The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 15 | Issue 14 | Number 2 | Article ID 5055 | Jul 15, 2017

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Transnational Environmental Activism and Japan’s SecondModernity

Simon Avenell

Abstract

This article examines the new sphere oftransnational activism in the Japaneseenvironmental movement of the 1970s. Whatwas previously a domestic phenomenon of localmobi l izat ions against pol lut ion anddevelopment expanded into a new array oftransnational initiatives, many with a specificfocus on pollution in the countries of East Asia.The article focuses on a transnationalmovement involving South Korean andJapanese activists to stop the relocation of apolluting mercurochrome plant from Japan toSouth Korea. I argue that such transnationalinvolvement had a significant impact on activistidentity. Within the framework of the Japanesenation, activists could seamlessly positionthemselves as victims of the state and industry.But transnational involvement upset thisschematic by exposing their complicity in thetransgressions of Japanese industry abroad.The result, I argue, was a more self-reflexiveactivist identity and the development of a kindof grassroots regional consciousness withinsome Japanese civic movements throughout the1970s.

Keywords

Japan, South Korea, environmental pollution,transnational activism

This is article is adapted from the volume NewWorlds from Below: Informal life politics andgrassroots action in twenty-first-centuryNortheast Asia edited by Tessa Morris-Suzukiand Eun Jeong Soh (Canberra: ANU Press2017). The overarching theme of that volume is

the unfolding of what we call “informal lifepolitics,” conceptualized by Morris-Suzuki asacts of “collected self-protection in the face ofthe profound deficits of institutional politics.”As she explains, informal life politics is often aform of “survival politics” responding directlyto “threats to the physical survival ofindiv iduals or the socia l surv iva l o fcommunities.” Different to formal politicscentered on regulatory institutions, legislativeprocesses, and professional political actors,informal life politics unfolds in multifarious andsometimes invisible spaces l ike ruralcommunities, urban groups, and loosenetworks dispersed across pol it ical ,geographical, and even national boundaries.This essay approaches the theme of informallife politics – especially survival politics –through the lens of Japan’s battle withindustrial pollution in the 1960s and early1970s. Although we know much about thehighly-successful struggle against pollutionwithin Japan during this period, we know littleabout the history of Japanese environmentalactivists’ involvement in transnationalmobilizations opposing the relocation ofpolluting industries from Japan to countries inEast Asia around the same time. The essayfocuses specifically on a transnationalmovement involving South Korean andJapanese activists to stop the relocation of apolluting mercurochrome plant from Toyama inJapan to Incheon City in South Korea.

As I explain in the essay, these early 1970stransnational mobilizations were important fora number of reasons. To begin with, the sharpdecline in incidents of Japanese industrialpollution export to East Asian countries (or

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anywhere else for that matter) by the mid- tolate 1970s, coupled with growing Japanesegovernmental criticism of responsiblecorporations, evidence a significant impact inthe realm of formal politics. Through publicshaming, the movements clearly contributed toslowing down this practice. I also see a numberof significant developments in terms of informallife politics. The movements discussed in thearticle evidence the potential of localizedprotest to transcend the local whi lemaintaining it as a critical site of struggle andidentity. Scholars studying environmentalprotest often point to a parochial “NIMBY”(not-in-my-backyard) tendency in antipollutionand environmental protection movements, butthe cases in this article suggest that the localcontains other potentialities. Moreover, theyalso remind us that, in practice, local andtransnational activism are often not clearlydemarcated spheres of activity but fluid, oftenoverlapping, processes. Indeed, it was preciselybecause of their experience as victims ofindustrial pollution within local communities inJapan that some activists felt obliged to opposethe export of this pollution abroad. In otherwords, the struggle to protect local livingenvironments clearly evolved into a largerquestion about environmental justice.Interestingly also, the fact that South Koreawas the primary destination of Japanesepollution export also led the activists involvedto an uncomfortable encounter with troublinglegacies from Japan’s imperial, militarist past inEast Asia.

As I suggest in the article, I believe thatinvolvement in these movements encouragedactivists to reconsider their identities in a moremultidimensional way. They certainly sawthemselves primarily as advocates for the localcommunity, but they also recognized theirethical responsibility to oppose environmentalinjustice wherever it manifested and,particularly, if they were somehow complicit inthese frameworks of injustice (for example, asprotesting residents who forced polluting

industry to relocate abroad). Informal lifepolitics, in a sense, became the staging groundfor imagining the whole world as one’s“backyard.” Admittedly, not all activists weretransformed in this way, but the phenomenonwas widespread enough to foster importantdevelopments in the subsequent history ofgrassroots activism in Japan. Leading activistslike the engineer Ui Jun who had been largelyfocused on internal struggles within Japan,such as the one against methylmercurypoisoning at Minamata Bay, began to developof sense of responsibility to the outside worldand Asia in particular. Ui realized thateliminating grievous industrial pollution withinJapan was not enough. Japanese activists had amoral responsibility to communicate knowledgeabout the disastrous consequences of pollutionabroad in the name of environmental justice.This was a new mentality among Japaneseenvironmental activists and it served as theplatform for a diversification of transnationalenvironmental activism in the coming decades.Although it is beyond the scope of this article, itis worth noting that environmental activistswere not alone in their attention to, andinvolvement in, East Asia. We see a similarawakening to the region in the anti-VietnamWar movement (Beheiren), the Japan-KoreaSolidarity movement, and the Asian Women’sAssociation active around the same time.Indeed, the early 1970s moments witnessed aflowering of so-called Asian solidaritymovements in Japan, the important history ofwhich is yet to be written.

