The Future of ACP-EU Relations:Scenarios for Post Cotonou 2020

The Future of ACP-EU Relations:

Scenarios for Post Cotonou 2020

Geert Laporte Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

29 September 2016

I. Context of the Post-Cotonou debateII. Current practice of ACP-EU cooperationIII. Scenarios for Post-CotonouIV. State of debate on Post-Cotonou in the ACP and

in the EUV. Options for Austria’s position regarding

Europe’s future relations with the ACP-group

Structure of presentation

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• “Think and do tank” born out of ACP-EU cooperation (1986)

• Non-partisan and independent role• Knowledge broker and dialogue facilitator• In depth political economy of ACP-EU relations and

scenario building

Role ECDPM in ACP-EU

• Evidence-based analysis to understand how things work out in practice and why

• Look beyond policy discourse, legal frameworks and formal institutions

• Focus on political and economic interests and incentives that drive the key players

• Focus on “what is feasible” in the given context rather than on “what should be done” (avoiding normative approaches)

• Drop taboos and political correctness: assess what has (not) worked and why

• Results provide a picture of the present state of cooperation with a view to inspire the identification of realistic & result-oriented scenarios for the future

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I. Context of the Post-Cotonou debate

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• Highly political and polarised debate in “inner circles” of EU and ACP policy makers (Informal Councils under Netherlands and Slovak Presidencies)

• Divided Europe• Heterogeneous ACP Group • Poor knowledge and interest beyond formal ACP-EU

institutions• Time is short to strike a deal involving 79 ACP and 27

(28?) EU countries!

Context of Post-Cotonou debate

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II. Current Practice of ACP-EU Cooperation

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The Cotonou partnership has lost appeal on both sides

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• Trade (EPAs) has moved to RECs

• Security, migration etc. has moved to AU and RECs

• Weak international identity ACP Group

• Limited intra-ACP cooperation beyond projects

• Mainly aid instrument

Erosion of the three pillar structure and political

constraints

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1. Should we continue to treat EU development differently for the ACP?

2. Does Cotonou deliver value for money?3. Does it respond to the growing heterogeneity of

EU and ACP?4. Does ACP Group have an added value

compared to other regional frameworks between Europe and Africa?

5. Can ACP- EU effectively deal with UN Agenda 2030?

Existential questions

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III. Scenarios and analytical tool for policy makers

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1. What is the scenario about?2. On what assumptions is the scenario based?3. What key interests do ACP and EU pursue with this

scenario?4. How realistic are the assumptions and interests?5. What are the thorny questions and political

choices linked to this scenario?6. Balance sheet with advantages, disadvantages

and risks

6 STEPS to assess feasibility of each scenario

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• Continuity with the past• No major changes to

current architecture (tri-continental structure, joint institutions, legal framework,..)

• Corresponds to large extent with scenario 1 of the EU

SCENARIO 1: Keep CPA with revisions

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• Best framework for mutually beneficial relations between A,C,P and EU post 2020

• ACP sufficiently coherent to transform into effective global player that can deliver on universal 2030 Agenda

• It is possible to fix longstanding implementation problems (political dialogue, intra-ACP, co-management, limited joint action in global fora,…)

• Play safe because current climate in EU (Brexit, migration crisis, etc.) is not conducive to big reforms

Assumptions (scenario 1)

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Perceived interests of ACP and EU (scenario 1)

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Perceived interests of the ACP Group

Perceived interests of EU policy makers supporting this scenario

• Keep substantial and predictable aid (EDF) through existing architecture (ACP Secretariat, Committee of Ambassadors, NAOs, joint institutions, UN agencies benefitting from EDF, etc.)

• Safeguard acquis of Cotonou: legal status, articles for political dialogue, provisions regarding EPAs, etc)

• Limited transaction costs by keeping 1 single interlocutor

Political value • CPA eroded to mainly aid instrument• Legal status was not a guarantee for effective political action• ACP limited track record in international fora• Competing alternative frameworks

Ability to deliver on Agenda 2030 • Limited ACP-EU collective action on global public goods &

negotiation of common interests (heterogeneity members)• Aid driven N-S partnership• Global challenges are addressed elsewhere (AU)

Coherence external action• CPA does not fit well with new EU priorities for more coherent

foreign policy (Global Strategy, regionalisation, overlapping policy frameworks- JAES,…)

How realistic are assumptions & interests (scenario 1)?

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• How solid is the assumption that the ACP Group can reinvent itself as a global player and an effective (self- financed) institution?

