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Transcript of Tort – injury to person or property We are interested in unintentional torts, inadvertent...
Economics of Tort Law
Tort LawTort – injury to person or propertyWe are interested in unintentional torts, inadvertent accidents.Injuries sustained by breach of contract are covered under contract law
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005State Courts
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005 State Courts
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005
Punitive Damage Awardsin Large Counties, 2001
Tort liability A court imposed obligation on the tortfeasor to pay for a victim’s losses.
Economic Analysis of Tort Liability 10
Why is there tort liability?
There are situations in which the transaction costs between potential injurers and potential victims are so high that they cannot bargain about liability prior to an accident.
Elements Breach of a preexisting duty of care No contract exists between the victim and the injurer
How can we affect pre-accident behavior when victim and injurer cannot assign liability by contract?
An efficient system would minimize these elements of cost
Cost of injuries Cost of precaution Cost of administration Indirect costs to economy
An efficient system would internalize externalities and provide incentives for efficient precaution and activity
Precaution is a function of the resources devoted to avoiding potential harm
Activity is a function of the volume or frequency of risky behavior
Traditional tort liability requires three elements
1. Breach of Duty - The defendant’s act or failure to act must constitute the breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant
2. Harm - The plaintiff must have suffered a harm
3. Cause - The defendant’s act or failure to act must cause the harm
Element 1: Breach of duty
Two possible rules Strict liability rule - only harm and cause are required
for a tort any harm is a breach of due care
Negligence rule - requires a minimum duty of care
Duty of careA legal standard prescribing the minimum acceptable level of precaution
Violation of the due care standard represents negligence Under strict liability any harm violates due care standard
Due care standard is based upon a reasonable person
Element 2: HarmThere typically must be an actual harm.
Liability law does not compensate for exposure to risk A pollutant that reduces property values may result in an
actual harm, but the future risk of illness is not an actual harm
Perfect compensation would compensate for both property losses and intangible harm.
Should reimbursement occur for intangible harms? How do we determine the value of intangible harms? (The
death of a child.)
Element 3: Cause“But for” test (cause in fact)
Problem when there are multiple causes (ambiguous causation) Ex., Medical malpractice cases
Proximity in the law is imprecise “But for” test does not distinguish between proximate
causes and remote causes Proximate cause satisfies the “but for” test and is
sufficiently direct to be the determined the legal cause of the injury
Palsgraph v. LIRR (NY 1938)
Plaintiff was standing on the platform when another passenger was having some difficulty boarding a train. While a LIRR guard helped him onto the train a package he was holding became dislodged and fell on the platform. The package contained fireworks which exploded. The explosion toppled a scale which struck the plaintiff“The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all. Nothing in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus removed. “
An efficient system would minimize these elements of cost
Cost of injuries Cost of precaution Cost of administration Indirect costs to economy
An efficient system would internalize externalities and provide incentives for efficient precaution and activity
Precaution is a function of the resources devoted to avoiding potential harm
Activity is a function of the volume or frequency of risky behavior
The economic purpose of tort law is to minimize the social cost of accidents.
