UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA...Civil File No. 15-cv-02713 PJS/LIB [PROPOSED]...

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Nelson Kargbo,

Petitioner,

v.

JIM OLSON, Carver County Sheriff; JOEL

BROTT, Sherburne County Sheriff; SCOTT

BANIECKE, Field Office Director,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

SARAH SALDAÑA, Director, Immigration

and Customs Enforcement; JEH JOHNSON,

Secretary of the Department of Homeland

Security; LORETTA LYNCH, Attorney

General of the United States.

Respondents.

Civil File No. 15-cv-02713 PJS/LIB

[PROPOSED]

Supplemental Habeas Petition

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), Petitioner Nelson Kargbo files

this Supplemental Habeas Petition, which alleges the occurrence of jurisdictional facts

occurring after the original Petition was filed and pleads claims under the Fifth

Amendment and in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231. A new respondent has also been added

as Mr. Kargbo has been transferred from Sherburne County Jail to Carver County Jail.

Petitioner alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Petitioner Nelson Kargbo has been held in immigration detention since August 29,

2013, even though an immigration judge granted his application for relief under

the Convention Against Torture after finding, in July 2015, that it was more likely

CASE 0:15-cv-02713-PJS-LIB Document 15-1 Filed 08/11/15 of 7

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than not that he would be tortured if he were removed to Sierra Leone. The

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) did not appeal this determination or

designate any other country for possible removal. Instead, DHS has continued to

detain him. Because that detention is not tied to any reasonably foreseeable

removal, it is unlawful, and Petitioner is entitled to release. See Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-92, 699-700 (2001).

2. Because the legal under-pinning for his detention has changed, in the interest of

judicial economy, Petitioner will limit this supplemental petition to the new

matters created and reference the original habeas, Doc. 1, where appropriate.

3. During pre-removal detention the government argued his detention was legal

under § 236(c). (Gov’t Response to Habeas, Doc. 10). However, with his relief

now granted, that section of law no longer applies. Instead, DHS has now taken

the position that they can detain him for 90 days under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. (Affidavit

of Linus Chan, Ex. HH.)

PARTIES

4. Jim Olson is named in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Carver County,

Minnesota. In that capacity, Sheriff Olson is responsible for the Carver County

Jail, a detention facility under contract with Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) and the physical location where Mr. Kargbo has been in

custody since on or about August 1, 2015. The address for Carver County Jail is

606 E. 4th St., Chaska, MN 55318.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE


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5. This Court retains jurisdiction and venue of this matter. See Doc. 1. The Court

has already accepted the case and only the legal justification for Kargbo’s

detention has changed.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

6. On June 11, 2015, Petitioner filed a habeas petition to challenge his long-term

detention by Respondents.

7. On July 30, 2015, Immigration Judge Kristin W. Olmanson ordered removal to

Sierra Leone but granted withholding of removal under the Convention Against

Torture after finding that Mr. Kargbo was more likely than not to face torture if he

were removed to Sierra Leone. Ex. GG, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17.

8. During his removal proceedings, Sierra Leone was designated as the country of

removal. At no time during his removal proceedings did Mr. Kargbo, DHS, or the

immigration judge identify any alternative country for removal.

9. DHS waived appeal of the immigration judge’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19.

10. As of that date, Petitioner’s immigration case is settled and he is no longer in

custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.

11. The government contends that he is now in post-removal detention under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231.

12. Petitioner’s removal is not reasonably foreseeable because he cannot be removed

to his home country of Sierra Leone and no other alternative country for removal

has been identified.

13. Petitioner is still detained, currently in the Carver County Jail.


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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

14. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein.

15. Mr. Kargbo’s detention by Defendants violates his rights under the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Immigration

detention violates due process if it is not reasonably related to the purpose of

ensuring a noncitizen’s removal from the United States. See Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 690-92, 699-700 (2001); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738

(1972). Where removal is not reasonably foreseeable, detention cannot be

reasonably related to the purpose of effectuating removal and is unlawful. See id.

at 699-700. Bah v. Cangemi, 489 F. Supp.2d. 905, 920 (D. Minn., 2007).

16. Mr. Kargbo’s detention is not reasonably related to the purpose of effectuating his

removal from the United States.

17. Mr. Kargbo’s detention is not reasonably related to the purpose of effectuating his

removal to Sierra Leone, because the immigration judge’s ruling prevents the

United States from deporting him to Sierra Leone.