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Sit-in protest over reparations forMinamata disease victims at Chisso

Corporate Headquarters, 14 May 1970

Introduction

The early 1970s were an important moment oftransnational engagement in the Japaneseenvironmental movement. What had until thenbeen a largely domestic phenomenoncomprising thousands of local mobilizationsagainst industrial pollution and rampantdevelopment expanded to include a new arrayof transnational initiatives, many with a specificfocus on pollution in the countries of East Asia.The initial stimulus for these new movementswas scattered media reports and anecdotalaccounts that some Japanese companies wererelocating their pollutive industrial processesto East Asia in response to stricter regulation inJapan. Such reports came as a rude awakeningto many Japanese activists, who realized thatso-called ‘pollution export’ undermined their‘victories’ against industrial pollution withinJapan. In response, a small number of Japaneseactivists promptly mobilized movements toaddress pollution export into countries such asThailand, South Korea, the Philippines,Malaysia, and Indonesia. Prominent civicactivists like the engineer Ui Jun and thenovelist Oda Makoto organized internationalconferences with Asian activists, while othersbegan publishing monthly newsletters on theissue in English and Japanese. A number of

Japanese activists also travelled to the affectedcountries to inform local activists about theJapanese pollution experience and thesuccessful strategies they had employed intheir domestic struggles. Impressively, thesemeetings sometimes resulted in coordinatedtransnational actions between protestors on theground in East Asia and supporters back inJapan. This kind of transnational activity was anentirely new phenomenon in the Japaneseenvironmental movement and it marked asignificant enhancement in the geographicalreach of postwar Japanese environmentalactivism.

In this article I provide a brief overview of thenew sphere of transnational activism in theJapanese environmental movement of the1970s. As I explain, I believe the transnationalmovements were glued together by a powerfultranslocal sentiment in which local strugglesand activists combined their strong communalidentities with an emergent East Asiangrassroots regionalism. Leading activistsserved as the important ‘connective tissue’nurturing this translocal sentiment. Thoughgrassroots movements in the region have along history, I believe that the transnationalinvolvement of the 1970s nurtured a newreflexivity among the Japanese activistsinvolved, emblematic of the mentalities andconsciousness of reflexive or second modernityreferred to by Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck,and others. If Japanese modernity was markedby a brash and uny ie ld ing s tate - leddevelopmentalism focused on the questions‘how do we grow?’ and ‘how do we appropriatethe resources we need to grow?’ as aneconomy, as a nat ional state, and asindividuals, then reflexive modernity hasunfolded as a deeply critical project in whichsome individuals have begun to ask ‘what arethe consequences of growth (or lack thereof)’and ‘how do we survive?’ in a world where thesureties of the national state framework ofmodernity are threatened and undermined bypolitical, economic, and technological

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pressures. Transnational involvement had aparticularly striking impact on the way theactivists involved conceptualized their activistidentity. Within the framework of the Japanesenation, civic activists could quite seamlesslyposition themselves as victims of the state andindustry. But transnational involvement upsett h i s s c h e m a t i c b y e x p o s i n g t h e i rcomplicity—albeit indirectly—in thetransgressions of Japanese industry abroad.The result, I argue, was a more reflexiveactivist identity characteristic of the mentalitiesof reflexive modernity. I begin the article bybriefly tracing some of the earliest and mostinfluential of the transnational movements,paying special attention to the role of coreactivists in bringing people together acrossborders. The latter part of the article examinesthe new mentalities and ideas born of thistransnational interaction.

Pollution Export and Response

Civic groups were certainly well aware ofJapan’s troubled legacy in Asia before the midto late 1960s, but until then their focus hadbeen mainly on resisting conservative rule andthe entrenchment of American influencedomestically. The pursuit of ‘Peace andDemocracy’ at home, in other words, was seenas the best way to address the misdeeds of thepast, particularly in Asia and the Pacific.Coupled with this approach, restrictions onoverseas travel until the 1960s also hinderedthe formation of transnational movementnetworks. But the outbreak of the Vietnam Warand the advent of pollution export almostforced Asia onto the activist agenda byexposing the direct connections of the region toconservative rule, economic growth, andAmerican hegemony at home. What resultedwas a period of intensive grassrootsregionalization among some Japanese civicgroups which would continue to develop overthe coming decades . By ‘grassrootsregionalization’ I certainly refer to thenumerical growth of Japanese NGOs and

groups active in East Asia, which was trulysignificant. But I also allude to what is bestdescribed as the regionalization of an activistmindset which had been largely national orlocal in focus up to that point. We might saythat the late 1960s and early 1970s marked adoubling of the civic mindset as domestic andregional initiatives came to be seen asnecessary components of the same struggle.Needless to say, this progressive reengagementwith Asia was by no means painless and, inmany ways, proved more difficult for activiststhan for political or corporate elites who could‘buy’ their way back into Asian countries.Activists, of course, approached their Asiancounterparts with a deep sense of remorse forJapan’s problematic history in Asia in the era ofcolonialism and the Asia-Pacific War, as well asa sense of responsibility for the pressing issuesof the present. Nowhere is this clearer than inmovements opposing Japanese industrialpollution export to the region.

Japanese pollution export of the early 1970shad its roots in the Japanese domestic pollutioncrisis which stretched from the late 1950s toaround the early 1970s. I have discussed thisdomestic history in detail elsewhere but, for thepurposes of contextualization, note thefollowing here. Japan’s rise as an economicsuperpower, coming in waves from around thelate 1950s and again in the 1960s, wasaccompanied by some of the worst cases ofindustrial pollution in modern global history. Asindustry spread around the Japanesearchipelago local communities were devastatedby extreme forms of atmospheric, water, andground pollution. Industries willfully pumpeddangerous gases into the atmosphere anddumped chemical toxins into bays and rivers.Residents living in surrounding communitiesbore the brunt of this rampant industrialexpansion. In Yokkaichi City, for example, manylocals were afflicted with pulmonary diseasesand chronic asthma caused by poisonoussulphur dioxide emitted from a nearbypetrochemical facility. At Minamata Bay and

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later in Niigata Prefecture, people were struckdown with debilitating motor neuron disease,impaired sensation, and loss of bodilycoordination due to their inadvertentconsumption of seafood contaminated withmethyl mercury dumped by industry. To makematters worse, people in affected communitiesnot only endured harrowing medicalcomplicat ions; they also faced crueldiscrimination from an uninformed public.

