Giroux/Foucault Links

Democracy Discourse Link

Romanticizing discourse of democracy justifies tremendous atrocities and turns the affVltchek 14 (Andre Vltchek is a novelist, philosopher, investigative journalist, filmmaker, photographer and playwright who covers war zones and conflict. “Down With Western ‘Democracy’!” 5/23/14 http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/23/down-with-western-democracy/)A specter is haunting Europe and Western world — it is this time, the specter of fascism. It came quietly, without great fanfare and parades, without raised hands and loud shouts. But it came, or it returned, as it has always been present in this culture, one that has, for centuries, been enslaving our entire planet.¶ As was in Nazi Germany, resistance to the fascist empire is again given an unsavory name: terrorism. Partisans and patriots, resistance fighters – all of them were and have always been defined by fascist bigots as terrorists.¶ By the logic of Empire, to murder millions of men, women and children in all corners of the world abroad is considered legitimate and patriotic, but to defend one’s motherland was and is a sign of extremism.¶ German Nazis and Italian Fascists defined their rule as ‘democratic’, and so does this Empire. The British and French empires that exterminated tens of millions of people all over the world, always promoted themselves as ‘democracies’.¶ And now, once again, we are witnessing a tremendous onslaught by the business-political-imperialist Western apparatus, destabilizing or directly destroying entire nations, overthrowing governments and bombing ‘rebellious’ states into the ground.¶ All this is

done in the name of democracy, in the name of freedom .¶ An unelected monster, as it has done for

centuries, is playing with the world, torturing some, and plundering others, or both.¶ The West, in a final act of arrogance, has somehow confused itself with its own concept of God. It has decided that it has the full right to shape the planet, to punish and to reward, to destroy and rebuild as it wishes.¶ This horrible wave of terror unleashed against our planet, is justified by an increasingly meaningless but fanatically defended dogma, symbolized by a box (made of card or wood, usually), and masses of people sticking pieces of paper into the opening on the top of that box.¶ This is the altar of Western ideological fundamentalism. This is a supreme idiocy that cannot be questioned, as it guarantees the status quo for ruling elites and business interests, an absurdity that justifies all crimes, all lies and all madness.¶ This sacrificial altar is called, Democracy, in direct mockery to what the term symbolizes in its original, Greek, language.¶ ***¶ In our latest book, “On Western Terrorism – from Hiroshima to Drone

Warfare”, Noam Chomsky commented on the ‘democratic’ process in the Western world:¶ “The goal of elections now is to undermine democracy. They are run by the public relations industry and they’re certainly not trying to create informed voters who’ll make rational choices. They are trying to delude people into making irrational choices. The same techniques that are used to undermine markets are used to undermine democracy. It’s one of the major industries in the country and its basic workings are invisible.”¶ But what is it that really signifies this ‘sacred’ word, this almost religious term, and this pinnacle of Western demagogy? We hear it everywhere. We are ready to sacrifice millions of lives (not ours of course, at least not yet, but definitely lives of the others) in the name of it.¶ Democracy!¶ All those grand slogans and propaganda! Last year I visited Pyongyang, but I have to testify that North Koreans are not as good at slogans as the Western

propagandists are.¶ “In the name of freedom and democracy!” Hundreds of millions tons of bombs fell from the sky on the Laotian, Cambodian and Vietnamese countryside… bodies were burned by napalm, mutilated by spectacular

explosions.¶ “Defending democracy!” Children were raped in front of their parents in Central America, men and women machine-gunned down by death squads that had been trained in military bases in the United States of America.¶ “Civilizing the world and spreading democracy!” That has always been a European slogan, their ‘stuff to do’, and a way of showing their great civilization to others. Amputating hands of Congolese people, murdering around ten million of them, and many more in Namibia, East Africa, West Africa and Algiers; gassing people of the Middle East (“I am strongly in favour of using poisonous gas against uncivilised tribes”, to borrow from the colorful lexicon of (Sir) Winston Churchill).¶ So what is it really? Who is it, that strange lady with an axe in her hand and with a covered face – the lady whose name is Democracy?

The aff’s heralding of the democratic order is founded in a neoliberal lie that we live in a democracy at all – neoliberalism has reappropriated the ideology of freedom and democracy for its own interests as radical dissent is destroyedGiroux 04 (Henry A., Global TV Network Chair Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ryerson University, “Neoliberalism and the Demise of Democracy: Resurrecting Hope in Dark Times” 8/7/04 http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Aug04/Giroux0807.htm)///CWNeoliberalism has become one of the most pervasive, if not, dangerous ideologies of the 21st century. Its pervasiveness is evident not only by its unparalleled influence on the global economy, but also by its power to redefine the very nature of politics itself. Free market fundamentalism rather than democratic idealism is now the driving force of economics and politics in most of the world , and it is a market ideology driven not just by profits but by an ability to reproduce itself with such success that, to paraphrase Fred Jameson, it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of neoliberal capitalism.¶ Wedded to the belief that the market should be the organizing principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neoliberalism wages an incessant attack on democracy, public goods, the welfare state, and non-commodified values. Under neoliberalism everything either is

for sale or is plundered for profit. Public lands are looted by logging companies and corporate ranchers; politicians willingly hand the public�s airwaves over to powerful broadcasters and large corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust; Halliburton gives war profiteering a new meaning as it is granted corporate contracts without any competitive bidding and then bilks the U.S. government for millions; the environment is polluted and despoiled in the name of profit-making just as the government passes legislation to make it easier for corporations to do so; public services are gutted in order to lower the taxes of major corporations; schools more closely resemble either malls or jails, and teachers are forced to get revenue for their school by

hawking everything from hamburgers to pizza parties. As markets are touted as the driving force of everyday life, big government is disparaged as either incompetent or threatening to individual freedom, suggesting that power should reside in markets and corporations rather than in governments

(except for their support for corporate interests and national security) and citizens.¶ Under neoliberalism, the state now makes a grim alignment with corporate capital and transnational corporations. Gone are the days when the state �assumed responsibility for a range of social needs.� [1] Instead, agencies of government now pursues a wide range of ��deregulations,� privatizations, and abdications of responsibility to the market and private philanthropy.� [2] Deregulation, in turn, promotes �widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation�s basic productive capacity.� [3] Flexible production encourages wage slavery and disposable populations at home. And the search for ever greater profits leads to outsourcing which accentuates the flight of capital and jobs abroad. Neoliberalism has now become the prevailing logic in the United States, and according to Stanley Aronowitz �...the neoliberal economic doctrine proclaiming the superiority of free markets over public ownership, or even public regulation of private economic activities, has become the conventional wisdom, not only among conservatives but among social progressives.� [4]¶ The ideology and power of neoliberalism also cuts across national boundaries. Throughout the globe, the forces of neoliberalism are on the march, dismantling the historically guaranteed social

provisions provided by the welfare state, defining profit-making as the essence of democracy, and equating freedom with the unrestricted ability of markets to �govern economic relations free of government regulation.� [5] Transnational in scope, neoliberalism now imposes its economic regime and market values on developing and weaker nations through structural adjustment policies enforced by powerful financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Secure in its dystopian vision that there are no alternatives, as England�s former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once put it, neoliberalism obviates issues of contingency, struggle, and social agency by celebrating the inevitability of economic laws in which the ethical ideal of intervening in the world gives way to the idea that we �have no choice but to adapt both our hopes and our abilities to the new global market.� [6] Coupled with a new culture of fear, market freedoms seem securely grounded in a defense of national security, capital, and property rights. When coupled with a media driven culture of fear and the everyday reality of insecurity, public space becomes increasingly militarized as state governments invest more in prison construction than in education. Prison guards and security personnel in public schools are two of the fastest growing professions.¶ In its capacity

to dehistoricize and depoliticize society, as well as in its aggressive attempts to destroy all of the public spheres necessary for the defense of a genuine democracy, neoliberalism reproduces the conditions for unleashing the most brutalizing forces of capitalism. Social Darwinism has been resurrected from the ashes of the 19th century sweatshops and can now be seen in full bloom in most reality TV programs and in the unfettered self-interests that now drives popular culture. As narcissism is replaced by unadulterated materialism, public concerns collapse into utterly private considerations and where public space does exist it is mainly used as a confessional for private woes, a cut throat game of winner take all, or a advertisement for consumerism.¶ Neoliberal policies dominate the discourse of politics and use the breathless rhetoric of the global

victory of free-market rationality to cut public expenditures and undermine those non-commodified public spheres that serve as the repository for critical education, language, and public intervention. Spewed forth by the mass media, right-wing intellectuals, religious fanatics, and politicians, neoliberal ideology, with its ongoing emphasis on deregulation and privatization, has found its material expression in an all-out attack on democratic values and on the very notion of the public sphere. Within the discourse of neoliberalism, the notion of the public good is devalued and, where possible, eliminated as part of a wider rationale for a handful of private interests to control as much of social life as possible in order to maximize their personal profit. Public services such as health care, child care, public assistance, education, and transportation are now subject to the rules of the market. Construing the public good as a private good and the needs of the corporate and private sector as the only source of investment, neoliberal ideology produces, legitimates, and exacerbates the existence of persistent poverty, inadequate health care, racial apartheid in the inner cities, and the growing inequalities between the rich and the poor. [7]¶

As Stanley Aronowitz points out, the Bush administration has made neoliberal ideology the cornerstone of its program and has been in the forefront in actively supporting and implementing the following policies:¶ [D]eregulation of business at all levels of enterprises and trade; tax reduction for wealthy individuals and corporations; the revival of the near-dormant nuclear energy industry; limitations and abrogation of labor�s right to organize and bargain collectively; a land policy favoring commercial and industrial development at the expense of conservation and other pro environment policies; elimination of income support to the chronically unemployed; reduced federal aid to education and health; privatization of the main federal pension programs, Social Security; limitation on the right of aggrieved individuals to sue employers and corporations who provide services; in addition, as social programs are reduced, [Republicans] are joined by the Democrats in favoring increases in the repressive functions of the state, expressed in the dubious drug wars in the name of fighting crime, more funds for surveillance of ordinary citizens, and the expansion of the federal and local police forces. [8]¶ Central to both neoliberal ideology and its implementation by the Bush administration is the ongoing attempts by free-market fundamentalists and right wing politicians to view government as the enemy of freedom (except when it aids big business) and discount it as a guardian of the public interest. The call to eliminate big government is neoliberalism�s great unifying idea and has broad popular appeal in the United States because it is a principle deeply embedded in the country�s history and tangled up with its notion of political freedom. And yet, the right wing appropriation of this tradition is racked with contradictions in terms of neoliberal policies.¶ The advocates of neoliberalism have attacked what they call big government when it has provided essential services such as crucial safety nets for the less fortunate, but they have no qualms about using the government to bailout the airline industry after the economic nosedive that followed the 2000 election of George W. Bush and the events of 9/11. Nor are there any expressions of outrage from the cheerleaders of neoliberalism when the state engages in promoting various forms of corporate welfare by providing billions of dollars in direct and indirect subsidies to multinational corporations. In short, government bears no obligation for either the poor and dispossessed or for the collective future of young people.¶ As the laws of the market take precedence over the laws of the state as guardians of the public good, the government increasingly offers little help in mediating the interface between the advance of capital and its rapacious commercial interests. Neither does it aid non-commodified interests and non-market spheres that create the political, economic, and social spaces and discursive conditions vital for critical citizenship and democratic public life. Within the discourse of neoliberalism, it becomes difficult for the average citizen to speak about political or social transformation, or to even challenge, outside of a grudging nod toward rampant corruption, the ruthless downsizing, the ongoing liquidation of job security, or the elimination of benefits for people now hired on part-time.¶ The liberal democratic vocabulary of rights, entitlements, social provisions, community, social responsibility, living wage, job security, equality, and justice seem oddly out of place in a country where the promise of democracy has been replaced by casino capitalism, a winner-take-all philosophy, suited to lotto players and day traders alike. As corporate culture extends even deeper into the basic institutions of civil and political society, buttressed daily by a culture industry largely in the hands of concentrated capital, it is reinforced even further by the pervasive fear and insecurity of the public that the future holds nothing beyond a watered down version of the present. As the prevailing discourse of neoliberalism seizes the public imagination, there is no vocabulary for progressive social change, democratically inspired visions, or critical notions of social agency to expand the meaning and purpose of democratic public life. Against the reality of low wage jobs, the erosion of social provisions for a growing number of people and the expanding war against young people of color at home and empire-building abroad, the market-driven juggernaut of neoliberalism continues to mobilize desires in the interest of producing market identities and market relationships that ultimately sever the link between education and social change while reducing agency to the obligations of consumerism.

Alt Card – Specific

The alternative is an embrace of radical democratic spaces – the role of the judge is to be an educator who leads the movement – absent the alternative a proto-facist corporatocracy will emerge that will crush true democracy forever and turn the caseGiroux 04 (Henry A., Global TV Network Chair Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ryerson University, “Neoliberalism and the Demise of Democracy: Resurrecting Hope in Dark Times” 8/7/04 http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Aug04/Giroux0807.htm)///CWAs public space is increasingly commodified and the state becomes more closely aligned with capital, politics is defined largely by its policing functions rather than an agency for peace and social reform. As the state abandons

its social investments in health, education, and the public welfare. It increasingly takes on the functions of an enhanced police or security state, the signs of which are most visible in the increasing use of the state apparatus to spy on and arrests its subjects, the incarceration of individuals coincided disposable (primarily people of color), and the ongoing criminalization of social policies. Examples of the latter include anti-begging ordinances and anti-loitering that fine or punish homeless people for sitting or lying down too long in public places. [11] An even more despicable example of the barbaric nature of neoliberalism with its emphasis on profits over people and its willingness to punish rather than serve the poor and disenfranchised can be seen in the growing tendency of many hospitals across the country to have patients arrested and jailed if they cannot pay their medical bills. The policy, right out of the pages of George Orwell�s 1984, represents a return to debtors prisons, which is now chillingly called �body attachment,� and is � basically a warrant for... the patient�s arrest.� [12]¶ Neoliberalism is not simply an economic policy designed to cut government spending, pursue free trade policies, and free market forces from government regulations; it is also a political philosophy and ideology that effects every dimension of social life. Neoliberalism has heralded a radical economic, political, and experiential shift that now largely defines the citizen as a consumer, disbands the social contract in the interests of privatized considerations, and separates capital from the context of place. Under such circumstances, neoliberalism portends the death of politics as we know it, strips the social of its democratic values, and reconstructs agency in terms that are utterly privatized and

provides the conditions for an emerging form of proto-fascism that must be resisted at all costs. Neoliberalism not only enshrines unbridled individualism, it also destroys any vestige of democratic society by undercutting its �moral, material, and regulatory moorings,� [13] and in doing so it offers no language for understanding how the future might be grasped outside of the narrow logic of the market. But there is even more at stake here than the obliteration of public concerns, the death of the social, the emergence of a market-based fundamentalism that undercuts the ability of people to understand how to translate the privately experienced misery into collective action, and the elimination of the gains of the welfare state. There is also the growing threat of displacing �political sovereignty with the sovereignty of the market, as if the latter has a mind and morality of its own.� [14] As democracy becomes a burden under the reign of neoliberalism, civic discourse disappears and the reign of unfettered social Darwinism with its survival-of-the-slickest philosophy emerges as the template for a new form of proto-fascism. None of this will happen in the face of sufficient resistance, nor is the increasing move toward proto-fascism inevitable, but the

conditions exist for democracy to lose all semblance of meaning in the United States..¶ Educators, parents, activists, workers, and others can address this challenge by building local and global alliances and engaging in struggles that acknowledge and transcend national boundaries, but also engage in modes of politics that connect with people�s everyday lives. Democratic struggles cannot under emphasize the special responsibility of intellectuals to shatter the conventional wisdom and myths of neoliberalism with its stunted definition of freedom and its depoliticized and dehistoricized definition of its own alleged universality. As the late Pierre Bourdieu argued, any viable politics that challenges neoliberalism must refigure the role of the state in limiting the excesses of capital and providing important social provisions. [15] At the same

time, social movements must address the crucial issue of education as it develops throughout the cultural sphere because the �power of the dominant order is not just economic, but intellectual�lying in the realm of beliefs,� and it is precisely within the domain of ideas that a sense of utopian possibility can be restored to the public realm. [16] Most specifically, democracy necessitates forms of education that provide a new ethic of freedom and a reassertion of collective identity as central preoccupations of a vibrant democratic culture and society. Such a task, in part, suggests that intellectuals, artists, unions, and other progressive movements create teach-ins all over the country in order to name, critique, and

connect the forces of market fundamentalism to the war at home and abroad, the shameful tax cuts for the rich, the dismantling of the welfare state, the attack on unions, the erosion of civil liberties, the incarceration of a generation of young black and brown men, the attack on public schools, and the growing militarization of public life. As Bush�s credibility crisis is growing, the time has come to link the matters of economics with the crisis of political culture, and to connect the latter to the crisis of democracy itself. We need a new language for politics, for analyzing where it can take place, and what it means to mobilize alliances of workers, intellectuals, academics, journalists, youth groups, and others to reclaim, as Cornel West has aptly put it, hope in dark times.

Democracy Good

Disease Module

Disease Module

Democracy is a prerequisite to effectively combatting diseaseRuger 05, (Jennifer Prah, “Democracy and health”. Harvard University, PhD, Health Policy. Yale University, MSL, Law. Oxford University, MSc, Comparative Social Research. Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, MA, International Relations. (Qualified as hell) http://qjmed.oxfordjournals.org/content/qjmed/98/4/299.full.pdfDemocratic institutions and practices can affect human development in multiple ways, including population health and well-being. The absence of democracy, in particular, can have deleterious affects on health, as the 1958–1961 Chinese famine and the 2003 SARS outbreak demonstrate. These case

studies highlight factors that are essential for preventing a full-scale HIV/AIDS epidemic in China: new and better standards of public accountability; an international imperative to cooperate globally to ensure health; freely available information, especially about disease prevention, control, and treatment; protection of individual rights and freedom of assembly, association and expression; and the ability to voice complaints and opposition. By instituting these rights in a timely fashion, China may be able to contain the HIV/AIDS epidemic before it loses millions of its citizens to yet another public health tragedy.

Diseases causes extinctionDUJS 09, (Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science, “Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate”, http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate)RIP Homo sapiens A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-

14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true

that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid

and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1.

HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted

viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

Famine Module

Famine Module

Democracy solves famineLynn-Jones 98 (Sean Lynn-Jones is editor of the Harvard Internal Security Program’s quarterly journal and of the program’s book series, the Belfer Center Studies in International Security. He is a member of the Editorial Board of Security Studies. “Why the United States Should Spread Democracy” March 1998 http://live.belfercenter.org/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2F25468%2Fcan_a_us_deal_force_iran_to_fess_up_to_the_military_dimensions_of_its_nuke_program)///CWFourth, the United States should spread democracy because the citizens of democracies do not suffer from famines. The economist Amartya Sen concludes that "one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no

substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a

relatively free press."43 This striking empirical regularity has been overshadowed by the apparent existence of a "democratic peace" (see below), but it provides a powerful argument for promoting democracy. Although this claim has been most closely identified with Sen, other scholars who have studied famines and hunger reach similar conclusions. Joseph Collins,

for example, argues that: "Wherever political rights for all citizens truly flourish, people will see to it that, in due course, they share in control over economic resources vital to their survival. Lasting food security thus requires real and sustained democracy."44 Most of the countries that have experienced severe famines in recent decades have been among the world's least democratic: the Soviet Union (Ukraine in the early 1930s), China, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cambodia and Sudan. Throughout history, famines have occurred in many different types of countries, but never in a democracy.¶ Democracies do not experience famines for two reasons. First, in democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their leaders have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. The need to be reelected impels politicians to ensure that their people do not starve. As Sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political solidarity."45 On the other hand, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the public; they are less likely to pay a political price for failing to prevent famines. Moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers often have political incentives to use famine as a means of exterminating their domestic opponents.¶ Second, the existence of a free press and the free flow of information in democracies prevents famine by serving as an early warning system on the effects of natural catastrophes such as floods and droughts that may cause

food scarcities. A free press that criticizes government policies also can publicize the true level of food stocks and reveal problems of distribution that might cause famines even when food is plentiful.46 Inadequate information has contributed to several famines. During the 1958-61 famine in China that killed 20-30 million people, the Chinese authorities overestimated the country's grain reserves by 100 million metric tons. This disaster later led Mao Zedong to concede that "Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below."47 The 1974 Bangladesh famine also could have been avoided if the government had had better information. The food supply was high, but floods, unemployment, and panic made it harder for those in need to obtain food.48¶ The two factors that prevent famines in democracies-electoral incentives and the free flow of information-are likely to be present even in democracies that do not have a liberal political culture. These factors exist when leaders face periodic elections and when the press is free to report information that might embarrass the government. A full-fledged liberal democracy with guarantees of civil liberties, a relatively free economic market, and an independent judiciary might be even less likely to suffer famines, but it appears that the rudiments of electoral democracy will suffice to prevent famines.¶ The ability of democracies to avoid famines cannot be attributed to any tendency of democracies to fare better economically. Poor democracies as well as rich ones have not had famines. India, Botswana, and Zimbabwe have avoided famines, even when they have suffered large crop shortfalls. In fact, the evidence suggests that democracies can avoid famines in the face of large crop failures, whereas nondemocracies plunge into famine after smaller shortfalls. Botswana's food production fell by 17% and Zimbabwe's by 38% between 1979-81 and 1983-84, whereas Sudan and Ethiopia saw a decline in food production of 11-12% during the same period. Sudan and Ethiopia, which were nondemocracies, suffered major famines, whereas the democracies of Botswana and Zimbabwe did not.49 If, as I have argued, democracies enjoy better long-run economic performance than nondemocracies, higher levels of economic development may help democracies to avoid famines. But the absence of famines in new, poor democracies suggests that democratic governance itself is sufficient to prevent famines.¶ The case of India before and after independence provides further evidence that democratic rule is a key factor in preventing famines. Prior to independence in 1947, India suffered frequent famines. Shortly before India became independent, the Bengal famine of 1943 killed 2-3 million people. Since India became independent and democratic, the country has suffered severe crop failures and food shortages in 1968, 1973, 1979, and 1987, but it has never suffered a famine.50¶ B.

2AC Democracy Solves Famine

Democracies stop famine Massing 2003 (Does Democracy Avert Famine? By MICHAEL MASSING March 1, 2003 Saturday)few scholars have left more of a mark on the field of development economics than Amartya Sen.¶ The winner of the 1998 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science, Mr. Sen has changed the way economists think about such issues as collective decision-making, welfare economics and measuring poverty. He has pioneered the use of economic tools to highlight gender inequality, and he helped the United Nations devise its Human Development Index -- today the most widely used measure of how well nations meet basic social needs.¶ More than anything, though, Mr. Sen is known for his work on famine. Just as Adam Smith is associated with the phrase "invisible hand" and Joseph Schumpeter with "creative

destruction," Mr. Sen is famous for his assertion that famines do not occur in democracies. "No famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy," he wrote in "Democracy as Freedom" (Anchor, 1999). This, he explained, is because democratic governments "have to win elections and face public criticism, and havestrong incentive to undertake measures to avert famines and other catastrophes." This proposition, advanced in a host of books and articles, has shaped the thinking of a generation of policy makers, scholars and relief workers who deal with famine.

Democracy will prevent famineMargot Norman 95 (Famine has no place in a democracy Margot Norman March 13, 1995, Monday)She could have started by quoting Amartya Sen, an Indian professor whose years of work on the causes of starvation led him to this conclusion: ''There has never been a famine in any country that's been a democracy with a relatively free press. I know of no exception. It applies to very poor countries with democratic systems as well as rich ones.'' The point, he went on,

was that ''if famine is about to develop, democracy can guarantee that it won't'' . ¶ She could have gone on to say that there has been no famine in India since independence despite a steadily rising population and severe food shortages in 1967, 1973, 1979 and 1987. She could have contrasted democratic India's situation with that of totalitarian China, where it was acts of ideological man, not of God, that caused 30 million people to starve between 1958 and 1961. The hunger was caused by politicians whom their suffering people were unable to call to account.

Econ. Module

1AC

Democracy increases economic growth and stability-most comprehensive studySmith 1-22(Noah Smith, 1-22-15, Prof. at Stony Brook University, Bloomberg View, “Democracy Is Good for Business”, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-22/democracy-is-good-for-business, Accessed 6-26-15, AA)

But is it correlation, or causation? Does democracy actually make countries richer, or is democracy merely a luxury in which rich countries can indulge? This question is hard to answer. For one thing, countries only get rich once, and democracies usually only become democratic once or twice. Also, there are lots of

other things about countries that might cause wealth, democracy or both. Although we will never know the answer for sure, a top team of economists has done what is just about the most careful study that is humanly possible. MIT economist Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson of Harvard, famous for the idea that “inclusive institutions” are the key to national development, teamed up with Suresh Naidu and Pascual Restrepo to tackle the problem. They use a large number of different statistical techniques to examine the effect of democratizations. They also use an alternate technique, where they look at waves of democratization . All of the methods give the same answer: Democracy increases gross domestic product by about 20 percent in the long run. That isn't a huge number -- almost certainly less than democracy’s proponents would like. But it’s not nothing, either. It turns out that Viktor Orban is wrong; authoritarianism probably won’t help his country get rich, though it

won’t doom Hungary either. Acemoglu and company also examine the question of how democracy boosts growth. They find that countries with democracy have better government -- they pursue more economic reforms, provide more schooling, provide more public goods and reduce social unrest. They also find, contrary to many who have been following China’s story, that business investment is higher in democracies. Now, that isn't a definitive, final answer. We may never

have one -- or at least, not for hundreds of years. Maybe democracies have done well in the last century simply because they could trade with, and be protected by, the U.S. -- the richest and most powerful country around. Perhaps now that China, by dint of its sheer size, is wresting the crown away from the U.S., we will see things reverse. We can’t yet rule that out. But the institutional improvements that Acemoglu et al. find suggest that the reasons go deeper into the structure of society. These observations match the theory of New York University political scientist Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, who hypothesizes that in democracies, there are too many voters to pay off with cronyism, forcing leaders to provide more public goods like education, infrastructure and property rights. Our

best guess is that democracy really is the best form of government currently available. There is also the question, however, of whether

democracy will survive. Some critics of democracy observe that humanity spent a very long time under some kind of authoritarian rule, such as monarchies or military dictatorships, while democracy is only a recent innovation. But economists Toke Aidt, Raphael

Franck, Peter Jensen, and Gabriel Leon recently did a study that found that since the early 1800s, revolution, or the threat of revolution, has tended to nudge countries toward democracy. If this study is to be believed, it means that democracy is a more stable configuration for a society than autocracy in the modern, industrial age. Just as a tower of blocks tends to fall over when shaken, autocracies tend to turn into democracies when the system is disturbed. This clearly wasn’t the case before the Industrial Revolution, so democracy is best seen as an

adaptation to the new technological environment. Not only is democracy good for business, it's here to stay unless the world undergoes some other dramatic shift

on the scale of the Industrial Revolution. Viktor Orban, and even China’s mighty Communist Party, really do seem to be on the wrong side of history.