18. Nor is Mr. Kargbo’s detention reasonably related to the purpose of effectuating his

removal to some other country. Although a grant of deferral of removal under the

Convention Against Torture permits removal to a third country, no third country

was designated during removal proceedings. It would be unlawful to remove

Kargbo to a third country without notice and the opportunity, during his removal


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hearing, to assert any claims to protection from removal to that country. And even

if it were not unlawful, removal to a third country is, as a practical matter,

implausible as he lacks any ties to any other country.

19. Because Mr. Kargbo’s removal is not reasonably foreseeable, his detention by

DHS is unconstitutional.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF 8 U.S.C. § 1231

20. The foregoing allegations are realleged and incorporated herein.

21. Title 8, section 1231, of the U.S. Code authorizes detention only for the purpose of

effectuating removal. Because Mr. Kargbo’s removal is not reasonably

foreseeable, his detention is not authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. See Zadvydas, 533

U.S. at 689 (reading statute “in light of the Constitution’s demands” to contain

limitation on detention).

22. Title 8, section 1231, of the U.S. Code authorizes detention only for the purpose of

effectuating removal during a 90 day removal period.

23. Petitioner has now been detained for over 140 days in post removal detention.

Judge Schiltz has ruled that § 1231 regulates immigration officials and that

unencumbered time where the government could have removed the alien, but

failed to do, counts as post removal time even if the alien later reopened his

immigration proceedings. See Bah v. Cangemi, 489 F.Supp.2d 905, 920-922 (D.

Minn., 2007). As such, the time Mr. Kargbo has spent in post removal is already

in violation of his rights.


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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Petitioner asks that this Court grant the following relief:

1. Order Petitioner’s release from DHS custody;

2. Award attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d) and 5 U.S.C. § 504, if applicable; and,

3. Order any further relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 11th

day of August, 2015

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION OF MINNESOTA

s/ Ian S. Bratlie__________________

Ian Bratlie #0319454

709 S. Front St., Suite 1B

Mankato, MN 56001

(507) 995-6575

Teresa Nelson #269736

2300 Myrtle Ave, Suite 180

St Paul, MN 55114-1879

(651) 645-4097

Katherine L Evans

Nicholas Hittler, Student Attorney

Rebecca Cassler, Student Attorney

University of Minnesota

190 Mondale hall

229 19th

Ave. S.

Minneapolis, MN 55455

(612) 301-8648

Fax: (612) 624-5771

Email: [email protected]

Kirsten E Schubert

Dorsey & Whitney LLP


mailto:[email protected]

7

50 S 6th

St Ste 1500

MPLS, MN 55402-1498

(612) 492-6755

Fax: (952) 516-5698


Attorneys for Petitioner



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Nelson Kargbo,

Petitioner,

v.

JIM OLSON, Carver County Sheriff; JOEL

BROTT, Sherburne County Sheriff; SCOTT

BANIECKE, Field Office Director,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

SARAH SALDAÑA, Director, Immigration

and Customs Enforcement; JEH JOHNSON,

Secretary of the Department of Homeland

Security; LORETTA LYNCH, Attorney

General of the United States.

Respondents.

Civil File No. 15-cv-02713 PJS/LIB

[PROPOSED]

Brief of Petitioner in Support of

Supplemental Habeas Petition

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Nelson Kargbo has been detained by federal immigration officials for

nearly two years. His detention is ongoing despite Immigration Judge Olmanson

granting his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture and finding that

it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if he returned to Sierra Leone. The

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) waived appeal of this decision. Nor did it

seek to designate another country for potential removal. Instead, DHS, through ICE, has

simply detained Mr. Kargbo under their local office’s official policy to detain

CASE 0:15-cv-02713-PJS-LIB Document 15-2 Filed 08/11/15 Page 1 of 12

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CAT/Withholding grants for 90 days after a final order. Because that detention is not

tied to any reasonably foreseeable removal, it is unlawful, and Mr. Kargbo is entitled to

immediate release.

FACTS

On July 30, 2015, Mr. Kargbo’s immigration proceedings finally ended when the

immigration judge ordered him removed to Sierra Leone but granted deferral of removal

under the Convention Against Torture after finding that Mr. Kargbo was more likely than

not to face torture if returned to Sierra Leone. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17.

DHS did not appeal the immigration judge’s decision. See Ex. GG.

Mr. Kargbo challenged his lengthy detention through a habeas petition filed with

this Court on June 11, 2015. His original petition challenged the long pre-removal

detention. Now that his immigration case is final, his detention has now changed to post-

removal status and is authorized by different statutes and regulations.

