The Republic and American Imperialism

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The Roots of the Filipino Nation by Onofre D. Corpuz

CHAPTER 19

THE REPUBLIC AND AMERICAN

IMPERIALISM, 1898-1899

The eyes of all the Great Powers are now directedtoward the Pacific Ocean the nations of Europewould like to be the only guests at the banquet butthe United States desires a share and wants tooccupy places in the Sandwich Islands, the

Marianas, the Carolines and the Philippines for thebenefit of her commerce. - AguinaIdo (1898)

We come not to make war upon the people of thePhilippines, nor upon any party or faction amongthem, but to protect them in their homes, in theiremployments, and in their personal and religiousrights. -- McKinley (19 May 1898)

There were three wars in the Philippines in 1898. The first was the

resumption of the Revolution, a triumphant campaign that joined the people

of Luzon and the Visayas into one government; even the Spanish presidio in

Zamboanga fell to a revolutionary group in September 1899.

The United States, too, had a war to fight. Commodore George Dewey

destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in May 1898.

But the United States Asiatic squadron proved to be a probe of

imperialism. On 19 May the American president McKinley ordered themilitary occupation of the archipelago. It was the purest and meanest

imperialism. There was no shred of law to justify it, and he did not have a

single soldier in the Philippines to implement it. But he was bent on taking

the country, and he issued a second order in December calling for

The Republic and American Imperialism, 1898-1899. 1


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subjugation, if necessary, because he had bought the archipelago, after

forcing Spain to sell it for $20,000,000. These orders of May and December

demanded that the Filipinos, who had won their war of liberation from Spain,

submit to United States rule.

And so the Filipinos had to fight a second war for liberty, not against their

old rulers, but against the new aggressors. The American imperialists called

the war a Tagalo insurrection as they called our war of independence from

Spain. Since McKinley had ordered the military occupation ofFilipinas in

May 1898, the imperialists misrepresented the Filipino-American War as an

insurrection. They called our patriots and heroes murderers, a Mafia,

bandits, outlaws, and ladrones (robbers).

Otis, the American commanding general, had advanced only forty miles

north of Manila by August 1899. It was a mess because he is reported to have

been saying the the situation is well in hand, and that the war will be over

in ten days. It ended in 1906.

The war was America's first Vietnam. Like the Vietnamese in the mid-

1960s, the Filipinos were simply elements in the complex of American

ambitions. Neither had the resources to attack the United States. Much of

the truth about the war, including the barbarity into which it deteriorated,

was hidden from the American people by censorship. There were two

differences from the Vietnam war. The Filipinos had no superpower ally; they

fought alone. And the Americans came not only for war, but to take Filipinas.

This is a story of the beginnings, the web of deceit, and the alliance of

force and piety behind this third war.1

Jingoism

The war between the Americans and the Filipinos could not be foreseen in1897. On November 3d this year, indeed, Aguinaldo's government proposed

an offensive-defensive alliance with the Americans against Spain. Through

the first half of 1898 Aguinaldo and his comrades continued to hope that the

United States government, which by now was fully aware of their struggle for



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which he discussed. There was a fifth which he said he would not consider:

I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of.

That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.

Like Cleveland, McKinley could not bind his government to a policy of

inaction in Cuba. So he assured the Congress that when the time came for

forcible intervention the United States would undertake it without

misgiving or hesitancy, in a manner that would command the support and

approval of the civilized world.

But the times were dangerous for the Filipinos, even if they were more

than an ocean away from Cuba. Spanish colonialism might be ending for

them, but United States imperialism had begun. It was still the age of BigPowers; the new leadership in Washington wanted to get the country into the

Big Boys' club. Four months after he forswore forcible annexation in Cuba,

McKinley ordered military occupation of the Philippines. His December 1899

message to the Congress explained his war against the Filipinos. McKinley

had adopted the law of the jungle, not civilized morality, as the new rule for

United States foreign policy during his presidency:

In this age of keen rivalry among nations for mastery in

commerce, the doctrine of evolution and the rule of the survival of

the fittest must be as inexorable in their operation as they are

positive in the results they bring about.

McKinley was reformulating Charles Darwin, who derived his theories

from scientific studies of the evolution of sub-human species. McKinley now

made these theories the paramount doctrine governing America's policy and

behavior in international affairs. His reference to commerce will seem

innocuous, but its potential mischief will become clear when we consider its

underlying ideas in fuller dress and when we realize that these ideas then

held sway over the minds of the leaders of the United States government. Among such men, for instance, was Henry Cabot Lodge; he was a key

senator, a ranking member of McKinley's party. Cabot Lodge has a

perspective of American history and of the events of 1898:



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Cabot Lodge's hodge-podge vision was a chauvinistic view of American

expansion unstoppable, dictated by destiny, historic. He looked at the

English-speaking people on the one hand, and the French-and-Spanish

speaking people on the other, as locked in a historic struggle for the New

World. The American advance from the eastern seaboard down to the Gulf of

Mexico and westward to California and the Pacific Ocean was inexorable:

The two inevitable antagonists were nearing each other at last,

for they were face to face now all along the western and southern

borders of the United States. The time had come for one to stop, or

for the other to give way. But there was no stopping possible for the

Americans.... All the lands of North America ... had passed from the

hands of the men who could not use them into those of the men who

could.

The expulsion of Spain from the Antilles is merely the last and

final step of the inexorable movement in which the United States

has been engaged for nearly a century.

Such notions and visions in the minds of the United States leaders had to

produce war. If it had not been 1898 it would have been another year; if it

had not been the Filipinos it would have been another people on the Pacific or

Far East that would be the victim; and then on to the Asian mainland, and

beyond, until the American people changed their leaders or until their nation

would have been ruined. The imperialist vision was a mark of the age, so that

imperfect men would impose their rule on others. But the aggression on the

Philippines was doubly wrong because McKinley's actions were accompanied

by deceit.2

We will have a better perspective of America's war against the Filipinos

after we understand America's war against the Spaniards in Manila.

Turkey Shoot In the Bay, Sham Battle for Manila

The Spanish-American War in the Philippines was hardly a war at all. It

consisted of a naval action in May followed by three and a half months

without fighting and a sham battle in August.



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The first engagement was a gross mismatch, with the American George

Dewey's modern warships displacing 19,098 tons and mounted with superior

guns against the Spanish admiral Patricio Montojo's antiques, displacing

11,689 tons. Indeed Montojo's second largest ship, the CASTILLA, weighing

3,260 tons, was a wooden cruiser; it was leaky; it was given a patch-up job on

26 April, but then its engines conked out, beyond repair; the cripple had to be

towed on 29 April to the battle site. In three days this would become the

graveyard of the Spanish squadron. Montojo then sacrificed every chance of

victory; he took his ships to the small bay of Caacao where the two horns of

the hook of the Cavite peninsula seemed to shelter him; but he only locked

himself in, awaiting the enemy in the shallow eight meters of water without

any room for maneuver.

The naval battle of Manila Bay, fought on 1 May 1898, was an

unprecedented victory for Dewey. It was diminished only by the quality of the

enemy. The battle lasted from 5:41 o'clock A.M. when Dewey opened fire,

until half past noon when all firing ceased, although this covers the interval

from 7:35 A.M. when all hands in the Dewey squadron took time for a

leisurely breakfast, until 11:16 A.M. when they resumed what had by then

amounted to a turkey shoot. The entire Spanish fleet was either destroyed or

sunk by the Americans, or scuttled by the Spaniards themselves, without the

latter managing to take even a single American life.

