Troika Spring 2011

An Undergraduate Journal in East European, Eurasian, and Slavic Studies University of California, Berkeley

Volume 1 | Issue 1 Spring 2011

Troika

Study abroad in Kharkiv, Ukraine

Field trips to Moscow and Kyiv

Intensive Russian and Ukrainian language training

Classes in English:

Attend one of the oldest and most prominent universities in Europe

24/7 on-site support from EESA Center

www.EESAbroad.org [email protected]

This publication is made possible by

support from the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies at the University of

California, Berkeley, with funding

from the the U.S. Department of

Education Title VI National Resource Centers program.

Front Cover Photograph: Lukomorye; Above: Prague. Katarina White

http://iseees.berkeley.edu

Table of ContentsEditor’s Note & Acknowledgments

Troika Editorial Staff

Contributer Bios

Topolinskaya | The Kornilov Affair and the Bolsheviks: Legitimacy for the Illegitimate

Matejcek | ‘We Have Such Things’: Government and Civilian Experiences of the Kitchen Debate in the United States and Soviet Union

Beigel-‐Coryell | Chopindimonium

Patrinely | The Aral Sea Disaster: Unequal Restoration Progress in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

Oberholtzer | Translation of Vrednye sovety dlya detej starshego vozrasta

Allen | Political Elites in a Croatian Context: Homogeneity and its role in political decision making in Croatia

Haggerty | Passions and Habits Intertwined

Budesa | Home

Allahverdi | Assimilation

Garcia | Chekhov in California

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Editor’s Note One windy, summer day, I began my first journey into a foreign land. I was on a bus full of jetlagged Americans, being carted around St. Petersburg to see the sights that attract both casual tourists and lovers of Russian culture alike. After a full day of sightseeing, I sat exhausted on the bus. I was frustrated because all I had done in Russia so far was take pictures of pretty buildings, but I hadn’t actually learned or experienced anything new. Looking out of the window of the bus, I saw a tree growing out of the gutter of an old, decrepit building. It was an instant reminder of why I first chose to study Russian. From a building that was beginning to crumble into the ground, a tree was starting to sprout into the skyline. I found the tree to be thought provoking and unexpected, but beautiful in its own way. This tree is a good representation of what I fell in love with in East European studies. There is simultaneous mystery, intrigue and charm surrounding the region, and it always keeps you wondering.

A year ago, I stumbled upon the world of publications in a similar fashion. When I decided to start a Slavic journal, I didn’t have an editing staff, support from the

Acknowledgements In addition to thanking the hard work of the Troika editors, I would like to acknowledge the contributions of Djamilia Niazalieva, Lena Tsurkan, Margarita Chudnovskaya and James Stein. I would also like to thank Irina Paperno of the UC Berkeley Slavic Department and Jeff Pennington of the Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies for their valuable advice, time and support.

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university, funding, or an idea of what I was hoping to accomplish. Luckily, a lot can change in a year. I couldn’t ask for a better editing staff than this one, and the Slavic Department and the Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies have been much needed sources of support and advice. The result of this is the journal that you now hold in your hands. I wish you happy reading and happy wondering.

Alekzandir Morton Editor-‐in-‐Chief

Troika Editorial Staff Alekzandir Morton, Editor-in-ChiefAlekzandir is a third year Slavic Cultures major. He is studying Russian and Romanian languages, and has an interest in 20th century Russian history, culture and literature. He studied abroad in St. Petersburg and Moscow in Summer of 2010. Olga Slobodyanyuk, Managing Editor

primary school in her home town of Moscow, to which she has often returned since. Visiting her family leads to her traveling all over Ukraine and trying to master Ukrainian. She is the current president of the UC Berkeley Russian Club. Nick Bondar-Netis, Managing EditorNick is a fourth year Political Science major with a minor in Slavic Language, Literature, and Culture. He was born in San Francisco, but his family emigrated from the L’viv and Moscow. He is interested in the current political situation of the former Soviet countries as well as modern Eastern European popular culture’s folkloric roots.

Christina Monzer, Associate Editor, Layout and Design EditorChristina is a fourth year Development Studies major, focusing on Anthropology and City Planning with a geographic concentration of Eastern Europe. Originally from Lvov, Ukraine, she returns often

sustainable development.

Julia Nowak, Associate Editor, Website Design EditorJulia is a third year, junior transfer in the Slavic department majoring in Polish Language & Literature. Her interests include Eastern European cinema, 20th century Russian & Eastern European history, and Slavic languages in general.

Natalie Budesa, Associate EditorNatalie is a Slavic Languages & Literatures major with a concentration in East European culture. She enjoys learning languages and is currently learning Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian and Japanese. In summer 2010 she stayed in Croatia and Montenegro where she visited family, swam in the Adriatic, and explored the old cities.

Jeong Choi, Associate EditorJeong is a fourth year history major and will be writing his thesis on either Eastern Europe or France. He spent a semester in Paris and had some of the most amazing experiences of his life.

Maya Garcia, Copy EditorMaya is a sophomore studying comparative literature and Russian at UC Berkeley. She draws for several campus publications and in her free time makes cartoons about Russian literature. She will be spending her junior year in St. Petersburg to get a better idea of how the backgrounds should look.

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Contributor Bios

Geoff Allen is a Political Science and Russian and Slavic Studies major who is currently completing his senior year at the University of Arizona. He has recently spent 3 months studying Russian language and culture in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Nika Allahverdi immigrated to the United States in 1997 from Azerbaijan. She is a UC Berkeley freshman intending to major in Linguistics. Nika speaks Russian, English, Spanish, and is currently learning French. Anna Matejcek is a History and Slavic Studies double major at Brown. She spent the Fall 2010 semester studying in Moscow. Cristian Macavei is a business administration and Economics major at UC Berkeley who will be graduating in 2012. He was born in Romania and lived there until he was eight years old. At that time he moved to the United States. He has visited Romania several times since then, but he has spent most of his time in California. Cristian speaks Romanian and Spanish.Photography on page 35 and back cover. Rhianna Patrinely is a senior at the University of Kansas. She is majoring in Slavic Languages and Literatures with a double major in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies. She will graduate in May 2012 as a 5th year senior. She has been studying Russian for 3 years and is hoping to go to Krasnoyarsk, Siberia for 5 weeks in the summer of 2011. Julia Nowak is a junior at UC Berkeley. She is an Associate Editor and the Website Design Editor for Troika.Photography on pages 18 & 20.

Maya Garcia is a sophomore at UC Berkeley. She is a Copy Editor for Troika.Cartoons on page 37.

Julie Beigel-Coryell will graduate in 2011 from UC Berkeley with a major in Slavic Studies with a focus on Polish Language and Literature. She did a volunteer project in Gdansk, Poland in Spring 2010, as well as a volunteer/study abroad program in Warsaw in summer 2010. She has also done volunteer work in France and Switzerland. She studies Polish and French languages. Marina Irgon is a undergraduate senior at Brown University, double majoring in Slavic Studies and Economics. She has integrated these disciplines through independent research conducted in both Russia and the Czech Republic. She took this photo of the Yuriev Monastery during the summer of 2008 while studying in St. Petersburg.Photography on page 19. Regina Topolinskaya is a senior at the University of Florida majoring in political science and economics with minors in Russian and history and a European Studies

State University this past summer, and speaks English and Russian and has studied Spanish. Katarina White is a second year History and Slavic Languages and Cultures double major at UC Berkeley. She was born in Serbia, and moved to the United States at a young age. She visits family there almost every summer. She grew up speaking Serbian, and learned English while in preschool. She now studies Russian. Photography on cover, pages 1, 20 & back cover.

Erica Haggerty is a Media Studies major and English minor at UC Berkeley. Natalie Budesa is a junior at UC Berkeley. She is an Associate Editor for Troika.

Christina Monzer is a senior at UC Berkeley. She is an Associate Editor & the Layout and Design Editor for Troika. Photography on page 21.

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The Kornilov Affair and the Bolsheviks: Legitimacy for the Illegitimate

Regina Topolinskaya

one of the most controversial and fascinating events of the Russian Revolution. Occurring on the tail end of a tumultuous summer for the Provisional Government, the events of early September 1917 (late August by the Russian calendar) had shaken

its leader Alexander Kerensky. While shrouded in a cloak of mystery, it is evident that various actors utilized

popularity, as is oftentimes the case in history. While Kerensky attempted to downplay his arguably duplicitous role in the course of events, the

near-‐pariahs to a more mainstream group within the socialist-‐leaning population of Russia. Their perceived success, albeit partially derived

was ultimately linked to the actions of railroad workers who stopped Kornilov’s troops from reaching Petrograd. Given the workers’ pivotal role, this paper’s analysis of Bolshevik

focus on the Bolsheviks’ connection with the railroad and the degree to which they can claim legitimacy

deeper examination of the railroad workers’ political sympathies reveals the limited extent to which the Bolsheviks deserved the praise and increasing popularity they received

Background

General Lavr Kornilov, a Cossack from western Siberia, emerged as the hero of rightist elements in the summer of 1917. Although prominent after February 1917 for his criticism of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, Kornilov gained true notoriety months later with his calls for military discipline. As a self-‐proclaimed Russian patriot, Kornilov’s primary objective remained military successes during World War I, in accordance with Russia’s promises to the Allies.

Kornilov advocated most strongly for reinstatement of the death penalty in the army to punish deserters and dissenters. In July he wrote to Denikin in response to his report on military discipline, “I would sign such a report with both my hands.”1 Denikin’s proposed methods included the resumption of deference

the introduction of special units

mutinies, and the reintroduction of capital punishment in the army.2

The last of these, although agreed to by Kerensky grudgingly in July of 1917, was a radical break from a provision signed into law by Prince Lvov in March 1917, a hallmark of the liberal revolution and as important as more famous provisions for freedom of speech and press. An article in Delo Naroda called it “the greatest victory of the revolution” and largely indicative of the greater freedom accorded to citizens by the revolution.3 Other measures favored by Kornilov and Denikin, among other military personnel, contradicted Order Number 1, which had challenged

to ordinary soldiers. By giving into pressure by Kornilov, Kerensky was betraying the revolution in the eyes of the left.

The reinstatement of the death penalty in the military symbolized Kerensky’s delicate balancing act between the right-‐leaning military, which Kerensky supported in his quest for victory in war, and the soviet, an organization he necessarily was required to share power with for legitimacy with the masses. Kornilov represented a serious rival from the right and center-‐right

possibly a deleterious opponent to the Provisional Government4. His popularity became evident during the Moscow State Conference of that summer when jubilant crowds greeted Kornilov, lining the streets to see the military hero and deliverer of possible order in chaotic revolutionary Russia. Portraits and biographies of Kornilov were also

distributed from automobiles.5 Kornilov was steadily developing his own cult of personality, whether desired or not, in direct opposition to Kerensky’s self-‐manufactured one. The emergence of two distinct

left in early 1917 set the stage for the

are dubious at best. Although key details are either missing or unclear, three possible explanations emerge.

Kerensky saw Kornilov as a rival power that needed to be eliminated for smooth rule by the Provisional Government. Kerensky’s duplicity was present in his negotiations through V.N. Lvov with Kornilov. According to this theory, Kerensky dispatched Lvov to gauge the plausibility of dictatorship and elimination of the power of the Bolsheviks and soviets by Kornilov. Kornilov’s coup then was not a “coup” in the traditional sense of the word at all, but a rather state-‐authorized movement of troops to deal with an anticipated Bolshevik uprising, consistent with his own story.6 When Kerensky realized his prospects for success in this endeavor

of counterrevolutionary activity (as well as a story of Kornilov’s ultimatum to Kerensky via Lvov) to mobilize the soviets and ensure his own salvation.7

A second group of scholars has emerged in support of an attempted coup by Kornilov without the acquiescence of Kerensky. The last strand of explanations comes from scholars who believe that a misunderstanding occurred between Kerensky and Kornilov, the latter ordering troops to march on Petrograd with an assumed governmental mandate and the former interpreting the movement as counterrevolutionary. Regardless of the motives and negotiations

in the situation was neither of the two. The Bolsheviks, weakened by the wave of retributions by the government since the July Days,

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were strengthened by the situation. In a sense, one could call Lenin the

8 Although the Bolsheviks played

an important role in the protection of Petrograd by organizing and arming workers, the primary reason for the defeat of the Kornilov coup was the

9 Three divisions ordered by Kornilov never reached the city due to the actions of these workers. The Bolsheviks capitalized on this in the months following the attempted coup, as later documents will evince, but had

that took place on the railroads which were instrumental in limiting the movement of Kornilovite troops. A more detailed examination of the sympathies of the railway workers and their centralized union yields a clearer picture of their allegiances

counterrevolutionary troops.

Railway organization and role in the Kornilov Affair

The power of railway workers to

dates back to their introduction of a general strike in October 1905, bringing the tsarist government to its knees and contributing to the signing of the liberal October Manifesto by Nicholas II. This strike created a popular pattern of organization followed by railway workers, despite their natural tendencies towards decentralization along lines, after the February Revolution in 1917.10 By that point, railway tracks numbered over 60,000 kilometers, and the industry employed approximately one million people, who controlled the supply of food and military supplies to cities and the front.11

In April 1917, the First All-‐Russian Congress of Railroadmen created the All-‐Russian Union of Railroadmen, a centralized organ of organization, and elected an All-‐Russian Executive Committee of Railroadmen, Vikzhel.12 Craft organizations were instructed to dissolve and become part of the mass participation union. The organization of railway workers was a manifestation of the growth of democratic-‐based mass

organizations throughout Russia. Much of civil society, empowered by the revolution and freedom from tsarist monopoly on organized

similar pattern to that observed in railway labor.

Vikzhel and the union as a whole were plagued by two main problems during their existence, the centralization of railway control and its increasing ties to the Provisional Government. The former contradicted the railway worker’s natural tendencies for low-‐level decentralized organization and control of any issues that would arise by a principle mirroring modern subsidiarity in governmental decision-‐making. Despite the railway union allowing for devolved powers throughout the tiers of control of the railway system via local and road committees, control over issues that pertained to all railway workers, such as strikes and wage bargaining, remained under the centralized union’s monopolization. Line committees also pressed for powers

workers resented.13 Vikzhel would continue to

have large-‐scale troubles with craft unions. In August, a Strike Committee of the Union of Locomotive Operating Crews bypassed the All-‐Russian Union of Railroadmen by declaring an impending strike to assure satisfaction of their drawn-‐out economic demands dating back from May 1917.14 On September 1, the Union of Railroad Engineers similarly decided to halt work on trains not marked as military or Red Cross.15 These incidents indicate the weakness of Vikzhel, generally more conservative and loyalist as a body than its divisions, and its union to control the actions of its composing parts and the tendencies of craft organizations to seek self-‐representation when their demands remained unmet.