• Does it make sense to have a major new treaty that will primarily deal with development cooperation?

• How will this scenario accommodate increasing regionalisation and thematic dynamics?

• What concrete value added will an ACP-EU framework have in dealing with Agenda 2030?

Critical questions

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Keep CPA with revisions: Overall balance sheet

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Advantages Disadvantages and risks

• Keep a framework for managing development cooperation with 79 ACP

• Guarantee to the ACP that cooperation will continue, most probably in the form of a legally binding treaty

• Desirable option for risk averse policy makers, especially in view of the turbulent times the EU is currently going through

• Artificial split between ACP and non-ACP in EU external action/development policy

• Difficult negotiations about politically sensitive issues (ICC, LGBT, migration)

• Major ratification challenges • Costly and quite ineffective joint

institutions that often overlap with EPA institutions

• Largely ignore whether the ACP as a Group can transform itself as an effective global player and political interlocutor

• Risk of being bound beyond 2020 to an increasingly ‘empty’ ACP-EU framework (aid)

• Safeguarding acquis (through ACP-EU umbrella agreement) while deepening regional partnerships (e.g separate agreements with regional bodies)

• Preferred scenario DEVCO/EEAS (Scenario 3 Informal Council September 2016)

SCENARIO 2: ACP umbrella linked to regional agreements

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• Current weaknesses of ACP-EU framework can be addressed through umbrella and regional agreements

• Umbrella keeps legally binding provisions for all 3 regions (pol dialogue, addressing sensitive issues migration, ICC, LGTBI, etc)

• Regional strategies (JAES including North Africa & JCEUS) can be consolidated

• Functional division of labour between ACP and the continental (AU) and regional bodies

Assumptions (Scenario 2)

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• Continuity of an all-ACP-EU legally binding agreement

• Keeping the ACP and the joint institutions largely intact

• Functional task division between the all-ACP level and the regions (subsidiarity/complementarity)

• Increasing the policy space for the RECs to further develop their own external policy towards Europe while benefitting from wider tri-continental Group and South-South cooperation

• Keep acquis of the CPA: legal status, channels for bilateral political dialogue (Articles 8 and 96) migration (art 13) or EPAs

• Deepening and widening the political partnership with Africa as a whole, including North Africa

• Tackle core EU interests (e.g. security, migration, etc.) through regional strategies (e.g. EU-Sahel, EU-Horn of Africa)

• Keep EDF that allows to flexibly fund EU priorities (without lengthy internal negotiations-(e.g. Africa Peace Facility.

Political value • Unclear added value of overarching all ACP structure• The political partnership between the EU and the AU will

continue to get priority over EU-ACP (e.g. joint summits EU-Africa)

• Despite a mixed track record, regional integration and co-operation will remain a political priority for the EU.

• The EU Global Strategy (2016) does not refer to the ACP-EU partnership. References to the Caribbean and the Pacific are scarce and framed in a wider geographic context (e.g. Caribbean and Latin America or the wider Asia-Pacific region). Even for Africa, the focus is on specific geographic sub-groups of African states that are central to the EU’s strategic interests.


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Ability to deliver on Agenda 2030• Limited track record and unclear role of the all-ACP Group as

an umbrella to undertake collective action on global public goods due to their growing heterogeneity

• The EU and the ACP regions increasingly look for other institutional channels (than the ACP-EU framework) to deal with global challenges: Valetta process (2015) with African leaders on migration; peace and security with AU; food security with UN related bodies as well as continental and regional structures; climate change through thematic groupings (e.g. SIDS) etc…


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Coherence external action• Strengthening the regional dimension is coherent with

regionalisation dynamics both in the EU and the A, the C and the P

• Possibility of ensuring a more differentiated approach tailored to the needs of each region and the EU’s priorities at stake

• There are doubts about the capacity from the side of the EU and the ACP to rationalise the ‘patchwork’ of regional cooperation frameworks

• Maintaining an all-ACP umbrella structure may reduce coherence and lead to higher institutional costs (e.g. complex structures and lengthy debates on who does what)


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1. How far do the various parties want to go in putting ‘regionalisation first’ in a future agreement?

