The impact of democratic governance on economic growth … Fall09/DPI403... · The impact of...
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DPI 403 Class 4
The impact of democratic governance on economic growth and social welfare
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Structure of the class I. Recap: Democratic Governance
II. Advocacy: does democratic governance matter instrumentally for development?
III. Does democratic governance lead to economic growth?
IV. Does democratic governance lead to social welfare?
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Required readings(1)Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. ‘Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions
over geography and integration in economic development.’ Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2): 131‐165.DOI: 10.1023/B:JOEG.0000031425.72248.85
(2) Ross, Michael. 2006. ‘Is democracy good for the poor?’ American Journal of Political Science 50(4): 860‐874. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4122920 DOI: 10.1111/j.1540‐5907.2006.00220.x
(3) Siegle, Joseph T., Michael Weinstein and Morton Halperin. 2004. ‘Why democracies excel.’ Foreign Affairs 83(5):57‐72. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20034067 Permalink: http://ezp‐prod1.hul.harvard.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=14348325&site=ehost‐live&scope=site
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I. Does democratic governance matter instrumentally for development?
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DEMOCRACY
RESTRICTED VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
INCLUSIVE VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
GO
VER
NA
NC
E EXPANDED GOVERNANCE CAPACITY
Bureaucratic autocraciesE.g. China
Bureaucratic democracies E.g. Canada
LIMITED GOVERNANCE CAPACITY
Patrimonial autocraciesE.g. Zimbabwe
Patrimonial democraciesE.g. Mali
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The debate about impactEconomic prosperity Social welfare
Positive impact Good governance (rule
of law, property rights )
lead to growth (Rodrik et
al)
Democracy strengthens
development (Siegle et
al)
No significant impact Democracy has no
significant impact
(Przeworski)
Democracy has no
impact on health
indicators (Ross)
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II. Does democratic governance lead to economic growth?
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The debate about impactEconomic prosperity Social welfare
Positive impact Good governance (rule
of law, property rights )
lead to growth (Rodrik et
al)
Democracy strengthens
development (Siegle et
al)
No significant impact Democracy has no
significant impact
(Przeworski)
Democracy has no
impact on health
indicators (Ross)
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Why? Plausible reasons?
Elected leaders have strong incentives to respond to social needs
Democracy has checks and balances Open flow of information, transparency, less
corruption Democratic adaptability and smooth leadership
succession, more predictability Commitment to rule of law Feedback learning, trial-and-error
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Systems model of public policy process (David Easton)
Policy-making institutions
ExecutiveLegislatureJudiciary
Outputs Outcomes
Groups
Media
PartiesPublicOpinion
Elections
Feedback learning
Agenda-setting >> Decision-making >> Implementation>>
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Rodrik et al ‘Institutions Rule’
Economic growth
Geography(Climate,
resources, transport, health, communications,
agriculture)
Trade(markets)
Institutions (property rights,
rule of law)
Endogeneity? Reverse causality? Instrumental variables
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Rodrik model
Geography(distance from
equator)
Integration (ratio trade/GDP)
Institutions.
Income level(GDP per capita
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Institutional variables
Institutions= property rights and rule of law Measured by Kaufmann-Kraay/World
Bank Settler mortality rates (Acemoglu 2001) Instruments are measured by settler
mortality rates (79 nations) and by % speaking West European languages (137 nations)
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Rodrik Conclusions “The quality of institutions trumps everything
else. Once institutions are controlled for, integration has no direct effect on incomes, while geography has at best weak direct effects.” p135.
Alternative measures, robust results Instrument not an explanation: colonial history? Policy implications? ‘Not much at all’ (!) eg
varied property rights in China and Russia Strengths and limits of this account?
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The debate about impactEconomic prosperity Social welfare
Positive impact Good governance (rule
of law, property rights )
lead to growth (Rodrik et
al)
Democracy strengthens
development (Siegle et
al)
No significant impact Democracy has no
significant impact
(Przeworski)
Democracy has no
impact on health
indicators (Ross)
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Przeworski et al. ‘No’
Adam Przeworksi, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limogi. 2000. Democracy and Development. (CUP) Ch3
Does democracy undermine growth? Growth rates of productive inputs
Investment share in GDP Probit model controlling for income, Britcol, religion
Unit of measurement: type of regime per year 1950-1990 (dictatorship v. democracy)
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Przeworski et al.