The second engagement was not even a mismatch. It was a sham. And it

was unnecessary. This was the American taking of the city of Manila on 13

August. (During the American regime 13 August was celebrated as

Occupation Day in the Philippines; all schools were closed for the great

holiday, for the children to hear speeches extolling the great American

victory over the Spaniards.)

The battle was unnecessary since the Spanish governor-general had been

ordered by Madrid on 8 and 29 June to capitulate, when it became

unavoidable, to the Americans but not to the Filipinos. On 22 July 1898

Spain officially sued for peace. On 10 August a draft protocol to end

hostilities was transmitted by the American Secretary of State to the



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Spaniards, to be signed by him and by the French ambassador to

Washington, the latter in representation of Spain's interests. This protocol

was duly signed in Washington in the presence of the American president in

the afternoon of 12 August. At 5:00 P.M. that same afternoon notice of the

ending of hostilities was dispatched to the American commanders in Manila.

But Dewey had cut the submarine telegraph cable linking Manila to

Hongkong; the Washington notice arrived in Manila only on the 16th August.

So the arrangements for the mock bombardment and then the surrender of

the city, negotiated through the British consul Rawson-Walker, and with his

death continued by the Belgian consul Andr, proceeded.

The afternoon of 12 August in Washington was the morning of 13 Augustin Manila. This morning came after a spell of monsoon rains in the night; the

morning began humid, with temperatures of 27 degrees Celsius and above.

But the sky cleared; then a cooling breeze arose, and it was a good day for a

mock bombardment of the city. Dewey's guns lobbed a few shells over the

rooftops of the walled city for the sake of Spanish honor, and the recently

arrived army troops waded through the water. The Spaniards raised the

white flag. The American commanding general had instructions to his

command which included: It is intended that these results shall be

accomplished without loss of life... The American army troops (470 officersand 10,437 men had arrived in four expeditions from the United States over 1

to 31 July) took the city.

If the Americans had wanted a real battle for the city, it would have been

just as much a picnic. The Filipinos had made it easy. Dewey in his

Autobiography records that the Filipinos had not only advanced their lines

along the beach almost to the fortifications [i.e., the walls of Manila], but had

invested the city on the inland side as well. An American war correspondent,

an eyewitness of these events, wrote of the American and Filipino lines: Our

pickets were having a rather dull time of it, for they did not have the

excitement of watching the enemy, as the insurgents [that is, the Filipinos]

were attending to that duty a few hundred yards to the front.

But the Americans were determined to make their takeover of Manila a



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genuine sham battle. This meant that the Filipinos had to be excluded from

the action; they could not be relied upon to play games.

Whatever, it was a nice and short and cheap war for the Americans; Spainsued for peace in July; the thing was over by 12 August in Washington. The

Paris treaty was signed on 10 December. The American jingoists earned full

membership for their country in the exclusive Imperialist Club. Spain saved

face by not having to surrender to the Filipinos. She even got $20,000,000; it

was better than nothing.

The United States seemed to have gotten the Great American Bargain.

But the imperialists in Washington were in for a bigger surprise. McKinley

paid $20,000,000 to buy the Filipinos' country, and bought a $300,000,000war.3

Three American Consuls and the Revolution:

November 1897-August 1898

The American consul in Manila, Oscar Williams, reported to his superiors

in Washington in February 1898 that a republic had been established by the

Filipinos. The republic was the Biak-na-Bato Republic. Throughout March he

kept his government posted on the Spanish regime's inability to suppress the

Revolution, the arms captured by the Filipinos, desertions from the regime's

forces, the barbarous methods used by the Spaniards, the Filipinos' siege of

Manila. In May after the destruction of the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay,

Williams recorded the continuing progress of the Revolution. His dispatch on

the 12th reported that members of the revolutionary government had called

on him and given assurances that all would swear allegiance to and

cheerfully follow our flag. They are brave, submissive and cheaply provided

for. He closed this report by foreseeing that the result of Dewey's naval

victory would be the acquisition of these islands, many times more

extensive, more populous, and more valuable than Cuba.

In mid June, after a string of Aguinaldo successes, Williams reported on

the 12 June ceremonies in Cavite. He said that he had been invited to attend

the independence proclamation ceremonies but had declined. He explained



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that:

For future advantage I am maintaining cordial relations with

General Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to our forceswhen treating for their return here.... General Aguinaldo told me

today that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held

as a colony of United States of America.

It has been my effort to maintain harmony with insurgents in

order to exercise greater influence hereafter when we reorganize

government.

Williams had repeatedly reported in March about rumors that the

Filipinos would take and burn Manila but that they did not do so because the

majority of the population was in support of the Revolution. In June hethought that by 4 July Manila would be in American hands.

Williams had another dispatch on 4 August, when negotiations between

the Spaniards and Americans for the surrender of Manila had been underway

for some time. Williams' report this day opened with:

It has been my study [sic] to keep on pleasant terms with

General Aguinaldo for ultimate objects. By so doing I have avoided

certain troubles and aided our forces.

Williams received a qualified pat of approval the same day. He was told

that the State Department had furnished the Navy and War departments

with copies of his 16 June report, and that:

Your course, while maintaining amicable relations with the

insurgents, in abstaining from any participation in the adoption of

their so-called provisional government, is approved.

And now for the second American consul, Rounseville Wildman in

Hongkong. He was visited a number of times during the latter part of 1897 by

Felipe Agoncillo, who was vested with full powers as diplomatic agent of theBiak-na-Bato republic. The officials of this republic, headed by Aguinaldo,

were named on 2 November.

Wildman sent a report to the State Department on Agoncillo's last visit on



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3 November. He explicitly referred to the republic of the Philippines not

just once, but twice. Agoncillo, he said, bore two proposals. The first was an

offensive-defensive alliance with the United States against Spain; on this

matter, according to Wildman, it was Agoncillo's judgment that the United

States would declare war against Spain very soon. The second proposal was

for the United States to supply 20,000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of

ammunition to the Filipinos, payment for which would be made when the

United States recognized the Filipino government.

Wildman's superiors in the State Department did not welcome his official

transmittal of the proposals, and he was instructed in December not to

encourage any advances of Agoncillo, as well as not to communicate with

the Department relative to Agoncillo's alleged mission.

But it seems that Wildman was sympathetic to the cause of the Filipinos.

His 19 May 1898 dispatch described the revolutionists as allies. His July

report stressed the utter impossibility of Spain, even with the aid of the

United States, reestablishing her sovereignty over the Philippines. He

advanced an opinion that the Filipinos were superior to the Malays and

Cubans. Aguinaldo, Agoncillo, and Sandico he identified as men who were

good enough to be leaders of government departments in any country. He

told the State Department that there was a systematic smear campaignagainst Aguinaldo and his cabinet; this was presumably inspired by the

Spaniards. Wildman advised that the Filipinos cannot be dealt with as

though they were North American Indians, shunted from reservation to

reservation at the whim of their masters.

He reported that on 27 April Williams was with him in Hongkong after

leaving Manila when war was declared and that Williams had joined the

Dewey squadron. Aguinaldo was en route from Singapore, which he had also

left the previous day after his meetings with the United States consul there.

