THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP AND …

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP AND ITS IMPACT ON LATIN AMERICA

Fabián NovakSandra Namihas

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP AND ITS IMPACT ON LATIN AMERICA

The Foreign Policy of President Donald Trump and its impact on Latin AmericaIssue: 500 copies

1st ed., December 2018Statutory Deposit at the National Library of Peru Number 2018-16200ISBN N° 978-9972-671-56-2

© PontificiaUniversidadCatólicadelPerú Instituto de Estudios Internacionales (IDEI)

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Authors: FabiánNovak,PontificiaUniversidadCatólicadelPerúSandraNamihas,PontificiaUniversidadCatólicadelPerú

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Index

Prologue .......................................................................................................................................... 11

Chapter I: Summary of the United States of America Foreign Policy vis-a-vis Latin America and the Caribbean between 1826 and 2017 ............................................................................ 13

1.1. EvolutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaForeignPolicy vis-a-visLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean .......................................................... 131.1.1. Fromisolationismtoexpansionismandinterventionism

(1826-1933) ....................................................................................................... 131.1.2. Roosevelt’sgoodneighborpolicy (1933-1945) ................................. 191.1.3. Truman’sandEisenhower’slackofinterestintheregion

(1945-1961) ..................................................................................................... 231.1.4. Kennedy’sAllianceforProgress(1961-1963) .................................... 271.1.5. The end of the Alliance for Progress (1963-1974) ............................ 301.1.6. ThesterileattemptsbyFordandCartertoapproach

the region (1974-1981) ................................................................................ 331.1.7. Reagan,between“friendly”autocraticandtotalitarian

regimes (1981-1989) ..................................................................................... 381.1.8. ThereturntogoodrelationshipswithGeorgeH.W.Bush

(1989-1993) ....................................................................................................... 411.1.9. BillClinton,expansionofdemocracyintheregion

andfrustrationwiththeFTAA(1993-2001) ....................................... 451.1.10. GeorgeW.Bush’snationalsecuritydoctrine (2001-2009) ........... 491.1.11. BarakObamaandhisapproachtotheregion (2009-2017) ......... 51

1.2. DistinctivefeaturesorpermanentguidelinesofUSforeignpolicy towardstheregion .......................................................................................................... 55

8 | The Foreign Policy of President Donald Trump and its impact on Latin America

Chapter II: President Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Guidelines in Connection to Europe, Asia and the Middle East ......................... 59

2.1. Europe ................................................................................................................................. 602.2. Russia ................................................................................................................................. 632.3. ChinaandEastAsia ..................................................................................................... 652.4. Middle East ..................................................................................................................... 742.5. South Asia ........................................................................................................................ 792.6. Southeast Asia ............................................................................................................... 84

Chapter III: President Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Vis-a-Vis Latin America and the Caribbean ..................................................... 87

3.1. SelectiveDefenseofDemocracy ............................................................................ 873.2. Hostilityforsomeandpoliticalcordialityforothers .................................... 903.3. Hardeningagainstimmigration ............................................................................. 953.4. Impact on free trade ..................................................................................................1023.5. Decrease of cooperation ..........................................................................................1073.6. Denying climate change and disregarding

environmentalcommitments ................................................................................110

Chapter IV: General and Distinctive Characteristics of President Trump’s Foreign Policy ........................................................................117

References ...................................................................................................................................127

Acknowledgments

The authors of this book wish to express their special acknowledgment to Soledad Castillo Jara, Italo Laiza Cuyubamba and Ana Paola Vergara Lamadrid, for their collaboration in collecting information for this work. Their great sense of responsibility and diligence in research signals a successful path for them in interna-tional studies.

Prologue

DonaldTrump’selectionaspresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericahasgivenrisetovariousacademic,journalisticandbiographicalpublications,whichnotonly try to portray his characteristics, but also analyze the policies that he has beendevelopingbothinternallyandexternally,aswellastheirimpactacrosstheworld.

AndthisisbecauseTrumpshowedsignsthatwereunusualinAmericanpoliticssincetheelectioncampaign,whichcausedconfusionandevenfearamonghishistoricalliesand,evenmoreso,amonghisrivals.

Inthisregard,theInstituteofInternationalStudies(IDEI)ofthePontificalCath-olicUniversityofPeru,supportedbytheKonradAdenauerFoundation(KAS),considereditimportanttodeveloparesearchprojectthatwouldpreciselyan-alyzethecharacteristicsofPresidentTrump’sforeignpolicy,establishitssim-ilaritiesanddifferenceswiththepoliciesexecutedbyotherUSpresidents,andmeasure the impact that thispolicyhasbeenhaving indifferentpartsof theworld,particularlyinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.

Todoso, theauthorsdecided todivide thework into fourparts.The first isintendedtoreviewtheforeignpolicyoftheUnitedStatesofAmericatowardsLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanbetween1826and2016,inordertoestablishthedifferentfeaturesorpermanentguidelinesofthispolicytowardstheregion.

ThesecondanalyzesPresidentDonaldTrump’sforeignpolicyguidelinesinre-lationtoEurope,AsiaandtheMiddleEast,whilethethirdpartexclusivelydealswiththefeaturesofthispolicytowardstheLatinAmericanandCaribbeanre-gion.Inthissense,Trump’spolicyisstudiedinitscommercial,migratory,envi-ronmental, democracy, cooperation, and other aspects.

Finally,basedontheinformationanalyzedinthethreepreviouschapters,thefourthpartofthisworkdevelopsthegeneralanddistinctivecharacteristicsofforeignpolicythatPresidentTrumphasexecutedduringthefirst20monthsofhis term, that is, from January 2017 to September 2018.

Preparingthisworkhasrequiredwidereadingofliteraturerelatednotonlytothe history of American foreign policy but also to the current policy executed by presidentTrump;hencenotonlyscholarlysourcesbutalsojournalisticsourceshavebeenusedforthelatterperiod.

Itshouldbenotedthattheanalysiscarriedoutinthisworkisbasedonforeignpolicy actions executed by President Trump and not on statements or proposals thathavenotbeenmaterialized.Thisisdonewiththepurposeofbeingobjec-tiveandtruthfulandnotfallingintothefieldofspeculation.

Definitely,alimitationforthedraftingofthisbookwasthefactthatPresidentTrumpishalfwayinhisadministrationterm.However,wealsobelievethatsuf-ficient timehaselapsedandnumerous important foreignpolicyactionshavebeencarriedoutthatallowdrawingsignificantconclusions.

Finally,wewouldliketoexpressourgratitudetotheKonradAdenauerFounda-tionandespeciallytoitsrepresentative,SebastianGrundberger,fortheinvalu-ablesupportprovidedtothisproject.

The authors

Plaza Francia, September 25, 2018

Chapter ISummary of the United States of America Foreign Policy vis-a-vis Latin America and the Caribbean

between 1826 and 2016

1.1. Evolution of the United States of America Foreign Policy vis-a-vis Lat-in America and the Caribbean

1.1.1. From isolationism to expansionism and interventionism (1826-1933)Sinceitsindependence,thefoundersoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica(USA)as-sumedthat theyhadamissionto fulfill in theworld, that is, theysawthem-selvesasachosenpeopletoleadtheworld;thiswasknownasthe“Americanexceptionalism”1.However,inparallel,sinceGeorgeWashingtontimes,theUSAkeptastrongisolationism(theso-called“splendidisolationism”)inordernottobecontaminatedwiththeproblemsthatprevailedinotherpartsoftheworld,especiallyinEurope.Thus,Washington,inhisfarewellspeechofSeptember17,1796,understoodthatitwas“unwiseinustoimplicateourselvesbyartificialtiesintheordinaryvicissitudesofher[Europe’s]politics,ortheordinarycom-binationsandcollisionsofherfriendshipsorenmities.Ourdetachedanddis-tantsituationinvitesandenablesustopursueadifferentcourse[...]”(Kissinger,2001, p.26).

Theideawas,toagreatextent,tobecomestrengthenedasaStatebeforeem-barkingontheadventureofseekingglobal leadership(Calderón,2000,pp.9-10). Likewise, this isolationism should be extended to the entire Americancontinent,astheUnitedStatesunderstoodfromthebeginningthat itwas itsnaturalareaofinfluence.

