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TRANSACTIONS
BASED
ANALYTICS
Vijay Desai, SAS Institute
Presented at Kelly School of
Business, Bloomington, IN
Nov. 8, 2010
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AGENDA
Transactions landscape Transactions data
Problems to tackle
Transactions analytics Types of techniques
Performance measurement
Target definition Fraud
Credit risk
Attrition
Deploying the solution Using the scores in production
Monitoring the production system
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Trasactions Data
Problems to Tackle
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TRANSACTIONS LANDSCAPE
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TRANSACTIONS DATA
Credit/Debit cards Authorisations
Payments
Statements
Non-monetary data
Bureau data
Demographic data
Campaign data
Clickstream data
Wire transfers
Financial transactions
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PROBLEMS TO TACKLE
First party fraud
Second party fraud
Third party fraud
Credit risk, bankruptcy
Product offers, pricing
Money laundering
Financial trading violations
Bio-terrorism
Intrusion detection
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PREDICTION VERSUS DETECTION
Detection examples Credit card fraud
Tax under-filing
Bio-terror attack
Prediction examples Charge-off, serious
delinquency
Cross-sell, up-sell propensity
??? Attrition
Fraud rings
Network intrusion
Time
Event Prediction Detection
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Attrition
TARGET DEFINITION AND AVAILABILITY
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Credit Risk Credit card fraud
Tax under-filers
Network intrusion
Bio-terror attack
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FIRST PARTY FRAUD
Committed on own account
Victimless fraud
Examples
Fictitious identities
Check kiting
Bust out fraud
Tax under-filing
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SECOND PARTY FRAUD
Committed by someone known to or close to
genuine account holder
Examples
Employee abuse of corporate cards
Relatives abusing cards/data of children, siblings,
parents
Caregivers abusing cards/data of senior citizens
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THIRD PARTY FRAUD
Committed on some one else’s account
Impersonation of genuine identity
Examples
Identity theft
Lost/stolen cards/accounts
Stolen data/account information
Online fraud with infected PCs
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FRAUD TYPES: DEBIT CARD EXAMPLE
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Source: First Data Resources
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GLOBAL CARD FRAUD
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US CARD FRAUD LOSSES
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Source: Kansas City Federal Reserve
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CARD FRAUD LOSSES FOR SELECT COUNTRIES
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Source: Kansas City Federal Reserve
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CREDIT RISK
Existing accounts
Serious delinquency
Bankruptcy
Charge-off
New accounts
Delinquency in first six months
Bankruptcy in first six months
Charge-off in first six months
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CREDIT LIMIT AND BALANCES
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DELINQUENCY STATUS
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ATTRITION/CHURN RISK
Closed/Cancelled account
Loss of revenue due to sharp and lasting
reduction in balance and activity
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NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS
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OPENED AND CLOSED ACCOUNTS
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Techniques
Performance measurement
Target definitions
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TRANSACTIONS ANALYTICS
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TYPES OF TECHNIQUES
Rules
Supervised learning models
Regression, decision trees, neural networks, SVM
Unsupervised learning models
Clustering, PCA, neural networks
Semi-supervised learning models
Association rules/Market basket analysis
Optimization
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PREDICTION/DETECTION TECHNIQUES
Un-supervised
Input Layer
Feature
Layers
Input Layer
Feature
Hidden
Input
Layer
Output
Layer
Feature
Hidden
Layers
Input
Layer
Output
Layer
Feature
Hidden
Layers
Input Layer
Feature
Layers
Input Layer
Feature
Hidden
Semi-supervised
Supervised
Input
Layer
Output
Layer
Feature
Hidden
Layers
Input
Layer
Output
Layer
Feature
Hidden
Layers
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TYPICAL RULE BASED SYSTEM
Pros
Easy to understand
Can be a batch or automated system
Effective in catching the obvious cases
Cons
Too many false-positives
Likely to miss many risky cases
Does not provide priority for investigation
Difficult to maintain
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RULES FOR MEASURING SUCCESS
All ”goods”
and “bads”
unknown
All ”goods”
and “bads” known
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PERFORMANCE MEASURES
How good is the score at separating the two classes of goods and bads?
Information value
Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic
Lift curve
ROC curve
Gini coefficient
Somer’s D-concordance statistic
How good is the score as a probability forecast?
Binomial and Normal tests
Hosmer-Lemeshow test
How good is the score and cut-offs in business decisions?