Now, on 27 April, just before the Dewey squadron steamed for Manila Bay,

Wildman and Williams were visited by a delegation of the Hongkong Junta

composed of Jose Ma. Basa, Tomas Mascardo, Teodoro Sandico, Miguel

Malvar, Mariano Llanera, Andres E. de Garchitorena, Lorenzo L. Zialcita,



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and Salvador Estrella. The consuls arranged with Dewey for two men of the

Junta (Jose Alejandrino and Garchitorena) to be with Dewey when the

squadron left for Manila Bay. Wildman also arranged for Aguinaldo's passage

on the American ship McCulloch, arriving in Cavite on 19 May. Wildman

closed his report with the view that Aguinaldo's establishment of the

dictatorial government in late May was an absolutely necessary step if he

hoped to maintain control over the natives. From that time on, Wildman

reported, Aguinaldo has been uninterruptedly successful in the field and

dignified and just as the head of his government.

Wildman was sure he was backing a winner; he was also helping

Aguinaldo buy arms in Hongkong. His encouragement was clear; in his 28

June letter he wrote:

I suppose you have taken Manila by this time; I hope so.

On 25 July Wildman was behaving beyond his status as consul, giving

advice and assurances and indeed committing the support of the United

States to Aguinaldo. This day he wrote:

The latest Telegraphic Dispatches assert that all the great power[s] of

Europe (except Great Britain) have arrived at an agreement th[u]s the

Philippines cannot become a part of the United States, but will bedivided up among themselves as has been the case with China. Should

this prove to be true, you will have a greater battle on your hands than

you have already had, and it will require all the power of the United

States and Great Britain to keep your Islands intact and to hold you, as

the first man in them. I have vouched for your honesty and earnestness

of purpose to the President of the United States and to our people, and

they are ready to extend their hand to you as a Brother, and aid you in

every laudable ambition. There are greater prizes in the world than

being the Chie[f] of a Revolution. I look to you to bear me out in all my

promises, and I give you my assurances that you can always call uponme to act as your champion should any try to slander your name.

Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the purpose

of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they were



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suffering, and not for the love of conquest or the hope of gain. They are

actua[t]ed by precisely the same feelings towards the Philippinos [sic].

Whatever the final disposition of the conquered territory may be, you

can trust the United States that justice and honor will control all theirdealings with you. The first thing is to throw off the Spanish yok[e]. Do

not let any thing interfere with that. I believe in you, do not disappoint

me.

But then Wildman was curtly rebuked by the State Department. The

Hongkong correspondent of the London Daily Mail had reported part of his

correspondence with Aguinaldo. He was sharply told by Washington on 6

August: If you wrote Aguinaldo, as reported by Hongkong correspondent of

Daily Mail, your action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make

pledges or discuss policy. (Emphasis supplied)

Wildman, his career at stake, now resorted to dishonesty. He denied

having made pledges or discussed policy with Aguinaldo. His report of 18

July to the State Department stated a changed view of the Filipino leaders'

goals. What they wanted, in spite of all statements to the contrary, was

annexation to the United States first, and ... independence secondly, if the

United States decides to decline the sovereignty of the islands.

And in a long explanation to the State Department on the 9th August,Wildman now said that he and Williams saw Aguinaldo as a necessary evil.

He said that Aguinaldo would be a useful instrument for Dewey and the

American army commander, General Merritt. He was sure that Aguinaldo

wanted to be the president of a Filipino republic; on the other hand, he said,

the great majority of his followers, and all the wealthy educated Filipinos

have but one desire - to become citizens of the Unites States of America.

Wildman further insured his career by now describing Aguinaldo's letters as

childish; Aguinaldo was a man of petty moods.

Williams' and Wildman's conduct toward Aguinaldo was roundly

condemned by Howard W. Bray (infra) in a January 1899 letter to Aguinaldo:

... Wildman, Williams and Co. have been the worst enemies you have had.

False and bastard. What I regret is that you placed so much confidence in



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them.4

The third American consul was E. Spencer Pratt in Singapore, who had

clandestine conversations with Aguinaldo. Our account of their meetings isbased on Pratt's reports of 28 and 30 April and on the detailed account in the

Singapore Free Press of 4 May. The view in Singapore saw Aguinaldo as the

supreme head of the revolutionary movement in the Philippines. Because

the Spaniards had reneged on the promise of reforms in the pact of Biak-na-

Bato, according to the newspaper, Aguinaldo went to Saigon and Singapore;

he wished to consult with friendly contacts on the chances of war breaking

out between Spain and the United States and whether, in such an event, the

United States would eventually recognize the independence of the

Philippines, provided he lent his cooperation to the Americans in theconquest of the country.

In Singapore Aguinaldo especially wished to meet Howard W. Bray, an

Englishman who had lived in the Philippines for fifteen years. Aguinaldo was

the house guest of Dr. Marcelino Santos, an emigr who was then head of the

Filipino colony there. Bray then approached Pratt, who asked to meet

Aguinaldo, and Bray arranged the meeting. Pratt records that he knew of the

great prestige of Aguinaldo, and that I determined at once to see him...

The first of two meetings was held on Sunday, the 24th April, at TheMansion on River Valley Road. There were also present, aside from Pratt and

Aguinaldo: Bray, Aguinaldo's private secretary Jose Leyba, his aide Col. Del

Pilar, and Dr. Santos. The interview was held through interpreters. The

Singapore Free Press reports that Aguinaldo reviewed the progress of the

Revolution for Pratt, and then detailed the cooperation he could give, should

the American forces land and take Manila.

Aguinaldo also stated that he could and would organize a liberal

government, and would be willing to accept the same terms for the country

as the United States intend giving to Cuba. Pratt records at this point that

he made clear that he had no authority to speak for his government.

However, both sides agreed on cooperation. Pratt sent a wire to Dewey.



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Dewey replied, according to Pratt: "Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible."

Dewey confirms this in his Autobiography with: I requested him to come.

The second meeting was held the next day at the American consularresidence in the Raffles Hotel. Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong the day

after, Tuesday, at noon. He sailed as agreed for Manila three weeks later.

Pratt's impression of Aguinaldo at this time suggests that there was at

least a concurrence of views, and very possibly an agreement. According to

Pratt, Aguinaldo was: a man of intelligence, ability and courage, and worthy

the confidence that had been placed facilitated the work of occupying and

administering the Philippines. The Singapore Free Press report ended by

summarizing Aguinaldo's political goals as embracing the independence ofthe Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European

and American advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily,

on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba.

In his 9 June report Pratt wrote the State Department that he had been

serenaded by the Filipinos of Singapore. They were led by Dr. Santos, who

eulogized Pratt and the United States with a warm address in French. Pratt

sent copies of the Singapore Free Press and of the Straits Times, both dated 9

June. The accounts of the serenade in the two papers were almost identical;

in both, Pratt is reported to have reciprocated the sentiments of the Filipinos

by addressing them as follows:

Today we have the news of the brilliant achievements of your

own distinguished leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating

on land with the Americans at sea. You have just reason to be

proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General

Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When,

six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived

incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour's

interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion, andhaving communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged

for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.