Econ decline escalates Harris and Burrows, 9 – *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)Increased Potential for Global ConflictOf course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing

sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely

to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason

to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most

dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and

newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that

would become narrower in an economic downturn.

The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own

nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will

produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in

neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises .

Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices .

Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short

of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups

and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to

increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to

be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

2AC Democracy -> Growth

Democracy has a positive relationship with economic growthZouhaier and Karim 12(Hadhek Superior Institut of Gestion (ISG) of Gabès- Tunisia, Kefi Mohamed ISTEC Business School, Paris, France., 2012, “Democracy, Investment and Economic Growth,” International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Volume: 2 Number 3, page # 223-240, AA)In this research project, I have tried to make a contribution to solve the fundamental question: Is there any link between a country’s democracy, investment, and the economic performances that it achieves? To this end, we employed a dynamic panel data model covering a sample of 11 countries from the MENA region during the period 2000-2009. After studying the relationship between democracy and economic growth, and the democracy and the investment, an interactive variable has been introduced in order to test the effect of the political institutions (democracy) on these countries’ investment productivity. The main findings derived from this empirical analysis reveal the following: - A positive impact of democracy on investment. - A positive effect of civil liberties on economic growth. -A positive interaction between political rights and investment. Generally speaking, the heterogeneous results in terms of link between institutional factors and economic growth which have been reached by the empirical tests carried out within the framework of this research reinforce the conclusion achieved by the empirical literature of the subject; that a clear relationship between the institutional sphere and the economic sphere is far from being found . The census done by Borner et al. (1995) falls within this same framework, since among all the studies done to test this relationship, they registered three empirical studies leading to a positive relationship, three going in the opposite direction, and ten which identify no conclusive relationship between democracy and economic growth. To conclude, these analyses

have permitted, though in part, to show that there exists a relationship between democracy and the economic performances and to detect certain essential channels through which may transit the effects of the political institutions on the performances of the countries as regards economic growth.

Environment Module

1AC

Democracy is key to checking Climate ChangeFredriksson and Neumayer, Department of Economics, University of Louisville, and London School of Economics, Department of Geography & Environment and Grantham Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, November 2013(Per G. and Eric, Democracy and climate change policies: Is history important?, Ecological Economics)While the theories discussed above focus on the policy effects of the current level of democracy, they are still relevant for our empirical investigation which focuses on the stock

of democratic capital. Today's environmental policies are the result of numerous historical institutional and policy choices, all influenced by the level of democracy at the time. Different historical experiences with democracy are likely to lead to different policy outcomes, as previous decisions form the base for subsequent choices. Our measure of democratic capital takes this historical process into account. Moreover, our measure helps capture transitions between democracy and autocracy which are by themselves likely to be detrimental to building the institutions needed to produce global public goods. It may also take time for environmental policy to become a focus of the democratic process. In countries such as Serbia and Sierra Leone with high values of current democracy but with limited histories of democracy, the democratic and electoral process may not have had enough time to focus on a

“secondary policy” (List and Sturm, 2006) such as environmental policy.3 Only over time will voters and environmental interest groups (needing time to organize) pressure politicians to start formulating appropriate institutions and policies. One channel through which the democratic capital stock may affect environmental policy is by raising expectations that the country will be a stable democracy in the future (Persson and Tabellini, 2009). Persson and Tabellini report that the probability of a currently democratic country remaining democratic increases with a larger democratic capital stock, and that democratic capital raises economic growth (indirectly, by increasing stability).4 Persson and Tabellini argue that a virtuous circle exists where

the accumulation of democratic and physical capital reinforces each other. Thus, democratic capital may actually help drive the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) relationship documented in the literature (Dinda, 2004 and Fosten et al.,

2012). Second, an expectation of continued stable democracy may also result in advocates for environmental policies having a greater incentive to fight for reform because their influence will continue in the future. Third, an expectation of continued democracy increases the time horizon of politicians and political parties. This matters for environmental policymaking where costs occur earlier than the benefits, especially for climate change policies. If democracy is more likely to prevail, democratic parties and their constituent groups are more likely to benefit from implemented environmental policies in the future.5 Fourth, if polluting industries have higher expectations that the country will remain democratic it may be relatively less beneficial to wait with investment in pollution control technology and to lobby against regulations. Fifth, competitive leadership selection processes in democracies are likely to yield more competent leaders (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011).6 Since environmental policies are generally built slowly over time, a history of competent leaders influences policy outcomes positively.

Biodiversity loss leads to extinctionCoyne and Hoekstra, professor at the University of Chicago in the Department of Ecology and Evolution, Alexander Agassiz Professor of Zoology in the Museum of Comparative Zoology Professor of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology Professor of Molecular and Cellular Biology Curator of Mammals in the Museum of Comparative Zoology Harvard College Professor Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigator, September 24 2007(Jerry and Hopi, The Greatest Dying, The New Republic)Aside from the Great Dying, there have been four other mass extinctions, all of which severely pruned life's diversity. Scientists agree that we're

now in the midst of a sixth such episode. This new one, however, is different - and, in many

ways, much worse. For, unlike earlier extinctions, this one results from the work of a single species, Homo sapiens. We are relentlessly taking over the planet, laying it to waste and

eliminating most of our fellow species. Moreover, we're doing it much faster than the mass extinctions that came before. Every year, up to 30,000 species disappear due to human activity alone. At this rate, we could lose half of Earth's species in this century. And, unlike with previous

extinctions, there's no hope that biodiversity will ever recover, since the cause of the decimation -

us - is here to stay. To scientists, this is an unparalleled calamity, far more severe than global warming, which is, after all, only one of many threats to biodiversity. Yet global warming gets far more press. Why? One reason is that, while the increase in temperature is easy to document, the decrease of species is not. Biologists don't know, for example, exactly how many species exist on Earth. Estimates range widely, from three million to more than 50 million, and that doesn't count microbes, critical (albeit invisible) components of ecosystems. We're not certain about the rate of extinction, either; how could we be, since the vast majority of species have yet to be described? We're even less sure how the loss of some species will affect the ecosystems in which they're embedded, since the intricate connection between organisms means that the loss of a single species can ramify unpredictably. But we do know some things. Tropical rainforests are disappearing at a rate of 2 percent per year. Populations of most large fish are down to only 10 percent of what they were in 1950. Many primates and all the great apes - our closest relatives - are nearly gone from the wild. And we know that extinction and global warming act synergistically. Extinction exacerbates global warming: By burning rainforests, we're not only polluting the atmosphere with carbon dioxide (a major greenhouse gas) but destroying the very plants that can remove this gas from the air. Conversely, global warming increases extinction, both directly (killing corals) and indirectly (destroying the habitats of Arctic and Antarctic animals). As extinction increases, then, so does global warming, which in turn causes more extinction - and so on, into a downward spiral of destruction. Why, exactly, should we care? Let's start with the most celebrated case: the rainforests. Their loss will worsen global warming - raising temperatures, melting icecaps, and flooding coastal cities. And, as the forest habitat shrinks, so begins the inevitable contact between organisms that have not evolved together, a scenario played out many times, and one that is never good. Dreadful diseases have successfully jumped species boundaries, with humans as prime recipients. We have gotten aids from apes, sars from civets, and Ebola from fruit bats. Additional worldwide

plagues from unknown microbes are a very real possibility. But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster. In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion. In fact, the global value of "hidden" services provided by ecosystems - those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace - has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross domestic product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber. Life as we know it

would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where we're heading if species extinction continues at its current pace. Extinction also has a huge impact on medicine. Who really cares if, say, a worm in the remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct? Well, those who suffer from cardiovascular disease . The recent discovery of a rare South American leech has led to the isolation of a powerful enzyme that, unlike other anticoagulants, not only prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots . And it's not just this one species of worm: Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins, including antistatin (a potential anticancer agent), decorsin and ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin (another anticoagulant).

Plants, too, are pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example, has given us quinine (the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and breast cancer), and aspirin. More than a quarter of the medicines on our pharmacy shelves were originally derived from plants. The sap of the Madagascar periwinkle

contains more than 70 useful alkaloids, including vincristine, a powerful anticancer drug that saved the life of one of our friends. Of the roughly 250,000 plant species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been screened for pharmaceutical properties. Who knows what life-saving drugs remain to be discovered? Given current extinction rates, it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years. Our arguments so far have tacitly assumed that species are worth saving only in proportion to their economic value and their effects on our quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained, especially in Americans. That is why conservationists always base their case on an economic calculus. But we biologists know in our hearts that there are deeper and equally compelling reasons to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and intellectual values that transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures? And what could be more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our evolutionary cousins, and realizing that we all got here by the same simple process of natural selection? To biologists, and potentially everyone else, apprehending the genetic kinship and common origin

of all species is a spiritual experience - not necessarily religious, but spiritual nonetheless, for it stirs the soul. But, whether or not one is moved by such concerns, it is certain

that our future is bleak if we do nothing to stem this sixth extinction. We are creating a world in which exotic diseases flourish but natural medicinal cures are lost; a world in which carbon waste accumulates while food sources dwindle; a world of sweltering heat, failing crops, and impure water. In the end, we must accept the possibility that we ourselves are not immune

to extinction . Or, if we survive, perhaps only a few of us will remain, scratching out a grubby

existence on a devastated planet. Global warming will seem like a secondary problem when humanity finally faces the consequences of what we have done to nature: not just another Great Dying, but perhaps the greatest dying of them all.

2AC Yes Environment Destruction

Comprehensive study concludes species extinction rate is going upUrban, Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Connecticut, May 1 2015(Mark C., Accelerating extinction risk from climate change, Science (New York, N.Y.) [2015, 348(6234):571-573], pg1Overall, 7.9% of species are predicted to become extinct from climate change ; (95% CIs, 6.2 and 9.8) (Fig. 1).

Results were robust to model type, weighting scheme, statistical method, potential publication bias, and missing studies (fig. S1 and table S2) (6). This proportion supports an estimate from a 5-year synthesis of studies (7). Its

divergence from individual studies (1–4) can be explained by their specific assumptions and taxonomic and geographic foci. These differences provide the opportunity to understand how divergent factors and assumptions influence extinction risk from climate change. The factor that best explained variation in extinction risk was the level of future climate change. The future global extinction risk from climate change is predicted not only to increase but to accelerate as global temperatures rise (regression coefficient = 0.53; CIs,

0.46 and 0.61) (Fig. 2). Global extinction risks increase from 2.8% at present to 5.2% at the international policy target of a 2°C post-industrial rise, which most experts believe is no longer achievable (8).

If the Earth warms to 3°C, the extinction risk rises to 8.5%. If we follow our current,

businessas-usual trajectory [representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5; 4.3°C rise], climate change threatens one in

six species (16%) . Results were robust to alternative data transformations and were bracketed by models with liberal and conservative extinction thresholds (figs. S2 and S3 and table S3). Regions

also differed significantly in extinction risk (DDIC = 12.6) (Fig. 3 and table S4). North America and Europe were characterized by the lowest risks (5 and 6%, respectively), and South America (23%) and Australia and New Zealand (14%) were characterized by the highest risks. These latter regions face noanalog climates (9) and harbor diverse assemblages of endemic species with small ranges. Extinction risks in Australia and New Zealand are further exacerbated by small land masses that limit shifts to new habitat (10). Poorly studied regions might face higher risks, but insights are limited without more research (for example, only four studies in Asia). Currently, most predictions (60%) center on North America and Europe, suggesting a need to refocus efforts toward less studied and more threatened regions.

Genocide Module

Genocide Module

Democracy averts genocide and enforces human rightsHamburg 10, (David A., “Recent advances in preventing mass violence”. President Emeritus at Carnegie Corporation of New York, previously President of the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences and President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, previously chair of the department of psychiatry at Stanford, M.D. from Indiana University.)Prevention of deadly conflict starts with the recognition of the immense dangers of egregious,

pervasive human rights violations, typically enforced in repressive states. Such violations lead toward ethnic, religious, and international wars as well as genocide. Sooner or later, these atrocities must be prevented, and bad outcomes averted, by promoting democracy, equitable economies, and the creation of strong civil institutions that protect human rights. Prevention is not simply smoothing over a rough spot in

intergroup or international relations—it requires creating a durable basis for peaceful conditions of living together, especially by protecting the human rights of all the people through clear norms and effective, humane institutions.

Genocide destabilizes regional powers - triggers nuclear war and extinctionMawdsley 8, (Christy, Texas A&M U. “An Interest in Intervention: A Moral Argument for Darfur”. http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Mawdsley-Vol10Issue1.pdf)Scholars and policymakers who propose that international stability is not relevant to U.S. national

interests misunderstand the very nature of a globalized world. A globalized world, by definition, is one that

entails aggregated systems of all types: economic, communications, transportation, ecological, and others. International stability levels have the potential to feed in to each one of these systems, thereby affecting American

quality of life either positively or negatively (albeit to varying degrees). Genocide and similar atrocities have historically shown to have destabilizing effects. Because of globalization, this may have an (indirect or direct) negative effect on the American national interest. In the Darfur genocide, for instance, millions of refugees have fled over the SudaneseChadian border into Chad, contributing to higher monetary and resource costs for the already poor government of Chad. The humanitarian crisis that has ensued in both Chad and Sudan divert resources from important areas in need of funding such as education, the fight against the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and economic development. In a world of independent nations, U.S. policymakers could write this off as irrelevant to the national interest. But in a globalized world, airplanes cross borders thousands of times a day, and the U.S. imports goods and resources from hundreds of nations, and nuclear weapons can be launched from one continent and hit another. Though these impacts might be irrelevant in the Darfur genocide, they might become far more relevant in a future genocide in a more strategically-relevant location. Ideas and products flow freely in this age, and it is certainly in the U.S. national interest to prevent the spread of the instability caused by genocide in our globalized world. What makes an activist approach when faced with genocide or similar events far more compelling is the argument that action is not only consistent with U.S. interests but also with U.S. values. Values are important because, in a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-ethnic country such as the United States, they are precisely what bring American citizens together as a nation. The values upheld in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and Constitution are the glue that gives American people a shared identity. They are thus of immense weight in U.S. survival as a nation. Our values should be upheld consistently both in domestic and foreign policy. An inconsistent application of our values in the broadest sense will lead to an erosion of the strength of the United States as a common nation as values are indeed the foundation.

We have an ethical obligation to combat human rights violations - they are a-priori issuesFasterling and Demuijnck 13, (Bjorn Fasterling, Law professor at Edhec Business School, Björn Fasterling holds both German Law degrees, Ph.D. in Law, from the University of Osnabrück (2001). Geert Demuijnck, Professor of business ethics, economic ethics and political philosophy. PhD in Philosophy from the University of Leuven. “Human Rights in the Void? Due Diligence in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”.)Despite the fact that some human rights violations may be much more severe than others, and despite the fact that it may be difficult to draw a very precise line between what we usually call human rights violations (with the dimension of official disrespect) and ordinary crimes committed by individuals, the common thread here is that we are talking about situations in which people’s fundamental, i.e. intrinsically valid, moral rights have

been violated. Intrinsic validity relates to two ideas: first, no reference to whatever prevailing legal framework can justify the violation, and second, no consideration of another nature (economic interest

or moral particularism) either. For instance, ‘the right not to have one’s life taken directly as a means to any further end’ can be qualified as an exceptionless, ‘absolute’ human right (Finnis 1980, p. 225). A consequence of this is that only trade-offs between different human rights violations are acceptable, not between human rights violations and other considerations. There may be a conflict between freedom of expression and the principle of non-discrimination (should we accept racist opinions in the public sphere?) but we cannot weigh up a human right against an economic interest. For example, it is pointless to calculate whether the economic interest of the alleged complicity of Shell in the execution of the Nigerian author Ken Saro-Wiwa3 exceeds the 15.5 million dollars they paid for a settlement of this case on the eve of a trial in New York. It was inacceptable to kill Ken Saro-Wiwa, whatever the profit Shell could make by being complicit in this killing. It may be helpful to

formulate the exceptionless and absolute character of human rights in the vocabulary of moral obligations. Human rights, understood as fundamental moral rights of humans qua humans, necessarily imply perfect duties, i.e. duties admitting no exception in favour of inclination to refrain from acting on it. Perfect duties have to be fulfilled to the fullest extent possible (Kant 2002/1785, pp. 24–25).

Human Rights

HR Module

Democracy assures human rightsThe New Nation 13(Human rights suffer where democracy fails The New Nation (Bangladesh) May 17, 2013 Friday)Dhaka, May 17 -- A Bangladeshi human rights activist of international fame Ms Irene has written a touching piece on recent tragic violation of human rights in Bangladesh under the caption 'Lost rights, Lost lives' in the Herald Tribune of America this Wednesday. She narrated the most tragic incident causing death to hundreds of poorly paid women garment workers, who in her words, contribute most in bringing vital resources to the country. They lost their lives in appallingly unsafe conditions resulted from callous neglect. In the context of the so many loss of lives at Savar, she saw it as an irony that the extremist Islamists, Hefazat-e-Islam, demanded free mixing of men and women to be banned. Feeling disconcerted, Ms Irene has noted that in a country where for more than a decade two women "swapped the political leadership back and forth" there is so much indifference to securing women's human rights.¶ For easy abuse of police power human rights of all of us are violated every other way also. Politically motivated police cases are rampant and human rights are violated when the bail is denied and persons are sent into police custody, called police remand.¶ What Ms Irene has said about the young bloggers should be seen as very incisive. Referring to their demand of death penalty for the accused of war crimes she told them: It does not occur to them that human rights apply as much to the guilty as the innocent; that even the worst perpetrator deserves due process of law.¶ Ms Irene quite fairly discussed some of the contradictions in the politics of the party in power as well as the opposition. But taken as a whole her commentary is about expressing anxiety for labour rights, women rights and political rights in the broader context of human rights and how these rights feed into each other. And the question she has rightly asked is whether Bangladesh has the vision, courage and the political will to keep its commitment to human rights as it expounded during the liberation war in 1971. It is a forceful argument deserving a forceful answer.¶ What is absent in the whole article of her's is any reference as to the importance of democracy as an expression of political will to uphold human rights. Our liberation war was most emphatically about democracy and democratic

process for making freedom meaningful. Not for once she used the expression democracy in her entire narrative. This aspect in her write-up struck us as a serious weakness in the otherwise compelling arguments from a life- long human rights activist. Though she cited rampant corruption as the reason for putting the lives of millions of women workers at risk in Bangladesh.¶ We find it both distressful and disappointing that most human rights advocates suffer from the contradiction in an unconcerned way, that they can hope to protect human rights and see these rights well-established without caring for the essential prerequisite of democratic good governance and the rule of law. We do not imply to say that in the absence of democratic good governance or the rule of law they will not raise and insist on observance of human rights issues for men, women and children anywhere.¶ We have no hesitation in accepting that the human rights are universal as highlighted by Ms Irene and these are not only democratic rights to be upheld under a democracy. But in order to ensure that the human rights to be safe and protected there is no alternative to striving for democracy and the rule of law.¶ We must condemn human rights violations taking place in the worst of dictatorships. But disregarding due importance of making democracy work for the enjoyment of human rights by the people is a lapse that must not be taken lightly by those who fight for human rights most earnestly and often in harshest of situations.

Democracy supports human rights The Malta Business Weekly 14 (Supporting democracy and human rights The Malta Business Weekly September 18, 2014)This is confirmed by studies that consistently show a decline in interest among young people in traditional politics, with decreasing levels of participation in elections, political parties and other political organisation¶ Call for proposals to establish a European Union Human Rights Defence Mechanism Declared by a 2007 United Nations resolution. Call for proposals to establish a European Union Human Rights Defence Mechanism¶ Declared by a 2007 United Nations resolution, 15 September marks the International Day of Democracy – a celebration intended to provide an opportunity to review the state of democracy in the world. With the scope of highlighting the challenges and opportunities of young people involved in democratic processes, the theme chosen for this year’s International Day of Democracy was, Engaging Young People on Democracy.¶ For those who enjoy it, democracy is a concept that is often taken for granted. It is

seen as something that simply “should be” there and will never be lost. It is viewed as a guaranteed integral part of the system, something that is in permanent good health without the need of any form of nurturing, strengthening or maintaining.¶ This is confirmed by studies that consistently show a decline in interest among young people in traditional politics, with decreasing levels of participation in elections, political parties and other political organisations.¶ Democracy however, is neither guaranteed nor enjoyed by all. Described by the United Nations as “a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives”, democracy is a concept that can be turned into reality and enjoyed by everyone only with the full participation of the international community, national authorities, civil society and individuals.¶ Democracy is also intrinsically linked to human rights. The values of freedom, respect for human rights and the holding of regular genuine elections are essential pillars of democracy, which means that, by its own nature, democracy provides the natural environment for the protection and effective realisation of human rights.¶ The European Union believes that a strong and effective civil society is essential to ensure human rights are respected and that democracy is strong and effective. Going by the Treaty that establishes it, the EU also believes that its “action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation... and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity...”¶ Within this context, the EU’s European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is a financial instrument designed to help civil society become an effective force of political reform and defence of human rights. This instrument is not dependent on the consent of the host government, and as such can address sensitive political issues and cooperate directly with local civil society without any interference, pressures or restrictions from public authorities.¶ EIDHR can grant aid even where no established cooperation exists, and can intervene without the agreement of thirdcountry governments. Its financial support is available both to groups or individuals within civil society defending democracy and to inter-governmental organisations that work to protect human rights.¶ Financial assistance under EIDHR complements other EU tools such as political dialogue, diplomatic initiatives and technical cooperation. Such assistance may take the form of grants to finance projects submitted by civil society, international or inter-governmental organisations, small grants to human rights defenders, and human and material resources for EU election and observation missions.

Trade Module

1AC

Democracy has a positive relationship with trade and economic growthDecker and Lim 9 (Jessica Henson, Jamus Jerome, “Democracy and trade: an empirical study” Economics of Governance10.2 (Apr 2009): 165-186. AA)In closing, we return to the central question that motivated this paper do democracies trade more? The answer, at least within the context of

this present study, is a qualified yes. Trade fosters the fertilization of ideas, and democracy is surely one of them. This finding has been demonstrated using the gravity specification for a very large panel dataset together with panel regression techniques. To that end

this study has upheld the findings of earlier studies that demonstrate that democracies are more likely to trade with each other. It has, however, also shown that this result depends on several key assumptions. The key democracy variable seems to be sensitive to alternative renderings of time periods and cross sections—in the sense that the time series aspect of the data appears to drive the result—and

democracy is also moderated by inter alia, economic size. As such, a one-size-fils-all theory of democratic processes and their political economic influences on trade flows and trade patterns is unlikely to be fruitful. Instead, future theoretical

research should distinguish between the motivations of trading nations based not just on their broad political-institutional structures, but also on their level of economic development as well as global economic trends. Future theoretical research would naturally fall along the lines of attempting to build a more coherent model of how democracy affects trade outcomes. Existing research, as reviewed earlier, seldom provide an explicit basis for democracies

affecting trade outcomes. Given the generally strong empirical evidence that suggests that the effects of democracy might be first order instead of second order, theoretical models of trade should consider explicitly accounting for this characteristic, instead of treating such outcomes as exogenous, as Grossman and Helpman (1994) do. Clearly, any model to this effect should also allow for heterogeneity between developed and developing countries, and. if possible, take into account the role of constraints and influences imposed by the external environment. In this regard, Mansfield et al. (2000) is an important step forward in this direction. (O'Rourke and Taylor 2006) also develop a model premised on a two-country Heckscher-Ohlin world.

Econ decline escalates Harris and Burrows, 9 – *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global ConflictOf course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing

sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely

to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason

to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most

dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and

newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that

would become narrower in an economic downturn.

The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own

nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear

umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will

produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in

neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises .

Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices .

Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short

of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups

and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to

increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to

be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

2AC Democracy -> Trade

Spreading democracy stimulates free trade globally Kwon, PhD currently an assistant professor of sociology at the University of La Verne, Jan 29 2014(Roy, What factors matter for trade at the global level? Testing five approaches to globalization, 1820–2007, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, pg 394-395)A number of economists and political scientists observe that the recent boom of world trade corresponds with a ‘third wave of democratization’ that began in the 1970s (e.g. Milner and Mukherjee, 2009). Over the years, many scholars studied this relationship in an attempt to scrutinize the link between a country’s political regime type and its level of international trade. Early

theoretical propositions claim that autocracies are better positioned than their democratic counterparts to implement trade-conducive policies. As a prominent example, Haggard (1990) argues that autocratic governments are more insulated from the influence of interest groups that lobby in favor of trade protectionism. By extension, the unencumbered political power of autocratic states allows these regimes to increase their tax returns by implementing free trade policies (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). However, recent works question the notion that autocracies are more conducive

for trade. For example, Mansfield et al. (2000) examine the bilateral trade levels of countries paired by regime type. They find that bilateral trade within democratic and autocratic pairs is significantly higher than within mixed pairs. Furthermore, these scholars find no significant difference in the overall level of trade when comparing democratic and autocratic pairs. More recent works tend to argue that democratic regimes are more

likely to engage in trade than their autocratic counterparts (e.g. Przeworski, 1991). According to this line of research, democratization reduces the political power of those that benefit most from protectionist policies, thereby paving the way for the adoption of free trade (Stokes, 2001). Dutt and Mitra

(2002) extend the literature by presenting the observation that democratization increases trade,

only if a majority of voters will accrue economic gains as a result of liberalization. Still others suggest that

increased trade benefits the low-skill segments of the national economy, especially in developing countries. As such, governments of developing economies tend to favor lowering their trade barriers in order to appease the mass electorate (Milner and Kubota, 2005)

Empirics prove: Democracies face peer pressure to adopt free trade policiesKwon, PhD currently an assistant professor of sociology at the University of La Verne, Jan 29 2014(Roy, What factors matter for trade at the global level? Testing five approaches to globalization, 1820–2007, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, pg 395)Nevertheless, the claim that neoliberalism decreases the impact of political regimes on trade is questioned by various scholars. In fact, many note that the spread of a neoliberal ideology actually enhances the link between regime type and international trade . In

particular, democratic countries are generally more exposed to the outside world and are likely to adopt the norms and ideologies of the international community. By extension, democratic states are more likely to succumb to external pressures and adopt free trade policies when compared to their autocratic counterparts (Russett and Oneal, 2001). Thus, insofar as democratic nation-states are more likely to adopt an ideology free trade, regime type should remain a robust predictor of international trade.

Democracies increase IGO’s which fosters tradeKwon, PhD currently an assistant professor of sociology at the University of La Verne, June 2012(Roy, Sociological Forum Vol. 27, pg 330)

Following this line of inquiry, world-polity scholars successfully demonstrate that IGOs diffuse ‘‘cultural scripts’’ to create a world-wide homogenization in the form and content of nations (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Paxton et al., 2006; Schofer and Meyer, 2005). And although worldpolity scholars have yet to directly study the effect of IGOs on

world trade, there exist a number of works that examine the relationship between bilateral IGO ties and bilateral trade. The foremost sociological contribution to the study of IGOs and trade comes from Ingram et al. (2005), who show that countries increasingly interconnected through IGOs significantly increase their levels of bilateral trade. Using the gravity model, these scholars show a robust and positive association between IGO connectedness and trade, and find that ‘‘a doubling of the level of connection between two countries across all IGOs is associated with a 58% increase in trade ’’ (Ingram et al., 2005:850). From these findings, the

authors conclude that IGOs knit ‘‘together national cultures, creating empathy, sympathy, and trust’’

(Ingram et al., 2005:851). These findings are confirmed by Zhou (2010), who finds that IGO ties are positive and significantly associated with bilateral trade net of other independent variables. 4 Thus, although it is important to note that world-polity scholars concentrate on the relationship between bilateral IGO connectedness and its relationship to bilateral trade, the current investigation will attempt to extend the empirical world-polity literature and argue that increases in the number of IGOs will increase trade globalization. Likewise, world-polity scholars also observe that IGO [International

Government Organization] affiliation is positively associated with the spread of democracy and argue that IGO networks diffuse democratic forms of political organization (Torfason and Ingram, 2010). As one of the first empirical

studies to examine the impact of IGO connectedness on national levels of democracy, Wejnert (2005) demonstrates that traditional national-level predictors of democracy lose their robust association when worldpolity measures are included in the regressions. Similarly, Thorfason and Ingram (2010) employ a network analysis and find that a country’s level of democracy increases as its IGO ties to other democracies increase. For world-polity scholars, given the legitimacy of democratic values and their prevalence in IGOs (Boli and Thomas, 1997:181), it is no wonder that the process of normative isomorphism sets in to diffuse democracy and democratic forms of political organization to nation-states connected via IGO networks.

War Module

1AC

Democracy solves war – 4 warrantsNormative Explanations:

1. Liberal states don’t want to fight liberal states2. Norms of conflict resolution

Institutional Explanations:1. Processes likes checks and balances check2. Free speech checks

Lynn-Jones 98 (Sean Lynn-Jones is editor of the Harvard Internal Security Program’s quarterly journal and of the program’s book series, the Belfer Center Studies in International Security. He is a member of the Editorial Board of Security Studies. “Why the United States Should Spread Democracy” March 1998 http://live.belfercenter.org/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2F25468%2Fcan_a_us_deal_force_iran_to_fess_up_to_the_military_dimensions_of_its_nuke_program)///CWB. Democracy is Good for the International System¶ In addition to improving the lives of individual citizens in new democracies, the spread of democracy will benefit the international system by reducing the likelihood of war. Democracies do not wage war on other democracies. This absence-or near absence, depending on the definitions of "war" and "democracy" used-

has been called "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations."51 One scholar argues that "the absence of war between democracies comes as

close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."52 If the number of democracies in the

international system continues to grow, the number of potential conflicts that might escalate to war will diminish. Although wars between democracies and nondemocracies would persist in the short run, in the long run an international system composed of democracies would be a peaceful world. At the very least, adding to the number of democracies would gradually enlarge the democratic "zone of peace."¶ 1. The Evidence for the Democratic Peace¶ Many studies have found that there are virtually no historical cases of democracies going to war with one another. In an important two-part article published in 1983, Michael Doyle compares all international wars between 1816 and 1980 and a list of liberal states.53 Doyle concludes that "constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another."54 Subsequent statistical studies have found that this absence of war between democracies is statistically significant and is not the result of random chance.55Other analyses have concluded that the influence of other variables, including geographical proximity and wealth, do not detract from the significance of the finding that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.56¶ Most studies of the democratic-peace proposition have argued that democracies only enjoy a state of peace with other democracies; they are just as likely as other states to go to war with nondemocracies.57There are, however, several scholars

who argue that democracies are inherently less likely to go to war than other types of states.58 The evidence for this claim remains in dispute, however, so it would be premature to claim that spreading democracy will do more than to enlarge the democratic zone of peace.¶ 2. Why there is a Democratic Peace: The Causal Logic¶ Two types of explanations have been offered for the absence of wars between democracies. The first argues that shared norms prevent democracies from fighting one another. The second claims that institutional (or structural) constraints make it difficult or impossible for a democracy to wage war on another democracy.¶ a. Normative Explanations¶ The normative explanation of the democratic peace argues that norms that democracies share preclude wars between democracies. One version of this argument

contends that liberal states do not fight other liberal states because to do so would be to violate the principles of liberalism. Liberal states only wage war when it advances the liberal ends of increased individual freedom. A liberal state cannot advance liberal ends by fighting another liberal state, because that state already upholds the principles of liberalism. In other words, democracies do not fight because liberal ideology provides no justification for wars between liberal democracies.59 A second version of the normative explanation claims that democracies share a norm of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm applies between and within democratic states. Democracies resolve their domestic conflicts without violence, and they expect that other democracies will resolve inter-democratic international disputes peacefully.60¶ b. Institutional/Structural Explanations¶

Institutional/structural explanations for the democratic peace contend that democratic decision-making procedures and institutional constraints prevent democracies from waging war on one another. At the most general

level, democratic leaders are constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to

mobilize for war. In most democracies, the legislative and executive branches check the war-making power of each other. These constraints may prevent democracies from launching wars. When two democracies confront one another

internationally, they are not likely to rush into war. Their leaders will have more time to resolve disputes peacefully.61 A different sort of institutional argument suggests that democratic processes and freedom of speech make democracies better at

avoiding myths and misperceptions that cause wars.62¶ c. Combining Normative and Structural Explanations¶ Some studies have attempted to test the relative power of the normative and institutional/structural explanations of the democratic peace.63 It might make more sense, however, to specify how the two work in combination or separately under different conditions. For example, in liberal democracies liberal norms and democratic processes probably work in tandem to synergistically produce the democratic peace.64 Liberal states are unlikely to even contemplate war with one another. They thus will have few crises and wars. In illiberal or semiliberal democracies, norms play a lesser role and crises are more likely, but democratic institutions and processes may still make wars between illiberal democracies rare. Finally, state-level factors like norms and domestic structures may interact with international-systemic factors to prevent wars between democracies. If democracies are better at information-processing, they may be better than nondemocracies at recognizing international situations where war would be foolish. Thus the logic of the democratic peace may explain why democracies sometimes behave according to realist (systemic) predictions.

Nuclear war is probable and causes human extinctionMorgan 09, (Dennis Ray, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race”. University of Houston-Clear Lake Master of Science (M.S.), Futures Studies, Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328709001049)No doubt, the reason for such strongly worded language concerning wars of aggression was not only due to a reflection and assessment of the devastation of WWII but also, in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, due to a concern for the future of humankind, at a time when the nuclear arms race had already begun, and the nuclear arsenals of countries were stockpiling higher and higher. Certainly, both Einstein and Russell had this in mind when they posed a question in the Russell–Einstein Manifesto of 1955, which is similar to Hawking's question today: “Here, then, is the problem which we present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?” [7]. Russell and Einstein warned of bombs that are thousands of times more powerful than those of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, bombs that would send “radio-active particles into the upper air” and then return to the Earth in the form of a “deadly dust or rain” that would infect the human race thousands of times greater than those “Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish,” to quite possibly “put an end to the human race.” They feared that “if many H-bombs are used there will be universal death, sudden only for a minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.” [7]. Years later, in 1982, at the height of the Cold War, Jonathon Schell, in a very stark and horrific portrait, depicted sweeping, bleak global scenarios of total nuclear destruction. Schell's work, The Fate of the Earth [8] represents one of the gravest warnings

to humankind ever given. The possibility of complete annihilation of humankind is not out of the question as long as these death bombs exist as symbols of national power. As Schell relates, the power of destruction is now not just thousands of times as that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; now it stands at more than one and a half million times as powerful, more than fifty times enough to wipe out all of human civilization and much of the rest of life along with it [8]. In Crucial Questions about the Future, Allen Tough cites that Schell's monumental work, which “eradicated the ignorance and

denial in many of us,” was confirmed by “subsequent scientific work on nuclear winter and other possible effects: humans really could be completely devastated. Our human species really could become extinct.” [9]. Tough estimated the chance of human self-destruction due to nuclear war as one in ten. He comments that few daredevils or high rollers would take such a risk with so much at stake, and yet “human civilization is remarkably casual about its high risk of dying out completely if it continues on its present path for another 40 years” [9].

2AC

Democracies do not fight each otherGleditsch 8(Nils Petter Gleditsch, International Peace Research Institute, 2008, Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), Chapter: Peace and Democracy, Pages: 1430-1437, AA)

The Democratic Peace Phenomenon The relationship between international peace and democracy can be analyzed at three different levels. At the dyadic or pairwise level, a number of studies have found that democracies rarely, if ever fight out another. At the nation level, most

analyses have concluded that democracies participate in war just as much as countries with other political systems. Whether this means that they are no more peaceful in their overall behavior is a more controversial point. At the system level, the

question is whether a world with a higher share of democracies will also be more peaceful . Most of those who have addressed the systemic question have assumed that the answer can be inferred from findings at one of the other levels of analysis. To date, there is relatively little empirical analysis at the system level. Civil war is now the dominant form of armed

conflict, so we finally ask whether there is a democratic peace at the intrastate level. Democracies Do Not Fight One Another Many Enlightenment philosophers saw

democratic government as encouraging a more peaceful interaction between states. More than 200 years ago, Immanuel Kant described a pacific union created by liberal republics. At that time, there were few, if any, democracies in our sense of the word, and Kant's prescription for peace had little force as a description of the international system. But in the nineteenth century, democratic government took hold in an increasing number of countries. The observation that democracies do not fight one another was noted at least as early as the late 1930s, and a first statistical study was published in the mid-1960s. However, it was not until the 1980s that the empirical study took off, giving rise to an enormous and sometimes heated debate. Patterns of warfare after the Congress of Vienna in 1 SI 5 have been intensively studied using data from the Correlates of War Project. If the thresholds for 'democracy' and 'war' are not set too low, there are few if any clear cases of war between democracies during this period. Indeed, this regularity has been characterized by Jack Levy as being as close to a law as anything we have in international relations. Ignoring cases that result from quirks in the data (notably imprecise timing of regime changes), the three most problematic cases are the Spanish—American War in 1H98, World War I, and the British declaration of war on Finland in World War II. While Spain had an elected parliament, the monarchy retained considerable executive power and US decision makers did not perceive Spain as a democracy. Regarding World War I, some have argued that Germany was largely democratic in 1914 when war broke out against Britain, France, and other Western democracies. However, even more clearly than in the case of the King of Spain, the German Emperor had special prerogatives, particularly in foreign and defense policy. This is one reason why systematic data on democracy score Germany as less democratic than its main opponents in the West. Finally, in World War II, the Finnish dispute was with the Soviet Union, not with Western democracies. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 and forced Stalin to change sides in the war, Finland found itself on the wrong side. Following pressure from Stalin, the United Kingdom declared war on Finland. Technically, Finland was at war for three years with the UK (and with several British Dominions, but not with the United States). However, there was no fighting

between Finland and the Western democracies, who regarded Finland more as a victim than as an enemy. Overall, the empirical evidence points to a much lower

probability of war between democracies than for other combinations of states. War is usually defined as organized military action with annual battle deaths exceeding 1000. The peace between democracies appears to hold up if the threshold on violence is considerably lower, for example, set at the 25 annual battle-deaths used as the threshold for the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data. However, a number of militarized disputes have occurred between democracies, that is, conflicts with threats of military action, force deployed, and even limited use of force. Many such disputes are conflicts over fishing rights (*cod wars'), where the use of force is generally between fishing vessels on the one hand and military or coast guard vessels on the other, with no direct forceful confrontations between the

representatives of the two states. Indeed, such incidents may be illustrative of the reluctance of democracies to use force against each other, even in the case of sharp disputes . Other low-level conflicts are more serious, such as the repeated border incidents between Ecuador and Peru, some of which have taken place in periods where both countries were under democratic rule. However, such disputes have claimed a very small number of lives. Although the debate about the democratic peace frequently assumes that countries can be neatly divided into democracies and non-democracies, empirical studies face similar threshold problems as in defining war. In the previous century, few countries satisfied the requirements that most observers today would specify for calling a country democratic, such as universal suffrage, freedom of speech, and accountability of elected officials. Indeed, some studies of the democratic peace have used suffrage thresholds as low as 10%. Of course, if even such wide definitions of democracy yield very few wars between democracies, or none, more restrictive definitions will not alter the relationship. In terms of the two main dimensions of democracy (or 'polyarchy') used by Robert Dahl and Tatu Vanhanen, competition between political alternatives seems to be more decisive than the level of

participation in promoting the values that lead to a democratic peace. There is less agreement on why democracies do not light each other than on the statistical regularity. The normative explanation argues that democracies use

non- violent means to resolve domestic political conflicts . A competitive political system requires second-order agreement that alternative views are legitimate to take precedence over disagreements over political issues. When the verdict is in from the ultimate arbiter of political disagreements, the people or its elected representatives, the parties generally accept the outcome or challenge it only by nonviolent means, such as

verbal protest or legal procedures. When two democracies face a disagreement, they transfer this nonviolent conflict behavior to the interstate level. Democracies have stable expectations that nonviolent conflict behavior will be reciprocated. In Rudolph Rummel's words, democracy is "a general method of nonviolence." This is why democracies resolve territorial issues or competition for limited resources like oil, freshwater, or transnational fish stocks by negotiation and agreements for the shared use of the resource rather than by violence . Nonviolent behavior may, of course, also be observed in mixed democratic/ nondemocratic dyads. Democracy is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for dyadic peace . A competing explanation for the democratic peace,

promoted by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and others, is framed in terms of institutional constraints. The executive power is answerable directly to the people or to its representatives

and is bound to seek their tacit or explicit consent before engaging in dramatic forms of conflict behavior. This will delay escalation in a crisis, and increase the

probability of finding a diplomatic solution. A variant of this argument suggests that war is more costly to the general population than to the central decision makers . In a democratic political system the decision makers will eventually be called to account for whatever support they have given to policies that led to war . To forestall this, decision makers will be more cautious. At first glance, the structural constraints explanation might seem unsuited to explain why

the overall participation in war is as high for democracies as for non-democracies. However, democracies selectively choose to fight in low-cost wars and other wars that they can win quickly . The reluctance of the public to support the war impedes the executive only in cases where a costly war is expected. A modified structural argument is that only certain types of democracies with a higher degree of restraint on the central decision makers, such as parliamentarian systems (as opposed to presidential ones), consensus democracies (as opposed to majoritarian systems), and federal systems (as opposed to unitary states), will be less war-prone. Both the normative and structural explanations have their adherents and attempts to test them against each other have been somewhat inconclusive. For one thing, it is difficult to measure the intervening variables, which are generally attitudinal, for all or most of the nation dyads in the statistical studies. A stable set of mutual expectations, for instance, cannot be measured with the same degree of validity as a particular institutional pattern. Some argue that upon closer examination, the analytical distinction between the normative and the structural explanations becomes less clear and they blend into each other. A number of scholars have looked for factors that might explain both democracy and peace, making the democratic peace spurious. For instance, Melvin Small and J. David Singer have suggested that democratic states are few and far apart. Since war primarily takes place between neighbors, a lack of democratic neighbors might account for the lack of war between democracies. In fact, democracies tend to cluster together rather than to be farther apart than the average pair of states. Thus, this factor can hardly account for the lack of war between democracies. Other attempts to find third variables that would render the relationship spurious have included wealth, alliance patterns, an international environment where democracies face a common enemy (as they did during the Cold War), or a shared preference for the status quo among democracies. Some of these factors raise problems of endogeneity; for instance, democracy might influence the alliance pattern while the alliance patterns also reinforce democracy. The Cold War explanation for the democratic peace has sometimes been reinforced with an argument that because wars are relatively infrequent and because democracies initially were few and far between, the lack of war between democracies might be a statistical accident. According to this argument, it is only during the Cold War that we find a fairly large number of democracies. The lack of war between these countries might be accounted for by the fact that most of them were allied with the United States, or by the peculiar stable bipolar pattern of mutual deterrence that prevailed during the Cold War, the so-called Long Peace. However, double- democratic dyads tended to be peaceful even before the Cold War. And as time passes since the end of the Cold War without war breaking out between two democracies, the force of the realist argument is weakened. Many realists expected armed conflict to rise after the Cold War. As clearly shown by recent compilations of conflict data, the immediate aftermath of the Cold War with the breakup of federal states like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was accompanied by violence, most of it intrastate. But very soon this was more than compensated for by the ending of a number the armed conflicts that were fueled by the Cold War, including several conflicts in Central America and in Southern Africa. By 2005, the number of ongoing armed conflicts was lower than ever since the mid-1970s and the

probability that any particular country was involved in an armed conflict had not been lower since the mid-1950s. The overall severity of the world's armed conflicts, as

measured by battle-deaths, shows a long-term decline since the peak of violence in World War II. The annual figures are subject to spikes for particularly large wars, like the Korean War and the Vietnam War, but the spikes are lower over time. Currently, the strongest candidate for an alternative explanation is to account for the democratic peace through economic development, market norms, or simply 'capitalism'. Erik Gartzke. Havard Hegre, and Michael Mousseau are associated with such lines of thinking. In this perspective, a liberal market economy is a cause of peace as well as a democratic political system. While the relationship between shared democracy and the lack of war is one of the strongest empirical relationships found in international relations, the lack of democracy is by no means the most powerful explanation for international war. Multivariate studies of war indicate that more of the variation in interstate war over the last

two centuries can be accounted for by factors such as geographical distance, wealth, and alliance patterns. During most of this period, democracy was relatively rare among nations and joint democracy even rarer among dyads. If the

democratic peace continues to hold up in a post-Cold War world of an increasing number of democracies, it will become an increasingly significant factor in accounting for the lack of war . Some skeptics have looked in detail at specific conflicts where war was narrowly avoided and have failed to find evidence of either structural constraints or nonviolent norms of conflict behavior at work. Rather, they have found traditional realist factors such as power politics to have prevented full-scale war in the end, as when Christopher Layne examined four crises between the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany in the period from 1861 through 1921. Others have examined these and other cases, reaching different conclusions. For instance, political factors have been invoked to explain how Scandinavia was transformed from a region ridden by domestic and interstate wars to a virtual zone of peace. The interpretation of single cases seems highly dependent both on the theoretical preferences of the researcher, as well as those of the historians whose work is synthesized. Most of the history of war and peace has been written in a realist mode. The theory of the democratic peace may stimulate a reexamination of the historical description of interstate relations. It has been suggested by William Thompson and others that the democratic peace thesis may put the cart before the horse hi that the resolution of regional conflicts frequently predates the development of democracy. Thus it may

be peace that leads to democracy rather t lie other way around. On the other hand, democracies tend to win the wars they join and regimes which lose are frequently subject to regime change. In this sense, war can be seen as the midwife of democracy . The political transformation of Japan and Germany after World War II are classical cases. The three waves of democracy following World War I, World War II, and the Cold War are associated with the defeat of autocracies in conflict with coalitions dominated by democracies.

Democracy is a critical impact filter - checks escalation for all warsHamburg 10, (David A., President Emeritus at Carnegie Corporation of New York, previously President of the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences and President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, previously chair of the department of psychiatry at Stanford, M.D. from Indiana University, “Recent advances in preventing mass violence”)Democracies thrive by finding ways to deal fairly with conflicts and resolve them below the threshold of

mass violence. They develop ongoing mechanisms for settling disagreements. That is why, they are so important in preventing mass violence. This requires the growing spread of democracy and the

application of democratic principles to intergroup and international conflicts. People who live in pluralistic democracies become accustomed to diverse needs and learn the art of working out compromises that are satisfactory to all groups. This does not mean democracy imposed by force, nor does it mean that a single, premature election will lead to peace and prosperity. But it does mean that patiently constructed democracies, based on fair processes of mutual

accommodation, offer the best chance for nonviolent conflict resolution.

AT: Democracy Bad

AT: Benevolent Dictator

No “benevolent dictator” – rarely happens and politics has no “right answer”Klienfeld 14 (Rachel Klienfeld is a senior associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program. She was the founding CEO of the Truman National Security Project. She has a PhD in IR from Oxford. “Benevolent Dictatorship Is Never the Answer” 3/8/14 http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/08/benevolent-dictatorship-is-never-answer)Viktor Yanukovych is the kind of dictator we love to hate. A kleptocrat who chose a bribe from Russia over his people's future in the EU. A thug who sent other thugs to beat up protesters, until he was finally ousted by his own people. A man who left his country bankrupt while pictures of his palatial estate and private zoo are broadcast around the world. We vilify dictators like this.

And, yet, there remains a dream, for far too many development experts, business people and others around the globe

that a strong leader with authoritarian powers is needed to move poor countries into the developed world.¶ I am watching Ukraine implode from a West Africa nation where corruption is perceived to be growing, development is stalled and the economy is heading downhill. From high-level government appointees to members of civil society, I hear: "What we need is a benevolent dictator. ... " The sentiment is generally followed by praise for Paul Kagame, who has created a remarkably clean and efficient Rwanda after that country's genocide, or Lee Kuan Yew, the "father of Singapore," who corralled government corruption and thrust his nation into the first world.¶ The desire for benevolent dictatorship is not confined to developing nations. I hear it even more often from America's business community and those working on international development - often accompanied by praise for China's ability to "get things done." The problem is that the entire 20th century seems to have produced at most one largely benevolent dictator and one efficient but increasingly repressive leader, both in tiny countries.¶ Meanwhile, we have seen scores of Yanukovych-like kleptocrats,

Pinochet-style military dictatorships that torture dissenters in secret prisons and "disappear" those who disagree, and North Korean-style totalitarians whose gulags and concentration camps starve and murder hundreds of thousands or even

millions of their countrymen.¶ Occasionally, dictators begin benevolently and grow worse. The world is littered with Kwame Nkrumahs, Fidel Castros and Robert Mugabes who rose to power with great popularity, built their nations, then turned their people's hopes to ash through corruption, personality cults and violence. One Lee Kuan Yew and a Kagame teetering from benevolence toward repression, versus every other dictatorship of the 20th century? Those are not odds to bet your country on.¶ And yet, the longing for benevolent dictators continues, particularly in California among our technology titans, whose denigration of politics leads to a special Silicon Valley ideology that mixes libertarianism with dictatorship. They seem to want politics to work the way their products do: with elegant, clear solutions implemented by smart, creative doers.¶ But politics does not have a "right" answer. It is the field where our values compete. Surely, you say, there is a right way to get the job done: to fill in the potholes, build the roads, keep our streets safe, get our kids to learn reading and math. Ah, but look how quickly those issues get contentious.¶ Whose potholes should get filled first? Do we try to keep our streets safe through community policing or long prison sentences? Should teachers be given merit pay, are small classrooms better, or should we lengthen the school day? These issues engender deep political fights, all - even in the few debates where research provides clear, technocratic answers. That is because the area of politics is an area for values disputes, not technical solutions.¶ One person's "right" is not another's because people prioritize different values: equity versus excellence, efficiency versus voice and participation, security versus social justice, short-term versus long-term gains.¶ At a conference I attended recently, a businessman extolled the Chinese government ministers in attendance for "building 100 airport runways while we in the West have failed to add even a single runway to notoriously overburdened Heathrow." That was, of course, because the British have civil liberties and private property, while the Chinese do not have to worry about such niceties. Democracy allows many ideas of "right" to flourish. It is less efficient than dictatorship. It also makes fewer tremendous mistakes.¶ The longing for a leader who knows what is in her people's best interests, who rules with care and guides the nation on a wise path, was Plato's idea of a philosopher-king. It's a tempting picture, but it's asking the wrong question. In political history, philosophers moved from a preference for such benevolent dictators to the ugly realities of democracy when they switched the question from "who could best rule?" to "what system prevents the worst rule?"¶ And as problematic as democracy is, the ability to throw the bums out does seem to prevent the worst rule. Corruption, vast inequality and failure to deliver basic goods and services are real problems with democracies in developed and developing nations. These ills are dangerous, leading to anger, stagnation and political violence. But dictatorship is no answer: it's playing roulette where almost every spot on the wheel leads to a Yanukovych or worse.¶ As Syria burns and Ukraine implodes, Americans tempted by the security or simplicity of dictators, benevolent or otherwise, should give up such simple answers and face the messy realities of politics.