Yokkaichi, circa 1960

Nevertheless, as the pollution problemintensified and spread (eventually into bigcities like Tokyo and Osaka where air pollutionreached dangerous proportions in the 1960s),local communities began to organize protestmovements and to take offending industries tocourt. These protests and court battlessometimes took well over a decade to settlebut , by the late 1960s, the Japanesegovernment and judiciary began to respond.Local governments took the lead by passingstringent regulations and forcing industry intopollution prevention agreements. A reluctantnational government followed, first by passingthe Basic Law on Pollution Prevention in 1967and then, at the historic Pollution Diet in 1970,amending the Basic Law to give it punitiveforce and passing over a dozen other pieces ofpollution prevention legislation. By the early1970s Japan had in place some of the strictest

industrial pollution regulations in the world anda body of case law strongly on the side ofpollution victims. Some even described thisoutcome as a “pollution miracle,” although forpollution victims the debilitating consequencescould never be undone.

Not entirely by coincidence, there was amarked increase in Japanese foreign directinvestment (FDI) into East Asia (and elsewhere)just as the new environmental regulationsbegan to bite in the early 1970s. From 1967 to1973 overall Japanese FDI increased tenfoldand between 1973 and 1976 it essentiallydoubled that of the preceding 20 years. Alongwith the quantitative change, Japanese FDI alsobegan to change qualitatively in the early1970s as polluting industries involved inchemicals and steel became more prominent.To be sure, it would be a mistake to attributeth i s FDI sp ike ent i re ly to domest icenvironmental regulations. Even activistsrecognized that other factors such as cheaplabor and resources played an important role incorporate decisions to go offshore. But there islittle doubt that domestic regulation alsoshaped corporate investment strategies.Important research by Derek Hall has shownthat the strict Japanese regulatory regime wasvery much on the minds of corporate executivesand government officials in the early 1970s, tothe extent that pollution export even became a‘state strategy’ at one point. Utilizing a wealthof government and industry publications,newsletters, and public comments, Hall showsbeyond doubt that the powerful Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry (MITI) andmammoth corporations like Mitsubishi openlyadmitted that environmental regulation was afactor shaping their FDI strategies. In 1970, forexample, MITI established a special fund tohelp relocate the pollutive petrochemicalindustry abroad while in the same year theMitsubishi Corporation noted siting difficultiesin Japan due to local opposition as one reasonfor building an oil refinery in Southeast Asiarather than at home. Overt strategy or not, the

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1970s witnessed a proliferation of pollutingJapanese industries throughout East Asia:hexavalent chromium plants in South Korea,chemical processing plants in Indonesia,mining operations and steel sintering plants inthe Philippines, caustic soda plants in Thailand,rare earth mining operations in Malaysia, andasbestos processing in Taiwan.

Ui Jun

Japanese environmental activists became awareof the pollution export practice relatively earlyon thanks to a number o f for tu i toustransnational encounters. The first was at thehistoric United Nations Conference on theHuman Environment (UNCHE) held inStockholm in early June, 1972. Whileparticipating in the nongovernmental forumsrunning parallel to the main conference, Ui Junand a group of industrial pollution sufferersfrom Japan met with activists from other East

Asian countries. Ui and his group’s mainobjective was to communicate the story ofJapanese industrial pollution to the world, sothey were deeply shocked to learn from theirAsian counterparts that Japanese industrialactivity was already causing concern in theregion.

On his return, Ui communicated this news toantipollution activists through his nationalenvironmental network, the IndependentLectures on Pollution (ILP). He scolded himselfand fellow activists for their naïveté inassuming that Japanese corporations wouldsimply clean up in response to domestic protestand regulation. Indeed, so insular was theirperspective that not until Asian activists alertedthem to pollution export had they evenconsidered the concrete implications of Japan’seconomic penetration into the region. For Uisuch realities demanded far deeper and moresubstantive engagement with East Asianactivists. As a first step in the process ofuncovering extant or potential cases ofpollution export, Ui and his group beganpublishing an English-language pamphletentitled KOGAI: Newsletter from Polluted Japanwhich ran articles on industrial pollution inJapan and throughout East Asia. ILP sent thenewsletter free of charge to subscribers who, inreturn, provided information about industrialpollution in their countries. In this way thenewsletter served as both a medium forinformation transmission and a vehicle forconnecting antipollution protesters across EastAsia into a rudimentary transnationalgrassroots alliance.

The contacts Ui and others formed with Asianactivists at UNCHE resulted in substantive,face-to-face interactions and movements in thecoming months and years. In late 1972 andearly 1973, for example, Matsuoka Nobuo, anactivist involved in ILP, travelled to Malaysiaand Thailand where he met with environmentalgroups. In Kuala Lumpur activists toldMatsuoka that they were desperate for

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technical information about pollution and wereactively collecting newspaper clippings onJapanese industrial pollution. The Malaysianactivists frankly stated that they wereextremely skeptical—if not cynical—about so-called Japanese technical and economic‘assistance’ since these were often simply codewords for Japanese corporate exploitation ofcheap labor and resources. As Matsuokaexplained, ‘if we fail to carefully reconsiderwhat assistance really is, the Japanese run therisk of losing the good faith of our Asian friendsto a point where it is irrecoverable.’ LaterMatsuoka travelled to ChulalongkornUniversity in Bangkok where he gave apresentation on Japanese pollution to studentsinvolved in environmental activism. On learningthat the Thai students had previously knownnothing about Japan’s terrible pollution history,Matsuoka felt an overwhelming sense of guiltand responsibility. From now on, he observed,Japanese activists ‘must be prepared toshoulder another heavy load’ (i.e. takingresponsibility for Japanese corporate activity inneighboring countries).