The second concern of railway

Nekrasov, Minister of Transport until August 1917, was a proponent of worker control and close connection of the unions and the state, continually working with

civil organizations. As the union continued to closely negotiate with

regarding the position of Vikzhel

as quasi-‐state representatives.

railroad union would morph into a state agency and lose its autonomy.16 These concerns grew as the union was unable to come to compromises

parties of railroadmen involved, an impossible and colossal task in and of itself.

Despite the obstacles faced by the central railway union, it played a crucial role in stopping the Kornilov

committee Vikzhel served as a centralized point of communication with which the soviets could interact. The Petrograd Soviet acted swiftly by creating the Committee for Struggle with Counterrevolution. It was composed of three Bolsheviks,

representatives of the Vtsik and the Executive Committee of Peasants’ Duties, and two representatives each from trade unions and the Petrograd Soviet. The composition was diverse and by no means dominated by Bolsheviks, as the numbers suggest. The committee procured weapons, organized the populace in Petrograd, and ensured the safety of a reliable food supply during the uncertain time. It also initiated contact with the railway workers to preempt the movement of troops into Petrograd through the Railway Bureau of the Soviets by calling on workers to block trains of Kornilovite soldiers.17 Trotsky delineates the following picture of the crucial role played by railway workers: The railroad workers in those days did their duty. In a mysterious way echelons

on the wrong roads. Regiments would arrive in the wrong division, artillery would be sent

get out of communication with their units. All the big stations had their own Soviets, their railroad workers’ and their military committees.

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The telegraphers kept them informed of all events, all movements, all changes. The telegraphers also held up the orders of Kornilov. Information unfavourable to the Kornilovists was immediately, multiplied, distributed, pasted up, passed from mouth to mouth. The machinists, the switchmen, the oilers, became agitators. It was in this atmosphere that the Kornilov echelons advanced – or what was worse, stood still.18

Vikzhel formed a special bureau to deal with the movement of Kornilov’s troops and instructed various rail lines to hold “suspicious telegrams” and inform them of the movement of all suspect military forces, later communicated to the soviets and government. The Bureau authorized radical means, such as blocking or destroying the tracks. In light of these actions, historian Alexander Rabinowitch calls the

crucial of all of Russia’s trade unions during this time.19 The three divisions of the Third Corps commanded by Kornilov to strike at Petrograd stopped by railway workers were the infamous Savage Division on Moskovsko-‐Vindavo-‐Rybinskoi line, the Ussuriisky Mounted Divison on the Baltic line, and the First Don Cossack Division on the Warsaw line.

While stopped on the Moskovsko line, the Savage Division was met by workers who revealed to them the motives for Krymov and Kornilov sending them to Petrograd. Having little desire to overthrow the Provisional Government, the soldiers

“land and freedom” and created a revolutionary committee to spread information to other divisions about the treason of Kornilov. The Ussuriisky Mounted Division was similarly neutralized after workers blocked its railway line. Representatives of the local soviets and the Committee for Struggle (including Tsereteli) convinced the soldiers to remain loyal to the Provisional Government. Although government control over the First Don Cossack Division took longer

than the other two, partly because General Krymov was traveling with the division, agitators were also able to win soldiers over to the government side, making the impractical plausibility of Krymov marching the troops to Petrograd,

trains were stopped,.20 The actions of railway workers ensured that skirmishes were almost non-‐existent

Petrograd remained in the hands of the Provisional Government.

Bolsheviks and railway workers: misalignment of goals and motivations

What led the railway workers to thwart Kornilov’s military and political plans? While Bolsheviks have argued that the workers that engaged in these actions were either Bolsheviks or Bolshevized, the true motives for their actions are governed by more complicated explanations. As the bedrock of the

it was crucial for the Bolsheviks to establish a link with the actions of railway workers which in reality existed simply in a weak form. The true motives of the railroadmen are best explained, not by ideological alignment with Bolshevism, but in four broader ways, undercutting Bolshevik legitimacy drawn from the event.

The most elementary reason for the actions of the railway workers was their opposition to the goals and political ideals of Kornilov. From a broad standpoint, railway workers were supportive of the revolution and, as later discussed, loyalist on the whole. Their recollections of the tsarist era were generally not pleasant, concerning the treatment of workers and their labor associations, where they existed. Kornilov, by being branded a counterrevolutionary, was related to the tsar in the minds of the workers. Much like the White generals Denikin and Wrangel during the civil war, Kornilov’s image

railway workers’ practical aims, Kornilov advocated militarization of

the railways, a measure that would challenge the joint worker and state control that had been instituted since February.21 Kornilov had demanded this provision in August after rumors of a general railway strike spread in the capital.22 These demands, along with Kornilov’s counterrevolutionary desires to curtail workers’ freedom gained since February, likely made the choice to stop his troops an easy one.

Additionally, the railway workers’ sympathies on the whole

number of service personnel, who were disproportionately involved in running the railway union, such as clerks, trainmen, station

engine personnel, leaned toward the SR’s.23 The First All-‐Russian Congress of Railroadmen in April 1917 included an overwhelming majority of Mensheviks, SR’s, and Internationalists, and although several Bolsheviks delegates from the workers were in attendance, they constituted a small minority. The second congress held in August featured no candidates, although the Bolsheviks had increased their

Congress.24 Their insistence on continuing as an anti-‐system party during this time may have contributed to their poor performance during the second congress. The summer congress eventually passed a resolution in full support of the

the allegiances that would be called 25 On

the whole, railways workers can be characterized as supportive of the soviets and Provisional Government, making their cooperation with the government and contact with the soviets natural during the Kornilov

Since February, the party had realized the crucial role these workers could play in their rise to power and devoted itself to agitation against the union and Vikzhel, positioning itself as an anti-‐status quo party, much like its position in Petrograd. In July 1917 the Central Committee of the party even created a commission under the chairmanship of Stalin to work on

26 As

Regina Topolinskaya

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craft unions grew during the summer of 1917, lower-‐ranking railway workers created Madzhel, just as locomotive engineers and service employees before them had done, increasing their class consciousness and group solidarity.27 Trotsky notes that during the October Revolution, a topic beyond the scope of this paper, lower ranks of railway servants recognized the power of Bolshevik Commissioners, hinting at the class-‐based nature of the party’s support in areas where it existed.28

The gains made by the Bolsheviks among the workers should not be hyperbolized. Looking beyond the limited gains among lower class railway workers, the Bolsheviks

appealing goals. Their message of long-‐term centralized control of railways contrasted with workers’ tendencies for worker control and decentralization, as already portrayed in their interaction with Vikzhel and the railway union.29 Conscious of this ideological setback, Shliapnikov, a member of the commission set up by the Bolsheviks for railway agitation among workers, espoused democratic principles on the railroads, while Stalin called for more centralization.30 In the summer of 1917, with an ideological view closer to Stalin’s, the party had little

of tangible results or theoretical arguments.

Despite these gains for

incorrect to characterize the railway workers who stopped Kornilovite troops in September as Bolsheviks or Bolshevized. The complicated

structure makes this evident. Their sympathies, based on turnout at congresses and the inability of the Bolsheviks to theoretically or practically appeal to a wide segment of workers without class-‐based slogans, leaned loyalist toward the government, rather than anti-‐government Bolsheviks. Many of their sympathies lay more distantly from the Bolsheviks and closer to those of Pyotr Arshinov, a railroad workshop storeman from Orel Province, who wrote to Kerensky to “slap an iron harness on those who are obviously

leading the Fatherland to its ruin. Rip the accursed weeds out of our native

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motives for railway assistance to the government lie with Vikzhel and the railway union leaderships’ political leaning. The majority of railway workers (likely the ones who did the physical work of stopping trains

anti-‐Kornilov and pro-‐government reasons. Without the coordination by Vikzhel of orders sent from the

have been non-‐existent. The next two motives explain why Vikzhel took upon itself the duty to save the government and revolution.

Vikzhel played an integral part

deal with the tumultuous events of September and maintaining a link between the rail lines and the

of its members. Vikzhel’s forty-‐member establishment at the time consisted of fourteen SR’s, seven Mensheviks, three Popular Socialists, two Bolsheviks, one Bolshevik sympathizer, two Interdict Committee representatives, and eleven non-‐

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far from Bolshevik and were dominated by moderates and SR’s, whose loyalties would lie with the Provisional Government and soviets. Certainly, no counterrevolutionaries were among its ranks, making the decisions to communicate with railway lines to halt troops a clear one.

Vikzhel’s close connection to the government is also useful for explaining its support of anti-‐Kornilovite measures. Minister of Transport Nekrasov espoused worker participation in industrial organization and unionization for the smooth operation of industry. His theory of management can be most closely explained in modern-‐day economic terms as “corporatist,” bringing together workers and employers (herein the government) for negotiations. Nekrasov had secured funds, thousands of rubles, for the organization of the railway union, which he envisioned as an autonomous state union with

positive spillover to Russian citizens,

of railway workers. Nekrasov also made war bonuses available to railway workers, although the

worker support of the government a moot point.22 Although Nekrasov had been replaced by August 1917 and Miliukov doubted whether there was a strong commitment to the ideals of worker control within the government in the run up to the Kornilov coup, the foundational

the railway union in April 1917 and connections it fostered with Vikzhel

the government and soviets.34 Given these four motives for mass

railway and Vikzhel mobilization

the Bolsheviks remain in their actions

lack of inclusion in the stoppage of the railways, an instrumental event in the course of the history of the revolution, the Bolsheviks must be ascribed a peripheral role in preventing the attempted Kornilov coup. Undoubtedly their actions in mobilizing workers into “Red Guards”

actions were preemptive and not necessary in the realized course of history since the three division of the Third Corps did not reach Petrograd

contribution, the reality remains that the Bolsheviks did gain substantially from the event.

The Bolsheviks perceived

point in their struggle against the bourgeoisie.Transformed from near-‐pariahs, the government had sought their assistance and exposed its weaknesses. The change in the status of the party among the people as a

is the writings of Lenin and Trotsky. Trotsky wrote that “the growth of

Bolsheviks was undoubted, and it had now received an irresistible impetus.”35 Lenin, in a document about the situation of the Bolsheviks in mid-‐September, similarly wrote

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that the revolution had been moving at an “unparalleled speed” and, like Trotsky, labeled the Kornilov coup as the event that exposed the unfair treatment of the government to the Bolsheviks. Lenin wrote:

the Kornilov revolt is that with extraordinary force, it opened the people’s eyes to a fact which the S.R.s and Mensheviks had concealed and still are concealing under conciliatory phrases. The fact is that the landowners and the bourgeoisie, headed by the Cadet Party, and the

on their side, have organised themselves; they are ready to commit, or are committing, the most outrageous crimes, such as surrendering Riga (followed by Petrograd) to the Germans, laying the war front open, putting the Bolshevik

mutiny, leading troops against the capital with the “Savage Division” at their head, etc. The purpose of all this is to seize power completely and put it in the hands of the bourgeoisie, to consolidate the power of the landowners in the countryside, and to drench the country in the blood of workers and peasants. The Kornilov revolt has proved for Russia what has been proved throughout history for all countries, namely, that the bourgeoisie will betray their country and commit any crime to retain both their power over

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disarm both the left in the soviets and parties in government. Although, as explained earlier, the Mensheviks and SR’s played a crucial role in Vikzhel’s operations during the

workers’ own sympathies, Lenin portrays all political elements sans Bolsheviks as losing credibility from the incident.

Lenin and Trotsky were correct in their assessments. The predictions of the Bolsheviks had manifested

themselves in Kornilov’s planned coup. Despite not partaking in

Kornilov, the Bolsheviks did gain legitimacy from the event. Kerensky, whether guilty of complicity or not, was discredited by mid-‐September. The Mensheviks and SR’s of the soviets, the so-‐called “compromisers,” whose popularity should have

contributions in coordinating with the railways and having similar sympathies to the railway workers that stopped Kornilovite troops, lost seats in the September Petrograd soviet. The Bolsheviks, propelled in part by their actions during September, had attained a majority of seats in the Moscow and Petrograd soviets, causing Lenin to proclaim that the time to assume power had come. Undoubtedly the Kornilov

for the Bolsheviks, and as Kerensky would later put it, “a prelude to Bolshevism.” Ironically, Kerensky’s gambit to repel the right paved the road for a one-‐party dictatorship by the left.

Notes1 Lavr Kornilov, in Ronald Kowalski, Russian Revolution 1917-1921 (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 70.2 A.I. Denikin, in Kowalski, Russian Revolution 1917-1921, p. 68.3 “The Magnanimity of the Russian Revolution,” in Alexander F. Kerensky and Robert Paul Browder, The Russian Provisional Government 1917: Documents, I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 203-‐204.4 Although associated with the right, Kornilov’s support relied heavily on center-‐right intellectuals. For further reading on the level of Kadet support of Kornilov, see Richard Stites, introduction to The Russian Revolution, I, by Paul N. Miliukov (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1978), p. xvii. Additional anecdotal evidence also comes

The Russian Review 12, no. 4 (1953): 242.5 Ibid.6

Reinterpretation,” Russian Review 29, no. 3 (1970): 300.7

articulated in this paper, see N. Ukraintsev, “The

Reinterpretation,” p. 296.8

9 Ibid., 249.10 Wilson R. Augustine, “Russia’s Railwaymen, July-‐October 1917,” Russian Review 24, no. 4 (1965): 667.

11William G. Rosenberg, “The Democratization of Russian’s Railroads in 1917,” The American Historical Review 86, no.5 (1981): 985.12Augustine, “Russia’s Railwaymen,” p. 668.13Rosenberg, “The Democratization of Russia’s Railroads,” p. 99414 “The Threat of a Railroad Strike,” in Alexander F. Kerensky and Robert Paul Browder, The Russian Provisional Government 1917 Documents, II (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961): 756-‐757.15 “Railway Engineers in Russia Vote to Stop Work in Part,” New York Times, September 2, 1917, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-‐free/pdf?_r=1&res=9A05E7DB103BE03ABC4A53DFBF66838C609EDE (accessed December 12, 2009).16 Rosenberg, “The Democratization of Russia’s Railroads,” p. 1001.17

18 Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, II, Marxists Internet Archive, http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1930/hrr/ch33.htm (accessed December 12, 2009).19 Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power: The Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1976), pp. 141-‐142.20 Ibid., 146-‐14921

22“Acting War Minister Resigns His Post,” New York Times, August 25, 1917, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-‐free/pdf?res=9C06E4DD123FE433A25756C2A96E9C946696D6CF (accessed December 12, 2009).23 Rosenberg, “The Democratization of Russia’s Railroads,” p. 986.24 Naglovski, in Kerensky and Browder, The Russian Provisional Government 1917, II, pp. 763-‐764.25 Augustine, “Russia’s Railwaymen,” p. 672.26 Naglovski, in Kerensky and Browder, The Russian Provisional Government 1917, II, p. 763.27 Rosenberg, “The Democratization of Russia’s Railroads,” p. 1004.28 Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-‐Litovsk, II, Marxists Internet Archive, http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1918/hrr/ch02.htm (accessed December 12, 2009).29Augustine, “Russia’s Railwaymen,” p. 676.30 Naglovski, in Kerensky and Browder, The Russian Provisional Government 1917, II, p. 763.31 Pyotr Arshinov , in Mark D. Steinberg, Voices of Revolution, 1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001): 191.32 Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power, p. 142.33 Rosenberg, “The Democratization of Russia’s Railroads,” p. 996.34

retractions of support for worker control, found in Milukov, The Russian Revolution, I, p. 161.35Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-‐Litovsk, I, Marxists Internet Archive, http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1918/hrr/ch01.htm (accessed December 12, 2009).36V.I. Lenin, “Draft Resolution on the Present Political Situation,” Lenin Collected Works, Marxists Internet Archive, http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/sep/03b.htm (accessed December 12, 2009).

