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Transformation of Russia and Ukraine: Social Bases of Reform

and Anti-ReformDavid Lane

Cambridge University

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System collapse

• Inherent instability of state socialism

• political actors, led by ‘elites’, manage socio-economic change

• new elites replace faulty institutions of state socialism with markets, private property and democratic institutions

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Absence of any mass base

• What of ‘bottom up’ forces? • Lack of any class analysis• Joseph E.Davis: study of collective

identity and political action;• Social movements are amorphous bodies

with a shifting focus; political parties lose their saliency

• ‘group struggles’ - ‘race, ethnicity, nationality, gender and sexuality

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Shift from production to consumption

• Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters, ‘...[P]ost-communist politics cannot be usefully analyzed using the class paradigm

• Class formation from state socialism was weak

• Absence of empirical backing, assertive in character

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Public Opinion Polls: Social identification

• Russia, April 2005, 1,600 people

• Ukraine, 2015 people, September 2005

• Evaluation of: the reform process, privatization, market economy

• Political Identifications: Communist, Social-Democrat, Agrarian, Rus/Ukr Nationalist, Liberal, ‘Hard Hand’

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Communist Identification by Occupational Background

% Occupation By Communist Identification

05

101520253035

Russia

Ukraine

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Subjective identification

• Your generation

• Russian/Ukrainian nation

• businessmen

• Intelligentsia

• Workers

• Peasants

• Students

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Multiple Identification of Communists

• Ukraine: Russian Nation – 93 per cent of communists

• Russia: ‘much in common with the working class’ - 79 per cent also identified with communist ideology

• Ukraine: those with communist views, 80 per cent had positive identification with working class; 72 per cent pos identification with peasantry

• Close identification between working class and communists

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Communists by Gender

• Ukraine, slightly more women than men (17.9 per cent as opposed to 15.4 per cent of the respective gender groups)

• Russia, the same: 17.9 per cent of women supported the communists and 15.3 per cent of men

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Communists: Regional Spread

• % of respondents in region with communists views:

• Russia: not significant difference• Ukraine: Significant• West: 7.3• West central: 11.2• East Central: 15.9 • South: 23.1• East: 27.3

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Nationalists

• Russia: • Fairly well divided between occupations (more

students), gender groups, age groups (rather more younger), regional differences (more in Far East, Central, North-West)

• Ukraine: • Significant occupational differences: Students

(31% of students), intelligentsia (13.6% of group); age significant – 18 to 29 year olds, 31% of nationalists. Regional differences: West – 38.4% of population, South – 1.8%, East- 2%.

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Liberal support, by occupation

Liberal Support: Russia and Ukraine

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

% o

f O

cc

up

UKR

RUS

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Liberal Views: Social background

• Slightly more men than women (% of group)

• Strong correlation with age: The younger the more liberal

• Russia, 25 to 39 years – 39 per cent of total; Ukraine: 38.9 per cent of category 18 to 29. Both significant at .001 level

• Regional: Russia - stronger Moscow, Far East; Ukraine – stronger in West than East

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Support and Opposition to Reform Policies

• Three basic questions:

• How do you evaluate the formation of a market economy, with private property and business

• The government should provide citizens with work and a normal standard of living

• The Government should own the basic

• industrial assets of society

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Support of market economy, by occupational status

Support for Formation of a Market Economy by Occupational Group

Occupational Group

Businessmen and

Managers

Specialists and

professionals

Lower non-

manuals Workers

Peasants and

agricultural workers Students

Others Total

RUSSIA % in

occupational group in

favour 75.2 68.2 62 40.2 40.4 74.4

46 N= 1599

57.8% Significant at .001 level

UKRAINE % in group In favour

82 78.80 69.80 62.70 48.40 89.90 78.80

N=1843 70.40%

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Chart Support for Market Economy by Occupation

0102030405060708090

100

BusMan Profs LNonM Wks Peas Studs

% o

f Occ

up G

rp

Rus

Ukr

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Support of Market Economy

• In Russia, 46.8% women against, 28.2 per cent of men. (.001 level);

• in Ukraine, 24% men against 34 per cent of women against – significant at .01

• Russia: 72% of under 39 yrs in support ; 36% for over 55 age group

• Ukraine: 14% of 18 to 29 cohort against, 55% - over 70s

• Ukr. Region: West 87% in favour; South/East 65/68%

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State Ownership

• Widespread support: A Russia, B Ukraine

• A:58% B: 62 complete;

• A: 28% B: 21 reservations;

• A: 10.7% B10 oppose with reservations;

• A: 1.5% B4 completely

•

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Opposition to state ownershipBy occupational group

Opposition to State Ownership: Russia and Ukraine

0

10

20

30

40

% o

f c

ate

go

ry

Rus

Ukr

20

Opposition to State Ownership

• Age: Russia, 18-24 years, 16.9%; over 55, 8%

• Ukraine: 18-29 years, 22.9%, 60-69, 6.1%

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Summary of Findings

• There is a common pattern of ideological orientations in Russia and Ukraine.

• Political ideology in both societies is strongly correlated to social background.

• Support and opposition to key left-right issues are also related to the same variables and to a similar extent.

• Main difference between Russia and Ukraine: a distinct regional bias of the Western Ukraine towards national ideology and more right wing policies.

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Why Little Systemic Opposition to Reforms Programme?

• Potential for political opposition, even counter revolution

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Elite consensus has neutralised opposition

• Lack of organisation of opposition

• Coloured Revolutions – support of market

• De-ideologised political opposition

• Weak basis of ‘civil society’ organisations under communism and since

• ‘Sponsored’ civil soc undermined the state

• Lack of ideological alternative