ARGUMENT

Mr. Kargbo raises arguments based on the fact that his detention is now governed

by different statues. Such arguments are appropriately before this court as they arise out

of the same unconstitutional custody that gave rise to the instant suit. The mere fact that

the government has changed its legal theory of the case does not prohibit Mr. Kargbo

from challenging it. As Judge Schiltz has noted, “to an alien, detention is detention. He

or she is no more free when detained under sec 1226 than when detained under sec

1231.” Bah v. Cangemi, 489 F. Supp. 2d 904, 920 (D. Minn 2007).

I. Nelson Kargbo’s detention violates Due Process


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Mr. Kargbo’s detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

because it is not related to any reasonable possibility of removal. The Due Process Clause

places strict limits on detention. “It is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes

a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Jones v. United

States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)(internal citations omitted). Detention is

unconstitutional “unless . . . ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural

protections, or, in certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances where a special

justification . . . outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding

physical restraint.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (emphasis removed)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This guarantee prohibits immigration

detention unless it is reasonably related to the purpose of effectuating noncitizens

removal from the United States. Id. at 690-92, 699-700.

Mr. Kargbo’s detention is not related to that permissible purpose. Instead, Mr.

Kargbo is being detained by immigration authorities based on a local policy of keeping

aliens who have been granted CAT relief in detention for 90 days of post removal

detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Chan aff. ex. HH. This policy is in violation of the

Constitution. Mr. Kargbo’s removal from the United States is legally barred to Sierra

Leone and practically implausible to any other country. Mr. Kargbo’s continued custody

thus violates due process.

A. The Due Process Clause prohibits immigration detention when removal is not

reasonably foreseeable.


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“[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration” of any civil detention “bear

some reasonable relation to the purpose” of that commitment. Jackson v. Indiana, 406

U.S. 715, 738 (1972); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992). For example,

someone who is incompetent to stand trial cannot be detained for longer than the

“reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial

probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” Jackson, 406 U.S. at

738. And if there is no “substantial probability” that he will become competent to stand

trial, he cannot be detained on the basis of his incapacity. Id.

The requirement that detention be reasonably related to its purposes applies with

equal force in the immigration context. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing Jackson,

406 U.S. 715). Because the central purpose of immigration detention is to secure removal

of those ordered removed from the United States, id. at 699; Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.

510, 527-28 (2003), the Supreme Court has recognized that immigration detention is

lawful only where it bears a reasonable relation to that purpose, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S.

at 690-92; Demore, 538 U.S. at 527-28. Detention of a noncitizen who has received a

final order of removal, therefore, is limited “to a period reasonably necessary to bring

about that alien’s removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. Where removal is not

“practically attainable,” immigration detention does not “bear a reasonable relation to the

purpose for which the individual was committed.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted); Demore, 538 U.S. at 527. Thus, a noncitizen can

be detained after a final order of removal only if his removal is “reasonably foreseeable”;


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otherwise, continued detention is unlawful. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700; Jackson, 406

U.S. at 738.

B. Nelson Kargbo’s detention violates due process because his removal is not

reasonably foreseeable.

Mr. Kargbo’s detention violates due process because it is not reasonably related to

the purpose of effectuating his removal. Because of his grant of deferral of removal, Mr.

Kargbo cannot be removed to Sierra Leone. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17.2 During removal

proceedings, the government never sought to designate another country to remove him to

and Mr. Kargbo lacks any ties to another country to make his removal realistically

possible. Courts that have reviewed similar facts have also found that removal is not

realistic in these circumstances. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir.

2006) (“Thus, at this juncture, the government is not entitled to remove Nadarajah to Sri

Lanka, and no other country has been identified to which Nadarajah might be removed.

Therefore, examining the circumstances objectively, one cannot say that his removal is

reasonably foreseeable.”). Like the plaintiff in Nadarajah, Mr. Kargbo cannot be

removed to his designated country and no other country has been identified by the

government to remove him to.

Additionally, Mr. Kargbo was under a final order of removal from January 5, 2015

until May 15, 2015. During those 130 days the government, despite no restrictions to

removing him, was unable to remove Mr. Kargbo to Sierra Leone or any other country.

It is not now realistic to believe that another country, with no ties to Kargbo, would


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accept him.1 During that time, immigration officials provided Mr. Kargbo with a 90-day

custody review where they determined that the only legal reason to continue to hold him

was that his removal to Sierra Leone was reasonably foreseeable. Ex. II. They instructed

him that he may in the future bring forth evidence of why his removal would be unlikely.

