The Russia-Ukraine Conflict Identity Construction in Russian Foreign Policy
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Transcript of The Russia-Ukraine Conflict Identity Construction in Russian Foreign Policy
Running head: IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Identity Construction in Russian Foreign Policy
(Carlos Latuff, 2014)
Jim Drew Bailey III
The American University of Rome
International Relations and Global Politics Programme
IAPO 499 International Relations Senior Thesis
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Eszter Salgó
May 2015
IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Dedication: This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my mother Victoria Joseph who I miss
everyday and to my father Jim Bailey Jr. who has sacrificed everything to provide me with
the opportunity to succeed in life.
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank all of my professors at The American University of
Rome for sharing their knowledge with me.
Special thanks to my advisor, Professor Eszter Salgó, for her time and guidance during the
drafting process.
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IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Table of Contents
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………….4
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..5
Methodology…………………………………………………………………………..8
Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………………10
Literature Review…………………………………………………………………….11
Chapter 1: Foundations of Russian Foreign Policy………………………………………19
1.1 Philosophical Foundations of Russian Foreign Policy…………………………...20
1.2 Russian Identity and the Role of the West……………………………………….27
1.3 The Construction of Russian Foreign Policy…………………………………….31
Chapter 2: Ambition and Application of Russian Foreign Policy……………………….33
2.1 Russia’s Current Foreign Policy…………………………………………………34
2.2 Russia’s Foreign Policy Decisions: 2008 Georgia Conflict……………………...35
Chapter 3: Russia-Ukraine Conflict……………………………………………………….37
3.1 Russia-Ukraine Conflict Overview………………………………………………38
3.2 Sources and Implications of Russia Intervention in Ukraine…………………….39
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………...45
References…………………………………………………………………………………...48
Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………….51
2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation……………………...52
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Abstract
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of Crimea has put the
international community on alert over the decision-making and the political ambitions of
Putin's Russia. Drawing from constructivist notions that indicate international relations are
social constructs of identity and the environment, this thesis examines Russian foreign policy
by surveying the philosophical foundations and the internal and external influences that
govern Russia’s decision-making. The main internal forces manifest themselves through the
ideals of Russia’s traditional schools of foreign policy and the construction of Russian
national identity while the external influences originate from Russia’s interactions and
perceptions of the Western World. Ultimately this investigation aims to demonstrate that the
Russia-Ukraine Conflict is a manifestation of these internal and external forces as shaped by
the constructed international community rather than an exhibition of power politics.
Keywords: Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Russian foreign policy, constructivism
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IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Introduction
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IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
In November 2013, the former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych cancelled the
European Association Agreement sparking mass demonstrations against his decision to
forego European cooperation. Existing as a buffer state between Russia and Europe, Ukraine
finds itself trapped between the on-going ideological feud between Russia and the West.
While assuredly there are other aspects of Yanukovych’s refusal of European alignment, the
current entanglement in Ukraine is clearly the most recent exhibition of this political divide.
As a result, the West has become apprehensive about Russia's intervention in Eastern Ukraine
and the subsequent annexation of Crimea. This apprehension is further exacerbated by
Russia’s combative stance against international sanctions, a damaged credit rating, and
widespread condemnation, which provokes the question, what is Russian foreign policy and
what influences its construction? Addressing this question will provide the reasoning as to
why Putin’s Russia is disregarding its precarious reputation and economic security to fight so
defiantly for a portion of Ukraine’s rust belt. Through a comprehensive analysis of Russian
foreign policy, this investigation considers the philosophical foundations as well as the
internal and external forces that govern Russian decision-making. The relevant internal forces
include the sources of Russian identity, and the external forces consider the role of the
Western World in Russian foreign policy. The aim of this investigation is to determine if
Russian intervention in Ukraine is an indication of new behaviour in Russian foreign policy
or the continuation of embedded ideals that reflect Russian identity and perceptions of the
Western World.
This thesis contains three chapters with sub-sections and a conclusion. The first
chapter carefully surveys the foundations of Russian foreign policy and is separated into three
sections. The first section provides a philosophical overview of the foundations of Russian
foreign policy by examining the three traditional schools of thought that influence Russia’s
decision-making. The second section discusses the implications of Russian identity and the
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influence of the Western World on Russian foreign policy. The final section of Chapter 1
discusses the formation of Russian foreign policy, as well as the features that have either
changed or endured throughout history. Through the analysis of the philosophical foundations
of Russian foreign policy, as well as the internal and external forces of influence, this chapter
provides the underlying framework and historical implications of Russian decision-making.
The second chapter presents the declared socio-political ambitions and application of
Russian foreign policy within the international community. This chapter contains two sub-
sections. The first section analyses the objectives and implications of Russia’s 2013 Concept
of Foreign Policy and the following section explores the implementation of Russian foreign
policy through the case example of the 2008 Georgia Conflict.
The final chapter of discussion surveys the Russian-Ukraine Conflict, specifically
looking at the motivations and implications of Russia’s involvement. This chapter examines
the link between the philosophical foundations, Russian identity, and Western influences to
the on-going Russia-Ukraine Conflict. The chapter consists of two sections. The first
provides an overview of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict within the context of Russian foreign
policy and the second addresses the causes and motivating factors for Russian involvement
through the consideration of the internal and external influences on said policy.
In contemporary international relations, Russia appears to be conducting itself in an
unpredictable manner that features the notions of realism and power politics; however, this
thesis claims that Russia’s foreign policy is a historical and social construct of the changes
and continuity in Russian identity. This argument suggests that Russia’s decision-making is a
reflection of the state’s unique identity, an identity that has been shaped by the internal
ideological foundations and external influences from the West. The Russia-Ukraine Conflict
endures as merely the latest exhibition of Russia’s constructed identity in practice. This thesis
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concludes by restating the research questions followed by a concise exposition of the
investigation’s results.
Methodology
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the Russia-Ukraine Conflict is a
manifestation of a new direction in Russian foreign policy or the logical continuation of an
entrenched ideology. This investigation utilizes a qualitative methodology with a
constructivist approach. In this case, qualitative research denotes the historical observation of
Russia within the context of the international community in order to understand or interpret
the ‘why’ and ‘how’ behind Russian decision-making. This qualitative research employs a
constructivist approach to a grounded theory research design that will seek to generate an
explanation of a process, action, or interaction shaped by the views of a large number of
participants (Creswell, 2006). Constructivism in international relations universally converges
on the belief that the world order is a construct of inter-subjective and collectively significant
structures and developments. For this investigation, the focus of constructivist analysis has
shifted towards the formation of Russian identity and its impact on Russian foreign policy.
Data collection will include the compilation of, both, primary and secondary data. The
primary data comprises of official policy documents and speeches given by Russian leaders.
The secondary data includes analyses of the ideological foundations of Russian foreign
policy, changes and continuity in Russian identity, and the sources and implications of the
state’s decision-making. A case example of Russian foreign policy in action accompanies this
data in order to form connections between the research and actuality. These connections can
then be used to answer the research questions and further support the thesis. The research
questions are as followed;
1) What are the main characteristics of Russian foreign policy?
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IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
2) What are the philosophical foundations of Russian foreign policy and their
effects on Russian identity?
3) How has Western influence facilitated the construction of Russian identity
and the formulation of Russian foreign policy?
The initial step of this investigation requires the collection of relevant data on the
philosophical foundations of Russian foreign policy. This data serves as the basis for
identifying which aspects have endured or changed over time. The sources of this information
are compiled primarily from Andrei P. Tsygankov’s book Russia Foreign Policy Change and
Continuity in National Identity with additional viewpoints from Ray Taras’ Russia's Identity
in International Relations: Images, Perceptions, Misperceptions and the Rand Report on
Russian Foreign Policy Sources and Implications. These sources also contain relevant
analyses regarding Russian identity and perceptions of the West, which forms the basis of
discussion in sections 1.2 and 1.3.