From “Polluted Japan,” 1972

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Ui, Matsuoka, and others’ calls for a newcommitment to East Asian environmentalproblems found a cause almost immediately.Only months after Matsuoka’s visit to Thailandanother colleague from the ILP’s Asia group,Hirayama Takasada, visited KasetsartUniversity in Bangkok to meet with members ofthe university’s nature preservation club.During these meetings the club’s leadershowed Hirayama a newspaper clippingentitled ‘No Repeat of the Minamata Tragedy’from the Bangkok daily, Siam Rath, reportingthat the Thai Asahi Caustic Soda Company—asubsidiary of the Japanese Asahi GlassCompany of the Mitsubishi Group—wasresponsible for dumping effluent containingcaustic soda, synthetic hydrochloric acid, liquidchlorine, and mercury into the Chao PhrayaRiver, resulting in a massive fish kill and skinafflictions and diarrhea among residents whoconsumed the fish. The discovery of a concreteexample of Japanese pollution in Thailand wasnothing short of earthshattering for Matsuokaand his visceral response is representative ofthe way most other Japanese activists reacted:

What’s this!? The evil hand of mercurycontamination has reached Thailand! My naïveassumption that full-scale pollution export wasyet to come had been betrayed wi thconsummate ease by these cold-hard facts.Utterly surprised, for a time I could saynothing. I was thrown into utter despair by apiercing reality: ‘pollution export had begun!Thai Asahi Caustic Soda was just the tip of theiceberg.’ I was quickly filled with rage. I couldnot allow this. I simply could not allow it. Onceagain I engraved in my mind the purpose of thistrip: to communicate the situation of Japanesepollution and to find a way to mobilize anantipollution movement based on cooperationbetween Japanese and Southeast Asian people.

Throughout 1973 and 1974 Japanese and Thaienvironmental activists mobilized one of theearliest transnational movements againstindustrial pollution in postwar East Asian

history. In late August 1973, students fromThammasat, Kasetsart, Chulalongkorn, MahidolUniversities organized a nature conservationexhibition on the campus of ThammasatUniversity. Around 20 per cent of the exhibitionwas devoted to displays on Japanese industrialpollution with the remainder focusing onenvironmental issues in Thailand. Organizersdistributed Thai translations of the ILPpamphlet Polluted Japan (prepared by Ui andothers for UNCHE) which contained detailedinformation on Japan’s pollution experience.They also ran screenings of TsuchimotoNoriaki’s disturbing documentary filmMinamata: The Victims and Their World. Onthe Japan side, in September 1973 around 150activists from antiwar, environmental, ando ther c i v i c g roups marched on theheadquarters of the Asahi Glass Company inTokyo with placards reading ‘Asahi Glass, StopExporting Pollution!’ The Tokyo protest wasreported in the Siam Rath newspaper dayslater under the headline ‘Japanese peopledemonstrate in opposition to factory pollutingThailand.’ The full-page report containedphotographs of the demonstration andinterviews with Japanese activists, whichgenerated a great response among Thaicitizens. After these protests, activistsestablished the Japan-Thai Youth FriendshipMovement (Nichi-Tai Seinen Yūkō Undō) to actas the organizational hub for the buddingtransnational mobilization.

In the coming months interactions betweenactivists intensified, culminating in a historicsimultaneous transnational demonstration inSeptember 1974. As in the previous year,activists in Tokyo marched with banners andplacards in Japanese and Thai reading ‘AsahiGlass, Get out of Thailand!’ Messages ofsupport from Thai activists were read outduring the Tokyo protest. In Bangkok studentactivists held a three-day exhibition entitled‘Opposing Japanese Export of Pollution’ whichattracted some 15,000 people. The organizers’aims were twofold: to use the Japanese

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experience to raise awareness about industrialpollution among the Thai people and to exertpressure on the Thai Government to implementmore stringent environmental regulations tocontrol industrial pollution. Visitors to theexhibition were greeted at the entrance by alarge banner reading ‘POLLUTED JAPAN’ and amock coffin with a photo of a fetal Minamatadisease victim. Inside were displays ofindustrial pollution at Yokkaichi and Minamata,shocking cases of food contamination fromarsenic and PCBs, photos of Japanese nuclearpower plants, and a series of panels on theJapanese economic penetration of Asia. Overthe course of the exhibition various publicdiscussions were held on pollution in Japan,local residents and pollution, and antipollutionstrategies for youth. Visitors were overjoyedwhen a statement from the demonstrators inTokyo was read out and they eagerly signed apetition opposing the proposed construction ofa petrochemical plant by Japanese industry inSi Racha in the Gulf of Thailand. Thanks to thispressure, the Mitsui and MitsubishiCorporations announced that they would beshelving their construction plans. Thecompanies cited increased pollution monitoringby Thai students and intellectuals as onecontributing factor. Japanese activists walkedaway from the demonstration with a deepenedawareness of the entanglement of Japaneseindustry and pollution with East Asia. As theKOGAI newsletter noted in 1975, ‘Weremember what a Thai friend said to us, ‘whatbrings disasters upon [the] Thai people willsurely bring them upon [the] Japanese. Andconversely, what damages [the] Japanese willalso damage [the] Thai people’.’

KOGAI, 1978

Deeply concerned about the extent of pollutionexport, Japanese activists involved in the ThaiAsahi movement began to carefully scrutinizeJapanese corporate activity elsewhere in EastAsia. Their concerns were not unfounded. Inmid-February 1974, Hirayama Takasada wasalerted to an article in the Tōyō Keizai Nippō, afinancial newspaper run by resident Koreans inJapan. The article, entitled ‘Polluting PlantExported to South Korea?!,’ reported how aresident Korean entrepreneur, one Mr. Koe,had purchased a mercurochrome plant fromthe Toyama Chemica l Company andreconstructed it in Incheon City, South Korea,where he was applying for permission tocommence operations. Pointing to a possibleinstance of pollution export, the article notedthat Toyama Chemical had decided to sell theToyama plant in 1973 after running into

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problems with Japanese regulators overcontamination issues. Toyama Chemical had infact been forced to halt production ofmercurochrome—a highly toxic substance—inSeptember 1973 when waters in Toyama Baywere found to have mercury levels equivalentto those in Minamata Bay. In December 1973tests by the Toyama Prefectural Governmentrevealed toxic levels of mercury contaminationin industrial sludge near the plant’s drainpipes.It was at this point that managers hatched the‘ingenious’ solution of selling the factory to Koeand simply importing mercurochrome from hiscompany once the factory was operational inIncheon.