11

Regina Topolinskaya

‘We Have Such Things’: Government and Civilian Experiences of the Kitchen Debate in the United States and Soviet Union

Anna Matejcek

At the July 24, 1959 opening of the American National Exhibition in Moscow’s Sokolniki Park, in front of the Whirlpool Miracle Kitchen display, Soviet General Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and American Vice-‐President Richard Nixon engaged in a much-‐publicized debate on the respective merits of their dishwashers, housing developments, and economic systems. While this exchange

regarding the attributes of an ideal

point of consensus: the production of consumer goods as a measure of success. This new focus on living standards increasingly dominated Cold War discourse during the mid-‐1950s to early 1960s, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy, and served as the impetus for the organization of national exhibitions like the American National Exhibition in Moscow (ANEM), on which this paper will focus.

The recasting of the Cold War as a competition of living standards can be traced back to the American

the core of a new social order” and subsequent construction of ‘The American Way of Life,’ characterized by the acquisition of domestic appliances and the retreat into suburbia.1 While membership in white, middle-‐class society, with its Frigidaires and Cadillacs, was not a realistic goal for all Americans, ‘The American Way of Life’ quickly came to represent an idealized version of American values and society that the

defend against the collectivism and egalitarianism of the Soviet Union. In response to this American challenge, Khrushchev, rather than choosing to reject consumer goods as a measure of progress, proved eager to set Soviet achievements against those of the United States and convince Americans that the communist system was indeed improving the lives of the Soviet populace. In contrast to earlier, more

ideological opposition to the United States, the Soviet approach to the kitchen debate can be characterized by the following remark made by Khrushchev in response to Nixon’s praise of the American model home at ANEM: “We have such things.”2

While existing scholarship has examined the ways in which this new emphasis on consumption endowed the American and Soviet publics with greater agency and political importance, this paper will analyze

to explore the discrepancies, or the

civilian experiences of the kitchen debate in both the United States and the Soviet Union. For the American and Soviet leadership the kitchen debate represented a new stage of Cold War competition in which the goal was to outdo the other in terms of housing and appliances, as opposed to rockets. However, civilian experiences of the kitchen debate were characterized by a deeper, more personal examination of both their own system, and that of ‘the other.’ While average Americans understood the kitchen debate as a

of Life’ and ‘sell’ it to the Soviets, most Soviet citizens perceived the kitchen debate as an opportunity to see

managed to produce, and to decide whether they or the Americans were

During the mid-‐1950s American government propaganda and foreign policy rhetoric began to place new emphasis on the country’s allegedly superior consumer goods and standard of living. This decisive shift in rhetoric that initiated the reframing of the Cold War in terms

from the failure of earlier, more abstractly ideological propaganda messages, and secondly, from the American postwar focus on consumerism as a means of security and social mobility. For the American government, this reconstitution of the Cold War as competition of living standards allowed politicians

to tie American abundance to liberal capitalism, thereby implying that such prosperity was not possible under the Soviet system.3

As the kitchen debate unfolded, American propaganda moved away from more abstract concepts like “freedom and justice for all” towards a less controversial focus on consumer goods and the new ‘people’s capitalism’ that was “fabulously

few, but the many.”4 While 1940s propaganda lauding more abstract values was initially successful, these claims became increasingly

the growing civil rights and feminist movements, thus necessitating a change in rhetoric. Beginning in 1950, state-‐sanctioned pamphlets like Amerika, published in Russian, were increasingly dominated by

‘people’s capitalism’ and enjoying “the highest standard of living in the world today.”5

development in shaping the American government’s experience of the kitchen debate was that of the idealized ‘American Way of Life’ during the late 1940s and 1950s. The postwar years had witnessed the development of a “myth of American

concealed” and Americans were portrayed as a “classless...and

homogeneity, combined with the relative prosperity of the 1950s, was central to the construction of ‘The American Way of Life,’ characterized by white, middle-‐class suburbia,

domestic and foreign policy during the kitchen debate.6 This ‘American Way of Life’ represented “an ideal that those of the working class sought to emulate,” but was in fact out of reach for most ethnic minorities and members of the lower class — a fact

point out.7 Regardless of its actual attainability, this image of secure,

12

the government to simultaneously

and develop a sense of American identity presented as being inherently incompatible with communism.

By the mid-‐1950s the

image of America and Americans it hoped to project abroad, and in 1959

clear goal of presenting American society in its best light and marketing liberal capitalism to the Soviet public.8 While the washing machines, Pepsi-‐Cola and make-‐up displayed at the exhibition seemed harmless enough, the statements of American government authorities demonstrate a conscious attempt to package ‘The American Way of Life’ and sell it as a product available exclusively under the system of liberal capitalism, thereby undermining communism in terms of its ability to provide citizens with the desired consumer goods and standard of living. As Katherine Howard, Deputy U.S. Commissioner General to the Brussels World Fair (1957–58), stated in 1959,“We must not lose sight of the fact...that

in a psychological battle to win the uncommitted nations to the free way of life. This is the main reason Congress brought us into being, and why the United States is participating in this exhibition...It is one of the wonders of the world that Americans in every economic strata have kitchens with labor-‐saving devices which free the American woman from drudgery, which make the kitchen the heart of the home.”9 Government authorities saw the kitchen debate as ‘psychological battle’ between the American ideology of domesticity and the grim image of Soviet frugality and were thus willing to dedicate an unbelievable amount of time and resources to ANEM in order to communicate the image of ‘The

as possible.One episode in particular

that demonstrates the extent to which American government

ANEM as a competition between homogenous American contentment and communism is the massive controversy surrounding the

selection of exhibition artwork. After a United States Information Agency-‐selected jury decided upon the paintings and shipped them to Moscow, research on the sixty-‐seven selected artists concluded

with Communist fronts and causes, twenty-‐two of whom had

American communist movements.10 Representative Francis E. Walter, Chairman of the House on Un-‐American Activities (HUAC), singled out Jack Levine’s 1946 painting Welcome Home in particular. The painting, which portrays a grotesque,

military general, was intended to imply contrast with the experiences of common American soldiers and to thus criticize American military hierarchy.11 Walter’s objection to the piece’s inclusion in the fair was that it would “help the Kremlin convince its enslaved people that its vicious propaganda about American military leaders is true, and even supported by the American people.”12 While the piece was ultimately allowed to remain at the exhibition, this debate indicates the extent to which the American government consciously manipulated the image it sent abroad. Rather than simply “trying to show them what America is like,” as the fair’s general manager stated, ANEM was understood as an opportunity to present Soviets with an idealized version of cohesive, prosperous American society that they would be unable to compete with.

The kitchen debate’s focus on living standards, in tandem with the proximity facilitated by increased Soviet-‐American exchange, made it possible for the American government to place increased pressure on the Soviet Union. As one Russian visitor to the fair stated, the United States’ overarching message at ANEM seemed to be “Look, see how wealthy we are.”13 Abundance, cleanliness, and the absence of drudgery were painted as “automatic by-‐products of capitalism,” while a “more covert...condescending, message [implied]

genetic, and moral strength of a

nation.”14 The American government believed that by presenting their superior automobiles, blenders and hairdryers they would be able to

wanted ‘The American Way of Life’ and secondly, that communism was incapable of providing it.

The American government’s experience of the kitchen debate was one of conscious competition with the Soviet Union; every interaction between the two countries was a chance to convince Soviets that liberal capitalism was superior to communism. While Harold McClellan, the Los Angeles industrialist selected as the exhibition’s general manger, told the New York Times “I’m not trying to prove that we’re better than they or that they’re worthless...”15American rhetoric and activity surrounding the broader kitchen debate and ANEM consciously linked the high quality and availability of American consumer goods to American capitalism and freedom. As Nixon told Khrushchev in the original kitchen debate, “To us, the diversity, the right to choose...is the most important thing. We don’t have one decision made at the top

machines so that the housewives have a choice.”16

American civilian experience of

greatly from that of the American government given that ‘The American Way of Life’ was not only the main tenet of American propaganda, but also a dominant idea in American domestic consciousness. As Elaine Tyler May writes, “The appliance-‐laden ranch-‐style home epitomized the expansive, secure lifestyle that postwar Americans wanted. Within the protective walls of the modern home, worrisome developments like sexual liberation, women’s

lead not to decadence but to a wholesome family life...Suburbia would serve as a bulwark against

17 For average Americans, the acquisition of symbols associated with ‘The American Way of Life’ — the suburban home, the new dishwasher,

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TROIKA

the family car — was important both in terms of facilitating upward mobility and defending American values against subversive political ideas and communism.

The representation of ANEM in mainstream American media demonstrates overwhelming support for the exhibition and its goal of “[giving] Americans a chance to make Russians more restlessly aware of the gulf between U.S. and Soviet standards of living.”18 During July 1959 articles about ANEM dominated the American press, from the New York Times to Better Homes and Gardens, suggesting that the success of the fair was understood as being important not only for the Soviets, but for American domestic society. Excitement surrounding the exhibition was ubiquitous, and some journalists even went so far as to label the exhibition “nothing less than the confrontation of two civilizations.”19 Most articles were liberal in their praise for American society, in which the “consumer is king, where the great bulk of the productive mechanism is devoted to satisfying people’s wants, be they necessities or whims” while the Soviet Union is portrayed as the “regimented....society in which for over four decades leaders...have decided what should be produced on the basis of an ideology which

steel mill while viewing the washing machine and the dishwasher... as of scant consequence.”20 The Cold War and the kitchen debate, far from being seen as the unique concern of political elites, increasingly entered the public domain and domestic discourse during the 1950s — a development further demonstrated by the proliferation of advice articles and product announcements like “How to Win the Chore War,” “The Detergents Strike Back” and “This Kitchen Took Cover.”21

Statements by Americans working at the Moscow exhibition also support this conception of the kitchen debate as a means to expose Soviets to the bounties of liberal capitalism and thereby convince them of communism’s obsoleteness. American participants in the exhibition were hand-‐picked

by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and thus unlikely to include citizens involved in progressive political movements, however, their views were generally representative of the general population. While beginning in 1960 public intellectuals and other sources of authority would begin to suggest that “excessive materialism,

moral confusion... impaired America’s global performance and reputation,” during the 1950s critics of American consumerism and ‘The American Way of Life’ were few and far apart. The prevailing attitude towards the 1959 exhibition was one of pride and excitement to educate Soviets about the wonders of American fashions and appliances.22 Take, for example, the December 1959 Better Homes and Gardens article written by Anne Anderson, the daughter of Russian immigrants and senior demonstrator for the Whirlpool Miracle Kitchen at the Moscow exhibition.23

Anderson displays a decidedly maternalistic attitude towards Soviet women, presenting them as comically misinformed about the realities of American life and asking questions like “Do American women work? Are these unmarried? I thought married women just sat at home!” “Now tell us truthfully, do you live in a home as nice as the model home shown here? Yours is better! How? How many rooms do you have? Who lives with you? Just you and your husband! Why don’t your parents live with you?” and “In the bedroom of the model apartment there are four or

you don’t own that many, do you? You brought six pairs to Moscow! Didn’t you leave any at home! How many?” This sense of superiority, founded in American women’s greater access to consumer goods like hairdryers and makeup, is representative of American civilian attitudes towards the kitchen debate. Americans saw themselves as privileged and hoped to use ANEM as an opportunity to

convince their Soviets counterparts that liberal capitalism would allow them to access the same luxuries Americans were already able to

encapsulates American attitudes towards the Soviet Union: “I consider myself very lucky to have been born an American. The special awareness of being American — in Russia —

at the Moscow airport.”24 The consensus on ‘The American Way of Life’ as an ideal worth protecting rendered American government and civilian experiences of the kitchen debate almost identical. While the American public relied on the government to protect their way of life, the popular dream of upward mobility strengthened the credibility of the government’s foreign policy message regarding the superiority of liberal capitalism.

The reconstitution of the Cold War as a competition to raise living standards presented a major, perhaps insurmountable challenge to the Soviet regime. While Khrushchev told Nixon “If you want to live under capitalism, go ahead...it doesn’t concern us. We can feel sorry for you,” he still found it necessary to place agitators among Soviet visitors to ANEM, giving them the task of monitoring “pro-‐American manifestations and excesses of enthusiasm on the part of Soviet visitors.”25,26 Despite Khrushchev’s

seemed uncertain whether the Soviet public would withstand the attractions of American consumerism, or completely surrender themselves to it. The Soviet regime’s experience of the kitchen debate was one of being constantly on the defensive; it could do little but watch as citizens saw the bounties

for themselves whether American capitalism or Soviet communism seemed more promising.