Conclusions: “There is no trade-off between democracy and development, not even in poor countries.” p178.
In poor countries (with incomes below $3,000), the two regimes are almost identical in their: Investment shares Growth of capital stock Growth of labor force Output per worker Product wages
Democracy need not be sacrificed to economic development
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Przeworski et al. Yet important distinction between rich and poor nations Poor nations invest little, get little value from total factor
productivity and pay low wages Most poor nations remain poor Regimes make no difference for growth Democracy is fragile in poor nations so most have dictatorships
More affluent nations ($2500-3000+) Total growth rates similar for dictatorships and democracies Yet reasons for growth differ…
Wealthy dictatorship grow by using a lot of labor and paying low wages (repressing unions) – labor-intensive productivity, higher birth rates/fertility but shorter longevity (esp. for women)
Wealthy democracies grow by using labor more effectively: slower population and labor growth rates but higher wages, benefit more from technical progress
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Przeworski et al. conclusions
The kind of regime does not affect the rate of investment, the growth of capital stock (p153), or the growth of total income (p156)
“There is no trade-off between democracy and development, not even in poor countries.” P.178
“Much ado about nothing.” Strengths and limits of this account? Why the contrasts with Rodrik’s account?
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III. Does democracy lead to social welfare?
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The debate about impactEconomic prosperity Social welfare
Positive impact Good governance (rule
of law, property rights )
lead to growth (Rodrik et
al)
Democracy strengthens
development (Siegle et
al)
No significant impact Democracy has no
significant impact
(Przeworski)
Democracy has no
impact on health
indicators (Ross)
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Ross ‘No’ AJPS 2006 “Is democracy good for the poor?” Democracy is linked to higher spending on
health, education, and social security Yet “Democracy has little or no effect on infant
and child mortality.” Previous studies fail to control for country-
specific effects and for global health trends, and they have sample bias (autocratic states often have missing data)
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Ross’s model 168 states 1970-2000 pop over 200,000 5 year panels Dep var=logged infant and child mortality Independent var=Polity IV democracy-autocracy scale Control for income, pop density, econ growth, HIV-Aids Missing data imputed (Amelia) OLS panel-corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) and
lagged dependent var A fixed effects model (controls for country-specific
effects but underestimates sig of slow/stable vars)
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Ross
No relationship between type of regime and infant/child mortality rates
Why? “We know little…” Incomplete information by voters? Weak channels of accountability? Strengths and weaknesses of this study?
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The debate about impactEconomic prosperity Social welfare
Positive impact Good governance (rule
of law, property rights )
lead to growth (Rodrik et
al)
Democracy strengthens
development (Siegle et
al)
No significant impact Democracy has no
significant impact
(Przeworski)
Democracy has no
impact on health
indicators (Ross)
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Siegle et al ‘Yes’ From Morton Halperin, Joseph Siegle and Michael Weinstein. 2005.
The Democracy Advantage NY: Routledge Democracies consistently out-perform autocracies in the developing
world Classify regimes by Polity IV index Compare low-income nations (GDP under $2000 constant 1995
dollar terms) World Bank data 1960-2001 No difference found in levels of economic growth Better measures of well-being
Life expectancy, access to clean water, literacy, health services, infaqnt mortality
Avoid humanitarian crisis and severe economic contractions
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Halperin, Siegle and WeinsteinClassification of nations Compare all nation states 1960 to 2001 Low-income nations (per capita less than
$2000) Contrast low-income autocracies and
democracies Classification by Polity IV
Ref: Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein
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Halperin, Siegle and WeinsteinConcepts Democracy: “Governance systems in
which national leaders are selected through free and fair elections, there are institutions that foster a shared distribution of power, and citizens have extensive opportunities to participate in political life.”