Democracy Bad

Environment/Rights Malthus

1NC Environment

Democracy fails to provide a solution to coming environmental collapse which causes extinction – evolutionary and structural problems mean that only a shift to an expert-run eco-authoritarianism can solveShearman 7 (David Shearman is emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an independent assessor on the IPCC. “Democracy and climate change: a story of failure” 7/7/07 https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/climate_change/democracy_climate_change_failure)///CWIt seems that some of the most perceptive brains in society have given up on an effective response to climate change. Stephen Hawking infers that mankind should colonise distant planets. James Lovelock thinks the remnants of

humanity will seek refuge on the tropical shores of the Arctic. Scientific data now strongly suggests that physical and biological changes in the planet are increasingly greater than those defined by the modelling in the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report. Despite the steadily rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, even countries expressing commitment are having little impact compared to the huge task in hand. Democratic governments continue to approve projects that will make reductions difficult if not impossible.¶ David Shearman is emeritus professor of medicine at Adelaide University, secretary of Doctors for the Environment Australia, and an independent assessor on the IPCC. ¶ His most recent book (co-written with Joseph Wayne Smith) is The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, (Praeger, 2007)¶ In an openDemocracy article, Andrew Dobson contrasts this environmental inactivity with the speedy response to a recent international financial emergency (see "A climate of crisis: towards the eco-state", 19 September 2007). If governments can recognise a cyclical financial emergency and in an instant move heaven and earth (and billions of dollars, pounds sterling and euros) to contain it, why can they not do the same in response to a global environmental emergency? His answers embrace institutional, ideological, and interest-laden factors together with the issue of who controls the public argument.¶ It can be argued that all these factors have a common denominator: the fundamental flaws in liberal democracy. The market economy, now the linchpin of western culture, is fused with liberal democracy, such that each is dependent upon the other for survival. Together they have developed a liberty for the individual that has environmentally destructive consequences. The liberty to negate these consequences is constrained.¶ This article discusses some of the psychological aspects of this situation and introduces the idea of authoritarian action led by experts to address the ecological emergency.¶ The

short-term fix¶ In psychological terms, a financial emergency immediately threatens self and the understood and

valued way of life. This carries more danger to self than the future and ill-understood threat of ecological crisis. Human psychological mechanisms profoundly influence the primacy of self-preservation and the need to procreate that determines our quest for goods, status, and power. Humanity's inability to think long term is related to the brain's evolutionary need to adapt to the conditions of a local environment (see EO Wilson, The Future of Life [Little, Brown, 2002]). Our ancestors had to think short term with an emotional commitment to the limited space around them and to a limited band of kinsmen. This is the Darwinian priority of short-term gain that bestowed longevity and more offspring upon a cooperative group of relatives and friends. As a result, we ignore any distant possibility not yet requiring examination.¶ If we imprint these responses upon the cult of liberal democracy as it operates today, it is possible to explain the illogical happenings that have brought us to current governmental responses - or indeed non-responses. An illustration close to home is the responses of the John Howard government in Australia, now facing the challenge of an election campaign - though similar responses are documented in the United States and to a lesser degree in Britain. Two recent detailed studies are used to document the permissive infiltration of government processes by the fossil-fuel industries (see Clive Hamilton, Scorcher: The Dirty Politics of Climate Change [Black Inc. Agenda, 2007] and Guy Pearse, High & Dry: John Howard, climate change and the selling of Australia's future [Penguin, 2007]).¶ The behavioural block¶ The mechanisms used by industry to reinforce its interests are intensive lobbying, financial support for think-tanks and government decision-making bodies, interchange of staff between industry and government bureaucracy and the writing of cabinet papers. In its eleven years of power, the Howard government has been united with industry in believing that the threat to Australia was not from climate change but from possible actions to alleviate it that might harm industry, exports and the rule of government.¶ During this period, a closely woven network of individuals with the intent of denying climate change and delaying any government responses to it has been in continuous operation. The network involved many government politicians, some members of cabinet, and conservative think-tanks linked financially and ideologically to their counterparts in the US. Clearly, it is doubtful if this could have happened if the government was not ideologically receptive. Government was fervent in denial of climate change, scientists were suppressed, research was terminated and disdain was expressed for expert opinion. The total denial of access to those who could explain the problem contrasted with an open-door policy for fossil-fuel lobbyists.¶ The functions of the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (Abare), a government resource, merit particular discussion. This organisation prepares and researches figures for government and industry yet it is supported financially by polluting industries. It prepared the model that underpinned the Howard government's greenhouse study and the polluters oversaw this process. Abare produced reports that stressed the dangers of cutting emissions.¶ On 16 August 2006, John Howard told parliament: "According to Abare, a

50% cut in Australian emissions by 2050 would lead to a 10% fall in GDP, a 20% fall in real wages, a carbon price equivalent to a doubling of petrol prices, and a staggering 600% rise in electricity and gas prices. They are the calculations of the Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics" (see Australia, House of Representatives, "Question without notice", Hansard, 16 August 2006).The report was embellished by John Howard. To give the impression that deep cuts in emissions would mean by 2050 an economy 10% smaller than today and with 20% lower wages, Howard's numbers excluded the words, "compared with business as usual". Despite the fact that the report was prepared to support him, he felt the need to embellish it.¶ These actions can be analysed in the context of conservational psychology and behavioural change (see O Hernảndez & MC Monroe, "Thinking About Behavior", in BA Day & MC Monroe, eds., Environmental Education and Communication for a Sustainable World: A Handbook for International Practitioners (Academy for Educational Development, 2000). Behaviour change is seen as a gradual process involving several stages. In the pre-contemplation stage the person or group does not know or does not consider adopting ecologically sustainable behavior, such as the acceptance and response to climate change. The contemplation stage sees the person thinking about these issues and considering adopting such behaviours. The person may then progress to preparation for action and then to the action stage.¶ In Australia, the Howard government has spent eleven years in the pre-contemplative phase, with its kinsmen industries in self-preservation mode and with an unsullied market ideology. In 2007 Howard still showed little acceptance of the effects of climate change. When asked what life would be like in Australia if temperatures around the world rose by 4-6 degrees Celsius, he said. "Well, it would be less comfortable for some than it is now" (see "Howard 'no idea' about climate change", The Australian, 6 February 2007). Public opinion has now forced him reluctantly into contemplation and into some action but he has employed actions that still fit within his ideological concerns. Proposals involve "aspirational" targets and clean coal that do not threaten the market ideology. This behavioural change cannot progress further because there is conflict of interest between the understanding of the science and the commitment to an unfettered market that supports political power and material existence.¶ The systemic flaw¶ The John Howard government has acted with integrity according to its own value-system. That value-system includes the righteousness of access and policy-making to those who support conservative government and free markets, and the exclusion of those experts who might endanger the system. The corruption of democracy is justified by the cause. Furthermore, the ideological kraal has become secure from contaminating thought by the politicisation of the public service which feeds government with what it wants to hear and by the interposition of politically appointed staffers.¶ This conflict between system and appropriate action is expressed in two statements by Tony Blair:¶ * "Making the shift to a sustainable lifestyle is one of the most important challenges for the 21st century. The reality of climate change brings home to us the consequence of not facing up to these challenges" (quoted in Tim Jackson, ed., The Earthscan Reader on Sustainable Consumption, Earthscan, 2006)¶ * "If we were to put forward a solution to climate change, something that would involve drastic cuts in economic growth or standards of living, it would not matter how justified it was, it would simply not be agreed to"¶ The conflict - the fusion of democracy and market - cannot survive without economic growth, and neither can the politician (see David Shearman, "Kyoto: One Tiny Step for Humanity", Online Opinion, 4 March 2005). George W Bush after seven years of denial and sabotage of climate science has reluctantly moved

forward from the pre-contemplative stage but is constrained by the same paradigm: "We must lead the world to produce fewer greenhouse gas emissions, and we must do it in a way that does not undermine economic growth or prevent nations from delivering greater prosperity for their people."¶ The big leap forward in behavioural change has to be an acceptance that economic growth in its present form threatens our survival. It is not a simple matter of changing to renewables which will bring an explosion in employment and continuing growth. Climate change is but one of a network of factors destroying the ecological services which support the world's burgeoning population. It is questionable whether the leaders elected through liberal democracy have the ability to understand these complex issues, and indeed the commitment to act upon them.¶ Plato recognised the problems that would befall democracy. The needs of the populace would not be

resisted by those who sought power; power is best exerted by those (experts) who did not seek power.¶ Clearly expertise is needed in this complex world issue, but how do we get there in the face of "mediocracy"?. The first step is to float the issue; and indeed we find that some intellectuals are thinking this way, though cautiously - so as to avoid being labelled as revolutionary.¶ Václav Havel, former president of the Czech Republic, says: "I don't agree with those whose reaction is to warn against restricting civil freedoms. Were the forecasts of certain climatologists to come true, our freedoms would be tantamount to those of someone hanging from a 20th-storey parapet" (see "Our Moral Footprint", New York Times, 27 September 2007).¶ Tim Flannery (in The Weather Makers: Our changing climate and what it means for life on earth) contrasts the freedom of humanity with the need for a more directive leadership.¶ The case for an authoritarianism of experts has been explored with the philosophical conclusion that continuing absolute liberty cannot be preferable to life (see David Shearman & Joseph Wayne Smith, The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, Praeger, 2007). It may well be non-western states (including China) will find ways to deliver while the west continues to display its extreme liberty with ineffectual debate and a surrender to powerful interests in its grinding democratic institutions.¶

Terrorism

1NC Terrorism

Democratic deadlock and freedoms exacerbate and encourage terrorismLi 5, (Quan, “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational terrorist incidents?” Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University, Florida State University MS, PhD, international relations. http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/49/2/278.full.pdf+html)Institutional constraints on the democratic government are likely uncorrelated with the negative effect of democracy on terrorism. Policy inaction and political deadlock often occur in democratic polities as a result of the constraints on the policy-making power of government. To the extent that policy inaction and political deadlock fail to reduce grievances but heighten public frustration, government constraints do not reduce but rather encourage terrorism. If one considers the implication of Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) argument on civil war, terrorist groups are typically extremely marginal groups whose political grievances are too narrow to be resolved through a democratic system. Policy inaction and political deadlock, induced by institutional checks and balances, will increase the grievances of marginalized groups, pushing them toward violence. More important, I argue that institutional constraints significantly weaken the ability of the democratic government to fight terrorism. Because the winning coalition in democracy tends to be larger, institutional checks and balances hold the democratic government accountable to a broader range of societal interests. It is, therefore, difficult for democracies to enact antiterrorist strategies that are as strict as those commonly adopted by nondemocratic regimes (Wilkinson 2001). Enacting repression and effective deterrence is more costly to the government in a competitive political system because it may harm political support and cause the government to lose power. In contrast, the largely unconstrained, repressive military regime, for example, can disregard civil liberties, effectively crush terrorist organizations, and reduce terrorist incidents (Crenshaw 1981). Finally, I also argue that institutional constraints perversely strengthen the strategic position of terrorists in their interactions with the government. Institutional checks and balances allow a broad range of interests to influence government policy making and involve careful and regular oversight and scrutiny of government performance and policy failures. As a result, the security of a vast number of citizens becomes the concern of the democratic government. Creating a general terrorist threat that affects most citizens is likely to be effective in democratic countries. Also, the cost of generating such a threat is low because of the abundance of targets valuable to the democratic government. In nondemocratic countries, the government is constrained only by the ruling elite, so an effective terrorist threat need only target those in the small ruling coalition. Because the ruling elite are easier to protect than the general population, an effective terrorist threat is much more costly and difficult to mount in nondemocratic regimes. Within the context of transnational terrorism, the effect of government constraints applies to both domestic terrorists and foreign terrorists in a country, thus influencing all three types of transnational terrorist attacks.

Terrorism causes WW3 - causes critical miscalculations in foreign policyMueller 5, (Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, “REACTIONS AND OVERREACTIONS TO TERRORISM”. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/nb.pdf)In some cases terrorist acts have had consequences because they are used as an excuse for--or seized upon to carry out--a policy desired for other reasons. The terrorist acts do not "trigger"

or "cause" these historically-significant ventures, but rather facilitate them by shifting the emotional or political situation, potentially making a policy desired for other reasons by some political actors possible but no more necessary than it was before the terrorist act took place. World War I, 1914. An important case in point is the reaction of Austria and Germany to the assassination in Sarajevo in June 1914. It is frequently suggested that that terrorist act "triggered" or even "caused" the cataclysm that soon came to be known as the Great War. It seems clear, however, that rather than causing the massive (and, in the end, spectacularly counterproductive) Austrian and German overreaction, the violence in Sarajevo more nearly gave some Austrian leaders an excuse to impose Serbia-punishing policies they were seeking to carry out anyway. In an extensive discussion, Richard Ned Lebow concludes of the episode: the Sarajevo assassinations changed the political and psychological environment in Vienna and Berlin in six important ways, all of which were probably necessary for the decisions that led to war. First, they constituted a political challenge to which Austrian leaders believed they had to respond forcefully; anything less was expected to encourage further challenges by domestic and foreign enemies. Second, they shocked and offended Franz Josef and Kaiser Wilhelm and made both emperors more receptive to calls for decisive measures. Third, they changed the policymaking context in Vienna by removing the principal spokesman for peace. Fourth, they may have been the catalyst for Bethmann-Hollweg's gestalt shift. Fifth, they made it possible for Bethmann-Hollweg to win the support of the socialists, without which he never would have risked

General

1NC Problem-Solving

Democracy dodges productive discussions and promotes over-simplifications and short-term solutions – turns all their offense and prevents solvencyStevens 15 (Brett Stevens is a writer for Amerika.org, “Democracy is disease” 5/07/15 http://www.amerika.org/politics/democracy-is-disease/)///CWDemocracy encourages “football-style” decision making where people root for a team and defend

it against all comers. At that point, they stop looking into their own beliefs to figure out what the intent is, and focus on the game of beating the other team. Over time, this leads to the teams being very similar,

which by the nature of leftism as more general than rightism, leads to a leftward drift.¶ Voting is an alternative to the old fashioned way of making decisions, which is either to have truly excellent people and/or wise elders in control, or to get together your best people and talk it out. Ask every relevant question. Take every line of

thought to a conclusion. Never fall back on “well that’s just subjective” or “that’s your ideology.” Remove ideology and politics entirely, and look at the task itself.¶ Of course, that is hard work. It can result in all-nighters and substantial

risk, since appearance is the opposite of reality. Voters panic if a new program does not immediately deliver results, which causes politicians to avoid rocking the boat and to construct new programs so that there is always someone else to blame for their failure. Voters respond to flattery, such as programs that show off how wealthy their nation is, and glaze over when negative, difficult or complex things are mentioned. But even more, voting itself causes distancing from the task. The question is no longer what should be done, but which of the two options — absurd oversimplifications polarized by the necessity of differentiation — seems a safer bet.¶ Our civilization has dedicated itself to avoiding the hard work of making choices and taking leadership roles out of fear of the crowd. We look for “systems,” or “objective” and automatic processes like democracy and the economy, to lead for us, but all of them succumb to decay through inevitable entropy and drift toward what humans want to believe is true and not what is. Economics reflects what people are willing to buy, not what they need. Democracy reflects what people want to think is true, not what is real. Even systems like “education” presuppose that simply indoctrinating people gives them the magical ability to make decisions that they lack the intellectual or moral fortitude to make. The future is not found in systems, but in organic leadership, which is putting the best people in charge and having them debate out questions instead of putting them to a vote.¶

AT: Disease Module

AT: Disease Module

Democracy effect is minimal on disease-correlation not causation Justesen 10(Mogens Justesen, 2-10, University of Southern Denmark, “Democracy, Dictatorship, and Disease: Political regimes and the fight against HIV/AIDS”, http://www.hha.dk/nat/christian/BBQ_10/Justesen.pdf, Accessed 6-29-15, AA)HIV/AIDS has evolved into being the major killer in developing countries today. Indeed, it is no longer confined to being an issue of public health. Due to its devastating human and economic impact, HIV/AIDS has become a major development issue. Yet we know very little about why medical treatment of HIV/AIDS victims is provided on a large scale in

only some countries, and we know practically nothing about the role of political regimes in this process. The purpose of this paper has been to fill this gap by analyzing the impact of political regimes on public health care policies relating to the treatment of HIV/AIDS victims by ARV drugs. The general argument linking political regimes to government performance implies that competitive democratic elections impose an accountability constraint on governments. In theory, democratic politics creates incentives for government to accommodate to voter preferences and rely on a relative large supply of public goods and broad-based services as means to stay in power. By contrast, a non-democratic government does not face any formal accountability constraints through competitive elections. This creates incentives for such governments to rule by distributing selective benefits targeted specifically at coalition members, rather than by means of general public services available to broad segments of citizens. Using regression and matching methods, this paper has tried to assess the relative merits of democracy

in the case of medical treatment of HIV/AIDS patient. Across various model specifications, the results have provided some support for the idea hypothesis that democracies tends to perform better than non-democracies in terms of providing access to treatment by anti-retroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS patients. While this suggests that political regimes do have some tangible effects on public health policies – at least in this limited, but vital, policy area – there is also reasons for caution, in particular since the substantial effect of democracy compared to non-democracy may not amount to more than a ten percent difference in ARV coverage. At the very least, we therefore need a more detailed understanding of the conditions under which democracy works as predicted by theory – and the conditions under which it does not.

No extinction from disease, lack of data to supportSmith, Sax, and Lafferty, USGS Channel Islands Field Station, University of California Santa Barbara, University of Georgia, Institute of Ecology, 2005(Katherine F., Dov F., And Kevin D, Evidence for the Role of Infectious Disease in Species Extinction and Endangerment, pg 1355)First, the lack of historical data make it difficult to support claims that infectious diseases have been emerging at increasingly high rates and are therefore likely to be of significant concern in the future. Alternative indirect methods should not be discounted. For instance, Ward and Lafferty (2004) tracked the proportion of published scientific papers related to infectious disease in several marine taxa to assess whether normalized reports of infectious disease could serve as an indirect proxy for infectious disease monitoring. In the absence of baseline data, this approach is useful for detecting quantitative trends in infectious disease occurrence through time. This and similar methods should prove beneficial for future studies on temporal trends in emerging infectious diseases. Second, it is crucial to recognize that not all infectious diseases increase the likelihood of extinction. There is a growing need for rigorous scientific tests to determine whether an infectious disease identified in a threatened host causes significant pathology. Related to this is the need to assess whether impacts at the individual level scale up to the population or species level (Lafferty & Holt 2003). Theoretical and historical evidence suggests that infectious disease can drive populations temporarily or permanently to low numbers or densities, predisposing them to extinction by other forces (de Castro & Bolker 2005; Gerber et al. 2005). Infectious diseases that are host

AT: Famine Module

AT: Famine Module

Democracy doesn’t stop hunger aloneMassing 2003 (Does Democracy Avert Famine? By MICHAEL MASSING March 1, 2003 Saturday)To Mr. Sen, though, it is not the thesis that needs revision but the popular understanding of it. Yes, famines do not occur in democracies, he said in a phone interview, but "it would be a misapprehension to believe that democracy solves the problem of hunger." Mr. Sen, who is the master of Trinity College at Cambridge University, said his writings on famine frequently noted the problems India has had in feeding its people, and he was baffled by the amount of attention his comments about famine and democracy had received. The Nobel committee, in awarding its prize, did not even mention this aspect of his work, he said, adding, however, that many newspapers had seized on it and misrepresented it.¶ Mr. Sen's views about famine and hunger have recently been put to the test by Dan Banik, an Indian-born political scientist at the University of Oslo. Mr. Banik has spent much of the last several years in India, studying the parched, desperate Kalahandi region of Orissa. In that area alone, Mr. Banik said by phone from India, he found 300 starvation deaths in six months. And they are hardly unique. "I have collected newspaper reports on starvation for six years in Indian newspapers," he said, "and there's not a state where it hasn't happened. Starvation is widespread in India."¶ He quickly added, however, that the toll was nowhere near the hundreds of thousands that constitute a famine. In fact, Mr. Sen's theory about famines not occurring in democracies "applies rather well to India," he said. "There has not been a large-scale loss of life since 1947." At the same time, he said, "there have been many incidents of large-scale food crises that, while not resulting in actual famines, have led to many, many deaths."¶ While the Indian bureaucracy responds well to highly visible crises like famine threats, Mr. Banik observed, starvation "occurs in isolated areas and so isn't very visible." India has done an even poorer job of addressing the problem of chronic malnutrition, he said. "It's so shocking," Mr. Banik added. "There's so much food inthe country, yet people are starving."¶ India's huge food stocks reflect the power of the farm lobby. It has pressed the government to buy grain at ever higher prices, making bread and other staples more and more expensive. To help the hungry, the government has a national network of ration shops, but they have been undermined by widespread corruption and distribution bottlenecks. What's more, the government, under pressure from the World Bank and other institutions, has reduced its once-generous food subsidies.

Alt causes to famine other than Democracy Devereux 90 (Democracy alone cannot free Africa from famine MR STEPHEN DEVEREUX July 6, 1990, Friday)Sir: Professor Amartya Sen explains ''How democracy can free the world of famine'' (2 July), where ''democracy'' means an elected government, social security and a free press. Professor Sen does not claim that democracy is sufficient to eliminate famines (let alone poverty and hunger),

which are the products of complex underlying causes and precipitating factors.¶ Democracy may generate the political will to deal with food crises, but it does not provide the economic and structural capacity to do so. If a government is truly accountable to its electorate; if it has good and timely information about rainfall, food production, rural incomes, nutrition and health; if it has access to adequate cash and food resources; if transport infrastructure is sound; and if the affected population is not isolated (because of civil conflict, say, or floods); then - and only then - public action might prevent a threatened famine.¶ In sub-Saharan Africa, famine is closely associated with drought and, increasingly, with war. During the 1980s, major famines in Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad and Mozambique were all precipitated by this drought-war combination. True, none of these countries has a particularly democratic government, but nor did Zimbabwe and Botswana (described by Professor Sen as ''relatively democratic'' and famine-free) suffer major civil conflict during the decade.¶ It is doubtful whether ''public activism'' within famine-prone countries can be credited with nudging governments into taking preventive actions, as Professor Sen implies. The vocal and articulate urban classes are usually too busy defending their own interests to care about their hungry country cousins, and most relief aid distributed in Africa comes from outside the continent. The political complexion of individual governments has much to do with who gets aid and who does not, but this is an argument for getting in the good books of the rich and powerful as a means of ending famine, not for democracy per se.¶ Drought, flood, grain hoarding, war - none of these causes famine in itself. Vulnerability causes famine, and vulnerability is caused by poverty and social disruption as much as by political marginalisation. Democracy, to the extent that it empowers

poor people and protects their interests, reduces that vulnerability, but it is not a panacea. If famine is to be eliminated from Africa, war and poverty must end too.

Democracy does not have anything to do with famine Polgreen 05 (A New Face of Hunger, Without the Old Excuses LYDIA POLGREEN July 31, 2005 Sunday)THE pictures are wrenching. A nomad holds an infant aloft, its gaunt head lolling dangerously, its matchstick limbs akimbo. A father asks God to forgive him for weeping publicly; he has just buried his son. A child in an emergency clinic awakens from a hunger-induced stupor only to moan and weep from the pain of his starvation-induced skin sores.¶ These images of victims of a food crisis in the vast, landlocked West African nation of Niger, captured by a BBC television correspondent and shown around the world, look like something the world has seen before -- the famine in Ethiopia in the 1980's. That catastrophe prompted an extraordinary outpouring of generosity, along with a vow that the world would never again stand by as millions went hungry.¶ Yet here it is again, far smaller in scale, yet replete with images of stick-thin children with hunger-swollen bellies clinging to bony, flat-breasted mothers. Once again there is the question: what causes these calamities that invariably afflict the world's poorest corners?¶ The immediate cause is certainly known. Locust swarms and poor rains last year wiped out much of the nation's harvest and caused grain prices to triple. But when misfortunes strike other countries, they can help their people, with planning, with resources and by seeking aid from abroad. So what has gone so terribly wrong in Niger?¶ For decades famine was seen largely as a consequence of bad political leadership. Food scarcity in Ethiopia in the 1980's had natural causes, but its transformation into a deadly famine came to be understood as mostly man-made, the result of a Stalinist regime's collectivist ideology and its pursuit of victory over insurgents without regard to the well-being of its people. It seemed a neat illustration of the development the economist Amartya Sen's dictum: ''No famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy.''¶ But that does not explain Niger's problem. Niger is a democracy . It has been one since 1999, when it made the transition to multiparty democracy and constitutional rule after a decade of turmoil. It has also made, in part at least, the painful transition from a centralized, state-run economy to a market-driven one, earning praise and ultimately relief from about half of its estimated $1.6 billion in foreign debt from the World Bank.¶ Yet Niger still earns a horrifically high score on the index of human misery compiled by the United Nations Development Program, which lists it as the second least developed nation in the world, just ahead of Sierra Leone.¶ More than 25 percent of its children die before their fifth birthdays. Those who survive go on to scrape a meager existence from a harsh, arid savanna that is just barely suitable for farming and cattle grazing, yet must feed 12 million people. Cyclical droughts and chronic hunger are a way of life. Life expectancy tops out at 46 years.¶ Nor is Niger alone in its troubles. Of the 25 countries at the bottom of the development list, all but two are in Africa. Niger's food crisis -- it is not, despite news reports, a famine yet -- is not even the worst on the continent. Similar problems, involving even larger numbers, exist in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Darfur and elsewhere.