The Soviet government’s insecurity regarding ANEM and the sudden proximity of ‘The American Way of Life’ is further demonstrated

attempts to manipulate the goods Americans would be able display at the exhibition. General Manager McClellan’s negotiations with Soviet authorities revealed that they were frightened by the American “emphasis on style and conspicuous

Anna Matejcek

14

consumption... as opposed to quantity,” and on May 25, 1959 Soviet

would not be able to give away the makeup kits provided by Coty or the Pepsi-‐Cola and souvenir paper cups.28 While the cola was ultimately allowed, and subsequently became one of the exhibition’s great hits, distribution of the makeup kits was barred. Further attempts to temper ANEM’s message of unending

and convenience” are evident in

press agency, Tass.29 In a dispatch from one of its correspondents in New York, Tass reported that “there is no more truth in showing this as the typical home of the American worker than, say, in showing the Taj Mahal as the typical home of a Bombay textile worker.”30 While this was an attempt to discredit ANEM’s claim that it depicted the life of an average America, Tass’s criticism was certainly warranted. Although few Americans saw the exhibition “as any wild exaggeration, even if the lily is gilded here and there,” the Whirlpool Miracle Kitchen alone cost $250,000 and included various electrical contrivances, push-‐button-‐operated appliances, and a ‘robotic maid’ that was actually a remote-‐

operated by a hidden technician, and it was certainly not representative of the kitchens most Americans possessed.31

Historically, the Soviet regime had given both ideological and economic priority to production, rather than consumption, thus nervousness surrounding this new emphasis on consumer goods is not surprising. On one hand Khrushchev tried to downplay American progress, asking “This is what America is capable of? And how long has she existed? 300 years? 150 years of independence and this is her level. We haven’t quite reached 42 years, and in another 7 years, we’ll be at the level of America, and after that we’ll go farther” but on the other hand, he proved determined to convince Nixon that the communist system was just at adept at providing citizens with amenities as the capitalist system.32 For example, upon seeing the model

home at ANEM he asserted, “We have steel workers and peasants

for a house.”33 The kitchen debate challenged the Soviet Union to develop an economic system that could focus on producing consumer goods while continuing to facilitate the rejection of materialism. The kitchen debate pushed the Soviet regime into unknown territory; the new consensus on living standards and consumer goods as the

the government to try and catch up with the United States while still maintaining a rejection of blatant consumerism.

The Soviet civilian experience of the kitchen debate is characterized by skepticism and assertions that the excess of consumer goods was not a worthy replacement for the communist values of collectivism and egalitarianism. While there is certainly a “close congruence” between popular evaluations expressed in conversations with ANEM guides, as well as in the comment books, and authoritative

was not necessarily unidirectional.”34 In fact, in many cases it seems that the Soviet government gave its population too little credit with regards to their ability to withstand the sparkle of American consumerism.

Despite initial curiosity surrounding the exhibition and

Americans lived, many of the 2.7 million Soviet citizens who passed through the fair articulated disappointment with the image of ‘The American Way of Life.’ Authors of many of the comments in the fair’s

producers, rather than consumers, and criticized the exhibition’s emphasis on consumer goods, asking “Where is the American technology that supposedly enabled you to reach your standard of living? ....where is it, this famous America, that great industrial power with its highly developed technology, science, and agriculture?”35 Although many Soviets were certainly fascinated by the goods displayed, for example, the woman who shouted to her

husband “You want to see tractors, then go and see tractors, but leave me alone!” as she headed for the displays of shoes and lingerie, but Americans eavesdropping on visitors’ conversations observed that, overall, more negative than positive comments were made. Despite the pride and enthusiasm that surrounded the exhibition’s opening in American public discourse, a United States Information Agency postmortem concluded that despite the American media’s presentation of the fair as a “smash hit” that had “wowed” Moscow, it “wasn’t,” and “it didn’t.”36

While average Soviet citizens certainly wanted the government to improve their living standards, they were by no means swayed by ‘The American Way of Life’ presented in American propaganda, and at ANEM. Insofar as ANEM visitors cast themselves as consumers, they demonstrated a distinctly rational attitude towards consumption, as opposed to the irrational shopaholic with insatiable desires. While in Anne Anderson’s article in Better Homes and Gardens she describes how Soviet women wondered at the model home and pushed aside agitators, apologizing “Ignore that fool!”, the most common attitude towards the plethora of material goods was one of skepticism and criticism of American materialism; as one citizen asked an American guide, “Nixon said that people buy ten to twelve pairs of shoes. Why so many? Are they so bad?”37 Many Soviets expressed a more favorable view of the Polish exhibition in Moscow than that they held of ANEM — it was much smaller, “but, in a way, it made a better (if not bigger) impression; the shipbuilding section — there was nothing like it at the American show — was really impressive; also the consumer goods were attractive, and the modern art (though our more orthodox critics fumed about it) interested people a lot.” To the apparent surprise of government authorities, the kitchen debate did

liberal capitalism; on the contrary, ANEM seemed to convince Soviets of the merits of their own system. As one Moscow worker stated, “We

15

TROIKA

don’t need such huge and luxurious automobiles at this time. I wouldn’t buy one like that. But a little mini car (mashinka) to drive with the family

at the weekend — that’s what I’d buy.”39 While the American press seemed unwilling to accept that Soviets were indeed underwhelmed by the 1959 fair, demonstrated, for example, by the assertion of one American reporter that “Those individuals who are not conditioned by ideological outlook seem to come away from the exhibition with positive impressions,” it was in fact so — most Soviets had been genuinely disappointed by ‘The American Way of Life’ portrayed at ANEM.40

The American model of freedom, progress, and prosperity, based on “individual wealth and consumption, was not desirable for Soviet people if not accompanied by the core

while social security, housing and free education and health care were

pride.41 The civilian experience of ANEM can be summed up by the comments of a Russian journalist who reported on the fair: “People were impressed, and yet not as much as one might have expected. A few, of course, were quite starry-‐eyed. But most of them thought it was too much like a department store, a sort of super-‐GUM, with lots of very nice goods, rather better than ours; but so what? We’d catch up with them in a few years where that sort of thing was concerned. They hadn’t had a war the way we had; so what the hell?”42

The years of the Khrushchev thaw, from the mid-‐1950s to early 1960s allowed for the increased exchange of ideas and visitors between the United States and the Soviet Union, facilitating civilian involvement in the Cold War to an extent previously unseen. In 1958 alone 7,000 Americans visited the Soviet Union, and though the number of Soviets who travelled to the United States was much smaller,

ANEM allowed Soviets to both interact with American civilians and see for themselves the fabled ‘The American Way of Life,’ no matter

how skewed the image presented at ANEM actually was. However, this climate of relative openness did not by any means lessen the extent to which all interactions between the two superpowers were perceived as political, nor did it prevent the Soviets and Americans from taking any opportunity to ‘one up’ the other — as David Zaslavsky wrote in Pravda on November 7, 1959, “the warmer the international relations, the more acute the ideological battle.”43

The kitchen debate illustrated American and Soviet government consensus that “the future would be determined by the economic system that provided the best products for the most people” but also revealed

and American attitudes towards consumer goods and the role of government.44 While the American public eagerly supported the image of their government as a “transatlantic crusader...striving for the satisfaction of consumers’ every desire...against the darkness of Third World poverty and the dinginess of state socialism,” most Soviets were hesitant to jump on the consumerist bandwagon.45 While the Soviet government fought to convince the Americans that ‘we have such things,’ the Soviet public seemed to be asking whether they really needed such things.

Notes1

Ideals and Realities,” in Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War, ed. Lary May (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 171. 2 Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, “The Kitchen Debate,” 1959, Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Soviet Union. <http://teachingamericanhistory.o rg/ l i b ra ry/ index . a sp?document=176> 3 Cynthia Lee Henthorn, From Submarines to Suburbs: Selling a Better America, 1939-‐1959 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006): 1. 4Andrew L. Yarrow, “Selling a New Vision of America to the World: Changing Messages in Early U.S. Cold War Print Propaganda,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11 (Fall 2009): 33. 5Ibid6Jackson Lears, “A Matter of Taste: Corporate Cultural Hegemony in a Mass-‐Consumption Society,” in Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War, ed. Lary May (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989): 41. 7Ibid,51.8 Robert H. Haddow, Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997): 168. 9 Ibid, 159.10 Marilyn S. Kushner, “Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow 1959:

Domestic Politics and Cultural Diplomacy,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4 (Winter 2002):11.11 Ibid.12 Ibid. 13 Susan E. Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-‐Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” Slavic Review 61 (Summer, 2002): 892.14 Henthorn, From Submarines to Suburbs, 3. 15 Interestingly, the title of this New York Times article is “Salesman for Capitalism.”16 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998): 17.17 Ibid, 20. 18 Karal Ann Marling, As Seen on TV: The Visual Culture of Everyday Life in the 1950s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994): 260.19 Jane M. Woolsey, “Cold War in the Kitchen: The Cultural Politics of the Kitchen Debate” (MA thesis, State University of New York College at Oneonta, 2001): 1959.20 Ibid.21 Henthorn, 230. From Submarines to Suburbs, 3. 22 David Brian Howard, “Between Avant-‐Garde and Kitsch: Pragmatic Liberalism, Public Arts Funding, and the Cold War in the United States,” Canadian Review of American Studies 34 (2004): 294.23 A. Anderson, “I Might Have Been One in that Russian Crowd!” Better Homes and Gardens, December 1959, 54.24 Ibid.25 Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-‐Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” 877.26G.A. Zhukov, head of the Soviet Union’s Committee for Cultural Relations and Abroad argued that the Americans also used agitators at the June 1959 Soviet National Exhibition. He cites an August 2,1959 New York Times article describing an “Information Center for Americans Visiting Russia” on East 6th Street set up by The Washington Institute for Government

role was to distribute anti-‐Soviet propaganda and facilitate espionage. Alexander Werth, The Khrushchev Phase: The Soviet Union Enters the Decisive Sixties (London: Hale, 1961):190. 27 Haddow, Pavilions of Plenty, 209. 28 Ibid.Woolsey, “Cold War in the Kitchen,” xxii. 29“Nixon Will Visit Moscow in July to Open Exhibit,” New York Times, April 17, 1959.31 Haddow, Pavillions of Plenty, 217.32 Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, “The Kitchen Debate,” 1959, Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Soviet Union. <http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=176>33Ibid. 34 Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen,” 879.35 Ibid, 892. 36 Ibid, 857.37 Ibid, 895. 38 Werth, The Khrushchev Phase, 173.39 Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen,” 878.40 Ibid, 876.41 Ibid, 903. 42 Werth, The Khrushchev Phase, 173.43 Ibid, 188.44 Haddow, Pavillions of Plenty, 214.45 Paul Betts, “The Rise and Fall of the American ‘Soft’ Empire,” review of Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through Twentieth Century Europe, by Victoria DeGrazia, History Workshop Journal, Spring 2007, 341.

Anna Matejcek

16

Julie Beigel-Coryell

Chopindimonium

On March 10, 2010, I rang in Frédéric Chopin’s 200th birthday at UC Berkeley by surprising my Polish class with gingerbread and monopolizing the chalkboard with the mammoth message: “Wszystkiego najlepszego z okazji urodzin Chopina!” My excitement provoked a few bemused smirks, but otherwise no one seemed impressed that the musical hero of Poland has remained relevant for two centuries.

But considering his music’s precarious role throughout Poland’s history, it’s a wonder that Chopin’s legacy remains. As a political exile in France after 1830, Chopin crafted musical collections including dozens of “mazurkas” and “polonaises” to commemorate the Polish culture

wars, failed uprisings, and foreign occupations. Due to its inherent “Polishness,” his music repeatedly faced the same threats of erasure endured by the nation itself. Public performances of his works were censured under tsarist rule in the 19th century. In the 20th century, his music was banned under Nazi occupation. It is no wonder, then,

Poland, the Polish people cherish his enduring music as a hallmark of Polish resilience. Nor is it any wonder that in 2010, Chopin’s name would carry more celebrity in his homeland than it did when he left Warsaw 180 years before.

I hadn’t planned to end up in Warsaw for the Chopin bicentenary celebrations, but it’s a welcome twist of fate that I did. I have always been a classical music fan but have been particularly devoted to Chopin’s music for the past several years. So I nearly squealed with delight when I landed at Warsaw Frederic Chopin Airport (yes, this is really its name) and found the city wallpapered with announcements for nonstop concerts, festivals, and tours in celebration of “His Year.”

Without allowing time even to overcome jet lag, I went to work. I wore my shoes to the heel running around town snapping photos of all

broken Polish, I asked shop owners and the random passersby to capture

me posing precariously next to his name, or holding my hand at just the right angle so that his head would

snacked on Chopin chocolates while sitting on Chopin musical benches, which, at the press of a button, would play 30 second clips of his compositions. I watched presidential campaign commercials on loop, not in interest of the historic election, but because the ads were often scored by Chopin etudes and preludes. When given the choice of city transit cards, I chose the commemorative Chopin design. I toured the Chopin museum, joined a busload of French tourists and made my pilgrimage to his birthplace at Zelazowa Wola, then was nearly kicked out for sitting at the piano while a Portuguese man snapped photos of me pretending to be Freddie. I treated the Chopin kiosk on Nowy Swiat like my own personal church. I would sit in the only chair in the corner, hands folded piously in my lap as I watched Chopin videos play for hours. They broadcasted everything in there, from a music video re-‐enacting the destruction of Chopin’s piano to Latin dancers tangoing across Chopin airport to a waltz remix. I bought books and CDs knowing all proceeds went to the Chopin Institute, and traipsed around Warsaw with armfuls of brochures and tourist maps with names like “Chopin’s Warsaw” or “In Chopin’s Footsteps.” And I walked in his footsteps, let me tell you. I saw his sister’s apartment, his university, his heart in the Holy Cross church. On Sundays I would attend the Chopin concerts at Lazienki Park with eager dedication. There, I would lie on the grass and close my eyes and half-‐expect to see visions of wiry hair and a crooked nose. I felt like a child on Halloween, running from neighborhood to neighborhood collecting as many treats as I could and gobbling them up in quick succession.

But within three weeks, the queasiness set in. It began when I saw a tourist in a gift shop unwrap a

on the shelf for someone else to buy. It was then that I thought Varsovians might not be as stoked on Chopin as

all the publicity made them out to be. Maybe Chopin is for them what Pier 39 is to San Franciscans, or Times Square is to New Yorkers. Maybe what began as a hallmark of Polish culture has become as ubiquitous and unoriginal as an “I NY” t-‐shirt. No matter how remarkable a historical icon is, if you are bombarded by it, and if you see it tainted by ravenous tourists, it begins to lose its appeal. And maybe it was the same with Chopin. My own Chopin binge had left me feeling a bit perverse. I once saw a poster that was nothing more than a sketch of an eyeball and I knew instantly that it was Chopin’s eyeball. I don’t know that I would recognize my own mother’s eyeball, yet there I was, snapping a photo of Chopin’s graphite eye to add to my collection.

