Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Harvard College in 1989, where he received the Hoopes, Firth, and

Bonaparte prizes. He attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar and received his doctorate in International Relations there in 1992. In 1995 he graduated from Yale Law School, where he received the Scharps and Emerson prizes. Dr. Ford joined the U.S. State Department in 2003, as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in what was then the department’s Bureau of Verification and Compliance under Assistant Secretary of State Paula A. DeSutter, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John Bolton, and Secretary of State Colin Powell. In December 2006, he was named U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Non-proliferation, being placed in charge of U.S. diplomacy related to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and heading the United States delegations to the 2007 and 2008 NPT Preparatory Committee meetings. In August 2008, Ford left the Executive Branch to become a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, a Washington, DC think tank founded in 1961 by nuclear strategist Herman Kahn. In March 2013, Ford became Republican Chief Counsel for the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, and moved to become Senior Counsel for National Security Policy at the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs after the Republicans won the Senate majority in the 2014 mid-term elections; he subsequently became that committee's Chief Investigative Counsel. In late 2015, he became Chief Legislative Counsel for the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Also, Dr. Ford is a practitioner of Japanese jiu-jutsu, a 3rd-degree black belt student of Grandmaster Dong Jin Kim in the Jigo Tensin-Ryu lineage (JTR Jujutsu); he is also a 2nd-degree black belt in Hapkido and a member of the Japanese martial arts organization Dai Nippon Butoku Kai with rank certified as Sandan (3rd-degree blackbelt) in Jujutsu. “China Looks at the West: Identity, Global Ambitions, and the Future of Sino-American Relations”, released 2015, https://muse.jhu.edu/book/40734) //ZB

A persistent element over time, however, has been the CCP regime’s growing reliance on nationalist and quasi-Confucianized moralpolitik themes in its domestic legitimacy discourse—themes that do not merely tend toward anti-Americanism in the particular but that also encourage it in the abstract, on systemic or philosophical grounds—and the tendency of such themes to bleed over into Chinese approaches to international affairs. As China approaches the end of its fourth decade since Mao Zedong’s death, the country’s political discourse has increasingly been reideologized along nationalist and quasi-Confucianized

lines. ∂ As we have seen, this reideologization has occurred in domestic affairs, where Liang Qichao’s Confucio-totalitarian theory has been updated for modern conditions, and where Confucianized

meritoligarchic ideals of rule by an all-powerful but supposedly benevolent self-selected elite are today

offered as a model that is not just superior to Western approaches in China but is, indeed, one from which the rest of the world has much to learn. The re-Sinicization of domestic discourse had begun years earlier, but it seems to have accelerated under President Xi Jinping, who is fond of quoting ancient Chinese thinkers such as the Legalist paragons Han Fei and Shang Yang, and who “portrays his policies as rooted in homegrown order and virtues that, by his estimate, go back 5,000 years.” (The People’s Daily has even published selections of what it said were Xi’s favorite quotations from such ancients, “most often Confucius and Mencius, but also relatively obscure works that [seem meant to] suggest a deeper knowledge of the

classics.”)14 Taking their cues from the new president, officials such as Xin Chunying—deputy head of the

Legislative A airs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress—have issued calls for a greater degree of Chineseness even in the names that should henceforth be given to children, in order to “reflect blood heritage, ethnic order and cultural tradition.”15 (Wang Zuoan, the director of the State Administration for Religious A airs, even declared that the CCP would construct a new “Chinese Christian theology” that would better “adapt to China’s national condition and integrate with Chinese culture.”)16 By late 2014, with party slogans stressing traditional culture and values, “the language of Confucianism . . . increasingly being invoked to legitimize a new dynasty of red emperors,” and “a whiff of a personality cult” emerging around President Xi, it was said that “China is again slowly turning in on itself.”17 ∂

Reideologization has also occurred in international relations, where hegemony theories inspired by ancient precedents—fed by modern strategic theories stressing the purportedly immutable laws of comprehensive national power (CNP), which themselves draw on Warring States–era thinking as well as Confucian affinities

for the rectification of names—have become the mainstream view. This hegemony theory has become the foundation not merely for increasingly self-assertive realpolitik maneuvering but also for the ever more explicit articulation of grandiose Chinese dreams of a virtuocratic world system apparently (as we will see) modeled on the harmony that the Party-state claims to be creating in its domestic politics. ∂ This reideologization seems particularly portentous, for, with the growth of Chinese perceptions since 2008–2009 that the United States is in both economic and politico-moral decline and no longer possesses sutras of modernity from which Chinese have much to learn—a conclusion that such Sinicized ide- ology encourages—China stands now without a foreign model of development and modernity for the rst time in its postimperial history.18 As Charles Horner has noted, accustomed to looking outside China for such models, yet repeat- edly disillusioned as events have conspired to “yank the rug out from under their feet” since the early years of the twentieth century as successive foreign sources of inspiration have collapsed or been discredited, Chinese in general and their Party-state in particular feel confusion and angst in looking at the future.19 ∂ China’s growing power and self-assertiveness in the international arena are coupled with tremendous insecurity, both at home and even in the world at

