The Iranian Bomb; A Cross-Country Comparison with Pakistan
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Transcript of The Iranian Bomb; A Cross-Country Comparison with Pakistan
IAF 400 Ryan 1
International Affairs 400 Senior Research in International Affairs The Iranian Bomb; A CrossCountry Comparison with Pakistan
By: Branden Ryan
Contents:
I. Introduction
1.1 Introduction of the Topic 1.2 Research Questions
II. Literature Review 2.1 Factors of Nuclear Proliferation; Why Do States Develop Nuclear Programs?
2.1.1 Realism: Classical and Offensive Realism and the Security Dilemma 2.1.2 Domestic Factors 2.1.3 Quantitative Measurements: A Growing Field
2.2 Nuclear Pessimism versus Nuclear Optimism: A Debate III. Methodology
3.1 Research Design IV. Data Analysis
4.1 The Political Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation 4.1.1 Security Concerns and the Role of the Balance of Power 4.1.2 Domestic Politics 4.1.3 The Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty
4.1 The Economic Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation 4.3 The Social Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation; Religion
V. Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Research VI. Bibliography VII. Appendix
7.1 Acronyms 7.2 Figures for Section 4.1.1 7.3 Figures for Section 4.2
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction of the Topic Nuclear proliferation in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been a longterm concern for its
neighbors and the international community as a whole, particularly after the IranIraq War of
19801988. Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and South East Asia region has presented a
variety of unique security concerns for the global community, and as sources of energy become
increasingly scarce, the desire to acquire nuclear technology for nuclear power has also
increased. However, nuclear technology for energy presents the risk of becoming nuclear
technology for weapons, and this concern underscores the foreign policy decisions of various
nations regarding Iran.
It is important to note that Pakistan is the only Muslim country that currently possesses
nuclear weapon technology. The Pakistani need for nuclear weapons as a source of deterrence
became pronounced during the conflicts along the borders of Pakistan and India and the inherent
issues between the two states. Iran is seeking to become a nuclear power in the region to affirm
its own security within the turmoil plaguing many of its neighboring states and to act as a bastion
of Islamic principles. The following sections will provide a theoretical framework of nuclear
proliferation and the explanation of nuclear proliferation according to the paradigms of
international relations and then will juxtapose nuclear pessimism and nuclear optimism. This
paper will seek to compare and contrast the nuclear programs of Pakistan and Iran and find
similarities between how Pakistan came to acquire and utilize their nuclear weapons as means of
deterrence, however peaceful they may be interpreted, and how Iran’s own strategy for nuclear
weapon acquisition affects the prospects of peace and the integrity of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime.
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1.2 Research Questions 1 How does the development of the Iranian nuclear program compare to that of Pakistan? 2 What are the prospects for Iran to develop peaceful nuclear technology? 3 What are the implications of Iran developing a nuclear weapons program? How are these
implications similar or different to those of the existence of a Pakistani nuclear weapons program?
4 Does nuclear pessimism or nuclear optimism describe Iran’s nuclear program?
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Factors of Nuclear Proliferation; Why Do States Develop Nuclear Programs?
2.1.1 Realism: Classical Realism, Anarchy, and the Security Dilemma There are numerous paradigms of international relations that attempt to describe the
actions of States. Alexander Wendt’s constructivst approach, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s
neoliberal institutionalist perspective, and Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist outlook all represent some
of the many paradigms that have emerged since the formal study of international relations began
at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, understanding the realist perspective, one of
the first and most important paradigms of international relations, is vital in interpreting the
significance of nuclear technology and weapons due to the nature of WMDs. Through the lens of
realism, the functions and purposes of nuclear arsenals is best explained as means of securing the
interests of States in the international system.
Hans J. Morgenthau’s “Six Principles of Political Realism” exemplifies the importance of
the author as one of the founders of political realism within international relations. This opening
chapter of Politics among Nations summarizes the primary tenets of political realism that are
essential in understanding nuclear weapons as means of power to secure interests. Political
realism creates a framework for obtaining a basic understanding of the principle of rationality of
States that provides motivation for certain actions, including the acquisition of nuclear
technology.
Morgenthau’s first assertion is that political realism is based on objectivity and the role of
natural laws in human nature (16). The role of natural laws is derived from the Enlightenment
tradition that serves to emphasize the importance of facts and objectivity over emotion and
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subjectivity in order to analyze the political system. Accordingly, the second point of
Morgenthau’s concept of realism is that interest is defined in terms of power (17). The
fundamental concern of States is the quest of power as a means of ensuring that their interests are
met. Historically, States have pursued power to fuel their motives, and foreign policy decision
making is rooted in this objective fact. Morgenthau notes that irrationality and emotionalism are
present in the objectives of States at times, but he notes that political realism “knows that
political reality is replete with contingencies and systematic irrationalities and points to the
typical influences they exert upon foreign policy,” implying that political realism notes the role
of subjectivity, but not over that of objectivity (18). However, interest defined as power is not a
fixed concept, which is the third point of Morgenthau’s principles. Context and circumstance
influence the formation of interests and the definition of power.
Morgenthau posits that morality cannot be used to define political reality; “realism
maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their
abstract formulation,” but rather, that the abstract concepts of statehood and States’ interests
must be governed by time and place (2021). Similarly, the fifth point of Morgenthau’s political
realism is that the moral foundations of one nation do not constitute universal applications of
morality due to the subjective nature of the construction of morality. The concept of power and
interest are universals, but the role of morality and emotionalism affects each State individually.
Morgenthau’s final observation on political realism is that it “maintains the autonomy of the
political sphere” and that the political realities of international politics differ from moral or
individual concerns (22).
Whereas Morgenthau’s classical realism emphasizes the importance of rationality as a
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human characteristic that is personified by States, Kenneth Waltz’ neorealism attempts to
redefine realism in terms of structure as opposed to human nature. In this Theory of International
Politics, Waltz describes the structural importance of the international system as a means of
defining the interests of States. “A system is composed of a structure of interacting units,” and
these structural units make “it possible to think of the system as a whole” (2009, 37). Waltz’s
analysis is divided into three parts: ordering principles, the nature of the units, and distribution of
capabilities. According to Waltz, the international system is “decentralized and anarchic,”
referring to the fact that an anarchical system has no centralized hierarchy (2009, 40). Thus, the
nature of the units, which in this case, are States, means that each State is essentially equal in the
international system. As such, in terms of capability, each State has the same potential
capabilities. However, “the unites of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their
greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks,” referencing the importance of
measuring power (Waltz 2009, 46). Thus, Waltz’s neorealism emphasizes the nature of the
structure of the international system over the characteristics of each individual rational State.
Waltz notes that anarchy in the international system requires States to govern their
actions by the principle of selfhelp. According to Waltz, “selfhelp is necessarily the principle of
action in an anarchic order” where States must engage in highrisk to secure their interests (2000,
53). John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism highlights the importance of military power
as a means of ensuring the interest of the State. “Survival is the number one goal of great
powers,” and though States often pursue nonsecurity goals, such as economic stability or social
programs, these are often made in order to bolster the nation’s position of security (Mearsheimer
66). These various strands of realism do differ from one another in specific details, but they all
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demonstrate the importance of the individual State as the primary actor in the international
community whose survival and security constitute the most essential foreign policy goals and
influence the conduct of international relations. As such, realism can operate on the individual,
unit, and systemic levels of analysis.
In order to cope with the conditions of uncertainty in the international system, Kenneth
Oye notes that “governments often bind themselves to mutually advantageous courses of action”
(79). States must decide what courses of action to take in different situations according to the
payoffs of the security dilemma. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler’s work on uncertainty and
the security dilemma demonstrate the importance of understanding international politics as a
situation of payoffs in which States must determine these courses of action. According to Booth
and Wheeler, “the security dilemma is a foundational concept because, above all, it engages with
the existential condition of uncertainty (133134 Williams book). The security dilemma is
divided into two parts: the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma of response. Essentially,
the dilemma of interpretation arises when a State is unsure how to interpret the actions of another
State, and the dilemma of response is the dilemma that State faces in determining what actions
constitute appropriate responses. When States engage in arms races and backandforth foreign
policy responses, Booth and Wheeler call this a security paradox in which responses to the
security dilemma create a cycle of responses to counter other States’ actions (137 williams
book). The dynamics of the security dilemma and uncertainty and the opportunity for payoffs are
articulated in the Prisoner’s Dilemma which creates a basic, fouroutcome scenario for States.
Oye summarizes the four possible options in the Prisoner’s Dilemma:
The structure of payoffs in a given round of play the benefits of mutual cooperation (CC) relative to mutual defection (DD) and the benefits of unilateral defection (DC) relative to unrequited cooperation (CD) is fundamental to the analysis of cooperation.
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[...] For a mutual benefit to exist, actors must prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD). For coordination to be necessary to the realization of mutual benefit, actors must prefer unilateral defection (DC) to unrequited cooperation (CD). (81)
Visually, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is as follows:
STATE A
Cooperation Defection
Cooperation STATE B
Defection
Image 2.1.1.A A variety of factors influence the decision of State A and State B to either cooperate or defect. A
cost/benefit analysis must be undertaken by each State to make these foreign policy decisions.
Possible methods of cooperation include alliances, bandwagoning, and engaging in mutual
security or defense initiatives. However, uncertainty makes it difficult to ascertain the goals of
the other state, thus contributing to the security dilemma between States.
Though other paradigms seek to explain the foreign policy decisions of States, none have
had as pervasive an effect on the study of nuclear proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear
technology as realism. Accordingly, this paper will operate under the theoretical assumptions of
realism when analyzing the foreign policy decision making processes of Pakistan and Iran.
2.1.2 Domestic Factors
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Though this paper assumes the primacy of the rationality of States and the importance of
survival as a security concern, it is important to make a brief note of the domestic determinants
of nuclear proliferation. Etel Solingen posits that domestic factors act as important filters through
which foreign policy decisions are made. Solingen’s liberal perspective focuses on how domestic
politics affect the notion of survival of the State. Solingen asserts that internal economic factors
and the need to strengthen domestic institutions can play an important role in the acquisition of
nuclear weapons. “Nuclearization [...] strengthen[s] bureaucracies and industrial complexes” and
can have effects on the nationalist sentiments of a nation (40). Regime legitimization can be an
important factor in the quest for nuclear weapons due to this facet of development. “Middle East
leaders faced lower barriers to, and stronger incentives for, the pursuit of nuclear weapons than
did East Asian ones” as a result of the need to strengthen domestic political institutions (41).