In February 1974 Hirayama Takasada andInoue Sumio—both involved in the Thaimovement—met with local civic groups inToyama which confirmed the newspaper report.Hirayama and Inoue subsequently producedtheir own detailed report on the incident andbegan to mobilize in opposition. In late Aprilgroups gathered in protest in Toyama andoutside the company’s Tokyo headquarters. InTokyo , ILP members were jo ined byrepresentatives from the Zainichi Korean YouthLeague (ZKYL) and the Japanese YWCA. The200-strong protest group waved placards inJapanese and Korean reading ‘ToyamaChemical, Stop Exporting Pollution!’ In Toyamalocal residents’ groups protested outsiderailway stations and at the Toyama Chemicalfacilities where they distributed pamphlets toemployees. At the Tokyo protest Hirayama andInoue were surprised to learn from YWCAparticipants that women in the Incheon chapterof the YWCA had been conducting a similarprotest against the mercurochrome factorysince February 1974. The Incheon women hadapparently learned of the factory relocationfrom the Korean-language Christian Newspaperwhich had reproduced the article publishedearlier in the Japanese Tōyō Keizai Nippō.Thereafter the Incheon YWCA women took thebold step of petitioning the Incheon Mayor todeny Koe’s appl icat ion to commence

mercurochrome production. They did this atsubstantial personal risk given the nature ofauthoritarian rule under President Park Chung-hee. The Park regime actively encouraged theestablishment of Japanese polluting industriesin South Korea by intentionally avoidingpollution regulation and cracking down on localprotest. In mid-1973 Park brazenly declaredthat ‘for the purposes of the industrialdevelopment of our country, it will be best notto worry too much about pollution problems.’

Faced with mounting pressure in bothcountries, on April 30, some three days afterthe protests, NHK television news reported thatthe Toyama Chemical Company board ofdirectors had decided to abandon their plan toimport mercurochrome from the plant in SouthKorea, effectively ending operations at that endtoo. Although the nature of pol i t icaldictatorship in South Korea had made directcoordination impossible, Japanese activistsrightly concluded that their protest had been a‘de facto’ transnational struggle with thewomen of the Incheon YWCA. Indeed, it wasthanks to this joint transnational action thatthey had succeeded. As with the Asahi Glassincident in Bangkok, the Incheon case providedyet another opportunity for Japanese activiststo rethink their domestic struggle in a widerregional context and, by consequence, toreevaluate their situation as pollution victims.As one of the placards at the April protestnoted, ‘We cannot ignore this mechanism inwhich our “affluence” is built on the sacrifice ofthe South Korean people….Come on, let’sdestroy from within Japan the economicinvasion and export of pol lut ion intoAsia…exemplified by Toyama Chemical’scorporate activity.’ The statement of the ZKYLexpressed a similar sentiment, noting that ‘Weare committed to transforming this struggleagainst Toyama Chemical’s pollution exportinto a joint struggle of the Japanese and SouthKorean people to oppose all forms of pollutionexport and economic invasion and to intensifyour condemnation of responsible corporations.’

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To this end, in June 1974 Hirayama and Inoueestablished the monthly publication, Don’t Letthe Pollution Escape, to monitor ToyamaChemical and other companies looking torelocate their polluting activities offshore.What just a few years before had been adomestic struggle between local communitiesand Japanese corporations was now escalatinginto region-wide battle against pollution exportand political dictatorship throughout East Asia.

The range of movements in ensuing years is toobroad to cover here but one further movementagainst the Nippon Chemical Company (NCC)deserves attention in the context of mydiscussion of the emergence of a newreflexivity in 1970s Japanese environmentalactivism stimulated by transnationalinvolvement. Activists became aware of NCCvia a report in the Nihon Keizai Shinbunnewspaper in June 1974. The article reportedthat NCC and its South Korean partner wereplanning to produce sodium bichromate andthenardite at a factory located in the Ulsanindustrial region. According to the article,NCC’s decision to go abroad was prompted bynumerous worker compensation claims,increased regulation, and civic protest relatingto the toxic compound hexavalent chromium, abyproduct of sodium bichromate production.NCC’s move was provocatively described as ‘anew direction in the development of productionbases for pollutive industries by way ofinternational dispersion.’

Hirayama and Inoue of the Don’t Let thePollution Escape movement began toinvestigate NCC immediately. They discovereda record of blatant disregard for environmentalr egu la t i on and a l onger h i s t o ry o ftransgressions against Asian people. NCCbegan producing sodium bichromate in 1915 atfactories in Tokyo and the surrounding Chibaand Kanagawa Prefectures. During World WarII the company actively provided material formunitions manufacture and, more troublingly,operated a chromium mine which made

extensive use of forced Korean labor. In thecourse of their investigations activistsdiscovered horrific instances of torture andinhumane t reatment a t th i s min ingoperation—all of which they documented (withgraphical reproductions) in Don’t Let thePollution Escape and other activist newsletters.Adding to its troubled wartime record, in thepostwar period NCC began to sell its chromiumslag to the construction industry for use in thefoundations of domestic dwellings and forfilling unused wet rice paddies. Although itwould only come to light much later, this slagcontained highly toxic chromium which thecompany was well aware of. Under increasingpressure from residents complaining about foulsmells and chemicals leaching from theirgardens and cases of pulmonary afflictions inworkers and communities around the factories,in 1972 NCC shifted production of sodiumbichromate to its Tokuyama factory. Beforecommencing operations there, the companysigned a pollution prevention agreement withTokuyama City pledging that it would convertall waste material into soluble trivalentchromium. Yet, despite these undertakings, inSeptember 1972 when a ship sank in waters offthe coast of Shimonoseki, it was revealed thatNCC had been dumping unprocessed chromiumslag at sea in direct contravention of theagreement. Subsequent investigations revealedthat the company had ocean-dumped anastonishing 5,000 tons of toxic waste materialsince July 1972. As a result, the TokuyamaMunicipal Assembly ordered a temporarysuspension of production at the factory. It wasshortly after this incident the NCC executiveshatched the plan to relocate operations toUlsan in South Korea.