In this sense, thewords uttered by the third president of theUnited States,ThomasJefferson(1801-1809)whenreferringtothiscontinent,arerevealing:

[…]inwhatevergovernmentstheyend,theywillbeAmericangovernments,nolonger to be involved in the never-ceasing broils of Europe [...] America has ahemisphere to itself: itmusthave its separate systemof interests,whichmustnotbesubordinatedtothoseofEurope.TheinsulatedstateinwhichnaturehasplacedtheAmericancontinentshouldsofaravailitthatnosparkofwarkindledintheotherquartersoftheglobeshouldbewaftedacrossthewideoceanswhichseparateusfromthem.Anditwillbeso.(Raymont,2007,pp.29-30)

1 ThisisavisionthathasmarkedAmericanpoliticsallalongitshistory.Inthatregard,AbrahamLincoln characterized theUSA as “the last best hope of Earth,”GeorgeW.BushpointedoutthatAmericaistheonlyonequalifiedtoleadtheworld,”whileBarackObamastated:“IbelieveinAmericanexceptionalism”(Odriozola,2017).


In1823, the fifthUSpresident, JamesMonroe(1817-1825),clearlydefendedtheseparationbetweentheNewWorldandEurope,becausehealsounderstoodthattheOldWorldpowerstrugglesdidnotharmonizewithAmerica’shistoricmission,whichwastoachievealifeofpeace,freedomandjustice.Evenwhenpronouncinghisfamousphrase“AmericafortheAmericans”2 Monroe intended tosendaclearmessagetoEurope,wheretheSpanishandPortugueseempiresaimedatkeepingorrecoveringtheircolonies.Itwashenceadoctrinethatwasessentiallydefensiveinitsorigins,becauseitsoughttorejectanyarmedexpedi-tionoftheHolyAlliancethatsoughttodestabilizethenascentAmericanrepub-lics,notingthatsuchapurposewouldimplyanunfriendlyattitudetowardtheUnitedStates.3(Merk,1966,pp.11-21;Mendieta,Espinosa-Saldaña,Escalante,Jiménez,Farje,Arequipeño,andCanepa,1993).

Beyondtheaforementioned,thisdoctrinedidnotmeanthattheUShadspecialconcern for the affairs of the American continent, as demonstrated by its min-imalparticipationin1826intheCongressofPanamaconvenedbySimonBolí-varorbyitsalmostnullinterventioninthewarsofindependenceintheregionwiththeexceptionofCubain1898.ItwasallaboutpreservingAmericafreeofalloutsideinfluence.

However,theMonroedoctrineevolvedovertime,adoptingacontentthatwasdifferentfromtheoneitoriginallyhad(defensivecharacter)andbecametherationale of the American expansionism of that time. And it is that Monroe himselfwouldcometodefendtheexpansionoftheUnitedStatestowardstheWest,sinceheunderstoodthatitwasnecessarytobecomeagreatpower,notperceivingthatitcontradicteditsinitialapproach.Monroe,verbatim,point-ed out:

Itmustbeobviousforall,thatthefurthertheexpansioniscarried,pro-vided itbenotbeyond the just limit, thegreaterwillbe the freedomofactiontobothgovernments[stateandfederal]andthemoreperfecttheirsecurity;andinallotherrespects,thebettertheeffectwillbetothewholeAmericanpeople.Extentofterritory,whetheritbegreatorsmall,givestoanationmanyofitscharacteristics.Itmarkstheextentofitsresources,ofitspopulation,ofitsphysicalforce.Itmarks,inshort,thedifferencebetweenagreatandasmallpower.(Kissinger,2001,p.25)

2 Accordingtoseveralhistorians,theMonroedoctrinewasactuallyformulatedbySec-retaryofState JohnQuincyAdams,whowouldsubsequentlybecomeaUSpresident(1825-1829).3Nonetheless,itmustberememberedthattheUSAdidnotopposetheBritishoccupa-tionoftheMalvinasIslandsin1833anddidnotuseforcetorepeltheFrenchoccupationofMexicoin1862(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,p.3).

Summary of the United States of America Foreign Policy vis-a-vis Latin America and ...| 15

Thus,in1843,PresidentJohnTyler(1841-1845)usedthisdoctrinetojustifyhiscampaigntoannexTexastotheUnionandthenDemocraticPresidentJamesK.Polk(1845-1849)alsousedittoannexhalfoftheMexicanterritorytotheUS,andeventopromoteanexpansionistprogramthatincludedCuba,apolicythatwasonlytemporarilyhaltedbytheCivilWar(Smith,1984,pp.246-247,Mendi-etaetal,1993).Then,in1868,PresidentAndrewJohnsonresumedexpansion-ism,butthistimebybuyingAlaska(Kissinger,2001,p.31).

AnotherUSaxiomwasaddedtotheMonroeDoctrinethatwouldreinforceitsexpansionism,werefertotheso-called“manifestdestiny”,accordingtowhichtheUSwaspredestinedto leadnotonlytheAmericancontinentbutalsotheworld.

This thoughtwas theworkof theAmerican journalist JohnO ‘SullivanwhenreferringtothequestionoftheannexationofTexasandOregon(Garrido,2012,p.47). Specifically, in his article entitled “Annexation,” published in theDem-ocraticReview in1845,henoted: “The fulfillmentofourmanifestdestiny tooverspread the continentallottedbyProvidenceforthefreedevelopmentofouryearlymultiplyingmillions”.

Otherauthors,however,attributethisproposaltothesouthernjournalistandpublicistJ.D.B.deBow,whopointedoutin1850:

Wehaveadestinytoperform,“amanifestdestiny”overMexico,overSouthAmer-ica,overtheWestIndiesandCanada.TheSandwichIslandsareasnecessaryforoureastern,asthegulfIslestoourwesterncommerce.ThegatesoftheChineseempiremustbethrowndownbythemenoftheSacramentoandtheOregon,andthe haughty Japanese tramplers upon the cross be enlightened in the doctrines of republicanismandtheballotbox.TheeagleoftherepublicshallpoiseitselfoverthefieldofWaterloo,aftertracingitsflightamongthegorgesoftheHimalayaortheUralMountains,andasuccessorofWashingtonascendthechairofuniversalempire!(Comellas,2001,p.57)

ItisalsoduringthosetimesthattheuseofthewordAmericawasborntorefertotheUnitedStatesandnottotheentirecontinent,evenusingthe“American”nametorefertoitsnationals,althoughinrealityitincludesallthenativesoftheAmericas(Ospina,2012,p.44).

Towardstheendof the19thcentury, theUSAsoughttoapproachtherestofthecountriesoftheAmericancontinentwiththepurposeofconsolidatingtheirleadership through consensus. This occurred in 1889when JamesG. Blaine,SecretaryofStateofthatcountry,underthepresidencyofRepublicanBenjaminHarrison(1889-1893),convenedtheFirstInternationalConferenceofAmeri-canStatesinWashingtonD.C.todiscusstradeanddefenseissuesthatparticu-


larlyinterestedthenorthernpower.Althoughthisinitiativewasreceivedposi-tivelybymostoftheAmericancountries,itwasresistedbyArgentinaandChileduetodifferencesinitscommercialinterests;Thiseventuallyledtoasignifi-cantnumberofUSproposalsintheconferencebeingrejected,althoughitwasacceptedtoestablishthepermanentsecretariatofthatconferenceinWashing-ton(Smith,1984,p.247).Inanycase,beyondsaiddifficulties,thismeetingwasimportantbecauseitinitiatedthemovementknownasPan-Americanismthatlater led to the creationof theOrganizationofAmericanStates (OAS) at the1948 Inter-AmericanConferenceofBogotá (OrregoVicuña, 1992, p.31;Ray-mont, 2007, pp.29 and 31).

Theapproachcontinued in1898,althoughdifferently,when thegovernmentofRepublicanWilliamMcKinley(1897-1901),wasinvolvedjustonceinthein-dependenceofacountry intheregion;werefertoCubavis-a-visSpain.ThissupportwasduetotheUSinterestinstrengtheningtheCaribbeanasitszoneofinfluencebutalsotoconsolidatethewithdrawaloftheSpanishempireintheregion(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,p.3).ThiswasenshrinedintheTreatyofParisofDecember10,1898,signedbetweentheUnitedStatesandSpainandbywhichthelatteryieldedtheislandsofPuertoRico,GuamandthePhilippinestotheUS,andrecognizedtheindependenceofCuba,wheretheUStroopsremaineduntil1903(UrbanejaClerch,1998,p.199).

The US relationship with the region was radically transformed when Republican Theodore Roosevelt took office as president (1901-1909). A successor of the assas-sinated William McKinley, under who he served as vice-president, Roosevelt devel-oped the policy of the big stick, based on a supposed African proverb: “Speak softly and carry a big stick, so you will get far”, seeking to reflect with this the convenience of combining diplomatic persuasion with violence, and pacts and agreements with military interventions. Although Roosevelt had already used such a phrase in 1900, it was in his speech in Minnessota, on September 2, 1901, that he made it official (Linares, 1993, p.67; ER Services, s / f; Encyclopaedia Britannica, s /F).