External behavior and internal behavior become interconnected, and as such, Solingen’s premise
is that the reasons for nuclear proliferation cannot be wholly dependent on the external
influences of a nation. Accordingly, “their inclusion may improve our understanding of the
actual effects of security dilemmas, international norms, and institutions when interacting with
domestic models” (44). Domestic determinants, including economic factors and political
institutions, regime type, leaders, and social characteristics such as ideology, are necessary in
creating a holistic analysis of the nuclear policies of a State.
2.1.3 Quantitative Measurements: A Growing Field Quantitative studies of nuclear proliferation have become increasingly important in
assessing the nuclear capabilities of States in recent decades due to the inherent failure of the
NPT to dissuade countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. The following reviews summarize
the major studies that have comprised the main body of literature on the issue of nuclear
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proliferation from a quantitative stance.
Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way’s “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A
Quantitative Test,” published in the December 2004 version of The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, was one of the first quantitative studies on the variables that indicate a propensity to
proliferate. According to the authors, the research on nuclear proliferation was qualitative in
nature and the “theories are frequently tested as if they make deterministic claims” though based
on observation and not quantitative data (860). Singh and Way divide their variables into three
categories: technological, external, and domestic determinants, in order to create a holistic
approach towards analyzing the nuclear policies of various countries. Briefly defined,
technological determinants place “emphasis on technology as the driving force behind weapons
development” (862). Thus, States must reach a certain technological threshold to acquire nuclear
weapons, and after crossing this threshold, some States may be inclined towards nuclear
development. External determinants are environmental factors that create a sense of willingness
or necessity to develop nuclear capabilities as a response to threats, as per the realist paradigm of
international relations. Domestic determinants include internal motivations for acquiring nuclear
weapons. Singh and Way cite democracy, liberalization, social classes, and symbolism/status as
examples of domestic determinants (864). States are then divided into four categories to codify
the variables: no interest in nuclear weapons, exploring the nuclear option, developing nuclear
technology, and acquiring nuclear technology. For the purposes of their study, Singh and Way
treat the last three categories in that list. The variables that they treat can be found in the
following table.
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Table 2.1.3.A from Singh and Way, 2004
Through statistical analyses, Singh and Way find that GDP per capita, the industrial capacity
index, and the external determinants of a threat environment are the most significant variables in
explaining nuclear proliferation along all three categories of nuclear or aspiring nations. This
study does not find economic liberalization to be an indicator or prohibitor of nuclear
proliferation; “the direct economic costs and foregone economic opportunities of pursuing or
even acquiring nuclear weapons do not seem prohibitive, as the relatively mild and shortlived
sanctions levied against India and Pakistan demonstrate” (Singh and Way 882 ).
DongJoon Jo and Erik Gartzke approach their quantitative study of nuclear proliferation
using different variables and statistical methods to analyze their data. In their 2007 article,
“Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Jo and Gartzke divide variables based on
willingness and opportunity, or the desire versus the capacity to develop nuclear weapons.
Opportunity variables include latent production capability, economic capacity, and diffusion of
knowledge, whereas willingness variables include threats (conventional and nuclear), collective
security agreements, diplomatic status, domestic politics, membership in the NPT, and regional
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status (Jo and Gartzke 171175). Through conditional probability analysis, Jo and Gartzke find
that latent nuclear weapons production capability is the most important opportunity variable in
explaining nuclear programs, though not for weapons purposes. They also conclude that “the
economic barrier to nuclear weapons possession is much more severe than that to nuclear
weapons programs” (181). Surprisingly, in terms of willingness variables, their findings indicate
that conventional threats are significant determinants of nuclear proliferation and that, if a state
possesses a nuclear threat, the probability of a nuclear weapons program decreases. Similarly,
diplomatic isolation plays little significance in determining whether or not a state will pursue
nuclear weapons. Jo and Gartzke also find little significance in domestic politics when
considering their effects on the willingness of states to proliferate in contrast to the hypothesis
asserted by Solingen. However, the desire to become a major power or the status of a nation as a
major power is a powerful determinant of nuclear proliferation. “Major powers with nuclear
weapons programs are more likely to have nuclear weapons than nonmajor powers” considering
the role of economic and technological capabilities (Jo and Gartzke 185). The proliferation of
nuclear weapons through trade is rare, and therefore, Jo and Gartzke conclude that willingness
cannot fuel a nuclear program alone, but must be coupled with opportunity.
Philipp C. Bleek utilizes hazard modeling when analyzing proliferation variables. He
combines elements of Singh and Way’s divisions of nuclear states with the variables used by Jo
and Gartzke to determine the extent to which these variables affect nuclear proliferation, not just
whether they are statistically significant or not. Bleek categorizes proliferation variables into five
categories: economic resources and technological capacity, security motivations, institutional
constraints, status motivations, and domestic politics (171). This broadens Jo and Gatzke’s
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opportunity and willingness categories into five specific groupings to be treated individually in
his statistical analysis. Economically, Bleek finds that countries that gain GDP at lower levels
tend to proliferate more than those with alreadyhigh levels of GDP, which he does not find
surprising due to the connection between economy and technology.. Similarly, Bleek notes that
the role of security and the threat environment of States plays an important role in proliferation
as well, particularly in the case of conventional security threats and threats to regional and
international status and power. Therefore, the NPT and the nonproliferation regime do not play
significant roles in mitigating nuclear aspirations. Bleek finds little support for the role of
domestic factors in nuclear proliferation.
In another important study, Matthew Kroenig argues for the importance of opportunity
through supplyside economics by analyzing the role of States in providing nuclear assistance for
aspiring nuclear powers. As he notes, “a state’s ability to produce nuclear weapons often hinges
on the availability of external assistance from a more advanced nuclear state” (164). The
following table shows these types of relationships.
Table 2.1.3.B from Kroenig, 2009
Kroenig employs extensive hazard modeling to determine the role of assistance, economic
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factors, rivalries, alliances, economic openness, regime type, and other variables in nuclear
proliferation. Kroenig concludes that States that receive sensitive nuclear assistance from
advanced nuclear states are more likely to proliferate than those who do not. Similarly, States
with the technological capacity to manufacture their own weapons are more likely to do so than
States that cannot. Due to the relatively low probability of States reaching these economic
capabilities, Kroenig asserts that studies in nuclear proliferation must consider nuclear
assistance.
The growing body of literature regarding quantitative analyses of nuclear proliferation
highlights the importance of combining figures and data sets with qualitative observations on the
nature of specific nuclear programs through casestudies. It is important to consider the role of
these various factors in determining the scope and applications of nuclear proliferation and the
purpose of specific nuclear programs.
2.2 Nuclear Pessimism versus Nuclear Optimism: A Debate As aforementioned, nuclear proliferation in Pakistan and Iran has raised concerns within
the international community over issues regarding the security and use of nuclear weapons. As
such, the current hypotheses posed by this research paper represent two views of Iranian
proliferation; The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic of Iran will not pose a
regional threat to security, or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic of Iran
will pose a regional threat to security. Proponents of each hypothesis can be divided into two
categories: nuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists.
Nuclear optimists believe that nuclear proliferation increases stability between states due
to the fear of secondstrike capabilities, thus decreasing the potential for attack and decreasing
uncertainty in other states’ actions: they will not strike because of the presence of a nuclear
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deterrent. Pessimists, conversely, believe that the nuclear factor allows countries to pursue more
aggressive foreign policies, thus increasing the chances of instability in regions and promoting
conflict escalation and increasing uncertainty.
According to the nuclear optimist, nuclear weapons “make the cost of war seem
frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of
such weapons” due to the doctrine of mutuallyassured destruction and the usefulness as nuclear
weapons as deterrents (Waltz 1981). Nuclear weapons dissuade States from attacking enemies
that they know possess nuclear weapons out of fear of retaliation. Waltz asserts that “in a nuclear
world, one is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated. If force is used and not kept within
limits, catastrophe will result” (1981). Waltz gives seven reasons that States seek to acquire
nuclear weapons on the premise of becoming secure with deterrent capabilities. Powerful States
follow the examples of other states who are nuclear powers in acquiring nuclear weapons as well
as preventing attack from those States. Similarly, if a State has multiple nuclear enemies or fears
the nuclear potential of those States, it will be more prone to proliferate. Economic incentives,
strategic goals, and international status also contribute to the desire to proliferate. Waltz
discounts the argument that fears about nuclear use have been founded on speculation.
There are three requirements that Waltz cites for effective deterrence. These include a
force that can survive and counterattack, a force that acts out of deliberation, and a force that
cannot be used accidentally or without authorization (1981). The difficulty in acquiring nuclear
weapons and the technological advances required to create an arsenal mean that arms races that
are not founded on these requirements are unlikely. Therefore, Waltz claims that “the spread of
nuclear weapons threatens to make wars more intense at the local and not at the global level,
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where wars of the highest intensity have been possible for a number of years” (1981).
Conventional weapons possess greater risk to countries due to the tradition of nonuse of nuclear
weapons present among States.
Waltz provides six reasons that outline the benefits of nuclear proliferation from a
nuclear optimist perspective. Because selfhelp governs the actions of States, States will not
attack nuclear powers out of fear of MAD. It is also highly improbable that States will be able to
destroy the entire arsenals of another nuclear power while judging strength based on the size of
arsenals. The fear of initiating nuclear war has also contributed to the tradition of nonuse.
Nuclear weapons possess defense purposes in addition to their roles as deterrents and the
importance of responsibility with nuclear weapons is an important behavioral constraint.