Importantly, immigration officials rejected the idea that Mr. Kargbo could be continued

to be held in custody due to being a danger to the community. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f).

ICE is detaining Mr. Kargbo, then, not to remove him but simply under an ICE

local office policy of detaining CAT/Withholding grantees for the entire 90-day post

removal period. This policy runs afoul of the agencies own position on the detention of

those protected under CAT/Withholding. See Strait memo, Ex. JJ. The Strait memo

states that policies implemented in 2000 and 2004 are still in effect and

The memorandum provides guidance that “[i]n general, it is

ICE policy to favor release of aliens who have been granted

protection relief by an immigration judge, absent exceptional

concerns such as national security issues or danger to the

community and absent any requirement under law to detain.”

Protection relief includes asylum, withholding of removal

under section 241 (b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality

Act, and withholding or deferral of removal under the

regulations implementing U.S. obligations under Article 3 of

the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.

16(d) - 1208. 18. This policy applies at all times following a

grant of protection, including during any appellate

proceedings and throughout the removal period.

Given the legal and practical roadblocks to removal, the mere theoretical

possibility that Mr. Kargbo could be removed from the United States is plainly

1 Nor is it likely that such an action, without giving Kargbo notice to challenge his removal to that country, would be

constitutional.


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insufficient to justify detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.

Because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, nor is he a danger to the community,

he is entitled to immediate release.

II. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 does not authorize Kargbo’s detention.

8 U.S.C. §1231 does authorize post removal detention of aliens. However, that

statutory provision does not trump the Supreme Court’s rulings that civil detention is

narrowly tailored to a legitimate government interest, in this case the ability to reasonably

effectuate removal of the alien.

The Supreme Court has upheld post removal detention because it is based on the

premise that the government will remove those aliens. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524

525 (1952). Demore, 538 U.S. 527-528, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. Civil detention

cannot be used to punish an alien. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. When the government’s

stated purpose for justifying the detention of an individual is no longer “practically

attainable” the detention doesn’t have a “reasonable relation to the purpose for which the

individual was committed.” Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. A statute cannot be read to allow

detention of an individual who is not likely to be removed. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S.

371, 378 (2005), Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (“We conclude that, once removal is no

longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by the

statute.”).

Our Constitution protects against even short confinement. Making aliens wait an

additional 90 days before they can challenge their detention violates their constitutional

rights. While courts have permitted some short durations in custody that do not violate


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the Constitution, the Eighth Circuit has recognized that short duration is “crucial to the

outcome of the case.” Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 718 (8th

Cir. 2014).

In Hunt v. Elkhart County Sheriff, 95 F.Supp.2d 930, 937 (N.D. Ind 2000), the

Court noted that 57 extra days of detention is clearly excessive, the Fifth Circuit found 30

days of extended detention could violate the Constitution in Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d

527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980) and another court noted that “the Due Process Clause clearly

protects against eighteen days of unlawful incarceration.” Johnson v. Herman, 132

F.Supp.2d 1130, 1139 (N.D. Ind 2001).

Under local ICE policy, ICE detains aliens like Mr. Kargbo due to a misreading of

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), which reads:

During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain

the alien. Under no circumstance during the removal period

shall the Attorney General release an alien who has been

found inadmissible under section 1182 (a)(2) or 1182

(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227 (a)(2)

or 1227 (a)(4)(B) of this title.

That is the only detention provision that even arguably applies to Mr. Kargbo’s

status. But in light of the serious constitutional concerns identified above, that provision

cannot be read to authorize his detention after he was granted protection under the

Convention Against Torture. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (court

must construe statute to avoid serious constitutional questions if “an alternative

interpretation of the statute is fairly possible” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); Clark, 543 U.S. at 380-81 (2005) (applying avoidance canon).


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Statutory authority to detain noncitizens after a final order of removal under §

1231(a) is premised on the ability to actually effectuate removal. Section 1231(a)(1)(A)

requires federal authorities to remove noncitizens who are subject to final orders of

removal within 90 days after the order becomes final, a period called the “removal

period.” Under § 1231(a)(2), DHS “shall” detain an alien “[d]uring the removal period.”

Moreover, “[u]nder no circumstance during the removal period shall [DHS] release an

alien who” is subject to criminal or terrorism-based grounds of deportability under 8

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) and (a)(4)(B). Id.