In effect, Roosevelt gave the Monroe doctrine as the ideas of “manifest destiny” and of the “civilizing mission”4itsmostinterventionistinterpretation.InhisspeechofDecember6, 1904,heproclaimeda general rightof any “civilizednation”to intervene, a right that only theUShad in theAmerican continent, adding

4 In the19th century,USApropagated that itsAnglo-Saxonculturewas superior toothers,forwhichtheynotonlyhadtherighttoexpandbutalsotocarryoutacivilizingmissionintheplacestheyoccupied.ThisservedasjustificationforoccupyingthePhil-ippines,theHawaiianIslands,Guam,amongothers,whosepopulationsweretheobjectofsuchamission.PresidentMcKinleythenmaintainedthathiswarswere“humanitar-ianmissions”(jpnora,2015,April9;Itulain,2017,July12;Scarfi,2014).


thatitwould,consequently,exerciseitsinternationalpolicepower5 in cases of maliceorincompetenceofagovernmentintheregion,whichthereforeguaran-teedthepresenceofonlylike-mindedgovernmentsregardingtheUnitedStates.(Kissinger, 2001, p.33)

Thus, the interventionistpolicywas initiated,particularly inCentralAmericaandtheCaribbean6,buteveninSouthAmerica,whenRooseveltpropitiatedtherebellionofthegreatColombianprovinceofPanama.ItmustberememberedthatatthattimePanamawaspartofGreaterColombiauntilitreacheditsin-dependencein1903,whicheventuallyallowedtheUnitedStatescontrolofthePanamaCanal,aproject thathadbeenrejectedbytheGreatColombianCon-gress (Smith,1984,p.248,Center for InternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,p.4).Infact,onNovember18,1903,thatis,afewdaysafterPanamanianindependence,JohnM.Hay,USSecretaryofState,andPhilipeBu-nauVarilla,Panamaextraordinaryenvoy,signedatreatyforwhichtheCentralAmericancountrywouldgranttheUSanarea10mileswideinperpetuity,onwhich theUSwas conferred rights, power and authority that theUS “wouldpossessandexercise”asifitweresovereignoftheterritory,inadditiontotheexclusiveapplicationofitspoliceandjudicialjurisdiction(ArticlesIIandIII).Inaddition,thetreatyenshrinedthepaymentinfavorofPanamaof$10millionandtheUSundertooktoguaranteeandmaintainPanama’sindependence(Arti-cleI).PresidentRoosevelt’sphraseaboutthisisfamous:

IaminterestedinthePanamaCanalbecauseIstartedit.IfIhadfollowedtradi-tional,conservative,methods,IshouldhavesubmittedadignifiedstatepaperofprobablytwohundredpagestoCongress,andthedebatewouldhavebeengoingonyet.ButItooktheCanalZone,andletCongressdebate,andwhilethedebategoeson,theCanaldoesalso.(GonzálezCasasbuenas,2002,p.74)

ThisinterventionismintheregioncontributedtothegrowthofUSinterestsinCentralAmerica-commercial,naval,railroad,banking,amongothers-whichre-inforcedRoosevelt’sdesiretopromoteinterventionsinthecontinent(Linares,1993, p.67).

Roosevelt’spolicyandtheso-called“dollardiplomacy”7weretheunderpinningsubsequentlyusedpresidentssuchasRepublicanWilliamHowardTaft(1909-5 InhisannualaddresstotheUSCongress,Rooseveltsaid:“TheUnitedStateswouldbecomethepolicemanoftheWesternHemisphere”(Smith,1984,p.249).6 Thus,in1905theUSgovernmentintervenedintheDominicanRepublictoguaranteethepaymentofcertaindebtscontractedwithEuropeanandAmericancreditors.7 Accordingly,theUSGovernmentpromotedtheexpansionofUScompanies’interestsandpresenceinLatinAmerica,consideringthatthiswasagoodmechanismtoensureUShegemonyintheregion(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,p.4).


1913)8,DemocratWoodrowWilson(1913-1921)9,andRepublicansWarrenG.Harding(1921-1923)andJohnCalvinCoolidgeJr.(1923-1929)10 to send tropos toCuba,Haiti,Mexico,Nicaragua,PanamaandDominicanRepublic.Eventhesegovernmentssawnocontradictionbetweenthisinterventionistpolicyandtheprinciple of self-determination that they also defended, since they understood thatagoodgovernmentcreatedthenecessaryconditionstoachieve“constitu-tionalfreedom”(Raymont,2007,pp.32-33,Linares,1993,p.66).

This interventionist wave generated a consequent adverse reaction in theregion, awakening Latin American nationalism and the beginning of an an-ti-American sentiment thatwas expressed even in the literaryworks of theNicaraguanRubénDarío,theArgentineanJoséManuelEstrada,theUruguayanEnriqueRodóandtheBrazilianMachadodeAssis(Raymont,2007,p.34).Thistense relationshipwasalsoevidenced in theSixthPanAmericanConferenceheldinHavanain1928,whereconfrontationbetweensomedelegations-liketheArgentineanagainsttheUS-gavetheimpressionthatthiswastheendofPan-Americanism (Smith, 1984, p.249).

8 DuringTaft’sadministration,theUSintervenedNicaraguain1912tocollectdebtsagreedwithUScreditors(Smith,1984,p.249).9 Inthispresidentialperiodtheso-called“moraldiplomacy”prevailed,accordingtowhich,inWilson’sownwordsinaspeechgivenbeforetheUSCongress,onDecember8,1914:“Dreadofthepowerofanyothernationweareincapableof.Wearenotjealousofrivalryinthefieldsofcommerceorofanyotherpeacefulachievement.Wemeantoliveourownlivesaswewill;butwemeanalsotoletlive.Weare,indeed,atruefriendtoallthenationsoftheworld,becausewethreatennone,covetthepossessionsofnone,desire theoverthrowofnone.” (Kissinger,2001,pp.40-41).However, inpractice,hisGovernmentintervenedinHaitiin1915alsoforthecollectionofdebtscontractedwithAmericancreditors.MarineswereevensenttoVeracruz(Mexico)andtroopsunderthecommandofGeneral JohnPershing innorthernMexico(Smith,1984,p.249,Linares,1993,p.68).ThispolicyofinterventionwasevendulysafeguardedbyWilsonwhenpre-paringtheCovenantoftheLeagueofNationswheninsistingoninclusionofarticle21,whichisexpresslyestablished:“NothinginthisCovenantshallbedeemedtoaffectthevalidityofinternationalagreementssuchastreatiesofarbitrationorregionalunder-standingsliketheMonroedoctrine,forsecuringthemaintenanceofthepeace”(Moniz,2010, pp.47-48). However,atthesametime,PresidentFranklinD.Roosevelt’sgood-neighborpolicyisconsidered to have originated inWilson’s plan to unite theAmerican republics in aPan-American alliance of non-aggression and mutual aid (Linares, 1993, p.68). 10 AlthoughinthecaseofHardinganattemptwasmadetomoderatetheabusescom-mittedintheoccupationsofHaitiandNicaraguaandtheinterventionintheDominicanRepublicwasended,CoolidgeandhisSecretaryofStateFrankKelloggresumedthein-terventionistpolicybysending5,000troopstoNicaragua(Raymont,2007,p.36).


ThisledthenextRepublicanpresidentHervertHoover(1929-1933)toseektoimproverelationswithLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.Inthissense,hemadeatripthroughSouthAmerica(whichincludedArgentina,themainopponentofUSpolicy)andsoughttocollaborateinthedefinitivesolutionoftheboundariesbetweenPeruandChileafterthePacificWar.Onthislast,Hooveracceptedtosend a memo containing the bases of the agreement on Tacna and Arica, as long astheywerepreviouslyagreedbetweenPeruandChile,whichwasacceptedbythesecountries;thus,onMay15,1929,PresidentHooversendsthefinalbasesofthefinalsettlementtobothcountries(Wieland,2017,pp.56and63,Ulloa,1987).

Also,duringthisadministration,SecretaryofStateFrankKelloggdeclaredbe-foretheSenatehisdisagreementwiththeadditionthatRoosevelthadmadetotheMonroeDoctrineinthesenseofgivingtheUnitedStatesapolicepower,towhichPresidentHooveraddedthattheUSGovernmentshouldnotuseforcetosecurecontractswithforeignstates(Mendietaetal,1993).Therefore,duringhispresidency, theMarineswere removed from the countries thathadbeenpreviouslyoccupied,withtheexceptionofHaiti(Smith,1984,pp.249and250).