Only FUNCTIONING democracies prevent faminePolgreen 05 (A New Face of Hunger, Without the Old Excuses LYDIA POLGREEN July 31, 2005 Sunday)Niger may be a democracy, but its government is weak and its tiny budget is almost entirely dependent on foreign aid. It may have a free press, but if literacy is at 17 percent and few can afford radios or televisions, how can a free press safeguard against famine? It may have elections, but if the government has put itself at the mercy of international donors in return for promises of aid, can it be held to account when the world does not live up to its end of the bargain?¶ In the end, the way out of misery for countries like Niger is neither democracy nor increased aid alone, but a blend of the two, said Stephen Devereux, an expert on famine at the University of Sussex in Britain. Mr. Sen's phrase about famine and poverty is often misquoted to leave out the word ''functioning.'' Helping young democracies

become functioning nations is probably the only way to inoculate countries like Niger against catastrophe.¶ ''Niger appears to have done everything it could,'' Mr. Devereux said. ''We have to ask ourselves, what do

international donors owe Niger in return? If you accept the situation that a country is so poor that it will be dependent on assistance for a long time, the responsibility for preventing famine is shared.''

AT: Econ. Module

1NC AT: Trade

Democracy is not key to a market economySowell 3-25(Thomas Sowell, 3-25-15, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute, “Western advocates of 'nation-building' should master recently deceased statesman's legacy of lessons”, http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell032515.php3, Accessed 6-25-15, AA)It is not often that the leader of a small city-state — in this case, Singapore — gets an international reputation. But no one deserved it more than Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of Singapore as an independent country in 1959, and its prime minister from 1959 to 1990. With his death, he leaves behind a legacy valuable not only to Singapore but to the world. Born in Singapore in 1923, when it was a British colony, Lee Kuan Yew studied at Cambridge University after World War II, and was

much impressed by the orderly, law-abiding England of that day. It was a great contrast with the poverty-stricken and crime-ridden Singapore of that era. Today Singapore has a per capita Gross Domestic Product more than 50 percent higher than that of the United Kingdom and a crime rate a small fraction of that in England . A 2010 study showed more patents and patent applications from the small

city-state of Singapore than from Russia. Few places in the world can match Singapore for cleanliness and orderliness. This remarkable transformation of Singapore took place under the authoritarian rule of Lee Kuan Yew for two decades as prime minister. And it happened despite some very serious handicaps that led to chaos and self-

destruction in other countries. Singapore had little in the way of natural resources. It even had to import drinking water from neighboring Malaysia. Its population consisted of people of different races, languages and religions — the Chinese majority and the sizable Malay and Indian minorities. At a time when other Third World countries were setting up government-controlled economies and blaming their poverty on "exploitation" by more advanced industrial nations, Lee Kuan Yew promoted a market economy, welcomed foreign investments, and made Singapore's children learn English, to maximize the benefits from Singapore's position as a major port for international commerce. Singapore's schools also taught the separate native languages of its Chinese, Malay and Indian Tamil peoples. But everyone had to learn English, because it was the

language of international commerce, on which the country's economic prosperity depended. In short, Lee Kuan Yew was pragmatic, rather than ideological. Many observers saw a contradiction between Singapore's free markets and its lack of democracy. But its long-serving prime minister did not deem its people ready for democracy. Instead, he offered a decent government with much less corruption than in other countries in that region of the world . His example was especially striking in view of many in the West who seem to think that democracy is something that can be exported to countries whose history and traditions are wholly different from those of Western nations that evolved democratic institutions over the centuries. Even such a champion of freedom as John Stuart

Mill said in the 19th century: "The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say, does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization." In other words, democracy has prerequisites, and peoples and places without those prerequisites will not necessarily do well when democratic institutions are created. The most painful recent example of that is Iraq, where a democratically elected government, set up by expenditure of the blood and treasure of the United States, became one of the obstacles to a united people with the military strength to protect itself from international terrorists. In many parts of the Third World, post-colonial governments set up democratically made sure that there would be no more democracy that could replace its original leaders. This led to the cynical phrase, "one man, one vote — one time."

Democracy can be wonderful as a principle where it is viable, but disastrous as a fetish where it is not. Lee Kuan Yew understood the pitfalls and

steered around them. If our Western advocates of "nation-building" in other countries would learn that lesson, it could be the most valuable legacy of Lee Kuan Yew.

AT: Environment Module

AT: Warming Module

No spread of democracy will change the environmental situation, only direct policy making can solveFredriksson and Neumayer, Department of Economics, University of Louisville, and London School of Economics, Department of Geography & Environment and Grantham Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, November 2013(Per G. and Eric, Democracy and climate change policies: Is history important?, Ecological Economics)

This paper argues that democratic capital (long-term historical experience with democracy) is an important determinant of climate change policies. In fact, we find that the current level of democracy has no effect on environmental policy once democratic capital is introduced. Higher levels of democratic capital stock (in particular, the stock of historical experience of

constraints on the executive) are associated with more stringent climate change policies. Thus, recent transitions to democracy are unlikely to have short-term positive effects on environmental policies addressing climate change. As democracy is consolidated over time, we expect such transitions to eventually have a positive environmental policy impact, however. The Arab Spring (and other democratization) can be considered an initial step in the right direction also for the environment. In the short run additional policy measures and international cooperation appear necessary to address climate change.

AT: Genocide Module

AT: Genocide

Modern democracy empty and is a facade for ethnocracy - this justifies systemic genocideConversi 06, (Daniele, Doctor in Sociology/European Studies from the London School of Economics, “Demo-skepticism and Genocide”)Mann (2005) convincingly demonstrates that majoritarian democracy may sustain genocide when the demos is associated with the ethnos. Unfortunately the latter is the rule, rather than the exception. He begins by dealing with the country which, until recently, was heralded as the beacon of ‘liberal democracy’, the USA (Mann, 2005, ch. 2). The American Constitution is the oldest unchanged one in the world and remains an object of sacred veneration by most Americans from both the right and the left of the political spectrum. But the Constitution's opening sentence, ‘We the people’, lends itself to two opposite interpretations: one ethnic, the other civic. The ‘people’ can be either the ethnos, sharing putative descent, or the demos, simply sharing citizenship and hypothetically equal rights, irrespective of their descent. However, in a settler society that was built on pillage and destruction, and where the clearing of the conquered lands of its original inhabitants was legitimized in God's name, the ethnic variety tended to prevail, imbued with legalistic and ideological justifications (see Lieven, 2004). The importance of slavery for the functioning of the US capitalist system has been recognized by both Marxists and non-Marxist scholars alike.15 Despite, or because of, an all-pervasive assimilationist culture, sharp cleavages in the labour market persist and have been abolished by neither the Civil War nor the Civil Rights movement. As a case study, the USA stands out as the litmus test, where democracy has repeatedly become an empty concept for larger and larger sections of its population.16 Mann's core thesis about the democracy-genocide linkage becomes self-evident when applied to the case of Rwanda (Mann, 2005, chs 14 and 15). Possibly, this is the only case that fully substantiates the book's core argument: Hutu genocidal leaders always spoke in the name of majoritarian democracy against ‘invaders’ from the Tutsi minority (Mann, 2005, p. 443). In truth, Mann's vision of democracy could be better rendered by the more suitable concept of ethnocracy, a political framework in which only the dominant ethnic group has the faculty of governing itself through democratically elected institutions and laws (Yiftachel and Ghanem, 2004).17 Yet, this has been precisely the prevalent pattern, first emerging in the West and then exported elsewhere. The term ‘ethnocracy’, originally coined to describe the Israeli political system, could in fact be extended to most modern nation states, notably in Eastern Europe.

AT: Human Rights Module

AT: HR Module

Human rights doesn’t need democracy just freedom New Nation 11(Democracy, human rights and media, The New Nation (Bangladesh), January 10, 2011 Monday)Dhaka, Jan. 10 -- In ancient Greece democracy meant direct rule of the people. The city states, where, democracy flourished, did not have more than ten thousand population. Democracy was not held in high esteem by the Greek scholar-philosophers. It was disliked by Socrates, considered as the rule of ignorant people by Plato and judged as dispensable by Aristotle. In the modern world about 29 democratic states emerged by 1926.¶ We have learnt the hard way in the past 37 years that democracy as a system of governance is difficult to practice. To prevent misuse of democracy and the dictatorship of the majority, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948 by the UN General Assembly. Human rights become integral with birth of humans. Human existence and human rights are inseparable unless laws or the constitution of a country provide to the contrary. Because of close linkage of freedom of speech and expression with freedom of press, the latter has been specifically mentioned in constitutions of many countries. While freedom of

speech is important, freedom of press has been demanded on legal ground and in the interest of corporate entity.¶ In democracy, sovereign power rests with the people. The people exercise that power either directly or through their representatives. On the other hand, totalitarianism is a politico- economic system under which the production process, commodity and services are owned and controlled by the collective entity which is regarded as the society and the state. Freedom of action and choice as promoted under individualistic system are contrary to control by the collective organisation or the state.¶ Democracy can be very much like collectivism if actual political power is vested with a particular group and freedom of individuals is controlled by a public body or the elite. Democracy can act as a shield to persecution and repression just as it can protect human freedom. There are many countries where elections are held at regular intervals but people are systematically subjected to repression. Democracy alone cannot guarantee freedom. James Madison (1809-1817), the fourth president of America said:¶ "Democracy is always an example of unrest and violence and it always violates individual security and right of ownership of properties. It is short-lived and ends violently."¶ Politicians and the public media are never tired of saying that the oppressed people want democracy and that only

democracy can make the world free and peaceful. It was to save democracy that America joined the Second World War.¶ We are more or less familiar with the deception used in recent times in the name of democracy. Nevertheless, people in the world frame constitutions, make declaration of human rights and champion freedom of press. Whatever virtues democracy may have, it is not the same as freedom. Democracy can be repressive like autocracy. Elected representatives are expected to be respectful of

individual freedom. But it is not always true when it is said that democratic states are relatively peace-loving and conflict-averse.¶ Three imperial countries in the 19th and 20th century, Britain, France and America, were democratic states. In the 20th century though America was not threatened it became involved in more than 200 armed clashes. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people lost lives in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Granada, Columbia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia and Bosnia.¶ Is democracy indispensable for freedom? For many centuries, in most parts of the world, law and order

were maintained without Parliament and people's representatives. According to many , for a free and peaceful world

what is more necessary than democracy is freedom of individuals and emancipation of

people.

AT: Trade Module

1NC AT: Trade

Democracy is not key to a market economySowell 3-25(Thomas Sowell, 3-25-15, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute, “Western advocates of 'nation-building' should master recently deceased statesman's legacy of lessons”, http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell032515.php3, Accessed 6-25-15, AA)It is not often that the leader of a small city-state — in this case, Singapore — gets an international reputation. But no one deserved it more than Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of Singapore as an independent country in 1959, and its prime minister from 1959 to 1990. With his death, he leaves behind a legacy valuable not only to Singapore but to the world. Born in Singapore in 1923, when it was a British colony, Lee Kuan Yew studied at Cambridge University after World War II, and was

much impressed by the orderly, law-abiding England of that day. It was a great contrast with the poverty-stricken and crime-ridden Singapore of that era. Today Singapore has a per capita Gross Domestic Product more than 50 percent higher than that of the United Kingdom and a crime rate a small fraction of that in England . A 2010 study showed more patents and patent applications from the small

city-state of Singapore than from Russia. Few places in the world can match Singapore for cleanliness and orderliness. This remarkable transformation of Singapore took place under the authoritarian rule of Lee Kuan Yew for two decades as prime minister. And it happened despite some very serious handicaps that led to chaos and self-

destruction in other countries. Singapore had little in the way of natural resources. It even had to import drinking water from neighboring Malaysia. Its population consisted of people of different races, languages and religions — the Chinese majority and the sizable Malay and Indian minorities. At a time when other Third World countries were setting up government-controlled economies and blaming their poverty on "exploitation" by more advanced industrial nations, Lee Kuan Yew promoted a market economy, welcomed foreign investments, and made Singapore's children learn English, to maximize the benefits from Singapore's position as a major port for international commerce. Singapore's schools also taught the separate native languages of its Chinese, Malay and Indian Tamil peoples. But everyone had to learn English, because it was the

language of international commerce, on which the country's economic prosperity depended. In short, Lee Kuan Yew was pragmatic, rather than ideological. Many observers saw a contradiction between Singapore's free markets and its lack of democracy. But its long-serving prime minister did not deem its people ready for democracy. Instead, he offered a decent government with much less corruption than in other countries in that region of the world . His example was especially striking in view of many in the West who seem to think that democracy is something that can be exported to countries whose history and traditions are wholly different from those of Western nations that evolved democratic institutions over the centuries. Even such a champion of freedom as John Stuart

Mill said in the 19th century: "The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say, does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization." In other words, democracy has prerequisites, and peoples and places without those prerequisites will not necessarily do well when democratic institutions are created. The most painful recent example of that is Iraq, where a democratically elected government, set up by expenditure of the blood and treasure of the United States, became one of the obstacles to a united people with the military strength to protect itself from international terrorists. In many parts of the Third World, post-colonial governments set up democratically made sure that there would be no more democracy that could replace its original leaders. This led to the cynical phrase, "one man, one vote — one time."

Democracy can be wonderful as a principle where it is viable, but disastrous as a fetish where it is not. Lee Kuan Yew understood the pitfalls and

steered around them. If our Western advocates of "nation-building" in other countries would learn that lesson, it could be the most valuable legacy of Lee Kuan Yew.

No long-term solvency – trade undermines democracyHickel 13(Dr. Jason Hickel, Lecturer at London School of Economics, 12-19-13, “'Free Trade' and the death of democracy”, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/trade-death-democracy-2013121812233660574.html, Accessed 6-28-15, AA)In this paradigm, democracy itself begins to appear as anti-democratic, inasmuch as it grants voters control over the economic policies that affect their lives. As this absurd logic moves steadily toward its ultimate conclusion, democracy becomes an obstacle that needs to be circumvented in the interests of "free" trade and investment. This may sound extreme, but it is exactly what is happening today. We can see it very clearly in two new "free trade" deals that are about to come into effect: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which will govern

trade between the US and the European Union, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will govern trade between the US and a number of Pacific nations. We hear very little about these deals because they are shrouded in secrecy, and because six of the corporations leading the negotiations happen to control 90 percent of our media. Yet we need to pay attention, because these deals are set to form the blueprint for a new global order. The TTIP and the TPP go far beyond earlier trade deals like NAFTA, which seem almost quaint by comparison. In addition to battering down import tariffs and privatising public services, they grant corporations the power to strike down the laws of sovereign nations. You read that right. If

these deals come into effect, multinational corporations will be empowered to regulate democratic states, rather than the other way around. This is the most far-reaching assault on the ideas of sovereignty and democracy that has ever been attempted in history. And it is being conducted under the banner of "freedom".

AT: War Module

1NC AT: War

Democracy doesn’t solve war – non-democracies and democracies go to war all the timeAbanes 08 (Menandro S Abanes Menandro S. Abanes is a researcher from the Philippines. He earned his PhD in Social Science from Radboud University Nijmegen. He teaches at Ateneo de Naga University in Bicol, Philippines., “Democracy and peace: an over-emphasized relationship” 8/29/08 http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=540)///CWPerhaps the most fundamental question that begs to be asked of the democratic-peace concept is: does democracy stop war from happening? Obviously it does not. Democratic states have initiated and engaged in plenty of wars. Just count the number of modern wars that the US and United Kingdom (UK), two known champions of

democracy, have been involved in. I remember two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many others. Thus, democracy does not stop wars, and it does not offer us a way out of the Hobbesian state of nature.¶ Democracy and war¶ If democracy does not stop war, then does it go to war? I would say, yes! Even though democracies do not fight each other, “they fight and initiate wars about as often as non-democracies” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, p.49).¶

Trade, not democracy, solves war – democratization causes conflictPazienza 14 (Toni Ann Pazienza was writing a thesis for a MA in IR and Government from the University of South Florida. “Challenging Democratic Peace Theory – the Role of US-China Relationship” May http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6294&context=etd)///CWDemocratic peace theory claims that democratic states are less likely to go to war with¶ other democracies, however, they are likely to go to war with nondemocracies. In all of the¶ literature and data bases there is little if no discussion of the U.S.-China relationship. The United¶ States is a democracy, and China is an autocratic state and they have never been to war with each¶ other. DPT, as we saw, is limited because it cannot explain this relationship and downplays the¶ influence of trade interdependence. I argued that in the absence of mutual democratic¶ constraints, the peaceful relationship between China and the United States is primarily the result¶ of economic interdependence.¶ The near absolute isolation of China before the 1970s is clearly over and China seeks its¶ place in the world as an equal with the United States. Participation has led Beijing to develop¶ more expertise on issues such as arms control and moderating some of its practices for fear of¶ jeopardizing its image. Clearly, China has reformed its economy from a command economy to a¶ state development/laissez faire model. By adapting to capitalist practices, embracing¶ international organizations and standards, China appears to have made a commitment to reform.¶ The Office of the United States Trade Representative reported that in 2011, that United¶ States goods and services traded with China totaled $539 billion, exports totaled $129 billion;¶ and imports totaled $411 billions. Post World War II, the United States emerged as the¶ preeminent trading partner, however, the United States Department of Commerce reported in ¶ 2011, that China sat at the number three position in all United States trade for total exports and¶ imports.¶ Strategic decisions made by both countries are greatly affected by their economic¶ connection, particularly

the United States. The close interconnectivity amongst the two nations¶ means that they must take into account the other nation when making key strategy decisions. The¶ connection also means that one nation could not launch a cyber-attack on the other, without¶ damaging its own economy.¶ The uncertain benefits of a democratic peace, and the strong possibility that a transition¶ to democracy might cause instability also suggests that democratization may not eliminate¶ security concerns about China. History demonstrates that the

democratization process can easily¶ turn violent and is often reversed.

2NC AT: War

Data for peace theory is mainly based on allying countries and ignores interdependence and deterrenceGleditsch 8(Nils Petter Gleditsch, International Peace Research Institute, 2008, Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), Chapter: Peace and Democracy, Pages: 1430-1437, AA)

The Limits of Democratic Peace The democratic peace thesis is one of the most promising findings to come out of the quantitative study of war and peace. Indeed, the

observation that democracies do not light one another is so simple and obvious that it is a little surprising that it was not made earlier. Of course, the idea that a single factor (a common dedication to democracy) could virtually eliminate the possibility of war between two countries may seem too good to be true. The first systematic study was made by a criminologist. Dean Babst, and as an outsider he may have found it easier to spot the most obvious correlate of war, while the insiders were pursuing various more sophisticated and theoretically grounded but eventually less productive leads. There may also be political reasons for the initial reluctance of scholars in peace research and international relations to take the democratic peace thesis seriously. Virtually all systematic research on the causes of war was taking place in countries affected by the Cold War. Research attributing major importance to political democracy seemed propagandistic to many peace researchers and others who subscribed to a 'third way' between East and West and disliked anything that smacked of propaganda for 'the free world' (which included many non-free countries). The debate on imperialism in the 1970s focused on the belligerent nature of some of the leading democracies (notably France and the LS) rather than on their peacefulness toward other democracies. On the other hand, the idea of a democratic peace seemed too 'soft' for many realists, who felt more

comfortable with the traditional ideas of bipolarity and deterrence. Of course, since the democratic peace offers no particular formula for peace between different regime types (short of converting the non-democracies to democracy) realist ideas were more relevant to the main dividing lines in the Cold War world. The emergence of zones of peace based on shared democracy among traditional enemies, for instance, in Western Europe, could be attributed to their common fear of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War ended not only the bipolar deterrence pattern, but also the hegemony of realist thought. The emergence of the idea of a democratic peace is part of a broader revival of liberal theories of international relations. Bruce Russett and John Oneal in particular have revived interest in the old idea that war does not pay for economically highly interdependent countries and have found new evidence for it . Most wars have taken place between highly interdependent states, but that is now more commonly interpreted as an artifact of the relation- ship between contiguity and war, although relating economic interdependence to peace remains more controversial than the democratic peace. There is new optimism about the respect for international law and increased recognition of international organizations. However, the idea of the democratic peace remains politically controversial and is

attacked both from 'the right' and 'the left'. As noted, the realist counterattack is based mainly on the idea that the democratic peace is at best a temporary phenomenon arising during the Cold War and a spurious effect of the stable bipolar pattern of that period. Radical and liberal critics of the democratic peace thesis, on the other hand, have focused on the use of covert action and overt military intervention against regimes that resisted the hegemonic world order. For instance, during the Cold War, the United States repeatedly tried to undermine

radical regimes in Latin America. These types of confrontations do not reach the level of violence required to qualify as wars, but they do not exemplify a nonviolent system of conflict resolution either. The extensive colonialism practiced by democratic countries is also difficult to reconcile with the idea of the peacefulness of democracies. The response of the proponents of the democratic peace hypothesis has usually been that at least the more drastic forms of covert action and military intervention are morally impossible to justify for democracies when the opponent is fully democratic. Military interventions and covert action against regimes like Castro's Cuba or the Sandinistas in Nicaragua are brought within the realm of the politically feasible and morally quasidefensible precisely by the lack of democratic practice in these regimes. Most proponents of the democratic peace have strong reservations against increased interventionism in the service of democracy. State-sponsored massacres in Rwanda, Bosnia, and elsewhere helped to promote the idea of 'humanitarian

intervention' as a means to prevent the worst excesses of autocrats. The Clinton administration's 'strategy of enlargement' aimed at expanding the world community of democracies. Following the events of II September 2001, President George W. Bush and his administration initiated major military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although these invasions had several aims, both attempted to establish democratic regimes in the target countries. Many have questioned the wisdom and morality of such democratization by force. By the time of writing (end of 2006) the prospects for achieving stable democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq do not seem very bright. A peace-building strategy based on

military intervention effectively has to be put into force by the major powers, who may be unable or unwilling to distinguish between global interests and their own. It is also questionable whether democracy is likely to take hold if countries are forced to democratize. Germany and Japan after World War II are the prime examples that such a strategy may be successful, but at great cost. Attempts to export democracy to Third World countries — whether by peaceful or not so peaceful means - have not been equally successful. During the Cold War many interventions by democratic countries led to the establishment or consolidation of authoritarian rather than democratic regimes, as

in Iran in 195} and in Guatemala in 1954. However, it is becoming increasingly rare for a major power to intervene without reference to the authority of an international organization. The major means for promoting the expansion of democracy will remain economic and political rather than military. These means of influence are slower and less dramatic, but they may also have a lower probability of backfiring. At the end of the day, democratization is probably mostly a matter of internal forces, and the outside world may have limited influence over this process. Only then can a worldwide democratic peace be built on a solid foundation.

Democracy doesn’t solve war - democracy is an effect, not cause of peaceGibler 7, (Douglas M., “Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict”. Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alabama. Post-Doctoral Fellow, Stanford University)By endogenizing the emergence of jointly democratic dyads to a series of factors that affect democracy and conflict behavior, my results suggest that what scholars know as the democratic peace is, in fact, a stable border peace. This is the first step toward looking at international conflict a little bit differently. Of course, even though the relationship between joint democracy and peace remains the core of the democratic peace literature, there still remain a host of empirical regularities generally considered supportive of democratic peace theory (see for example a partial list in Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 218–219). So, while space does not permit a full discussion of all these secondary relationships, I use this brief conclusion to reinterpret, in the context of a stable border peace, several of the more important, second-order democratic peace findings. A stable border peace implies that democratic states are more peaceful, but this is not due to any quality inherent in democratic government; rather, the development path necessary for democratization selects democracies into a group of states that have settled borders, few territorial issues, and thus, little reason for war against neighbors. With only minor, nonterritorial issues remaining for these states, mediation and arbitration become both easier and more likely for democracies, while the need for defensive alliances, military buildups, and aggressive crisis bargaining also decreases. Because borders are international institutions, they affect the development paths of both states in the dyad, and stabilized borders that decrease the need for militarization and centralization in one state also tend to demilitarize and decentralize the neighboring state. ‘‘Zones of peace’’ can thus be understood as the contagion effect of stabilized borders, as democracies cluster in time and space following the removal of territorial issues. This clustering of peaceful states should also affect the economic development of the states involved. With less money needed for guns, spending for butter increases, and trade across settled borders is always preferred to the risk of crossing militarized frontiers. A stable border peace does not necessarily imply that democracies will always be peaceful; the implication is only that democracies will have fewer conflicts relative to other types of governments. Should war occur, though, the war will likely be fought over far-flung territories since local borders have already been settled. This selection effect explains why the disagreements that democracies escalate are a matter of choice. The threat of conflict never directly affects the territorial homeland, so democratic leaders have the relative luxury of choosing their fights, or intervening when winning is easy. This renders democratic victories the product of peaceful local environments, not the result of domestic institutions that constrain leader choice or otherwise advantage democratic systems.