For my last few days in Warsaw, I decided to take it easy on the

photograph every concert poster I saw. I didn’t obsessively replay the musical benches and I stopped admiring my Chopin transit card before going to bed at night. Instead of following his two hundred year old footsteps in my now-‐tattered shoes, I spent time visiting non-‐Chopin

instead of music festivals, strolling through Lazienki Park on weekdays rather than concert weekends, and glumly preparing myself to say good-‐bye to what had quickly become my new home.

I spent my last night in Warsaw sharing hot fudge sundaes with my roommates at Wedel Chocolate Shop in the city center. Chopin’s “Minute Waltz” came on the café radio, prompting two Polish women in a booth next to ours to chat about an upcoming Chopin festival that would last 31 days and feature over 2,000 performers. Overhearing this, I smiled to myself, realizing at once

words like “two-‐thousand” and “performers” and “fantastic!” and that I could welcome Chopin back into my diet. Chopin’s year was not just for tourists. On the contrary, it provoked in the locals the same thrill that I had experienced when stammering out grammatically atrocious requests for concert tickets

17

at the beginning of my stay. Perhaps the Varsovians I passed in the street had been speaking about Chopin’s year this whole time, it just took me six weeks to understand.

After taking one last stroll around Centrum, my roommates and I approached the tram platform for

To their confusion, I didn’t board the tram, but opted for the hour-‐long walk home instead. It was late, and

this was my last night in Warsaw in 2010, His Year. Marszalkowska Street was lined with fresh Chopin posters advertising the next wave of concerts and exhibits in his memory, and I couldn’t leave Warsaw without relishing the scene.

Yes, plastering his face all over the city might be overkill. But even after these centuries, even after partitions and wars that took

city was systematically destroyed then systematically rebuilt, Chopin’s music still echoes in its parks and halls. His heart still rests in Warsaw. And these days, back home in my Chopinless town, I wonder if mine does too.

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Factory near Pcim, Poland. Julia Nowak

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Yuriev Monastery, Novgrod, Russia. Marina Irgon

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Volga Halo, Russia. Katarina White

Statues in Poland. Julia Nowak

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Books for Sale, Lvov, Ukraine. Christina Monzer

The Aral Sea Disaster: Unequal Restoration Progress in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

The Aral Sea – at one time the world’s fourth largest lake – is today only a fraction of its original size.

Sea dead1 and only about one-‐fourth of its original volume remaining (see Figure 1), the destruction of the Aral Sea has become one of the “world’s great environmental tragedies.”2 The Aral is situated on the western Kazakhstan-‐Uzbekistan border and is fed by the Syr Darya River in the north and the Amu Darya River in the south. For years, the surrounding communities have depended on these waters for their livelihoods. Today, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers have been used so extensively for irrigation that they barely reach the Aral Sea in some years (see Table 1).3 The Aral’s depletion has destroyed not only the local economy, but people’s lives as well.

Cities which once lay on the

for survival are now in the middle of a desert. As the sea’s water levels decrease, the sea bed becomes an exposed “saline desert”4 , which has led to an increase in incidences of respiratory problems in the surrounding areas.5 Furthermore, after years of irrigating deserts which are naturally arid, the lands surrounding the Aral Sea have become increasingly waterlogged and salinized, leading not only to poor crop yields, but drinking water which is unsuitable for human consumption.6 For example, Karakalpakstan, an autonomous republic in western Uzbekistan which borders the Aral, is most

of the sea. The region’s economy has

of Karakalpakstan’s population designated as “poor” or “severely poor” by the Asian Development Bank. Still worse, almost 50 percent of Karakalpakstan’s population “does not have access to drinking water, and the groundwater supplies have increasingly become…undrinkable”.7 In addition, a drought in 2000 caused grain production in all of Uzbekistan to decrease by roughly

six percent, while the production in

four percent in the same year.8 While the Aral Sea crisis primarily

Uzbekistan, each of the Central Asian states are involved in water-‐sharing agreements – between up-‐ and down-‐stream riparian states – regarding the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers.9 However, irrigation is where most of the rivers’ waters are lost on the way to the Aral Sea, and both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are down-‐stream states which rely heavily on irrigation for their agricultural sectors. 10

around the Aral Sea, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan must reconsider their current water-‐usage habits. To date, both nations have begun to address the Aral Sea crisis – both directly and indirectly. Despite the most adverse environmental, health

depletion observed in the South Aral Sea, more progress toward the sea’s restoration has been documented in the North Aral Sea.

This paper will examine why, although the most alarming consequences of the Aral’s destruction have been witnessed

been made to rehabilitate the North Aral Sea in Kazakhstan. First, the paper will examine the history of agriculture in the Aral Sea Basin, as the over-‐exploitation of agriculture has led to the Aral’s destruction.

current state of the economies in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Later, it will discuss what the two states have done to address their water use and its consequences for their population and their portion of the sea. Finally, the paper will discuss several reasons why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan may be addressing

History of agriculture in the Aral Sea Basin

At least since Russian colonial expansion began in Central Asia in the middle of the 19th century, cotton production has been a priority in the region.11 Cotton has become such an integral part of life in Central Asia that Erika Weinthal asserts, “In Central Asia, to understand water is to understand cotton”.12

For years, Central Asians inhabiting present-‐day Kazakhstan were nomadic peoples, with the majority of sedentary populations

Figure 1. Depletion of the Aral Sea since 1960. Source: (Britannica Online Encyclopedia)

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Table 1. Aral Sea year inflow of water from Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers (km3). Source: (Weinthal 3), selected dates.

located in the south, around present-‐day Uzbekistan.13 As a settled, crop-‐cultivating society, southern inhabitants already had established irrigation and crop rotation practices which were adequate to maintain crop yields and the state of the surrounding environment.14 As the Russian Empire expanded in Central Asia, it sought to expand its textile industries by urging these sedentary populations to grow cotton.15 By 1909, the Russians were seeing results; in lands that had once produced wheat, barley, millet, alfalfa and fruits, “25 percent of the irrigated area [was]…devoted to the planting of cotton.”16 After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Union saw a need to further expand cotton production, making Central Asia the only source of cotton production in the entire country.

The Soviet Union aimed “to

production,”17 and in order to do so,

production. Traditional irrigation and crop rotation methods were too slow, so instead the Soviet government used “endless amounts of fertilizers along with various pesticides and defoliants…to aid the growing and harvesting periods.”18

production, combined with ever-‐increasing, unattainable production output targets began the processes of environmental degradation and industry corruption witnessed in the region, especially Uzbekistan, today.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were left to develop their industries and economies in their own ways, which included addressing how extensively they wanted to rely on cotton. Kazakhstan moved toward developing and privatizing its oil and gas companies, but Uzbekistan remained highly dependent on the

cotton monoculture which had dominated the Soviet period.19 What the two states (as well as the other Central Asian states) realized,

approaches, was the need to jointly address the problem of the Aral Sea. By September 1992, the water

states had reached out to the World Bank for assistance with water management and environmental stabilization in the Aral Sea basin.20

Since then, some states have worked harder than others toward the Aral Sea’s restoration. In Uzbekistan, some individuals and groups involved in cotton production, whose corrupt, rent-‐seeking practices

period, were unwilling to relinquish the wealth and power they had become accustomed to.21 Weinthal suggests that cotton production became a system of control in the region, and any reduction of cotton production in Uzbekistan, for example, might lead to rising unemployment followed by mass migration to urban areas, discontent and political and social upheaval, which would jeopardize the system of control.22has been made to move away from cotton dependency in Uzbekistan. Additionally, international aid received might have been used by the new governments not only – as the funds were intended – to address issues related to the Aral Sea, but to ensure the governments’ continued

opposed to the region’s reliance on cotton monoculture.”23 By bribing the opposition, the new governments could maintain their system of social control. Especially in Uzbekistan, corruption and heavy reliance on cotton has persisted into the present day.

Economies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

After they became independent states in 1991, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan approached economic

Kazakhstan looked to integrate into the world economy and began to privatize its oil and gas companies, which helped the country to “acquire foreign capital.”24 In contrast, Uzbekistan chose “a ‘gradual’ approach to transition” and maintained its strong state control over industries, with the

many sectors of the economy.25 Uzbekistan chose to continue the mass production of cotton, using its revenue to “cushion the initial shock” of moving away from the old Soviet system.26in these early approaches to economic development have caused Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to follow

reducing water consumption to save the Aral Sea.

Today, with an emphasis on less water-‐dependent industries, Kazakhstan may be better suited to reduce and change its water-‐use habits, which would improve the condition of the Syr Darya River and the North Aral Sea. The country is heavily reliant on extractive resources; in 2008, 73 percent of exports and 39 percent of GDP were generated by the mineral, oil and gas industries.27 In 2009, oil and oil products alone accounted for 59 percent of Kazakhstan’s exports.28 Additionally, the bulk of Kazakhstan’s investments in cultural development and in infrastructure are in the

regions of the country.29 There is far less investment in the northern and eastern portions of the country30,

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where most of its agricultural production is located.31 This may be due to the fact that only 6.4 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP is produced by the agricultural sector.32

Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan is less prepared to reduce its water consumption. Agriculture accounts for 26.8 percent of Uzbekistan’s GDP, with cotton being the nation’s second largest export.33 Agriculture,

important in Uzbekistan today that the government shuts down schools during the harvest and requires teachers and students to help pick cotton or face expulsion unless

required to avoid it.34 Kazakhstan has recognized the

need to diversify its economy if it wishes to reduce its vulnerability to

35 Unfortunately, there is little information available from the Uzbek government regarding its economy and any future plans to move away from such dependence on cotton. The Uzbek government is not a transparent one; it ranks 174th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.

Addressing the Aral Sea Crisis As newly independent

states after the Soviet Union’s collapse, water-‐sharing agreements

established under Soviet rule were no longer applicable. The Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins, which once were located within the borders of the same state, now spanned each

a portion of Afghanistan and Iran (see Figure 2). New water-‐sharing agreements were unavoidable because upstream riparian states like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who use very little of the water from the rivers, were interested in generating their own hydropower, while downstream riparian states like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan wished to continue large water consumption for the purposes of irrigated agriculture.36 Without new water-‐sharing agreements, there may have been a greater

water resources.37

states signed an agreement, which formed the Interstate Commission on Water Coordination (ICWC) to regulate water resource use.38

another agreement to cooperate in addressing the Aral Sea crisis. The 1993 agreement established another organization, the Interstate Council on the Problems of the Aral Sea Basin, ICAS, designed to “facilitate assistance from the World Bank

Figure 2. The Aral Sea Basin. Source: (Micklin 507).

and other international donors.”39 Unfortunately, many organizations and agreements established among the Central Asian states

limited in scope, or have largely gone unimplemented.”40 Perhaps in part because of the seeming inability of the Central Asian states

international community has become involved in saving the Aral Sea and its surrounding populations.

Various international agencies have extended their aid to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to address the desiccation of the Aral Sea and water resource management. Most notably, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank have implemented projects in the two states. However, the number of projects implemented and the funds allocated for projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have not been equal.

Three projects related to water management and the Aral Sea crisis have been initiated by the Asian Development Bank in Uzbekistan. First, the “Uzbekistan Land Improvement Project” aims to increase income for farmers, and improve land sustainability and productivity.41 Next, the “Western Uzbekistan Rural Water Supply Project” aimed to improve sanitation and potable water supplies for populations living near the Aral Sea.42 Finally, the “Supporting Innovative Poverty Reduction in Karakalpakstan Project” was intended to generate income, better infrastructure, and safe drinking water for residents of Karakalpakstan.43 Interestingly, the last two projects, which address the region most in need of assistance in Uzbekistan, have only been allocated $68.28 million -‐ $65 million for the “Western Uzbekistan Rural Water Supply Project” and $3.28 million for poverty reduction in Karakalpakstan – while the “Uzbekistan Land Improvement Project” has been allocated $76.2 million and addresses only the eastern regions of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Kashkadarya (see Figure 3).

The Asian Development Bank also initiated the “Water Resources Management and Land Improvement Project in Kazakhstan,” which

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was allocated $55.1 million. The project’s goals were to improve the environment by improving irrigation

productivity.44 Indeed, agricultural productivity in the project area increased by 38 percent from 1999 to 2004 and was expected to increase by 111 percent by 2009.45 Additionally, crop rotation was reintroduced and the percentage of agricultural land allotted for cotton fell from 94 percent of land in 2004 to 86 percent in 2005.46

The World Bank alone has conducted 35 projects in Kazakhstan and only six in Uzbekistan.47 The large disparity between the two may be due, in part, to a more centralized Uzbek government, resistant to

with so many more projects implemented in Kazakhstan, it seems logical that there has been more progress in restoring the North Aral Sea than the South Aral.