DespitethegoodintentionsofHoover’sGovernment,theeconomicdepressionin theUSA in those years as a result of the of the stockmarket collapse ledthegovernmenttoimplementaprotectionistpolicythroughtheSmoot-HawleyLawofJuly17,1930(whichunilaterallyraisedtariffsonimportedproducts),whichhadanegativeimpactontheregionthatkindledresentmentagainstthesuperpower.Likewise,thecrisisprovokedawaveofdictatorshipsintheregion-suchasthatofGetúlioVargasinBrazilattheendof1929,CarlosBlancoGalin-doinBolivia,LuisMiguelSánchezCerroinPeruandJoséFélixUriburuinArgen-tinain1930-besidespoliticaldestabilizationinChilein1931,eventsthatledtogreaterestrangementandtensionsbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheregion.In1932,theChacoWarbetweenBoliviaandParaguaybegan,whichwasalsoasourceofdiscordwiththepowerofthenorth.

1.1.2. Roosevelt’s good neighbor policy (1933-1945) Itisinthisperiod,underthepresidencyofDemocratFranklinD.Roosevelt,thattheUSleadershipinLatinAmericawasdefinitivelyconsolidatedbydisplacingGreatBritainandtherestofEuropeancountriestoasecondplace.Thefunda-mentalreasonforthiswasthegreateramountofUSinvestmentintheregion,aswellastheincreaseincommercialexchange(1,700%between1914and1939),aresultofthedisconnectionbetweenLatinAmericaanditsEuropeansuppliersduetothetwoworldwars(Calderón,2000,p.32).

Likewise,PresidentRoosevelttookaradicalturntoUSforeignpolicyvis-a-visLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.Initsfourterms,hispurposewastotrytoleavebehindthefactorsofconfrontationandresentmentthathadcharacter-


izedthepreviousperiod,reinforcingPan-Americanismandseekingacontinen-talalliancebasedonmutualrespectbutalsooncertaincommonvaluessuchasfreedomanddemocracy.Inthisregard,Rooseveltcalleditthegoodneighborpoli-cy,whoseeffectivenessbecameapillarofhisforeignpolicy(Freidel,1990,p.211).

RooseveltwasawareofthedifficultsituationthatbothEuropeandAsiaweregoingthroughonthevergeofwar,butalsooftheeconomiccrisisofhisowncountry,whichiswhyhedeemeditconvenienttofocusontheAmericanconti-nent.ThiswasonemorereasontopromotethegoodneighborpolicyincludedinhismessageofMarch4,1933,reaffirmedinhisspeechonApril12ofthatsame year and in that of January 3, 1936 after his re-election.

InthesecondmessagetotheWoodrowWilsonFoundation,PresidentRooseveltsaid:

InmyInauguralAddressIstatedthatIwould“dedicatethisNationtothepolicyofthegoodneighbor[…]theneighborwhorespectshisobligationsandrespectsthesanctityofhisagreementsinandwithaworldofneighbors”.Neverbeforehasthesignificanceofthewords“goodneighbor”beensomanifestininternationalrelations. […]YourAmericanismandminemustbeastructurebuiltofconfidence,cementedbyasympathywhichrecognizeonlyequalityand fraternity. (Roosevelt,1938a,pp.130-131)

In the 1936 address he pointed out:

AmongtheNationsofthegreatWesternHemispherethepolicyofthegoodneigh-borhashappilyprevailed.AtnotimeinthefourandahalfcenturiesofmoderncivilizationintheAmericashasthereexisted—inanyyear,inanydecade,inanygenerationinallthattime—agreaterspiritofmutualunderstanding,ofcommonhelpfulness,andofdevotiontotheidealsofself-governmentthanexiststodayinthetwenty-oneAmericanRepublicsandtheirneighbor,theDominionofCanada.This policy of the good neighbor among the Americas is no longer a hope, no lon-geranobjectiveremainingtobeaccomplished.Itisafact,active,present,perti-nentandeffective.(Roosevelt,1938b,pp.8-9)

Thus, a fewmonths after assuming his mandate, Roosevelt ordered CordellHull-hisSecretaryofState-toattendtheSeventhInter-AmericanConferenceofMontevideoin1933-thefirstinwhichaUSofficialofthatrankparticipat-ed-wheretheveryclearinstructionsgivenbytheUSpresidentwereconveyed,statingthat“ifweestablishcategoriesintheinternationalrelationsoftheUnit-edStates,Pan-Americanpolicyoccupiesthefirstplaceinourdiplomacy”(Ray-mond,2007,p.43).Inaddition,attheendoftheconference,Hullvisitedadozen


LatinAmericancountriestransmittingthepresidentialmessage.Thisvisitwasalso useful for the negotiation of bilateral trade agreementswith Argentina,Brazil,ColombiaandCuba(Raymond,2007,pp.43and54).

Subsequently,PresidentRooseveltmadehisfirstvisittothecontinenttoattendtheInter-AmericanConferencefortheConsolidationofPeace,tobeheldinBue-nosAiresinNovember1936,andwasacclaimedbythepopulation.Rooseveltconfirmedinithispurposeofmaintainingpeaceintheregionanditseconomicandsocialimprovement,allbasedonarelationshipamongequals.

From the beginning, President Roosevelt began to adopt certain measuresaimedat improving the relationshipwith theLatinAmericanandCaribbeanregion,andthusallowpracticaleffecttothegoodneighborpolicy,forwhichhehadthesupportofCongressandtheAmericanpeoplethemselves.Thefollow-ing are among these measures:

a)Renunciationtoterritorialexpansionism.AsearlyasJuly1928,inthearti-cleentitledOurForeignPolicy:ADemocraticView,RooseveltcalledAmer-icanunilateralinterventionismintolerable(1928,p.584).Alreadyaspres-ident, on December 29, 1933, he noted:

It therefore has seemed clear to me as President that the time has come to supplementandtoimplementthedeclarationofPresidentWilson[theUnit-edStateswillneveragainseekoneadditionalfootofterritorybyconquest]bythefurtherdeclarationthatthedefinitepolicyoftheUnitedStatesfromnowonisoneopposedtoarmedintervention.(Roosevelt,1933)

b) RenunciationtointerventionismintheStates’internalaffairs,byauthoriz-inghisSecretaryofStateCordellHulltosigntheConventiononRightsandDutiesofStatesattheSeventhPanAmericanConferenceheldinMontevi-deoin1933.ItsArticle8statedthat“noStatehastherighttointerveneintheinternalorexternalaffairsofanyotherState”.

c) WithdrawaloftheremainingmarinesfromNicaraguainJune1933.

d) Abolition of the Platt Amendment (1934, May 29). It should be remem-beredthatthisamendmentwasintroducedasanannextotheCubanCon-stitutionduringthefirstUSmilitaryoccupationoftheisland,andthatitwasintendedtoimposeaseriesoflimitationsonthepoliticalandterrito-rialsovereigntyofCubainfavoroftheUnitedStates.

e) Subscription of an executive agreement to withdraw American troopsfromHaiti,whichwereeffectivelywithdrawnin1934.


f) ThebeginningofnegotiationswithPanama,duringhisfirstyearofgov-ernment,toendtherightenshrinedinfavoroftheUnitedStatesto“pro-tect”theindependenceoftheCentralAmericancountry,underthetreatyof1903.Subsequently,withtheGeneralTreatyofFriendshipandCooper-ation(Arias-RooseveltTreaty),signedonMarch2,1936,theUSagreedtoendtheinterventionistpolicyinPanamanianinternalaffairs.

g) Thedecision,inApril1935,thattheUnitedStatesjointheABCP(Argen-tina,Brazil,ChileandPeru)mediationgrouptopromotethecelebrationofanarmisticebetweenBoliviaandParaguaythatweretheninvolvedintheChacoWar,whichmaterializedintheBuenosAiresProtocolofJune12,1935(NovakandNamihas,2013,p.113).

h) Thecreationofacollectiveconsultationmechanismtofaceanythreatstoacountryintheregion-initiativepresentedattheBuenosAiresConferenceof1936andconfirmedattheEighthPanAmericanConferenceinLimain1938andattheNinthConferenceheldinHavanain1940-,thatlaterled-afterRoo-sevelt´sdeath-totheInter-AmericanTreatyofReciprocalAssistance(TIAR).

i) Finally,theassertionthattheissueofhumanrightswouldbecomeatopicofpermanent concernon thepartof theUnitedStates, as evidenced inhisspeechonthe“fourfreedoms”deliveredonJanuary6,1941(Calderón,2000, p.14).