Scott Sagan provides four components of stable nuclear deterrence: “prevention of
preventive war during periods of transition [...], the development of survivable secondstrike
forces, the avoidance of accidental nuclear war, and [...] terrorists” (2001). However, he asserts
that it is difficult to achieve stable nuclear deterrence in many aspiring nuclear nations. In
relation to the case study between India and Pakistan, Scott Sagan doubts the ability for nuclear
weapons to act as a deterrent and Kenneth Waltz cites the existence of a tradition of nonuse of
nuclear weapons as an integral facet. Sagan expresses doubts that Pakistan’s nuclear technology,
controlled by its military, will act as a stable deterrent due to the potential for aggression and
misuse as a military tool (Waltz and Sagan 2002). Due to Iran’s perceived instability, the issue of
a stable nuclear program becomes a concern, much like Pakistan and India. Similarly, geographic
proximity and the nature of the IndianPakistani conflict further complicate nuclear relations
between the two states. Sagan cites the 1988 Ojheri Incident as an example of the potential for an
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accident to spark fullscale nuclear war and believes that “nuclear South Asia will be a
dangerous place because of any unique culture inhibitions against strategic thinking in both
countries” (Sagan 2009, 220) Waltz does not share these prescriptions due to the historical
narrative provided by the past two centuries. The Cold War did not result in nuclear conflict
between the U.S. and the USSR despite the conflicts and crises that punctuated the period, and
indeed, nuclear weapons have never been used as tools of war between any states (with the
notable exception of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although scholars note that Japan did not have the
means to retaliate and the attacks only expedited inevitable loss). Instead, Waltz argues that the
presence of nuclear weapons increases stability based on the fear of mutually assured destruction
via secondstrike capability. “In a nuclear world, any state whether ruled by a Stalin, a Mao, a
Saddam, or a Kim JongIl, will be deterred by the knowledge that aggressive actions may lead to
its own destruction,” thereby asserting that states should acquire nuclear weapons in order to
stabilize the world system (Waltz 2009, 233). This study will determine if the development of an
Iranian nuclear weapons arsenal will present a threat of nuclear warfare or if it will lead to
regional stability per the views of the nuclear pessimist and the nuclear optimist.
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III. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research Design A crosscomparison between Pakistan and Iran is being made for one primary reason:
religion. As it currently stands, Pakistan is the only Islamic country with nuclear weapons
technology, thus earning its arsenal the name the Islamic Bomb. Iran is another country marred in
similar controversy within the realm of global politics over its intended goals of its nuclear
program. Current concerns over Iranian proliferation are similar to those during the formative
years of Pakistan’s nuclear testing; Will this country be able to sacrifice economic goals for
nuclear technology acquisition? What are the consequences of a functioning Iranian nuclear
program? How will this impact security concerns in the region? Due to the inherent similarities
between the development of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and the current Iranian government’s
nuclear policies, this research project will focus on a comparison between the two and will seek
to determine whether the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran will result in a nuclear conflict
or if it will stabilize the region through active nuclear deterrence.
By drawing parallels between Iran and Pakistan, this paper will aim to determine the
future prospects of the Iranian program based on the traditional principle of nonuse of nuclear
weapons by Pakistan. Three areas will be explored in order to analyze the nuclear programs of
Pakistan and Iran: the political aspect, the economic aspect, and the social aspect. The
assessment of the political factors of nuclear proliferation will be subdivided into three parts:
the balance of power, domestic concerns and politics, and commentary on the relationship
between the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and Pakistan and Iran. The economic aspect of
proliferation will be used quantitatively to examine the economic factors that have influenced the
development of the nuclear programs, including the resources spent on nuclear technology and
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the impact of domestic economies and international sanctions and embargoes. Finally, the role of
religion will be treated as this is the lynchpin of the PakistanIran comparison. The analysis of
the role of religion in the decisionmaking processes of the two countries will constitute the
social aspect of nuclear proliferation. The analysis will include a statement of facts regarding
Pakistan, then a statement of facts regarding Iran, followed by a synthesis of the information.
Through these different levels of analysis, a conclusion will be made regarding whether or not
nuclear pessimism or nuclear optimism best describes the future of Iran’s nuclear program.
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 4.1 The Political Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation
4.1.1 Security Concerns and the Role of the Balance of Power The security concerns of both the Islamic Republics of Pakistan and Iran have, by the
nations’ own admissions, played integral roles in the quest for nuclear technology as a means of
protecting sovereign interests. This aspect of the nuclear proliferation process of the two nations
affirms the aforementioned conclusions by the studies presented in the Literature Review of this
paper that emphasize the significance of external determinants in nuclear proliferation. Through
security concerns and the external environments of Pakistan and Iran, it is clear that the threat of
existence visàvis other actors in the anarchic international system is a primary motivator of
nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, it is important to trace the historical influence of security
concerns on the foreign policies of both countries in order to ascertain the extent to which
Pakistan and Iran’s nuclear programs have similar origins.
It is important to note the conflictual nature inherent to the relations between India and
Pakistan as this is the nexus of Pakistani nuclear policy and reflects the role of security and the
need to act as a balance in terms of regional divisions of power. Conflicts between the Hindu and
Muslim factions in Britishcontrolled India resulted in the partitioning of the region, thus
creating the two nations which were essentially born of conflict. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first
Prime Minister of India, reflects the unfavorable sentiments of India on the creation of Pakistan:
Pakistan is a medieval state with an impossible theocratic concept. It should not have been created, and it would never have happened had the British not stood behind the foolish idea of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. [...] We want to cooperate and work towards cooperation, and one day integration will inevitably come. (Hilali 33)
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Pakistan viewed its larger neighbor as an expansionist and hegemonic threat, seeking to reabsorb
the territory into a greater, Hindudominated Indian subcontinent. “India’s efforts immediately
after independence to undo Pakistan, particularly its attempt to seize Kashmir, were the main
causes for the bitterness and sense of insecurity” that became prominent features of Pakistani
foreign policy and cemented India as the foremost threat to the Pakistani state (Amin 39) . Amin
also notes that “the principle objective of Pakistan’s strategic policy has been at least to prevent
India from over running or subjugating Pakistan and, at the most, to pose as an equal of India”
(165). Thus, this context reflects the need to secure the survival of the Pakistani state, a motive
upon which Pakistan’s nuclear policies are best understood due to the significance of the Indian
threat.
The early notions of a Pakistani nuclear program date to the policies of the Ayub Khan
and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto administrations during the 1960s and 1970s. Ayub Khan did not view
the nuclear option as a viable source of security for the Pakistani people, although he was a
vehement supporter of the formation of a clear Pakistani identity separate from India with
significant regards to religion and asserted that reconciliation would not be possible given their
two ideologies. Thus, while peaceful reunification of the subcontinent was not a viable option,
the security dilemma between India and Pakistan did not necessitate a nuclear deterrent. “As
evident in the writings and speeches of Ayub Khan, the nuclear option was conspicuously absent
in Pakistan’s strategic discourse” throughout his tenure in the 1960s (Nizamani 72). The conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union was subsequently characterized as a problem of
the others and parallels were not drawn between the IndianPakistani relationship and the Cold
War. Strengthening Pakistan’s Muslim identity featured heavily in Ayub Khan’s domestic and
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foreign policy decisions.
The absence of nuclear strategy in Ayub Khan’s foreign policy decision starkly contrasts
with that of Z. A. Bhutto, whose foreign policy emphasized the importance of acquiring nuclear
weapons in order to address the Indian threat. In the wake of the 1971 conflict that resulted in the
loss of East Pakistan and subsequent creation of Bangladesh, it became clear to Bhutto that the
development of nuclear weapons would act as a viable deterrent option for Pakistan. In an
address to the UN General Assembly in 1965 while serving under Ayub Khan’s government, he
said that Pakistan was “facing a great monster” and a “great aggressor” whose goal was to
“annihilate Pakistan” (Nizamani 75). Bhutto also emphasized the importance of fighting for
Kashmir and linked Pakistani identity to the acquisition of the disputed territory, thus embedding
this issue deep in the minds of Pakistanis and again condemning the actions of India and
emphasizing that the differences between India and Pakistan, including their historical legacies,
cultures, and identities, were irreconcilable. As such, Bhutto articulated that “Pakistan’s security
and territorial integrity are more important than economic development” and that a nuclear
deterrent acts as a tool to ensure this security (Nizamani 78). When the five permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council drafted the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty in 1968,
Bhutto recognized that this treaty was incompatible with the security goals of Pakistan if India
did not also agree to the tenets of the NPT, to which it did not; consequently, Pakistan has not
ratified the NPT to this day.
The loss of East Pakistan as a result of conflict between Pakistan and India in 1971
caused Bhutto actively seek to create a nuclear program in Pakistan, though it was not yet an
immediate concern for the Pakistani government. Bhutto created the Pakistan Atomic Energy
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Commission in order to research and develop nuclear technology. It was not until 1974, when
India tested its first nuclear explosion, that nuclear weapons became a foremost issue for the
government in order to remain competitive with India and obtain a nuclear deterrent to prevent
future acts of aggression by a potentiallynuclear India. On May 18, 1974, India conducted what
officials called a “peaceful nuclear explosion” which was viewed with skepticism and
apprehension by the Pakistani government, media, and population as an Indian nuclear weapon
would invariably give the country an advantage in the IndiaPakistan security dilemma
(Nizamani 85). In seemingly contradictory diplomacy, Pakistan also pushed to create a nuclear
weaponfree zone (NWFZ) in South Asia in order to prevent the emerging nuclear arms race
between India and Pakistan from escalating. This was coupled with attempts to agree to a
simultaneous ratification of many armslimitations treaties. However, India’s repeated refusal to
agree to such treaties exemplified the security concerns in the region. In a significant push
towards nuclear development, Bhutto negotiated a deal with the French government that would
give Pakistan a nuclear reprocessing plant despite attempts by U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger to persuade Pakistan otherwise.
The importance of nuclear development in political discourse continued after General
ZiaulHaq’s military coup against Bhutto and remained an important element of Zia’s domestic
and external policies. The coup also threatened Pakistan’s deal with France due to the regime
change, to which Bhutto heavily criticized while jailed, and caused France to withdraw from
negotiations. It was also during the end of Bhuttos tenure as President and the beginning of Zia’s
government when Abdul Qadeer Khan brought his technical expertise to Pakistan in order to
develop Pakistani nuclear technology. Educated in Europe, Khan worked for various energy
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companies, including the Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory in the Netherlands while
touring various centrifuge facilities (“A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology”). While at these facilities,
Khan made numerous inquiries into various types of technologies and was monitored by
authorities for his actions, though he was not detained and questioned. In 1975, Khan left the
Netherlands “for Pakistan with copied blueprints for centrifuges and other components and
contact information” for companies that would provide the necessary components to build
centrifuges needed to enrich uranium and other nuclear materials (“A.Q. Khan Nuclear
Chronology”). He then began work in the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to research and
conduct nuclear experiments in power and weaponry under Bhutto and then Zia. “The Zia
regime adopted Bhutto’s views on the nuclear issue as a cornerstone of the security discourse,”
so there was little change in Pakistani foreign policy regarding the importance of acquiring
nuclear weapons (Nizamani 98). For Pakistan, the importance of a nuclear deterrent against India
could not be understated.
