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The Presocra tic Philosophers A CRITICAL HISTORY

WITH A SELECTION OF TEXTS

BY

G. S. KIRK REGIUS PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF GREEK

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

J. E. RAVEN FORMERLY FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

M. SCHOFIELD FELLOW OF ST iOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

Second Edition

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I'RE SQC RATI C PHILOSOPHER S

and reincarnationJ 284J takcn togethcr with 281- 3, suggests that Pythago ras taug ht an eschatology accord ing to wh ich: ( I ) the soul is subjec t a fter death to a div ine judgement ; (2) the re follows punishment in the und e rwo rld for the wicked (perhaps with hope o f eventua l rel ease : 410) , but (3) a better fate for the good, who - if they remain n·cc from wickcdncss in the next world and in a furthcr reinca rnation in this - may at las t reach the isles of th e b lessed (cf. Plato Corg. 523A- n).

CONCLUS I ON

285 Porph yrius Life if l) thagoras ' 9 (DK ' 4,80) &. ~'V OUV EAEyE Tois cruvoUcrlv, ou5, ETs EXEI <ppacral [3E[3aiws· Kai yap ou5' ,; Tuxoucra "V 1Tap' otlTois cnWlTrl . IJCxi\IO"TO I-IEVTOl yvwptlJa lTopa rrCxO"lv EyevETo lTPWTOV ~'V WS aeavaTov ETvai <pT)<JI TT]V ",UXT]V, EiTa ~ETa[3aAAoucrav EiS ai\i\a yevTl 3~wv, lTpOS oE TOlITOlS OTI KOTO: lTEpl600vS Tlvas Ta YEv61-1EVCx lT07E lTo:i\IV y ivETOI, VEOV 0' ouoEv CxlTi\ws E071 Kai enl rraVTa TO Ylv6~Eva 1~",uxa 6~OyEvii 5,i vo~i3EIV. <paivETai yop Els TT]V 'EAAa5a TO 56y~aTa 1TPWTOS Ko~icral TauTa nueayopas.

285 What he said to his associates J nobody can say for certain; for silence with them was of no ·ordinary kind . Nonethel ess the following became uni versall y known : first, that he main tains lhal the soul is immortal ; nex t, th at it changes into other kinds ofliving th ings; also that events recu r in certain cycles, and that no thing is ever absolutel y new; and finall y, th a t a ll living things shou ld be regarded as akin . Pythagoras seems to have been the firs t to bring these bel iefs into Greece .

28S (probably from Dicaea rchus) sums up a picture of Pythagoras ' teaching wh ich our stud y of the sourccs has confi rm ed, a lth oug h it leaves out one or two points on wh ich we have laid some stress (notably ideas about number a nd harmonia ), a nd ineludes som e not so lar mentioned, such as Pythagorean sil ence (c r. Aristotle f ... ' 92 , DK 14., 7; Diog. L. VIII , 15 ) and belief in cyelical recurrence (c r. Eudemus 0/). Simp!. in Plrys. 732, 30, DK58 B3'1) . Like the other sources it vouchsafes no hint of any reason Pythagoras may have offered for an y of his doctrin es. L ike them it gives little ground for recognizing anything determinately phi loso phical or scicntific in the content of his thought. Pythagoras, we m ust concl ude, was a p hil osopher only to the cx tent that he was a sage (cr. p. 213 above) . His con tri bution to Greek though t more broadly consid ered, however, was origina l, sedu ctive and durab le .

238

C HAPTER V III

Parmenides of Elea

DATE AND LIFE

286 Plato Pormenides 127A (DK 29A I I ) E<pT) 5, 0'; 0 'AvTI<pwv AEyEIV TOV llu6oowpov OTI a<pIKolvTO 1TOTE Eis llavae,;vata TO ~EyaAa Zi]vwv TE Kal llap~Evi5T) S. TOV ~EV ouv llap~Evi5T)v Ei'i ~aAa 0'; 1Tpecr­[3UTT)V dVOI, cr<po5pa lTOA IOV, KaMv 0' KayaeOV T';V O""V, TIEpi tTT) I-IO:ALOIO TIEV7E Koi E~riKoVTO · Zrlvwva oE EYYVS E7WV TETTapaKovTa T6TE elVOI, EUlJtlKll oE Kai XOpiEVTO tCEtV· Koi i\eyecr601 OUTOV rrololKO: 70V n OPIlEvioov YEyovEval. KaTai\vElv oE aUTovs E<Pll n opa Tt;) nu608wp~ EKTOS TEixovs EV KEpOIJEIK0· oT or, Kai aqllKEaeal TOV 7E LWKpaTll Kai ai\i\ovs Tlvas I-IET' aUTov rroi\i\ovs, errl6vIJoVVTas aKOVO"OI TWV TOU Zrivwvos ypollllaTwv - T6TE YO:p atlTa npwTov UTI' EKEivwv KO~lcreiivOi - 2:wKpaTT) 0' ETvOi TOTE cr<po5pa vEov.

287 D iogenes Laertius IX, 21 - 3 (DK 2BA I ) 2Evo<pavous 5, 5,­i]KoVcrE llap~Evi5T)S llupT)ToS 'EAEaTT)S (TOUTOV' 8EO<ppacrTos EV T~ ' ElTlTo~~ 'Ava~l~av5pou <pT)criv aKOucrOl ) . o~WS 0' ouv aKovcras wi zevocp6:vovS OUK r,KOAOVellO"Ev OUTc;,. EKOIvwvllcrE oE Kai . AIJElvi<;x tlloxaiTa T0 llueayoplK0, ws E<pT) 2:wTiwv, av5pi lTEVT)TI ~Ev, KaA0 5, wi aya60. 0 Kai ~aAAov ';KOAOUeT)crE wi alTOeaVOVTos ,;p00v iOpVcrOTo YEVOVS TE urr6:pxwv i\OIJTIpOV Kai rrAovTou. Koi urr' 'A~EIVlou, aAA' OUX UlTO 2Evo<pavous Els ,;cruxlav lTpOETpa1TT) ... iiK~a3E 5, KaTo TtlV ;VaTT)V Kai E~T)KOcrT';V oAu~1TIa5a ... AEYETOI 5, Koi v61-10vs 6Eivol TOtS rroi\haIS, WS <PllO"\ L nEvcrlrrrros EV T4J n Epi 'l'IAocrO<pwv.

286 According to Antiphon 's accou nt, Py thodorus said that Parrnenid es a nd Zeno once came to Athens ror the Great Pan ­athcnaca . Parmenides was well advanced in years - aboul six ty­five - and very g rcy, but a fine- looking man. Zeno was then nearl y forl y, a nd ta ll a nd handsome; he was said to have been Parmen id es' favo u r ite. T hey were staying at Py thodorus' house outside th e city-wall in the Cerami cus. Thithcr we nt Socratcs, and scveral others with him, in the hope of hea ring Zeno's treatise; for this was th e first time Parmcnid es a nd Zeno had broug ht it to A thens. Socrates was still very young at the time.

239

PR ESOC R AT I C P HI LOSOP H E R S

287 Parmenides ofElea, son of Pyres, was a pupil of Xenophanes (and he, according to Theophrastus in his Ej}ilollle, of Anaxi­mander). But though a pupil of Xenophanes, he did not follow him . He associa ted a lso, as Sotion recorded , with the Pyth agorea n Amcinias, son of Diochaitas, a poor but noble man, whom he preferred to follow. When Ameinias died Pa rmenides, who came of a distinguished famil y and was ri ch, built a shrine to him . It was by Ameini as ra th er th an Xenophanes th a t he was converted to the contempla tive life ... He fl ourished in the sixty-ninth O lympiad [sc. 500 B.C .] .. . H e is said a lso to have legisla ted for the citizens of Elea, as Speusippus records in his wo rk Oil lhe Philosoj}h"s.

1 T heophras tus' claim must have relatcd to Xcnophancs, but Diogcncs writ cs as though Parmcnidcs is in qucs tion.

Wh cth er or not Parmenidcs and Zeno ever visitcd Athens and met th ere the young Socrates, Plato need not have been so precise about th eir respective ages. T he fact that he gives th ese details strongly suggests that he is writing with chronologica l accuracy. Socrates was just over scventy when he \·vas putto death in 399 D.C., which means that he was born in 470/469. If we assume that the words " q>65pa VEOV, Ivery young ', mean that he was about 20, then the meeting might have taken place in 450 B.C. Th is places Pa rmenides' bir th in about 5 15 D.C. and Zeno's in abo ut 1.90 D.C. It is of course true th a t the da te given by Diogenes, whi ch he probably deri ved from Apollodorus, does not nea rly squ a re with this; but, as Burnet poin ts out (EGP, 170), ' the date given by Apollodorus depends solely on th a t of the foundation of Elea (540 u. c.), which he had ad op ted as th eflorI/ il of Xenophanes . Parmenides is born in th a t year, just as Zeno is born in the year Parmenides <I nourished".' U nsa tisfactory as a late Platonic di a logue may be as evidence for chronology, it ca n ha rdly be doubted that it is more rel iable than this.