In 2005, the eight-‐mile long Kok-‐Aral Dam was completed in

Figure 3. Map of project area for the Uzbekistan Land Improvement Project. (ADB 2008)

Kazakhstan as part of the $85.79 million “Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea Project,” which began in 2001.48 The dam separates the North and South Aral Seas, allowing water from the Syr Darya

beginning to recover, with more 49

The restoration of the North Aral has not only helped to improve the surrounding economy; health in the region has also improved because the exposed salt beds are again covered with water, and the salinity of water resources has slightly decreased.50 Furthermore, the project is slowly assisting with the recovery of the South Aral Sea, as excess water from the North Aral is occasionally let through the dam into the South Aral.51

After the Kazakh project proved to be successful, the World Bank expanded into Uzbekistan. In 2003, the World Bank initiated the “Drainage, Irrigation and Wetlands

Improvement Project” in Uzbekistan. The $74.55 million project is intended to improve the water quality of the Amu Darya and increase productive

Karakalpakstan.52 In addition to the projects

of the Asian Development and World Banks, the United Nations

Organization, UNESCO, has put forth a “Water-‐Related Vision for the Aral Sea Basin for the Year 2025.” UNESCO has placed emphasis “on what the people in the region want the future to be and what they can do themselves.”53 Besides reducing child mortality and increasing life expectancy and income, goals related to water resource management and access to water resources are addressed in the vision. At the time the vision was put forth, the average water use per hectare of cotton was 12,000 cubic meters, and by 2025, UNESCO hopes to reduce water usage to less than 8,000 cubic meters per

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at the time was about 40 percent; the aim for 2025 is to increase water

75 percent.54 Finally, to address the issue of safe drinking water in rural areas, covered, piped water supplies are to be increased from 26 percent at the time the vision was proposed to greater than 60 percent in 2025.55

With so much international involvement in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, one might expect to see the two states quickly change their agricultural policies, as a way to appease international donors. It

is attempted after international organizations complete projects in Central Asia and look to other issues, in other regions of the world. Changes in policy may be easier while extra support – in the form of international organizations and monetary aid – is already in each country. However, MacKay does not foresee agricultural policy changes being made in Central Asia any time soon. He asserts, “While the governments openly repudiate Soviet-‐era agricultural policy, their implicit policy is to continue it, suggesting little immediate prospect for change in the region.”56

Additional Factors

In addition to a history of cotton monoculture and current economic dependence on cotton, there are several reasons why Uzbekistan may be more reluctant than Kazakhstan to address the issues surrounding the Aral Sea’s depletion. There are various incentives and disincentives for each country to move away from cotton monoculture and to begin

Kazakhstan has several incentives to address the Aral Sea’s depletion and begin environmental restoration in the Syr Darya River basin. First, the country may have more incentive to address environmental and health issues in the Aral Sea region because

microscope.” As Kazakhstan seeks to attract foreign direct investment for their industries, the country must

might be important to those foreign investors – especially those from the

West, who are typically concerned with such issues as human rights and the environment. Furthermore, much of the world is looking to Kazakhstan, the new 2010 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, chair with a critical eye. The OSCE addresses issues such as “human rights, national minorities…and economic and environmental activities.”57 Many people have questioned whether or not Kazakhstan is indeed the best choice to chair the organization,

the organization and while being 58

Second, as Kazakhstan seeks to

the country cannot help but to address environmental and health

The project’s motto is “prosperity, security and improved living standards for all Kazakhs.”59 Some programs in the project include: “Developing Agricultural Land,” “Drinking Water Supplies,” and a

all of which must inevitably deal with the Aral Sea region.60

Finally, Kazakhstan’s most important industries are the oil and gas industries – not agriculture.

territories in the western part of Kazakhstan produce a large amount of wealth, are predominantly inhabited by ethnic Kazakhs, and are seen as the “most Kazakh” portions of the country.61 The Kazakh government has invested more money for infrastructure in

elsewhere in the country, partially to help build a national identity which excludes minorities, and partially in order to maintain production levels in the region.62 Interestingly, although there have been improvements in the environment and the health of people surrounding the Northern Aral Sea, some improvements may not have been intentional. While the Aral Sea is on the government’s mind, there may be an element of coincidence that some of the increases in health and living standards have happened so close to the Aral Sea. Some improvements may actually be by-‐products, or ‘spill-‐overs,’

from investment aimed at the more

the west; the Aral Sea is conveniently situated in the same region.

Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan has fewer incentives for change in water-‐use policy, and therefore, more disincentives to address the depletion of the Aral Sea and the health of the residents in Karakalpakstan. First, cotton is used as a system of control by the Uzbek government.63 The agricultural industry employs 44 percent of Uzbekistan’s labor force.64 If the country were to decrease cotton production, unemployment would rise, creating a potential mass migration of people to the cities in search of work, which might cause overcrowding and civil unrest.65 Rather than face these possible outcomes, the government chooses to maintain high levels of cotton production, which serves to keep populations in the rural portions of the country.

systems might be considered to help prevent excessive water withdrawals from the Amu Darya River and allow

This option, though, is unattractive and carries few incentives for the Uzbek government. Roughly 5.4 million hectares of irrigation systems would need to be replaced, with a cost of $3,000 to $4,000 per hectare; such a project would amount to a total $16 billion bill,

pay.66 Alternatively, replacing cotton in favor of less water-‐intensive grain crops would be less expensive than replacing old irrigation systems and

However, doing so may not yield

cotton, making it too, an unattractive option for the Uzbek government.

Thirdly, Karakalpaks are a minority population, closely related to Kazakhs, living in western Uzbekistan.67 Because Karakalpaks are a minority, and because the Ferghana Valley is more fertile than the western portion of the country, the Uzbek government may see the Karakalpak population as too small or not productive enough to warrant massive health and environmental

Rhianna Patrinely

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improvement projects in the region. In fact, it seems the government of Uzbekistan may be trying to force the migration of Karakalpaks out of the country. There has recently

to the region, and street names have been changed from Karakalpak-‐ to Uzbek-‐language names.68 Conclusion

The Aral Sea crisis stems from excessive water use from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Rivers, and so involves all of the Central Asian riparian states. However, the downstream states, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are

Aral’s depletion. The most severe environmental degradation and adverse health conditions have been recorded in Karakalpakstan, but as evidenced, Kazakhstan and the Northern Aral Sea have seen more progress in the restoration of the environment and regional health. Several reasons account for more progress in the north, despite more dire conditions in the south.

Kazakhstan has moved away from dependence on agriculture, instead fostering the growth of its extractive resources sector. Less water is needed for these sectors, allowing more water from the

Sea once again. On the contrary, Uzbekistan has continued the cotton monoculture of the Soviet period and still requires massive amounts of water to maintain its yearly crop.

Additionally, Kazakhstan has attracted a greater quantity of typically higher-‐budget projects from international agencies. This has allowed Kazakhstan to reform their water-‐usage habits more quickly and on a larger scale than Uzbekistan. For example, the Kok-‐Aral Dam would not have been feasible without international assistance.

Perhaps most importantly, Kazakhstan has greater international

Sea region. In contrast, Uzbekistan has expressed a desire to be self-‐reliant in various economic sectors, making the country less receptive to pressure from valuable international

partnerships calling for change water use and policy in the Aral Sea basin.

Progress seen in the North Aral Sea is encouraging, but the South Aral Sea needs desperately to be addressed by Uzbekistan and the international community. Regardless of what measures are taken, it seems unlikely that the Aral Sea will be restored to its pre-‐Soviet condition.69 Sadly, at the present time it seems no incentives are convincing enough for Uzbekistan to abandon cotton

reduce its reliance on the production of cotton. Change will only take place in Uzbekistan if there are adequate incentives viewed from within and

Notes1 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Russian Ecologists Say All Fish Dead in South Aral Sea” 25 September 20092 Joseph MacKay, “Running Dry: International Law and the Management of Aral Sea Depletion,” Central Asian Survey 28.1 (2009); 173 Philip Micklin, “Water in the Aral Sea Basin of

Eurasian Geography and Economics 43.7 (2002); 5124 MacKay “Running Dry,” p. 185 Osamu Kunii et al., “Respiratory Symptoms and Pulmonary Function among School-‐Age Children in the Aral Sea Region,” Archives of Environmental Health 58.11 (2003); 676-‐6826Asian Development Bank, “Proposed Grant Assistance to the Republic of Uzbekistan for the Supporting Innovative Poverty Reduction in Karakalpakstan Project” (2001)7 Asian Development Bank, “Proposed Grant”8 Ibid9 Erika Weinthal, “Sins of Omission: Construting Negotiating Sets in the Aral Sea Basin,” The Journal of Environment and Development (2001); 50-‐7910 Micklin, “Water in the Aral Sea Basin,” p. 51211Erika Weinthal, State Making and Environmental Cooperation: Linking Domestic and International Politics in Central Asia (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002)12 Weinthal, State Making p. 9513 Ibid p. 75-‐7614 Ibid p. 7715 Ibid p. 74-‐7516 Ibid p. 77-‐7817 Ibid p. 8218 Ibid p. 8919 Ibid p. 12620 Ian Small and Noah Bunce, “The Aral Sea Disaster and the Disaster of International Assistance,” Journal of International Affairs 56 (2003)21 Weinthal, State Making p. 101, 15922 Ibid p. 2023 Ibid p. 13124 Ibid p. 12625 World Bank, “Uzbekistan Country Brief 2010” < http://www.worldbank.org.uz >26 Weinthal, State Making p. 125

27 World Bank, “Kazakhstan Country Brief 2010” < http://www.worldbank.org.uz >28 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook (2010) < http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-‐world-‐factbook/index.html >29 Cristin Burke, “Social and Economic Development in Kazakhstan,” Culture and Security in Central Asia. Lawrence, KS, 23 April 201030 Burke, “Social and Economic Development”31 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Kazakhstan Wheat Production: An Overview (2003) <http://www.fas.usda.gov>32 CIA, World Factbook33 Ibid34 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Uzbek Students ‘Regularly’ Expelled For Not Picking Cotton,” 6 December 200935 World Bank, “Kazakhstan Brief” 36 Micklin, “Water in the Aral Sea Basin,” p. 50737

Cooperation,” SAIS Review 22 (2002)38 Micklin, “Water in the Aral Sea Basin,” p. 50739 Ibid p. 51840 MacKay, “Running Dry,” p. 2041 Asian Development Bank, “Uzbekistan Land Improvement Project,” (2008)42 Asian Development Bank, “Western Uzbekistan Rural Water Supply Project,” (2002)43 Asian Development Bank, “Proposed Grant Assistance”44 Asian Development Bank, “Kazakhstan: Water Resources Management and Land Improvement Project,” (2007)45 Asian Development Bank, “Kazakhstan: Water Resources Project”46 Ibid47 World Bank, “Kazakhstan Brief”48 World Bank, “Saving a Corner of the Aral Sea,” The World Bank- Kazakhstan (2005)49 World Bank, “ Miraculous Catch in Kazakhstan’s Northern Aral Sea,” (2006)50 World Bank, “Saving a Corner”51 Ibid52 World Bank, “Drainage, Irrigation and Wetlands Improvement Project-‐ Phase 1,” World Bank- Uzbekistan Projects (2010)53 UNESCO, “Water-‐Related Vision for the Aral Sea Basin for the Year 2025,” (1997)54 UNESCO, “Water-‐Related Vision”55 Ibid56 MacKay, “Running Dry,” p. 2557 OSCE, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2010)58 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “ U.S. Welcomes Kazakhstan as OSCE Chair, but Raises its Record on Rights,” 2 February 201059 ECOSOC, Kazakhstan-2030: Prosperity, Security and Improved Living Standards for all Kazakhs (2008)60 ECOSOC, Kazakhstan-203061 Burke, “Social and Economic Development”62 Ibid63 Weinthal, “Sins of Omission,” p. 9764 CIA, Fact Book65 Weinthal, State Making p. 10066 Micklin, “Water in the Aral Sea Basin,” p. 51567 UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency- World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peopless- Uzbekistan, (2008) 68 UNHCR, World Directory69 Micklin, “Water in the Aral Sea Basin,” p. 513

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Translation of Vrednye sovety dlya detej starshego vozrasta

Jenny Oberholtzer

When your dearest darling mother

Takes you to the dentist’s chair

Do not wait for mercy from her.

And do not shed salt tears or swear!

Clam up, you captured partisan!

And really clench your jaws

So that they cannot be undone

By a thousand dentists’ claws.

Oster G. B,

Vrednye sovety dlya detej starshego vozrasta.

Moscow: AST Publishing, 2010.

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It is a well-‐known fact children will without fail do the complete opposite of what you tell them to do. Following this logic, a famous Russian humorist decided to write a book of bad advice for children, since, obviously, kids who read it will do the opposite and in this way will be ensnared to behave properly.

The above work is one among the many gems of the Big Bad Book of Bad Advice, which also features other guidance such as the advantages of hysterical fits to obtain toys, how to crash-‐stop on a bicycle into your father and the correct wall surface for mother’s day congratulations.

Written in an idiosyncratic language targeted to children, and featuring cliches of Russian, but not American, child’s play such as partisans, the translation of this poem was quite challenging. Nonetheless, as you can see, the translator managed to produce a truly delightful work. -‐Olga Slobodyanyuk Managing Editor

Political Elites in a Croatian Context:Homogeneity and its role in political decision making in Croatia

Geoff Allen

Croatia is a country that has, in

since independence in 1991. It proves a very interesting study, especially when looking at issues of the political elite, those who hold a national political standing, either in the parliament or the executive branch. Examining the national level political elite in Croatia by focusing on elite recruitment and homogeneity, inter-‐elite competition and coexistence, elite-‐mass relations, and elite policy making, this paper will show that the political elite of Croatia, despite the fact that they have only recently been formally established, are a relatively homogeneous and somewhat self aware group that has distinct policy preferences and an established weltanschauung.

Croatian politics have taken place in a parliamentary system since the constitutional reforms in 2000, which were a backlash to the autocratic rule of President Franjo

country from a semi-‐presidential system to a new parliamentary system, and drastically reduced the role the President of Croatia plays in politics in favor of the Prime Minister.1 The next year, the legislative branch was reformed, eliminating the upper house and creating a unicameral legislature elected primarily through proportional representation in multi-‐member constituencies.2 These reforms were key measures taken in the democratization of Croatia,

1990’s. Politics in Croatia revolve

around political parties, as in almost all parliamentary systems. The dominant party in Croatia since

in the last decade, has been the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which has controlled the largest number of seats in parliament since 2003.3 The HDZ is a center-‐right

political party that is currently the dominant member of the governing coalition, holding 66 of 153 seats in parliament.4 The next biggest party and largest opposition in parliament is the Social Democratic Party, the center left party that holds 56 seats in parliament.5 Together, these two political parties have been the dominant political parties in Croatia since independence.