Operation Brasstacks of 19861987 and the Kashmir crisis of 1990 were two major
periods of escalation between India and Pakistan and contributed to the strained relations
between the two nations. 1986 saw provocative brinksmanship by the Indians when General
Sundarji commanded a training exercise in the Rajasthan desert (Khan 101). This was intended
to dissuade Pakistan from aiding Sikh insurgents in Punjab, but it resulted in the positioning of
both Pakistani and Indian troops at the border between the two nations. “Some people have
argued that there was some power asymmetry in conventional weapons in favor of Pakistan” as
well as the threat of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan, demonstrating that this was, indeed, the first
nuclear crisis between the two countries, whether or not the presence of nuclear weapons was
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true (Khan 103). Resolution to this example of brinksmanship was only possible due to
thirdparty intervention by the U.S., and deescalation occurred in 1987, though the nuclear
dimension of Operation Brasstacks was clear.
The 1990 Kashmir Crisis was driven by the value placed on Kashmir by Pakistan and the
adamant opposition of any claims to Kashmir by India. After supporting the mujahideen in
Afghanistan and the Sikhs in the Punjab area, the Kashmir Crisis allowed Pakistan another
opportunity to exercise its brinksmanship abilities to deter India. The Kashmiri uprising against
the Indian government prompted Pakistan to position troops and military equipment along the
border once again, increasing the tension along the line of control separating the region. As noted
by Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s nuclear policy was not Kashmircentric, but rather a byproduct
dispute resulting from the overarching conflict with India, and that “the nuclear capacity’s utility
in Kashmir ‘came out’ as a major factor in Pakistani strategic thinking” (Ganguly and Kapur 38).
Like Operation Brasstacks, this crisis did not result in direct conflict and again, deescalation was
only possible due to the U.S.’s efforts. In the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. had
few lingering interests in the region but pursued mediation in order to prevent nuclear war.
Indeed, the acquisition of nuclear technology in Pakistan has occurred as the country has acted
more aggressively against India. The cyclical nature of escalation near the line of control
between India and Pakistan and the absence of conflict visàvis one another indicates the de
facto deterrence power that existed between the two during these crises, and this dynamic would
soon become consolidated when both countries were officially declared nuclear states in 1998.
Like Pakistan, Iran’s quest for nuclear acquisition has been defined by Iran’s desire for
regional influence in the Middle East and its longstanding conflicts with its neighbors. Iran’s
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perceived threats to security include Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and, indirectly, the United States.
The relationship between Iran and these actors has prompted the continued development of
Iran’s nuclear program. Though Iran continues to deny the existence of nuclear weapons within
the republic, the growth of the program has increased as the perceived threats against Iran have
done so in turn.
Iran’s nuclear program dates back to the 1950s during the reign of Shah Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi, as Iran sought to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as a means of
securing stable sources of energy. “By the mid1970s, his nuclear plans became remarkably
ambitious and included the construction of twenty nuclear power reactors, research reactors, a
uranium enrichment facility, and a plant for the reprocessing of spent fuel” to achieve these
means (Mukhatzhanova 43). Iran entered into agreements with several nations, including the
United States, to acquire the materials needed to support these emerging nuclear programs,
subsequently linking the Shah’s regime with the interests of the U.S. In order to solidify the
peaceful nature of the program as a means of promoting Iranian energy independence, Iran,
under the Shah, signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, agreeing to the
protocols therein regarding the stipulations of a nuclear program. The construction of
infrastructure needed to support these programs continued throughout the Shah’s regime and was
supported by many economic trading partners in addition to the U.S., such as Germany, France,
and South Africa, until the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In an effort to combat against
Westernization and secularization of the Islamic state, revolution leaders, led by founder
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, proceeded to overthrow the Shah and move Iran towards
deeprooted Islamic principles. After the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in April of
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1979, “Iran has not acted like the typical state, carefully calibrating its national interests, but
rather as the vanguard of a revolutionary movement” and “its constitution openly calls for the
‘continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad’” (Gold 23). Thus, the propagation of
Islamic ideals (Shiite, specifically) throughout countries became the focal point of Iran’s foreign
policy which was also marked by the desire to become a regional power to balance the Sunni
majority. “The regime's preoccupations with consolidating power, the war with Iraq, and its
international isolation precluded it from aggressively pursuing the nuclear option,” and as such,
nuclear technology was not a primary focus of the Ayatollah (Dueck and Takeyh 190). The
Revolution effectively ended Iranian nuclear development partnerships with Western nations due
to trade concerns and apprehension by Iran to conform to Western nuclear standards.
The IranIraq War during the 1980s marked a distinct shift in the political rhetoric
regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a means to address security threats against Iran
and its people. As Gold appropriately notes, “The Iranian government viewed the Shah’s nuclear
projects as prohibitively expensive to maintain,” but because “the Iranians absorbed terrible
losses throughout the IranIraq War— ultimately one million casualties— Khomeini began to
have serious doubts about his own fatwa” banning nuclear research and development (111).
Chemical and nuclear weapons became necessary instruments of security, defense, and
deterrence for the Iranians as Saddam Hussein’s government began actively pursuing the
development of such technology. According to intelligence reports published by the U.S., Iran’s
nuclear development program resumed in 1982 (Kerr 1). The literature on Iran’s nuclear program
fails to offer many details on the status of Iran’s nuclear program during this period. However,
authors agree that Russia began to act as the primary source of nuclear materials for Iran. Dueck
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and Takeyh posit that “the Russian Federation soon began to fill the void left by the withdrawal
of the other international actors and assisted Iran in building its two nuclear reactors at Bushehr,
which suffered from neglect during the IranIraq war” and that “Russia has also [possibly]
provided Iran with fuel fabrication technology and [...] uranium enrichment centrifuge plans”
(190191). Similarly, Lewis and Olson note that “Iran signed contracts with Argentina, Russia,
and China to build the program,” cited from various reports from those nations, though the
veracity of these claims is unclear (207). Mukhatzhanova offers different sources, claiming that
“by 1984, however, Iran expressed renewed interest in nuclear power and engaged in talks with
India and China on nuclear cooperation” (43). Delpech asserts that Russia was the primary
source of Iran’s nuclear technology; “the Iranians tie any strategic partnership with Russia to the
pursuit of nuclear cooperation” due to Russia’s consistent economic support of Iran’s nuclear
program (46). Though the discrepancies in the reports of the sources of Iran’s nuclear materials
during the 1980s make it difficult to determine which country Iran did acquire them from, it is
clear that Iran’s program was nascent during this decade.
“A more detailed focus on the nuclear infrastructure began during Hashemi Rafsanjani's
presidency in the early 1990s and was sustained by Muhammad Khatami's reformist
government” after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the succession of Ali Khamenei as
Ayatollah (Dueck and Takeyh 190). General consensus in the literature confirms Russia’s
involvement while also emphasizing the importance of the A.Q. Khan Network. Sahimi claims
that “first protocol on the Bushehr project with the Soviet Union [which] called on Moscow to
complete the Bushehr project and build additional two reactors in Iran, but financial problems
delayed the deal” (2003). However, a new deal was concluded between Iran and Russia in 1995,
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though the Bushehr project still remains unfinished. The bilateral negotiations conducted
between the Islamic Republic of Iran indicate a commitment to continue developments of the
nuclear program on the basis of security concerns and balancing power in the region.
Indeed, the relations between states have had significant impact on the shape of Iran’s
nuclear program, both in which nations have been alleged with providing nuclear assistance to
Iran as well as those which have seemingly antagonistic relationships with Iran. “Washington’s
perception of the Iranian question is largely overdetermined by its perception of the Iraqi
question,” and the relationship between Iran and Iraq must factor significantly in understanding
the foreign policy of Iran regarding nuclear weapons (Delpech 35). As a supporter of the Shah’s
regime and the subsequent measures, embargoes, and efforts to prevent Iran from developing its
nuclear technology, the U.S. plays an adversarial role in the development of Iran. As Lewis and
Olson appropriately conclude, “a policy of sanctions adds stress to U.S.Iran relations, and
increases Iran’s perception of a treat from the United States” (210). Similarly, Saudi Arabia
continues to be a focal point of Iran’s foreign policy concerns. “Saudi Arabia has a longstanding
tradition of hostility towards Iran” due to the issue of regional leadership and “Iran has never
forgiven Riyadh for supporting Baghdad during the IranIraq War” (Delpech 79). Saudi Arabia’s
advanced military technology and close relationship with the U.S. and its military and defense
contractors has raised Iranian concerns about Saudi Arabia’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons.
However, to date, Saudi Arabia has pursued neither nuclear technology for the sake of power due
to their abundance of fossil fuels nor nuclear weapons to carry out its military goals. “Saudi
Arabia [also] took a clear and public stance against Iran’s nuclear programme in 2005” and has
encouraged the U.S. to continue its strong support against the militarization of Iran’s nuclear
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technology (Delpech 79). According to Alani, if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the
security threat posed in the region would prompt the Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia, to then
arm and develop their own nuclear arsenals (2012). This is in accordance with the notion that
regional leadership plays an especially important role in the nuclear policies of these nations. As
previously stated, the Middle East as a region is Sunnidominated, reflected in the overwhelming
support of the Arab countries for Iraq during the IranIraq War, when only Syria (who possesses
a large Shi’a population) defended the territorial integrity of Iran. Thus, “the acquisition of
nuclear weapons could conceivably change the balance [of power in the region], placing Iran in a
position of strength” to exercise its foreign policy (Mukhatzhanova 50).
The issue of Israel in relation to Iran’s nuclear program is divisive, though there is
general consensus that Israel does factor into the foreign policy decision making process of
Tehran. Delpech views the chronology of Iran’s program as indicative of its motives:
Israel, it must be stressed, is not the reason why Tehran wants to acquire the nuclear bomb. The key dates when decisions were made, i.e. the 1970s under the Shah, who had good relations with Israel, and then 1985 during the war with Iraq, suggest that there was a different agenda [which includes] regional domination [and] a decisive response to Saddam Hussein’s lethal chemical weapons attacks on Iranian troops. (65)
Thus, power politics become the focal points of Iran’s foreign policy instead of Israel, according
to Delpech’s reasoning. However, the evolving relations between states in the Middle East have
fundamentally altered the threat perception of Iran. In contrast, Mukhatzhanova views the
growing tension with Israel as a primary motivator for Iran’s nuclear development, as “Israel is
Iran’s enemy of choice, the target of most radical rhetoric and opposition for its very existence,
occupation of Palestinian Territories, unconditional support of the United States, and its nuclear
arsenal” (52). Iran has been a continued supporter of Hezbollah and Hamas. However,
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Mukhatzhanova does note that Israel “provides a ready justification,” not a direct threat, for Iran
to develop nuclear weapons capabilities and that Israel has only recently become a foreign policy
concern of Iran (53). This is largely in part due to the inflammatory rhetoric of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, current President of Iran.