The opposition movement which began togather steam around mid-1974 is an excellentexample of the way growing awareness of thepollution export problem—thanks to thetransnational activities of individuals like Ui,Hirayama, and Inoue—encouraged activists invery localized movements within Japan to

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reconsider the industrial pollution problem on awider regional canvas and, in turn, reconsidertheir own sense of victimization. By acting asthe connective tissue between pollution andprotest abroad and mobilizations back in Japan,core activists like Hirayama helped to grow thisawareness both within themselves and otherJapanese activists. As I noted earlier, it was anawareness which resulted in substantive actionbecause some activists began to develop asense o f empathy , comradery , andresponsibility toward the victims of Japanesepollution export, even though in many casesthey would remain physically separated bygeographical, cultural, and political distance.

The Residents Association to Rid Kōtō, Sumida,and Edogawa Wards of Pollution (RAR) is acase in point. This group initially formed toexamine contamination of their neighborhoodsby toxic materials illegally dumped from NCC’sfactories. With the cooperation of an ethicalmunicipal employee, the RAR was able toidentify numerous locations of NCC’s illegalchromate slag dumping, some containing levelsof chromium 1,300 t imes in excess ofregulatory limits. Importantly, activists in theRAR did not limit their public protests to thelocal contamination issue. On the contrary, asleaders of the movement explained to InoueSumio, a central pillar of their action was toprevent NCC exporting its pollution to SouthKorea. For these people, NCC’s South Koreanmaneuver was part of a single ‘structure ofdiscrimination.’ People in this downtown areaof Tokyo knew all too well that the rich ofuptown Tokyo sent all of their unwantedthings—trash processing, toxic chemicalfactories etc.—in their direction. When Tokyodowntowners complained, the company simplyrelocated out to the Japanese countryside. Butthe structure now extended even further, withJapan treating Asia in just the same wayuptown Tokyoites had treated peopledowntown. The challenge was to oppose thisstructure of discrimination through thestraightforward logic of ‘don’t force bad things

on others, keep them in your own backyard.’ Tothis end the RAR organized a series of publicprotests under the banner ‘NCC, StopExporting Pollution to South Korea!’ Thecentral refrain of participants was that ‘there isno valid reason to inflict the pain we areenduring right now onto the South Koreanpeople.’ Moreover, as the following extractfrom an RAR publication reveals, localresidents had begun to understand thepollution problem not only on a wider regionalcanvas but also in the context of a fracturedhistory between Japan and its neighbors:

There could be nothing more disrespectful toSouth Korea and its people than to impose this[factory] on them simply because it is notpossible in Japan. Nippon Chemical must not beallowed to replicate the same ‘imperialistmentality’ of the war when it forcibly broughtKoreans to Japan and imposed abusive labor onthem. We will fight until pollution export isstopped so that normal ties of friendship andgoodwill lasting for 100, 200, or forever can beconstructed between South Korea and Japan.

For Inoue Sumio, the shift from insular localismto regional awareness was all about activistsabandoning the logic of ‘Old Maid’ for that of a‘dual-frontal attack.’ Just as the aim of the OldMaid card game was to deflect the joker cardon to other players, for too long localmovements in Japan had focused on eradicatingpollution from their own backyards withoutconcern for its subsequent destination(s). Butthings were different now. Activists—eventhose in very localized movements—were tryingto deal with the pollution ‘joker’ at home.Moreover, even when the pollution jokermanaged to escape to Thailand, South Korea,or elsewhere in East Asia, activists were nowforming transnational ties across borders,effectively mounting ‘dual-frontal attacks’ onpolluting industries.

Of course, we need to keep in mind that thesetransnational movements were very small in

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scale and, as in the case of NCC whichsuccessful ly began sodium chromateproduction at Ulsan in 1976, that they oftenfailed. But, by connecting activists acrossborders, by opening their eyes to the regionalimplications of Japanese corporate activity, andby connecting industrial pollution of thepresent to transgressions of the past, thesemovements facilitated a rethinking of extantactivist identity built around entrenchednotions of victimhood.

Understanding Aggression

While not all were successful, the rise oftransnational movements against pollutionexport in the 1970s undoubtedly forcedJapanese corporate and government elites totread more carefully in their strategy foreconomic expansion in East Asia. As Hallexplains, ‘MITI began criticizing the practice[of pollution export] as early as January 1974,when it called for increased surveillance of FDIprojects which might constitute pollutionexport.’ Moreover, as we have seen, decisionsto abandon industrial projects by Mitsubishi,Mitsui, and other corporations also reveal agreater corporate sensitivity to the problem.But the reverberations of the new transnationalmovements were also felt in the realm ofJapanese civic activism. In this section I look ata few typical examples of how Japaneseactivists began to rearticulate their activism inlight of their experiences in Asia. I seeimportant ideational developments, especiallywith respect to the degree of reflexivity inactivist identity and consciousness. Whereas todate the problems had always been positionedexternal to the self (i.e. industrial pollution,state power) now some activists began toreconsider their complicity in these problems.