T he other items of inform ation in 287 proba bly deri ve from ea rly traditions, which may wel l be true, particularly Sotion's c ircum­stantia l ta le. If it was a Pyth agorean who converted l'a rmenid es to philosoph y, there is littl e sign that any p reoccupa tion with Pyth ago­rean ideas continued into his mature thought, except perhaps in his descrip tion of bir th as something' ha teful ' (306) and in th e teachi ng about the fa te of th e soul which Simplici us b ri efl y and a llusively records in conn ex ion with fr. 13 (ill Pigs. 39, 10). T he notio n that he was ta ught by Xenophanes was taken over by T heo phrastus fro m Aristotle, who may in turn have deri ved it from a remark , perh aps

PARM EN I DES

no t entirely serious, in Plato's SO/Jltis', (see 163, with the discussion on Pl'. I 65ff. ). Certa inl y there a rc echoes, not merely verbal, of Xenopha nes' theology (170 a nd 171 ) a nd epistemology (186- g) in Pa rm enides. And Pa rm enid es' d ecision to write his philosoph y in hexameter verse may well have been prompted partl y by the example of Xenophancs, who spent the laller part of his long career in Sicil y and Sou th Italy.

PAR MEN ID ES' H E X Alo.I E T E R P OEM

Pa rmenides is cred itcd with a single 'trea tise' (Diog. L. 1, 16, DK28A 13). Substantia l fragments of this work , a hexameter poem, surv ive, th anks la rgely to Sex tus Empiricus (who preserved th e proem) and Sim plicius (who tra nscribed further ex tracts into his commentaries on Aristotle's de caelo and Physics' because of the scarceness of th e treatise' ). Ancients and mode rns alike are agreed upon a low estimat ion of Parmenides' gifts as a wri ter. He has li tt le facili ty ·in d iction, and the struggle to force novel, difficul t a nd high ly abstract phi losop hi cal ideas in to metrical fo rm freq uently resul ts in inerad icable obscurity, especia ll y syn tactic obscurity. O n th e other hand, in th e less argumenta tive passages of the poem he achieves a kind of cl umsy grandeur.

Aftcr the proem, the poem fa lls in to two parts. T he firs t ex pounds ' th e tremorl ess hea rt of well-rounded Truth ' (288, ·29). Its argumen t is radica l and powerful. Parm enides claims that in any enquiry there arc two and onl y two logica lly coherent poss ibiliti es, which a rc excl usive - tha t th e subj ect of th e enqui ry ex ists or tha t it does not exist. O n epistemologica l grounds he rules out the second altern a tive as un in telligi ble. He then turns to abuse of ordina ry mor tals for showing by their beliefs tha t they never make the choice between the two \\fays ' is' and' is not ', but follow both wi thout discrimination. In the fi na l secti on of this first pa rt he ex plores th e one secure pa th, ' is ' , and proves in a n astonishing d ed uctive IOllr deforce that if someth ing ex ists, it cannot comc to be or perish, change or move, nor be subject to any im perfection. Parmenides' arguments and his paradoxical concl usions had a n enormous inOu ence on later Greek philosophy; his method and his im pact a like have rightl y been compa red to those of D escartes' cogito.

Parm cnides' metaph ysics and epistemology leave no room fo r cosmologies such as his Ionian predecessors had constructed nor indeed for any bel ief at all in the worl d our senses discl ose to us. None th eless in th e second (a nd much marc scantily preserved) part

PRE SOC RATI C PHIL OSOPHERS

ofthc pocm hc gives an account of' the opinions 0: mort a ls., in whi ch Lh ere is no Lrue convic tion t . 'T'he status and mo tive of this accounL

are obscure.

THE PROEM

2BB Fr. I (SexLus adv. //Ialh . VII, 3 (lin es 1- 30); Simplicills de caelo

557 , 25fT. (lines 28- 32)) ilnrol Tat IlE q>Epoucnv oaov T' hri SUIlOS iKexVOl IT'IllTOV, Emf Il' ES o50v !3;;aav lTOAVql1WOV ayouaal oafllovos, ii KaTa mIVT' aaTTi I q>'PEI ElooTa q>(;na' Tij q>EPOIlTiV ' Tij yelp IlE lTOAVq>paaToI q>'pov IlTlTOI aplla TlTaivouaal, KOVpal 0' 600v IiYEIlOVEUOV. a~wv 0' EV xvoilJalV lEI avplyyos elUTT]V

'0

'0

'5

30

aleollEvoS (OOlOlS yap ElTElyETO OIVWTOIOW KVKAOIS allq>oTEpWeEV), CTE alTEPxoiaTO lTElllTEIV ' HAlelOES KOVPal , lTpOAIlTOVaal OWllaTa NUKT6s Eis q>elOS, WaelllEVaI Kpc'xTWV WO XEpal KaAV1fTpas.

EvBa lTVAaI Nun6s TE Kal "HllaTOS Elal KEAEVeWV, Kal aq>as UlTEpBUpov allq>is EXE I Kal AC((VOS ou06s· aUTal 0' aieEplal lTA;;VTaI IlEYelAOlal BupiTpOlS' TWV 0' lIiKTI lTOAVlTOIVOS EXEI KATIIOas aIl01!30VS. T1)V 01) lTapq>elllEVaI KOVpal llaAaKOIal AOYOlalv mlaav ElTIq>paOEWS, WS aq>lv !3aAaVWTOV 6x;;a a1fTEpEWS ",am lTUAEWV WO' Tai O. eupiTpwv Xelall' axav,S lToiTlaav aVa1fTelllEVaI lTOAUXelAKOUS a~ovas Iv avply~lv a llol!3a50v EIAf~aaal YOIlq>OIS Kal mpovlJalV apTiPOTE' Tij pa 01' aUTEWV leus EXOV KOVpal KaT' alla~ITOV aplla Kai IlTlTOUS.

Kal IlE eEa lTpoq>pwv umOE~aTo, XElpa 0, XElpl OE~ITEP1)V EAEV, WOE 0' ElTOS q>elTO Kai IlE lTpoaTlvoa' W KOUp' a6avCrrolai auvexopos livloxolalv, hrlTolS Tat aE <pEpoualV iKexvwv lillETEpOV OW, xaip', ElTEl OUTI oe lJoipa KaKT) TTPOU1TEIJTTE VEEa6a1 TTivO' o50v (i'i yap alT' aVepWlTWV EKTOS lTc'xTou EaTlv), aAAa BEllIS TE oiKTI TE . XPEW OE aE lTelVTa lTUBEaBaI TiIlEV 'AATleEITIS EUKUKAEOS' c'xTPEIlES i'iTop Tio, !3POTWV 5O~as, TaiS OUK 1vI lTfaTIS aATIeTiS. aAA' ElllTTlS Kal TaVTa llaeTiaEaI, WS Ta OOKOVVTa Xp;;v OOKIIlWS Elval ola lTaVTOS lTaVTa lTEpWVTa.'

I For the cOlueclUral reading aO'TT) see A. 1-1 . Coxon, CQ N.S. 13 ( 1963), 69; 1\ . P. O. M ourclalos, The Rou te oj I'Mllwlides (New Haven, Conn., 1970),22 Il.

3 1.

PARMEN JD ES

:l EVKVKMos Simplicius, derended by Diels, PnrmenidtS uhrgedichl (Berlin , 1397L 54- 7; EVTTEl6tos Sext us (ieclio fnti/jor) has some contemporary advocates, e.g. M ourcJalos, Roult, ' 54-7. 3 TrEpWVTa Simp!. A ; TrfP oVTa DEF.

288 The mares Lh aL ca rry me as far as my hea rL ever aspires sped me on , wh en Lh ey had broughL a nd seL me on Lhe far-famed road ofLhe god, which bears the man who kno ws over all cities. On that road was J born e, for thaL viray the wise horses bore me, straining a t the cha riot, and maidens led the way. And the axle in the naves gave oULLh e whisLle of a pipe, blazing, for iL was pressed hard on either side by the Lwo well-Lurned wheels as the da ughters of the Sun made hasLe to escort me, having lefL the halls ofNighL for the light, and having Lhrust the vei ls from Lheir heads wiLh their hands.

T here are Lh e ga tes ofLhe paths of Niglll and Day , and a linLeI and a sLo ne Lhreshold enclose them. They Lh emselves, high in the ai r, a re blocked with great d oors, and avenging Justice holds Lhe alLern a te bolts. Her the maidens beguiled with genLle words and cunningly persuaded to push back swifLly from Lhe gaLes Lhe boILed ba r. And the gaLes crea ted a yawn ing ga p in the door frame when they fl ew open, swinging in turn in their sockets the bronze-bound pi vots made fast wiLh dowels and ri ve ts. StraighL through them, on the broad way, did th e maidens keep Lh e horses and the chariol.

And Lhe godd ess greeLed me kindl y, a nd Look my righL hand in hers, and add ressed me wiLh th ese words : 'Young man , yo u who come to my house in the co mpany of immon al charioLeers with Lhe mares which bear you, greetings . No ill fate has se nt you Lo LravelLhis road - far indeed does it li e from Lhe sLeps of men - bUL righL andjusLice . IL is proper Lh a L you should learn a ll things, bOLh Lh e unshaken hea rL of well-rounded truth, a nd Lhe opinions of inortals, in which th ere is no true rel iance. But nonetheless you shall lea rn Lhese Lhings Loo, how whaL is believed would have LO be assuredly, pervad ing a ll Lhings throughout.'

Pa rmenides' chief purpose in Lh ese lines is Lo la y cla im to knowledge of a truth noL a tta ined by the ordina ry run of mortals. The claim is dramaLica lly ex pressed by mea ns of motifs d eriving largely from Hom er and Hesiod , in matching diction and metre. I t is sometimes suggesLed Lh a t Parmenid es' j ourn ey Lo Lh e goddess recalls Lhe magical jou rneys of shamans. BuL as was observed above (p. 229) th e evidence for a shamanistic tradition in earl y Greece is doubtful. SCXLUS, followed by many modern schol a rs, took Lhe journey to be an allegory of en lightenlTI enL, a translaLion from Lhe ignora nce of Night lO Lhe knowledge of Light. Bu L Parmeni des a lread y begins hi s

243

j. I

PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS

journey in a blaze of light, as befits one who' knows'. The point of the narration is suggested rather by the obstacle that has to be passed and by the destination, the two things (apart from description of the chariot and its movement) upon which the poet dwells. Parmenides seeks to leave the familiar world of ordinary experience where night and day alternate, an alternation governed - as Anaximander would have agreed (110) - by law or 'justice'. He makes instead for a path of thought (' a highway') which leads to a transcendent com­prehension both of changeless truth and of mortal opinion. No less important is his message about the obstacle to achievement of this goal: the barrier to escape from mortal opinion is formidable, but it yields to 'gentle argument'.