There are a number of smaller

parliamentary seats and are essential in forming coalition governments, as no party has controlled a plurality of seats in the last decade. On the political right stand the Croatian Rights Party (HSP) with one seat and the Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonija and Baranja (HDSSB) with three. In the center sits the coalition bloc of the Croatian Peasant’s Party (HSS)-‐Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) -‐Alliance of Primorje-‐Gorski (PGS), which took eight seats in parliament in 2007.6 On the left stand the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) with three seats and the Croatian People’s Party-‐Liberal Democrats (HNS) with seven seats.7 The Croatian Pensioner’s Party carried one seat in 2007 as a single issue party. In Croatia’s legislature, seats are reserved for ethnic minorities, who vote for their preferred candidate or candidates in a single-‐member vote; the largest

party in Croatia is the Independent Democratic Serbian Party, which won all three seats reserved for Serbians in 2007.8 Other represented minorities include Czechs and Slovaks, Hungarians, Italians, Albanians and other minorities from the Former Yugoslavia, and any other minority, all of whom hold one seat.9

The members of the legislature,

group, with similar age, sex, and educational backgrounds. The

parliament is predominantly made up of males while 25% of the members of parliament are women.10 Only the SDP, with women representing just over 35% of their seats, and the HNP, with women representing 40% of their seats, have female representation levels higher than the average.11 Though women in Croatia may be better represented than in some countries, they are still a minority in parliament. It is also telling that issues of adequate female representation are not often brought up in parliament, and are not large parts of any party’s platform. Another aspect of homogeneity is age, with the vast majority of members of parliament being between the ages of 40 and 60.12

Educational background is also a homogenizing factor for the legislative elite. Approximately 70% of Croatian MPs hold a university degree.13 Of an even more interesting nature is the fact that every Prime Minister of Croatia in the 21st century, with the exception of the present PM Jadranka Kosor, has held a Ph.D. Of these university educated members of the executive and legislative branches, a large number have degrees earned at the University of Zagreb. This particular statistic is more easily seen when examining the educational backgrounds of the cabinet of the governing coalition in Croatia, which is made up of the HDZ, HSLS, HSS and SDSS.14 Of 19 cabinet ministers, educational data could be found on eleven; of those eleven, every individual holds at least one degree from the University of Zagreb.15 This is a very noticeable level of homogeneity in the very highest reaches of Croatia’s government, and forces an outside observer to wonder how much

preferences of the political elite.In order to better understand

the competition between the various political parties, it is important to

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platforms, the interactions between the various parties, and the level of cooperation within the parties and governing coalitions themselves. The HDZ and SDP are constantly in competition with each other. For the most part, the HDZ has been the winner, being in opposition only once, at the very beginning of the decade.16 Since then, the HDZ has

through clever coalition building. Despite its association with the right and its background as the Croatian nationalist party, the HDZ has managed to pull in minority representatives in all of its cabinets since 2003, including the Serbian representatives of the SDSS.17 Its most recent coalition government brought in the two centrist parties, the HSLS and the HSS, two parties that until that point had consistently worked in opposition with the SDP and other parties of the left.18 This ability to build coalitions with

two conclusions: either there is a large amount of common interest between the various political parties, which makes coalition building between seemingly disparate groups somewhat easier; or that the HDZ is

platform in order to build a coalition and maintain power. In reality, it is more likely that both of these conclusions are correct.

There are a number of commonly held policy preferences in Croatia, particularly the policy of reform tied to EU accession.19 This makes coalition building easier because smaller parties can jump on board with this overarching policy. At the same time, shrewd political maneuvering cannot be discounted. Despite the fact that the HDZ controls 66 of the 77 seats necessary to form a majority government, it has handed

the small parties that make up its coalition, namely the HSLS, HSS and SDSS.20 Together, these three parties control less than ten percent of

the vote in the parliament; yet the leaders of the HDZ have placed them

reason this is such a smart move for the HDZ is because it robs possible coalition partners from the SDP.

The rivalry between the SDP and the HDZ is very strong in Croatia, and has its roots in the largely undemocratic 1990’s and the power wielded by the HDZ during that time. In 2000, amid widespread discontent with the system, the SDP won the most seats in the legislative election

other than the HDZ had been the largest party in parliament.21 The SDP, in coalition with the HSLS, the HNS, the HSS and the IDS became the

the country. This coalition would last only three years, however, and in the election of 2003 the HDZ came back to power, gaining over 20 seats.22 After these legislative battles had taken place, there was an elite competition between various candidates from the SDP and the HDZ over the post of the President of Croatia, which was soon to be vacated by Stjepan Mesic, an independent. Mesic, who had

following independence, had won both the 2002 and 2005 presidential elections in relatively resounding fashion.23 The stalemate was broken when the SDP candidate, Ivo Josipovic, was able to pull ahead and win the 2009 presidential election.24 This may be due to the fact that the right was split between who to support, as the individual running against Josipovic, Milan Bandic, was a former member of the HDZ who had been expelled for choosing to run

25 It has yet to be determined whether this presidential victory for the SDP represents a major shift in political power, though the trend seems to point that way.

Looking at elite interrelations, it might seem that there is a large amount of competition between the groups that would be easily

recognized by the people, resulting in large amounts of voter turnout and decent elite-‐mass relations. However, this does not seem to be the case. The percentage of eligible voters who turn out for elections has been on a negative trend since 2000; in the 2009 presidential election, voter turnout was only 44% in the

26 This trend could be due to a number of factors. One could be that the people see very

parties because of their united platform of EU accession, something that is becoming more and more unpopular in Croatia.27 This could

of Croatians in a recent poll said they were happy with the direction of their government, which represents a very high amount of voter frustration.28 Another explanation could be a growth in general anger with political parties and the government in general, which could lead to a growth in apathy and a loss of voter participation. This would be supported by a recent poll that saw only 22% of respondents claim to trust their government.29 This type of anger could be caused by the policy preferences and decisions, or lack thereof, that have come down in recent years.

As mentioned, the biggest policy push in Croatia today revolves around making needed reforms for Croatia to enter the EU by 2012. This major policy goal of the current HDZ-‐lead coalition government is not opposed

Croatia, and is actively supported by the SDP.30 But it is increasingly unpopular with average Croatians, who at the moment see all of the

of EU accession. Euroscepticism is a growing trend across Europe, so it is not surprising that it would surface in Croatia. However, it is surprising that it would crop up so strongly in the populace, but is not latched on to by any of the major political parties. On a number of

Geoff Allen

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political issues, the positions of the two largest parliamentary parties are very close, if not identical.31 Both support an expansion of pension coverage and a general move towards a welfare state for Croatia. Both have come out claiming they want to champion the rights of the poor, and to provide for those who choose to start a family. Both parties have highly detailed, though very similar plans for dealing with Croatia’s large levels of unemployment, which were measured at 15% in 2009 and is expected to increase to nearly 20% this year.32is that the HDZ has governed the country since 2003, while the SDP has been in opposition. This could lead to the SDP coming into the 2011 election untarnished by the unpopularity of the current government, and winning a mandate to try to implement its own policy program.

With all of this evidence, the question becomes, where does Croatia go from here? What does the future look like in this country? First, it is likely that the SDP will become the dominant party in Croatian politics following the 2011 parliamentary elections; the current HDZ lead coalition is just too unpopular to win enough seats to reform. Second, it is also likely that voter turnout in the next election will continue to follow the current trend and remain low. It is possible that

political party could gather enough seats to form a plurality on its own: the SDP would only need to pick up 21 seats. However, it is more likely that a coalition between the SDP and the current coalition members the HSS and HSLS, or a coalition between the SDP and the various regional parties may occur. The policy outputs of any future government, however, are not

than the policy outputs of the current government. The prime goal of an SDP lead government would still be EU accession by 2012, and the reforms necessary for that to happen

on time. Economic and social policies would likely be somewhat more liberal but, with the high likelihood that the SDP will coalition with the HSLS and HSS, it seems more than possible that the SDP’s moves in this regard will be tempered by the need to maintain its alliance.

A study of Croatia’s political elites sheds light on a group that is very homogeneous in a number of areas; that competes with itself for electoral seats but has very little

is relatively out of touch with its constituent base. Looking at all of this, the conclusion can be reached that the Croatian political elite are a very self aware group that pursues policies very much in line with its weltanschauung. The elites of separate and competing parties often support the same legislation and policies, even when they go against what the people want, which is shown by the European integration policy. The high level of homogeneity in policy making and background has lead to a growing sense of apathy among voters, who fail to see any

major political parties. Despite the homogeneity of the elites, there is competition between the SDP and the HDZ; rather than competition over policy ideas and platforms, this competition is instead more of a popularity contest, where each side is battling with the other for more votes. While the SDP is poised to take control of parliament for the

elections, the country will likely not shift courses, but instead follow the same general trajectory.

Notes1 Hrvatski Sabor. (Web: The Croatian Parliament, 2010). April 19, 2010.2 Carr, Adam. Republic of Croatia. (Web: Adam Carr’s Election Archives, February 2010). 7 April, 2010. Hrvatski Sabor3 Carr, Republic of Croatia. Government of the Republic of Croatia. (Web: The Government of the Republic of Croatia). April 17, 2010.4 Government Hrvatski Sabor5 Carr, Republic of Croatia6 Ibid

7 Ibid8 Ibid9 Ibid10 Hrvatski Sabor11 Ibid12 Ibid13 Ibid14

right coalition under Prime Minister Sanader.” (wieninternational.at, 17 Jan. 2008). April 17, 2010.15 Government16 Carr, Republic of Croatia17 18 Government19 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Croatia. ( Web: April 2010) 15 April, 2010.20 Country Report: Croatia21 Carr, Republic of Croatia22 Ibid23 Ibid24 BBC.com, “Social Democrat Ivo Josipovic elected Croatia president” (Web: 11 Jan. 2010). April 17, 2010.25 BBC.com26 Carr, Republic of Croatia27 Country Report: Croatia28 Ibid29 Ibid30 The Social Democratic Party of Croatia. Web. April 13, 2010. Translated through google.com.31 The Croatian Democratic Union. Web. April 13, 2010.Translated through google.com. The Social Democratic Part of Croatia32 Country Report: Croatia

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31

Passions and Habits Intertwined

Erica Haggerty

Nikolai Gogol’s short story “The Old World Landowners” is set in a sphere of monotonous routine, pastoral tranquility, and a bizarrely stagnant mood. Producing and pickling food, eating, resting, discussing eating, hosting guests, eating, sleeping, and eating again

of the lives of the two protagonists, Pulkheria and Afanasy. Their daily interactions appear to be painfully delineated by habit. However, Gogol hints that their lives contain something more. Upon stating, “The life of their modest owners is quiet, so quiet that for a moment you forget yourself and think that the passions, desires, and restlessness produced by the evil spirit who troubles the world does not exist at all, and that you saw them only in a splendid, shining dream”,1 he suggests that one thinks that “passions, desires, and recklessness” are nonexistent. Passions are present within the characters, coexisting within their daily routines. Through his portrayal of the roles passions and habits play in Pulkheria and Afanasy’s lives, Gogol suggests that the two

in-‐hand, but they are also contingent upon one another.

Whether it is managing the household, hosting her guests, or petting her cat, Pulkheria’s habbits become a source of passion within her life. Her character is essentially marked by habit; she is unfeeling, mature, and constant. “Pulkheria Ivanovna was rather serious, she hardly ever laughed”. 2 Yet she is not as dry and lifeless as the fruits she prepares; she possesses passion, pursuing the possibility of happiness and achieving what she likes. Through her habits she becomes passionately happy: happy with the way that she manages the household, happy to serve her guests to the point of lethargy, and happy with what is familiar to her. The following passage manifests the extreme passion and fervor she achieves through her role as a hostess: “Generally, Pulkheria Ivanova was in exceptionally good spirits whenever they had guests. A kindly old woman! She belonged entirely to

her guests”.3 While Gogol originally refers to passions as created by an “evil spirit who troubles the world”4 Pulkheria’s habits seem to produce “good spirits” within her and make her unconditionally generous rather than recklessly harmful as the term “evil” suggests. An instance where one can see how her habits have caused her to adopt a particular passion or liking is through her relations with her cat. “It cannot be said that Pulkheria Ivanovna loved her all that much, she was simply attached to her, being used to seeing her all the time”. 5 Her passion for the cat is contingent upon the comforting familiarity habit produces. Pulkheria

her required daily habits; rather habits have become the source of her

On the other hand, her husband Afanasy is not induced to passion through habit. Instead there exists within him passions that fuel his quiet and solitary life, that give reason behind the habits he adopts. His character is marked by an inclination toward passion. Unlike his wife, he is described as “childish” and “infantile” as in the passage, “On the contrary, in questioning you, he showed great curiosity and concern for the circumstances of your own life, its successes and failures, which always interest all kindly old men, though it somewhat resembled the curiosity of a child”.6 With his constant joking and eagerness to learn about the larger world, he seems to be young at heart. Yet contrary to Gogol’s statement that passions induce recklessness and trouble through an “evil spirit,” Alfanasy does not go rashly gallivanting on romantic adventures. He adopts his habits as a way to feed his youthful passions. By conversing with guests, he is able to satisfy his curiosity for a world outside of his household; by habitually consuming

and by poking fun and interacting with Pulkheria, he expresses his inner passions for her. His passion for her shines through his joking, seen in the passage, “But Afanasy Ivanovich, pleased at having poked fun at Pulkheria Ivanovna, would

smile, sitting on his chair”.7 Habits for him are thus powerful mechanisms of desire.

Passions and habits, though

function together in particular ways within the characters. Yet if this is so, one cannot help but question why the two characters depart from their peaceful world in such a strange fashion. On one hand, one could argue that Gogol suggests that passions have a way of causing trouble, that because of an “evil spirit,” Pulkheria and Afanasy, as creatures of habit, are led to their deathbeds. However, one could also argue that passions and habits are contingent on one another. In the case of Pulkheria’s death, it is the shattering of habit due to the cat’s failure to show the traditional gratitude of a guest that Pulkheria is left with passion alone. Without the cat there to pet and without that grounding habit of tradition to bring

with an uncontrollable sadness, as seen in the text “In vain did Afanasy

why she was suddenly so sorrowful”.8 In Alfanasy’s case, Pulkheria’s death leaves him solely with habit; his passion dies along with her. He takes part in his regular habits of eating and inviting guests over, yet without passion, “he sat insensibly, insensibly holding his spoon” (152). It is when passions and habits stand alone that they become lethal.

Through the lives and deaths of the couple, Gogol refutes that within humans resides a tendency toward passions and habits. It is by

the two, whether it is controlling the “evil spirit” within him with habit or partaking in habit that one enjoys, that one achieves tranquility.

Notes1Gogol, Nikolai. The Collected Tales of Nikolai Gogol. Trans. Pevear/Volokhonsky. (Vintage-‐Random House, 1999.) pg, 1322 Gogol, The Collected Tales of Nikolai Gogol pg. 1353 Ibid pg. 1444 Ibid pg. 1325 Ibid pg. 1456 Ibid pg. 1357 Ibid pg. 1428 Ibid pg. 147

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Home

Natalie Budesa

Exhausted, I laid down my rucksack at the edge of the kitchen table. Already I could see the seams I had patched up last week beginning to tear, thinly stretching across a new gap, failing to contain the books that were stacked inside.

Mama had left some stew on the counter, meaning she was going to be at work all night again. I watched the sun inch toward the horizon through the dirty window. The intense light illuminated the dirt till I didn’t see it anymore -‐ only a blinding beam shining down on me, exposing the contour of my smooth cheekbones, the crack on the table, the mouse in

the garden.