Polity IV democracy index
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Use Polity IV index
Rates 161 states every year since 1800 0-10 scale
Constraints on the chief executive (1-4) (Independence of the chief executive)
The competitiveness of executive recruitment (1-2) (Extent to which chief executive is chosen through competitive elections)
The openness of executive recruitment (1) (Opportunities for non-elites to attain executive office)
The competitiveness of popular participation (1-3) (Extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression)
Democracies: score 8 to 10 Intermediary states: 3 to 7 Autocracies: score 0 to 2
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Halperin, Siegle and WeinsteinEconomic Growth Among all countries, democracies have realized
consistently higher levels of economic growth from 1960-2001 (2.3% vs. 1.6%).
Among low-income countries, no difference in per capita growth in GDP between democracies and autocracies (1.5% to 1.3%) (confirms Przeworski) When East Asia is removed, the authoritarian growth
rate of growth drops while the democratic rate remains steady
Low income democracies have less volatile growth Note: prob. of missing/unreliable data for autocracies
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Halperin, Siegle and WeinsteinEconomic indicators
0.74
3.26
-0.15
2.66
1
3.16
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
PerCap GDP Growth 1975-2002 GNP Annual Growth 1975-95
AutocracyMixedDemocracy
Note: Poor nations only (GDP/cap under $2000)
Polity DEMOC: 35 Autocracies, 25 Mixed, 16 Democracies
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Halperin, Siegle and WeinsteinEast Asian exceptionalism? What of S. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,
Vietnam, Indonesia and China? Rapid growth under autocracies. Exceptions. Why? Pursuit of market economics Access to capital markets Constraints on leaders Relative social equality Openness to Western markets Security interests
Also failures (Burma, Cambodia, N. Korea)
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Halperin, Siegle and WeinsteinSocial indicators On average, low income democracies
consistently have superior levels of welfare across various measures of human development
Life expectancy Secondary school enrollment Agricultural production Childhood mortality HDI
Growing divergence in recent decades Due to greater effectiveness NOT higher welfare
spending (eg education)
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Halperin, Siegle and WeinsteinSocial Indicators
90
75
114
54
107
74
116
55
29
43
6067
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Aids/100000 InfantMortality ChildMortality LifeExp
AutocracyMixedDemocracy
Note: Poor nations only (GDP/cap under $2000)
Polity DEMOC 35 Autocracies, 25 Mixed, 16 Democracies
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Halperin, Siegle and WeinsteinSocial Indicators
90
75
114
54
107
74
116
55
29
43
6067
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Aids/100000 InfantMortality ChildMortality LifeExp
AutocracyMixedDemocracy
Note: Poor nations only (GDP/cap under $2000)
Polity DEMOC 35 Autocracies, 25 Mixed, 16 Democracies
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Halperin, Siegle and WeinsteinGovernment expenditure
24.5
4.22.7
9.7
20.2
3.52
10.5
22.9
4.11.6
3.2
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Central Govnt Educ Military Aid rec'd
AutocracyMixedDemocracy
Spending & aid as % GDP.
Poor nations only (GDP/cap under $2000)
Polity DEMOC 35 Autocracies, 25 Mixed, 16 Democracies
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Halperin, Siegle and WeinsteinPolicy implications?Multilateral agencies should prioritize democracies
by…1. Use democratic conditionality when allocating aid
Eg MCA2. Revise charters WB, IMF & regional banks to favor
democratic regimes3. Use democracy-impact statements4. Separate security aid from development aid5. Develop cohesive Development Policy coordination
Council (Sec State, Treasury, MCA, USAID)
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IV. What are the policy implications?
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Advocacy debate: You are asked to break up into discussion pairs. You have 15 minutes allocated for the paired discussions. You are asked to draw upon the readings for this class and your
own arguments and experience. For policy advocacy, you should either argue for or against the
proposition that democratic governance reduces poverty and improves welfare.
Give a series of reasons, ranked in importance using the template overleaf, supported by evidence or case illustrations wherever possible.
After 15 minutes, we will compare the reasons for or against the proposition in plenary, to see if a consensus emerges.
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TemplatePRO: Reasons why democratic governance reduces poverty and
strengthens social welfare.
Evidence, examples, support for this claim
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
CON: Reasons why democratic governance fails to reduce poverty
and strengthen social welfare.
Evidence, examples, support for this claim
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Next classDoes democracy lead to a peace dividend?Class Materials: www.pippanorris.com