Thismerited,aswasexpected,apositiveresponseintheregion,aspointedoutbyWoods(1979,p.6):

LatinAmericawelcomedthegoodneighborpolicybothforitsapparentspiritandforitssubstance.TomanyitseemedthatatlasttheUnitedStatesintendedtotreattheAmericanrepublicsasacommunityofnations,eachwithitsowncultureandpoliticallegacy,andeachwiththerighttoformulatenationalandforeignpolicieswithabsoluteindependencefromallexternalinterference.(p.6)

Andrade considers, in the same sense that (1976):

FranklinRooseveltdeservesall thecredit forrepudiating thepolicyof the “bigstick”,proposedbyhiscousinTheodore.Withthat,hesetasideacenturyoffearanddistrustthathaddividedLatinAmericansfromAmericans.Inasense,withthegoodneighborpolicy,theUnitedStatesestablisheditselfasaliberatorofthemassesfrommisery,oppressionandslavery.(p.54)

Inthisline,whentheUSisattackedbyJapaninPearlHarboronDecember81941,theLatinAmericanstatesunitedaroundthenorthernpowergivingititsbackupandsupport.


RooseveltalsomaintainedpermanentcontactwithLatinAmericanleaders,forexamplemeetingwithPresidentGetúlioVargasinBrazilin1943,orwithPres-identÁvilaCamacho inMexico in that sameyear, thusbecoming the firstUSpresidenttomakeanofficialvisittohisneighbor(Raymont,2007,p.52).

However,alloftheaboveshouldnotleadonetobelievethatRooseveltdidnothavetofacecrisissituationswiththeregioninthelongperiodinwhichhewaspresidentoftheUnitedStates.Forexample,duringhisterm:theChacowarbe-tweenBolivia andParaguay continued and ended;Peru andColombiahad adisputeovertheLeticiaarea;ArgentinadecidedtosupporttheAxispowersinWorldWarII;MexicoconfiscatedlandandUS-ownedoilcompanies;andtherewasalsothefirstCubancrisisthatputintoquestiontheprinciplesthatRoos-evelthimselfhadproposedtotheregion(Raymont,2007,p.52).However,theseproblemscouldbefinallyovercome,themostimportantbeingtheCubancrisis.

ThiscrisiswastheresultofapopularrebellionagainstGeneralGerardoMach-ado’styrannyandwhosefall,onAugust12,1933,wasmanagedbytheUSSec-retaryofStateSumnerWelles.Ineffect,WellesthreatenedMachadowithtakingtheUSNavy toCubanports, if thedictatordidnotchoose towithdraw frompower.WhilethisactionbytheRooseveltgovernmentcontradicteditscommit-mentnottointerveneininternalaffairs,itdidsoinresponsetothestill-cur-rentPlattAmendment.Machado’sfallinitiatedDiplomatCarlosManueldeCés-pedes’sprovisionalgovernment.Hewasinturnoverthrownaftertheso-calledsergeants’ revolt ledbyFulgencioBatistaonSeptember4,whichisknownasthesecondCubancrisis.Thissergeant-whowaspromotedtocolonelafewdayslater-endedupbeingbackedbytheUS,afterSumnerWelleswaschangedforJeffersonCaffery,whoidentifiedinBatistathenecessaryleadertorestoreorderinCuba(DelaCova,2017,pp.21,22,28,31,47and48).Asitisknown,Batistaremainedinpowerfor25years,untilhisoverthrowaftertheCubanRevolution.

1.1.3. Truman’s and Eisenhower’s lack of interest in the region (1945-1961)

TheinternationalscenariothatthepresidentoftheDemocraticPartyHarryS.Truman(1945-1953)hadtofacewasverydifferentfromwhathispredecessorhad had to assume.

Indeed,aftertheSecondWorldWar,theUScompletelydevoteditselftorebuild-ing Europe and maintaining its presence in Asia, neglecting the Latin American region.AnotherfundamentalfactwastheemergenceoftheUSSRasanantag-onisticworldsuperpowerthathadtobefacedinwhatwascalledtheColdWar.Athirdfactwasthefallinthepricesofrawmaterials,alsoasaresultoftheendofthewar,whichcausedaseriouseconomiccrisisintheLatinAmericanandCaribbeanregion.Additionally,Trumandidnotshowapersonalinterestinthe


region,soduringhisfirsttwoyearsinoffice,helettheStateDepartmenthandleexclusivelyrelationswithLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean11. But the under-lyingproblemwasthattheUShadgrownasapower,reachingthedimensionofglobalsuperpower,whichforcedittorethinkitsinterestsandprioritiesnotonlyintheworldbutspecificallyintheregion.

ThefirstsignofchangeintheUSpolicytowardsLatinAmericaandtheCaribbe-antookplaceinJanuary1949,whenPresidentTrumangroupedLatinAmericawithAsiaandAfrica,forwhomhedesignedhisso-calledFourPointsprogram,whichconsistedingrantingtechnicalassistancetothenewcategoryof“under-developedregions”oftheworldandtopromoteAmericanprivateinvestmentinthem,verydifferentfromtheMarshallPlaninwhichtheUSStateitselfwithitsofficialfundssupportedtherecoveryofEurope12(Ospina,2012,pp.293-294).

Asearlyas1948,ontheoccasionoftheNinthInter-AmericanConferenceheldinBogota,Colombia,LatinAmericanshadtriedtogetUScommitmenttogreatercooperationoreconomicassistance,towhichUSSecretaryofStateGeorgeMar-shallflatlyrefused.ThisrefusalinsomewayadvancedthemeasuresthatwouldbeadoptedbyTrumanthefollowingyear,generatinggreatdiscouragementintheregion.InthewordsofformerSecretaryofStateSumnerWelles(2007):

ThefeelingagainstthatcountryintheBogotaConferencewasmorebitterthanatanyInter-AmericanmeetingsincetheHavanaConferencein1928.TheUnitedStateshadfailedtoshowanycomprehensionofourneighbors’mostvitalprob-lems. (p.112)

Likewise,democracywouldnolongerbeasharedvaluewiththeregion,whileTrumanbeganaperiodofsupportandrecognitionofiron-fistedLatinAmer-icanandCaribbeandictatorshipswhenevertheywereuseful forhispolicyofcontaining communism.

Ontheotherhand,afterthemeetingheldinRiodeJaneiroin1947inwhichtheInter-AmericanTreatyofReciprocalAssistance(TIAR)-whichwouldserveasamodelforthesubsequentNATOcharter-wassubscribed,itbecameclearthatthesecurity issues linkedtothe fightagainstcommunismwouldbecomethemainagendaitemwithLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.

Regardingthelatter,itshouldbespecifiedthatafterNorthKoreainvadedSouthKorea,theUSsoughtamoreactiveparticipationoftheregioninthefightagainst

11 Itwasonlyin1947thatTrumanvisitedMexicoandBrazil.12 AproofofthisisthatUScooperationtotheregiononlyreached79milliondollarsbetween1949and1952ascomparedto18billiondollarsreceivedbytherestofthe


communism, conveninga special conferenceofOAS foreignministers,whichtookplacebetweenMarch26andApril7,1951.However,itonlyresultedintheapprovaloftheso-calledDeclarationofWashingtondenouncingthecommunistaggressionintheregionandaffirmingthatitendangereddemocracyandfree-dominthecontinent(OAS,1951).

All these measures led the region to clearly realize that it had ceased to be one ofUSforeignpolicyprioritiesandhadbecomethe“backyard”13whichhadsim-plytobeguardedagainstanycommunistpenetration.Moreover,countriesthathadparticipatedalongsidetheUnitedStatesinWorldWarII-likeBrazil,Colom-bia,Mexico,Uruguay,amongothers-andthatsomehowhopedtoberewardedfor such support, felt doubly frustrated.

RepublicanDwightD.Eisenhower’sUSpresidency(1953-1961)onlymeantadeepeningofthedistancewithLatinAmericaandthedefinitiveabandonmentof the good neighbor policy.

Inthisregard,fiscalpolicywasextremelyrestrictiveduringthisGovernment.ItkeptminimumamountsofcooperationtowardstheLatinAmericanandCa-ribbeanregions.Inaddition,Eisenhowerplacedinter-AmericanaffairswithintheglobalstruggleagainsttheUSSR,whichwasevidencedbysupporttoLatinAmericandictatorshipswhenevertheywereagainstcommunism,evendecorat-ingdictatorssuchasVenezuela’sMarcosPérezJiménez,NicaraguanAnastasioSomozaorPeruvianManuelA.Odría.Likewise,thepolicyofSecretaryofStateJohnFosterDulles-forwhomneutralityduringtheColdWarwasimmoral-im-posedaspikeinarmamentismtodefendagainstthecommunistthreataswellasagainsttheinsurrectionwarspromotedbytheUSSR(Mendietaetal,1993Ospina,2012,pp.308and323).