The motifs of the gates of Day and Night and of divine revelation, modelled on materials in Hesiod's Theogony, are well chosen to convey both the immense gulf which in Parmenides' view separates rational enquiry from common human understanding and the unexpected~ess of what his own reason has disclosed to him (cf. for both these pOInts Heraclitus, e.g. 205, 206, 210). And religious revelation suggests both the high seriousness of philosophy and an appeal to authority - ~ot, however, an authority beyond dispute: 'Judge by reason my stnfe­encompassed refutation' says the goddess later. (294)·

289 Fr. 5, Proclus in Parm. I, p. 708, 16 Cousin ... ~uv6v Se Iloi eOLlv

c)1T'Tr06ev ap~oolla1' T661 yap lraA1V i~olla1 aV61S·

289 It is a common point from which I start; for there again and again I shall return.

289 fits neatly after 288 and immediately before 291, at any rate if its point is that all the proofs of 296-9 take the choice specified in 291 as their common foundation (cf. also 294)·1

1 With 289 may be compared 290 Heraclitus fro 103, Porphyrius in Iliadem XIV,

200 ~ov apx,; Kal1Tepas hr} KVKAOV. (In a circle beginning and end are common.) But despite his talk of 'well-rounded truth' Parmenides need not be implying here that his own thought is circular.

TRUTH

(i) The choice 291 Fr. 2, Proclus in Tim. I, 345, 18; Simplicius inPhys. 116,28 (lines 3-8)

,-~, -

PARMENIDES

e[ S' C'xy' sywv speoo, K61l10'al 6e O'U Ilv60v CxKovO'as, ailrEp 6S01llovval 613';0'16s EtO'l voiiO'al' ,; IlEV OlrOOS eOLlV TE Kat WS OUK EOL1 Ilfl eTval, lre160vs EaT1 KEAEU60S C AA1l6e(1J yap 6lrllSeT) ,

5 ..; S' WS OUK SOL1V Te Kat WS xpewv eOL1 Ilfl eTva1, Trw S,; TOI CPP6:3W lravalrEu6ea Ellllev cnaplr6v' oClTe yap av YVOlllS T6 ye Ilfl e6v (ou yap avuO'T6v) OUTE cppoO'alS.

291 Come now, and I will tell you (and you must carry my account away with you when you have heard it) the only ways of enquiry that are to be thought of. The one, that [it] is and that it is impossible for [it] not to be, is the path of Persuasion (for she attends upon Truth); the other, that [it] is not and that it is needful that [it] not be, that I declare to you is an altogether indiscernible track: for you could not know what is not - that cannot be done - nor indicate it.

The goddess begins by specifying the only ways of enquiry which should be contemplated. They are plainly assumed to be logically exclusive: if you take the one, you thereby fail to take the other. No less plainly they are exclusive because they are contradictories (cf. 296, 16: 'the decision on these things lies in this: it is or it is not').1 What is the' [it] , which our translation has supplied as grammatical subject to Parmenides' verb estin? Presumably, any subject of enquiry whatever - in any enquiry you must assume either that your subject is or that it is not. Interpretation of est in itself, here rendered awkwardly but neutrally as 'is', is more difficult. The two obvious paraphrases are the existential (' exists ') and the predicative (' is [something or other],). To try to decide between them we need to consider the arguments in which estin most prominently figures, particularly the argument against the negative way of enquiry in lines 5 to 8 of 291.

Unfortunately consideration of this argument is not decisive. Certainly it appears impossible to know or point out what does not exist: nobody can be acquainted with Mr Pickwick or point him out to anyone else. But a predicative reading of Parmenides' premiss is also plausible: it seems impossible to know or point out what is not something or other, i.e. what possesses no attributes and has no predicates true of it. Clearer is 296, 5-2 I, where an analogous premiss - 'it is not to be said nor thought that it is not', lines 8-9 - is used to argue against the possibility of coming to be or perishing. The point Parmenides makes is that ifsomething comes to be, then it must

245

PR ES O C R A TI C PHIL OSO PH E R S

prev iously not have been - a nd at th a t tim e it wo uld ha ve been tru e to say or it ' it is not '; bu t the premiss fo rbids say ingj ust th a t ; so there ean be no coming in LO being. Now ' come to be' in this contex t is plainl y to be construed as 'come to ex ist'. Here, th en, < is not ' mea ns 'does not ex ist ' .

At 296, 10} however} Pa rm enid cs goes on immedi a tely to refer to wha t docs not exist (hypothetica ll y, o r course) as' th e nothing' (cr. 293 , 2). T his suggests that he und erstands non-existence as being nothing at all, i.e. as having no a ttributes; a nd so th a t fo r him, to exist is in eOcc t 10 be something or olher. Wh en la ter (e.g. 297 , 22- 5; 299 , 46- 8) he uses the part icipl e eOIl, ' being'} it is mu ch eas ier to construe it as' rea lity' or ' the real} th a n as ba rel y d esigna ting ex istence. And wha t ma kes someth ing real is surel y th a t it has some predicate tru e or it (e.g. 'occupics space' ) . I r this li ne or in terpreta ti on is correct, Pa rm eni dcs' usc of eslin is simul taneo usly ex istenti a l a nd p red ica ti ve (as KR held ), but not th ererore (as KR concl ud ed ) conrused .

From the unknowa bleness of wha t docs not ex ist Pa rmeni cies concl udes di rec tl y th a t the negative way is ' indiscernible', i.e. th a t no clea r thought is ex pressed by a nega ti ve ex istentia l sta tement. VVe might put th e point thus : 'Take a ny subj ect or enquiry yo u like (e.g. Mr Pickwick) . T hen the proposition <l Mr Pickwick docs not exist " fa ils to ex press a genuine thought a t a ll. For if it were a ge nuine th ought, it would have to be possible to be acqu a in ted with its subj ect, Mr Pickwick. But th a t poss ibility docs not obtain unl ess Mr Pickwi ck exists - which is exactl y wha t the proposition d eni es.} This line or a rg um en t, in one guise or anoth er, has exercised a powerrul a ltraCljon on man y philosophers, from Pla to to Russell. Its concl usion is paradox ical , but like all good paradoxes il rorces us to exa min e more deeply our grasp or th e concep ts it employs - notably in this case th e relat ions between mea ning, reference a nd ex istence .2

I A d ifficult y: Parmcnides fu rther spcciflcs the fi rst way as ' it is im poss ible for [i t] llotlO be' and the second as 'it is needful that [it ] not be', which a re not contradic to ri es. A solut ion: pe rhaps these fu rt her specificat ions const itute not cha racterizations of the two ways, but indica tions of their incompatibilit y. Line 3 will be saying: the !irst way is ' [i t] is'; a nd it follows necessa ril y th a t, if someth ing is. it is not the case that it is not. So IIIIt /atis rlllltmuliJ for line 5. 2 Ed itors oft en complete the ha lf-line 291 , B, with a fragment known onl y in qu i te different sources: 292 Fr. 3. Clement Strom. VI, 23; Plotinus v, 1,8 TO yap a\rrO voei v EOTI V TE Kal elVa!. ( For Ilu same thing is there bolh 10 be thought of and 10

be.) If thus transla ted (but some render : ' Thought and be ing arc the same'). it docs sound as though it ma y fi t here; 293, [ shows tha t Pa rmenidcs ex plicitly dep loys considera tions about wha t ca n be thought, no t j ust w hat can be known, in the conlext ofargumellt against the negative way. But ifso it is surprising tha t neither Prod us nor Simplicius quotes it a t the end Of 291. And it is hard to sec

246

PARM EN ID ES

wha t cOlltribuliOl1 il adds to the reasoning Of 291 , 6--8. (I frlOeill lllea nt ' know ' here, as e.g. C. I-I. Kahn (Rcview of M eta/lliys;,s 22 ( [968- 9). 700-211.) thin ks, the ll perhaps 292 wou ld sim ply be another way of putling 291 , 7- 8. But "vein is lIsed by Parmenicles in para ll el with simple ve rbs of saying (293, I; 296, 8; cf. anomwwl/, 296,17), and so must be transla ted ' think '. )

(i i) M or{al error

293 Fr. 6, Simplicius ill Ph)'S. 86, 27- 8; 11 7,4- 13 XPr, TO i\eyelv TE voeiv T' EOV E~~lEVOI ' EO'TI y a p d Va!, ~'lOEV 0' OVK EaTIV· Ta a ' Eyw q>pa3E06at Cxvwya. TTPWT'lS yap a' a q> ' 0000 TatlT'lS 013Ilalos ( Eipyw) , a VTop ETTE IT' OTTO Tiis, ~ v 0'; i3poToi EI86TEs OVOEV

5 TTi\CxTTOVTat , 5iKpa vor 6:~llxavill yap EV a tlTWV O'T~8Ecr I V teVVEI lTi\OKTOV VOOV ' a loe <pOPOOVTOI Kw<poi 6~ws Tv<pi\oi TE, TEelllTOTES, O:KptTa <pOi\a, oTs TO TT€i\e lv TE Ka i aUK eTva! Ta UTOV veVO~IO'Ta\ KOU TaUTOV, n a VTWV oi: TTai\ lvTpolTOS EO'TI K€i\ev8os.