We will assume only cost of injury and cost of precaution
x = unit of precaution w = cost of a unit of precaution A = monetary value of the harm p(x) = probability of harm
Minimize social cost
harm expected ofcost marginalprecaution ofcost marginal
0)(,0)(
)(
0)(
)(
xpxp
Axpw
Axpwx
SC
AxpwxSC
Total Costs
x = Amount of precaution
p(x)A = Expected Accident costs
$
Total Costs
x = Amount of precaution
wx = precaution cost
p(x)A = Expected Accident costs
$
Total Costs
x = Amount of precaution
wx = precaution cost
p(x)A = Expected Accident costs
Total Cost = p(x)A + wx
$
Total Costs
x = Amount of precaution
wx = precaution cost
p(x)A = Expected Accident costs
Total Cost = p(x)A + wx
Minimum = Efficient amount of precaution
x*
$
The same issue with slopes
Marginal Costs
x = Amount of precaution
Rate at which Accident costs decrease
$
The same issue with slopes
Marginal Costs
x = Amount of precaution
Marginal cost of precaution
Rate at which Accident costs decrease
w
The same issue with slopes
Marginal Costs
x = Amount of precaution
Marginal cost of precaution
Rate at which Accident costs decrease
Minimum = Efficient amount of precaution
x*
w
PrecautionUnilateral precaution
Only the injurer or only the victim can influence the probability or severity of injury
Bilateral precaution Both the injurer and the victim can influence the
probability or severity of injury
Strict LiabilityInjurer is liable for all harmPrecaution does not reduce or eliminate liabilityThe opposite of strict liability is no liability
Regulating Risk with a Liability Standard
Strict liability with perfect compensatory damages gives the victim no incentive to take precaution
No liability gives the injurer no incentive to take precaution
Strict liabilityAppropriate when only unilateral precaution by the injurer is possible
Injurer has incentive to minimize total social cost Assumes costs can be accurately measured and
injurer will be found liable for all harms he caused
Strict Liability versus No Liability
Strict Liability Appropriate when only unilateral precaution by the
injurer is possible Injurer has incentive to minimize total social cost Assumes costs can be accurately measured by injurer Injurer internalizes cost of injury
No liability Appropriate when only unilateral precaution by the
victim is possible Victim has incentive to minimize total social cost Assumes costs can be accurately measured by victim Victim internalizes cost of injury
Liability QuestionsUnilateral v. Bilateral Precaution Should airlines be strictly liable for
crashes? Should manufacturers be strictly
responsible for consumer injury?Defective products
Defect in design Defect in manufacture Defect in warning
Knives, Guns, Toasters
Bilateral precautionWhen bilateral precaution is possible neither strict liability or no liability causes both the victim and the injurer to take the optimal level of precaution.
The party who does not internalize the harm will not take adequate precaution.
Negligence may be the preferred rule when bilateral precaution is possible .
Negligence standardSimple negligence: Injurer is liable only if precaution is less than due care standard; otherwise victim is liableNegligence rule with perfect compensation and the legal standard set to the efficient level of care gives the injurer and victim incentives for efficient precaution.
Injurer has incentive to satisfy the due care standard Victim responds as if there is no liability, therefore
victim has efficient incentive for precaution
If the DCS is too low:
Total Costs
x = Amount of precaution
wx = precaution cost
Expected Accident costs
Total Costs
Minimum = Efficient amount of precaution
x*
DCS
If the DCS is high:
Total Costs
x = Amount of precaution
wx = precaution cost
Expected Accident costs
Total Costs
Minimum = Efficient amount of precaution
x*
DCS
If the DSC is high can get excessive caution:
Total Costs
x = Amount of precaution
wx = precaution cost
Expected Accident costs
Total Costs
Minimum = Efficient amount of precaution
x*
DCS
If the DCS is very high :
Total Costs
x = Amount of precaution
wx = precaution cost
Expected Accident costs
Total Costs
Minimum = Efficient amount of precaution
x*
DCS
Negligence RulesNegligence rules give the victim and the injurer efficient incentives for precautionNegligence rule is preferred when there is bilateral precaution
Negligence rules1. Simple negligence2. Negligence with defense of contributory
negligence3. Comparative negligence4. Strict liability with defense of contributory
negligence
Activity versus Precaution
Activity - repeated risky behavior The more you drive, the more likely that you will
have an accident
Expected harm is a function of activity, harm and precaution
The more we engage in risky behaviors, the greater is the expected harm
The less precaution we take, the greater is the expected harm
Strict liability forces the injurer to internalize the harm related to activity, negligence does not.
Activity vs. Precaution
With simple negligence the carnival operator is relieved of all liability as long as he adheres to the duecare standard. Even with inspections, mishaps can occur, passengers can be injured. Riders put their set belts on because they can’t be sure the ride is safe. They will make sure restraints are functioning and will keep their hands and feet in. There is no incentive for the carnival operator to limit the passengers on the ride or the number of carnivals.Result
Optimal precaution, but too much activity With strict liability the number of riders would be less
but there would be no incentive for the riders to take due care
Trucking ExampleAssume driver is only liable if he is negligentIf he is not negligent, damages are not related to the number of trucks on the roadThe number of accidents is positively related to the number of trucks on the roadIncreased probability that you will be in an accident with a truckWith strict liability the trucking company has both an incentive for taking precaution and limiting mileage. The victim has no incentive for precaution or limiting activity.