The day after the serenade Pratt wrote To His Excellency, General

EMILIO AGUINALDO:



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All is coming to pass as I had hoped and predicted and it is now

being shown that I was right in arranging for your cooperation with

Admiral Dewey, and equally right in asking that you are given the

support and entrusted with the confidence of the AmericanGovernment.

I trust that I shall next have the pleasure of congratulating you

upon the capture of Manila and when that occurs let me ask that

you will send me some historic memento of the place and the

incident, such as the flag or keys of the Ciudad or principal

[fortress,] in souvenir of our Meeting at Singapore and of the

important results which have ensued.

Whether or not there was an agreement with Pratt cannot yet be

established. It is very likely that there was one, and this is supported by the

fact that Dewey accommodated Aguinaldo on one of his ships on the latter's

going to Manila; by Pratt's record of his high esteem for Aguinaldo; and by

the appreciative serenade for Pratt by the Singapore Filipinos. There is also

direct testimony indicating the existence of an agreement. While in Singapore

Aguinaldo gave no other interviews except to the Singapore Free Press editor,

W.G. St. Clair, who was thereby able to report on Aguinaldo's political goals.

In January 1899, after reading Aguinaldo's 5 January proclamation, Bray

wrote him from Hongkong:

Did you not say that the basis of any negotiation in Singaporewas the Independence of the Philippines under an American

protectorate? This is what Consul Pratt telegraphed and to which

Dewey and Washington agreed; as I figured up the price of the

telegram, I know very well what occurred, and I am ready to state it

and to swear to it when the proper time comes.

There are five of us against one in the event of Consul Pratt

receiving instructions to deny it. Furthermore, Mr. St. Clair knows

what happened and I am certain that he also would testify. St.

Clair still has the rough draft as an historical relic, and St. Clair is

a true and loyal friend of yours, as is your humble servant.

And then, after his 9 June report, the boom was lowered on Pratt. The

State Department sent him a peremptory telegram on the 17th June:

Two hundred twelve [the number of Pratt's 28 April dispatch]



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received and answered. Avoid unauthorized negotiations with

Philippine insurgents.

The answer referred to was a letter-reply dated the same day. It wassigned by the Secretary of State, and read in part:

The Department observes that you informed General Aguinaldo

that you had no authority to speak for the United States; and, in

the absence of the fuller report which you promise, it is assumed

that you did not attempt to commit this Government to any alliance

with the Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional

personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to

Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes

which it might not be practicable to gratify.

This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as

discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted

with their purposes. While their contest with that power has been a

matter of public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received

from this Government any recognition. The United States, in

entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of

its military operations in that quarter, will do so in the exercise of

the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect from the

inhabitants, without regard to their former attitude toward the

Spanish Government, that obedience which will be lawfully due

from them. (Emphasis supplied)If in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you

acted upon the assumption that this Government would cooperate

with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in

accepting his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to

recognize any political claims which he may put forward, your

action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.

The disconsolate Pratt now had a great deal of explaining to do, which he

did in his dispatches in June and July. He denied having committed his

government to the goals of the Filipinos. But he was skating on thin ice. Hehad referred to Aguinaldo, in public, as the Filipinos' distinguished leader.

He had written Aguinaldo that he had asked for his government's support

and confidence in his behalf. And he closed his address to the Filipinos during

the serenade by expressing the hope that the eventual outcome will be all



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that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos.

Pratt, at least, was an honorable man. He was unlike Wildman who

belittled Aguinaldo after he had been rebuked. Pratt would not take back thegood words and high esteem he had said about the Filipino leader. On 21

June he wrote to his superiors:

I beg further to state that it was not only on account of the

material aid I was confident he could lend us that I regarded the

cooperation of General Aguinaldo as so desirable, but also because,

as the recognized leader of the insurgents, he was, I considered, the

one best able to direct and influence them, and therefore the one

most important for our commander to have under immediate

control, both as concerned the present and future policy of ourGovernment in the Philippines, whatever that policy might be.

(Emphasis supplied)

The underscored words in the above excerpt from Pratt's reply supply the

key to Pratt's problem: Washington was quick to tell the consuls what they

could not do, but Washington would not tell them what American policy in

the Philippines was. It certainly seemed as if what the United States

government wanted in the Philippines was a deep and dark secret, which it

did not wish its consular officials to know. Williams and Wildman were

simply bureaucrats - they would do what their instructions ordered them,without knowing what for. Pratt at least thought that he would do what his

government wanted done. But he was guilty nevertheless. He was guilty of

presuming to define what his government's goals were; he should have known

that only his superiors could do that. He promised in his dispatch of 21 June

that he would have no further dealings with the Filipinos.

But that was not enough. He had also said, as early as 28 April, that he

had made it easier for the Unites States to occupy and administer the

Philippines. And he was absolutely right. The Secretary of State's 16 Juneletter to him said that the United States was entering upon the occupation

of the islands. But he was wrong again, because he had guessed right; in

other words, he had let the cat out of the bag. Pratt was punished shortly.

He was recalled from his post as consul-general, in consequence of the part



19/72


he took in sending Aguinaldo to the Philippines.5

An American President's Piety and Imperialism:

May 1898-January 1899

Aguinaldo interpreted the words and acts of the consuls as at least

evidence of a de facto alliance. The consul's authority did not authorize them

to enter into political commitments in behalf of their governments in any

way, and their superiors kept them in the dark about the United States

government's definite plans in the archipelago. They were not to enter into

agreements with Filipino leaders. But they had personally dealt with

Aguinaldo and made assurances in terms that indicated at least cooperation

with mutual benefit. Aguinaldo certainly thought so, and he was right. The

Singapore Free Press, which had been keeping a close watch on the progress

of the Revolution, and now on the war between the United States and Spain,

believed so. Its 4 May 1898 issue reported on a secret political arrangement

that brought Aguinaldo into direct relations with Admiral Dewey; it also

reported that Pratt coincided with the general views during his second

interview with Aguinaldo. The Spaniards assumed that there was an

alliance, and said so to the American panel during the treaty negotiations inParis, on 1 October 1898.

For its part, the American government consistently avoided an alliance

and denied the existence of any commitments based on a formal agreement

with Aguinaldo. It, too, was right, although it could not deny the benefit that

the United States derived from Aguinaldo as a result of a de facto alliance.

During the Paris negotiations the American Commissioners admitted the

assistance to the American military operations owed to the Filipinos,

particularly in connection with the taking of Manila. (Both panels studiously

suppressed any suggestion that their forces had staged a sham battle.) The

American panel's memorandum dated 9 November said on this matter:

The city was closely besieged on the land side by the insurgents.

It was in extremity for provisions and the insurgents controlled the



20/72


water supply. The Spanish forces had been unable to raise the

siege, and therefore could not escape from the city on the land side.

In another memorandum, submitted to the 21 November session of thepeace conference, the American commissioners took note of the Spanish

observation of the Americans' alliance with the Filipinos, but stated that such

a relation was not intentional on the part of the United States. This

memorandum said:

The Spanish commissioners have, themselves, in an earlier

stage of these negotiations, spoken of the Filipinos as our allies.

This is not a relation which the Government of the United States

intended to establish; but it must at least be admitted that the

insurgent chiefs returned and resumed their activity with theconsent of our military and naval commanders... (Emphasis

supplied)

This was the view from Washington. There was an alliance but it was

unintended. So it could not be acknowledged. The reason lay in the

Secretary of State's letter of rebuke to Pratt on the 16th June: here the

Secretary had revealed that the United States was entering upon the

occupation of the islands. This was due to McKinley's orders of 19 May - we

will deal with these shortly.