The more activists learned about pollutionexport, the more they began to suspect thatone of the troubling paradoxes of theirsuccessful protest at home was how ithad—unintentionally, to be sure—encouraged

Japanese corporations to take their pollutingprocesses abroad. This realization came as arude awakening because it hit at the heart of avictimization consciousness running verydeeply in the Japanese environmentalmovement and, indeed, in postwar Japanesecivil society more broadly. Oda Makoto, thecharismatic anti-Vietnam War protestor, ofcourse, had articulated this tension betweenJapanese activists’ sense of victimization by thestate and their complicity as aggressors in thecontext of the Indochina conflict. As Odaexplained, ordinary Japanese had, to an extent,been victimized by the wartime state and theU.S. fire and atomic bombings at the end of thePacific War and they were now victims of quasi-American colonization in the form of militarybases and facilities. But this victimization alsomade them aggressors toward the Vietnamesepeople because the US assault on that countrywas using Japan as a staging ground. The samecould be said of the pollution problem: ordinaryJapanese people were certainly victims ofindustrial pollution but when this pollution wasdirected abroad, these same Japanese victimsbecame unwitting accomplices in Japanesecorporate transgressions overseas. After all, toan extent, the affluent daily life and cleanerliving environments of all Japanese were builton the suffering of people throughout Asia.

Such logic pervades the discourse of Japaneseenvironmentalists in the early to mid-1970s, forexample, as in the following ideas of a youngILP activist, Aoyama Tadashi, in 1976. FromAoyama’s perspective the Japanese people’sbattle against the ‘contradictions born of high-speed economic growth’ had producedimpressive results. Thanks to these strugglesthe public was now resolutely opposed toindustrial pollution and the Japanese naturalenvironment was much cleaner. Yet, despitesuch successes, the Japanese had been woefullyunaware of people overseas ‘suffering in theshadows of Japanese affluence,’ nowhere moreso than in Asia. ‘Haven’t we essentially ignoredthe voices and existence of our neighbors up

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until now?’ Aoyama asked. If the Japanese wereto ‘properly comprehend’ their future pathwaythey needed to ‘listen to the appeals’ of theseneighbors and to act accordingly. In thisconnection, Aoyama felt emboldened by theflowering of the new antipollution exportmovements. ‘Ours is a small struggle whichbegan as a battle against pollution export andin pursuit of genuine friendship between thepeople of [Asia] and Japan…. But from thisstarting point it escalated into a new pollutionissue causing uproar throughout Japan.’ Moresignificantly, Aoyama observed how remarkablydifferent the new mobilizations were from theearlier domestic antipollution movements.Whereas these earlier movements were begunby victims who gathered supporters andthrough joint struggle achieved legal, political,and social recognition, the new movementswere initiated and spearheaded by a cadre ofantipollution export advocates who were notthemselves direct victims. This was an entirelynew phenomenon in postwar Japaneseenvironmental activism because the initialmotivation for action stemmed not from adesire for individual or communal retributionand compensation but out of concern forothers. Ui Jun’s ILP movement was a pioneer inthis respect, opening the way for latertransnational movements involving Japanese,Thais, South Koreans, Filipinos and others fromEast Asia. For Aoyama the rise of suchadvocacy for fellow East Asians promised to bea truly revolutionary force in Japaneseenvironmental activism because it overlay avictim-focused agenda with an outward-looking,other-focused rubric (i.e. a reflexive outlook).The result, concluded Aoyama, could be amovement ‘beyond our wildest dreams.’

Aoyama’s exuberance is admirable if not a littleoverstated, but he was on target with respectto the powerfully transformative impact of thenew transnational movements on Japaneseenvironmental activism and the consciousnessof activists. Pollution export demanded thatJapanese activists deal with the aggressor

within as a necessary element of any newtransnational alliance. Indeed, this was the verycrux of the matter, and its urgency pushedJapanese environmental thought beyond thesomewhat insular earlier focus on Japanesevictims. Only when Japanese activists exposedthe aggressor within and, from this position ofvulnerability, attempted to fashion ties ofequality with their East Asian counterparts, didgenuine border-crossing sentiment begin totake root. To be sure, this process unfolded atf i r s t on l y i n a hand fu l o f J apaneseenvironmental movements. But I believe itseffects on activist identity and civic activism inJapan were more widespread. After thesemovements it was no longer possible toconsider Japanese environmental problems oractivist identity within the narrow frameworkof the national state, national citizenship, ornational victimization. The problems and theresponses now transcended borders and,hence, demanded a new mentality which in asimilar way transcended the confines of thenation alone.

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“Polluted Japan,” 1972

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Simon Avenell is an associate professor at the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. Hisresearch focuses on modern Japanese history, civic activism, civil society, and politicalthought. He is the author of Transnational Japan in the Global Environmental Movement(University of Hawaii Press, 2017) and Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and theMythology of the Shimin in Postwar Japan (University of California Press, 2010), as well asnumerous book chapters and journal articles. His current research examines Japanese

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grassroots activism in postwar (East) Asia. Many of his publications can be downloaded at hishomepage (https://savenell.wordpress.com/).