Activity levels Under a negligence rule the marginal risk of harm
to others by engaging in the activity is externalized. Under strict liability, the social cost of accidents is internalized. Induces efficient precaution and efficient activity by injurers.
The party who escapes bearing the cost has an incentive for an inefficient activity level.
Efficiency requires choosing a liability rule so that the party whose activity level most affects accidents bears the residual cost of accidental harm.
Liability rules cannot provide an efficient incentive for bilateral activity levels
No single rule can create efficient incentives for both
bilateral precaution and bilateral activity levels.
Identifying Efficient PrecautionThe Hand Rule
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., (2d Cir. 1947) Defendant hired to move barge The mooring lines were not correctly adjusted A barge broke loose and sank The tug owner argued that barge owner was also
negligent because there was no bargee
The Hand Rule for identifying efficient precaution
“Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables:
(1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.”
… in algebraic terms: if the probability is P; the injury, L; and the burden (cost), B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B less than PL. If B<PL then party is negligent
If the party’s cost of preventing accidents (burden, B) is less than the expected losses from accidents (PL) that party should be deemed negligent. Otherwise it is better for accidents to occur.• In this case the barge owner was liable
Restatement of Hand Rule for identifying efficient precaution
Axpw )(
Axpw )(
Optimal precaution in marginal terms
If the marginal cost of precaution is less than the marginal benefit from precaution, the party is negligent.
When B < PL, the party is negligent
Potential errors by court
Errors in setting due care standardErrors in damages
Size of award Holding injurer liable
Errors related to Strict liability standard
Errors in setting DCS not relevant Errors in size of liability award and holding
injurers liable Errors in setting damages under a rule of strict
liability causes the injurer’s precaution to respond in the same direction as the error Excessive awards create excessive precaution
Errors in failing to hold injurers liable under a rule of strict liability causes them to take less precaution Ex., linking cancers to environmental contamination
Errors in Damages
Overestimating damages causes more precautionFailing to hold injurers liable produces less precaution
Errors related to Negligence standard
Errors in monetary damages Injurer’s negligence does not respond to modest
errors in setting damages under the negligence rule
Errors in DCS Injurer’s precaution responds exactly to court errors
in setting the legal standard under a negligence rule
Errors in Due Care Standard
Errors in due care standard affect precaution
Errors in setting Damages
Small errors in damages does not influence precaution
or
Possible exceptions in tort liability
Firefighter ruleGood Samaritan protectionPublic policy rule
Firefighter rulePrecludes a firefighter from recovering from one whose negligence causes or contributes to a fire that in turn causes injury or death to the firefighter
There is an assumption of risk May be limited to premises liability and ordinary
negligence Gross negligence and intentional harm is not
ordinarily protected
Good Samaritan LawProvides protection from ordinary negligence when providing emergency assistance
Medical professionals are not ordinarily protected
There may be no general duty to render assistance
Public policy ruleDamages would run counter to public policy goalsA victim should not benefit from their own criminal behavior
A bomb maker sued those who sold him the gunpowder
A suit by a burglar against the homeowner for faulty stairs
Extension to Third Party Liability -Alcohol related
liabilitiesAn injured person can sue those who contributed to the injurer’s intoxication
Dram shop laws Social host laws
There was a special duty of care because the injurer was invited to drinkFindlaw: Ohio Social Host Law
Summary of Major Tort Liability Standards Components of Efficiency
Implicationsfor Equity
Standard Provides Incentives for Efficiency in
Transaction CostsStandard
Injurer's Degreeof Care?
Scale ofInjurer'sActivities?
Victim'sDegreeof Care?
Scale ofVictim'sActivities?
Distributionof Risk?
Strict Liability Yes Yes No No No (Overinsuresnonpecuniarylosses)
High Compensates all victims; bundles unwanted insurance for nonpecuniary losses into product prices
Strict Liability with Comparative Negligence
Yes Yes Depends on extent of reduction in compensation to negligent victims
No No (Overinsuresnonpecuniary losses)
High Compensates nonnegligent victims (partially compensates negligent victims); bundles unwanted insurance for nonpecuniary losses into product prices
Negligence Depends on the efficiency of the legal standard of due care
No Yes Yes No (Overinsures nonpecuniary losses, though less so than strict liability since nonnegligent injuries are not compensated)
High Nonnegligent injurers not held liable; some victims uncompensated
Source: Congressional Budget Office.