293 What is there to be sa id and th ought must needs be: ro r it is th ere ror being, bu t nothing is no t. I bid you pond er th a t , ror this is the first way or enquiry rrom whi ch I hold yo u back, but th en fro m th a t on which mortals wand er knowing nothing, two- headed ; for helplessness guides the wandering th ought in their breasts, a nd they a re carri ed a long, dear a nd blind a t once, dazed , undi scrimin a ting hord es, who beli eve th a t to be a nd not to be a re th e same a nd no t th e sa me; a nd th e pa th ta ken by them a ll is backwa rd- turning.

Pa rm enid es' summ a ry orhis case against th e negative way (lin es 1- 3), which says in elTect that a ny obj ect or th ought must be a rea l object, co nfirms despite its obscuri ty that h is rej ection of ' is not ' is moti va ted by a co ncern a bo ut wha t is a possibl e con tent for a genuine th ought. It is followed by a warning aga inst a second mista ken way, identified as the way or enqui ry pursued by morta ls. No mention or this third wa y was mad e in 291 } a nd th e reason is not fa r to seek. T he godd ess was th ere speeirying logically coherent a ltern a tives betwee n which ra ti ona l enquirers must d ecide. The third way is simpl y th e pa th you will find yoursclrrollowing ir, like the generality or morta ls, you do not ta ke th a t d ecision (293 , 7) through ra ilure to

usc your criti cal powers (293,6- 7). You will find yoursclr sa ying o r impl ying both th a t a thing is a nd that it is not (e.g. by acknowled ging cha nge a nd coming into ex istence) ; a nd so you will wander helpl essly from one of the ways disting uished in 291 to th e o th er. Hence yo ur

I'RESOCR ATI C PI-IIL OSO PHER S

steps will be 'backward-turning', i.e. contradictory. Of course, you will recognize lhat ' is' and ' is not' arc flot the same. Bu t in fa iling to dec id e between them you will t rea t th em as thoug h they were the same.

293 was probably follo wed, after an interval, b y a fragment in which the goddess bids Pa rmenid es to make up his mind (unlike the mo rta ls dismissed in 293 ) about her refuta tion of th e second way:

294 Fr. 7, Plato So/,hisI242A (lines 1- 2) ; Sextus ad • . //lath. VII , 114 (lines 2- 6)

OU yap ~TjlTOTE TOUTO oa~ij ETVai ~i) ,ovTa' allAa ou Tiioo' a<p ' ooou Ot3TjoIOS ETpyE vOfj~a ~fjOE 0' E80s lTOAUlTElPOV 600v KaTa TTjvOE i3 tao8w vw~av aaKOTIOV OIJIJO Koi ilXT,EaaOV CxKOVr,V

5 Kaj yAwaaav, KplVai O. AOY'l' lTOAUOfjPIV EAEYXOV ,~ '~E8EV pfj8EVTa.

294 For never shall th is be forcib ly maintained, that things that a re not are, but you mus t hold back yo ur though t fi'om this way of enquiry, nor let habit, born of much expe rience, force you down th is way, by maki ng you usc an aimless eye or an car and a tongue full of mean ingless sound: judge by reason th e strife-encompassed refutation spoken by me.

(iii ) Siglls oj Irulh

295 Fr. 8 , 1- 4, Simpli cius ill Phys. 78, 5; 145, 1 ~OVOS 0' h i ~u80s 60010

AEhTETOI WS EcrTtV· TOVT1J c' ETTt aT,IJOT' Eaat lTOA;\O ~Ol-', WS 0YEVfjTOV ,ov Kaj avwAE8pov ,aTtV, OVAOV ~OUVOYEVES TE Kaj aTpE~'S 1']0. TEAElOV.1

I T,B' OIEi\EO"TOV Simplicius: for the emendation see G. E. L. Owen in StuditS ill PrtJocratic Philosophy II , ed. R. E. Allen and D.J . Furley (London, 197.1). 76-7, who also convincingly rejecLs KR's rcading (takcn ovcr from OK ) : eo" yap ovi\Ol-Lei\ES IE Kai en-pEI..IES ... (Plutarch).

295 There still remains just one acco unt o f a way, that it is . On this way there arc very man y signs, that being uncreated and imperishable it is, w hole a nd of a single kind and unsh a ken a nd perfect.

If we must avoid th e way ' is nOl', our only hope as enquirers lies in pursuit of the way 'is ' . At first sig ht it wou ld a ppear that if we embrace thal alterna ti ve, there open for us limitl ess possibilities of ex plora tion: the requirement that any subject we in vest iga te must

248

PARM EN IDES

exist seems to impose scarcely any reslriction on what we might be able to discover about it; and the argument that wha l is avail able to be thought of must exist (293, 1- 2) m a kes it look as thoug h th e range of possible subjects of in ves tigation is enormOllS, including centaurs and chimaeras as well as ra ts and restauran ts. But in the course ofa mere 'I·g lines Parmenid es succeeds in red ucing th is infinity of possibilities to exactly one. For the' signs' prog rammatically listed in 295 in fact constitute further formal requirements which any subject of e nqu iry must sa tisfy; a nd they impose formid a ble con ­strain ts (note th e metaphor of c hains in 296 a nd 298 bclow) on the tn terpretatio n of what is compatibl e with saying of something that it exists. The upshot of Parmenid es' subsequent argument for these requirements is a form of monism: it certai nly transpires tha t everything there is must have one and the same character; and it is doubtful whether in fact anything could have th at ch aracter except reality as a whole .

(iii ) (a ) Ullcrealed alld im/mishabie

296 Fr. 8, 5- 21, Simplieius ill Ph),s. 78,5; 145,5 (continues 295) 5 ouoe TIOT' rjv ouc' EaTal, ETIEI vOv eO"T1V OIJOO TIav,

EV, aVVEXES' TIVO yap yevvov C13tlcrEOl OUTOO; TID TI08EV aU~T18ev; ouo' EK IJT) eoVTOS eaaaw cpacreol a' O\icE vOEiv· OU yap CPOTOV OUCE VOTlTOV eaT1V ()1TWS OUK ECrT!. Ti c' av IJI V Koi xpeos wpaEv

10 VcrTEpOV il TIpOaeEV, TOO I-ITlOEVOS ap~CxI-lEVOV, cpOv ; OlITWS il TIOIJTIOV TIEAeVal XPEWV eaT1V il oux'­OUOE lTOT' 'K ~N 'OVTOS '<pTjOEl lTlO"TtOS laxus ylYVEOeaf Tt lTap' aUT6· TOU EivEKEv OOTE yevEo8at OOT' OAAUo8at oviiKE lIiKfj xaAoaaaa lTEOIJOtV,

' 5 aI-A' EXEl' 1'] 0' Kpiats TIEpl TOUTWV 'v Ti;>O' EaTiv' EaTlv il OUK EaTIV· KEKpnOI c' OVV, WalTEp avaYKTl . Ti)V ~.V 'OV OVOfjTOV avwvu~ov (ou yap aAfj8i)s EO"TIV 6c6s) , Tr,V c' WaTE lTEAEIV Kai ET~TVI-IOV elva!. TIWS c' av ETIEITO TIeAOI TO eov; lTWS c' (XV KE yevolTo ;

20 Et yap EyEVT', OUK eaT', OUc' EI TIOTE IJEAAEI ECTEaeOI. TWS YEVEOIS ~EV alTEoi3EoTat Kaj O:lTUOTOS OAE8pos.

I Many scholars fo llow Karslen and Reinhardt in emending \.I T, to TOU.

296 It never was nor will be, since it is now, all together, one, con ti nuo us. For w hat birth w ill you sec k for it ? How and w he nce di d it g row? I sh a ll not a llow you to say nor to think from not being: for it is not to be said nor thought that it is not; and what

\

I~RESOCRATI C PHILOSOPHERS

need would have driven it latcr rathef than ea rli er, beg inning from the nothing, to grow? Thus it mu st e ither be completely or not at a ll . Nor will the force of" conv iction a llow anything besides it to come to be ever from not being. T herefore Justice has never loosed her fellers to a llow it to come to be or to perish , but holds it fast. And the decision about these things lies in this: it is o r it is nolo But it has in fact been decided, as is necessary, to leave th e one way unthought and nameless (for it is no true way), but that the other is and is genuine . And how cou ld what is be in the future? How could it come to be? For if it came into being, it is not: nor is it if it is eve r going to be in th e future. Thus co ming to be is ex tinguished and perishing unheard or.

These lines (as the conclus ion, line 2 1, shows) arc desig ned to prove that what is can neither come to be nOf perish. I Parmcnides is content to marshal exp lic it argum en ts only against coming into being, taking it as obvious that a paral lel case agai nst perishing cou ld be constructed by parity of reasoning. He advances two principal co nsidera tions, corresponding to the dual in terrogative: 'How a nd whence did it grow? ' (line 7). He assum es that the onl y reasonable a nswer to 'whence?' could be: . from not existing', which he rejects as already excluded b y his argument against ' is not ' (li nes 7- 9 ) ' In his treatment o f ' how?' he appeals to the Principle of S uffic ient Reason. He assumes that anything whi ch co mes to be must co ntain within it some princip le of development (' need', XpEOS) suffic ient to explain its generation. But if something docs not exist, how can it contain a ny such principl e?