The qualitative nature of the historical facts regarding the development of Pakistan and
Iran’s nuclear programs reflects trends found in the aforementioned studies of the significant
variables that affect nuclear development. Though it is difficult to say that one nation is directly
responsible for the foreign policy decisions of another, or that India possesses a percentage of
responsibility for Pakistan’s nuclear program, for example, the developments of conflict between
Pakistan, Iran, and their regional, existential threats are of important note. Given the complex
nature of Pakistan’s relationships with other countries, depicted in Appendix Figure 4.1.1.A, it is
likely that Iran’s similar webs of relationships will present the republic with security concerns
that will necessitate the development of a diplomatic tool, whether economically, politically, or
with conventional or nuclear weapons. The notion of a deterrent becomes important from a
nuclear optimist perspective, and it is significant to note that Pakistan itself has not used nuclear
weapons despite continued conventional engagements with India. The various conflicts between
India and Pakistan reflect continued tension over borders and territory. These have elevated the
importance of possessing nuclear weapons in order to assert primacy in the region against a
particular threat to the balance of power. Iran’s relationship with Iraq, the Middle East, and the
West has been strained since the IranIraq War as many nations in the Middle East supported
Iraq’s invasion. Saudi Arabia was the primary economic contributor to Iraq, and Saudi Arabia’s
close strategic relationship has also been a concern for Iran. The lack of a security guarantee
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through an alliance or mutual defense agreement increases the perception of insecurity and
uncertainty. Thus, it is likely, based on the historical trends of conflict and insecurity and the
elements of support within the international community, that Iran will follow Pakistan’s example
and work to develop a nuclear weapon deterrent in the future.
4.1.2 Domestic Politics
The domestic political environments of Pakistan and Iran during their periods of nuclear
development, both past and present, are difficult to understand. The closed political
environments during the last three decades have rendered an analysis of the domestic politics of
each nation insignificant in order to ascertain the role of domestic factors in nuclear proliferation.
Solingen’s study refers to bureaucratic institutions, industrial complexes, and national sentiments
as the primary elements of domestic factors of proliferation. Industrial complexes in this paper
are considered as an economic factor, not an internal determinant based in politics. Bureaucratic
institutions and the importance of nationalism comprise the domestic political factors of nuclear
proliferation. However, the nature of both countries makes an indepth analysis of the domestic
patterns of behavior seemingly inferior to the impact of external factors on nuclear proliferation.
This reflects the conclusions of the literature that find stronger correlations between external
factors and the prevalence of nuclear proliferation in nations that are influenced by many of these
factors.
Pakistan is characterized as a federal parliamentary republic, and Iran is a unitary Islamic
republic. Pakistan’s leaders are its President and Prime Minister and roots its government in
Islamic principles. Similarly, Iran, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, maintains strict
Islamicism in its government and is headed by a President and a Supreme Leader. The latter acts
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as the spiritual head of the government, which is consolidated and centralized in order to afford
the national government with a majority of political power that is subsequently relegated to
subsidiary political organs. Both of these countries have gone through prolonged periods of
political isolation in the international community due to their nuclear programs. As such,
information on the public support or opposition to the nuclear option is difficult to find as both
governments engaged in propaganda and suppression of opposition during the formative years of
their respective nuclear programs.
In Pakistan, Ahmed notes that “discourse on security issues in Pakistan is determined by
the lack of transparency in the formulation of policy and the absence of an informed public
debate” characterized by the oppression of the state itself (54). Indeed, the existential threat of
Pakistan versus the hegemonic aggressor of India is used in order to boost nationalist sentiments
and garner support for the nuclear program. Domestic issues within Pakistan, including
economics, are tied with the external threats against Pakistan, and the foreign policy section
above elaborates on the connection between Pakistan’s nuclear program and India. As Ahmed
states, “all aspects of policy in the nuclear field remain the military’s sole prerogative,” and
therefore, domestic factors of nuclear proliferation hold little significance in explaining
Pakistan’s desire to proliferate (55). Low literacy rates in Pakistan and the authoritarian nature of
the country’s government provide few examples of public polling regarding the acceptance of
Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons. Domestically, Pakistan’s government has sought to
use “the external threat to foster internal unity, exploiting antiIndian sentiment and suspicions”
to legitimize the nuclear program as a means of guarding the state against their existential threat
(Ahmed 59). The political parties in Pakistan have all supported the country’s nuclear program
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as a means of gaining public support due to the pronuclear stance of the populace due to the link
between India and nuclear weapons. Regime legitimacy is an important domestic determinant of
nuclear proliferation, but in the case of Pakistan, the role of external factors creates the need for
proliferation and supporting nuclear policies is a method of maintaining, not acquiring, political
power. Therefore, Vahhabi notes that “ the dominance of the security discourse over Pakistan’s
nuclear policy process is to such a degree that the domestic model’s dynamics echoes the trends
of the security model” (2011). “Pakistan’s proliferation policy, witnessing a high level of
military influence, lacked a domestic politics perspective and was mostly concerned with
security perspective” and public support was a method of bolstering the Pakistani ideology and
identity against India (Vahhabi). The security model of analyzing the PakistaniIndian nuclear
relationship, addressed at length in the previous section, is so pervasive within the country that
considerations regarding domestic politics or public polling analyses are, effectively, elements of
an analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear program based on external factors.
The domestic politics model of nuclear proliferation in Iran functions similarly to that of
Pakistan. Because Iran’s foreign policy decisions are influenced by their external environments
more than the domestic components of the country, the model assumes a subsidiary role to
foreign relations. However, the nature of Iran’s domestic politics itself is fundamentally different
from Pakistan. Shahram Chubin summarizes Iran’s domestic environment as follows:
For the public, the nuclear program also initially enjoyed broad popular support since it promised energy independence and scientific progress. It was also popular because the regime depicted it as an assertion of Iran’s rights against foreign arrogance. But the program has not been subjected to informed debate or public discussion about its ultimate goals, the costs, and the relationship with Iran’s other objectives. Consensus ends where specifics begin. (Chubin)
Though domestic support for the program exists, there are no polls or figures present to
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quantitatively demonstrate that the Iranian public, as a whole, supports the nuclear program in
Iran. The nuclear question has also become highly politicized in recent years in Iran, particularly
after increasing sanctions on Iran between 20002012 and the disputed election of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad in 2009. The dispute between various political factions in Iran have divided the
nuclear issue between those who seek to work with the international community and those who
proclaim Iran’s right to proliferate as a nation. At times, these lines become blurred as parties vie
for power; “Since 2009, factions take positions that do not reflect their real preferences, mainly
to thwart political rivals” (Chubin). Nevertheless, the Iranian government continues to deny the
existence of nuclear weapons and asserts that uraniumenrichment facilities are allowed under
the tenets of the NPT. The issue of domestic politics in Iran questions the motivation of the state
to develop nuclear weapons because the way in which the issue has been politicized, thus
becoming an area of debate for status and legitimacy opposed to one based out of a strategic
concern.
Though Iran asserts that its nuclear program is peaceful in nature, Iran has become
aggressive in its research endeavors, and the emphasis on the right to clean energy roots the
proliferation factors of Iran in domestic concerns. However, foreign policy statements by Iran’s
leaders does present a contradictory perspective. Most famously, Ahmadinejad’s statement that
Israel should be “wiped off the map” has become the socalled catchphrase of Iranian
nuclearhardliners’ foreign policy stance towards Israel. The mere fact that Israel exists is,
according to Ahmadinejad, an “insult to mankind and an affront to all world nations”
(Gladstone). However, Ahmadinejad has also claimed that nuclear technology in Iran will only
be used for peaceful purposes, aligning his position on nuclear weapons with that of Ayatollah
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Khomeini, citing that nuclear weapons are not in line with Islamic principles. These statements
on nuclear policy vary, and therefore, imply a shift in language that is contextually determined
for political purposes. In an NBC Nightly News interview in 2008, Ahmadinejad make the
following statement:
Nuclear energy is very beneficial and very clean, by the way. All nations must use it. A bomb, obviously, is a very bad thing. Nobody should have such a bomb. If there are parties that claim a bomb is a bad thing, it’s only appropriate for them, as a first step, to destroy their stockpiles. Destroy their bombs and allow clean energy to be utilized by all. (Ahmadinejad)
According to this spoken policy, deterrence is not a goal of Iran’s nuclear program. However, the
aforementioned investigations by the IAEA are contraindicative to this position. Nevertheless,
the presence of nuclear weapons would allow Iran to engage in practices of brinksmanship
similar to Pakistan:
A nuclear Iran could also lead to an escalation of attacks against Israel by Iran’s main surrogates on its borders, Hezbollah and Hamas, increasing the chances of a new ArabIsraeli War erupting and washing away any nascent peace arrangements between Israel and more pragmatic parts of the Palestinian leadership. Israel, itself, will have to make some hard judgments given Iran’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities and the declared intentions of most of the Iranian leadership— and not just Ahmadinejad— to see “Israel wiped off the map.” (Gold 293).
Thus, the true intentions of Iran’s nuclear program become unclear due to the ways in which
previous conflicts between other nations have been affected by the presence of nuclear weapons
and the everchanging political climate in Iran to date.
The current status of Iran’s nuclear program cannot be assessed. Though Iran has been
slightly amenable to IAEA inspections, there is a high unknown factor in terms of what Iran is
and is not capable of producing at this moment, and there is an element of uncertainty in the
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domestic support of the program. The clandestine nature of Iran’s nuclear program since the
1980s has limited the knowledge and evidence available to make an effective quantitative
analysis on the prospects of Iran’s nuclear program, if Iran truly is capable of producing nuclear
weapons, and if shifts in political power in Iran will alter its nuclear status. There are various
surveys that have attempted to codify public support of Iran. For example, a World Public
Opinion poll found over 60% support for the Iranian uranium enrichment program despite
economic sanctions (“TwoThirds”). Similarly, a 2010 Rand Survey found overwhelming
support for the right of Iran to develop nuclear energy 97% (Esfandiary). However, statistical
data on both Iran and Pakistan and scarce and the veracity of these polls is difficult to determine.
In many regards, the domestic political models of Pakistan and Iran are similar because neither
program acts independently from its external determinants. The closed environments in which
each program has developed and the close links between the government, the military, and the
program preclude substantial involvement from the general population. However, general
support for Pakistan during its phase of nuclear development is similar to the type of support that
Iran enjoys now, though impacted by continued international sanctions and embargoes. Even
though Iran’s program has become politicized, Pakistan’s nuclear history reflects that the nuclear
issue tied to India was a relative constant in domestic political discourse, and therefore, Iran’s
nuclear program will likely remain a similar fixture of political dialogue in Iran.