In collaboration with the first chapter’s comprehensive overview of Russian foreign
policy, which includes the ideological foundations as well as the internal and external
influences, the next step in the investigation explores Russia’s officially declared foreign
policy and examples of that policy in practice. This is completed through the analysis of the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian
Federation, as well as, Russia's decisions and implications within the international
community since the fall of the Soviet Union. This analysis provides the content for Chapter
2 while also revealing patterns in Russian decision-making. Ultimately this chapter illustrates
how the unique ideological foundations and identity highlighted in Chapter 1 are visible
through Russia’s actions within the international community.
The final Chapter of discussion scrutinizes the on-going Russia-Ukraine Conflict with
a constructivist approach. This chapter begins with an overview of the conflict to
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IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
contextualize it within previous applications of Russian foreign policy as investigated in
Chapter 2. Subsequently, the sources and implications of the conflict are then considered, in
regards to the discussion in Chapter 1, for the purpose of determining how the changes and
continuity in Russia’s identity have ultimately governed the state’s decision-making.
Research on the overlying topic of Russian foreign policy is wide-ranging and
encompasses many schools of thought. Therefore, this investigation narrows the research to
the subtopic of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict while employing a constructivist approach to the
sources and implications of Russian decision-making after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Russian foreign policy and the current Russia-Ukraine Conflict remain a relevant topic for
research, as the desire to understand Russia’s decision-making and ambitions are at a
premium in the international community.
Theoretical Framework
This thesis employs a constructivist approach to the investigation of Russian foreign
policy and affirms that the inherent characteristics of international relations are constructed
socially through the interaction of states and their environment. The common ground for
constructivist thought in international relations converges on an ontology that depicts "the
social world as intersubjectively and collectively meaningful structures and processes where
material resources only acquire meaning for actions through the structure of shared
knowledge in which they are embedded" (Carlsnaes, Risse, Simmons, 2012, p.121). This
common ground implies that the international community composes of states that each have
individual understandings of their own and each other’s interests. Furthermore, the literature
on the norms of constructivist research is based on the idea that identity dictates the interests
of states. For example, “states face security choices and act upon them, not only in the
context of their physical capabilities but also on the basis of normative understandings”
(Carlsnaes et al., 2012, p.126). This idea challenges the notions of realist thought, in which
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IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
the structure of the international system is prioritized at the expense of history. Realism
suggests that international relations are the reflection of power politics and balance of power
imperatives while constructivism incorporates the realist notion and further argues the
significance of identity and subjective norms. Ultimately this theoretical framework will
provide the foundation for this thesis to demonstrate that the Russia-Ukraine Conflict is the
result of Russia’s uniquely constructed identity due to its ideological roots and interactions
with the Western World rather than simply being an act of power politics. The constructivist
approach is the most appropriate theoretical framework for this investigation as it observes
international relations in three main ways, that is, in terms of the role actors and
bureaucracies play in shaping foreign policy, the process of decision-making, and the effect
of international system or society on the conduct of foreign policy by states (Behravesh,
2011). In regards to the topic of Russian foreign policy, a constructivist approach minimizes
the significance of military power or material possessions and instead focuses on the social
implications. While some Constructivists would accept that States are self-interested, rational
actors, they would stress that varying identities and beliefs belie the simplistic notions of
rationality under which States pursue simply survival, power, or wealth (Slaughter, 2011).
Literature Review
There is an abundance of literature on the topic of Russian foreign policy; however,
this thesis will focus on Russian foreign policy within the context of the Russia-Ukraine
Conflict by examining the philosophical foundations of Russian foreign policy, as well as the
formation of Russian identity. It should be noted that much of the literature overlaps as it is
focused on the same period of post-Soviet Russia and the historical analyses of the internal
and external influences that govern the State’s decision-making. This literature review
separates the relevant sources into two groups: foreign policy foundations and Russian
identity, and foreign policy decisions and implications.
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Foreign Policy Foundations and Russian Identity
Andrei P. Tsygankov’s Russia’s Foreign Policy Changes and Continuity in National
Identity (2013) provides this investigation with three traditional schools of thought in Russian
foreign policy: Westernism, Statism, and Civilizationism. Furthermore, this book explores the
development of Russian national interests and identity as the state transitioned between these
traditional schools of thought. Tsygankov claims that the Westernist school of thought
accentuated Russian similarities to the Western World while furthermore suggesting its
civilizational superiority. This claim implies the support for Western tenets of constitutional
liberties and equality. He further argues that Soviet-era Westernists believed Russia to be in
accordance with many of the social democratic norms of European society. The Statist school
of thought places importance on Russia’s aptitude to manage and uphold internal socio-
political structures. Tsygankov argues that this school of thought is the most influential of the
foundations of Russia’s foreign policy and that the notions of independence, power, and
stability take precedence over freedoms. Tsygankov further dictates that Statists are not
innately against Western ideals but rather desire acknowledgment through the means of a
powerful military or economic success. Political initiatives that were beneficial to
consolidating state power coincided with Statist ideals, which further suggests, as the leaders
of Russia changed so did their actions and interpretations of what empowers the state. The
Civilizationist school of thought suggests that Russia’s norms and beliefs are inherently
different from those of the Western World. Tsygankov claims Civilizationists are
continuously promoting the Russian norms and beliefs internationally. This argument
includes the notions of a Russian Empire and the movement of Slavophilism. Russian
Civilizationists fervently strived for expansion and during the Soviet Era and challenged the
Western World directly. “Born out of the agony of two Europes, Soviet Russia saw itself as
superior to the decadent and rotten Western capitalist civilization” (Tsygankov, 2013, p.8).
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This book also looks at Soviet and Russian international relations by comparing the
differences in foreign policy under Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin.
This comparison aids the thesis by providing a basis for understanding the changes and
continuity in Russia’s foreign policy from the Cold War to contemporary Russia. This source
also implies that global instability has led Russia to strive for a new political direction, which
in regards to this investigation is very relevant when analysing Russia's present-day
behaviour and the conflict in Ukraine. Tsygankov further argues that the notions of national
interest are contingent on the national identity and that identity is born from a combination of
history and domestic politics.
In Elena Morenkova Perrier’s The Key Principles of Russian Strategic Thinking
(2015) report, Russian foundations of strategic thinking as well as the main schools of
thought are contextualized within the modern debate on Russian decision-making. Perrier
highlights the main schools of thought as the sovereign democracy doctrine, Neo-
Eurasianism, and Westernism in regards to the foundations of Russian foreign policy. She
further argues that the sovereign democracy theory was the first ideological movement that
structured Russian strategic thinking during a conservatism revival following the year 2000.
This doctrine indicates the desire for Russian independence from participation within the
international community. Essentially this implies the traditional notion of neither an Eastern
nor Western Russia but instead a unique Russian state between both. In regards to Neo-
Eurasianism, Perrier states this ideological trend is based on three key affirmations: 1)
Russian History is unique, and her experience renders Western models inapplicable. 2)
Russia’s destiny is to remain faithful to her Eurasian roots and to reject an imitation of
Western models. 3) The development of Russia can be explained by external factors: climate,
geographic position, and geopolitical situation. Eurasianism is similar to Slavophilism due to
the idea of a unique Russian path for development. Lastly marginalised Westernism
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according to Perrier was the dominant ideological trend in the first half of the 1990’s that
eventually phased out of Russia by the year 2000. This school of thought included
intellectuals and academics that viewed collaboration with the Western World as beneficial
for Russia.
Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (2009) by Jefferey
Mankoff, updates and examines the progression of Russian foreign policy, in the aftermath of
the cold war, by repositioning its development within the broader context of Russia’s political
and ideological history. This book provides this thesis with an account of Russia's foreign
policy that considers the identity of the state, as well as its formation and evolution through
history. Mankoff argues that behind Russia’s tough rhetoric within the international
community is the deeply rooted ambition to identify itself and restore the state’s major power
status rather than directly acting to challenge the Western World. Mankoff labels this
ambition as a foreign policy reawakening (Mankoff, 2009, p.293). It is worth remembering
that Russia never existed as a self-contained national state but rather one that lacked natural
frontiers and ethnic unity (Mankoff, 2009, p.294). As a result of this, the establishment of a
foreign policy has been strategically planned since the fall of the Soviet Union. Mankoff
supports this argument by examining these notions through the scope of the 2008 Georgia
Conflict. “The conflict highlighted Russia’s resurgence as a major power, at least in its own
region, capable of employing overwhelming force to protect its perceived interests even in
the face of international condemnation, and cemented Russia’s identity as a state outside the
confines of the collective known as the West” (Mankoff, 2009, p.293). Furthermore, this
source provides valuable insight into the goals and ambitions of post-Soviet Russian Leaders.
Foreign Policy Decisions and Implications
Putin again: Implications for Russia and the West (2012), a Chatham House report,
examines Russia’s economy and policy decisions for the purpose of projecting the state’s
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IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
behaviour in the aftermath of the 2012 Russian elections. This report provides this thesis a
detailed look into Putin’s instruments of government and through retrospect, a Western
perspective of Russia’s political ideology and direction in the years prior to the Russia-
Ukraine Conflict. This report also recommends a set of principles that European and United
States leaders should base their relationship with Russia. These recommendations prove
useful when examining the role that Western countries may have had in the eventual outbreak
of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. The aforementioned principles are: help Russia by integrating
them into the liberal world system, refusal to accept the premise that Russia has special rights
over former Soviet states, hold Russia accountable for its promises, collaborate with the
European Union to better understand Russia’s bilateral relations, persist in the applying the
Third Energy Package, take Russia’s view of the world into account, and lastly encourage
Russian compliance with Western standards regarding private interests.
Marcel van Herpen’s book, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism
(2014), analyses various Russian conflicts. This investigation utilizes the analyses of two
recent Russian conflicts; the 2nd Chechen War and the 2008 Georgia Conflict. Van Herpen
employs a historical perspective derived from original Russian sources for the purpose of
exhibiting how Vladimir Putin’s Russia legitimized and consolidated itself through the means
of the previously mentioned conflicts while simultaneously fighting a domestic ‘Internal
War’. This source provides the relevant organizational dynamics of Putin’s Russia in addition
to being credited with accurately predicting the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Van Herpen
explores the role of empire building in Russian history and compares it to present-day empire
building in Western Europe and how the legitimization of such activities differs for the
respective sides.
In Alexander Lukin’s “What the Kremlin is Thinking” (2014), Lukin investigates
Russia’s desired political direction in the aftermath of the Cold War. Lukin claims that the
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Russia-Ukraine Conflict is a direct consequence of the West’s effort to assimilate Russia into
the norms and values of the Western World. "It remains hard to say whether a different
approach to the post-Soviet states would have produced a better result for the West. What is
obvious is that the course Clinton and Bush took empowered those Russians who wanted
Moscow to reject the Western system and instead become an independent, competing centre
of power in the new multipolar world” (Lukin, 2014). Lukin argues that this attempt of
assimilation forced Russia’s hand to react against being encircled by ideas that do not match
their own, thus fostering the collision course that ultimately collided in Ukraine. This source
provides a valuable point of view of Russia’s political state of mind and desires in relation to
the opposing containment practices of the West.
John J. Mearsheimer’s “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault” (2014) presents
the assertion that Russia’s desire to resuscitate the Soviet Empire is a fearful misconception
from the West. Mearsheimer argues that Russia’s recent aggression and defiance in the
international community can be attributed to The United States and its European Allies for
their roles in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) enlargement and its
coinciding efforts to move Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of influence. In the aftermath of
these initiatives from the West, Mearsheimer further claims that Russia’s actions in Ukraine
should not have been a surprise, due to its perception as a direct threat to Russian ambitions.
Possible solutions to the on-going Russia-Ukraine Conflict and future conflicts are suggested
on the grounds that The United States and Western World should stop its efforts to
Westernize countries within Russia’s sphere of influence and instead respect the buffer states
between the separate parties.
The New Russian Foreign Policy Concept: Evolving Continuity (2013), a Chatham
House report by Andrew Monaghan, investigates the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’
new Foreign Policy Concept revealed in 2013. This report is incredibly relevant as it is the
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self-proclaimed foreign policy direction of Russia in the year prior to Russia’s involvement in
Ukraine. Monaghan further validates the relevance of his report and investigation by claiming
the lack of attention from The United States and Western Europe upon the Russian Foreign
Policy Concept’s release. He argues that Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept can provide
significant insight on Russia’s stance on the many changes within the international
community since 2008. By utilizing Russia’s vantage point, the concept could serve the
purpose of understanding Russian ambitions more clearly. Monaghan’s report argues that
there are flaws within the Russian Foreign Policy Concept but maintains Russia’s intent to re-
establish itself as an international power and to not be surprised to see the state acting more
prominently within the international community through the promotion of its interests and
employing traditional hard power to safeguard and assert those interests.
“The Sources of Russian Conduct” (2014) by Alexander Motyl references George F.
Kennan’s “X” article, regarding the Western World’s necessity to contain Russia, for the
purpose of reiterating Kennan’s past arguments as contemporarily relevant. Kennan's
argument states that Russia’s political identity is a by-product of ideology and environmental
circumstances. Motyl suggests that Kennan's claim implies that Russia’s contemporary
actions in Ukraine are a result of the international community and the political ideals and
initiatives of Putin (Motyl, 2014). Motyl further argues that in order to combat Russian
actions and future aggression, a long-term policy is the answer. This includes having
strategies in the form of Russian containment, such as restricting Russia’s capability of using
energy as a political weapon as this exists as an important factor in the Russia-Ukraine
Conflict. This source further provides this thesis with a Western viewpoint on Russian
motivations while also highlighting the notions and practice of Russian containment.
Russian Foreign Policy Sources and Implications (2009), a RAND Corporation report
led by Olga Oliker, comprehensively evaluates Russia’s strategic interests both domestically
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and internationally in addition to the causes that influence Russian foreign policy. In
collaboration with the United States Air Force’s Strategy and Doctrine Program, this
investigation is carried out for the purpose of providing a plan of action for US policy choices
regarding Russia. This report provides this thesis with an American vantage point on a wide
range of aspects regarding Russia and their initiatives. Ultimately the report recommends a
strategy that resembles a containment policy of Russia. This approach is evident in the
chapter "Managing Discord" which suggests letting the European Union directly deal with
Russia while maintaining amicable relations with states within Russia's sphere of influence.
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Chapter 1: Foundations of
Russian Foreign Policy
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1.1 Philosophical Foundations Russian Foreign Policy
To understand the present-day relations between Russia and the international
community, the foundation of what governs the Eurasian state’s decision-making requires the
examination of its ideological origins. Due to the state’s enormous size and geographic
positioning, Russia has continuously throughout history been faced with security threats and
an unstable internal environment. These difficulties, which included threats of invasion and
the preservation of the ruling authority’s legitimacy, fostered the development of three
separate yet traditional foreign policy ideologies; Westernist, Statist, and Civilizationist.
“Throughout centuries, Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists sought to present Russia’s
international choices in ways consistent with the schools’ historically established images of
the country and the outside world” (Tsygankov, 2013, p.4).