Notes1 Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2005), 206.2 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization,’ inUlrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash eds., Reflexive Modernization: Politics,Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1994),1–55.3 Simon Avenell, ‘Japan’s Long Environmental Sixties and the Birth of a Green Leviathan,’Japanese Studies 32, no. 3 (2012): 423–44.4 T. J. Pempel, ‘Gulliver in Lilliput: Japan and Asian Economic Regionalism,’ World PolicyJournal 13, no. 4 (winter 1996–7):18; Derek Hall, ‘Pollution Export as State and CorporateStrategy: Japan in the 1970s,’ Review of International Political Economy 16, no. 2 (2009): 262.5 Hall ‘Pollution Export,’ 262.6 Hall, ‘Pollution Export.’7 Derek Hall, ‘Environmental Change, Protest, and Havens of Environmental Degradation:Evidence from Asia,’ Global Environmental Politics 2, no. 2 (2002): 22, 23.8 Ui Jun, ‘Pollution Export,’ in Shigeto Tsuru and Helmut Weidner eds., Environmental Policyin Japan (Berlin: Sigma, 1989), 396, 401.9 Ui Jun, ‘Kokuren kankyō kaigi hōkoku I,’ Kōgai Genron 13 (July 1972): 17–18. Reproduced inSaitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 2fukkoku ‘Kōgai Genron’ dai 1-kai haihon dai 3-kan (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2007), 221–2.10 Matsuoka Nobuo, ‘Tōnan Ajia no tabi kara (Marēshia nite),’ Jishu Kōza 18 (Sept 1972): 2.Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondaishiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 3-kan (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2005), 346.11 Matsuoka Nobuo, ‘Mō hitotsu no omoni o seou kakugo o: Higashi Ajia no tabi kara (3),’Jishu Kōza 20 (Nov 1972): 38. Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentāed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 4-kan (Tokyo: Suirensha,2005), 106.12 Inoue Sumio, ‘Bokura wa kōgai yushtsu to tatakai hajimeta,’ Tenbō 191 (Nov 1974): 50.13 Hirayama Takasada, ‘Tōnan Ajia kōgai saihakken no tabi (1) Tai nite,’ Jishu Kōza 31 (Oct1973): 52. Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshūkōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 2-kai haihon dai 1-kan (Tokyo: Suirensha,2006), 382.14 Hirayama Takasada, ‘Exporting Pollution (The Export of ‘KOGAI’),’ KOGAI: The NewsletterFrom Polluted Japan 2 (Winter 1974): 7; Inoue, ‘Bokura wa,’ 52.15 Jishu Kōza Ajia Gurūpu, ‘Tai Asahi Kasei Sōda no kasen osen,’ Jishu Kōza 31 (Oct 1973), 48.Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondaishiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 2-kai haihon dai 1-kan (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2006), 378.16 Inoue, ‘Bokura wa,’ 51.

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17 Inoue, ‘Bokura wa,’ 52–3.18 Inoue, ‘Bokura wa,’ 53.19 Okuda Takaharu, ‘Nichitai o musubu kōgai hantai undō,’ Jishu Kōza 44 (Nov 1974): 41–54.Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgai mondaishiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 2-kai haihon dai 4-kan (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2006), 53; OkudaTakahara, ‘Documents of the First Co-operation Between Japanese Citizens and Thai PeopleActing Simultaneously to Stop the Exporting Pollution,’ KOGAI: The Newsletter From PollutedJapan 7 (Spring 1975): 10–11.20 Inoue, ‘Bokura wa,’ 53.21 Okuda, ‘Documents,’ 11.22 Hirayama Takasada, ‘Sōkan no ji,’ Geppō kōgai o nogasuna 1 (1974): 1; 1974/2/15; Inoue,‘Bokura wa,’ 54.23 Hirayama Takasada, ‘Toyama Kagaku, kōgai yushutsu chūshi!?’ Jishu Kōza 39 (June 1974):28. Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshū kōgaimondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 2-kai haihon dai 3-kan (Tokyo: Suirensha, 2006), 94.24 Inoue, ‘Bokura wa,’ 55.25 Ogawa Hiroshi, ‘Ajia no mado: Nihon Kagaku no kōgai yushutsu o kokuhatsu suru,’ JishuKōza 42 (Sept 1974): 57. Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., UiJun shūshū kōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 2-kai haihon dai 3-kan (Tokyo:Suirensha, 2006), 307.26 Hall, ‘Pollution Export,’ 269.27 Inoue Sumio, ‘Babanuki no riron o koete: Nihon Kagaku no kuromu tarenagashi to kankokue no kōgai yushutsu,’ Tenbō 204 (Dec 1977): 89.28 Emphasis in original. Hirayama, ‘Toyama Kagaku, kōgai yushutsu chūshi!?’ 95.29 Hirayama, ‘Toyama Kagaku, kōgai yushutsu chūshi!?’ 93.30 Ogawa Yoshio, ‘Dai 2 no Toyama Kagaku = Nihon Kagaku no Kankoku e no kōgai yusutsu oyamesaseyo,’ Geppō kōgai o nogasuna! Kankoku e no kōgai yushutsu o kokuhatsu suru 3(August 1974): 2.31 Ogawa Yoshio, ‘Dai 2 no Toyama Kagaku,’ 2; Masayoshi, Hideo, ‘Nikkan no genjō to kōgaiyusutsu soshi undō.’ Geppō kōgai o nogasuna! Kankoku e no kōgai yushutsu o kokuhatsu suru7 (Dec 1974): 1.32 Inoue, ‘Bokura wa,’ 59.33 Kawana Hideyuki, Dokyumento Nihon no kōgai 13: Ajia no kankyō hakai to Nihon (Tokyo:Ryokufu, 1996), 101.34 Kawana, Dokyumento Nihon no kōgai, 101.35 Inoue, ‘Babanuki,’ 91.36 ‘Damatte irarenai: Jimoto higaisha ga dantai o kessei,’ Tōyō Keizai Nippō (May 6, 1975).Reproduced in Geppō kōgai o nogasuna! Kankoku e no kōgai yushutsu o kokuhatsu suru 14(July 1975): 31.37 ‘Damatte irarenai,’ 31.38 Inoue, ‘Babanuki,’ 92.39 Hall, ‘Pollution Export,’ 274.40 See Oda Makoto, ‘Heiwa o tsukuru: Sono genri to kōdō – hitotsu no sengen,’ in Oda Makoto,Oda Makoto zenshigoto 9 (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shinsha, 1970), 113–31.

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41 Aoyama Tadashi, ‘Nikkan jōyaku 10-nen to kōgai yushutsu hantai undō,’ Jishu Kōza 58 (Jan1976): 64. Reproduced in Saitama Daigaku Kyōsei Shakai Kenkyū Sentā ed., Ui Jun shūshūkōgai mondai shiryō 1 fukkoku ‘Jishu Kōza’ dai 3-kai haihon dai 2-kan (Tokyo: Suirensha,2006), 70.42 Aoyama, ‘Nikkan jōyaku,’ 68.43 ibid.44 Aoyama, ‘Nikkan jōyaku,’ 67–8.45 Aoyama, ‘Nikkan jōyaku,’ 68.