2. What do the various parties want to put under an ACP-EU umbrella agreement?

3. Where does the ACP Group enjoy recognised value added by its members?

4. How to effectively and efficiently manage such a complex set of structures at two levels (All ACP and regions)

Critical questions

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Umbrella scenario: Overall balance sheet

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• Potential to combine “the best of two worlds” with a clear distinction between principles (in umbrella agreement) and specific regional arrangements with the A, the C and the P

• Continuity of (most of) current ACP-EU institutions

• A more differentiated approach according to the needs of each region and the EU’s priorities

• Complicated and simultaneous negotiating processes at ACP-EU and regional-EU levels

• Unclear complementarity between possible umbrella agreement and specific EU-RECs agreements

• Unclear added value of ACP-EU umbrella structure to deliver on global public goods

• De facto external action of EU with A,C,P increasingly takes place with regional groupings

• Post Cotonou 2020 provides opportunity to organise relations directly around regional dynamics without all-ACP structure

• Corresponds with scenario 2 of Comms/ EEAS

SCENARIO 3: Regionalisation

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• RECs are no longer building blocks of ACP• No added value of ACP-EU umbrella- CPA acquis can be

incorporated in regional partnerships• Regionalisation as the driving force behind EU’s foreign

policy • More homogenous and effective regional interlocutors to

deliver global public goods


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Perceived interests of ACP and EU for scenario 3 (regionalisation)

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• Deepening of the political partnership of Africa (mainly through the AU), the Caribbean and the Pacific with the EU

• Increasing the policy space for the various regions and sub-regional groupings in the ACP in their relations with the EU

• The interest of the Caribbean and the Pacific in this scenario largely depends on the ‘offer’ the EU can make in terms of an alternative deal to the CPA (Caribbean and Pacific reluctant to be part of respectively EU-LA and wider geopolitical Asian partnership

• Deepening political partnership with Africa (as a whole) and to a lesser extent with the C and P

• In a highly competitive world consolidating the EU’s position as a key international partner for RECs in Africa, the C and P

• Using ODA and other external action tools to tackle core EU interests (e.g. security, migration, trade) through targeted RECs

• Having credible regional partners to jointly deliver on the 2030 Agenda

• Ensuring coherence with the geographic focus of the EU Global Strategy (2016)

Political value • Despite mixed track record and some set-backs RI

will remain top priority for the EU• Trend in EU to go regional to conclude political

deals (e.g. Global Strategy)• Political partnership EU-AU more important to deal

with joint challenges (P&S, migration,..)• Concerns on whether EU and the regions can

manage simultaneous negotiation processes with several RECs


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Ability to deliver on Agenda 2030 • EU and ACP regions increasingly look for other

institutional fora to deal with global challenges• RECs may have more legitimacy but the are

confronted with similar problems of legitimacy, autonomy, self financing and therefore do no provide guarantees that results will be spectacularly better…


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Coherence external action • Coherent with regionalisation dynamics• Potential for differentiation tailored to the needs of

each region and the EU’s strategic priorities• Doubts about capacity and preparedness EU and

ACP to rationalise patchwork of regional cooperation frameworks


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1. Is the EU looking for strategic partners at regional level or implementing bodies for development cooperation?

2. Is a regionalisation scenario possible without the marginalisation of the C and P regions?

3. What will be status of the regional agreements that replace the ACP-EU framework? Is it politically desirable/feasible to negotiate a comprehensive and legally binding agreement (like the CPA) with specific regions?

4. What relation will be maintained with the ACP Group?

Critical questions

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Regionalisation: Overall balance sheet

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• Regional approach coherent with evolution of international relations and major changes in the external action of both the EU and ACP

• Opportunity to differentiate and customise EU external action with A, C, P according to interests

• Coherence with the logic of the universal 2030 Agenda and global goals

• Negotiations on a follow-up treaty to the CPA – which are likely to be difficult – could be avoided

• Complexity of implementing such a differentiated regional approach in practice

• Fear that the acquis of the CPA as such would be lost, especially without a legally binding treaty

• Risk that the C and the P are marginalised in EU external action

• Need for major adjustments in the institutional set-up and (financial) instruments

• Engage on the basis of shared interests both regional and functional

SCENARIO 4: Mixed regional and thematic multi-actor partnerships

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• Modern international cooperation = functional, based on shared values and interests not on historic or N-S logics

• Today’s multipolar world require a menu of strategic partnerships where political deals can be concluded on global public goods

• An open-ended and interest-driven approach to partnership is coherent with the evolving nature of the external action as conducted by both the EU and the regions of the A, C and P

• The EU and the A,C, P regions have the political and institutional interest and capacity to conceive and implement a transition towards a portfolio approach

• Brexit may further erode the legitimacy of the ACP-EU as a postcolonial construction


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• In line with ACP Group ambition to become a global player with diversified strategic partners (including EU)

• AU diversified its strategic partnerships with and beyond the EU (e.g. China, India, Latin America, Turkey, etc.)