The Westernist school of thought accentuates Russia’s parallels with the Western
World. In this mindset, Russia would see itself conform to Western ideals by embodying the
European civilization’s archetype, as they were perceived to be the most enlightened. This
first instance of Westernist thought in Russia can be linked to Peter the Great and his
observable admiration for the West’s – at that time consisting of only Europe – technology
and political intrigues. Peter the Great’s affinity to Westernist notions are apparent through
his annexation of a significant portion of the Baltic Coast, effectively opening Russia’s door
to Europe and establishing the state on the European scene. As Russia interacted within the
European community, the appropriation of Western technologies and norms became the
foundation for change in Russia’s political values. The traditional nature of European-
Russian relations and policy at that time was non-existent, as Russia had no interest in
Western proceedings until the middle of the eighteenth century. This change brought about a
period of political reform under Alexander II that saw Russia adhere to the Western ideals of
constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is the idea, often associated with the political theories of
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John Locke, where governments have limited powers and are dependent on the observation of
these limitations for legitimacy (Waluchow, 2001). This adherence manifested itself in
Russia’s decision to remain involved in the First World War as an active participant in the
Allied efforts to stop Germany’s military coalition. Despite the fact that the war had
fundamentally crippled the state, Russia continued the fight in a display of European
fellowship. However, the economic and societal expenses of remaining in the Great War
ultimately pushed Russia to revolution and fostered the subsequent birth of the Soviet Union.
Westernism remained dormant under several decades of Soviet politics that elicited a
different relationship with the West, which centered on the Marxist notions of class conflict.
In the waning years of the Soviet Union, Westernist thought resurfaced under the Perestroika
movement, which called for the restructuring of the Soviet Union’s governing Communist
Party. This political movement essentially became the beginning of the end for the Soviet
Union. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the last president of the Soviet Union, foreign policy
became directed at the concepts of mutual security agreements, “a series of revolutionary
arms-control agreements with the United States, as well as over the Soviet military
withdrawals from Europe and the third world. By introducing the idea of ‘common European
home,’ Gorbachev meant to achieve Russian-European integration based on the principles of
European social democracy” (Tsygankov, 2013, p.5). The ‘common European home’ concept
is best defined in former President Gorbachev’s 1987 speech in Prague, Czechoslovakia
when he declared:
We assign an overriding significance to the European course of our foreign
policy.... We are resolutely against the division of the continent into military
blocs facing each other, against the accumulation of military arsenals in
Europe, against everything that is the source of the threat of war. In the spirit
of the new thinking we introduced the idea of the "all-European house"...
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[which] signifies, above all, the acknowledgment of a certain integral whole,
although the states in question belong to different social systems and are
members of opposing military-political blocs standing against each other. This
term includes both current problems and real possibilities for their solution.
(Svec, 1988)
During this time, Westernizers viewed Russia as a provisional supporter of the social
democratic mind-set of the West. As a result of this, the Westernist school of thought became
one of the prevailing philosophical movements of the early 1990’s. After the fall of the Soviet
Union, Westernist ideals called for Russia and the West to cooperate on the shared principles
of universal human rights, competitive economy, and democracy while also implying the
avoidance of relations with ex-Soviet states. The Westernist ideology saw integration with
the Western World as the best possible solution to the political and economic complications
that arose from the Soviet Union’s collapse. This discourse would clash with the opposing
anti-Westernist camp throughout the 1990’s which affirmed ‘The West is the inimical other.’
According to this view by anti-Westernists, “the West strives to impose its system of values
on Russia in order to weaken it” (Taras, 2012, p.77). As a polar opposite position to the West,
anti-Westernism focused on similar aspects of the Western World but with negative
implications. This viewpoint saw the West as a primarily exploitative presence. Upon
Vladimir Putin’s first Presidential election in 2000, Putin employed a balanced approach to
the West equating it to a competitive partner. Putin accentuated competition within the
international community and that pursuing economic interests is the natural path for Russia.
This approach coincides with Westernist thought as the West conducts itself in a similar
matter when pursuing its interests. However the 2000’s would see Putin become increasingly
frustrated with the West due to its influence within the international community. Westernist
thought would again take a back seat until the years 2008 and 2012 when Russia experienced
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a political turning point under Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev presented the state with the
initiative to modernize through the employment of organizational changes for the purpose of
pushing Russia into line with the Western model. This initiative is visible in the Moscow-
based Institute of Contemporary Development (Gontmakher et al., 2011) report; Attaining the
Future Strategy 2012, which reveals the proposals of the liberal Westernist faction
responsible to Russia’s then President, Medvedev. The aforementioned report discloses, “The
change in values (the deconsecration of the State and development of individualism) must be
accompanied by global changes in institutions, democratization, and the establishment of a
state based on the rule of law. Furthermore, innovation in the economy and, in particular, its
diversification are presented as the only way to face the challenges of the Twenty-First
Century” (Perrier, 2014, p.33). Traditionally, these changes in values and democratic
engagements are features of Westernist thought that suggests Russia will follow the model
and direction of the west. This ideological trend would fade by the end of the decade, but
certain influences within the philosophy would have continuity, such as international
collaboration and globalization, which are still evident in contemporary Russia’s political
behaviour.
Following the expiration of the Soviet Union, the necessity for Russia to select a
sociopolitical direction was crucial. Initially, the above-mentioned Westernist school of
thought took precedence in Russian politics but by the mid-1990’s the political challenges
that the state was facing were piling up. These changes forced Russia to reconsider the state’s
foreign policy, which ultimately reintroduced Statism into Russian politics. Statism
emphasizes the government’s capacity to control all aspects of a state’s socio-political
structure. Statism further implies the preference of state sovereignty and stability instead of
individual liberty and democracy. According to Tsygankov, the notion of external threats to
Russia’s security have developed a psychological complex of insecurity and a readiness to
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sacrifice everything for independence and sovereignty (Tsygankov, 2013, p.6). This is largely
due to Russia’s extensive history of external conflicts and desire to not allow such events to
repeat themselves. Statism became the opposition to the Westernist movement but did not
characteristically signify anti-Westernist ideals. For Russia, the Statist school of thought
desired acknowledgment from the West through the development of a strong military and
economic prowess. The first instance of Statist thought in Russian foreign policy coincides
with that of Westernist thought and is correspondingly linked back to Peter the Great. While
Westernist thought focused on the similarities and European characteristics of Russia, Statists
emphasized the military capabilities of the state. During the existence of the Soviet Union,
the Statists school of thought focused on providing the ruling Communist Party with the
power to dictate the sociopolitical system in an effort to prevent influence from the West.
Within Soviet governance, Statists remained cautious of any non-Communist political
activity and openly resisted the previously mentioned reforms brought about by Gorbachev.
In regards to foreign policy, the camps of Statist thought within the Soviet Union were
divided with some supporting partial integration with the Western World and the remaining
Statists believing in a more balanced approach to international relations. Before Stalin had
eradicated the Russian Ministry of Jewish people, the People’s Commissar for Foreign
Affairs Maksim Litvinov was a strong advocate for collective security. Collective security
implies the avoidance of power blocs within the international community and the
marginalization of those not included in those blocs. For Russia, this denotes that the state
could act as is its proprietor without the necessity to compromise its sovereignty, which
coincides with Statist ideals in preserving the power of the state. The other faction of Statists
supports the notion of balancing potential threats against each other. This notion itself
through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, more commonly called the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The
Nazi-Soviet Pact was an agreement of non-aggression between Hitler’s Nazi Germany and
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Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union with the intent from the Russian side to detach the state from
World War II. By counteracting Western ideals with those of Nazi Germany, Statists believed
they could minimize external threats. All Statists shared the collective goal of maintaining
Russia’s independence within the international community and keeping the ruling
Communist Party in power, but these notions would disappear with the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Statism saw the end of the one-party state and instead shifted its
focus to the significance of democracy and a healthy free-market economy. This new focus
maintained its connection with the traditional philosophy of a strong state in order to counter
any and all external threats. There are two distinct strategies in post-Soviet Statist thought,
and these strategies are discernable through Yevgeny Primakov and Putin’s policies. In-line
with Statist thought, both Putin and Primakov looked to restore Russia as a world power.
Primakov elected to control large corporations while Putin took this initiative a step further in
his governing of all aspects of the socio-political system. Where the two leaders differentiated
was in their respective foreign policies. Primakov desired to reconstruct the Soviet Union and
oppose the West through containment agreements with India and China. Putin’s approach to a
foreign policy focused on the relationships with Russia’s neighboring countries, as well as
collaborating with Western countries to curb terrorism.