] I n lines 5- 6 Pannenides appea rs to go farther thall this. The statemen t < it never was nor will be, since it is now, all together' seems to cla im not merely thal what is will not come to exist, but that it will not cx ist at all in the future. Probably what Parmenides mca ns to ascribe to what is is ex istence in an eternal present not subject to tempora l distinctions of any sort. It is very unclear how he hoped to ground this conclusion in the arguments of 296.

(iii ) (b) aile alld cOlltillUOUS

297 Fr. 8, 22- 5, Simpli cius ill Ph),s. 144.,29 (continues 296) ouoe OialpET6v EO"TIV, hrEi rro:v EO"TIV QlJoiov' ouBe TI TT;JIJO:AAOV, T6 KEV EipYOI IJIV avvEXEa6ol, ouBE TI XE1p6TEPOV, rro:v B' ElJrrAEov eO"TIV EOVTOS. T~ ~VVEXES rro:v ECTT tV ' EOV yap eOVTl lrEAa3EI.

297 Nor is it divided , since it all ex ists alike; nor is it more here and less th erc, which would preve nt it rrom holding toge thef, but

250

PARMENIDES

it is a ll rull of bcing. So it is all continu o us; for what is draws nea r to what is.

Docs Parmcnid es have in mind spatial or temporal continuity here? H e surely mcans to show th at what is is continuous in any dimension it occupies; b ut 296 h as probably a lready denied that it ex ists in time. I s the point simply that a ny subject of enq uiry must be cha racterized by internal continui ty, or is Parmenides mo re ambitiously claiming that a ll rea li ty is one? It is ha rd to resist th e impression that he intends th e s tronger thesis, although why h e thinks himself entitled to assert it is unclear (perhaps he wou ld rely, for example, on the identity of indiscernibles: there is no basis for disting uishing anything th at is from a n ything else that is). T he same ambigu ity aITects 298 a nd 299, a nd the sa me verdict suggests itself.

(iii ) (c) Ullchallgeable

298 Fr. 8, 26- 3 1 , Simpl ieius ill Plzys. 145, 27 (continues 297) aClTap aKivT]TOV IlEYOAWV EV TrEipao"l OEaIlWV

30

eO"Tlv avopXov aTrOVCTTOV, ElTEi YEVECTlS Koi OAESpO) TTj AE 1l0A' ETrAOx8T]O"av, OTrWO"E 0, TriO"TIS aAT]8i)s. TOUTOV T' ev TOUT~ TE IJEVOV KOS' eovTo TE KEiTai xo(hwS EIlTrEOOV auel IlEVE" KpaTEpi] yap' AVOYKT] mipaTos EV OEO"Il0'O"IV EXEI, T6 IlIV all<p is EEPYEI.

298 But changel ess w ithin the lim its of g rea t bo nds it ex ists without beginning Of ceasing, sin ce com ing to be and perishing have wandered very far away, and true convic tion has thrust them o ff. Remaining the same and in the same place it lies on its own and thus fixed it wi ll remain. For strong Necessity holds it within the bonds of a li mit, wh ich keeps it in on every side.

Lines 26- 8 suggest the following argument:

( 1) It is impossible fo r wh a t is to co me into being or to p e rish . So (2) it ex ists unchangeably within the bonds of a limit. It is then natu ral to read lin es 29-3 1 as sp elling o ut th e content of (2) mo re full y. So construed , they indicate a more compl ex inference from ( 1) :

So

(2a) it is h eld within the bonds of a limit which keeps it in on every side.

(2b) it remains the same a nd in the sa me place a nd stays o n its Own.

T h e notio n of limit Parmenides is employi ng here is obscure . It is eas ies t to und ersta nd it as spatial limit ; and then (2b) fo llows

25 1

PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPH E RS

intellig ibly from (oa) . But why on this interpretation should (oa) foll ow from ( !)? Perhaps rather ' within limits' is a metaphol'leal way of talking about detemlil/aey. In (oa) Parmenid es will then be say ing that what is has no potentiality for being difl'erent - a t any time or in any respect - from what il is al prcsent.

(iii ) (d ) Perfect

299 Fr. 8, 32- 4.9, Simplicius iI/ Plzys. 1 ,~6, 5 (continues 2g8) OVVEKEVI OUK t~.rTEi\ElJTTlTOV TO eov 6EJltS EIvot· ;crn yap aUK hn5Eves' [Ili]) EOv 5' av navTos E5Eho. Ta(JTOV 0' EO'Tl vOEiv TE Kat OVVEKEV EaT1 VOT}JlO.

35 ou yap aVEV TOU eOVTOS. EV ~ TTEq>OTlcrIlEVOV EaTtv, EVPf]C1ElS TO vOEiv' ou5EV yap < i\) ,crT!V i\ ,crTa! aAAo nap,~ TaU EOVTOS, Eml TO yE Moip' Ene5TliJEv ovi\ov aKivTlT6v T' EIlEVa t· T~ lTaVT' 6VOlla<TTat,2 ocrcra [3poToi KaTEeEVTO nEnOleOT'S ETva! aAr)eii,

-\0 yiyvEa6ai TE Kat oi\i\vaeOI, Elvai TE Ka\ ouXl, Kal Tonov a'A'AacrcrEiv 51a TE xpoa 'l'avov aIlEi[3E1v. OlITCx:P ElTellTEipas lTVIlCXTOV, TETei\eO'IlEVOV EaTi, n aVTOeEV EUKUKAOV cr'l'aipTlS Eva'AiYKloV iiyKCfl, llecrcr66ev tcrorrai\es rrCtVTt;J · TO yap mITe Tt JlEi30V

45 OUTE T! [3alOTEpov nEAEval XPEOV EcrTI Tfj i\ Tfj . OUTe yap OUK tov ecrn, TO KEV lTOVOl IlIV iKveicr60l eis OIlOV, OUT' tov eaTtv crrrws EiTl KEV eoVTos Tfj 1l0AAOV Tfj 5' i'icrcrov, EnEinav EcrTlv aD'VAov' oT yap naVTOeEV TD'ov. OIlWS EV nEipaD'1 KUpEi.

I For OVVEKEV as ' thercrorc' cr: TOU eivEKEv, 296, 13. ' Dccause' is the more usua l meaning in epic usage, and is preferred by many here. t 6v61lao-ral Simpl icius (in Ph),s. B7, I ) E; avolla eaTai nF. cr. Mourclalos, Routt, IOo-5i M. F. Durnyca t, PhilosojJhiml Rtvitw 9 1 ( 19°2), 19 n. 32.

299 Therefore it is right that what is should not be imperfect; fo r it is not deficient - ifit were it would be deficient in everything. The same thing is there to be thought a nd is why th ere is thought. For you will not lind thinking without what is, in all that has been said ' For there neither is nor will be anything else besid es what is, since Fate fettered it to be whole and changeless. Therefore it has been named all the names which mOrlals have la id down believing them to be true - coming to be a nd perishing, being and not being, cha nging place a nd altering in bright colour. But since there is a furth est limit, it is perfec ted , like the bulk or a ball well-rounded on every side, eq uall y balanced in every direction from the cen tre . For il nceds must not be somewha t more or

PARM EN ID ES

somewhat less here or there. For neither is it non-ex istent, whi ch would stop it from reaching its like, nor is it existent in such a way that there would be more being here, less therc, since it is a ll inviolate : for being equa l to itself on every side, it lies unifo rmly within ilS limi ts.

lOr : 'i n which thinking is expressed '.

T his long and difficult fin a l section of the Truth combines a summing­up of the whole first parl of the poem with a derivation of the perfection of rea lity rrom its determinacy (argued full y in lines 4.2- 9, whi ch arc oft en - as in KR - regarded as presenting a tra in of th ought quite distinct from both lines 32- 3 (usually reckoned part of 298) and lines 3'~-41 ) . Parme nid es first briefly sketches his main argument that what is, iflimitcd or determina te, cannot be deficient, and if not d eficient, cannot be imperfect (32- 3). Then he takes us right back to his o rigi na l starting-point: if you have a thought about some object of enq uiry, you must be th inking about something that is (34.-6). Yo u might suppose you can also think about something besides wha t already is coming into being. But the argument has shown th at what is ex ists completely a nd changelessly - it is never in process of coming to be (36-8). So ex pressions like' comes to be' and 'cha nges' employed by morta ls ca n in ract rerer (despite their mistaken intentions) on ly to com plete a nd ch a ngeless rea lity (38- 4' ) ' Indeed from th e fact lha t what is is limited or determ inate, we ca n inrer its perfecti on (42-4) , For its determinacy excludes not just the possibil ity that it is subject to coming into being a nd cha nge but any kind or deficiency in its reality (14- 9).

Once again we race a puzzling choice between a literal and a metaphorical interpretation of'limit '. Once again what lheargument seems to require is onl y some form of d eterminacy (cf. 296, 14.-15). Once again the spatial connotations of the word arc ha rd to forget - indeed th ey a rc pressed upon our attention (NB the epithet jJumll/oll, 'furlhest limi t' ). And one can well imagine Parmenides coneluding that ifrea li ty is both spatiall y extended a nd determinate, it must be limited in spatia l ex tensio n. In the end we must settle 1'01'

both the literal and the metaph orical reading of the term. Pursuit of th e way cis' thus leads to a conclusion as as tonishing as

the result of consideration or I is nOl'. Parmcnidcs' final posilion in 299 is in ract doubl y paradoxical. He not only denies the logica l coherence of evcrything we believe about the world , but in making all reali ty a finite sphcre introdu ces a nOlion whose own logical coherence TllUSL in turn be doubted. 1

253

PRE SOC RATI C PH I LO SO PHER S

I l'vlust lhere Ilot be rea l empty spacc bcyond the limits of the sphere if thcy are to function as limits? Th is object ion might persuade one that Pannenides could not have held reality to be a sphcrc, wcrc it not that what leads us to think he must have believed that is hi s apparently uncritical exploitation of the mctaphor of limi t (i.e. of what we would take to be a metaphor).