large. In this context, the CCP regime’s growing investment of political capital in quasi- Confucian legitimacy narratives and in Sinocentric global moralpolitik is likely to prove particularly important, for that schema provides a conceptual frame- work to which the Party-state and its supporters may increasingly cling as they grapple with the unfamiliar challenge of self-identity in a world bereft of models. (Such clinging, moreover, may become all the more desperate to the extent that the regime continues to face domestic instability and popular unhappiness with China’s corrupt and heavy-handed one-party autocracy,

particularly if the CCP is no longer able to provide endless opportunities for wealth creation.)∂ These essentially internal

ideological and political developments, in turn, may have implications for Sino-American relations. Clinging to and investing political capital in the modern ideology of Confucio-Leninism—a process already

well under way in the Chinese Party-state of the middle years of the second decade of the century—is likely to condition increasingly hostile and oppositional stances and international threat perceptions even as Beijing’s newfound power and international weight make confrontation seem less costly than ever before.

Cooperation link – if China didn’t respond would be Perceived as anti-nationalist if Xi engages in cooperation with the United States – means either the plan would result in a collapse of Xi credibility OR he would lash out turning back the case Liu 09/23/15 (Melinda Liu, reported in China for more than two decades, and has been based in the Chinese capital since 1998 as Newsweek's Beijing Bureau Chief, September 23, 2015, Xi Jinping and the Real ‘Asia Pivot’- Why the United States and China are entering a new ice age, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/xi-jinping-and-the-real-asia-pivot)

Much has changed since then, and not necessarily for the better. For one thing Xi, who became president in March 2013, has quickly proven to be a much different sort of Chinese leader: “bolder, more ambitious, more risk tolerant, seen as more nationalistic,” says Beijing-based senior analyst Yanmei Xie of the International Crisis Group, “More able to go big and go fast.” But go where? The United States and China appear to be entering a new era of icier relations—including what sometimes seems to be an undeclared cyberwar—that makes it dangerous for either leader to seem too chummy with the other. In Obama’s case that’s especially true during a presidential election season; and in Xi’s it is hard to smile too much at the Americans when jingoistic sentiment in China is strong, some of it ignited by Communist Party “patriotic” propaganda. On the first leg of his journey, Xi stopped in Seattle to stress his brand of “people-to-people diplomacy”—not to mention a desire to do deals with Boeing. With glamorous first lady Peng Liyuan at his side, Xi dropped references to “Sleepless in Seattle,” hobnobbed with CEO’s from the IT world, and toured Microsoft’s Redmond campus. Raising hopes of a deal on cybersecurity after he arrives in the nation’s capital, he promised to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. to battle the “criminal” cybertheft of commercial secrets and hacking attacks. Despite China’s slowing economic growth and recent stock market meltdown, Xi brushed off jitters about Beijing’s economic and political stability, claiming his intense anti-corruption campaign has “nothing to do with power struggle … This is no ‘House of Cards.’” Yet the sense of something quietly collapsing dogs Xi’s American tour. In Washington, the bipartisan consensus that’s prevailed since President Richard Nixon’s groundbreaking 1972 trip to China—agreement that Washington must constructively engage China—now seems to be wobbling. Over the past year, some American Sinologists have found it fashionable to declare that they were once Sinophilic “panda-huggers” (even if some really weren’t) but now they’ve been transformed into “panda bears,” newly skeptical that engagement with Beijing can work after all. “The sands are fundamentally shifting in the relationship,” wrote veteran Sinologist David Shambaugh of The George Washington University in the South China Morning Post, “the ‘engagement coalition’ is crumbling and the ‘competition coalition’ is rising.” On the other side of the Pacific, Chinese seem puzzled and disappointed by the trend. Many ordinary Chinese were offended when Washington declined to send a Cabinet member to Bejing’s Sept. 3 military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the World War II victory over Japan. Even as he sat in the viewing area to observe the parade spectacle, American author and China expert Robert Lawrence Kuhn said one of the hardest questions for Chinese intellectuals today is “why have U.S. analysts who normally disdain involvement in American politics universally turned negative on China, with a subset who have crossed the threshold and now say constructive engagement isn’t gonna work? Why is this happening?”

T extensions Need answer to answer blocks

Politics TPP extensions Need 2nc link wall – including cutting some more specific link cards Need 2nc TPP turns the case block