AT: Liberal Values Check

Liberal values don’t check – don’t prevent wars and don’t even apply internationally – empiricsRosato 03 (Sebastian Rosato has a PhD from the University of Chicago in Political Science and a Masters in IR from Oxford. He is a professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory” November 03, The American Political Science Review)Norm Externalization¶ The historical record indicates that democracies have¶ often failed to adopt their internal norms of conflict¶ resolution in an international context. This claim rests,¶ first, on determining what democratic norms say about¶ the international use of force and, second, on establishing¶ whether democracies have generally adhered¶ to these prescriptions.¶ Liberal democratic norms narrowly circumscribe the¶ range of situations in which democracies can justify the¶ use of force. As Doyle (1997,25) notes, "Liberal wars¶ are only fought for popular, liberal purposes." This does¶ not mean that they will go to war less often than other¶ kinds of states: it only means that there are fewer reasons¶ available to them for waging war.¶ Democracies are

certainly justified in fighting wars of¶ self-defense. Locke ([I6901 1988), for example, argues¶ that states, like men in the state of nature, have a right¶ to destroy those who violate their rights to life, liberty,¶ and property (269-72). There is considerable disagreement¶ among liberal theorists regarding precisely what¶ kinds of action constitute self-defense, but repulsing an¶ invasion, preempting an impending military attack, and¶ fighting in the face of unreasonable demands all plausibly¶ fall under this heading. Waging war when the other¶ party has not engaged in threatening behavior does¶ not. In short, democracies should only go to war when¶ "their safety and security are seriously endangered by¶ the expansionist policies of outlaw states" (Rawls 1999,¶ 90-91).¶ Another justification for the use of force is intervention¶

in the affairs of other states or peoples, either¶ to prevent blatant human rights violations or to bring¶ about conditions in which liberal values can take root.¶ For Rawls (1999,81), as for many liberals. human rights¶ violators are "to be condemned and in grave cases may¶ be subjected to forceful sanctions and even to intervention"¶ (see also Doyle 1997,31-32, and Owen 1997,¶ 34-35). Mill ([I8591 (1984)) extends the scope of intervention,¶ arguing that "barbarous" nations can be conquered¶ to civilize them for their own benefit (see also¶ Mehta 1990). However, if external rule does not ensure¶ freedom and equality, it will be as illiberal as the system¶ it seeks to replace. Consequently, intervention can only¶ be justified if it is likely to "promote the development¶ of conditions in which appropriate principles of justice¶ can be satisfied7' (Beitz 1979,90).¶ The imperialism of Europe's great powers between¶ 1815 and 1975 provides good evidence that liberal¶ democracies have often waged war for reasons other¶ November 2003¶ than self-defense and the inculcation of liberal values.¶ Although there were only a handful of liberal democracies¶ in the international system during this period, they¶

were involved in 66 of the 108 wars listed in the Correlates¶ of War (COW) dataset of extrasystemic wars¶ (Singer and Small 1994). Of these 66 wars, 33 were "imperial,"¶ fought against previously independent peoples,¶ and 33 were "colonial," waged against existing colonies.¶ It is hard to justify the "imperial" wars in terms of¶ self-defense. Several cases are clear-cut: The democracy¶ faced no immediate threat and conquered simply¶ for profit or to expand its sphere of influence. A¶ second set of cases includes wars waged as a result of¶ imperial competition: Liberal democracies conquered¶ non-European peoples in order to create buffer states¶ against other empires or to establish control over them¶ before another imperial power could move in. Thus¶ Britain tried to conquer Afghanistan (1838) in order¶ to create a buffer state against Russia, and France invaded¶ Tunisia (1881) for fear of an eventual Italian¶ occupation. Some commentators describe these wars¶ as defensive because they aimed to secure sources of¶ overseas wealth, thereby enhancing national power at¶ the expense of other European powers. There are three¶ reasons to dispute this assessment. First, these wars¶ were often preventive rather than defensive: Russia¶ had made no move to occupy Afghanistan and Italy¶ had taken no action in Tunisia. A war designed to avert¶ possible action in the future, but for which there is no¶ current evidence, is not defensive. Second, there was¶ frequently a liberal alternative to war. Rather than¶ impose authoritarian rule, liberal great powers could¶ have offered non-European peoples military assistance¶ in case of attack or simply deterred other imperial¶ powers. Finally, a substantial number of the preventive¶ occupations were a product of competition between¶ Britain and France, two liberal democracies that should¶ have trusted one another and negotiated in good faith¶ without compromising the rights of non-Europeans if¶ democratic peace theory is correct.¶

AT: Trust and Respect

Realism trumps trust and respect – empirics and studies proveRosato 03 (Sebastian Rosato has a PhD from the University of Chicago in Political Science and a Masters in IR from Oxford. He is a professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory” November 03, The American Political Science Review)Three features of these cases deserve emphasis. First,¶ all the regimes that the United States sought to undermine¶ were democratic. In the cases of Guatemala,¶ British Guyana, Brazil, and Chile democratic processes¶ were fairly well established. Iran, Indonesia, and¶ Nicaragua were fledgling democracies but Mossadeq,¶ Sukarno, and the Sandinistas could legitimately claim¶ to be the first proponents of democracy in their respective¶ countries. Every government with the

exception¶ of the Sandinistas was replaced by a succession of¶ American-backed dictatorial regimes.¶ Second,

in each case the clash of interests between¶ washington and the target governments was not particularly¶ severe. These should, then, be easy cases for¶ democratic peace theory since trust and respect are¶

most likely to be determinative when the dispute is¶ minor. None of the target governments were communist,¶ and although some of them pursued leftist policies¶ there was no indication that they intended to impose¶ a communist model or that they were actively courting¶ the Soviet Union. In spite of the limited scope of¶ disagreement, respect for democratic forms of government¶ was consistently subordinated to an expanded¶ conception of national security.¶ Third, there is good evidence that support for democracy¶ was often sacrificed in the name of American¶ economic interests. At least some of the impetus for¶ intervention in Iran came in response to the nationalization¶ of the oil industry, the United Fruit Company¶ pressed for action in Guatemala, International Telephone¶ and Telegraph urged successive administrations¶ to intervene in Brazil and Chile, and Allende's efforts¶ to nationalize the copper industry fueled demands that¶ the Nixon administration destabilize his government.¶ In sum, the record of American interventions in the¶ developing world suggests that democratic trust and¶ respect has often been subordinated to security and¶ economic interests.¶ Democratic peace theorists generally agree that¶ these interventions are examples of a democracy using¶ force

against other democracies, but they offer two reasons¶ why covert interventions should not count against¶

the normative logic. The first reason is that the target¶ states were not democratic enough to be trusted and¶

respected (Forsythe 1992; Russett 1993, 120-24). This¶ claim is not entirely convincing. Although the target¶ states may not

have been fully democratic, they were¶ more democratic than the regimes that preceded and¶ succeeded them and were democratizing further. Indeed,¶ in every case American action brought more autocratic¶ regimes to

power.¶ The second reason is that these interventions were¶ covert, a fact believed by democratic peace theorists¶ to reveal the strength of their normative argument. It¶ was precisely because these states were democratic that¶ successive administrations had to act covertly rather¶ than openly initiate military operations. Knowing that¶ their actions were illegitimate, and fearing a public¶ backlash, American officials decided on covert action¶ (Forsythe 1992; Russett 1993, 120-24). This defense¶ fails to address some important issues. To begin with, it¶ ignores the fact that American public officials, that is,¶ Vol. 97,

No. 4¶ the individuals that democratic peace theory claims are¶ most likely to abide by liberal norms, showed no respect¶ for fellow democracies. Democratic peace theorists will¶ respond that the logic holds, however, because these¶ officials were restrained from using open and massive¶ force by the liberal attitudes of the mass public. This¶ is a debatable assertion; after all, officials may have¶ opted for covert and limited force for a variety of reasons¶ other than public opinion, such as operational¶ costs and the expected international reaction. Simply¶ because the use of force was covert and limited, this¶ does not mean that its nature was determined by public¶ opinion.¶ But even if it is true that officials adopted a covert¶ policy to shield themselves from a potential public¶ backlash, the logic still has a crucial weakness: The¶ fact remains that the United States did not treat fellow¶ democracies with trust or respect. Ultimately, the logic¶ stands or falls by its predictive power, that is, whether¶ democracies treat each other with respect. If they do,¶ it is powerful; if they do not, it is weakened. It does not¶ matter why they do not treat each other with respect,¶ nor does it matter if some or all of the population wants¶ to treat the other state with respect; all that matters¶ is whether respect is extended. To put it another way,¶ we can come up with several reasons to explain why¶ respect is not extended, and we can always find social¶ groups that oppose the use of military force against¶ another democracy, but whenever we find several examples¶ of a democracy using military force against¶ other democracies, the trust and respect mechanism,¶ and therefore the normative logic, fails an important¶ test.6¶ Great Powers. Layne (1994) and Rock (1997) have¶ found further evidence that democracies do not treat¶ each other with trust and respect in their analyses of¶ diplomatic crises involving Britain, France, Germany,¶ and the United States. Layne examines four prominent¶ cases in which rival democracies almost went to war¶ with one another and asks whether the crises were resolved¶ because of mutual trust and respect. His conclusion¶ offers scant support for the normative logic:¶ "In each of these crises, at least one of the democratic¶ states involved was prepared to go to

war. .. . In each¶ of the four crises, war was avoided not because of the¶ 'live and let live' spirit of peaceful dispute

resolution at¶ democratic peace theory's core, but because of realist¶ factors" (Layne 1994, 38).7¶ Similarly, Rock finds little evidence that shared liberal¶ values helped resolve any of the crises between¶ Britain and the United States in the nineteenth century.¶ In addition, his analyses of the turn-of-the-century¶ "great rapprochement" and naval arms control during¶ the 1920s show that even in cases where liberal states resolved¶ potentially divisive issues in a spirit of accommodation,¶ shared liberal values had only a limited effect.¶ In both cases peace was overdetermined and "liberal¶ values and democratic institutions were not the only¶ factors inclining Britain and the United States toward¶ peace, and perhaps not even the dominant ones" (Rock¶ 1997, 146).'¶ In sum. the trust and respect mechanism does not¶ appear to work as specified. Shared democratic values¶ provide no guarantee that states will both trust and¶ respect one another. Instead, and contrary to the normative¶ logic's claims, when serious conflicts of interest¶ arise between democracies there is little evidence that¶ they will be inclined to accommodate each other's demands¶ or refrain from engaging in hard line policies.

AT: Institutional Constraints

Institutional logic relies on logical fallacies and nationalism takes out all their argsRosato 03 (Sebastian Rosato has a PhD from the University of Chicago in Political Science and a Masters in IR from Oxford. He is a professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory” November 03, The American Political Science Review)Accountability¶ Each variant of the institutional logic rests on the claim¶ that democratic institutions make leaders accountable¶ to various groups that may, for one reason or another,¶

oppose the use of force. I do not dispute this claim but,¶ instead, question whether democratic leaders are more¶ accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Since¶ we know that democracies do not fight one another¶ and autocracies do fight one another, democrats must¶ be more accountable than autocrats if accountability¶ is a key mechanism in explaining the separate peace¶ between democracies. On the other hand, if autocrats¶ and democrats are equally accountable or autocrats are¶ more accountable than democrats, then there are good¶ reasons to believe that accountability does not exert the¶ effect that democratic peace theorists have suggested.''¶ Following Goemans (2000a) I assume that a leader's¶

accountability is determined by the consequences as¶ well as the probability of losing office for

adopting an¶ unpopular policy. This being the case, there is no a priori¶ reason to believe that a leader who is likely to lose office¶ for fighting a losing or costly war, but unlikely to be¶ exiled, imprisoned, or killed in the process, should feel¶ more accountable for his policy choices than a leader¶ who is unlikely to lose office but can expect to be punished¶ severely in the unlikely event that he is in fact¶ removed.¶ Therefore, determining whether autocrats or democrats¶ are more accountable and, consequently, more¶ cautious about going to war rests on answering three¶ questions: Are losing democrats or losing autocrats¶ more likely to be removed from power? Are losing¶ democrats or losing autocrats more likely to be punished¶ severely? and Are democrats or autocrats more¶ likely to be removed and/or punished for involvement¶ in costly wars, regardless of the outcome?¶ To answer these questions I have used a modified¶ version of Goemans's (2000b) dataset. Our analyses¶ differ in one fundamental resuect: While he counts the¶ removal of leaders by foreign powers as examples of¶ punishment, I do not. This decision is theoretically informed.¶ The purpose of the analysis is to determine¶ whether leaders' decisions for war are affected by their¶ domestic accountability, that is, if there is something¶ about the domestic structure of states that affects their¶ chances of being punished. Punishment by foreign powers¶ offers no evidence for or against the claim that¶ democrats or dictators have a higher or lower expectation¶ of being punished by their citizens for unpopular¶ policies, and these cases are therefore excluded. I have¶ also made two minor changes to the data that do not¶ affect the results: I have added 19 wars that appear¶ in the COW dataset but not in Goemans's dataset and¶ coded 11regimes that Goemans excludes.12 The results¶ appear in Table 4.¶ Although democratic losers are two times more¶ likely to be removed from power than autocratic losers,¶ this evidence is not strong. This is

because there are only¶ four cases of democratic losers in the entire dataset,¶ making it impossible to draw any firm conclusions¶ about the likelihood that losing democrats will be removed.¶ Prime Minister Menzies of Australia, for example,¶ resigned early in the Vietnam War, but his resignation¶ may have had more to do with the fact that he¶ was in his seventies than the expectation of defeat in¶ South East Asia a decade later. If this case is recoded,¶ as it probably should be, democratic losers have only¶ been removed from power 50% of the time and the¶ distinction between democrats and autocrats is small.¶ Losing autocrats are more likely to suffer severe punishment¶ than their democratic counterparts. None of¶ the four losing democrats was punished, whereas 29%¶ of autocratic losers were imprisoned, exiled, or killed.¶ Thus, while democratic and autocratic losers have similar¶ chances of being removed from office, autocrats¶ seem to be more likely to suffer severe punishment in¶ addition to removal.¶ The evidence from costly wars, regardless of whether¶ the leader was on the winning or losing side, confirms¶ these findings. Costly wars are defined as wars in which¶ a state suffered one battle fatality per 2,000 population.¶ as the United States did in World War I.13Historically,¶ autocrats have been more likely both to lose office and¶ to be punished severely if they become involved in a¶ costly war. Autocrats have been removed 35% of the¶ time and punished 27% of the time. while democrats¶ have only been removed 27% of the time and punished¶ 7% of the time.14¶ In short, there is little evidence that democratic leaders¶ face greater expected costs from fighting losing or¶ costly wars and are therefore more accountable than¶ their autocratic counterparts. This being the case, there¶ is good reason to doubt each variant of the institutional¶ logic.¶ Public Constraint¶ Pacific public opinion does not appear to place a fundamental¶ constraint on the willingness of democracies¶ to go to war. If it did, then democracies would be more¶

peaceful in their relations with all types of states, not¶ just other democracies. However, instead of being more¶ peaceful, on average democracies are just as likely to¶ go to war as nondemocracies (Farber and Gowa 1995).¶ There are three reasons why publics are unlikely to¶ constrain democratic war proneness. First, the costs of¶ war typically fall on a small subset of the population¶ that will likely be unwilling to protest government policy.¶ Excluding the two World Wars, democratic

fatalities¶ in war have exceeded 0.1% of the population in¶ only 6% of cases. In 60% of cases, losses represented¶ less than 0.01% of the population or one in 10,000¶ people. Most democratic citizens, then, will never be¶ personally affected by war or know anyone affected¶ by military conflict. Adding the many militarized disputes¶ involving democracies strengthens this finding.¶ Both the United States and Britain have suffered fewer¶ than 100 battle casualties in approximately 97% of the¶ militarized disputes in which they have been involved¶ (Singer and Small 1994). Moreover, modern democracies¶ have tended to have professional standing armies.¶ Members of the military, then, join the armed forces¶ voluntarily, accepting that they may die in the service¶ of their countries. This in turn means that their families¶ and friends, that is, those who are most likely to suffer¶ the costs of war, are unlikely to speak out against a¶ government that chooses to go to war or are at least¶ less likely to do so than are the families and friends of¶ conscripts. In short, the general public has little at stake¶ in most wars and those most likely to suffer the costs¶ of war have few incentives to organize dissent.¶ Second, any public aversion to incurring the costs of¶ war may be overwhelmed by the effects of nationalism.¶ In addition to the growth of democracy, one of the most¶ striking features of the modern period is that people¶ have come to identify themselves, above all, with the¶ nation state. This identification has been so powerful¶ that ordinary citizens have repeatedly demonstrated a¶ willingness to fight and die for the continued existence¶ of their state and the security of their co-nationals.¶ There are, then, good reasons to believe that if the¶ national interest is thought to be at stake, as it is in¶ most interstate conflicts, calculations of costs will not¶ figure prominently in the public's decision process.¶ Third, democratic leaders are as likely to lead as to¶ follow public opinion. Since nationalism imbues people¶ with a powerful spirit of self-sacrifice, it is

actively¶ cultivated by political elites in the knowledge that only¶ highly motivated armies and productive societies will¶ prevail in modern warfare (e.g., Posen 1993). Democratically¶ elected leaders are likely to be well placed¶ to cultivate nationalism, especially because their governments¶ are often perceived as more representative¶ and legitimate than authoritarian regimes. Any call to¶ defend or spread "our way of life," for example, is likely¶ to have a strong resonance in democratic polities, and¶ indeed the historical record suggests that wars have often¶ given democratic leaders considerable freedom of¶ action, allowing them to drum up nationalistic fervor,¶ shape public opinion, and suppress dissent despite the¶ obligation to allow free and open discussion.¶ Events in the United States during both World Wars¶ highlight the strength of nationalism and the ability¶ of democratic elites to fan its flames. Kennedy (1980,¶ 46) notes that during the First World War, President¶ Wilson lacked "the disciplinary force of quick coming¶ crisis or imminent peril of physical harm" but turned¶ successfully to "the deliberate mobilization of emotions¶ and ideas." At the same time his administration turned¶ Vol. 97, No. 4¶ a blind eye to, or

actively encouraged, the deliberate¶ subversion of antiwar groups within the United States.¶ The Roosevelt administration was equally successful¶ at generating prowar sentiment during World War 11.¶ Early in the war the president spoke for the nation in¶ asserting that the German firebombing of population¶ centers had "shocked the conscience of humanity," and¶ yet, remarkably, there was no sustained protest in the¶ United States against the bombing of Japanese cities¶ that killed almost a million civilians a few years later.¶ This abrupt transformation, notes Dower (1986), was¶ made possible by a massive propaganda campaign, condoned¶ by the political elite, describing the Japanese as¶ subhuman and untrustworthy "others." In stark contrast,¶ America's allies were forgiven all their faults¶ "Russian Communists were transformed into agrarian¶ reformers, Stalin into Uncle Joe . . . " (Ambrose 1997,¶ 150).¶

Democracy Promotion Good

China Module

1AC

Democratization in China is possible, but de-securitized means are keyHe, the Chair in International Studies at Deakin University in Melbourne Australia, winter 2013(Baogang, Working with China to Promote Democracy, The Washington Quarterly, pg 49-50)The difficult challenge for both Beijing and Washington is how to ‘‘desecuritize’’ U.S. democracy promotion. While Washington needs to assure Beijing that it has no agenda to change the regime against its will, a wider set of elites in Beijing

need to develop the view that democracy in the end enhances China’s national security. The United States successfully desecuritized the civil rights movement in the 1950—/60s, and economic relations between rival countries were desecuritized in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union . These experiences offer tips for how to work out a plan with Beijing for the desecuritization of democracy promotion .

Washington also needs a new set of democracy-/promotion strategies with China. It is critical to work with reformers within the government, although the waste of money and governmental control are serious issues to consider.

Sometimes it is advantageous to use Chinese official language to advance the democratic cause, rather than Western language. For example, when ‘‘deliberative democracy’’ was translated as ‘‘xieshang minzhu’’ [consultative democracy], it helped to promote Western ideas and practices of deliberative democracy in China, and even the official report of the 18th Party Congress for the first time officially confirmed and endorsed deliberative and consultative democracy for China. A lesson from the Bush administration is that democracy-/promotion

projects need to focus on improving governance, not changing regimes . Henry Kissinger is right to argue that ‘‘a

systematic project to transform China’s institutions by diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions is likely to backfire and isolate the very liberals it is intended to assist.’’50 In the twenty-/first century, democratization is the most important challenge for China and the CCP, and the democracy-/promotion issue is the most sensitive issue for Sino—/U.S.

relations. This fundamental question is likely to affect all other issues. In the near future, Washington is not willing to abandon democracy promotion in order to improve the broader relationship, and the current ruling party in Beijing will continue to resist it. This stalemate will certainly continue. In answering my question about this stalemate on July 18, 2012, in Beijing, CASS political adviser Fang Ning argued that top national leaders

must handle the issue wisely, and that leaders of both China and the United States need greater wisdom. Leaders of both countries ought to look for strategies that find common or overlapping interests, narrow the political and cognitive gap, develop collaborative programs, and prevent certain issues from damaging the overall relationship.

A democratic China solves war – military structure, domestic politics, and freedom of speechPei 11 (Minxin Pei is Tom and Margot Pritzker ‘72 Professor of Government and the director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College., “Peace, Democracy, and Nightmares in China” 6/22/11 http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/22/peace-democracy-and-nightmares-in-china)One of the most important changes democratization would bring to China is a new civil-military relationship. This issue has not received adequate attention in discussions about how civilian control of the military influences a

country’s external behavior. In the case of China, it is a critical factor. As we all know, at the moment, the Chinese military is under the control of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is not a national army, which would be politically neutral and loyal to the Chinese state not to a particular political party. The mission statement of the People’s Liberation Army is revealing: its top priority is to defend the political monopoly of the CCP. Understandably, the CCP has made

it abundantly clear that it will not allow the military to become a national army. If China became democratic, the Chinese armed forces would be much less subject to political manipulation and more loyal to national interests. This fundamental change alone would reduce the likelihood of conflict between China and its neighbors.¶ A democratic China would also have real political checks and balances. Opposition parties and civil society in a liberal democracy play an important part in constraining the freedom of action

of the ruling party in national-security policy. At the moment, the CCP’s national-security policy is completely unchallenged. But that would change if China had well-organized opposition parties and strong nongovernmental organizations that could force the leadership to justify and seek public support for its agenda.¶ The military establishment itself would be placed under greater scrutiny in a competitive political system as well. Opposition parties and NGOs would raise questions about defense expenditures

and force the military to be more transparent regarding its doctrine and capabilities.¶ Democratic institutions would also make the national-security-policy-making process more open and accessible to different interest groups. As a result, advocates for peace and cooperation would have the ability to rally public opinion and influence

policy. Taken together, these institutional checks and balances would make the ruling party and the military more accountable.¶ No doubt, democratization in China would bring an enormous expansion of press freedoms and would fundamentally change the political dynamics of public discourse on national-

security issues. At the moment, the lack of freedom of the press makes it very difficult for the Chinese public to gain a well-informed view of issues critical to the country’s national security. Take the

Taiwan question, for example. The mainland’s official press coverage of Taiwan is so distorted that it is impossible for ordinary Chinese people to have a decent understanding of the history of the matter, its complexity and the risks of a military conflict. If China were a liberal democracy, press freedom would allow far more open and objective discussion of foreign-policy issues. Hawkish views would be countered by more moderate voices.

Nationalist sentiments would be constrained by more cosmopolitan perspectives. And dangers of an aggressive foreign policy would be readily apparent.

Conflict causes extinctionWittner 11 (Professor of History at SUNY Albany. “Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?,” www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea , increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet,

there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur . Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving

many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far

higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands . Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe — destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

AT: CCP Works

CCP is failing in china nowDiamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, January 24 2012(Larry, Why East Asia—Including China—Will Turn Democratic Within a Generation, The Atlantic)Beyond the ongoing frustrations with censorship, insider dealing, abuse of power, environmental degradation, and other outrages that can only be protested by antisystem activity of one sort or another, there are, as Fukuyama notes, the big looming social and economic challenges that China faces as the consequences of its one-child policy make themselves felt in a rapidly aging (and disproportionately male) population. Jack Goldstone reports that China's labor force stopped growing in 2010 and has begun shrinking half a percent a year, which "will, by itself, knock 2.2 percentage points off China's annual economic growth potential." Urbanization, a key driver of productivity increases, is also slowing dramatically, and the growth of education "has clearly reached a limit," as the number of college graduates has expanded faster than the ability of the economy--even as it faces labor shortages in blue-collar industries--to generate good white-collar jobs. The Chinese economy will have to pay for rapidly rising wages and cope with industrial labor shortages even as it comes under pressure to finance pension, welfare, and healthcare benefits for the massive slice of the populace that is now moving toward retirement. Moreover, as it manages all this, China will need to address growing frustration among college graduates who cannot find jobs to match their expectations. If the suspected bubbles in the real-estate and financial markets burst as these twin generational challenges are gathering force, political stability in the world's most populous country may well become no more than a memory. Increasingly, the CCP faces the classic contradiction that troubles all modernizing authoritarian regimes. T he

Party cannot rule without continuing to deliver rapid economic development and rising living

standards--to fail at this would invite not gradual loss of power but a sudden and probably

lethal crisis . To the extent that the CCP succeeds, however, it generates the very forces--an educated, demanding middle class and a stubbornly independent civil society--that will one day decisively mobilize to raise up a democracy and end CCP rule for good. The CCP, in other words, is damned if it does not, and damned if it does. The only basis for its political legitimacy and popular acceptance is its ability to generate steadily improving standards of living, but these will be its undoing.