Similarly, this Government resumed the interventionist policy abandonedduring the Roosevelt government, causing the fall of Jacobo Arbenz’s Gov-ernment inGuatemala in1954,on thepretext that thisregimewas tilting tocommunism,wheninrealityitwastodefendtheinterestsofanexpropriatedcompany,theUnitedFruitCompany(theworld’sleadingproducerofbananas),whichhadhadSecretaryofStateDullesamongitspartners(returntothe“dol-lardiplomacy”).ArbenzwasreplacedbyCarlosCastilloArmaswhowasassassi-

world(Raymont,2007,p.93).13 AnexpressionusedbyUSpoliticianssincethenineteenthcenturytorefer to thecountries located fromtheRioGrande, consideredaspartof theirareaof influence.ThelastpoliticiantouseitpubliclywasformerSecretaryofStateJohnKerry,beforetheForeignAffairsCommitteeoftheUSHouseofRepresentativesin2013(Notimex,2013,April 17).


natedin1957,startingalongandbloodyrevolutionthatleft100thousanddead(Smith, 1984, p.251).

Ontheotherhand,therewasnoawarenessamongUSforeignpolicytopopera-torsabouttheregion’sneglect.ThisisevidencedbythestatementsofPresidentEisenhowerandhisSecretaryofStateDulles,respectively:

Ithinkthereisalotwecandotoimproveourrelationshipwiththem,butIamnotsosurethatthepresidentoftheUnitedStatescanfindinthesedaysthetimenecessarytomakeoneofthosetrips,withthephysicalwearinessthatimpliesandothercharacteristics.(Raymont,2007,p.120)

Ithinkwearepayingalotofattention,infact,unusualattention,toourrelationswithalltheAmericanStates.(Raymont,2007,p.121)

Thisiswhy,Eisenhower’sre-electionin1956distancedLatinAmericancoun-tries’prospectsaboutreceivingAmericancooperation.NotevenafterthetripofMiltonEisenhower-theAmericanpresident’sbrother,around10Americanrepublicsandafterhisreportwherehegaveaccountofthegreatdissatisfactionexistingintheregion,werechangestriedinUSforeignpolicy(Delgado,1992,p.477; Tulchin, 1988, p.471).

ItwasonlyasaresultoftwoeventsthattheUSbegantobecomeawareofdis-contentintheregion.ThefirstofthemwasthatsomeLatinAmericancountriesapproachedextracontinentalpartners-suchastheUSSR-insearchofcooper-ation,even thosewithgovernments likeCarlos Ibáñez’s inChile.Thesecondevent -andundoubtedly themost importantone-was thedisastrous tourbyVicePresidentRichardNixonin1958,whowasviolentlyreceivedbyprotestersinPeruandVenezuela,whichgeneratedintensedebateinCongressandtheUSmedia to analyze the cause of this reaction (Tulchin, 1988, p.472).

However,farfromacknowledgingthisdiscontent,theEisenhoweradministra-tionshowednointerestinarealchangeinpoliticalandeconomicrelationswiththeregion.ThiswasdemonstratedwhentheUSrejectedJuscelinoKubitschek’sinitiativein1958.ThisBrazilianPresident(promoterofdevelopmentalismandtheconstructionofBrasilia)preciselyaimedatrethinkingthecontinentalre-lations to launch the so-calledPan-AmericanOperation -OPA.This initiativehadthreeobjectives:a)toincreaseUSeconomiccooperation;b)tocreateaninter-American development institution; and, c) to develop Latin Americanregionalmarkets. However, the USA only supported the second objective bybackingupthecreationoftheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,asawaytopromoteeconomicandsocialdevelopmentintheregion(SoaresSimon,2012,pp.145-148).


Finally,itwasduringthisgovernmentalperiodthattheCubanRevolutiontookplace.Infact,onJuly26,1953,FidelCastroroseupagainstFulgencioBatista’sgovernmentbyattackingtheMoncadabarracks,forwhichhewasimprisoneduntil 1955.He thenwent into exile inMexicowherehe created the “July26Movement”andreturnedtoCubain1956throughtheSierraMaestra,wherehewagedaguerrillawaragainstBatista’sdictatorship.Afterthreeyearsofstrug-gle,onJanuary1,1959,hesucceededinoverthrowingthedictatoraccompaniedbyhisbrotherRaúlCastro,aswellastherevolutionariesCamiloCienfuegosandErnesto“Che”Guevara.InMayofthatsameyear,heinitiatedtheagrarianre-formandproclaimedthesocialistcharacteroftherevolution.Thelattergen-erated special concernon thepart ofEisenhower’s administration; however,itwasthemeasuresadoptedbetweenJuneandSeptember1960-theconfisca-tionofAmericancompaniessuchasrefineries,sugarmills,electriccompanies,amongothers;addedto theestablishmentofrelationswith theUSSR-whichcausedthecommercialembargoimposedbytheUnitedStatesagainsttheis-landinOctoberofthatyear,inthebreakingofdiplomaticrelationsinJanuary1961(Gómez,2015,February19).

1.1.4. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress (1961-1963)DemocraticPresidentJohnF.Kennedysoughttorecoverthelevelofrelation-shipwithLatinAmericathatPresidentRoosevelthadattained,intheconvictionthatthegreatnessoftheUnitedStatesdependedtoagreatextentonstrength-ening its areas of influence, and that itwas necessary to promote economicandsocialreformsintheregionwiththeaimofpreventingfurtherrevolutions-liketheCubanone-intheregion,whichwouldinclinethesecountriestothecommunistbloc.AsKennedyhimselfpointedout:“Thosewhomakepeacefulrevolutionimpossiblewillmakeviolentrevolutioninevitable”(Kennedy,1962,March 13).

However,thegreatproblemforthatpurposewastheplantoinvadeCubaap-proved during the Eisenhower administration (Bay of Pigs Operation, April1961),inordertooverthrowtheCastroregimeandregainitsinfluenceontheisland.ItwasanoperationinwhichtheCIApreparedandequippedabrigadeofCubanexilestocarryoutacounter-revolution,whichfromthebeginninghadnochanceofsucceeding,giventhenumericaldifferenceandthecombatants’equipment(1,200counter-revolutionariesversus60,000revolutionarieswithexperience incombatandwithheavyartillery)andthepopularsupportthattherevolutioncountedon(Smith,1984,p.252).

ItwastocushiontheeffectsofthisoperationthatKennedydeliveredaspeechtotheLatinAmericanambassadorsaccreditedinWashingtonattheWhiteHouseearly on, that is, on March 13, 1961. There he proposed the so-called Alliance for Progress.Likewise,inDecemberthatyear,Kennedydecidedtomakehisfirst


visit to the region,meetingwith theprogressivepresidentsRómuloBetan-courtofVenezuelaandAlbertoLlerasCamargoofColombia (Ospina,2012,p.416).

TheplanproposedbyKennedywasdrawnupbyeconomistsrecruitedbyhisgovernment,whowerefollowersoftheschoolofeconomicdevelopmentandwhohadalsoparticipated in theMarshallPlan.Theywereconvincedthat -iftheUnitedStatespromotedglobaldevelopment-itwouldnotonlyconsolidateAmericanleadershipbutwouldalsoprovidevitalitytothemissionitwascalledtofulfill(Raymont,2007,pp.166-167).

Theplan-whichwouldbeformalizedinanagreementheldatthemeetingofMinistersofForeignAffairsofPuntadelEsteinAugust1962-wouldbesupport-ed by a one-billion-dollar fund per year comprised by loans and donations. It intendedtoachievefivefundamentalobjectives:agrarianreform,employmentincrease,housingpromotion,aswellashealthandeducationimprovement.InKennedy’swords:

Therefore,IhavecalledonallpeopleofthehemispheretojoininanewAllianceforProgress,avastcooperativeeffort,unparalleledinmagnitudeandnobilityofpurpose,tosatisfythebasicneedsoftheAmericanpeopleforhomes,workandland, health and schools.[…]LetusonceagaintransformtheAmericancontinentintoavastcrucibleofrevolu-tionaryideasandefforts—atributetothepowerofthecreativeenergiesoffreemenandwomen—andexampletoalltheworldthatlibertyandprogresswalkhandinhand.LetusonceagainawakenourAmericanrevolutionuntilitguidesthestruggleofpeopleeverywhere—notwithanimperialismofforceorfear—but the rule of courage and freedom and hope for the future of man. (Kennedy, 1961, March 13)

Theplanalsohadcertainstatisticalobjectives.Thus,forexample,itsimplemen-tationwasexpectedtoachieveanincreaseof2.5%perannuminthepercapitaincomeofthecountriesintheregion,aminimum20-billion-dollarUSinvest-mentinthefollowing10years,etc.Likewise,stablepriceswereexpectedforcommodity exports, public housing and health programs, taxation, educational, agrarianandpublicadministrationreforms(Raymont,2007,p.184).