4.1.3 The Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty In an effort to curb the growing presence of nuclear weapons in the twentieth century, the
five nuclear powers worked to broker the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
abbreviated the NPT. It is important to understand the importance of the NPT in establishing an
international standard of nuclearization and proliferation that would preclude states from
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acquiring nuclear weapons in the future, essentially creating an exclusive Nuclear Weapon State
(NWS) club versus NonNuclear Weapon States (NNWS). However, the marked failures of the
NPT present few constraints on the nuclear programs of willing and able nations.
The NPT was a method of institutionalizing concerns of proliferation and promoting a
tradition of nonuse of nuclear weapons. The articles of the NPT were intended to assure nuclear
states that weapons would not become subject to trade, but would also allow for states seeking to
acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to be able to do so under strict observation.
Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT prohibit NWS from transferring or aiding in the acquisition of
nuclear weapons to NNWS and NNWS from seeking to acquire or manufacture such weapons.
Article 4 does, however, allow NNWS to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,
thereby assuring NNWS that they do have the right to obtain nuclear technology but not for the
manufacture or transfer of weapons. Article 6 requires that NWS work to stop the manufacture of
nuclear weapons and disarm existing nuclear arsenals. All of the P5 nations are parties to this
treaty and are “among the 187 states forswearing their nuclear weapons options,” though there
are four prominent nonsignatories to the NPT: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea (Paul
158). It is important to note that North Korea was a signatory but then invoked their rights, under
Article 10, to withdraw from the treaty. Noting the prevalence of nuclear assistance in the past
four decades, there has been a clear dismissal of the articles prohibiting such actions.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a United Nationssponsored
organization, is tasked with the responsibility of monitoring compliance with the NPT. Iran
ratified the NPT on 1 July, 1968, and has not invoked Article 10 to remove membership from the
regime. However, the IAEA has found Iran in violation of its NPT commitments repeatedly,
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resulting in various United Nations and bilateral sanctions that will be discussed further in the
following section. Given the ability of India and Pakistan to develop their nuclear weapons
technology out of their nuclear programs while refusing to sign the NPT and the constraints the
international community placed on these programs, it is unlikely that the presence of the NPT
and Iran’s ratification of the treaty will be a significant factor in limiting the willingness or
ability of the country to develop its nuclear program.
4.2 The Economic Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation
The economic aspect of nuclear proliferation is characterized by the ability of a nation to
produce or acquire the materials and technology needed to develop a sustainable nuclear
program. The primary reason for analyzing the economic variables associated with proliferation
is to determine the capabilities of a nation prior and post nuclearization. The importance of an
economic comparison is to look at the factors that affected Pakistan during the development of
its nuclear program and then see how the current economic situation in Iran is similar or
dissimilar. Pakistan was able to create a nuclear arsenal in the midst of difficult economic
circumstances, and thus, this section will determine whether or not Iran will be precluded from
the same abilities as a result of its economic characteristics.
The first significant area of note is the relative Gross Domestic Product levels of both
Pakistan and Iran. Figures 4.2.A and 4.2.B in the Appendix chart the growth of GDP levels.
Iran’s abundance of oil and associated exports have allowed Iran to enjoy a stronger economy
than Pakistan, and based on this fact alone, Iran would have a stronger economic predisposition
to developing a nuclear program. Iran is 18th in the world based on GDP measured by
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), whereas Pakistan is 28th (taken from the Central Intelligence
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Agency’s country profiles). Similarly, nominal GDP in 2012 for Iran was 483.8 billion USD as
opposed to Pakistan’s 230.5 billion USD. Per capita, Iran currently possesses 13,100 USD per
capita of GDP and Iran’s per capita GDP is only at 2,900 USD. In 1998, the year of Pakistan’s
nuclear test, nominal GDP was only at 75,966 million USD, according to estimates from the
International Monetary Fund. Given these basic figures, Iran’s economy is significantly stronger
than Pakistan’s during the development of its nuclear program.
The security budgets of Pakistan and Iran have not been disclosed publicly, so any
quantitative analysis of related figures must be made from secondhand reports and statements
on the allocation of funds for the nuclear program. In a recent news article in Pakistan Today, A.
Q. Khan disclosed that the budget of Pakistan’s nuclear program was not over $25 million USD
while in development (Abbas). This is a stark decrease from the earlier estimates of $1 billion
USD. Currently, the statistics on Pakistan’s security budget indicate that the nation spends $2.5
billion USD on its nuclear program, according to a report by the Women’s International League
of Peace and Freedom (“Pakistan”). There is little consensus on the true amounts that Pakistan
has spent or currently spends on its nuclear arsenal. Iran’s budget is under similar scrutiny.
Champion asserts that the cost of Iran’s nuclear program totals to more than $100 billion USD
(Champion). The ambiguity of the reports on the budget of the nuclear programs of both
countries makes it difficult to determine how money is allocated to the different aspects of
development, from infrastructural projects to the purchase of raw materials. However, neither
country was free from the hardship of debt and sanctions.
On May 28 and 30, 1998, two weeks after India’s first nuclear tests, Pakistan conducted
six tests at Chagai in Balochistan. “The tests were a technological expression of political value
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invested in the nuclear option as a guarantor of national sovereignty,” demonstrating to the world
that Pakistan would be able to actively deter India from future acts of aggression (Nizamani
111). According to the Congressional Research Service, seismic activity suggests that Pakistan’s
tests yielded explosions between ten and five kilotons, capable of inflicting much damage if used
(Kerr and Nitin 4). The importance of these tests was felt around the country as public
sentiments responded positively to Pakistan’s reaction to India’s tests and elevated the approval
of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
The international community strongly condemned the tests of both India and Pakistan,
but Pakistan, in particular, was punished by an array of sanctions, including those from the U.S.,
for its nuclear tests. As a state that had yet to ratify the NPT to the CTBT and refused to sign the
FMCT, the nuclear explosions further alienated Pakistan from the nonproliferation goals of the
West despite its earlier attempts to promote nonproliferation. United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1172 was issued a week after Pakistan’s tests, condemning both India and Pakistan
for conducting tests and calling upon “India and Pakistan [to immediately] stop their nuclear
development programs,” abide by international nonproliferation norms, cease nuclear activity,
and adopt the treaties intended to promote nonproliferation (UNSC Res 1172). Despite
international condemnation, Pakistani leaders believed that this was a significant display of
national selfreliance and that the price of sanctions was inconsequential when compared to the
security concerns that these tests helped erase. The dominant Hindu threat to Pakistani security
was now able to be deterred, thus constituting a foreign policy and an economic victory for
Pakistan.
Fiscal irresponsibility in Pakistan led to a debt crisis that plagued the country in 1998. A
IAF 400 Ryan 42
large trade deficit, defaulted loans, and continued borrowing, along with the East Asian Financial
Crisis that affected the region in 1997, were the primary contributors to the debt crisis in
Pakistan. Mahmood traces the history of debt during the Musharraf regime prior to the testing of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and claims that “by 1995, the external debt situation had [...]
enlarged to approximately half Pakistan’s GNP” (65). Both domestic and foreign debts were at a
high during this period, with 96.7% of GDP in debt as of June 30, 1999, according to
Mahmood’s sources (65). The IMF worked to provide a financial package for Pakistan totalling
$596 million USD in order to assist Pakistan in its debt recovery. Through this package, Pakistan
has been able to secure multilateral loans and has worked to devalue loan agreements and
increase taxation. However, “a significant problem with Pakistan’s economy is that a substantial
portion of the loans the country receives is consumed by debt servicing,” and therefore, loans
that Pakistan has received go towards the repayment of prior loans, so the debt burden on
Pakistan increases (Mahmood 68). Though Pakistan’s economy has grown, “added together, debt
servicing and defense expenditures exceed Pakistan’s total national income” and the government
outspends its income through tax revenue in order to maintain its security infrastructure
(Mahmood 69). Pakistan has worked to increase its economic base by promoting growth in its
private sector and creating a large base of exports, including cotton and agricultural products.
Due to the military structure of Pakistan’s government and the prevalence of warhawks in the
various political parties in Pakistan, it is unlikely that Pakistan will experience significant budget
cuts in the area of defense spending, particularly due to the everpresent security concerns that
stem from India.
After it became evident that Pakistan was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons through the
IAF 400 Ryan 43
development of its program, a variety of sanctions were placed on the nation to dissuade it from
its continued pursuit of proliferation and to hinder the economic ability of Pakistan to acquire
nuclear technology. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Symington Amendment of
1977 both prohibited the U.S. to provide aid to countries that were found seeking to acquire
nuclear weapons. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions on Pakistan, but the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan altered the U.S. stance towards Pakistan as a result of its geostrategic
importance during the Cold War. As such, Pakistan continued to receive aid from the U.S., but
stipulations were added under the Pressler Amendments that would require Pakistan to provide
assurances to the U.S. that it was not seeking to develop nuclear technology. Bilateral
negotiations between Pakistan and the U.S. fluctuated during the 1990s, and many aid programs
were cancelled. Malik describes the economic situation following the 1998 tests:
Across Pakistan, the economic affairs suddenly started deteriorating. Since the nuclear tests
in May, the prices of basic goods like food and gasoline had shot up by as much as 25 percent. The Karachi Stock Exchange had lost 40 percent of its value before
Thursdayand it dropped again after the missile strikes. The rupee, Pakistan's currency, had lost 30 percent of its value against the dollar.[14] G8 countries (the G7 plus Russia) at the G8 summit in London on June 12, 1998 opposed new nonhumanitarian lending by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank to India and Pakistan. Henceforth, Pakistan’s downturn started as its economy was heavily dependent on the IMF loans.
(143) Economic sanctions from the U.S. directly affected the economy of Pakistan during the nascent
period of Pakistan’s nuclear program, and further hindrances from the IMF and World Bank also
limited the development of Pakistan’s economy along with its nuclear weapons. Despite the
economic hardships associated with sanctions, Pakistan’s security concerns outweighed the
IAF 400 Ryan 44
economic consequences of proliferation, thus demonstrating that economic sanctions do not
preclude a nation from developing nuclear weapons if the infrastructure and commitment to
proliferate exist.