And so, in the 12 August protocol in Washington ending the hostilities in

the Spanish-American war, the Americans discarded Aguinaldo and

disregarded as well the informal alliance born of the acts of its officials for

cooperation with the Filipinos.

Of the causes and later character of this new war, Richard Brinsley

Sheridan, an English barrister who witnessed the events in Manila and

Malolos from just after the battle of Manila Bay until after the start of

hostilities in February, wrote:6

[The American people] are ignorant of many important facts in

connection with this war in the East, and they do not realize the

situation in respect to the broken pledges given by American

representatives to the Filipino leaders. There has been a systematic



21/72


deception, possibly for political reasons....

Had the people of America known the real conditions of the Filipinos, and

the methods which were adopted to subjugate and to deceive them, it isprobable that they would have withdrawn their support and sympathy from a

war which, although commenced with the highest and noblest motives, has

been carried on by so continuous an exercise of cruelty and injustice, that it

has involved the violation of all the rules of public faith and civilized warfare.

Let us now consider the peace treaty negotiations in Paris and the

testimony presented to the American panel. The negotiating panels met for

their first session on the 1st October. The issues over Cuba, Porto Rico, and

Guam were easy and virtually disposed of before the month was over. When

the panels met on 27 October to take up the Philippine question, however,

the Americans asked for a postponement; the next session was reset to 31

October. It was in this session that the American panel demanded the cession

of the entire Philippine archipelago.

The Spaniards were shattered by this demand; they asked for

adjournment until 4 November. Then the Americans, in turn, asked for

adjournment until 8 November, which was further reset for the next day. On

9 November the panels agreed on an adjournment until the 12th; this was

reset to the 16th, and again to the 21st. Each adjournment was accompanied

by the submission of lengthy papers by one or the other panel. On 21

November the Americans persisted in their demand for cession, but

sweetened it with a proposal for the United States to pay $20,000,000 to

Spain, should the latter agree to the cession.

The Spanish panel snapped up the offer on 28 November. The diplomatic

language of the Spanish acceptance had the following:

[Spain] resigns itself to the painful strait of submitting to the

law of the victor, however harsh it may be, and as Spain lacks

material means to defend the rights she believes are hers, having

recorded them, she accepts the only terms the United States offers

her for the concluding of the treaty of peace.



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The Spanish acceptance broke the deadlock. The rest of the negotiations

were relatively easy from here on, and the panels signed the treaty on 10

December 1898.

It was in fact way back in May that the American demand for cession

became inevitable. On the 19th McKinley issued orders to his secretaries of

War, Navy and the Treasury, calling for the military occupation of the

archipelago. Indeed he had only a navy squadron in Manila Bay and no army

to occupy the Philippines. But that did not matter; he wanted to occupy the

islands and he was going to send an army. He had declared that forcible

annexation was criminal aggression, just the previous December, but now

in May it no longer meant anything to him.

The orders began with almost identical opening sentences, to the effect

that the Spanish fleet had been destroyed and the Cavite naval station

occupied. In consequence, McKinley said, an army of occupation was needed

to complete the destruction of the Spanish forces and to provide order and

security to the islands while in the possession of the United States.

(Emphasis supplied). The Secretary of War ought to have been dumbfounded.

If there was any occupying to be done, the only territory then under

American control was the few square meters of the naval station, taken by

Dewey early in the month. The Americans had not taken Manila, and theirfirst land soldiers would not arrive until the 1st July. But McKinley had

already decided on the occupation by force of the entire archipelago.

Military occupation of course meant military government and

administration of the islands. The Treasury secretary was ordered to make

recommendations on the collection of duties and taxes in the islands. The

commanding general for the expeditionary forces was named (General

Merritt); he was vested with sweeping powers as the military governor; he

could replace or dismiss native officials, set up law courts, and so on.

The orders to the War secretary were the most detailed; they dealt with

the establishment of a new regime covering the entire archipelago and all its

inhabitants. The text is clear and needs no elaboration:



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The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's

territory is the severance of the former political relations of the

inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under

this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as theyperform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and

property and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire

that the people of the Philippines should be acquainted with the

purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its

obligations in this regard.

It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the expedition,

immediately upon his arrival in the islands, to publish a

proclamation declaring that we come not to make war upon the

people of the Philippines, nor upon any party or faction among

them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments,

and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either

by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the United

States in its efforts to give effect too this beneficent purpose will

receive the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation

should be as free from severity as possible.

Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and

supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of

the inhabitants.... (Emphasis supplied)

On 26 May Dewey received instructions from Washington not to have

political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that wouldincur liability to maintain their cause in the future.

General Merritt arrived in Cavite on 25 July. He avoided any

communication with Aguinaldo until I should be in possession of the city of

Manila. He had clear orders:

My instructions from the President fully contemplated the

occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and state

that 'the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme

and immediately operate upon the political condition of theinhabitants....'

The premeditation in McKinley's aggression on the land of the Filipinos

that began with his orders of 19 May undercut his blasphemous lie to a group



24/72


of Protestant clergymen in Washington in November 1899. The truth, he

said, was that he did not want the Philippines, but they came to us, as a gift

from the gods.

On 13 August the Navy Department cabled Dewey that:

The President desires to receive from you any important

information you may have of the Philippines; the desirability of the

several islands; the character of their population; coal and other

mineral deposits; their harbor and commercial advantages, and in a

naval and commercial sense which would be the most

advantageous....

Dewey was advised that he might be called to Washington if he had other

information of value.

About the lull between 1 May and 13 August Dewey writes in his

Autobiography that: Among the situations with which I had to deal promptly

as they arose, when I could not delay to consult Washington, the most

complicated was that of the Filipino insurgents. This required instructions.

Merritt testified that after his arrival he cabled Washington about the

possible trouble that might arise with the insurgents, and asked for

instructions as to whether I should consider them as enemies and treat them

accordingly in such case. McKinley obviously would not answer such aquestion, and Merritt records that he received no reply.

On 14 August, after the pusillanimous surrender of Manila by the

Spaniards, Merritt finally issued the proclamation called for in McKinley's

orders of 19 May. He announced that the American army had established a

government of military occupation. The new proclamation was issued in

English, Spanish, and Tagalog. It was addressed To the People of the

Philippines.

It repeated McKinley's dishonest words to the Filipinos that the

Americans had not come to wage war upon them, nor upon any party or

faction among them, but to protect them.... The final paragraph gave the

Filipinos ugly options: they would be left alone if they preserve the peace,



25/72


and perform their duties toward the United States; but they would be

disturbed if it were found necessary for the good of the service of the United

States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines.

Every doubt that the Filipinos had about the intentions of the United

States on their country dissolved with this proclamation. They had not

known of McKinley's earlier 19 May orders. But they had wondered about the

arrival of thousands of American troops in July. Troop ship after troop ship.

The Filipinos had planned to take Manila with or without Dewey. They had

enough men; and all they needed from Dewey was his guns. But McKinley

had sent expedition after expedition. Now, after they had been excluded from

the taking of Manila, and after Merritt's proclamation, the Filipinos saw

McKinley's designs beyond dissembling or denial. The American troops hadnot been sent to fight the Spaniards. They were sent to take Filipinas and to

fight the Filipinos.