Benny still hadn’t come home so I pulled my hat over my ears and ventured outside. You never had to go far before you ran into some straggler on the streets, a tiny woman with fragile wrinkles powdered throughout her face, bent low over her groceries, or a kid kicking up pebbles as he looked for a playmate. I had barely walked past our home when Ivan rushed across my path, shouting at a girl sitting on a porch. Ivan always squinted up at me as if judging whether I was someone worth talking to. I imagined he

he grew up.

“Ivan, have you seen Benny?” I called.

He squinted at me, his eyes becoming beady holes in his face.

“I dunno,” he mumbled.

“Ivan! Tell me now or I’ll tell your mother about the turtle,” I said as menacingly as I could. It must have worked, because after kicking the ground once more, he pointed further down the road.

The wind rushed behind my feet, carrying me uncomfortably faster than I meant to go, till my breath

around, not yet knowing what to

panic about. Just past Zorka’s house, I could hear kids shouting. When Benny came into view, I sighed with relief, but then saw another boy approaching, his footsteps steady and tense. I knew this walk. I also recognized the way Benny threw back his shoulders, straightening his whole body into a hard mass that appeared impenetrable. The other

back and forth, mounting strength from his core into his knuckles. Like

Just when he rushed at the other boy, I screamed.

“Benny!”

The boys stopped and looked at me. Blood dripped from Benny’s

I could tell by his frown he wasn’t ready to go home yet. The other boy used Benny’s temporary distraction to punch him hard in the stomach.

whole body at the other boy and slammed him to the ground.

“Benny! Benny!” I never knew what else to scream. “Benny!” My voice had become hysterical, until I didn’t even recognize the boy standing beside me through my tear-‐stained eyes.

“Benny!”

“Alright!” he shouted back, right next to me. The anger had not left his face. I quickly wiped my eyes and looked for the other boy. Slightly stooped over his stomach, his eyes watched us with pent up savagery and when I turned away, I could feel his eyes on my back.

“He took dad’s pension,” Benny mumbled.

“What?” I asked.

“When dad was drunk last week and we had to carry him home... his pockets were empty. They pick his pockets now, you know.”

Benny and I continued in silence.

Although Benny was only fourteen he was approaching six feet tall, his muscles beginning to take shape around his shoulders. He was going to be the same height as dad, but sturdier and with a harder look about him. Most smiles never reached his eyes, and when I saw this, it made my insides drop a little. I felt secure standing next to his tall form, but at the same time, I kept a little distance between us. When we got home, the only souls in the household, Benny headed straight for his room. American rock music wafted through the hall to my room, where I lay,

My home for twenty-‐three years was in Priština, Kosovo, but the warmth of the word “home” was as foreign to me as the lyrics to Pink Floyd.

I always wondered if my brother’s

from his personality or if our life had shaped him that way. His body was made for anger, his hulking muscles always bracing for the next blow. Though I wanted to know what went on in his head, I didn’t know how

winter night, I was rereading the ending of Anna Karenina, waiting

on the sofa, I watched as my brother

I excitedly waited for him to hand it over, but he simply lay there, staring

ceiling, and after realizing there was nothing of importance there, I gently pulled the book from my brothers stomach into my lap. I glanced at the clock. It was nearly midnight. When my eyes began to itch and I got up to go to bed, Benny was still staring at the ceiling. Maybe he was angry at the world, for the way nothing seemed to last; I’m not sure what my brother was truly angry about, or worse, who he could rightfully blame.

most were with my dad. I was most at a loss during these times. I could not cry to my mom as I watched their brawny skin grapple in the sickly light of the kitchen. At times, circling each

33

other like prey, at others shooting at each other’s bulk with wrenching force, I would feel my own weakness

weight that pinned me to the ground, in my own helplessness. My brother would reach for my dad’s neck, then for a knife.

At these times, I learned to transfer the frantic beating of my heart to my legs. I would run, run hard, to our neighbor. A very decent, middle-‐aged couple lived next door. I sometimes watched them, imagining that if they ever had kids, those kids would be very lucky. Anyway, I would run to Boris, the kind husband, and would ask for his help. I always tried to be polite even when I imagined my

intensity every passing moment. In time, Boris became used to my gentle then hardened pounding on the door, and knew to rush over and pull my brother and father apart. Not once did he complain, but always with a surety in his whole body become a calm wall in the midst of

never seemed enough. Sometimes he caught me watching him and his wife from my bedroom window, and he would smile and wave. In a way, he was my hero.

One time I woke up to my dad yelling outside. I ran out and he was banging on Boris’ door, thinking it was his own home. Rubbing sleep from my eyes, I tiptoed across the broken grass, teetering in the darkness.

“Dad! That’s not our house,” I called. I put my hand on his shoulder, and he turned to me, his breath rank and warm.

“Tell them... I need to go inside!”

continuing to bang on the door. I reached for his arms, but he balked at my steady grip and spun away.

“I need..! I need...!” he shouted into the night. I was so tired. I hoped he had not awakened Boris, and that he was sleeping peacefully with his wife, who perhaps would someday have a bulge at her belly, and Boris would then sleep with his cool palm on her belly. My brother came out

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and stared at our blabbering father. Eventually he calmed into a stupor and lay against the stone fence. We dragged him inside, but couldn’t

bedroom. His body had become dead

mouth hung open, taking in deep gulps of air while we panted. Mom wasn’t home; she never really was.

We made it as far as the bathroom. Benny and I stared at the remaining distance to the bedroom in contempt, our dad’s snores rending through the humid night air, unaware of our struggle. The bathroom stood welcomingly to our right. We wondered if this should be a strange sight, watching our dad sleep peacefully curled in the bathtub. I lay a blanket over him and Benny smiled approvingly. Though he looked peaceful sprawled in the tub, and his wrinkles seemed to deepen and emphasize how much more of life he had seen than me, I felt sorry for my dad.

Every couple of years we would go to the Adriatic coast on a family vacation and stay at a condo there. It was the highlight of the year. Except my dad had to be sober for it. We couldn’t leave him at home alone drunk – who knew what would happen to him – and we certainly didn’t want to drag him along when he was in one of his stupors.

I imagined myself running along the salty beach, sea spray moistening my skin, my mother resting her sore feet in the lush, warm sand. My brother would peer out into the sea, squinting at the horizon, the corner of his mouth slightly upturning as

The day before the trip, my brother was hanging with his friend Tomislav, on our small apartment patio. I secretly liked the way Tomislav’s mouth curled into a smirk when he talked, the sturdy build of his arms, the rough calluses on his palms, the way he could sit with my brother and just listen to the silence, at ease. They were drinking beer,

with each cool sip, letting the warm summer heat pour into their seams. Though we were still within our home, in our minds we were already on the sunny beaches of the Adriatic,

When my dad stumbled in, I felt all my carefree visions slip away, like miniscule grains of sand held together for one last moment before being yanked away into the relentless sea. In one moment, I knew we were no longer going on the trip we had anticipated for a whole year. My dad was drunk. I looked to Benny, and saw he was already watching me; his eyes, which were formerly burning with the relief of a vacation, now burning with fury. Tomislav did not understand, and merely took another sip of his beer as my dad tripped onto the patio. I became not only scared of Benny and his anger, but that Tomislav may see the sick

that was our father.Our dad unceremoniously strode

cooler for a cold beer, all the while mumbling under his breath. Benny tightened his hand around his own drink, till I thought the glass would shatter within his grip.

“Hello,” Tomislav broke in, unaware of the change in mood.

As if this was the cue Benny was waiting for, he suddenly stood up and slammed the cooler shut while my dad struggled to open his bottle. He smelled horrible in the summer heat, and it made me long for the fresh ocean breeze even more. I remembered the suitcase in my room, and frowned at the thought of unpacking all my summer dresses that night.

Benny stared hard at dad, who had moved to the patio fence, shouting at no one in particular. I

my brother’s mood swing. “You call this hot?” my dad

shouted, seemingly at a few kids wandering in the distance.

“When I was in the war we had to -‐” he mumbled, but he didn’t get

Benny grabbed the back of dad’s shirt and pulled him away from the fence. My dad stumbled and beer sloshed out of his bottle onto both of their bodies. Benny started punching him so violently that I could only stand dumbfounded, as if patiently waiting for him to stop. But his arm continued to shoot up and then down so forcefully, without losing

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momentum, that my heart began to pound in my chest with growing fear.

face.

Tomislav, scrambling to

tried to calm Benny with words. When that didn’t work, he tried to push Benny away.

I thought to myself, this is it, this is the moment when an outsider enters our home and realizes it was a mistake. We are not normal and

never like me, and from now on he would be too disgusted and ashamed of me that he could never look at me the way I’d always dreamed he would.

Benny from my father. A few teeth lay in a puddle of blood on the ground. Tomislav said a few calming words to my brother and I loved him even more for that, though I knew I had already lost any chance with him.

I helped my smelly, bleeding dad up and led him to the bedroom. I cleaned him and lay him down in bed like a child, all the while saying good-‐bye to my long-‐awaited vacation, my secret crush, my own childhood.

When I went to bed that night, I tucked myself in.

Assimilation

Nika Allahverdi

Natalie Budesa

I’ve got two feet in two separate buckets,

Each bucket is red, white and blue.

And with my feet in these two buckets,

I can’t feel a thing,

Except perhaps a numbing chatter

And a disconnected sting.

Hut In Countryside, Cristian Macavei

35

Chekhov in California

Maya GarciaA rhythmic autumn rain was

falling outside, bringing the grey of the clouds to the land below. Liliya Petrovna watched in silence from her window, listening intently to the soft cadence that brought to her mind the dull patterns of daily life: droning on and on in a sequence that hardly altered, where any change was just a beat in a larger rhythm

“Hey, Lily, which top should I

wear with my new skirt?”“Oh, um…the pink one. Yeah.”“Thanks! That means I can wear

my pink sandals too, yes! It’s going to be such a lovely day. Still sunny in October! God, I love California.”

The vision broken, Liliya Petrovna turned her eyes from the window and back down to the work at her desk. She had been preparing for an examination in classical myth for some weeks, and the little stack of hand-‐written cards was already well worn. Her mind soon wandered from the unexciting task of memorization:

appeared again and again amongst the ancient lists like a stray line of ink bleeding through the pages. She shook her head to clear it of this image and, sighing, set the cards down to rest again up the cluttered desk. Her desk was too much a display of the state of her mind, its disarray a hindrance to studies. She decided she would be better served by a walk out-‐of-‐doors.

“Where are you going?”“Just outside for a little bit. For

some fresh air, I dunno.”“OK, well I’m leaving soon for

class so I guess I’ll see you later, then.”

“OK, see you.” She had not come six steps from

the gate when she saw the young man coming up the path. Though she knew he walked this way at this time,

familiar measured gait as it carried its bearer towards her. She slowed in

horizon, but continued forward with his pale, clean-‐cut face in her sight’s periphery. Her heart thumped two or three loud, erratic beats for every one of his long, deliberate strides

that fell noiselessly on the ground. She gathered her nerve with a sharp breath and formed her lips into a greeting. The sound of it lagged a little, held back by the intimidation of the handsome, serious face that now loomed before her.

“Hi!”“Hello.”“Uh, how have you been doing?”“OK, thanks. You?”“Pretty well. I have a midterm

tomorrow, but I think I’m ready for it.”

“Which class?”“Classics.”“Ah.” The conversation between the

young man and young woman quickly fell into a pattern as predictable and innocuous as rainfall. Beneath

Petrovna’s mouth were passionate declarations and desperate pleas she longed to make to the young man, but in this drizzle they were simply drowned. Were her youthful feelings really so fragile that such a pattering of light talk could silence them? But perhaps it was not the drizzle of

words, but the deep and frigid ocean in the young man’s dark blue eyes.

She is worrying the hem of her

t-‐shirt with increasing rapidity, preparing for the conversation to reach its peak. Her gaze blinks nervously away from his eyes and down to his tweed knit shoulder. His layered clothing is as incongruous on this bright, warm day as her brooding Russian Realist fantasies.

“Are you, uh, doing anything

Friday night?” The fabric of her t-‐shirt warms against her shaking thumb. “Because I’m thinking of going to the Film Archive; they’re screening The Lady with a Dog and I thought you might like to go too.” The silence that follows lets Lily listen to the rushing blood in her ears.

expression has not altered.”Hm. I’ll have to think about it.”

seam of the hem and go suddenly still. “Oh! OK. Well, I guess I should

be going. Bye.” “Bye.” She forces herself not to look

back as she continues down the path he continues up. She tries to drown out the sound of the gate opening, then closing behind him with her thoughts.

As Liliya Petrovna’s steps carried her away from the young man, her thoughts ran the reverse, closing in upon him to recall each detail of their recent conversation. His words were well mannered enough, his aspect quite polite, even pleasant. What lacked in his speech was any perceptible amount of warmth. It confounded her to think that not a single degree of the great warmth that permeated her being could seep into his. Had he somehow wrapped himself in a case, sealed beneath a cold membrane that caused every

that sought to caress it to fall away, frostbitten?

Lily smiles bitterly. Whatever the cause, it was likely

for the best that Liliya Petrovna’s love was not returned. What she desired, she desired too much – to have it would consume and destroy her. Better to let energetic young

the cool staidness of maturity. Lily stops in her tracks, too

disturbed by this last thought to continue. When Chekhov gets too bleak, she thinks, he often stops to make some beautiful remark about the natural setting. You get a nice paragraph to digest whatever bitter

She surveys the “natural setting” around her.

The sparse early-‐afternoon

path that stretched to the horizon, a multicolored river moving along by spurts, its shores hard, grey stone. Liliya Petrovna stood upon this shore, staring hard at the parking garage on the far side, willing it to become

wheat, until her mind began to ache and she turned back for home.

36

Maya Garcia

Back Cover Photography | Top: Castle of Vlad Tepes (Dracula), Cristian Macavei. Bottom: Jan Palach Memorial, Katarina White

How to Contribute to Troika

Interested in having your work published in Troika’s next issue?

Email us your submissions to [email protected]

We accept all kinds of student work, from photography to memoirs to research papers.

You can find more information on our submissions policy and requirements or view an online version of our

journal at http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~troika/

University of California, Berkeley Graduate Program in Slavic Languages

and Literatures The graduate program is designed to train future scholars and teachers of Slavic languages and literatures. Students concentrate either in literature and culture or in linguistics and philology; they combine a core curriculum with independent research early in their graduate career. Our graduate students participate in the life of the Department (studying, teaching, running the library, organizing film series, performances, colloquia, conferences), in the life of the University, and in the profession (reading papers at national and international conferences).

More information: http://slavic.berkeley.edu/graduate.html

Troika Spring 2011

Documents

Transcript of Troika Spring 2011