Lastly, the Civilizationist school of thought focuses on the relationship of cultural and
religious identity rather than the more traditional foreign policy themes of economics and
politics. In the international community, this signifies that each respective state remains
within its sphere of influence and does not interfere with the cultural jurisdiction of others.
This school of thought insinuates that the so-called universal view of humanity, democracy,
and separation of church and state are simply concepts that are exclusively pertinent to the
Western World and irrelevant in differentiating spheres of influence. Civilizationists view
Russia as the natural opposition to the Western World and maintain that Russian values are
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inherently distinctive from Western norms. In regards to Civilizationist foreign policy, the
first manifestations can be traced to Ivan IV and his conquests for land that saw Russia
transform into a religiously and ethnically diverse state. This transformation coincided with
the original Civilizationist initiatives for expansion and the pursuit of a Russian empire.
Civilizationist school of thought was aware of the Western-centric international community
and, as a result, supported the idea of Russia spreading its borders as far as possible to create
a unified cultural identity under the characteristics of Pan-Slavism. In the socialist faction of
Civilizationist thought, competition with the West became a central part of the ideology. This
became evident in Leon Trotsky’s concept of permanent revolution, which suggested that
socialist revolutions could arise in states that had yet to realize capitalism. This idea would
remain legitimate within the Soviet political apparatus until 1921 when Vladimir Lenin
elected to share the international community with the states that practice capitalism. Another
faction of Civilizationist thought called Eurasianists considered Russia to be an ever-
expanding empire in close competition with the growth and containment from the West, most
notably with the United States. Soviet Russia believed itself to be of a higher-class than the
rest of the international community and vindicated their foreign policy of territorial expansion
by challenging the West in a direct fashion with the belief that Russia was a Eurasian power
that existed in-between the Eastern and Western civilizations and posses its own sphere of
influence (Kasymov, 2012, p.61). In regards to post-Soviet Civilizationism, it remains to be
seen how Russia's political behavior will take shape (Tsygankov, 2013, p.8).
Russia has endured many different regimes and ideologies throughout its history that
are fundamentally different. The present-day Russia that has forced itself back into the
forefront of the international community is virtually unrecognizable compared to the Soviet
state of the 1900’s. Today’s Russia is a legitimate foreign policy adversary to the United
States and a growing sphere of influence in between Europe and Central Asia. Russia’s
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current foreign policy is focused on bolstering Russia’s prestige, supporting economic
recovery and growth, and more effectively demonstrating power to keep Russia secure and
able to pursue its policy goals (Oliker, Crane, Schwartz, Yusupov, 2009, p.xv). Although this
current shape of Russian foreign policy is unique, the leaders of the various regimes in
Russia’s history were all faced with significant challenges initiated by the Western World.
The differences remained in the selected approach to those challenges.
In regards to the topic at hand, Putin’s Russia, within the context of philosophical
foundations, has adopted a unique vision of national interest, which balances Russia’s great
power status with the need to cultivate special relationships with the Western World. This
concept places Putin within the Liberal Statist school of thought, which stresses the
importance of the Western ideals of democracy and free-market economy while
simultaneously maintaining traditional Russian values of a strong state. Russian Liberal
Statists argue that liberal values should be established to strengthen, not weaken, the state as
Russia continues to be exposed to many external threats and must remain a great power
capable of responding to those threats anywhere in the world (Tsygankov, 2013, p.8).
1.2 Russian Identity and the Role of the West
With the foundations and history of Russian foreign policy highlighted, this section
addresses the internal and external influences that govern its formation. Although there are
many, the primary sources of influence stem from the development of Russian identity and
the Western World. Within a constructivist approach, identity remains a fundamental aspect
of international relations, as each nation’s identity establishes their role within the
international community. This is due to the constructivist notion that in order for a nation to
make decisions based upon their interests, that nation must have an understanding of their
role within the international community and how the pursuit of their interests will affect that
community. “By interacting with other members of international society, nations develop
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affiliations, attachments, and ultimately their own identities” (Tsygankov, 2013, p.15). In
regards to Russia, the combination of influence from the West and the fluctuation of internal
ideologies have constructed a unique Russian identity in international politics. The West has
also undergone ideological changes throughout Russian history, but the aspect that makes the
above-mentioned theme unifiable is the fact that the Western World has always been present
to affect Russia’s decision-making when interacting with the international community. The
relationship between Russia and the West has seen alternating periods of alignment and
divergence throughout history. This is due to “many Russian leaders, as well as a significant
proportion of the Russian public, seeing themselves and their country as European” in
addition to a differing faction that argues that “Russia should look more, or at least equally
toward the East (Oliker, Crane, Schwartz, Yusupov, 2009, p.105). Culturally and historically
Russia has undeniable connections to Europe and the Western World. Russian perception of
Western Europe can be broken down into three separate scopes. The first of which being, as
briefly highlighted in the previous section, Western Europe provided Russia with an
enlightened society to admire and seek to emulate. This model society comprised of
democracy, representative government, and constitutionalism. Contemporary Russia may be
a long (and widening) way from this ideal, but this vision of Europe, and of Russia as
European in this way, has always appealed to the progressive and liberal elements of Russian
society as a goal for their own country (Stent, 2007). However, this notion of the West being
a model society is rejected under Putin’s leadership, as it is perceived to be counterproductive
to Russian interests due to the competitive nature of their relationship with the United States.
Secondly, Russia also understood Western society as a model for economic development.
This notion provided the framework for a Russian alternative for economic progress and
modernization, but it would not have been possible without the influence derived from the
Western model. Lastly, Russian interaction with Western States is almost exclusively
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bilateral and for the sole purpose of advancing national security and achieving economic
objectives. With these perspectives of the West in mind, the discussion on what influences
Russian foreign policy is externally underlined as Russia’s perception of its international
neighbors and internally how Russia identifies itself within the international community.
The United States, as part of the Western World, maintains diplomatic relations with
Russia; however the political ambitions of America often clash with Russian interests. This
conflict of interest is evident in both Russian and United States foreign policy. In the
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks of 2001, The United States under George W.
Bush opted for a unilateral approach to international relations. Although the terror attack had
led to a temporary improvement in United States-Russia relations, America’s new ambitions
were undergoing an aggressive transformation, which ultimately resurfaced tensions with
Russia. This transformation is evident in America’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty in 2002 for the purpose of installing a missile defense system in Eastern
Europe and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These actions taken by the United States are
perceivable intrusions into Russia’s sphere of influence as well as threats to Russian security.
At the 20th Russia-European Union Summit, Putin’s confirms this position when asked if
Russia would respond positively to the United States initiative for missile defense in Europe:
“I recall how things went in a similar situation in the mid 1960s. Similar
actions by the Soviet Union, when it put rockets in Cuba, precipitated the
Cuban Missile Crisis. For us the technological aspects of the situation are very
similar. We have removed the remnants of our bases from Vietnam and
dismantled them in Cuba, yet such threats for our country are today being
created on our own borders.” (Putin, 2007)
With the United States occupying a hegemonic role within the international community,
Russian foreign policy is reactionary in nature. This is evident in essentially every escalation
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of tension between the two states. An example that holds value in this investigation was the
planned installation of additional missile defense systems and NATO bases in Ukraine. As a
response to this initiative, at the Kremlin’s Annual Big Press Conference of 2008, Putin
threatened the retargeting of Russian missiles at the proposed missile systems and NATO
basis.