McKinley's treachery could not be implemented for some time. Merritt

could extend his military government beyond Manila only by occupying

territory under the Revolutionary Government. This he could do by force, but

it was clear that it would not be taken well back home. This was because the

American people knew that their war with the Spaniards was over, and that

a treaty of peace would soon be negotiated: why, then, should Americantroops be making war against the Filipinos?

On the 17th August Merritt issued his General Orders No. 6 to the troops.

He congratulated them for their brilliant success in the capture, by assault;

of Manila. He praised his troops for their fortitude. This was crazy; the worst

tribulation suffered by Merritt's men was seasickness on the voyage to

Manila.

On the same day Merritt had to report that the Filipinos were demanding

joint occupation of Manila. He asked Washington:

Inform me how far I shall proceed in forcing obedience of the

insurgents on this matter and others that may arise. Is the

government willing to use all means and ... the natives to submit to

authority of United States? [The elision is in the original text of our



26/72


source, and probably indicates deletion of material from Merritt's

cable.]

In view of the fact that Merritt's authority under the order of 19 May wasabsolute and supreme, the matter was clearly within his authority to resolve.

But he was on the spot; it could mean war, and he had to protect himself by

ensuring that he had direct instructions. He received his instructions;

McKinley's reply was prompt; it left Washington on 17 August; the telegraph

cable had been restored:

The President directs that there must be no joint occupation

with the insurgents.... The insurgents and all others must recognize

the military occupation and authority of the United States and the

cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Use whatevermeans in your judgment are necessary to this end.

After Spain sued for peace on 22 July and after the taking of Manila in

August the scene shifts to Paris. The American panel was supplied with

statements about the archipelago obtained from a variety of sources; it also

received oral testimony from some officers, including Merritt, who had been

called from Manila and who had brought many of the statements to Paris.

One of the first questions was the relationship between the American

forces and Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo had a correspondence with Gen. Anderson,commander of the army expedition that was the first to arrive in Cavite (on

the 1st July). On 4 July Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, and we excerpt the

following:

Seor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO

Commanding Philippine Forces, Cavite, Luzon

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the United

States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command

in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire

sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the

Philippine Islands.

For these reasons, I desire to have the most amicable relations

with you, and to have you and your people cooperate with us in



27/72


military operations against the Spanish forces....

Aguinaldo replied as follows:

Brig. Gen. THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

Commanding the United States Volunteers

GENERAL: Interpreting the sentiments of the Filipino people, I

have the honor to express to your excellency my most profound

gratefulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments which the

natives of these islands inspire the great North American nation

and your excellency.

I also thank most profoundly your desire of having friendly

relations with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and

kindness, which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and

special satisfaction whenever occasion presents....

Merritt found Anderson's cordial sentiments awkward, and he testified to

the American panel: I suppressed the whole thing after I arrived, because it

was not the wish of the Government to make any promises to the insurgents

or act in any way with them.

Merritt was asked for his opinion of what would happen if the United

States and Spain made peace by treaty and the former left the islands

completely, except perhaps that it might retain a coaling station in otherwords, Spanish sovereignty would be restored. The record reads:

General MERRITT. I think in the island of Luzon they would

fight to the bitter end. I have talked with a number of them,

intelligent men, who said their lives were nothing as compared with

the freedom of the country, getting rid of Spanish government.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you think Spain would be able to reduce them?

General MERRITT. No, sir.

Dewey's instructions going into Manila Bay in May had been limited tothe undertaking of offensive operations. He adhered to his instructions to the

letter. After his victory he waited for further orders. There was not a single

American land soldier in the Philippines. As late as July Dewey believed that

neither the army nor the navy was ready for an engagement. He had



28/72


informed Washington, if the American government's decision was to occupy

Manila, that 5,000 well-equipped troops would be enough against the

Spaniards, provided that the Americans did not have to fight the Filipinos.

Dewey's estimate of 5,000 troops was only for a specific and limited action,

a fight to take the walled city. The Spaniards were bottled up, food supplies

running out, and without hope of escape or outside help. He also had the

guns of his warships. But it was now October, and Merritt was testifying in

Paris, and the situation was different. McKinley had ordered Merritt to

occupy the archipelago. And so we read the following:

Mr. DAVIS. How many troops, in your opinion, will be necessary

to administer the government of this island - to secure the

administration of our Government there?

General MERRITT. From 20,000 to 25,000 would be necessary

at first..

The six statements that Merritt brought from Manila were prepared by

American military officers, except the last, by the Belgian consul. Some are

lengthy, but they say much the same on the issue of Filipino-American

relations and on what the United States should do in the Philippines. The

first, dated 27 August, was by Maj. Gen. Francis V. Greene, USV. It began

with a rather broader perspective than the others, and we quote from it:

If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil

war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The

insurgents were furnished arms and the moral support of the Navy

prior to our arrival, and we cannot ignore obligations, either to the

insurgents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed

upon us. The Spanish Government is completely demoralized, and

Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. Spain

would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them. ...

On the other hand, the Filipinos cannot govern the country without

the support of some strong nation. They acknowledge thisthemselves, and say their desire is for independence under

American protection; but they have only vague ideas as to what our

relative positions would be - what part we should take in collecting

and expending the revenue and administering the government.

(Emphasis supplied)



29/72


The principal paper in another set of statements was a very long one,

again by Gen. Greene; it was dated 30 August. We cite that portion of it

which states a view that became a major theme in the American government

thinking on the Revolution; it is very likely that it helped to bring about the

war:

Finally, it must be remembered that this is purely a Tagalo

insurrection. There are upwards of thirty races in the Philippines,

each speaking a different dialect.... It is claimed by Aguinaldo's

partisans that the Visayans are in sympathy with his insurrection

and intend to send representatives to the congress. But it is a fact

that the Visayans have taken no active part in the present

insurrection, nor in that of 18%; that the Spanish Government is

still in full control at Cebu and Iloilo and in the Visayas' islands,and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no effort to attack them. The

Visayas number nearly 2,000,000, or about as many as the

population of all the Tagalo provinces which Aguinaldo claims to

have captured. There is no evidence to show that they will support

his pretensions, and many reasons to believe that, on account of

racial prejudices and jealousies and other causes, they will oppose

him. (Emphasis supplied)

Greene was either deceiving or humoring McKinley with his Tagalo

insurrection assessment. Maybe he was ignorant about the Visayas, where

all the main islands, from Cebu, Bohol, Panay, Negros, to Samar and Leyte,

were either under the control of, or had adhered to, the Revolution after

August.

Another lengthy and interesting paper was prepared by Cmdr. R.B.

Bradford, USN, who was also interviewed by the American panel on 14

October. He had extensive knowledge, for the time, of Philippine harbors and

anchorages, coal deposits, the different islands, and the strategy implications

of occupation of islands or island groups in the archipelago. He also had

strong ideas on American naval strategic goals and their application to Chinaand the Pacific islands. The crucial issue in the oral examination of Bradford

related to whether the United States might take one or more of the islands,

as against taking or leaving the archipelago altogether. We cite the following

excerpts:



30/72


Q. From your point of view as a naval expert, what is the

objection to the division you have indicated there, taking in Luzon,

Mindoro, Palawan, and the islands between Mindoro and Palawan?