DuringtheKennedyadministration,aninterestingprojectknownasthePeaceCorpswasalsocarriedout,whichwouldbeaimedatpromotingparticipationof young American volunteers in differentmissions in developing countries,whichwouldallowexchangingexperiences,promotingpeaceand friendship,aswellasincreasinginterculturalunderstandingbetweentheAmericanpeopleandotherpeoples intheworldsuchasthoseinLatinAmerica.Theinitiative


arosein1960duringtheelectoralcampaign,whenKennedyarrivedattheUni-versityofMichiganandaskedinfrontof10,000students(Berman,2011,p.4):

Howmanyofyou,whoaregoingtobedoctors,arewillingtospendyourdaysinGhana?Techniciansorengineers,howmanyofyouarewillingtoworkintheFor-eignServicesandspendyourlivestravelingaroundtheworld?(Kennedy,1960)

This programwas complementedwith another equally important now; it isaboutthejointcivic-militaryactionsbetweenUSAandLatinAmericanArmedForces,whichaimedtobenefitboththeirneediestpopulationsandtheimageoftheUSmilitaryintheregion.Finally,anotherKennedyprojectwastohavetheUSArmedForcesdeveloptrainingforLatinAmericanArmedForcesinanti-sub-versivewarfare,whichwouldnotonlyallowthemtocarryoutpreventiveworkagainst armed groups in the region at that time, but also establish strong ties betweentheUSmilitarysectorsandLatinAmerica(Feres,2008,p.155;Ianni,1970, p.88).

AlthoughthisgeneratedgreatenthusiasmamongLatinAmericanleaderswhosawinKennedythepossibilityofreturningtothegoodneighborpolitics,itac-tuallycreatedanumberofdifficultiesbywhichsuchideadidnotgettomate-rialize. Inthe firstplace,LatinAmericasawKennedy’sspeechin favorof theregionasacontradictionwithat thesametimeexecuting theplan to invadeCubaand,after it failed, itsdecision todenyaid toLatinAmericancountriesthatdidnotjointotheCubanembargodecreedbyWashington14. Second, the implementationoftheAllianceforProgresswasinexcessivelydelayedbytheUSbureaucracy,whichtooktwoyearstoapproveitsfundsandplans.Addition-ally,Congresscuttheforeignaidprogramin1962andwithitthefundsforthisplan.Third,someLatinAmericancountriesprotestedaboutthelinkageofUSloansanddonations,andtheobligationtoacquireequipmentandmachineryfromthatcountryforthespecificproject.Fourth,theforecaststhatUSinvestorswouldplacecapitalsofnot less than300milliondollarsayear in theregionwereveryfarfromreality.Thus,inthefirstfiveyearsoftheAlliance,investmenttotaled 91 million dollars. Fifth, the efforts to strengthen democratic institutions

14 Regardingtheisolationpolicy,oneshouldremembertheAmericaninitiativesup-portedbyseveralLatinAmericancountriestosuspendCubafromtheOASattheEighthConsultationMeetingofForeignAffairsMinistersof thatorganization,held inPuntadelEste(Uruguay)fromOctober22toJanuary31,1962,whichwasapprovedwith14votesinfavor,1against(Cubaitself)and6abstentions(Argentina,Bolivia,Brazil,Chile,EcuadorandMexico).ThismeasurewasalsoadoptedinrelationtotheInter-AmericanDefense Board (IADB). Theso-calledMissileCrisisinOctober1962inCubamustbeaddedtothis,whichal-mostledtoanarmedconfrontationbetweenthetwosuperpowersofthetime,USAandtheUSSR.


intheregionproveduseless,sincenotonlyweretheredictatorships-Stroess-nerinParaguayandDuvalierinHaiti-,butalsotherewasamassiveoverthrowofdemocraticgovernments,suchas:theArgentineanArturoFrondizi(1962),thePeruvianManuelPrado(1962),theDominicanJuanBosch(1962),theGua-temalanYdígorasFuentes (1963), theEcuadorianEmilioArosemena (1963),theHonduranVilledaMorales (1963), theBrazilian JoãoGoulart (1964)andtheBolivianVíctorPazEstenssoro(1964)(Raymont,2007,pp.174,176,187,189, 190).

AlloftheaboveledtheregiontoenvisionthepossibilityofsufferingasecondfrustrationaboutestablishinganewandsubstantiverelationshipbetweentheUnitedStatesandLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,whichwouldunfortunatelybeconfirmedinthefollowingyears.

1.1.5. The end of the Alliance for Progress (1963-1974)With the violent assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy onNovember 22,1963,VicePresidentLyndonBainesJohnsonassumedthecountry’sleadership(1963-1969)andhisfirstwordsseemedtoindicateacontinuityinKennedy’spolicytowardstheregion.Ineffect,Johnsonstated:“Weknowofnomoreim-portantproblemsanywhere,anytime,thantheproblemsofourneighbors.Wewanttoseeourrelationswiththembetheverybest”(Johnson,1963).

Regrettably,hisGovernmenthad to faceat least fourcrises inLatinAmericathat it approached in total contradictionwith this initialdiscourse.ThiswasunderstoodbytheregionasanabandonmentofPresidentKennedy’sinitiativesby the region (Smith, 1984, p.253).

ThefirstwasarebellionofPanamanianhighschoolstudentsintheCanalZoneinJanuary1964,whoprotestedagainstnot includingthePanamanianflag inthatarea.ThisactionwasstronglyrepressedbytheUSpolicewiththeconse-quentdeathof20studentsandmorethan300injured,whichledthePanama-niangovernmentofRodolfoChiaritorequestareviewofthecanalagreementswiththeUS,butalsotofacethatcountryininternationalforumssuchastheOASandtheUN,andfinallytothebreakdownofrelations.Afterthreemonths,diplomaticrelationswererestored,althoughthePanamanianpeople’sresent-mentremainedintact(Raymont,2007,pp.198and200).InRaymont’swords(2007):

Fromitsinception,perhapsinevitably,thePanamacrisiswasseenbyWashingtontoalargeextentintermsoftheColdWar.ButformostLatinAmericansthecanalcontinuedtorepresentalegacyfromTeddyRoosevelt’stimes,ofmanifestdestiny,andviolationtothesovereigntyofasisterrepublic.(p.202)


ThesecondcrisisfacedbyJohnsonwastheCubanthreattocutoffthewatersupplytotheGuantánamobase,whichfinallymanagedtobeovercomeinafewdays.Thethirdwasmuchmoreserious,asitinvolvedthedecisionofJohnsontosendmorethan2,000USMarinestotheDominicanRepublicinApril1965to quell a rebellion of young officerswho had deposed the provisional andconservativegovernmentofDonaldReidCabral,adecisionthatendedupblur-ringtheimageofhisgovernmentbeforetheentireregion,whichimmediatelyconvened a consultativemeeting of the OAS. The situationworsenedwhenseveraldemonstratorslootedtheInternationalDevelopmentAgency(USAID)missionandfiredontheembassywhichledJohnsontosend22,000morema-rines(Raymont,2007,pp.204-207;Mendietaetal,1993,Smith,1984,p.253).ItisatthismomentthattheUSpresidentmanifeststhedoctrinethatbearshisname,accordingtowhichtheUSneveragainwouldallowtheestablishmentofacommunistregimeintheWesternHemisphere(Rabe,2006,p.48),whichgenerated fear throughout the region due to the resumption of the policy of invasions.

Finally,thefourthcrisisoccurredasaresultoftheoverthrowofJoãoGoulart’sgovernment inBrazil,whichwasoverthrownonMarch31,1964,byagroupofsoldierswhowouldremaininpowerformorethanadecade,establishingabloodyandviolentdictatorship.The favorable treatmentand immediaterec-ognitionoftheJohnson’sGovernmenttothisdictatorshipledbyGeneralHum-bertoCasteloBranco,generatedconcernintheregion,evenmoresowhenitimpliedabreakoftheconstitutionalorderinacountrylikeBrazilwithalongdemocratic tradition.