Nuclear enrichment of uranium is necessary in lightwater reactors and in fuel
assemblies, but enriched uranium can also be used as fissile material for weapons and to power
nuclear weapons. Given the need for enrichment programs for both nuclear power and weapon
programs, ambiguity has served to cover the intentions of the Iranian government which are not
as pronounced as the intentions of Pakistan were during the development of its nuclear program.
According to Kerr’s Congressional Research Service report, there are three enrichment facilities
in Iran of which the U.S. possesses intelligence: two near Natanz and one near the city of Qom
called the Fordow Enrichment Facility (1517). Intelligence predictions believe that there is
enough lowenriched uranium (LEU) to produce enough highenriched uranium (HEU) for five
nuclear weapons, though such an enrichment program would be detected (Kerr 15). Numerous
centrifuge programs at Natanz and Fordow raise concerns that Iran might be attempting to
convert high amounts of LEU into HEU. Kerr notes that “Iran’s failure to inform the IAEA of
the Fordow plant’s existence until well after Tehran had begun constructing it has raised
concerns that the country may have other covert nuclear facilities” (18). Kerr provides an
extensive review of intelligence reports on these enrichment facilities as well as the reactors at
Arak and Bushehr and the sanctions that have been imposed on Iran, but does not indicate that
Iran has nuclear weapons. Testing is vital in confirming the presence of nuclear weapons, and as
such:
It is also worth noting that Iran could produce only fairly simple nuclear weapons, which are not deliverable by longerrange missiles, without conducting explosive nuclear tests. Such tests, many analysts argue, would likely be detected. It is also worth noting that
IAF 400 Ryan 45
moving from the production of a simple nuclear weapon to more sophisticated nuclear weapons could take several additional years. (Kerr 37)
Kerr asserts that Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons and the existence of any such
weapons will not go undiscovered. This report demonstrates the miscommunications and failures
to communicate between Iran, the IAEA, and the international community at large regarding the
status of Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Iran’s
nuclear program has grown and towards what direction the program is evolving. However, Iran
has been able to buy and trade for its nuclear facilities with little economic loss but has faced
numerous sanctions from the international community.
While Pakistan was heavily dependent on U.S. aid during the Cold War and experienced
sanctions on a bilateral basis, the United Nations Security Council has been the most active body
in sanctioning Iran. Similarly, many individual nations have initiated trade embargoes against
Iran in order to discourage continued efforts to develop a nuclear program. Table 4.2.A in the
Appendix provides a comprehensive list of sanctions, multilateral embargoes, and significant
bilateral embargoes that Iran has experienced. The vast amount of sanctions imposed on Iran is
significantly higher than the amount of sanctions imposed on Pakistan. Iran’s status as a
fledgling member of the nuclear community has been an issue of contention within the
international community, as evidenced by the above table of sanctions. While this list is not
exhaustive, it does serve to demonstrate the pressure that the international community has placed
on Iran to dissuade the country from continuing its nuclear aspirations. However, despite these
trade embargoes and sanctions, Iran continues to enjoy strong oil exporting relationships with
China and Russia and its economy is not necessarily debilitated by these sanctions to the point of
abandoning its nuclear aspirations. Iran also continues to claim that its nuclear program is for
IAF 400 Ryan 46
peaceful energy purposes only, as is within its right under the NPT. The relatively recent
timeline of these sanctions means that the longterm effects on Iran’s economy have not been
realized and the mounting pressure on the government will continue to affect the security
decisions of Iran.
Although both nuclear programs were under economic assault in order to cripple the
ability of the governments to continue financing their nuclear endeavors, both Pakistan and Iran
have been able to develop infrastructure to support their programs. In addition to the facilities
noted above in Iran and the CHASNUPP facilities in Pakistan, both nations have the
technological capacity to deliver nuclear weapons through missile programs. The ranges of their
missiles are limited, but the technological capacity to deliver nuclear weapons is an important
consideration to note in an analysis of the nuclear programs of both countries and the prospect of
technologysharing between nations. The Nuclear Threat Initiative is an international
organization that works to investigate nuclear programs and create policy recommendations.
According to the NTI:
The Shaheen solidfueled MRBM and Ghauri liquidfueled MRBM series missiles serve as the flagships of Pakistan's current missile deployments. Capable of striking most of India, the Shaheen series missiles are of Chinese M11 and M18 lineage, whereas the Ghauri series missiles were built from North Korean Nodong designs. Pakistan more recently unveiled the Babur cruise missile, with mobile landbased launch capabilities, and the Ra'ad cruise missile, with airbased launch capabilities. Analysts believe Pakistan is actively pursuing seabased and airbased launch platforms for the Babur cruise missile. (“Iran”)
Pakistan’s missile system is bolstered by international agreements to develop missile technology
as opposed to developing its own missile defense/delivery system due to the associated costs
with such a project. Similarly, Iran’s own program relies on international assistance. The NTI
states that Iran’s missile program is twofold; “Iran's ballistic missile program has developed
IAF 400 Ryan 47
along two parallel tracks: (1) liquid propellant engines based on imported Soviet and North
Korean missiles; and (2) solidpropellant motors based on solidpropellant rocket artillery”
(“Pakistan”). Estimates from both Pakistan and Iran claim that both countries are seeking to
acquire Musudan missile technology, allowing their reach to extend into the intermediate range,
though these reports have not been verified. Iran has demonstrated its technological capabilities
through its space program, completing three successful launches between 2009 and 2012.
Delivery systems are crucial components of a substantial nuclear weapons program, and thus, it
is important to note that the existence and the desire to improve cruise missile systems in both
countries reflects the latent industrial capacity to proliferate.
These various economic indicators of proliferation, though inherently qualitative, do
indicate a propensity to proliferate. The budgetary practices of both Pakistan and Iran are,
admittedly, obscure, and it is difficult to find budget reports regarding the fiscal appropriation of
funds for the various projects involved in a nuclear program. However, the shared experiences of
the two neighbors does affirm the relative importance of economic factors of proliferation noted
above. Both nations have demonstrated their financial commitments to their nuclear programs;
Iran is in a better economic situation to support its nuclear program than Pakistan was when it
first tested its nuclear weaponry. Bhutto once stated that “if India acquires nuclear status,
Pakistan will have to follow suit even if it entails eating grass,” reflecting the intense
commitment to the nuclear program regardless of economic hardship that the country would
have to face in order to achieve its goals (Ahmed 59). Iran’s similar commitment indicates that
economic factors will not limit Iran in achieving its foreign policy goals, though Matthew
Kroenig’s assertion regarding the necessity to engage in nuclear assistance will likely
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characterize the future of Iran’s nuclear program.
4.3 The Social Aspect of Nuclear Proliferation; Religion
As aforementioned, the common trait between Pakistan and Iran is their shared Islamic
traditions that underpin the countries’ historical origins in the modern system of states. However,
because Pakistan possesses a Sunni majority and Iran is predominantly Shia, the notion of an
Islamic Bomb is not uniform. The theological underpinnings of each country are also different,
and the histories of the two alter the impact of religion on society, and subsequently, the impact
of religion on nuclear policies. The social aspect of nuclear proliferation is, from a constructivist
perspective, the internal qualities that prompt a nation to place value on a nuclear program.
The historical context of the state of IndianPakistani relations is rooted in the Partition
of India after the British Empire ceded colonial power over the subcontinent in the mid 20th
century and demonstrates the importance of the HinduMuslim dynamic. During the period of
colonization and imperialism, the British Empire maintained control of the Indian subcontinent,
which included Hindu and Muslim areas. The struggle for independence from the British Empire
was initially waged by both Hindus and Muslims together. Ultimately, Muslims demanded a
separate homeland that would protect the interests of Muslims because the Indian National
Congress (INC), which stood for a unified India, was predominantly Hindu. “The Muslims felt
that they did not even have the basic security of life and honor” and that the Hindu majority
treated them unfairly and were unrepresented within the Indian government (Amin 17). The
AllIndia Muslim League (AIML) demanded a resolution to the issue, resolving to push for the
partition of India that would result in the creation of Pakistan. The INC asserted that they were
secular and represented all Indians regardless of religion, but they failed to appease the demands
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of the AIML. The AIML proposed the Two Nation theory, which called for the division of the
population into Hindu and Muslim regions. The separation of India was not amenable to the
Hindus and was “immediately opposed by many Hindus who saw it as a vivisection of ‘mother’
India” (Amin 21). Out of fear of possible civil war in India, Britain agreed to the Partition in
what was called the Mountbatten Plan, and a separate Pakistan was created on the 15th of
August, 1947 (Ganguly and Kapur 10). Britain allowed the princely states to determine their own
allegiances to either Pakistan or India, which, in the case of provinces like Jahoor, Punjab, and
East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh, resulted in conflict, as well Kashmir, an area still in
contention today. Thus, the creation of Pakistan was rooted in religious differences with India,
but the evolution of the nuclear issue has been linked with security, not religion, following the
Partition. Religion has only been significant insofar as Pakistan is the only Muslim nation with
nuclear weapons technology, but religion was not a direct factor in prompting nuclearization
during the 1970s and 1980s.
Unlike Pakistan, whose political institutions are fairly secular though the government
does espouse the principles of Islam, Iran’s postrevolutionary politics are direct reflections of
the Islamism upon which the Revolution was founded. Indeed, the emphasis of the Revolution
being Islamic and the creation of the Supreme Leader to lead the nation on religious matters is an
integral part of Iranian identity. “Regime elites compete among themselves for power; yet, they
are all dependent on the maintenance of the Islamist system for their positions” and the
proclamation of a religious identity is an important aspect of Iranian foreign policy, specifically
in reference to antiWesternism (Sherrill 41). Nationalism and Islam are intrinsically linked in
Iran, as evidenced by the opening articles of its constitution. “Domestically, the regime seeks to
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buttress eroding support by emphasizing its Islamist character and by equating nuclear
technology with nationalist pride,” extolling the value of the nuclear program as a means of
securing energy needs as well as possibly developing a nuclear deterrent (Sherrill 44). Iran’s
inwardlooking concerns for the maintenance of its Islamic principles differentiate the social
aspect of constructivism in nuclear proliferation from Pakistan.
Alireza Forghani, former governor of the Kish Province in Iran, elaborates on the
political significance of an Islamic bomb in Iran. His editorial on the right of Iran to acquire
nuclear weapons is an example of the opinion of the political elite, and though he does not write
as a representative of the government, the widespread publication of his work does demonstrate
common sentiments held throughout the government. He argues that “all Islamic countries have
Islamic blood” and that “the Islamic world should rise up and shout that ‘a nuclear bomb is our
right to wake America and Israel up!’” (Forghani). Forghani notes that the United States is the
only nation that has used nuclear weapons and that Pakistan is the only Muslim nation with
nuclear capabilities that other nations could use as viable deterrents. The emphasis on Syria,
Lebanon, and Iran as nations that have acted out of concern for Islamic interests reflects the
importance of the religious aspect in Forghani’s premise. Nevertheless, Ayatollah Khamenei
issued an oral fatwa, or religious ruling, that forbade nuclear weapons due to their inconsistency
with the teachings of Islam.