- A. I think it a fairly good division, if a division must be made. Thisdivision is much more valuable than Luzon alone. I do not advocate

taking a part, however.

Q. What is your objection to taking that part? - A. The

difficulties of defense, which I have already alluded to, and the fact

that a whole loaf is better than half a loaf....

Q. You answer that it would take less to defend the coasts of the

United States, plus the Philippine Islands? - A. Yes, sir; and I

would like to give my reasons. For the purpose of illustration, let us

suppose that war is declared and that the theater is in the

neighborhood of the China Sea. Suppose we have on the Pacificcoast 100 ships and no naval supply stations between that coast

and China. Now, the point I make is, that we would be better off

and more powerful with a chain of naval-supply stations stretching

from the Pacific coast to China and 50 ships, or one-half the force

under the conditions first mentioned. Few realize the great changes

that have taken place since the days of sails and muzzle-loading

guns. With the rapid-firing guns of today the entire supply of

ammunition may be expended in a few hours. Ships are helpless

without coal. We must be able to follow the enemy with our ships

the world over, as Nelson did.

Bradford was expressing an 1898 version of United States military

strategic thinking during the 1980s: the concept of projection of force vis-a-

vis Soviet Russia in the Far East, which assigned a key role to the American

military bases in the Philippines.

Another notable statement before the American panel was that of Brig.

Gen. Charles A. Whittier, USV, summoned from Manila. He was also

questioned in person. Whittier had good things to say about the military

ability of the Revolution's leadership. After Aguinaldo's return from

Hongkong, Whittier said:

From that time the military operations and the conduct of the

insurgents have been most creditable Positions taken and the

movements of troops show great ability on the part of some leader



31/72


I do not say it was necessarily Aguinaldo, but he gave the

directions.

Whittier was asked whether the Revolution had been of materialassistance to the American operations. His answer was brief: Very great.

He elaborated that if the peace protocol of 12 August had not been in effect,

and if the Spaniards and the Filipinos had had to fight each other, the former

would have made a good contest of it because they would be fighting from a

strong position, the walled city. But, Whittier went on, every place had

been taken from them by the Filipinos, who managed their advances and

occupation of the country in an able manner.

On the issue of treatment of prisoners, Whittier's statement was by no

means a minority opinion, and it went against the many allegations of the

Spaniards against the Filipinos:

Their conduct to their Spanish prisoners has been deserving of

the praise of all the world. With ... every justification to a savage

mind for the most brutal revenge, I have heard no instance of

torture, murder, or brutality since we have been in the country.

Whittier's primary testimony related to the options the United States

might take. He was for a take all or nothing decision:

And now comes the vital question, What is to be done with these

islands, and, if we hold them, what form of government is to

prevail? Whatever grave doubts one may have as to colonial

extension on the part of America, we have gone too far, either by

design or chance, to recede. It cannot be denied that we owe it as a

duty to the natives and to humanity that the islands should not be

restored to Spain (even if they were they could not be held for a

year). Any division of them is absolutely impracticable. This would

induce constant friction, the ruin of Manila as the great commercial

center; the important products would be shipped direct from the

southern islands and goods sent directly there in exchange Oneowner must hold the whole country and prescribe uniform duties

and government.

This was somewhat similar to Greene's 27 August statement. Whittier



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then recounted a conversation with Aguinaldo on the 25th October. Whittier

had gone by train from Manila to Malolos for the prearranged interview. He

first met Buencamino (Whittier has "Buen Camino"), who was a wise-looking

counselor. He was taken to Aguinaldo. After Buencamino left them Whittier

told Aguinaldo that he was leaving in a few days to appear before the

American panel in Paris. He avowed that he had friendly feelings for the

Filipinos and admiration for many of their good qualities and that he

wished to present their views and demands properly, especially what

relation they expected to hold the United States to in case we decided to keep

the islands.

Aguinaldo replied, rather naively, that his people were divided

into two parties those in favor of absolute independence and thoseof an American protectorate; that the parties are about equal; that

he is waiting to see who will have the majority ... [and at that time]

to take his position. I pointed out to him that it would probably be

useless to try to bring those in favor of absolute independence to

any change of opinion, but they must consider that they are without

any navy and without capital, which is greatly needed for the

development of the country; that the Philippine government alone

did not possess the element of strength to insure the retention of

the islands without the assistance of other governments. They

would be at the mercy of any of half a dozen powers striving to take

either a part or the whole of the islands, and they must considerthat their greatest prosperity would come by the gradual accession

of power under American auspices.

Aguinaldo countered that the civilized nations would ensure that the

Filipinos would not lose their territory, and Whittier noted that the civilized

nations were controlling and holding Chinese territory. On the role of the

United States as protector:

[Aguinaldo] said: To furnish the navy, while the Filipinos held

all the country and administered civil offices with its own people.And what then would America get from this, said I. That would

be a detail," he said, "which would be settled hereafter.

I asked how far they controlled Luzon and other islands.

Almost entirely he said. That the different bands, little by little,



33/72


were expressing their desire to join him. The Igorrotos [sic] had sent

in some of their leaders the day before and were acting with him.

That he had three representatives from Iloilo within a few days on

the same mission.

After a while Buencamino rejoined them. Buencamino was twenty years

Aguinaldo's senior and had been a key adviser of the latter since June, which

explains Buencamino's assured tone in the following:

Buen Camino said I could be certain that if a protectorate were

granted that they would do their best to have it accepted by their

people on the same lines that I have stated, agreeing with me fully

that to hold one island and giving the others to other powers would

be most unfortunate, and not to be considered.

Whittier recorded that he had notes made of the interview immediately

afterwards, and he concluded with the following impression: a great desire

for our protection, for the improvement of their people materially and

intellectually, the wish to send their young people to America for education.

8

The American panel also received various statements on the resources and

commercial potential of the archipelago, as well as others on comparative

colonial administration. By the last week of October the chairman of thepanel, the former Secretary of State, had doubts over the wisdom of taking

the archipelago, but would accept occupying Luzon for commercial and naval

station purposes. Another member, Senator George Gray, flatly opposed

taking any part of the islands. The three other members were for taking the

whole loaf, the entire archipelago.

On 25 October the chairman informed McKinley by cable about the

divided opinion of the panel. The American peace commission was made up of

former Secretary of State W.R. Day as chairman and members Senator Gray,

C.K. Davis, W.P. Frye, and Whitelaw Reid. They were appointed in the

second week of September. McKinley's instructions to the panel said:

Without any original thought of complete and even partial acquisition, the

presence and success of our arms at Manila impose upon us obligations which



34/72


we cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human action.

McKinley then instructed the panel to negotiate for the cession of Luzon and

for commercial privileges in the other islands.

McKinley was certainly not honest with his own commissioners and did

not respect the peace treaty conference. He had already ordered, the previous

19 May, the occupation of the archipelago and the establishment of a new

political regime in the islands while in the possession of the United States.

But he could not order military operations against the Filipinos. This was

because he was going to demand cession in the Paris conference, and this

would call for a treaty, which would need Senate concurrence, and things

could be awkward if the United States were fighting a war with the Filipinos

for their archipelago and buying the same archipelago from Spain all at thesame time!