• RECs may be open to deepen partnership relations with the EU, particularly to address shared priorities.

• Caribbean and the Pacific increasingly ‘going regional’ by linking up with countries in their direct neighbourhood (South America, Asia) or seek to defend their interests through specific thematic (global) groupings (SIDS)

• Beyond 2020, the application of the differentiation principle means that traditional aid benefits will further diminish

• Deepening political partnership with Africa (as a whole) and with sub-regions and groups of countries

• Address core EU interests (e.g. migration, security, Agenda 2030) through regional structures and thematic groupings

• Ensuring coherence with the EU Global Strategy by focusing on strategic regions and countries in the proximity of Europe, such as North Africa, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa

• Reducing transaction costs by dealing directly with the regional bodies and issue-driven thematic groupings

Political value • New approach to international relations• More differentiation• In line with EU Global Strategy and consensus• Uncertain political value for the ACP Group because

of likely competition with RECs


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Ability to deliver on Global public Goods (Agenda 2030) • Global challenges increasingly structured around

regional but also functional lines• Collective action EU and RECs and functional

groupings still in infancy stage• Most groupings confronted with problems of

legitimacy, capacity, funding etc. affecting their capacity to deliver on GPG


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Coherence external action• Consistent with EU Global Strategy’s ambition to

reform EU external action towards greater alignment with EU strategic interests

• Allows to treat Africa as 1 continent and revitalise EU-Africa partnership

• Incorporate EDF in the EU budget and reduce the number of financial instruments

How realistic are assumptions & interests of scenario 4?

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1. Are the benefits and practical implications of this scenario sufficiently clear?

2. What are the risks of such a ‘portfolio’ approach to future cooperation and how can they be mitigated

3. Is the scenario possible without the marginalisation of the Caribbean and Pacific regions and how?

4. Can the EU manage such a far-reaching reform of its partnerships and instruments?

Critical questions

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Mixed regional& thematic multi-actor partnerships: Overall balance sheet

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• Coherent with evolution of international relations and major changes in the external action of both the EU and ACP regions/countries

• Opportunity to differentiate and customise EU and A, C, P external action

• Coherence with the logic of the universal 2030 Agenda

• Negotiations on a follow-up treaty to the CPA – which are likely to be difficult – could be avoided

• Complexity of implementing such a differentiated approach in practice

• Fear for loss of acquis (e.g. legally binding treaty)

• Need for major adjustments in the institutional set-up and EU (financial) instruments

• Interest-driven cooperation may lead to short-sighted EU policies incompatible with development objectives

• Requires political leadership, institutional creativity, risk taking which may not be available in EU or in the A, C and P regions

IV. State of the debate on Post Cotonou in the ACP

and the EU

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• Very ambitious agenda as a global player, partnerships beyond EU, financial sustainability …but not always realistic

• Critical reflections Chair ACP Ambassadors: “Are we as ACP member states serious about our own institution. If not why should the EU take the ACP seriously?...We must put something on the table to the EU and have them to react to our ideas”

• Retreat Ambassadors 5-6 November 2016 (contours of future partnership with EU and operationalisation EPG report)

• Action Plan for implementation on priorities on which there is convergence across the various regions (for Ministerial Council of November 2016 and after approval to be shared with the EU)

• Crucial role RECs in A,C, P but very distant so far

State of the debate in the ACP

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TWO CAMPS: ➢ GROUP 1: Revision/ modernisation (legal framework,

integrate SDGs, modernisation institutions, into some type of Cotonou II: F, ES, PT, IT, LUX

➢ GROUP 2: fundamental change; most other countries led by D, NL, DK, UK, POL, FIN, CZ, LET, SW,… “like minded”

➢ Impact Brexit on Post Cotonou debate?➢ Joint Staff Working document: not an independent

evaluation, not evidence based rather reflection paper➢ November: Communication Commission➢ Towards umbrella option as a compromise?

State of the debate in the EU

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• ……• …….• ……• …..• …..

V. Options for Austria’s position

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Thank youGeert [email protected] www.ecdpm.org

http://www.ecdpm.org/

The Future of ACP-EU Relations:Scenarios for Post Cotonou 2020

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