“We are asking that this not go ahead, but no one is listening. We are giving a
clear warning right from the start… We will be compelled to aim our missiles
at facilities that we consider a threat to our national security, and I am putting
this plainly now so that the blame for this is not shifted later.” (Putin, 2008)
Putin’s stance on the West is comparable to the philosophical works of Ivan Ilyin, which
coincide with Russia’s responsive decision-making through the notions of protecting the
nation's identity. Ivan Ilyin was a Russian political philosopher who was a proponent of
conservatism and the ultra-nationalist Pochvennichestvo moment, which coincided with
Slavophile notions of a Russian Empire founded on the beliefs and traditions of early Russian
history. Ilyin’s ideas of nationalism were fundamental to his philosophy in which Russian’s
should always prioritize Russian interests and promote the image or identity of a strong
Russian state. This philosophy suggests that Russia exists as a unique actor within the
international community and is entitled to progress in a similarly unique manner. Putin
appears to the international community as an unpredictable operator due to his constant
pursuit of Russian interests. However, the Russian leader's true intent lies in the promotion of
the traditional values and identity of the Russian nation. “He is convinced that liberalism is
contagious and that Western mores and institutions present a real danger to Russian society
and the Russian state” (Kratsev, 2014). This quote serves the purpose of validating the notion
that national interests are not unanimously about power politics, security, and new behaviors,
but rather it is the adaptability to the ever-changing internal and external environments.
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Therefore, Russian national identity appears to be shaped by perceived domestic anxieties
and the current relationship with the Western World.
1.3 The Construction of Russian Foreign Policy
It is evident in the previous sections that Russia is a country wedged in-between the
influences of the Western World and its own ideological and political turbulences. This
makes the coherent formulation of a foreign policy difficult to define. Historically, Russia has
been a state with a volatile internal structure, which is evident in instances such as the
Bolshevik Revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Russia transitioned between
these stages of political rule, the state remained unstable as certain aspects from previous rule
clashed with the new characteristics of the current authority. For example, “even as the
Russian political system evolved under Presidents Yeltsin and Putin, it failed to develop the
sturdy institutions that would lend a degree of continuity and predictability to its behaviour”
(Mankoff, 2009, p.53). This failure to develop a sound political structure ultimately
culminated in a central government with all of its power vested in a handful of individuals
with no checks and balances to keep them responsible. This means that national interest, as
well as the creation of Russian foreign policy ultimately, rests with the few individuals that
sit at the top of the centralized government. In contemporary Russia’s system of government,
the above-mentioned individuals who make up the top are situated within the Presidential
Executive Office rather than Russia’s legislative body. To this day, the Russian Federal
Assembly remains appointive and responsible to the political elite located in the Presidential
Executive Office. The centralization of foreign policy making within the Kremlin
(Presidential Executive Office) was part of a process that Putin called “strengthening the
power vertical” (Hanson, Nixey, Shevtsova, Wood 2012, p.5). This centralization allowed
Putin to impose a fairly coherent vision of national interest in a way that was not consistently
possible during the Yeltsin-Primakov years when regional and sectoral interests often took
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predominance (Mankoff, 2009, p.55). Putin was able to achieve the centralization of foreign
policy by maintaining his relevance in Russian politics over an extended period of time.
Marcel Van Herpen argues this was possible due to two conditions:
“The first of these was the unhampered continuation of his (Putin’s) regime in
order to be able to realize his long-term projects. The second condition was the
necessity of upholding a formal democratic façade to facilitate the acceptance
of his regime in the West, thus avoiding the West mobilizing against the
emergence of a new “Russian danger.” (Van Herpen, 2014, p.129)
In practice, this signifies Putin’s adherence to Russia’s constitution but not necessarily the
ideals behind it. This indicates that the Russian Government possesses all of the necessary
features of a functioning democratic regime but in reality Putin has successfully consolidated
foreign policy decision-making for the foreseeable future. In regards to the international
community, this consolidation of policymaking indicates Putin’s desire to remain in power.
With the influence of internal factors as well as the external role of the West, Russian foreign
policy is principally a reactionary construct of Russian identity. The identity takes material
form through Russia’s interests and anxieties regarding the international community.
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Chapter 2: Ambition and Application
of Russian Foreign Policy
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2.1 Russia’s Current Foreign Policy
Russia’s current foreign policy is viewable through the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. This concept was
commissioned during Putin's time as prime minister and then later approved by Putin as
president on 12 February 2013. This foreign policy concept has received little attention in the
West, where it has been dismissed as either a bureaucratic formulation or a simple reiteration
of previous documents (Monaghan, 2013, p.2). However, this document does provide
valuable insight into how Putin’s Russia views changes in the international community since
its previous Foreign Policy Concept of 2008. From a constructivist approach, this shows how
Russia identifies itself within the international community and how it will seek to act. The
concept contains five sections with 104 points of interest. The five sections are labeled: I)
General Provisions, II) Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation and the Modern World, III)
Priorities of the Russian Federation for Addressing Global Problems, IV) Regional Priorities,
V) Development and Implementation of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. The
section on general provisions outlines the foreign policy concept as a comprehensive report
on the fundamental principles, priorities, goals and objectives of the Russian Federation.
Grounded in the values of the constitution and international norms, this section stipulates that
the points of interest exist as the guiding notions of Russian foreign policy up until the year
2020. In collaboration with Russia’s national security policy, the title of the five sections can
be equated to the current aims of Russian foreign policy (See Appendix A). While these
ambitions are overstated, the concept does provide an indication of Russia’s understanding of
the contemporary international community, as well as a warning of the country’s intent to
consolidate itself as a global center of influence. The concept further serves as a warning for
the apparent differences in how Russia and the West see the world and the various challenges
in international affairs. These points are not mutually defined – i.e. the nature of the
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problems, their causes and approaches to resolving them are differently understood,
preventing true cooperative partnership between the two sides (Monaghan, 2013, p.7). The
constructivist approach directs attention to the notion of a Russian sphere of influence
through the establishment of its post-Soviet identity. Russia’s current relations within the
international community are evident through the understanding that both, Russia, and the
international community, are in the midst of an ongoing formative process. Therefore, the
current declared foreign policy of the Russian state carries inter-subjective implications for
both parties. For Russia, the current stated foreign policy concept is an indication of their
understanding of the current international environment while also declaring the state’s
interest to consolidate itself as a sphere of influence. As the concept notes, Russia “will work
to anticipate and lead events” within the international community (Monaghan, 2013, p.8)
2.2 Russian Foreign Policy Decisions: 2008 Georgia Conflict
This section examines the 2008 Georgia Conflict as an application of Russian foreign
policy within the international community. The 2008 Georgia Conflict was an armed
skirmish primarily between Russia, Georgia, and the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The battle lasted five days and ultimately resulted in a Russia, Abkhazia, and
South Ossetia victory over the Republic of Georgia. Outcomes of the conflict included
Russian state recognition of participating members Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the
establishment of Russian military bases in the newly recognized nations. Russia’s
participation and interests in the conflict were founded on the strategic location of the
Georgian state and the refusal to allow NATO expansion into a neighbouring country. This
conflict is relevant to this investigation due to the strikingly similar characteristics to the on-
going Russia-Ukraine Conflict. The most apparent similarities are; they are conventional
wars, European interstate conflicts, and perceived violations of sovereignty by the
international community. Further similarities exist in the motivations behind Russia’s
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intervention. Russia stressed the importance of action in Georgia and classified the initiative
as a ‘peace enforcement operation’ while also promoting an underlying objective “to curb the
threat which was coming at the time from the territory of Georgia” (Van Herpen, 2014,
p.326). The strategic location of Transcaucasia between the Middle East and the North
Caucasus acts a buffer zone and a security interest for Russia. Authority over the
Transcaucasia region would allow Russia to curb Western intrusion into their desired sphere
of influence. This is evident in a statement from Medvedev in which he claims “if we had
faltered in 2008, the geopolitical arrangement would be different now and a number of
countries in respect of which attempts were made to artificially drag them into the North
Atlantic Alliance, would have probably been there [in NATO] now” (Van Herpen, 2014,
p.326). With respect to the previous chapters’ discussion of the construction of Russian
foreign policy, this conflict was a clear indication of said policy in action. From a
constructivist stance, the Georgia Conflict is the summation of Russia’s self-perceived
identity as a sphere of influence and the security threat within their sphere of influence, which
was Georgia’s potential accession to NATO. This conflict in international relations is not just
definable as predetermined power politics but rather of an exhibition of constructed Russian
identity. Russia perceives itself as an established influence within the international
community. This self-identification as an influence prompted Russia to take a hard-line
stance towards Georgia due to the potential threat to their perceived sphere of influence.