Section 1231(a)(2) does not provide authority to detain a noncitizen who – like

Mr. Kargbo – cannot be removed because he has obtained protection from being returned

to the only country designated for removal. Judge Schiltz has noted that this section of

law “is directed primarily to regulating the behavior of immigration officials” and does

not discuss the rights of detainees. Bah v. Cangemi, 489 F. Supp. 2d 904, 921 (D. Minn

2007). The statute applies to noncitizens who can be removed, requiring their detention

during the removal period, i.e., the period in which the government, or immigration

officials, “shall” remove them. By its plain terms, the provision has no application to

noncitizens who cannot be removed because they have been awarded relief from

removal. Removal of a noncitizen awarded protection is surely not required during the

removal period; neither is detention.

At a minimum, § 1231(a)(2) is fairly interpreted not to apply to noncitizens who

cannot be removed. And because such confinement runs afoul of the Due Process Clause,


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the statute must be construed not to authorize detention under such circumstances. See

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, 696-97.

Properly construed, therefore, § 1231(a)(2) does not authorize Mr. Kargbo’s

detention. Mr. Kargbo was ordered removed to Sierra Leone, the only country

designated for removal by the government, but was awarded withholding of removal to

that country. Because he cannot be removed—or, at a minimum, his removal is not

reasonably foreseeable—detention is not authorized by § 1231(a)(2).

III. Nelson Kargbo’s detention has exceeded statutory authorization

Alternatively, even if the court rules that §1231(a)(2) authorizes his detention

during the initial removal period, which it does not, Mr. Kargbo has been detained far

beyond the statutorily permissible time available in the initial removal period.

From August 29, 2013 until January 5, 2015, 494 days, Mr. Kargbo was held in

pre-removal detention. That status ended when the BIA declined his appeal. (Ex. G.)

From January 5, 2015 until the BIA reopened his case on May 15, 2015, 130 days, Mr.

Kargbo was held in post-removal detention. After his case was reopened, his detention

converted again to pre-removal status and was the focus of this original habeas petition.

From May 15, 2015 until July 30, 2015, 76 days, Mr. Kargbo was again held in pre-

removal detention. Since July 30, 2015, Mr. Kargbo has been held in post-removal

detention, governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

So far, Mr. Kargbo’s time in detention has exceeded 710 days, nearly 150 of

which are in post-removal status. Mr. Kargbo served 24 days in jail for his criminal acts.


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This court has already addressed the issue where the removal period time changes

by later events in Bah v. Cangemi, 489 F. Supp. 2d 905 (D. MN 2007). This court found

that “allowing unlimited pre-removal period detention under §1226 would be inconsistent

with the reasoning underlying Zadvydas.” Bah, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 920. In that case, like

this one, Judge Schiltz noted that the alien’s removal time had shifted between both pre-

and post- removal time during his confinement. The government’s position was that time

that had been previously been considered post-removal detention must be now considered

pre-removal detention. Judge Schiltz was rightly concerned that such holdings could

permit and create potentially indefinite detention. Id. Instead, the court ruled that

“unencumbered time,” time where the government could have removed the alien but

failed to do so, would still count in the post removal detention period. Id. at 920-922.

Judge Schiltz noted that § 1231 is directed to regulate “the behavior of

immigration officials” and not secure the rights of detained aliens. “Once the statute is

understood to require diligence on the part of immigration officials, the unencumbered-

time approach seems appropriate” in cases like Mr. Kargbo’s. Id. at 921.

Factoring that time period, Mr. Kargbo has already surpassed the 90 day removal

period dictated by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). As his removal to Sierra Leone is prohibited,

the government has no reason to hold him past this 90 day removal period.

CONCLUSION

Nelson Kargbo’s immigration detention violates the Due Process Clause and is not

authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). He is entitled to immediate release.


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Respectfully submitted this 11th

day of August, 2015

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION OF MINNESOTA

s/ Ian S. Bratlie__________________

Ian Bratlie #0319454

709 S Front St. Suite 1B

Mankato, MN 56001

(507) 995-6575

Teresa Nelson #269736

2300 Myrtle Ave, Suite 180

St Paul, MN 55114-1879

(651) 645-4097

Katherine L Evans #0389923

Nicholas Hittler, Student Attorney

Rebecca Cassler, Student Attorney

University of Minnesota

190 Mondale hall

229 19th

Ave. S.

Minneapolis, MN 55455

(612) 301-8648

Fax: (612) 624-5771


Kirsten E Schubert

Dorsey & Whitney LLP

50 S 6th

St Ste 1500

MPLS, MN 55402-1498

(612) 492-6755

Fax: (952) 516-5698


Attorneys for Petitioner




UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA...Civil File No. 15-cv-02713 PJS/LIB [PROPOSED]...

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