Anyway, McKinley cabled to Paris on 26 October in answer to Day's

request for instructions. He directed the panel to ask for outright cession of

the archipelago, believing, he said, that this course will entail less trouble

than any other, and besides will best sub-serve the interests of the people

involved, for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility. The American

panel thus demanded the cession on the 31st October, and offered the

sweetened terms on 21 November.

With the Spanish acceptance of the demand for cession, signing of a treaty

became only a matter of time. Dewey and Otis (the new American military

commander in Manila) were ordered on 4 December to inform McKinley on

the forces needed in the Philippines. Now McKinley could repeat his 19 May

orders.

On 21 December he issued a proclamation that Dewey's victory and the

reduction of Manila (again!) had practically effected the conquest of the

Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. Thiswas both incorrect and tricky. The peace protocol of 12 August had fixed the

occupation by the United States as covering only the city, bay, and harbor of

Manila. In December the rest of Luzon and the principal islands of the

Visayas were under Filipino occupation and administration. McKinley's



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statement that the sovereignty of Spain had only been suspended was

simply a legal fiction. This was because Spain's sovereignty had been

irrevocably extinguished by the surrender, in writing, of the various Spanish

garrisons to the Revolution. Using McKinley's logic, Spain's sovereignty

would also have been suspended in those parts of the archipelago that had

been taken or reduced by the Filipinos. And why, or how, would a state

demand cession of territory by treaty with another state, and pay

$20,000,000 for that territory when the latter's sovereignty over it was

suspended and under control of a successful revolutionary government?

McKinley's inconsistencies were catching up with him and he fabricated

some hazy notion of Spanish sovereignty, even if only in a suspended state.

Did McKinley realize that chaos would reign in international relations if histheory of suspended sovereignty were part of the law of nations? He needed

the fiction because Spain could not be made to cede the Philippines unless it

was pretended that it had some sort of sovereignty over it. McKinley went

along with that kind of sovereignty. But he employed brute force against the

Filipinos' rights that were based on actual and physical possession and

control of their native land.

The 21 December proclamation continued by stating that as a result of the

cession, the:

actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the

Philippine Islands become immediately necessary, and the military

government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city,

harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible

dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory....

It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to

announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come,

not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends....

Finally it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the militaryadministration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the

inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible

way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the

heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of

the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the



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mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.

This 21 December proclamation is sometimes called the benevolent

assimilation proclamation. But its nice name did not mask McKinley'sdeadly decision: to extend the area occupied by the United States, until then

limited to the harbor, bay and city of Manila, over and into territory held by

the Filipinos. It may be said that McKinley had loaded the gun, primed the

charge, had a finger on the trigger, and waited only for the moment to fire.

He irrevocably declared war on the Filipinos with this proclamation.

There appear two more orders of McKinley that we must note. The

headquarters of the Spanish commanding general in the Visayas was Iloilo.

The general, Diego de los Rios, entered into a truce with the Revolution in

early December. On the 21st, General Otis was ordered to send troops to

Iloilo. Meanwhile the Spaniards evacuated Iloilo completely and then

delivered it to the Federal Council of the Visayas; this government recognized

subordination to the Revolutionary Government in Luzon. Otis' instructions

included the following: It is most important that there should be no conflict

with the insurgents.

The Iloilo situation was tense, and on 1 January 1899 Otis received the

following further instructions: The President considers it of first importance

that a conflict brought on by you be avoided at this time, if possible. The

peaceful tone of the two orders to Otis was deceiving. McKinley had to hold

his horses, he had to order Otis to avoid conflict because he had to nurse the

Paris treaty in the Senate.9

We have already seen how dismayed and appalled the Spanish panel was

when the Americans demanded cession of the Philippines. The United States

Senate published the complete protocols of the Paris peace negotiations in

1899. The American panel memorandum of 21 November reads: ... the

American commissioners are authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cessionshould be agreed to, the sum of twenty million dollars.... (Emphasis

supplied) The Spaniards consistently opposed cession since 28 October, and

agreed to it only because Spain was materially prostrate, and had to resign

herself to the harsh law of the victor.



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On this matter McKinley officially misrepresented the facts again, on 5

December 1899, this time to the American people themselves through their

elected representatives in the Congress:

In this manner the Philippines came to the United States. The

islands were ceded by the Government of Spain, which had been in

undisputed possession of them for centuries. They were accepted

not merely by our authorized commissioners in Paris, under the

direction of the Executive, but by the constitutional and well-

considered action of the representatives of the people of the United

States in both Houses of Congress.

This was an untruth, and McKinley certainly knew it. Spain did not offer

any cession, and the American treaty commissioners had not accepted any

cession; it was the other way around. But he had said it, and he compounded

the lie with another totally unfounded statement:

I had every reason to believe, and I still believe that this

transfer of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and

the aspirations of the great mass of the Filipino people.

McKinley told the Congress that in January 1899 he had decided to send a

commission to the Philippines (the Schurman Commission) on "a mission of

good will and liberation." But, he said, "the sinister ambition of a few leadersof the Filipinos had created a situation full of embarrassment for us and most

grievous in its consequences to themselves" before the commission got to

Manila. McKinley could not bring himself to say that his decision had

brought on war. Then he told still another enormous lie to the Congress. The

following was his version of how the war began we will tell the facts shortly:

The aggressions of the Filipinos continually increased until

finally, just before the time set by the Senate of the United states

for a vote upon the treaty, an attack, evidently prepared in advance,

was made all along the American lines, which resulted in a terriblydestructive and sanguinary repulse of the insurgents.

McKinley continued remorselessly:10

Everything indicates that with the speedy suppression of the



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Tagalo rebellion life in the archipelago will soon resume in its

ordinary course under the protection of our sovereignty, and the

people of those favored islands will enjoy a prosperity and a

freedom which they have never before known.The truest kindness to them will be a swift and effective defeat

of their present leader. The hour of victory will be the hour of

clemency and reconstruction.

McKinley had been a schoolteacher and a postal clerk in his youth. He had

also attended seminary in some small town in his native Ohio. This might

explain his pious imperialism, and particularly his famous tall tale about how

he had decided to buy the Philippines as a possession of the United States.

The fabulous tale came at the end of a call by a group of Protestant

clergymen in Washington in November 1899. It is not proper to pass on

another person's religious thinking, so that we will forego comment on his

story, except to mark how very easily something like it could have been said

by the Spanish friars who came to convert the Filipinos in the sixteenth

century. McKinley detained his callers as they prepared to leave, and said to

them:

Before you go I would like to say just a word about the

Philippine business. I have been criticized a good deal about the

Philippines, but don't deserve it. The truth is, I didn't want the

Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did

not know what to do with them. When the Spanish War broke out,

Dewey was at Hong Kong, and I ordered him to go to Manila, and

he had to; because, if defeated, he had no place to refit on that side

of the globe, and if the Dons were victorious they would likely cross

the Pacific and ravage our Oregon and California coasts. And so he

had to destroy the Spanish fleet, and did it! But that was as far as I

thought then. When next I realized that the Philippines had

dropped into our lap, I confess I did not know what to do with them.

I sought counsel from all sides - Democrats as well as Republicans -

but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; thenLuzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the

White House night after night until midnight; and I am not

ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and

prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night.

And one night late it came to me this way - I don't know how it



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was but it came: (1) That we could not give them back to Spain -

that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) That we could not

turn them over to France or Germany - our commercial rivals in the

Orient - that would be ba

The Republic and American Imperialism

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