Error rates
Swap set analysis
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INFORMATION VALUE
Divide the score into i bands
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PERFORMANCE DEFINITIONS
Let F(s|G) ( F(s|B)) be distribution functions of scores (s) of goods, (G) ( bads (B)) in a scorecard
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KOLMOGOROV SMIRNOV STATISTIC
Kolmogorov Smirnov statistic (KS)
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LIFT CURVE
Plots percentage bads rejected versus percentage rejected
Ideal score given by ABC where B represents population bad rate
Random score represented by AC
Accuracy ratio AR=2(Area of curve above diagonal)/Area of ABC
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ROC CURVE
ABC represents ideal score
Diagonal represents random score Gini coefficient (GC) measures twice
the ratio of area between curve and diagonal to area ABC GC=1 corresponds to perfect score
GC=0 represents random score
Somer’s D-concordance (SD) If “good” and “bad” chosen at
random, good will have lower score/probability of being bad than bad
AUROC is area under ROC curve GC=2AUROC-1=SD
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BINOMIAL TEST
Checks if predicted bad rate in a given bin i is
correct versus underestimated
Let there be
bads in the observations of
bin i and the probability of a borrower in that
band being good
The predicted bad rate in bin i is correct if it the
number of bads k in bin i is less than or equal
to
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NORMAL TEST
Approximation of Binomial
The predicted bad rate in bin i is correct if it the
number of bads k in bin i is less than
Where is the inverse of the cumulative
normal distribution
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HOSMER-LEMESHOW TEST
Assess whether observed bad rates match
expected bad rates in each of ten bins
A chi-square test statistic
Let
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SIMPLE SAS EXAMPLE-I
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SIMPLE SAS EXAMPLE-II
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ERROR RATES
Account False Positive Ratio (AFPR): The ratio of good to bad accounts for a given cut-off score
A ratio of 10:1 would indicate that out of 11 accounts, 1 is bad, 10 are good
Account Detection Rate (ADR): The ratio of bad accounts to the total number of bad accounts for the period at a given cut-off score.
If there are 100 bad accounts in the time period and 30 of them are at or above the cut-off score at some time during the period, the ADR is 30%
Value Detection Rate (VDR): Percentage of dollars saved on detected bad accounts for a given cut-off score
Assuming that the total losses on all accounts are $1,000,000 and that $600,000 of these are saved by the system, the VDR would, consequently, be equal to 60%
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SWAP SET ANALYSIS
Used to compare two competing scores
Choose top x% accounts using score1 and score2
Eliminate the common bads and goods
Compare the two data sets to identify bads caught by score1 but not score 2 and vice versa
Score1 is better than score2 if it has a higher bad rate in the swap set
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TARGET DEFINITION: CARD FRAUD
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Pre-fraud Fraud window Post Block
Date/time of
first fraudulent
transactions
Block date/time
All transactions are
declined / blocked
Fraud activities has not been detected or confirmed yet. The approved fraudulent
transactions during this window are the fraud losses. Legitimate transactions could
exist in this period. (For the fraud case with no loss, there is no fraud window.)
All transactions are
legitimate
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TARGET DEFINITION: CREDIT RISK
Bad: Account becomes at any time during the outcome window 3+ cycles delinquent
Bankrupt
Charged-off
Indeterminate accounts Maximum of 2 cycles delinquent in the outcome window
Fraud or Transfer status in the outcome window
Inactive accounts
Indeterminate accounts will be excluded from off-sample validation and off-time validation
Other accounts are Good
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TARGET DEFINITION: ATTRITION RISK
Account closure Many banks/vendors use this to define “Bad” accounts
Silent attrition Many banks/vendors use this to define “Bad” accounts
Silent attrition defined as a sharp and lasting drop in economic value (balance and activity) of accounts that were valuable in prior periods
Many banks/vendors refine this definition to exclude accounts that have other reasons for change in economic value of account
Many banks/vendors use both to define “Bad” accounts
All other non-fraudulent active current accounts are classified as “Good” accounts
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Using the scores in production
Monitoring the production system
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DEPLOYING THE SOLUTION
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SCORE USES
Typical use of scores is in strategies to manage decisions concerning: Whether to approve/decline authorizations Whether to approve/decline over-limit requests Actions to make delinquent accounts current Increase/decrease credit limits Whether to reissue credit cards Collections related actions
Credit risk score is the most frequently used score for above strategies. Some banks also use attrition, revenue and profit scores
Scores also used in other strategies such as retention, balance transfer, balance build, convenience checks, and cross-sell/up-sell optimization
Fraud scores are used for approve/decline/refer decisions
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BENEFITS FROM REAL TIME SCORING
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WHY DO BOTH RULES AND SCORING?