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Chapter 3: Russia-Ukraine Conflict
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3.1 Russia-Ukraine Conflict Overview
In the wake of former Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s refusal to sign a European
Union Association Agreement, (that would have seen Ukraine become more politically and
economically linked with Western Europe), supporters of the treaty and European integration
sparked a wave of political protests and civil unrest in Ukraine. These demonstrations would
ultimately develop into the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, driven by the perception of
governmental corruption and Russian partiality. After the Ukrainian Government refused to
recognize the demands brought forth by the protesters that would see the Ukrainian
Constitution revert to the amended 2004 form, violence broke out that culminated in
government officials fleeing Ukraine and demonstrators gaining control of governmental
administration. Yanukovych’s subsequent removal from office instigated a chain reaction that
saw the factions of pro-Russian Eastern Ukraine look to Russia while protesting the newly
founded government. In response to the Ukrainian Revolution and the growing pro-Russia
protests, Putin deployed unmarked Russian troops that were ultimately able to appoint a new
government in Crimea and call for a referendum that fostered the territory's annexation. This
action by Putin has invited widespread condemnation from the international community and
has paved the way for the plethora of sanctions that Russia continues to face. However due to
the ever-increasing ideological differences between the West and Russia, it is a possibility
that the Russia-Ukraine Conflict was inevitable due to physical and conceptual location of
Ukraine in between Russia and the West. This conflict originally ensued amongst internal
Ukrainian political blocs with one side promoting the previously mentioned Association
Agreement with the European Union and the other advocating for Ukrainian membership in
the Eurasian Customs Union. Therefore, the former Ukrainian President Yanukovych
decision to opt against signing the treaty with the European Union was the manifestation of
this conflict at the international level. The West perceived this decision as an antagonistic
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Russian effort that promoted an alternative regional integration to the Western World, similar
to the traditional structure of the Soviet Union. However, Alexander Lukin argues that
Western leaders are incredibly misled regarding the ideals of Eurasian integration:
“Neither Russia nor any of the states seeking to join a Eurasian system wants
to restore the Soviet Union or openly confront the West. They do, however,
believe that in a multipolar world, free nations have a right to create
independent associations among themselves. In fact, the ruling elites of many
former Soviet republics have long favored the idea of maintaining or re-
creating some form of association among their states” (Lukin, 2014).
Out of the fifteen former Soviet states, very few have disregarded their traditional
connections to the former Soviet Union in favor of the Western World’s socio-political
structure. However these states have not all formally aligned with Russia either. This leaves
buffer states in between the constant battle for influence. In regards to the topic at hand, the
ideological disconnect between Russia and the West, in addition to the misunderstanding of
each other’s ambitions, has left the Russia-Ukraine Conflict in a problematic condition.
3.2 Sources and Implications of Russian Intervention in Ukraine
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and the West have seen an increase in
cooperation within the international community. However, the recent annexation of Crimea
has effectively halted this post-Soviet trend of conformity and vehemently disregarded the
international norms of the Western World. This is due to a deeper conflict of interest between
Russia and the West. From the Russian vantage point, the origins of the Russia-Ukraine
conflict can be traced to the culmination of the Cold War. After the Soviet Union collapsed,
the West essentially had two options: either make a serious attempt to assimilate Russia into
the Western system or wrest away piece after piece of its former sphere of influence (Lukin,
2014). Scholars in favour of the assimilation of Russia into the West believed that the anti-
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Russian option would instigate further conflicts of influence over the former Soviet states and
ultimately provide few benefits for all involved. However, the latter option would prevail
under United States Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush as they ignored the
agreements made with Gorbachev, which specified that NATO would not expand into
Russia’s sphere of influence. NATO added “12 new members, including former parts of the
Soviet Union, while trying to convince Russia that the foreign forces newly stationed near its
borders, in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, would not threaten its security.
The EU, meanwhile, expanded as well, adding 16 new members of its own during the same
period” (Lukin, 2014). This expansion by the West put Russia in a position of retaliation as
they had anticipated progress in international cooperation that would see both sides paying
respect to the ambitions of the other. By ignoring the promises to Russia, the West indicated
that they were more interested in promoting their own goals while Russia was under the
impression of cooperation. Essentially the United States and Western Europe continued the
Cold War conflict and mind-set towards Russia without the presence of Russian retaliation,
which in turn made post-Soviet Russia feel vulnerable. This perceived vulnerability laid the
foundation for Russia to retract their cooperation with Western ideals and in its place adopt
an independent set of norms for the purpose of establishing an opposition to the Western-
centric world. The West’s continuing advancement of its goals has caused immense problems
in Russia’s neighbouring states. Territorial separations in Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine
are a testament to these problems. The inherent cultural differences within Russia’s
neighbours are split between the desire for European integration and the preservation of
societal structure and the historical connections with Russia. The Western World’s
encouragement of pro-Western groups in the former Soviet states has influenced the
governing bodies of these countries to subjugate the pro-Russian inhabitants, many of which
do not posses the basic entitlements and privileges of citizenship (Lukin, 2014). Russia
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considers these encouragements from the West to be threats to the wellbeing of its people. In
regards to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, due to the impending threat of Ukraine becoming
more closely affiliated with the West and more specifically NATO, Russia moved to protect
its own interests and ethnic populations. With the majority of Crimea being ethnic Russians
and the implication of NATO’s intrusion into the Black Sea, Russia had no choice but to
annex the territory. NATO maintains an underlying principle that stipulates that states with
internal conflicts are not eligible to join the coalition. This principle guides Russia's intrusion
into West-Leaning buffer states, and the establishment of breakaway regions under Russian
influence, as this proves useful in preventing the expansion of NATO. In regards to the
Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Russian intrusion into Ukraine provides a beneficial outcome as the
annexation of Crimea and a divided Ukraine not only provides an additional buffer space, but
also deters Ukraine from NATO membership. To be put concisely, Russian intervention in
Ukraine addresses the economic and security threats associated with NATO and the European
Union’s intrusion into Russia’s sphere of influence.
A different perspective, regarding the motivating factors of Russia’s involvement in
Ukraine, stems from the idea of Russia rejecting the Western world model. The first instance
of this rejection is visible in the 2000 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, which claims the
existence of a new multipolar world order rather than the longstanding Western-centric order
(Gonzalez, 2013, p.2). This position suggests that all states have the authority to select their
own development model, the Western World’s democratic principles were no longer
comprehensive, meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign states was unacceptable, and
lastly that Russia would then be able to step into the forefront of the international community
as an alternative power to the West (Perrier, 2014, p.35). Putin clarifies this position in the
2007 Parliamentary address where Russia’s resistance to the West’s ideological impositions
are evident through the state's pursuit of Russian interests and the utilization of any
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international advantages. With this resistance to the Western World in mind, Russia
reinforces itself as a counterweight in the development of a multipolar world. The notion of
Russia being an alternative to Western society allows the state to act as an arbitrator between
other communities that reject the Western model. The ‘Russian Federation and the Modern
World’ section within the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept states:
“Desire to go back to one's civilizational roots can be clearly seen in recent
events … where political and socioeconomic renewal of society has been
frequently carried out. Similar processes can be observed in other regions as
well (Ukraine), which makes it a priority for world politics to prevent
civilizational fault line clashes and to intensify efforts to forge partnership of
cultures, religions and civilizations in order to ensure a harmonious
development of mankind. In these circumstances imposing one's own
hierarchy of values can only provoke a rise in xenophobia, intolerance and
tensions in international relations leading eventually to chaos in world affairs.”
(Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013)
The guiding principle behind this statement is the guarantee from the Russian government to
protect its people domestically and abroad. On the grounds of this principle, Putin justified
Russia’s intervention in Eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea despite widespread
international disapproval.
The Ukraine’s Soviet links also play a role in Russia’s motivations for intervention.
The desire to perpetuate the economic relations between former Soviet states has seen Russia
enter into many international agreements with its neighboring countries. This desire has
seemingly intensified recently with the creation of The Customs Union of Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Russia, in addition to the successive Eurasian Economic Union, which came
into effect on January 1st, 2015. With the Ukraine potentially becoming more integrated into
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the Western World, Russian economic and political interests are at risk. The struggle for
influence over Ukraine between the West and Russia carries a zero-sum inclination as both
sides pursue their interests in the region at the expense of Ukrainian society.
Analyses of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine Conflict, from the Western World, suggest
that the Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine are an act of aggression on a sovereign state. The
underlying argument from this point of view insinuates that Putin annexed Crimea due to the
ideological ambition to regain territory from the former Soviet Union. From this perspective,
Russia’s exercise of power in Ukraine is a display of aggressive behavior in relation to the
states previous conduct in the international community. This perception of Russian
aggression originates from the ideological notions of the Cold War. George Kennan’s “X”
article, which is grounded in a similar assertion, states “the political personality of Soviet
power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances” (Motyl, 2014).
Kennan’s article was written in July of 1947, however, a case for its contemporary relevance
its evident by paralleling the Civilizational ideals of the Soviet Union to Putin’s present-day
Russian initiatives.
“Like the Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia fosters antagonism to the West, and,
like the Soviet Union, it feels impelled to expand, but not immediately and
unconditionally or against unassailable barriers. It is under no real threat:
NATO has been in decline, Europe has been cutting its defense budget, and
the United States has been distracted by the Middle East and domestic
priorities. Instead, Putin’s neoimperial ideology and his standing as Russia’s
all-powerful leader require him to gather former imperial territories.”
(Motyl, 2014)
This argument indicates that Putin’s actions in Ukraine are inline with Russia’s desire for
material power and territorial expansion. These actions are the social construct of Russia’s
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IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
disdain of the Western World and the ambition to consolidate the identity of a sphere of
influence.
John Mearsheimer argues against the Western interpretations by shifting the blame to
the NATO enlargement initiatives of the United States and its European allies. Dating back to
the mid-1990’s, the Russian Government has continuously resisted the expansion of NATO
into former Soviet states. As mentioned in the previous chapters, contemporary Russia made
it abundantly clear that there will be repercussions if NATO or a missile defense system
compromises their sphere of influence. However, the United States and Europe elected to
encroach on Russian strategic interests by enlarging NATO through the addition of twelve
new member states since 1999. Six of the new member states were under the old Soviet
sphere of influence, and three were former Soviet Republics. Mearsheimer hypothetically
equates this to China building an impressive military alliance and then attempting to include
Canada and Mexico (Mearsheimer, 2014). The culmination of European Union and NATO
expansion set the stage for conflict. It was the former Ukrainian President’s rejection of the
European Association Agreement that ultimately sparked the conflict, as the West’s attempt
to pull Ukraine westward failed, igniting a Western-supported revolution. As a result, Putin
annexed the predominately ethnic Russian Crimea further validating the many instances in
which Russia had warned the Western World that infringing upon their sphere of influence is
unacceptable and will carry repercussions. While the Motyl and Mearsheimer arguments
differ, one unifying theme is clear, and that is the understanding that Russia would act if
threatened.
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Conclusions
Russian foreign policy is a complex and ever-developing feature of the international
community. Characteristics of this policy have evolved from the respective ambitions of the
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IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Westernist, Statist and Civilizationist schools of thought, with each representing a different
construct of Russian identity. The unifying aspect remains in the dynamic construction of
said identity in relation to Russia’s perceptions of the West. This indicates a sense of
otherness that Russia manifests in its ambitions and declared policy.
Russia currently sees itself and the West as two separate spheres of influence with
their own values and perceptions of the international community. This viewpoint shapes the
role of Russia’s decision-making within the international community.
The Russia-Ukraine Conflict endures as a manifestation of the ideological clash
between Russia and the West. This is valid due to the idea that the international community,
as well as the notions of democracy and sovereignty, are socially and culturally defined.
Therefore Russian foreign policy, from a constructivist vantage point, is determined by the
relationship between Russian identity and national interests. Due to the centralization of
Russian foreign policy decisions, Vladimir Putin principally decides Russia’s political
interests. Putin’s 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation highlights
Russia’s self-identification as a commanding sphere of influence in addition to the objectives
of consolidating this identity within the international community by protecting security
interests.
The above-mentioned ideological conflict subsists in Ukraine due to the clash of
socially constructed values between Russia and the West as both spheres of influence
maintain a presence within the state. The Western influence is appropriately present in
Western Ukraine while Eastern Ukraine positions itself with Russia. Russia and the West's
different positions on the socio-political future of Ukraine have prompted the respective
spheres of influence to act accordingly for their promotion. For the Western World, this
included NATO expansion initiatives and the negotiations for European alignment from the
European Union. Russia responded to these movements with a military response of their own,
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subsequently annexing Crimea to protect Russian identity as a sphere of influence and the
security threat of having another NATO member in a neighbouring state. Therefore, Russia
acts as an alternative or ‘other’ to the Western centric international community. Russia as the
'other' shapes its role in the Russia-Ukraine crisis by prompting the state to act reactively to
the historical implications and security threats related to NATO’s past expansions. Russia's
role in Ukraine possesses the characteristics of realism and power politics, however; Russia’s
involvement can only be defined through the constructivist understanding of socially and
historically constructed norms that indicate Russia acts in response to instances of Western
encroachment. Materialistic control of Ukraine is not the motivation but rather a by-product
of Russia protecting its identity as a sphere of influence and the corresponding role within the
international community.
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Appendix
Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013
a) Ensuring the security of the country, protecting and strengthening its sovereignty and
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territorial integrity, and securing its high standing in the international community as one of
the influential and competitive poles of the modern world;
b) Creating favorable external conditions for a steady and dynamic growth of the Russian
economy and its technological modernization with a view to putting it on the innovation-
based development tracks, as well as for improving the quality of life, strengthening the rule
of law and democratic institutions, and ensuring human rights and freedoms;
c) Active promoting of international peace and universal security and stability for the purpose
of establishing a just and democratic system of international relations based on collective
decision-making in addressing global issues, on the primacy of international law, including,
first of all, the UN Charter, as well as on equal, partnership relations among nations with the
central coordinating role of the UN as the principal organization regulating international
relations;
d) Promoting good-neighborly relations with adjoining states and helping to overcome
existing and prevent potential tensions and conflicts in regions adjacent to the Russian
Federation;
e) Developing mutually beneficial and equal bilateral and multilateral partnership relations
with foreign states, interstate associations, international organizations and forums on the basis
of respect for independence and sovereignty, pragmatism, transparency, multi-vector
approach, predictability and non-confrontational protection of national interests; promoting
broad international cooperation based on the principle of non-discrimination and facilitating
the formation of flexible non-bloc network alliances with Russia's active involvement;
f) Strengthening Russia's positions in the global trade and economic system, providing
diplomatic support to national economic operators abroad, preventing discrimination against
Russian goods, services or investments; making use of the potential of international and
regional economic and financial institutions to that end;
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g) Ensuring comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens
and compatriots residing abroad, and promoting, in various international formats, Russia's
approach to human rights issues;
h) Promoting the Russian language and strengthening its positions in the world,
disseminating information on the achievements of the peoples of Russia and consolidating the
Russian diaspora abroad;
i) Facilitating the development of a constructive dialogue and partnership relations between
civilizations in the interests of enhancing accord among various cultures and confessions and
ensuring their mutual enrichment.
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