“Because Shiite religious doctrine exalts the suffering and martyrdom of the faithful, Iran
is sometimes portrayed as an irrational state” whose nuclear aspirations will fall in accordance
with these views (Eisenstadt and Khalaji x). However, as Eisenstadt explains in his treatment of
Islam in Iran with regards to nuclear weapons, Iran cannot be completely irrational as a state
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because the spread of revolutionary Islam would end with the extinction of the Republic in the
event of a nuclear conflict (2). As such, Ayatollah Khamenei clarified this point of the fatwa:
There is a difference between nuclear technology and a nuclear weapon [...]We do not have the motivation to pursue nuclear weapons. We have not and will not go after them. We do not need a nuclear bomb. If we defeated our enemy so far, it was not with nuclear bombs. [...] When such a bomb is dropped somewhere, it would kill both guilty and innocent, armed individuals, young children, babies, and oppressed human beings. A science used for this end and a country in possession of such a weapon and its development would be led to this point which we do not approve [of ]; we do not like such change. (Eisenstadt and Khalaji 14)
Nevertheless, the indications that Iran has worked to develop methods of enriching uranium with
Russian assistance contradict these statements. The relationship between religion and nuclear
weapons in Iran is unclear, but the significance of Islam in Iran will remain a strong trend in
Iranian nuclear discourse unlike in Pakistan, where the nuclear option is not necessarily
predicated on the status of the country as the only nuclear Muslim nation.
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V. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The statement of facts regarding the three dimensions of proliferation raises two
questions that must be answered instead of the four originally asked. The first question that must
be considered is whether or not Iran is actually developing nuclear weapons. Iran’s government
has vehemently denied that it has nuclear weapons or is aspiring to develop nuclear weapons
technology. As stated in the data analysis, Iran’s stated nuclear policy is that the country is
seeking to acquire nuclear technology for the purposes of clean, sustainable energy to drive the
nation’s growing infrastructure and development. However, the existence of various nuclear
reactors, such as the plant at Natanz, do not rely on enriched uranium for their operation, and the
use of such fissile material is an indication that Iran is stockpiling uranium for the purposes of
weapon development. Unlike Pakistan, there is no major security imperative necessitating the
immediate creation of a nuclear weapon in Iran, so there is little rush in the republic devoting a
vast amount of resources to the creation of an Iranian bomb. The suggestive nature of Iran’s
clandestine program and the continued defiance of sanctions from the international community
contributes to the realist understanding that Iran is “guilty until proven innocent” with regards to
its nuclear program as the IAEA has had limited success in monitoring the nuclear program.
With this in mind, it is with a relative amount of certainty that the conclusion can be made that
Iran is attempting to develop nuclear weapons.
If the assumption that Iran is seeking to create or acquire nuclear weapons is correct, then
the second question that follows that conclusion is whether or not Iran will actually use their
nuclear arsenal. Advocates for action against Iran’s nuclear program cite Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's inflammatory rhetoric against the United States and Israel as evidence that Iran
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will use nuclear weapons if given the opportunity to develop those capabilities. However,
Ahmadinejad does not possess direct power over security concerns as President rather,
Ayatollah Khamenei does as Supreme Ruler, and his rhetoric has been less worrisome than that
of his colleague. The irrationality of a single leader does not necessarily imply the irrationality of
a state as a whole, especially considering the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and the
notion of the tradition of nonuse of nuclear weapons since their first and only uses in Japan. The
doctrine of mutuallyassured destruction (MAD) has proven to be a stabilizing component of
nuclear policy, particularly during the Cold War, and the tradition of nonuse that has emerged
regarding nuclear weapons is not likely to disappear in the coming decades. Similarly, the
militant aspect of Iran’s government has been called into question, and the fanatic Islamicism
that defines the Iranian political system is seen as an unstable element that will allow nonstate
actors to gain access to Iranian nuclear facilities to use weapons. In Pakistan, the National
Command Authority currently oversees the security of all Pakistani weapons complexes and
have worked to assure the global community that they are wellprotected. Under the NCA,
Pakistan’s protection system features a policy called “C4I2SR”, signifying “command, control,
communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance”; these
efforts were developed with assistance from the U.S. in a control structure that would protect
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and ensure the U.S.’s interests in keeping terrorists from acquiring
nuclear weapons (Kerr/Nitkin 12 Pak FAS source). Compartmentalization of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons also contributes to the protection of these assets and hinders nonstate actors,
generally without adequate means of fully infiltrating such facilities, from acquiring and using
such weapons for extremist purposes. In the event that Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, it will
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be unlikely that nonstate actors will be able to use such weapons; one concern of Pakistan’s
program was the ability of terrorist or militant factions to gain access to its nuclear weapons, but
the program has been secure for over three decades.
In addition to the unwarranted domestic concerns of Iran, its security environment is not
necessarily insecure. Although Iran does have a history of conflict with Iraq, the ousting of
Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the fall of the Baathist regime has alleviated Iran of its primary
security concern. The role of Israel and the U.S. in Iranian foreign policy, while important in a
rhetorical sense, does not constitute an ongoing conflict between Iran and the West. Pakistan’s
history with India has been marked with more uncertainty and conflict than Iran, and given
Pakistan and India’s refusal to engage in nuclear war despite the prevalence of conventional war,
an important precedent in the region has been set. A nuclear weapon might allow Iran to engage
in more aggressive foreign policy, as the existence of weapons in Pakistan allowed visàvis
India, but the prevailing success of nuclear optimism suggests that Iran will not use its nuclear
weapons. The similar concerns that affected Pakistan affect Iran, and Pakistan’s example as a
Muslim nation that has not allowed fundamentalism to prompt it to act irrationally presents Iran
with a model upon which to base its nuclear policy of the future. Brinksmanship and aggression
might occur in the region as Iran seeks to solidify its position of power, but those actions are far
different than using nuclear weapons to assert dominance. Therefore, after comparing the
similarities and differences between Pakistan and Iran, it can be concluded based on the
information available that Iran will act like Pakistan and will not become an aggressive nuclear
state.
Given the ongoing nature of Iran’s nuclear program, it is difficult to ascertain its full
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extent. However, indications by various intelligence agencies mentioned throughout this paper
allude to the imminency of critical developments in Iran, but the claims of this paper are
speculative. Similarly, the difficulty in finding evidence to support the various proliferation
variables, such as the domestic determinants of proliferation in both countries, leaves a
possibility for future research. Limitations of this paper include a lack of access to confidential or
securitysensitive documents regarding the status of the nuclear programs of both countries and
the difficulty in finding primary sources from both on the domestic role of the nuclear program.
This paper was also limited in the application of statistical analyses due to the qualitative nature
of the speculative claims. It was difficult to find figures regarding the budgets of both countries
as the nuclear programs have remained fairly secretive, so in the absence of concrete data,
implications of the actions and policies of both Pakistan and Iran must suggest the importance of
the trends explained above. In the future, research should seek to quantify the various
proliferation variables associated with Pakistan and Iran in an attempt to link different areas of
proliferation variables, as this paper sought to do qualitatively. However, until Iran performs a
nuclear weapons test and the yield confirms their status as a NWS, future research in this area of
security studies will remain composed of predictive hypotheses.
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VII. APPENDIX
7.1 Acronyms CTBT: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty FMCT: Fissile Material CutOff Treaty IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction NPT: NonProliferation Treaty NNWS: Nonnuclear Weapon State NWFZ: Nuclearweapons Free Zone NWS: Nuclear Weapon State WMD: Weapon of Mass Destruction 7.2 Figures for Section 4.1.1
Figure 4.1.1.A Nuclear Support of Pakistan and India
Figure 4.1.1.B Regional and International Actors in Iranian Balances of Power
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7.3 Figures for Section 4.2
Figure 4.2.A The GDP of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Figure 4.2.B The GDP of the Islamic Republic of Iran
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Table 4.2.A
Sanction Description Text
United States Executive Order 12957 15 March 1995 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the
Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Documen
ts/12957.pdf
United States Executive Order 12959 6 May 1995 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Documen
ts/12959.pdf
United States Executive Order 13382 28 June 2005 Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferators and Their Supporters
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs
/Documents/wmd.pdf
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 31 July 2006 SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS IRAN
SUSPEND URANIUM ENRICHMENT BY 31 AUGUST, OR FACE POSSIBLE ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 23 December 2006 SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON
IRAN FOR FAILURE TO HALT URANIUM ENRICHMENT
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 24 March 2007 SECURITY COUNCIL TOUGHENS SANCTIONS
AGAINST IRAN, ADDS ARMS EMBARGO
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980.doc.htm
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 3 March 2008 SECURITY COUNCIL TIGHTENS
RESTRICTIONS ON IRAN’S PROLIFERATION SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, INCREASES VIGILANCE OVER IRANIAN BANKS, HAS STATES INSPECT CARGO
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835 27 September 2008 SECURITY COUNCIL REAFFIRMS EARLIER
RESOLUTIONS ON IRAN’S URANIUM ENRICHMENT, CALLS ON COUNTRY TO COMPLY WITH OBLIGATIONS ‘FULLY AND WITHOUT DELAY’
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9459.doc.htm
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 9 June 2010 SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSES ADDITIONAL
SANCTIONS ON IRAN
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm
United States Executive Order 13553 28 September 2010 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to
Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Documen
ts/13553.pdf
United States Executive Order 13574 23 May 2011 Concerning Further Sanctions on Iran
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/2011/05/23/executiveorderconcerningfurth
ersanctionsiran
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1984 9 June 2011 SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES EXPERT
PANEL HELPING TO MONITOR SANCTIONS ON IRAN TO CONTINUE WORK UNTIL JUNE 2012
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10276.doc.htm
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United States Executive Order 13590 21 November 2011 Iran Sanctions
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/2011/11/21/executiveorder13590iransanct
ions
European Union Council Regulation No. 267/2012 23 March 2012 COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 267/2012 of 23
March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:088:0001:0112:EN:P
DF
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2049 7 June 2012 SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS MANDATE OF
EXPERT PANEL MONITORING IRAN SANCTIONS UNTIL JULY 2013
https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10666.doc.ht
m