Rules allow the input of client specific intellectual property and operation constraints
Rules allow tracking and adjustments for new or short term risk patterns
Models pick up non-obvious risk patterns and behaviors
Output from advanced models easy to translate into probability & log odds scores
Scores can be used very easily to rank order entities
The combination of rules and scores provides better detection rate and better quality referral
Business implication - with the same amount of resource,
Catching more risk activity
Catching them earlier Faster way to get a good ROI
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AUTHORIZATION STRATEGY EXAMPLE
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OVERLIMIT STRATEGY EXAMPLE
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RETAIL/CHECK STRATEGY EXAMPLE
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CREDIT LIMIT STRATEGY Risk Score Low Medium High
Credit Limit Utilization Low High Low High
Delinquency Status Clean Dirty Clean Dirty Clean Dirty Clean Dirty
Credit Line Inc. 0 500 0 1000 500 1500 1000 5000 2500
Implemented in the form of decision trees/strategies
Champion/Challenger framework for improving strategies over time
Randomly assign accounts to champion or challenger strategy
Measure performance over time
Takes a six to twelve months to evaluate each challenger strategy
A very small number of potential champion strategies can be tested at a
given time
Difficult to analyze why a particular challenger strategy worked
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EXPANDING BEYOND THE “COMFORT ZONE”
Risk Score Low Medium High
Credit Limit Utilization Low High Low High
Delinquency Status Clean Dirty Clean Dirty Clean Dirty Clean Dirty
Champion Credit Line Inc. 0 500 0 1000 500 1500 1000 5000 2500
Test Group 1 0 0 0 500 0 500 0 2500 1000
Test Group 2 0 0 0 500 0 1500 0 3000 1500
Test Group 3 0 0 0 1500 0 2000 1500 4000 2000
Test Group 4 500 1000 500 2500 1000 3000 2000 7000 3000
Test Group 5 500 1500 1000 3000 1500 4000 2500 8000 4000
Test Group 6 500 2000 1500 4000 2500 5000 3000 9000 5000
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NON-LINEAR PROGRAMMING EXAMPLE (A)
Credit limit increases are a
continuous variable
Randomly choose a small
number of accounts for
optimization
Use Lagrangian relaxation
techniques
Adding more constraints can
make solution more difficult
Map optimal solution to a
decision tree to score all
accounts
Deploying decision tree in
lieu of solution can result in
significant loss in benefit of
the whole effort
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LINEAR PROGRAMMING EXAMPLE I (B)
Only discrete credit limit
increases allowed
Subset of LP problem has
integer solutions most of the
time
Account level optimization
possible
Solve relaxed LP problem
and check feasibility for
remaining constraints
No need to map optimal
solution to a score
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MONITORING THE SYSTEM
Monitoring the scoring system Stability index of score
Stability index of input fields
Remedies for score deterioration
Monitoring the portfolio Population stability report
Characteristic analysis report
Final score report
Delinquency distribution list
Roll rates
Vintage analysis
Reports by portfolio segments, risky segments
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CHARACTERISTIC ANALYSIS REPORT
Stability index
Characteristic reports
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REMEDIES FOR SCORE DETERIORATION
Score shelf life depends upon the problem
Fraud scores have lower shelf life because fraudsters constantly change techniques
Credit scores have longer shelf life because causes do not change much over time
Remedies
Recalibrate the score Least expensive, easiest to implement
A table mapping the old score to a new score
Retrain the model More expensive, straightforward to implement
Keep same variables, simply change the weights/coefficients
Rebuild the model Most expensive, needs the full implementation cycle
New models with new variables and new weights/coefficients
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QUARTERLY REPORTS
Population stability report
Measures change in score distribution over time
Characteristic analysis report
Measures changes in individual input fields over time
Final score report
Measures how closely the score is used in production
E.g., show number of accepts and rejects by application score band
Delinquency distribution report
Measures the portfolio quality by different score ranges
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QUARTERLY REPORT EXAMPLE
Monitor change in population
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NET FLOW RATE REPORT
Month Total Active 0 Days 30 Days 0 to 30 60 Days 30 to 60 90 Days 60 to 90 120 Days90 to 120 Charge-off120 to Charge-off
Jan-02 5,000,000 3,223,095 2708576 138010 62592 20993 15504 20304
Feb-02 4953109 3,042,517 2572243 135248 4.99% 53557 38.81% 22461 35.88% 20993 100.00% 15504 100.00%
Mar-02 4904891 3,113,894 2540610 149907 5.83% 50032 36.99% 20013 37.37% 20384 90.75% 10391 49.50%
Apr-02 5053111 2,871,802 2372516 156405 6.16% 32108 21.42% 15676 31.33% 12809 64.00% 16991 83.35%
May-02 4757579 3,499,756 3020579 107666 4.54% 49620 31.73% 30997 96.54% 15676 100.00% 12029 93.91%
Jun-02 4797435 2,705,767 2319788 159521 5.28% 35672 33.13% 23269 46.89% 10495 33.86% 12967 82.72%
Jul-02 4893318 3,413,728 2916158 146442 6.31% 49193 30.84% 21039 58.98% 16096 69.17% 10495 100.00%
Aug-02 4873484 2,995,243 2565883 91843 3.15% 48012 32.79% 26098 53.05% 21039 100.00% 15735 97.76%
Sep-02 4782782 3,474,030 2804788 173177 6.75% 44291 48.22% 33136 69.02% 21253 81.44% 14616 69.47%
Oct-02 4988121 3,365,931 2999460 118388 4.22% 38906 22.47% 23146 52.26% 15841 47.81% 14074 66.22%
Nov-02 5239903 2,991,770 2584154 152951 5.10% 46657 39.41% 17197 44.20% 14658 63.33% 15841 100.00%
Dec-02 4943682 3,204,539 2734118 141276 5.47% 48221 31.53% 23593 50.57% 12658 73.61% 14658 100.00%
4.99% of current accounts in Jan ’02 become 30 days delinquent in Feb ‘02
3,223,095 accounts roll into 12967 charge-offs with annualized charge-
off rate of 4.8%
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VINTAGE CURVE REPORT
Vintage Curve
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Months on Books
Cu
mu
lati
ve %
Lo
sses
Months Cohort #1
Months Cohort # 2
Months Cohort #3
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Q&A
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