MO RTAL OP I NIONS

(i) The stalus <1Parmellides' accolIlIl

300 Simplicius ill Phys. 30, '4 (continuation of299, cf. ill Phys. '4-6, 23) "ETEAewv 0' (mo TWV VO'lTWV Erri Ta aiae'lTa 0 n ap"Evio'lS, !iTOI arro aA'leElas, WS mhos <P'lalv , Erri 56~av, EV oTs MyEl (fr. 8, I. 50) 'v T0 aQl rravw lTIaTOV Myov 1']0' vO'l"a

a,,<pis aA'leEi'lS' 56~as 0' arro TOUOE f\poTEias llo:v8avE Koallov EIl6"w E1TEWV arrcrrTlAOv 6:Kouwv.

300 Pa rmenid es eITects the transition from the objects of reason to th e objects of sense, or, as he himsel f puts it, from trulh to opinion, when he writes: ' H ere I end my truslwonhy discourse and thought concerning truth ; henceforth learn the bcliefs of mortal men, listening LO the deceitful ordering of my words.'

The goddess's account will doubtless be unreli able and deceitfu l p rincipally because it presen ts bel iefs which arc themselves utterl y confused as though th ey were in order (cf. 293). The second ha lf of the poem did not simply describe or analyse curre nt opinions about the cosmos. It contained an elaborate and distinctive theogon y and cosmology remin iscent in parts of Hesiod, in parts of Anaximander. Parmenides' object, as we sha ll sec, is to present mortal opinions not as they actually are, but as they might be at best. But that makes the account deceitful in a further sense: in effect it provides a deceptively plausible (a lthough not genuinely convincing) represen­tation of reality .

To understand better" th e cannex ion between Parmenidcs' cos­mology and mortal op inions in general, we need to consider the last two lines of 301 :1

301

30

Fr. 1,28- 32, Simplicius de caelo 557, 25 (from 288) XPEW OE aE rraVTa rrueeaeOl

1']",v 'AA'leEi'lS EVKUKAEO\ 6TpE,,'\ fiTOP 1']0. f\POTWV 56~as, Tais OUK EV I rriaTI\ aA'le1\s. oAf.. ' EllrrTlS KO\ To(iTa lla6r,aEol, WI) TO: OOKOVVTO xpfiv /5oKillwS elVa! 510: rravTos rro:vTo rrepWvTo.

254

PARMENIDES

301 It is proper that yo u should learn a ll things, both the unshaken hean of well-rounded truth, and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reli ance. But nonetheless you shall lea rn these things too, how what is beli eved would have to be assured ly, pervading all things throughout.

Lines 3 1- 2 arc naturally interpreted as stating the cond ition upon wh ich th e gen uine existence of the objects of morta l bel ief may be secured , viz. that they completely pervad e all things. This condition is closely akin to th e requirem ent of the Trulh that any subject of enquiry ex ist completely. What Parmenides takes to be false in lines 3 I - 2 is not th e goddess's specifica tion of the cond ition, but her claim that it ca n be satisfi ed by objects of morta l belief. It foll ows that th e cosmology of the second part of the poem shou ld be read as a rei nterpretation of the world mOrlais believe in , in terms whieh explain it (fa lsely but a ttractively ) as satisfy ing the pervasiveness cond ition.

1 Text, translation and interpretat ion arc vexed: see Mourelalos, Roule, ch. VIII.

The main problem is tha t lines 3 1- '2 appear to attem pt to save the crcdi t ofmonal opinions, in nagranl contradiction with the assertioll of line go tha t there is no trut h in them. The solution is to read the content of the teachi ng of lines 3 1- 2 as a lie, as indeed it is exp liciLl y prcsented in 300 (cf. I-Iesiod Theog. 26- 7. the model for 30 J).

(ii ) Lighl alld night

302

55

Go

30 3

Fr. 8, 53- 61, Simplicius in Phys. 38, 28 (continues 300) "op<pas yap KaTEeEVTO ovo yvw"as ovo"a3E1v, TWV Iliav ou XPEWV eUTlv - ev 4> rrElrAaVTlIlEVOl Eiaiv -TavTla 0' EKplvavTo oEllas Kai af}~crr ' g9EVTO xwplS orr' OAA1']Awv, Tij ",v <PAOYOS aleEploy rrup, T}TrIOV QV, IlEy' EAa<ppov, EWVT~ lTaVTOaE TWlJTOV, Te;> S' ETEPCfl 1lT, TWlJTOV· aTap KCxKEivo KaT' alJTO TaVTia VVKT' ooaii, rruKlvov oe"as E,,~pleE\ TE. TOV aot eyw olaKoallov EOlKoTa rravTa <Pcrri3w, WS ou ,,1'] rroTe Tis aE f\POTWV yVW"'l rrapEAaaa1J.

Fr. 9, Simplicius ill Phys. 180, 8 aVTap EITEI01'] rraVTa <paos Kai vv~ ovo"aaTOI Kai TO: KOIO: a<pETEpaS 5vvallEtS Erri Toiai TE Kat Tois. rrav TrAEOV eOliv OIlOV <paEOS Kai VVKTOS a<paVTOV, iawv a ,,<poTepwv, EITEi OUOETEP~ "iTa "'lOEV.

302 For they made up their minds to name two forms, of wh ich

255

PRESOCRATI C PHILO SO PHERS

they needs must not name so much as one' - that is where they have gone astray - and distinguished them as opposite in appear­ance and assigned to them signs different one from the other - to one th e a itheria l fl a me of fire, gen tle and very ligh t, in every direction identical with itself, but not w ith the oth er ; a nd that other too is in itself just the opposite, dark nigh t, dense in appearance and heavy. T he wholc ord ering of these I tell you as it seems fitting, for so no thought of morta l m en shall ever outstrip

you . 303 But because a ll things h ave been named light a nd night, and things corresponding to their powers have been assigned to this a nd that, a ll is fu ll of light and o f obscure night at once, both equa l, since neithe r has any sh a re of no thing.

I Alternatively: (a) ' not name one' (sc. although the other is correc t) ; the culprit is then identified as night, following Aristotle's view (mistaken : see 30 3) that Parmenides 'ranges the hot with whal is and the o ther with what is not' (Met. 98Gb3 1) , or as lIol-btillg (an over-ingen ious sugges tion ). (b) ' no t name onl y onc ': 50 KR, following Sirnplicius; but mortals in general alloid this error - their discourse is fuJi of contrary expressions, as 302 obviously recognizes. Sec further e.g. A. A. Long in Furley and Allen (cds.) , Sllu/its in Prtsocratic Philosophy II , 82- 1 0 1,

Mourclat05, Routt, 80-7, D.J. Furley in Extgtsis a"d Argument, cd. E. N. Lee et al. (Phrollesis Supp. Vol. I) , 1- 15·

302- 3 ad vance the speci fi c hypothesis by which Pa rm enides seeks to do th e best that ca n be done to save mortal opinions. He pre tends that th ey a rc bu ilt upon th e fo undation o r a belief in two basic a nd mutua lly irreducible sensibl e rorms, w hich a rc individ ua lly ascri bed some thing like the determinacy req uired of subjects or enq uiry in the Truth, and which together sat isry the condition or30 1, 3 1- 2 tha t they pervade a ll reali ty . Other things a rc treated simply as manirestations orligh t o r orn ight (or, presum ably, o r both ), and arc characterized by specifi c powers associated with on e rorm or the other.

The fi c tion or a n arbitra ry decision to introduce the n a m es ' light ' and ' night I has sometimes becn implausibly construed as an expla­nation or how the re can be a world or the sort believed in by mortals . I t rather expresses drama tically a n episte mological characterization or their belier. Mortal opinions do not refl ect the discovery or objective truth: the only a lternative is to interpret them as products or conventio ns el a borated by the human mind. Now it follows th a t no thing about th e world can explain wh y mortals should have such conventions or why they sho uld invest them with the specific content they give them. Hence the currency of these conventions can only be represented as due to arb itrary fiat.

256

PARMENIDES

Parmenides was evid ently quite systematic in his lI SC of light and nig ht in ph ysical explana tio n, to judge from 305- 7 below and rrom Plutarch's testimony (which also indicates the main topics discussed; cf. fr. I I , Simp\. de caelo 559, 20) :

304 Plutarch ado. Colotem I I I4B (OK 28 B 10) 6s yE Kat 01C:XKO<J~OV TTETTO(TlTat Kol o-rotxeia l .. lIYVVS TO I\OIlTTPOV Kat CiKOTE1VQV EK TOVTWV

Ta <palVO~EVa TIaVTa Kat ola TOllTWV aTIOTEAEi · Ka\ yap TIEpl yiis EipT)KE TIOAAa Kat TIEpt ovpavov Kat t'\Aiov Kal <JEATtVT)S Kat YEVE<JIV av6pwTIwv a<pTtYT)Tal· Kal OVO'V i'xPPT)TOV WS avi)p apxaios EV <pV<JIOAoyiC;X Kal <JVV6EtS ypa<pi)v l5iav, OVK aAAOTpiav OIa<popwv TWV KVpiwv TIapiiKEv.

304 Parmenides h as actua ll y made a n ordering, and by blending as elements the clear and the d ark produces ou t of them and by them all sensible appearances. For he h as said much abou t the earth and about the heavens and sun and moon, and he recoun ts th e coming into being of men ; and as befits an ancient natural philosopher, who put together his own book , not pulling apart someone else's, he has left none of th e im portant topics undiscussed.