Democracy Promotion Works

2AC Works

Democritization is possible everywhere, no cultural barriers, everyone likes itDiamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, winter 2013(Larry, Why Wait for Democracy?, The Wilson Quarterly)Further refuting the skeptics, democracy has taken root or at least been embraced by every major cultural group, not just the societies of the West with their Protestant traditions. Most Catholic countries are now democracies, and very stable ones at that. Democracy has thrived in a Hindu state, Buddhist states, and a Jewish state. And many predominantly Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Indonesia, have by now had significant and mainly positive experience with democracy. Finally, the claim that democracy was

unsuitable for these other cultures— that their peoples did not value democracy as those in

the West did—has been invalidated, both by experience and by a profusion of public opinion

survey data showing that the desire for democracy is very much a global phenomenon . Although there is wide variation across countries and regions, with low levels of trust in parties and politicians in the wealthier democracies of Asia, Latin America, and postcommunist Europe, people virtually everywhere say they prefer democracy to authoritarianism. What people want is not a retreat to dictatorship but a more accountable and deeper democracy. Despite the persistence of authoritarianism under Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and the authoritarian tendencies of left-wing populist presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, the bigger story in Latin America has been democratic resilience and deepening. Chile and Uruguay have become stable liberal democracies, Brazil has made dramatic democratic and economic progress, and even once chronically unstable Peru has seen three successive democratically elected presidents deliver brisk economic growth with declining poverty rates. In fact, Latin

America is the only region of the world where income inequality has decreased in the last

decade . The new popular embrace of democracy is particularly striking in sub-Saharan Africa, where five rounds of the Afrobarometer opinion surveys have uncovered a surprisingly robust public commitment to democracy. In 2008, an average of 70 percent of Africans surveyed across 19 countries expressed support for democracy as always the best form of government. But only 59 percent perceived that they had in their country a full or almost full democracy, and only 49 percent were satisfied with how democracy was working in their country. This finding simply does not fit with the image of a passive and deferential populace ready to exchange freedom for bread. In Africa, people have learned through bitter experience that without democracy they will have neither freedom nor bread. Throughout most of the non-Western world, majorities of the public have come to see that the right to choose and replace their leaders in competitive, free, and fair elections is fundamental to the achievement and defense of all other rights. This is strikingly the case now in the Arab world, where the Arab Barometer surveys show that upward of 80 percent of the citizens of most countries name democracy as the best form of government, even if they do not define democracy in fully liberal and secular terms. It is much too early to know the fate of the popular movements for freedom in the Arab world, and we should not minimize the continuing assault on movements for democracy and accountability in countries as diverse as Venezuela, Russia, and Iran. Over the last decade there has been a slowly rising tide of democratic breakdowns, and more reversals could follow due to

corruption and abuse of power by elected rulers. But the data show that popular attitudes and

values are not the principal problem, and there is little evidence to support the claim that

postponing democracy in favor of strongman rule will make things better. The people of

Burma have made that point repeatedly at the polls and on the streets, and finally their

rulers seem to be listening to them. The best way to democracy is through democracy.

Works in Africa

US democracy helps to lead Africa to its own form of democracyMorgan 13 (Mary Morgan Can democracy deliver for Africa? http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24228425 26 September 2013)How to 'Africanise' democracy¶ null¶ Those who disagree with or criticise our development and governance options do not provide any suitable or better alternatives¶ Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda¶ Speaking this year on the death of Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Rwanda's President Paul Kagame was clear about both countries' lukewarm relationship with a Western version of democracy.¶ "Invariably, the question has been raised about whether the emphasis on development and the role of the state in it is not done at the expense of democracy and people's rights.¶ "Those who disagree with or criticise our development and governance options do not provide any suitable or better alternatives. All they do is repeat abstract concepts like freedom and democracy as if doing that alone would improve the human condition. Yet for us, the evidence of results from our choices is the most significant thing."¶ President Kagame is not alone in questioning multi-party democracy in the African context. Indeed, US historian William Blum in a recent book describes democracy as a Western imposition on Africa - "America's deadliest export" and foreign policy tool.¶

Consequently, there has been some discussion as to how to "Africanise" democracy. Mr

Zimba suggests incorporating traditional power structures into formal government . ¶ "At the moment chiefs are seen as political footnotes, even though they are often more effective and revered than politicians. Politicians recognise the influence of traditional leaders on how communities vote during elections and try to manipulate this. A better system would be some kind of bicameral government, even giving traditional leaders legislative powers."¶ As with any healthy democracy, there is a range of opinions and robust debate, but the consensus seems to be that whilst democracy is not delivering as well as it could be for Africa, it remains the most viable form of government for the continent.¶ Mr Ngoma sums it up: "Democracy on paper is very beautiful, but the practice depends on what practitioners actually do - and often they're not doing very well."¶

Democracy Promotion Bad

China

1NC Relations

Democracy promotion kills US-China relationsLarison 12 (Daniel Larison Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and is a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas. “As You Would Expect, US Democracy Promotion Increases International Distrust” 4/3/12 http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/as-you-would-expect-democracy-promotion-increases-international-distrust/)///CWThe new Brookings report on U.S.-China “strategic distrust” is interesting reading (via Drezner). The Chinese co-

author, Wang Jisi, cites U.S.-led democracy promotion as one of the causes of Chinese distrust:¶ American involvement in the “color revolutions” in Central Asian states and some other former Soviet states, as well as the

American attitude toward the Arab Spring in 2011, have further solidified the notion that the United States would sabotage the rule of the CPC if it saw similar developments and opportunities in China .¶ This is not an entirely far-fetched or unreasonable suspicion on their part. Let’s remember that one of Mitt Romney’s foreign policy advisers has written a book about the U.S.-Chinese “struggle for mastery in Asia” in which he made the following statement:¶ Stripped of diplomatic niceties, the ultimate aim of the American strategy [toward China] is to hasten a revolution, albeit a peaceful one, that will sweep away China’s one-party authoritarian state and leave a liberal democracy in its place.¶ According to Friedberg, this is a description of U.S. strategy, not an argument

for what it ought to be. As one of the causes of U.S.-Chinese distrust, U.S.-led democracy promotion seems to be an unnecessary irritant in an important bilateral relationship. Furthermore, it doesn’t seem to serve any

identifiable American interest to create additional mistrust between the U.S. and other countries, but this has been the effect of democracy promotion efforts in many other countries besides China. Robert Merry commented on this earlier this week:¶ For anyone trying to understand why this anger is welling up in those countries, it might be helpful to contemplate how Americans would feel if similar organizations from China or Russia or India were to pop up in Washington, with hundreds of millions of dollars given to them by those governments, bent on influencing our politics.

US-Sino relations solve multiple scenarios for nuclear war and environmental destruction.

Desperes, 01 (John Desperes, Fellow, RAND Corporation. “China, the United States, and the Global Economy.” p. 227-8)Indeed, U.S.-Chinese relations have been consistently driven by strong common interests in preventing mutually damaging wars in Asia that could involve nuclear weapons; in ensuring that Taiwan's relations with the mainland remain peaceful; in sustaining the growth of the U.S., China, and other Asian-Pacific economies; and, in preserving natural environments that sustain healthy and productive lives. What happens in China matters to Americans. It affects America's prosperity. China's growing economy is a valuable market to many workers, farmers, and businesses across America, not just to large multinational firms like Boeing, Microsoft, and Motorola, and it could become much more valuable by opening its markets further. China also affects America's security. It could either help to stabilize or destabilize currently peaceful but sometimes tense and dangerous situations in Korea, where U.S. troops are on the front line; in the Taiwan Straits, where U.S. democratic values and strategic credibility may be at stake; and in nuclear-armed South Asia, where renewed warfare could lead to terrible consequences. It also affects America's environment. Indeed, how China meets its rising energy needs and protects its dwindling habitats will affect the global atmosphere and currently endangered species.

1NC China-Russia Alliance

US democracy promotion spurs a Russia-China allianceRachman 14 (Gideon Rachman became chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times in July 2006. He joined the FT after a 15-year career at The Economist, which included spells as a foreign correspondent in Brussels, Washington and Bangkok. He also edited The Economist’s business and Asia sections. His particular interests include American foreign policy, the European Union and globalization. “China and Russia push back against the US” 11/19/14 http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2014/11/china-and-russia-push-back-against-the-us/)///CWThe announcement of closer Russian-Chinese military co-operation is a striking sign of how geo-political competition is hotting up – as both Russia and China look to push back against a US-dominated world.¶ Russia, in the midst of the crisis in Ukraine, is eager to show that it has alternatives to the West and a powerful new ally in China. China also has a strong motivation to push back against America. The

Chinese greatly resent America’s much-ballyhooed “pivot to Asia” – which includes stationing 60 per cent of the US navy in the Pacific. One of China’s weaknesses in the contest with the US for dominance in the Asia-Pacific is that it has few clear allies in the region. By contrast, America has defence treaties with Japan and South Korea, and close ties with several South-East Asian nations. However, by getting closer to the Russians, the Chinese potentially set up a powerful nascent alliance of their own.¶ It is yet to be seen how much substance there are to these ties. But two of the announcements made by the Russian defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, are particularly eye-catching. First, his statement that Russia and China are intent on forming a “collective regional security system” suggests that this is potentially a very ambitious arrangement – that might go far beyond the occasional joint naval exercise. “Collective security” arrangements imply a Nato-like commitment to collective self-defence. Second, the suggestion that China and Russia will hold joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean next year is also slightly mind-boggling. If we see the Chinese navy on patrol in the Med, it really will feel like a new world.¶ The attractions for the Chinese and Russians of all this – however – are clear. They both deeply resent America’s global military reach. The fact that the US navy patrols off the Chinese coast, while Nato-nations are up against the Russian border is a source of grievance. By beginning to hold naval exercises in the West’s backyard (although not quite the Caribbean, yet), the Russians and Chinese seem to be engaging in a very deliberate exercise in push-back.¶ But it is premature to say that a Russia-China bloc is emerging that is now in a full-on confrontation with the West. On the contrary, China seems to be skilfully playing both sides. It is interesting that this tilt to Russia comes just a week after a relatively warm and productive summit between the US and Chinese presidents – that resulted in an important agreement on climate change.¶ It is clear that Russia and China share some common resentments about the US. Specifically, both feel bitter about America’s refusal to grant

them dominance of their own neighbourhoods. Both feel internally threatened by US democracy

promotion – hence the Russian defence minister’s angry references to America’s promotion of “colour revolutions”. Both nations dislike US interventionism and the idea of a unipolar world, which is why they are spending a lot of money on weapons to try and close the military gap.¶ But Russia is much weaker than China. Its economy is in bad shape, and Russia’s relationship with the US is now so bad, that – unlike China – it no longer has an American option. As a result, Russia had to accept a disadvantageous gas price in the energy deal it negotiated with China in May. China is also now pressing Russia to sell it high-tech weaponry that the Russians formerly withheld.

Russia-China alliance kills heg and causes Russia expansionismSands 15 (David R. Sands has a masters from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He reporters on politics, diplomacy, and trade for the Washington Times. “New Russia-China alliance latest diplomatic, strategic blow to Obama”4/30/15 http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/30/china-russia-alliance-challenges-us-western-domina/?page=all)From the moon to the Mediterranean to the heart of Moscow, China and Russia in recent days have announced a striking number of moves to strengthen military, financial and political ties, raising the specter of a

deeper alliance between the U.S. rivals.¶ Adversaries during the long Cold War, Beijing and Moscow have increasingly found common cause in challenging the U.S. and Western-dominated order in Europe and Asia, finding

ways both symbolic and concrete to challenge what they see as Washington’s efforts to contain their rise.¶ The latest sign of closer ties emerged Thursday with the announcements of the first joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean and that Russia will be one of the biggest outside investors in China’s proposed development bank, which the Obama administration tried to undercut.¶ “Russia and China are now becoming, as we wanted, not only neighbors but deeply integrated countries,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin told reporters on a trip to the eastern Chinese city of Hangzhou this week.¶ The two sides discussed making China the “main partner” in a Russian program to establish a scientific station

on the moon by 2024. Russia has been trying to revive the space program carried out under the Soviet Union, and China has been gearing up its own manned lunar mission.¶ Analysts even see a budding “bromance,” as the BBC recently put it, between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping.¶ President Obama and virtually all other Western political leaders declined Mr. Putin’s invitation to attend commemorations in Red Square next week to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, so Mr. Xi is perhaps the most prominent foreign leader who will be there.¶ The two men met five times last year and “will meet at least as many times this year,” said Andrey Denisov, Russia’s ambassador to Beijing.¶ “While the Russians and the Chinese expect the United States to continue to be the most

powerful nation in the world for several more decades, they see its grip on the rest of the world rapidly loosening,” Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote in a lengthy analysis of the “Sino-Russian entente” in

April.¶ “Both Moscow and Beijing see the world going through an epochal change away from U.S. domination and toward a freer global order that would give China more prominence and Russia more freedom of action,” he wrote. “They also see the process of change gaining speed.”

Continued Russian aggression triggers global nuclear war – deterrence is key Fisher 9/3/14 (Max, Political Analyst @ Vox, "Obama's Russia paradox: Why he just threatened WWIII in order to prevent it," http://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/6101507/obama-just-committed-the-us-to-war-against-russia-if-it-invades)President Obama gave a speech on Wednesday, in a city most Americans have never heard of, committing the United States to

possible war against Russia. He said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a Western military alliance better known as

NATO, would fight to defend eastern European members like Estonia against any foreign aggression. In other words, if Russian President Vladimir Putin invades Estonia or Latvia as he invaded Ukraine, then Putin would trigger war with the US and most of Europe. Obama's speech from the Estonian capital of Tallinn, though just a speech, may well be America's most important and aggressive step yet against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. While the speech will do nothing for Ukraine, it is meant to stop Russia from invading, or perhaps from sponsoring rebellions in, other European countries — so long as those European countries are part of NATO, as most are. "We'll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania," President Obama said from the capital of Estonia, one of the three Baltic states that were once part of the Soviet Union but now are members of NATO. "You lost your independence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again." Obama was making a promise, and a very public one meant to reverberate not just in European capitals but in Moscow as well: If Russia invades any member of NATO, even these small Baltic states on the alliance's far periphery, then it will be at war with all of them — including the United States. "The defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London," Obama

said. To be really clear: that defense means war with Russia, which has the world's second-largest military and second-largest nuclear arsenal, a prospect so dangerous that even during the angriest moments of the Cold War, the

world managed to avoid it. The idea, though, is not that Obama wants to go to war with Russia, it's that he wants to avoid war with Russia — this is also why the US and Europe are not intervening militarily in Ukraine to

push back the Russian tanks — but that avoiding war with Russia means deterring Russian President Vladimir

Putin from invading these Baltic states in the first place by scaring him off. The risk of such an

invasion , by the way, is real: these countries are about one-quarter ethnic Russian, and Ukraine's own Russian minority which was Putin's excuse for invading Crimea in March. Putin also clearly sees former Soviet states as fair game; he has invaded Ukraine and Georgia, both marked in red on the above map. So the Baltic states are rightly terrified that they are next. Here is Obama's dilemma, and Europe's: They want to prove to Putin that they will definitely defend Estonia and Latvia and other eastern European NATO members as if they were American or British or German soil, so that Putin will not invade those countries as he did in Ukraine. But the entire world, including Putin, is suspicious as to whether or not this threat is a bluff. And the worst possible thing that could

happen, the thing that could legitimately lead to World War Three and global nuclear war , is for Putin to call Obama's bluff, invade Estonia, and have Obama's bluff turn out to not be a bluff.

2NC Heg Impact

2NC Kills Heg

Russian-Sino Alliance crushes the US and the US will always create enemiesKimberley 5-20(Margaret Kimberley, 5-20-15, Global Research Analyst, Global Research, “Russia Wins: Military, Economic and Political Alliance with China Will Fundamentally Alter the World”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/russia-wins-military-economic-and-political-alliance-with-china-will-fundamentally-alter-the-world/5450898, Accessed 6-29-15, AA)The leaders of the greatest land and people masses in Eurasia are forging a military, economic and political alliance that will fundamentally alter the world in both the near and long term. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains the bully that many fear, but no one trusts. “America will always turn friends to enemies and suddenly declare that enemies are friends because it is not a true friend to anyone.” Every year on May 9th millions of people throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics commemorate their victory over Germany in World War II. Foreign leaders attend the ceremonies in Red Square, as

George W. Bush did in 2005. This year western leaders did not but the significance of their absence is not what corporate media would have us believe. Barack Obama and David Cameron and Francois Hollande weren’t in Red Square in 2015, but Chinese president Xi Jinping was and he never left Vladimir Putin’s side. While Americans suffer from government and media propaganda telling them that Russia is isolated, their country is isolated too because it insists on being the world’s biggest bully. The United States has woven a tangled web with its continued commitment to the imperial project. Barack Obama may not have been in Red Square but just three days later secretary of state John Kerry met with Vladimir Putin in Sochi. That meeting is proof of at least a partial defeat for the United States. In 2014 Washington used Ukraine’s

internal crisis as an attempt to kill two birds with one stone. The western backed coup not only put a pro NATO president in office but sanctions enacted after Russia annexed Crimea were a blow to its position as a leading energy producer. The United States behaved like the schoolyard bully accustomed to stealing lunch money from the weaker kids. The sanctions and the removal of Russia from the G8 were meant to neuter the gas producing giant. Russia not only stood in the way of American energy producing supremacy but also speaks out against Washington’s mischief carried out around the world. Russia used its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to prevent a “no fly zone” over Syria that could have meant defeat for president Assad. Western

wishful thinking would have a compliant Russia doing their bidding and giving up its sovereignty and prerogatives. To quote an old saying, “Dream on.” The dream of an easy Russian smack down is at least partly over. Kerry and foreign secretary Lavrov have met and spoken repeatedly since the Ukraine crisis began, but there haven’t been any high level meetings with president Putin. The fact that Kerry wanted to speak with the

president and that Putin agreed indicates that both sides know they need the other. Washington hasn’t completely surrendered, as its attempted rapprochement with Iran proves. Obama is pushing to end sanctions with Iran in order to make it an energy supplier to

Europe, supplanting Russia in the process. But Putin has not been wringing his hands in the Kremlin, hoping for mercy from the United States. He has been forging new economic and military alliances with leaders all over the world. The Chinese haven’t been passive either while Washington tries to make the whole world bend to its will. They have forged ahead with their Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to compete with the World Bank and IMF. Washington has to watch as allies such as France and the United Kingdom are among the 57

founding members. Xi Jingping and Putin were literally cheek to cheek during the Victory Day parade. While American media made fun of the paucity of people they considered important, Russia and China strengthen their alliance. The two nations are holding war games in the Mediterranean Sea and have announced energy partnerships while the United States props up the failed state of Ukraine with billions of dollars. Russia has also announced pipeline deals with Turkey, another U.S. ally. Turkey may have joined in the effort to defeat Bashir

al-Assad in Syria, but that doesn’t mean it will be an American puppet in every circumstance. The United States has worn out its welcome even among its friends. Angela Merkel may have missed the parade but she met Putin the day after and repeated her belief that the only solution to the Ukraine crisis is a diplomatic one. America’s bullying may have gotten the Europeans to agree to sanctions but they

have harmed their own economies by doing so. Merkel and other Europeans are facing pressure to stand up to the Americans and stop cutting their own throats. President Obama is like a circus juggler with many balls in the air. He wants to hurt Russia by helping Iran but Israel and the Arab gulf states were all committed to regime change, something they could count on Washington to uphold. Now that Obama wants to make nice with Iran its other enemies are very unhappy. Of course King Salman of Saudi Arabia wouldn’t

show up for a meeting at Camp David. He sees no reason to go along with Washington’s attempt to have its cake and eat it too. So while friends are angered about the move toward Iran, nations like Russia and China act in their own interest and watch the United States with wary curiosity. America will always turn friends to

enemies and suddenly declare that enemies are friends because it is not a true friend to anyone else. One day destroying Iran is the top priority, then propping up the failed Ukrainian state, then destroying Syria, then making friends with Cuba but still imposing

sanctions on Venezuela. It is a litany of deceit and dishonor among thieves. Putin and Xi prove that it is possible to stand up to the United States. Even though Obama succeeded in keeping other leaders away from Moscow’s celebration it didn’t really matter. When it counted they had to come and show their respect and that is a victory for the entire world.

Interventionism

1NC Interventionism

Democracy promotion causes interventionism and wars and fails to actually spread democracyScheuer 14 (Michael Scheuer is a professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies, an ex-CIA officer, has a PhD in British Empire-U.S.-Canada-U.K. relations from the University of Manitoba. “Face facts, U.S. democracy-crusading causes wars — it’s time for American neutrality” 7/23/14 http://non-intervention.com/1277/face-facts-u-s-democracy-crusading-causes-wars-its-time-for-american-neutrality/)///CWThis week, some of the world is engulfed in bloodshed that is playing out against the background music of Woodrow Wilson’s howling madness. Wilson’s “Making the World Safe for Democracy” symphony and “Self-

Determination” nocturne have now been playing for almost 100 years, and few works by other men have caused

more human costs or more unnecessary wars. Wilson’s demented mind produced a product which, rather than spreading democracy as promised, has simply spread war. The equation is simple: spreading democracy causes war. This morning, for example:¶ –1.) Rival militias are fighting and killing each other

near the international airport in Tripoli in another episode in the unrelenting economic and human disaster that has been caused by the Obama/McCain-led, NATO campaign to install democracy in Libya.¶ –2.) A Malaysian airliner and its passengers lie scattered across fields in eastern Ukraine in another racheting-up of the war started in that country by the ignorant but arrogant interventionists and the democracy crusaders of the EU and the Obama administration. This situation, of course, has led the Neocons to call for “stronger action” against Russia to protect what does not exist, Ukrainian democracy, and to stand up to that non-threat to the United States, Vladimir Putin and Russia. (NB: The culprit here is Malaysian Air — and any other airline — that flies passengers over war zones to save money on fuel.)¶ –3.) Iraq is disintegrating into sectarian civil war as the very

predictable consequence of the Republican/Neocon removal of Saddam Hussein and a decade of democracy building in that country. We can look forward to the same situation after we and the West Europeans

help the great democracy-loving Syrian resistance — better entitled the mujahedin — destroy Asaad. Then, using Western-provided weapons and supplies, it will turn on and destroy the Jordanian regime.¶ –4.) The war in Gaza burns right along as always with Israelis and Palestinians merrily murdering each other. This war has gone on for 60-plus

years because Washington and its European allies keep intervening, first in favor of Israel, then in favor of the Palestine, then back to Israel, and so on and so on. Now is the time to stand back and let the two sides fight it out to the finish. Democracy in Israel or Palestine is worthless to American interests. Let the better war-fighter win, and then let America have no ties to the winner.¶ All of these wars and near-wars have been brought to us by the contemporary American and European believers in Woodrow Wilson’s academic theorizing and ignorance of of the world outside the American South. Wilson also was a profound bigot who was as cock-sure as today’s most ardent racists in Western capitals that he could and should force Slavs, Africans, Latinos, and Arabs to behave as he wanted them to behave, either through eloquent persuasion or gunboats and the Marines’ bayoneted rifles.¶ The Founders did not create the United States to act as Wilson and his policies have acted; that is, as the catalyst that foments unnecessary wars. But a catalyst for war is exactly what our bipartisan political elite has been for the last thirty years and more. The sad truth is that many of our politicians, diplomats, generals, and religious leaders are war-causers. None will leave well enough alone; none trust foreigners to work out their own futures; and none seem to care how much the unnecessary wars they cause will cost Americans in lives, dollars, and affection/respect.¶ These men and women take it as their righteous mission to intervene in the affairs of others and work to make them into people just like themselves, whether in terms of worshiping secular democracy, self-determination, women’s rights, religious tolerance, human rights, or some other one-size-fits-all abstraction that no young American man or woman should ever be called on to fight and die for overseas. This Wilsonian practice amounts to insanity and was long ago recognized as such by one of the greatest Americans. ” The improvement of our way of life is more important than the spreading of it,” Colonel Lindbergh told his countrymen. “If we make it satisfactory enough, it will spread automatically. If we do not, no strength of arms can permanently impose it.”

Democracy Promotion Fails

1NC Fails

Democracy is not a universal system-cannot be applied everywhereSowell 3-25(Thomas Sowell, 3-25-15, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute, “Western advocates of 'nation-building' should master recently deceased statesman's legacy of lessons”, http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell032515.php3, Accessed 6-25-15, AA)It is not often that the leader of a small city-state — in this case, Singapore — gets an international reputation. But no one deserved it more than Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of Singapore as an independent country in 1959, and its prime minister from 1959 to 1990. With his death, he leaves behind a legacy valuable not only to Singapore but to the world. Born in Singapore in 1923, when it was a British colony, Lee Kuan Yew studied at Cambridge University after World War II, and was

much impressed by the orderly, law-abiding England of that day. It was a great contrast with the poverty-stricken and crime-ridden Singapore of that era. Today Singapore has a per capita Gross Domestic Product more than 50 percent higher than that of the United Kingdom and a crime rate a small fraction of that in England . A 2010 study showed more patents and patent applications from the small

city-state of Singapore than from Russia. Few places in the world can match Singapore for cleanliness and orderliness. This remarkable transformation of Singapore took place under the authoritarian rule of Lee Kuan Yew for two decades as prime minister. And it happened despite some very serious handicaps that led to chaos and self-

destruction in other countries. Singapore had little in the way of natural resources. It even had to import drinking water from neighboring Malaysia. Its population consisted of people of different races, languages and religions — the Chinese majority and the sizable Malay and Indian minorities. At a time when other Third World countries were setting up government-controlled economies and blaming their poverty on "exploitation" by more advanced industrial nations, Lee Kuan Yew promoted a market economy, welcomed foreign investments, and made Singapore's children learn English, to maximize the benefits from Singapore's position as a major port for international commerce. Singapore's schools also taught the separate native languages of its Chinese, Malay and Indian Tamil peoples. But everyone had to learn English, because it was the

language of international commerce, on which the country's economic prosperity depended. In short, Lee Kuan Yew was pragmatic, rather than ideological. Many observers saw a contradiction between Singapore's free markets and its lack of democracy. But its long-serving prime minister did not deem its people ready for democracy. Instead, he offered a decent government with much less corruption than in other countries in that region of the world . His example was especially striking in view of many in the West who seem to think that democracy is something that can be exported to countries whose history and traditions are wholly different from those of Western nations that evolved democratic institutions over the centuries. Even such a champion of freedom as John Stuart

Mill said in the 19th century: "The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say, does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization." In other words, democracy has prerequisites, and peoples and places without those prerequisites will not necessarily do well when democratic institutions are created. The most painful recent example of that is Iraq, where a democratically elected government, set up by expenditure of the blood and treasure of the United States, became one of the obstacles to a united people with the military strength to protect itself from international terrorists. In many parts of the Third World, post-colonial governments set up democratically made sure that there would be no more democracy that could replace its original leaders. This led to the cynical phrase, "one man, one vote — one time."

Democracy can be wonderful as a principle where it is viable, but disastrous as a fetish where it is not. Lee Kuan Yew understood the pitfalls and

steered around them. If our Western advocates of "nation-building" in other countries would learn that lesson, it could be the most valuable legacy of Lee Kuan Yew.

2NC Fails

Democracy promotion is fundamentally impossible because it lies between disciplines and different approaches create irreconcilable contradictionsJahn 12 (Beate Jahn is a professor of IR at the University of Sussex. She got a PhD in Political Science, Sociology, and German Studies at the University of Frankfurt “Rethinking democracy promotion” October 2012 Review of International Studies)Despite these efforts, however, democracy promotion policies have, at best, ‘very¶ modest’ success.4 Failures attended both major post-World War II periods of¶ ‘democracy promotion’. Modernisation theories5 informed the first such period and¶ focused on ‘various national preconditions and deep structural factors’ such as ‘levels¶ of socioeconomic development, degrees of socioeconomic equality and group polarization,¶ patterns of land ownership or agricultural production, the prevalence of certain¶ beliefs or cultural traits’ which modernisation policies then sought to manipulate¶ through aid and assistance in the military,

economic, and political fields.6 These¶ policies largely failed to achieve their stated aims 7 and their

failures , in turn, were ¶ widely blamed on the lack of a strong, coherent, and well-substantiated

theoretical ¶ basis :8 on ‘our lack of knowledge about the long causal chains running from outside¶ help to internal conditions to changes of regime’.9 One of the weaknesses of democracy¶

promotion has thus been identified as its tendency to focus on ‘impulses, strategies,¶ impacts’,10 that is, to frame the issue either as a matter of foreign policy on the part¶ of liberal states or as a matter of domestic political and economic development¶ in target states. What this framing leaves untheorised, however, are the relations¶ between sponsors and targets, that is, its international dimension.11¶ The second period of democracy promotion policies was triggered by ‘The Third¶ Wave’ of democratisation12 in which political factors seemed to play an important¶ role and thus gave rise to a more optimistic assessment of the possibilities of influencing¶ such developments from the outside. ‘As the 1990s progressed, however, the¶ bloom came off the rose . . . Despite the expenditure of billions of dollars and countless¶ hours of effort . . . most of the various democracy promotion efforts had little¶ to show for themselves.’13 While empirical studies of such failures identify a host¶ of contributing factors, theoretical weaknesses remain a problem,14 specifically the¶ failure to link political institutions to the ‘social requisites of democracy’.15¶ Policies of democracy promotion thus suffer from two conceptual weaknesses: the¶

first consists in a tension between the political and economic dimensions of liberal¶ democracy generating calls ‘to reconnect the socioeconomic and political spheres¶ in both theory and practice’.16 The second lies in the theoretical separation of the¶ domestic and international dimensions of liberal democracy promotion.17 These two¶ weaknesses are interrelated, I will argue, and provide the basis for contradictory¶ democracy promotion policies.¶ The argument is based on the assumption that the theoretical fragmentation of¶ contemporary conceptions of liberal democracy and its promotion is the product of¶ historical development; specifically of the separation of politics and economics and¶ of their domestic and international dimensions in modern liberal democratic societies¶ which finds expression in the development of separate academic disciplines of¶ Politics, Economics (or Development Studies) and International Relations (IR). The¶ analysis of democracy promotion ‘sits awkwardly in between the disciplines of international¶ relations, comparative politics, development studies, and law – related to all¶ four but not finding a home in any one’.18 As a product of the fragmentation of¶ social scientific knowledge, each of these disciplines provides tools designed for the¶ analysis of its respective domain – distinguishing it from, rather than relating it to,¶ the others. Such shortcomings of disciplinary fragmentation are, of course, widely¶ recognised and addressed by calls for, and support of, interdisciplinary research.¶ And yet, combining the research methods or findings of different disciplines does¶ not overcome the fundamental separation which is constitutive of these methods,¶ and hence their results, in the first place. Instead, as the democracy promotion literature¶ clearly shows, such combination frequently results in listing a variety of relevant¶ factors generated by different approaches without establishing the nature of their¶ relationship and/or in ‘master narratives’ based on one approach with others simply¶ providing auxiliary material filling the theoretical gaps left by the former. In short, as¶ products of such disciplinary fragmentation, contemporary analytical categories do¶ not lend themselves to providing a holistic account of the development of liberal¶ democracy. Instead, reading the history of the development of liberal democracy¶

through the lenses of these analytical categories, as contemporary approaches to¶ democracy promotion do,

simply results in a fragmented narrative or account of¶ that history. One solution to this problem lies in returning to a time prior to this¶ fragmentation. Hence, I will use the work of John Locke to develop and assess a¶ more holistic conception of the development of liberal democracy.¶ Contemporary models of democracy promotion are generally derived from an¶ interpretation of the historical development of liberal democracy in the West. In the¶ first section I will show that these models fall into two broad categories – a political¶ approach and an economic

approach – in line with contemporary disciplinary divisions.¶ The political approach fails to theorise the

relationship between the political¶ and economic dimensions of liberal democracy. The economic approach, in contrast,¶ accounts for this relationship between politics and economics at the domestic level,¶ but

fails to theorise the relationship between the domestic and international dimensions¶ of the

development of liberal democracy. Theoretically, I will argue, these two¶ approaches are ultimately incompatible and they give rise to potentially contradictory¶ democracy promotion policies.¶ In the second section I will turn to the work of John Locke whose reflections on,¶ and advocacy of, liberal democracy apply to the same history, yet prior to the¶ contemporary disciplinary fragmentation. Locke’s work, I will show, provides a conception¶ of the establishment and democratisation of liberalism based on an explicit¶ theorisation of the relationship between politics and economy in which, moreover,¶ the international sphere plays a constitutive role. Comparison with contemporary¶ models shows, moreover, that despite its normative character, this Lockean conception¶ accounts more accurately for the subsequent historical development of liberal¶ democracy than either of the contemporary approaches and it provides explanations¶ for the weaknesses of policies based on the latter.¶ This alternative conception of democracy promotion, I will conclude, calls for a¶ fundamental rethinking of democracy promotion in theory and practice. Specifically,¶ it suggests that a realistic analysis of the history of liberal democracy and the prospects¶ of its promotion requires the theoretical integration of its international dimension.¶ And this in turn necessitates a shift away from the comparative method which¶ stands in the way of such an integration.

AT: Africa

America can’t take responsibility for African democracy Kenneth 95 (Is democracy taking root in sub-Saharan Africa? Kenneth Jost Jost, K. 1995, March 24http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1995032400&type=hitlist&num=12) At least 18 countries of sub-Saharan Africa can be counted as functioning democracies today, according to Freedom House, the New York-based human rights organization. The African-American Institute, a private development organization also based in New York, says as many as 35 countries are in some form of democratic transition.¶ “We now have a fairly critical weight of countries that are moving in very positive directions,” says Steve McDonald, the institute's executive vice president. “We feel very strongly that there is a sea change of

attitude in Africa.”¶ The wave of democratization that some have called Africa's “second liberation” began cresting with the end of the Cold War. With the fading of geopolitical rivalries, the United States and other Western powers felt freer to urge autocratic regimes to adopt political reforms. But officials and experts agree that the African people themselves are the main force behind the movement toward democracy.¶ “African populations are no longer patient with dictators,” says Ali Mazrui, a Kenyan who is director of the Institute for Global Cultural Studies at the State University of New York in Binghamton. “Dictatorships are definitely on notice and, in some cases, under siege.”¶ Mazrui, who wrote and narrated the eight-part PBS series “The Africans,” says public discontent with autocratic regimes has both political and economic causes. “The disenchantment with African dictators is that they have not delivered,” Mazrui says. “You can tolerate loss of freedom if you get prosperity in return. But loss of freedom and deepening poverty is not a very good bargain. And the African people have decided that enough is enough.”¶ Almost all of the African countries south of the Sahara have held elections since 1989. Typically, the elections have drawn good turnouts despite primitive conditions - paper ballots instead of voting machines, for example - and frequent political intimidation. Since 1992, three longtime presidents have given up power after being defeated for re-election - the first such peaceful transitions in the independence era.

AT: China Module

1NC China Module

East Asia Democritization inevitable- other country’s pressure, and new opertunitiesDiamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, January 24 2012(Larry, Why East Asia—Including China—Will Turn Democratic Within a Generation, The Atlantic)If there is going to be a big new lift to global democratic prospects in this decade, the region from which it will emanate is most likely to be East Asia. With the eruption of mass movements for democratic change throughout the Arab world in 2011, hopeful analysts of global democratic prospects have focused attention on the Middle East. Three Arab autocracies (Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya) have fallen in the past year. At least two more (Yemen and Syria) also seem destined for demise soon, and pressures for real democratic change figure to mount in Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and perhaps Kuwait, and to persist in Bahrain. Yet among these and other countries in the Middle East (including Iraq and Iran), only Tunisia has a good chance of becoming a democracy in the relatively near future. Aspirations for more democratic and account- able government run deep throughout the Middle East, and for years to come the region will be a lively and contested terrain of possibilities for regime evolution. But if a new regional wave of transitions to democracy unfolds in the next five to ten years, it is more likely to come from East Asia--a region that has been strangely neglected in recent thinking about the near-term prospects for expansion of democracy. And East Asia is also better positioned to increase the number of liberal and sustainable democracies. Unlike the Arab world, East Asia already has a critical mass of democracies. Forty percent of East Asian states (seven of the seventeen) are democracies, a proportion slightly higher than in South Asia or sub-Saharan Africa, though dramatically lower than in Latin America or Central and Eastern Europe, where most states are democracies. As a result of the third wave of global democratization, East Asia has gone from being the cradle and locus of "developmental authoritarianism," with Japan as its lone democracy--and a longstanding one-party-dominant system at that--to at least a mixed and progressing set of systems. Today, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all consolidated liberal democracies. East Timor, Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines are at least electoral democracies with some resilience. Moreover, as I will explain, there are now significant prospects for democratic change in a number of the region's remaining authoritarian regimes. Thailand is progressing back toward democracy; Malaysia and Singapore show signs of entering a period of democratic transition; Burma, to the surprise of many, is liberalizing politically for the first time in twenty years; and China faces a looming crisis of authoritarianism that will generate a

new opportunity for democratic transition in the next two decades and possibly much

sooner . Moreover, all this has been happening during a five-year period when democracy has been in recession globally.

China is moving towards a democracy- Lack of adaptability from CCPDiamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, January 24 2012(Larry, Why East Asia—Including China—Will Turn Democratic Within a Generation, The Atlantic)

As Francis Fukuyama notes in an essay in the Journal of Democracy, the one flaw in the otherwise impressive institutionalization of Chinese Communist rule is its lack of adaptability . For a regime whose specialty is producing rapid economic change, such rigidity is a potentially fatal defect. With every month or year that ticks by while corruption, routine abuses of power, and stifling constraints on expression go unchecked, citizens' frustration mounts. Already, protests erupt with ominous frequency across tens of thousands of Chinese localities every year, while subversive and democratic ideas, images, and allusions proliferate online, despite the best efforts of fifty-thousand Internet police to keep Chinese cyberspace free of "harmful content." As Minxin Pei has been arguing for some time and as he asserts again in his essay here, the strength of the authoritarian regime in China is increasingly an illusion, and its resilience may not last much longer. As frustration with corruption, collusion, criminality, and constraints on free expression rise, so do the possibilities for a sudden crisis to turn into a political catastrophe for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Internet Freedom

Aff

1AC China Module

Free internet key to Chinese democratization Bajoria 09 (Jayshree Bajoria is a staff writer at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Can the Internet Bring Democracy to China?” 5/18/09 http://www.cfr.org/internet-policy/can-internet-bring-democracy-china/p19385)China has the largest number of Internet users in the world--300 million, or roughly the population of the

United States. China's blossoming online political dialogue, some of which includes the country's political leaders,

has prompted questions about whether the Internet could lead to a political revolution. At the

same time, however, Beijing continues to employ various forms of online censorship and surveillance. Xiao Qiang, director of the China Internet Project and an adjunct professor at the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California, Berkeley, says the Chinese Communist Party seems increasingly inclined to try to use the Internet as a tool to gauge public opinion on local issues. At the same time, he says, it seems bent on strongly policing online dialogue to keep a handle on public opinion.¶ Xiao says strong Internet voices are emerging in favor of democratic reforms in China. He notes that this strain of opinion can at time conflict with nationalistic voices in the country, such as those that emerged in response to last year's pro-Tibet rallies, which have also been amplified by the Internet.

But Xiao says nationalistic and reform-oriented voices also overlap . "The same people who are very nationalistic" on issues like Tibet can be "very vocal to support political reform," he says. Xiao says the "jury is still out" on what China's experience with the Internet says about the medium as a democratizing factor. He stresses, however, that the Internet has proved to be a liberal force for the Chinese society, and could,

in the long run, lead to a less repressive government in the country.

2AC Censorship Kills Democratization

Perceived censorship in China kills the Internet as a political toolWang 09 (Xiaoru Wang was working toward a PhD in Communications at the University of Michigan, “BEHIND THE GREAT FIREWALL: THE INTERNET ANDDEMOCRATIZATION IN CHINA” http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/64681/wangx_1.pdf) Chapter 4 examined the individual characteristics associated with using the Internet for political purposes. Similar to previous studies, this research confirmed that younger, wealthier, and more politically interested users are more likely to use the Internet for political activities. In China, where media censorship has been practiced for years, the perceived threats associated with Internet control could also influence how the internet is used. These threats could come from the evaluation of the government‘s determination and ability to censor, the consequences of violating the Internet control, as well as users‘ perceptions of security, which entails their confidence in

the Internet and their own computer skills to bypass possible censorship. As results from Chapter 5 suggest, the perceived security has a positive impact on political net use. In other words, when users believe that the government cannot monitor their online behaviors, or they have enough knowledge to avoid possible Internet

censorship, they are more likely to engage in political activities online. Furthermore, three individual characteristics were found to be interactive with perceived threats. For instance, a more educated user is more likely to participate in online politics, but this is only true when he/she perceives a low Internet censorship. An older user is less likely to participate in online political activities, and this relationship is even stronger when the older person‘s perceived security is low. Consumption of 212 traditional news is only associated with political net use when users‘ perceived security is high. These findings could be explained by Hachigian‘s (2001) argument that Internet users in China might have a lot at stake, therefore, they

try to avoid potential risks associated with using the Internet for political purposes. When perceived

threat is low or perceived security is high, educated users and the ones who like to seek for political information from

traditional news are slightly more likely to participate in political activities online. However, this group also represents the population most likely to have a successful career worth protecting. Therefore, once this population perceives less security or more threats over the situation, they would rather stay away from possibly dangerous activities on the Internet. Similarly, since older people tend to have little knowledge pertaining to the Internet, their weak sense of perceived security would strengthen the existing negative association between age and political Internet use. Perceived threats are clearly one of the key determinants for engaging in online political activities. Not only would individual characteristics like age, education or political interests affect people‘s patterns of using the Internet, whether or not they believe there is a real danger associated with political net use could also change their decision on using the Internet for politics

Neg

1NC China Turn

Free internet key to Chinese democratization Bajoria 09 (Jayshree Bajoria is a staff writer at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Can the Internet Bring Democracy to China?” 5/18/09 http://www.cfr.org/internet-policy/can-internet-bring-democracy-china/p19385)China has the largest number of Internet users in the world--300 million, or roughly the population of the

United States. China's blossoming online political dialogue, some of which includes the country's political leaders,

has prompted questions about whether the Internet could lead to a political revolution. At the

same time, however, Beijing continues to employ various forms of online censorship and surveillance. Xiao Qiang, director of the China Internet Project and an adjunct professor at the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California, Berkeley, says the Chinese Communist Party seems increasingly inclined to try to use the Internet as a tool to gauge public opinion on local issues. At the same time, he says, it seems bent on strongly policing online dialogue to keep a handle on public opinion.¶ Xiao says strong Internet voices are emerging in favor of democratic reforms in China. He notes that this strain of opinion can at time conflict with nationalistic voices in the country, such as those that emerged in response to last year's pro-Tibet rallies, which have also been amplified by the Internet.

But Xiao says nationalistic and reform-oriented voices also overlap . "The same people who are very nationalistic" on issues like Tibet can be "very vocal to support political reform," he says. Xiao says the "jury is still out" on what China's experience with the Internet says about the medium as a democratizing factor. He stresses, however, that the Internet has proved to be a liberal force for the Chinese society, and could,

in the long run, lead to a less repressive government in the country.

Chinese democratization fails to prevent aggression but tanks international credibility in checking it – leads to inevitable war and internal conflictHornat 12 (Jan Hornat is a researcher for the Department of American Studies at Charles University. “Chinese Democracy Is No Goal” 11/23/12 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinese-democracy-no-goal-7761)This imitation of democracy implies broader questions about democracy in China. Will China democratize? Can China democratize? But perhaps we are we asking the wrong question. What if democracy in China does not bring the desired outcomes?¶ A burgeoning middle class and a more active civil society may be the seeds of future change. In early 2012, semi-free elections in Wukan demonstrated that local-level Chinese governments can be receptive to civil protests. But semi-free elections are the only thing resembling democracy in China to date.¶ So why would the United States welcome a democratic China? The most obvious answer is that a democratically governed China would share mutual interests with the United States and the international community, including human rights and the adherence to the rule of law.¶ As with other peoples, the Chinese want to live in a free society and choose their own government. The immediate impact of democracy in China would presumably terminate the instances of unjustly imprisoned dissidents. However, the past (e.g. Rwanda) shows that such humanitarian objectives are not Washington’s primary interest.¶ Beyond civil society concerns, economic and strategic interests play a bigger role in shaping White House policies toward China. Issues such as the growing U.S. trade deficit with China, the artificially undervalued Chinese yuan and Beijing’s increasing military budget cause the most anxiety in Washington.¶ U.S. policy toward China must avoid the dangers of an all-inclusive policy, assuming that the democratization of China is the universal remedy.¶ In the economic sphere, a democratic China might be a more accessible trade partner and comply with its World Trade Organization obligations. Beijing would stop manipulating its currency and entertain U.S. advice to boost domestic consumption. With stout anti-piracy laws and intellectual property protection, U.S. exports to China would thrive and the trade deficit may even turn into a surplus.¶ Building on the democratic peace theory, Washington can claim that the democratization of China could eliminate the threat of military confrontation. President Obama’s recent “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific would thus not need to be a policy of veiled containment, but rather a policy of bilateral cooperation in the region.¶ But unfortunately, democracy is not a panacea. In fact, a democratic China may not be much

different from today’s China.¶ Democracies are not always exemplary international actors—take for example the United States. It failed to ratify international agreements such as the Statute of the International

Criminal Court or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In fact, Washington has also manipulated with the value of the dollar, though in a more opaque manner than China: the 1985 Plaza Accord was

arguably intended to limit growing Japanese imports to the United States. Furthermore, as an assertive actor in world affairs, the United States often circumvents international organizations such as the United Nations when in pursuit of national interests.¶ Before accepting a democratic China into the international system,

it would behoove Washington to soften its superpower mindset toward Beijing. A democratically governed China

would likely still have great power ambitions and Beijing could legitimately claim the role of the “second superpower” in the next decade.¶ Democratization would upgrade China’s political power and credibility in the international community. The United States and the European Union would forego the leverage of confronting China about its policies, as China’s laws would be the result of a popularly elected government.¶ New problems, which could destabilize democracy, might appear. For example, would Tibet and Xinjiang attempt to breakaway? How would privatization of state

firms and redistribution of land proceed? What would North Korea do in the midst of losing its only ally? If Chinese democracy could not meet growth rates of authoritarian China, how would the Chinese public react?¶ Like Western-style democracies, a democratic China may repudiate its non-interventionist doctrine and be more assertive in pursuit of its interests. How would the United States react to a Chinese

“coalition of the willing”? Democratic or not, China would still depend on a growing amount of natural resources and territorial disputes in the South China Sea would continue to disrupt regional security.¶

A democratic Chinese government would face significant obstacles, some unforeseen, that have toppled regimes or caused civil wars in the past. Indeed, China’s Communist Party claims that political liberalization would lead to “chaos.” At the same time, the party feels compelled to imitate democracy, creating a liberal façade to justify its rule. Whether real or imagined, Chinese democracy may not bring the effects everyone hopes for.

Conflict causes extinctionWittner 11 (Professor of History at SUNY Albany. “Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?,” www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea , increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet,

there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur . Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving

many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands . Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe — destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another

decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

2NC Censorship Kills Democratization

Perceived censorship in China kills the Internet as a political toolWang 09 (Xiaoru Wang was working toward a PhD in Communications at the University of Michigan, “BEHIND THE GREAT FIREWALL: THE INTERNET ANDDEMOCRATIZATION IN CHINA” http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/64681/wangx_1.pdf) Chapter 4 examined the individual characteristics associated with using the Internet for political purposes. Similar to previous studies, this research confirmed that younger, wealthier, and more politically interested users are more likely to use the Internet for political activities. In China, where media censorship has been practiced for years, the perceived threats associated with Internet control could also influence how the internet is used. These threats could come from the evaluation of the government‘s determination and ability to censor, the consequences of violating the Internet control, as well as users‘ perceptions of security, which entails their confidence in

the Internet and their own computer skills to bypass possible censorship. As results from Chapter 5 suggest, the perceived security has a positive impact on political net use. In other words, when users believe that the government cannot monitor their online behaviors, or they have enough knowledge to avoid possible Internet

censorship, they are more likely to engage in political activities online. Furthermore, three individual characteristics were found to be interactive with perceived threats. For instance, a more educated user is more likely to participate in online politics, but this is only true when he/she perceives a low Internet censorship. An older user is less likely to participate in online political activities, and this relationship is even stronger when the older person‘s perceived security is low. Consumption of 212 traditional news is only associated with political net use when users‘ perceived security is high. These findings could be explained by Hachigian‘s (2001) argument that Internet users in China might have a lot at stake, therefore, they

try to avoid potential risks associated with using the Internet for political purposes. When perceived

threat is low or perceived security is high, educated users and the ones who like to seek for political information from

traditional news are slightly more likely to participate in political activities online. However, this group also represents the population most likely to have a successful career worth protecting. Therefore, once this population perceives less security or more threats over the situation, they would rather stay away from possibly dangerous activities on the Internet. Similarly, since older people tend to have little knowledge pertaining to the Internet, their weak sense of perceived security would strengthen the existing negative association between age and political Internet use. Perceived threats are clearly one of the key determinants for engaging in online political activities. Not only would individual characteristics like age, education or political interests affect people‘s patterns of using the Internet, whether or not they believe there is a real danger associated with political net use could also change their decision on using the Internet for politics

AT: Surveillance Kills Internet Freedom

The advantage is wrong – countries don’t care about what the US says anywayUlfelder 13 (Jay Ulfelder is freelance political scientist. “NSA Surveillance Revelations Won’t Dent Democratization Elsewhere” 6/23/13 https://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2013/06/23/nsa-surveillance-revelations-wont-dent-democratization-elsewhere/)///CWA piece in today’s Boston Globe makes a case I’ve also seen in other venues in the past couple of weeks: that revelations about the NSA‘s domestic surveillance programs have undercut the U.S. government’s ability to prod authoritarian regimes to democratize. In the Globe, Thanassis Cambanis writes:¶ Officially, American policy promotes a surveillance-free Internet around the world, although Washington’s actual practices have undercut the credibility of the US government on this issue. How will Washington continue to insist, for example, that Iranian activists should be able to plan protests and have political discussions online without government surveillance, when Americans cannot be sure that they are free to do the same?¶ For activists grappling with real-time emergencies in places like Syria or long-term repression in China, Russia, and elsewhere, the latest news doesn’t change their basic strategy—but it may make the outlook for Internet freedom darker.¶ “These revelations set a terrible precedent that could be used to justify pervasive surveillance elsewhere,” [Access spokesperson Katherine] Maher said. “Americans can go to the courts or their legislators to try and challenge these programs, but individuals in authoritarian states won’t have these options.”¶ As someone who donates to the ACLU, I think there are a lot of reasons to be concerned about the scope of the NSA’s domestic snooping, but the encouragement those programs supposedly provides to authoritarian rulers isn’t one of them. American officials only wish they had that kind of power over their foreign counterparts.¶ The claim that authoritarian regimes will be more repressive than they would have

been absent revelations of the NSA’s eavesdropping rests on the assumption that autocrats design their domestic surveillance programs around the American example and in response to the U.S. government’s jawboning. Anyone who’s spent much time studying authoritarian regimes knows that’s simply not true. Under all but the most exceptional circumstances, autocrats worry vastly more about internal threats

than external ones, and they build and maintain their machines of surveillance and repression in response to those domestic pressures. International norms probably do shape human-rights practices in authoritarian regimes at the margins, but the U.S. is not and never has been the lone vessel of these norms, and the effects of normative change pale in comparison to the immediacy of threats from

domestic rivals.¶ Foreign governments can sometimes affect this calculus, but their influence is usually modest at best. The U.S. routinely shames other governments for their repressive practices in the State Department’s annual human rights reports, but I can’t think of a single case in which that shaming alone has

prodded an authoritarian regime confronting a domestic threat to change course. Countries like

Russia and China and Iran are already surveilling their populations on a massive scale in spite of years of cajoling by the U.S. government, Human Rights Watch, and many others because they fear their own citizens a lot more. When it comes to spying on their own people, officials in regimes like those hardly need any encouragement.¶ What does seem to help crack open authoritarian regimes some of the time are material threats—things like economic sanctions or suspensions of valued aid programs—especially with regimes that depend heavily on foreign largesse. Still, there’s no reason to believe those levers will become any more brittle because the U.S. does some vaguely similar things at home. That would only matter if foreign autocrats thought that accusations of hypocrisy on this issue could dissuade Congress or the president from following through on their threats against them. For better and for worse, I just can’t see that happening. The intervening variable in that equation is the American electorate, and those kinds of accusations probably aren’t going to weigh heavily on the minds of voters, especially when so many of them don’t even seem to mind what the NSA is doing to them.