While Parmenides offers no rationa l justifica tion for choosing light and night as cosmological principles, h e was probably conscio us or fo llowing Hesiod 's Theogolly I 23 ff. (31 above) , which was certai nl y the model ror his treatment or the origin of L ove (fr. 13; cf. 31, 116- 22 ) a nd orWa r and D iscord (C ice ro de natura deorum I, I 1,28, DK 28A37; cr. Theog. 223- 32 ).

(iii ) Cosmology

305 Fr. 10, C lement Sirolll. v, 138 Eial) 0' al6Epiav TE <pV<JIV Ta T' EV a l6EpI TIaVTa <JTt~aTa Kal Ka6apas EVcryEOS TtEAiolO Aa~TIaOOS ,py' aiOT)Aa Ka\ 6TITIo6EV E~EyEvOVTO ,

Epya TE KVKAwTIOS TIEV<J'! TIEpi<po lTa <JEATtVT)S 5 Ka\ <pV(JJV, EiOTt <JEIS 0' Kat ovpavov a~<plS EXOVTa

Ev6EV E<PV TE Kal WS ~IV i'xYOV<J( a) ETIEOT)<JEV ' AvaYKT) lTElpOT' EXEIV OCTTpWV.

306 Fr. 12, Simplicius ill Phys. 39, 14 a nd 3 I , 13 a\ yap CITEIVOTEpal (sc. <JTE<paVal ) TIAiivTal TIVpOS aKPTtToIO , al 0' ETII Tais VUKTOS, ~ETa 0' <PAOyos IETal aT<Ja· EV 0' ~E<JCP TOVTWV oai~wv i\ TIaVTa KUJ3EpV<:<·

257

PRESO CRA TI C PHILO SO PHER S

m'xVTWV yap aTvyepoio TOKOV Kai 1l1~los a pXEI 5 IT!h.l1TOUO'' apcrEvl 6iii\u \ .. nyfw TO T' EvaVTIOV aUTIS

opaev 8'lllvTEpCfl.

307 Aetius 11 , 7, I (DK 2BA 37) n apllevi5'ls aTe<pavas eTVai mpl­mrrlleYIlEvas Errolllll)lIovS, Ti)V IlEV EK TOO apaloO, Ti)V 5E EK TOO lTUKVOU' JJIKTCxS 5E ai\i\as EK <pu:nos Kal O"KOTOUS JJETa~u TOlITWV. Kat TO mplEXOV 5E rraaos Teixovs 5iK'lV aTepeov (mapXElV, v<p' 0 rrvpw5'lS O"TE<pOVTl. Kat TO ~EO"aITaTOV lTacrwv O"TEPEOV, lTEpl 8 TrOi\lv lTvpw5TlS (sc. aTe<paV'l ). TWV 5E aVlllllywv Ti)V lleaOlTaT'lv CrnaaalS <apXl)v ) Te Kol <ohlov) Klvl)aeWS Koi yevEaeW\ vrrapXElv, i'jVTIVO Koi 5aillova KVj3epvfiTlv Kal KlI~500xov ErrOVOllasEi t>iK'lV Te Kai 'AvayK'lv. Ka! Tfis IlEV yfis arroKplU1v eTvai TOV aEpa 51a Ti)V j31a10TEPOV oenfis E~OTll la8EVTa rrlll'lU1v, TOO 5E rrvpos avarrvoi)v TOV filliov Ka! TOV yalla~iav KVKlIov. aVlllllyfi 5' E~ all<poiv eTvaI Ti)V aelll)v'lv, TOO T' oepos Kal TOU lTvp6s. lTEPIO"TOVTOS 5' Cxv(...nclTw lTCxVTWV TOU aieepos UlT' oVT<9 TO lTUPWOES UlToTayiival TOUS' OlTEP KEKi\i)Ka~Ev ovpav6v, v<p' 0 i'j5'l Ta mpiYEIa.

305 And you shall know th e nature of aither and a ll the signs [i. e. constellat ions] in it and th e destructive works of the pure torch of the shining su n, and whence they came into being; a nd you shall hear o f the wandering wo rks of the round-eyed moon and of her nature; and you shall know too of th e surrounding heaven , whence it grew and how Necessity guiding it fettered it to hold the limi ts of the stars. 306 The narrower rings are fill ed with unmi xed fire, those ncxt to thcm with night, but into them a share of Rame is inj ected ; and in the midst of them is th e goddess who steers a ll things; fo r she governs the hateful birth and mingling of a ll things, send ing fema le to m.ix with male, and again conversely male with female. 307 Parmenidcs said that there were rings wound one around the other, one formed of the rare, th e other of the dense ; a nd that there were others between these compou nded of ligh t a nd darkness. That wh ich surrounds th em a ll like a wall is, he says, by nature solid; beneath it is a fiery ring; and likewise what li es in the middle of them a ll is solid ; and aro und it is again a fiery ring. The middlemost of the mixed rings is the [primary cause] o f movement a nd of comi ng into being for th em a ll , and he calls it the goddess that steers all, the holder o f the keys, Justice and Neccssi ty. The air, he says, is separated off from the earth, vaporized owing to the earth's stronger compression ; the sun is an ex halation of fire, and so is the circle of thc Milky Way. The moo n is compounded

PARME N IDE S

of both air and ~rc. Aithcr is o utermost, surrounding all ;.ncxt comes the fiery thmg th at we call the sky; a nd last comes the reg ion of the earth .

305 evidently form ed part of the introd uction to the deta il ed account of the heavens. It is full of echoes of the Truth, e.g. when it speaks of the heaven 'surrounding' (c r. 298, 3 1), of the 'limits of the stars' (ef. 298, 26, 31; 299, 42, 49), and of how' Necessity fettered' the heaven (cr. 296,. 11.; 298, 30- 1). Perhaps th ey arc meant to suggest that lJ1 atte.mpllng to save morta l opin ions our descriptions of the world they IJ1vent mUSt approximate-so far as possible to those used III Our account of tru e reality.

T he exiguous surviving evid ence of Parmenid es' astronomical system is so brief (306) and so obscure (307) that it is impossible with any con fid ence to reconstruct a coheren t account of his extraordi nary theory of ' ga rlands' or rings. ' The whole construction was built out of the basic forms of light and night, as witness furth er Parmenides' memorable line about the moon's borrowed light:

308 Fr. 14., Plutarch adD. CoLotem 1I16A VVKTlCpaes lTEpi yaTav 6i\Wj..IEVOV aAi\6Tp 10v q>WS

308 A night-shining, foreign light, wandering a round the carth.

The theory seems to have been surprisingly influentia l. Philolaus (446- 7 below) was perhaps following Pannenides when hc placed lire both at the extremity of the uni verse and at its centre, displacing th e ~arth rrom the position traditionally assigned to it (but Parmenides' Idea may ha~e been of a fire withill the earth ) . And Plato developed IllS Own ve~'slOn of the scheme, including its presiding deity, in the myth of Er IJ1 the Re/JUbltc (6 17- 18). Parmenides for his part probably owed something to Anaximander 's rings (125-8), a lthough Hesiod had spoken of' the shining stars with whi ch the heaven is garlanded' (Theog. 282 ).

l ~ ~~or so~e ~llempts see K. Reinhardt, Parmenides (Donn , 191G) 10- 32 , H. hankel 1~ l'urlcy and Allen (cds. ), Studies ill Presocmtic Philosophy II , 22- 5, J. S. Mornson,]oumai oJHeflenicStudies 75 ( 1955), 59- G8, U. Holscher, Panlunides: Vom Wesen des Seiendell (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), 106- [ [.

Postulation of a deity as first cause of cosmogonic mixture is supportcd by appea l to her operation in animal procreation (306, 4- 6), wlHch we know was one of the topics of this part of the poem (cr. 304) . A si ngle line of Pa rmenides' embryology is preserved:

PRE SQCRAT I C PHILOSOPHERS

Fr. 17, Galen ill E/Jid. V I , 4.8 OE~ITEpoi(JIv ~Ev KOUPOVS, Aatoial oE KOUpaS ...

On the right boys, on the left gi rls ...

Parmenides' interest in these mallers was perhaps stimulated by th e Croton iate medical tradition; his notion of mixture ofoppositcs may be compared with Alcmaeon 's theory of h ealth (probably roughly contemporary in date) :

310 Aetius V, 30, I (DK24n4 ) 'AAK~aiwv Tils UYIEiaS E1vOI crVVEKTIKT]V TT]V 'icrovolliav' TWV OVVO:IlEWV, uypov, ~l1POV, \fIvXpov, 6EPIJOV, TI1KpOV, YAVKEOS Kai TWV AOllTWV, TT,V 5' EV atJTois 'lJovapxiav ' vocrov TIOll1T1K"v· q>60pOTTOlOV yap EKaTEpov Ilovapxiav. Kai vocrov aV~lTi1TTE IV WS ~'V ucp' ou UTIEP~OAij eEp~6T'lTOS il \jJvXp6T'lTOS, WS 0' E~ ou ola lTAileoS Tpocpils il EVOElaV, WS 0' EV 01S il <TIEp! Dicis) a1~a il ~vEMv il EyKEcpaAov. Eyyivweat 0' TOUTOIS lTOTE Kl:lK TWV €~WeEV aiTlwv, UOO:TWV TTOlWV 1) xwpaS fl KOTTWV i1 aVO:YKTlS i1 TWV TO\~JTOIS TIopaTIATlcrfwv. TrlV 0' uyiElav TT,V Q"lJIJIJETpOV TWV TT01WV Kpacrlv.

310 Alcmaeon m a intains that the bond of h ealth is th e 'eq u a l rights' of the powers, moist and dry, cold and hot, bltle~ and sweet, and the rest, while the' monarchy' of one of them IS the cause of disease ; for the monarchy of either is destructive. Illness comes about direc tly through excess of h eat o r co ld, indirectly through surfeit or deficiency of nourishment; and its centre is ei th er the blood or the marrow or the brain. I t sometimes arises in these centres from external causes, moisture of some sort or environm ent or exhaustion o r hardship or simila r causes. Health on the other h and is the proportionate ad mixture of the qu a lities.

It is unclear whether Parmenides' di vin e first cause is anything more than a m etaphor for the mutual attraction exercised by oppos ite {orms, although there is no room {or such a cause in the ontology of 302- 3. What is clear and important in his cosmogony is the general idea that c reation is the product not (as th e Milcsians thought) o f separation from an original unity, but of the interaction and ha rmony of opposite powers. This idea was to be taken up by Emp edocles and (in a distinc tively Pythagorean form ) by Phi lolaus.

(iv) Theory of mortal thought

311 Theophrastus de sensll liT. (DK28A46) lTEp\ 0' aiaeTjaEws a\ IJEV TToA"Aoi KO\ Ko6oAOV 56~0l Bu' eicrlv· oi IJEV yap T~ QlJofcp lTOlOVO'IV, 01 OE T~ EVOVTitf>. napI-IEvi81lS IJEV Kat 'EIlTIEOOKAiis Kal n"AcXTWV Tc;:,

260

PARMENIDES

6~oi't', 0\ 0' TIEp\ 'Ava~ay6pav Kaj ' HpaKAEIToV T0 EvaVTi't' . ... (3) rTap~Evio'lS ~EV yap OAWS ouo'v a<PWPIKEV aAM ~6vov OTI ovoiv OVTOIV (rTOlXEiolV KaTa TO uTIEp~aMov EcrT!V Tj yvwcrlS. Eav yap uTIEpaip'l TO eEp~OV il T6 \jJvxp6v, iXM'lv yivwem Tf]V olavOIav, ~EATiw 0, Ka\ Ka6apwTEpav TT]V 510 TO 6EPIlOV' ou lJT}v aAAa Kat TaVTTlV oeia6c:d TIVOS crv~~ETpias'

(Fr. 16) WS yap EKaaTOT' (cp'lcriv) EXEl KpaalS ~EAEWV lTOAVlTAaYKTWV, TWS voos aV6pWlTOIO'I rropEO'TllKEV' TO yap alJTO EcrTIV OTTEP CPPOVEEI IJEAEWV q>vms av6pWTTOIa\V Kat TTacrlv Kat rrOVTI· TO yap TrAEOV EO"Tl VOTlIJO.

TO yap aicr66:vea6at KOI TO <ppoVEiv WS TalJTO AEYE1· OlD Kat TTJV ~vTj~'lV Kaj Tf]V ATje'lV alTO TOUTWV yivEaem ola Tils KpacrEWS' av 0' icr0:3wcri Tfj lJi~EI, TIOTEPOV eO'Tol <ppovEiv f) 00, Koi TIS 1i 5t6:6EO"IS, OVOEV ETI OIWpIKEV. OT1 OE Koi TW EvaVTiw Ko6' aUTO TTOlEi TT]V aiae'lalV, <paVEpov EV 01s CP'lcrl T6v ~EKPOV cp:':nOS ~'V Ka! eEp~OO Ka\ CPWvi'js OUK aicreavEcr8m ola Tf]V EKAEl\jJIV TOO lTvp6s, \jJvXpoO 0, Kaj crlwrriis Kat TWV EVOVTiwv aicr6avEcr6m. Kat OAWS oe nov TO QV EXEIV TIVCx yvwcrlV.

3 1 I T he majority of genera l views about sensation are two: some make it oflike by like, othe rs of opposite by opposite. Parmenides, Empedocles a nd Plato say it is of like by li ke, the followers of Anaxagoras and of Heraclitus of opposite by opposite ... Parmen­ides gave n o clear definition at a ll , but said o nly that there were two cl emen ts and that know led ge depends on the excess of one or the other. Thought varies according to whether the hot or the cold prevails, bu t that which is due to the hot is better and purer; not but what even that needs a certain balance; for, says he, ·' As is at any moment the mixture of the wandering limbs, so mind is present to men ; for that which thinks is th e same thing, namely the substance of their limbs, in each and all men; for what preponderates is thought' I - for he regard s perception and thought as the same. So too memory and forgctfulness arise from these causes, on accou nt of the mixture; but he never made clear wh ether, if they a re equally mixed, there will be thought or no t, or, if so, what its character will be. But that he regards perception as a lso due to the opposite as su c h h e makes clear when he says that a co rpse does not perceive light, heat or sound owing to its deficiency of fire, but that it does perceive their opposites, cold, si lence and so on. And he adds that in general everything that ex ists has some measure of knowledge .

PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS

lOr: 'for the full is thought '. Translation and interpretation of the who le fragment are much disputed. Sec e.g. Guthrie, /-/GP II, 67- 9 for discussion and references to lhe scholarly literature.

Fr. 16 gains in point if construed as a final dismissive comment on mortal opinion. In Tru.th genuine thought was in a sense id entifi ed with the being which is its object. But mortal opinion is mere invention of the human mind, not determined by reality, Mortal thoughts are now reductivcly 'explained' in terms of the very forms Lhey have invented , as functions of the proportions of light and night in Lhe human body.

CONCLUSION

312 Fr. 19, Simpli cius de caelo 558, 8 O(lTW TOl KOTO: 8o~av ECPV To8E Kat VVV Eaa1 Ka! I1ETETfElT' cnfO Tou8E TEAEvTiJaoVat TpacpEVTa' ToiS 8' avol1' aVepWlTOI KaTEeEVT' ElTiarlllOV EKoaT'tl.

313 Fr. 4, Clement Strom. v, 15,5 AEuaaE 8' OI1WS cnrEovTa voep lTapEOVTa !3Ej3aiws' OU yap 6lTOTl1iJ~E l TO EOV TOU EOVTOS EXEaeal OllTE aK18voIJ.EVOV lTclVTT;) lTO:VTWS KaTO: KOal10V

OUTE aVVlaTOI1EVOV.

312 Thus accord ing Lo belief these Lhings came to be and now are, and having matured will come to an end after this in the futu re; and for them men have laid down a name to distinguish each one. 313 But look at things which, though far off, arc securely present to the mind; for you will noL cuL off for yourself whaL is from holding to what is, neither scattering everywhere in every way in order [i.e. cosmic order] nor drawing together.

T he goddess may have concluded her account of the content of morLal opinions (rounded off in 312) with the obscure exhortation of 313 to contemplate the truth. Why Lhat elaborate accou nt was includ ed in the poem remains a mystery: the goddess seeks to save the phenomena so far as is possible, but she knows and tells us that Lhe project is impossible. Perhaps Parmenides simply failed Lo resist the opportunity for versati lity afforded by the idea of , saying many fal se things resembling the truth and uttering true things when we wish' (Hesiod Tileog. 27- 8).

CHAPTER IX

Zeno of Elea

DA T E AND LIfE

The most reliable evidence for Zeno's daLe is the same passage of Plato's ParmelZides (286) as was used to determine the date of Parmenici es, On the basi s of that evidence, Z~no seems to have been born about 4.90- 485 B. C. Once again Lhe date g iven by Apollodorus for Zeno'sjlomit, namely 46'1.-461 (Diog. L. IX, 29 = DK29A I: Lext unfo rtunately lacunose), conflicts with this; but we have already seen that his dating of Lhe EleaL ics depends so lel y on Lhe date of Lhe foundation of Elea. Nonetheless he Illay fortuitously give us a date on ly about five years too late for Zeno's book, ifit was indeed written (as 314 says) in his youth.

Little is kn own of Zeno's life. Diogcnes Laertius tells us (IX, 28, DK29A I: a passage apparently intended to contradict the story in 286) thaL he loved £lea, 'mean Lhough iL was and skilled only in bringing men up to be virtuous, in preference to the arrogance of Athens', which he did not visit, li ving all his life in his native city. ]n the one context in which his name repeatedly occurs by itself - the sto ry of his part in a plot against a tyrant and of his courage und er Lorture (sec DK29A 1,2,6, 7,8 and 9) - the details vary so much that the facts are impossible to reco nstruct.

ZENO'S BOOK

3 14 Plato Pamzenides 127D- 128A Tov ovv LWKPc'XTIl CxKOVO"OVTO rrO:A1V TE KEAEUaat Tr,V rrpc.:~)TrlV VrrOeEO'lV TaU rrpWTOV AOYOV 6va­

yvwval, Ka! avayvwoeElaflS, nWS, cpO:VaI, w ZiJvwv, TOVTO AEYElS; Ei rroAAO: EaT1 TO: QVTa, WS apa 8Ei aUTa 0110 10: TE ETVal Ka! 6V0l1Ola,

TOVTO 8E 8r, 60vvaTov' O('JTE yap Ta 6Vol1Ola 01101a OUTE TO: 011010 aV0l101a oT6v TE ElvaI; oUX OVTW AEyElS;

OVTW, CPO:Val TOV ZiJvwva. OUKOUV Ei 68vvaTov TO: TE 6V0l1Ola 0110 1a ETval Koi Ta 01101a

6V0l1010, aovvoToV oil KO! rroAAO: ETvOI; Ei YO:P lTOAAO: Eifl , lTo:axOl O:v