AsforPeru,therewerealsosomeincidentsduringtheJohnson’sGovernment,whoimposedtheapplicationoftheKuchelandSymingtonamendmentsfortheseizureofAmericanfishingvesselswithinthePeruvianmaritimedomainof200nauticalmilesaswellasfortheacquisitionofMirageIIIaircraftfromFrance,bothmeasuresdecreedduringthefirstgovernmentofFernandoBelaúndeTer-ry (Linares, 1993, p.152).

TheUSendedupbycompletelyabandoningtheAllianceforProgressproposedbyPresidentKennedy,duringthepresidentialtermofRepublicanRichardMil-housNixon (1969-1974).Thiswas in considerationof the fact that theViet-namWargeneratedhighcosts,andthatthequesttoputanendtoitpracticallytookovermuchoftheUSforeignagenda.Additionally,theeffortsforanopeningwithChinaandforlowertensionswiththeUSSRrelegatedLatinAmericatothebackground.Moreover,theNixonadministrationbureaucratsweredisenchant-edwiththeregion,duetothesuccessivecoupsthatledtonumerousdictator-ships,whichalsodeepenedtheeconomicandsocialcrisisof theirrespectivecountries.Facedwiththissituation,theNixongovernmentaskedwhatwasthe


realimportanceofLatinAmericainthefaceoftheUnitedStates’globalinter-ests,andhisresponsethatnotbeneficialforthecontinent.Thisexplainswhyduringhissixyearsinoffice,NixonnevervisitedLatinAmerica,whichledmanyexpertsandpoliticiansofthetimetonamehispolicytowardsthisregionwiththephrase“noprofile”(Raymont,2007,pp.217-220).

NeverthelessNixonseemedtohavesomeinterestintheregionatthebeginningofhistermwhenhesentGovernorNelsonRockefellertotakeanextensivetripthrough 16 Latin American countries15 This resulted in the report on Quality ofLife intheAmericas,withasetofrecommendations,almostnoneof themwasimplementedbytheGovernment.Likewise,PresidentNixon’sinitialdec-larationstoreachasystemofgeneralizedtradepreferencesforalldevelopingnations,includingLatinAmerica(whichtranslatedintotheeliminationofmanybarriersimposedbytheUSonLatinAmericanexports,bothrawmaterialsasmanufacturedproducts),nevermaterialized,becausesuchmeasuresrequiredtheapprovalofCongress,whichwascontrary toanactionof this type (Ray-mont,2007,pp.221-222;Ospina,2012,p.459).

OneofthefewregionalissuesthatwereamatterofconcernfortheNixonad-ministrationwastheentryoftheleftistSalvadorAllendetothepresidencyofChile(1970).Thus,theUSpresidentorderedtheCIAtopreventtheelectionofthis candidate and thenhis inauguration. Failing to achieve theseobjectives,NixondevelopedadestabilizationcampaignandthensupportforGeneralAu-gusto Pinochet’s dictatorship after the coup of September 11, 1973 (Smith,1984,p.253,Rabe,2006,p.56).

Likewise,inthecaseofPeru,GeneralJuanVelascoAlvarado’smilitarygovern-ment-startedinOctober1968-causedamajorshiftinrelationswiththeUnitedStates,asitwentfromalignmentwithWashingtontotheformulationofamoreindependentposition.Additionally,severalincidentswerecausedbysuccessivemeasuresdictatedbythePeruvianGovernment(Madalengoitia,1987,p.294).Thus,therewasadiplomaticincidentforanewdetentionofUS-flaggedfishingvesselswithinthe200milesofthePeruvianmaritimedomain,whichledtheNixonGovernmenttosuspendthesaleofmilitaryequipmenttoPeru.Asare-sponse,thiscountryexpelledaUSmilitarymissionandthevisittoLimaoftheRockefellermissionwasrejected(Nieto,2005,p.202).

ThesituationworsenedwhenthePeruviandictatorcarriedoutthefollowingactions(Ospina,2012,pp.458-459,Madalengoitia,1987,p.298,Linares,1993,pp.125 and 153, Nieto, 2005, p.202):

15 CubaandChilewereexcluded,whilePeruandVenezueladidnotinvitetheMission.


a) theexpropriationofUSinvestments,whichgaverisetothethreatbyWash-ingtonofapplyingtheHickenlooperamendment(whichdidnotmaterialize)andthePellyandGonzalesamendments,forwhichtheIDBwithheldloansfromthePeruvianmilitarygovernmentandwhichwouldlaterbeliftedbytheGreen-DeLaFlorAgreement;

b) thesubscriptionofacommercialagreementwiththeUSSRandthenwithChinaandCuba;

c) leadingaregionalgovernmentsothattheOAScancelthesanctionitimposedonCubain1964andsothattheTIARbereformedtowardsamoreautono-mousvisionfromthatoftheUSA;

d) thepurchaseofweapons fromtheUSSRwhichbroketheAmericanconti-nental security scheme, becoming the second country in Latin America -after Cuba-thatmadeanimportantacquisitionofweaponsfromthatpower;

e) the takingof themedia thatwasperceivedby theNixongovernmentasasocialistmeasurethatindicatedaturninthePeruvianpoliticalprocess;and,

f) thedecisiontoentertheNon-AlignedCountriesMovement.

Nonetheless,PresidentNixonnevercametoperceivePeruorhisGovernmentasacriticalcase,asheconsideredthesocialistgovernmentofSalvadorAllendeinChile; theaforementionedGreen-DeLaFloragreementcontributedtothisperception (Madalengoitia, 1987, pp.296-297).

1.1.6. The sterile attempts by Ford and Carter to approach the region (1974-1981)

AftertheWatergatescandalandinviewoftheresignationofPresidentNixon,RepublicanGeraldRudolphFordassumedthepresidencyoftheUnitedStates(1974-1977),andhispolicytowardLatinAmericadidnottranscend.

However,fouraspectsshouldbehighlighted:thefirstregardingthetalkswithCubatoreachcertainagreements,whichwereunfortunatelyfrustratedwhenCubadecidedtogetinvolvedinAngola’scivilwar.ThesecondaspectwasPres-identFord’sgreaterconcernforhumanrights,whichwasevidencedwhenhemade public his repudiation of the human rights violations by the dictator-shipsinArgentina,BrazilandChile,notwithstandingtheideologiestheyrep-resented.AthirdaspectwasapproachingthemainLatinAmericanactorssuchasArgentina,BrazilandMexico.Andfinallyonelastaspectwashismoderateanti-communiststance,givinggreaterfreedomofdecision.Thelatterbecameclearwhen,inOctober1975,thecountriesintheregiondecidedtocreatetheLatinAmericanEconomicSystem(SELA)thatdidnotincludetheUnitedStates,butincludedCuba,afactthatwasgreetedbytheUSadministration,alsoprom-isingitssupportwheneveritsmembersdeemeditconvenient(Raymont,2007,pp.243-245).


AsforPeru,GeneralFranciscoMoralesBermúdez’smilitarygovernmentnor-malizedrelationswith theUS,motivated inpartby thecountry’seconomicsituation that forced him to seek international financial support. Themea-suresadoptedbythenewPeruviangovernmenthaltedthereformsandna-tionalizations,aswellasHenryKissinger’svisittoLima,contributedtothischange, ending in the expulsion of leftist generals Fernández Maldonado, De La FlorandGrahamfromtheregime(Madalengoitia,1987,p.300).Inthissense,themilitarygovernmentwouldmaintainagoodrelationshipwithAmericancommercialbanks,obtainingsuccessiveloans.However,USandinternationalfinancialbanksledbythegreatpowerwithdrewtheirloanstoPeruduetoitsgovernment’sdecisiontoacquireSukhoi22aircraftfromtheUSSR.Inaddi-tion,PeruheldthepresidencyoftheGroupof77andrecognizedthestateofbelligerenceinNicaragua,whichalsocausedevidentdiscomfortintheFordgovernment(Linares,1993,p.153;Madalengoitia,1987,pp.301-302).

TheinaugurationofDemocratJames(Jimmy)CartertothepresidencyoftheUSA(1977-1981)generatedsomepositiveexpectationsintheregion,particu-larlyinprogressivesectors,becauseduringtheelectoralcampaign,Carterwasfavorabletoastrongdefenseofhumanrightsnotwithstandingtheideologyofthegovernment that violated them (apositionattributed tohis idealismbe-causeofbeingaBaptistpreacher),butalsobecauseofhisinsistencethattheUSshouldmoveaway“fromanattitudeofpaternalismorofrewardsandpunish-mentswhenaSouthAmericancountryisnotconvincedbyus”(Raymont,2007,p.257; Linares, 1993, p.74).

However,aroundthepoliticalrelationshipwiththeregion,Carterdidnothaveaprogram-whetherpartialorcomprehensive-toaddresscontinentalproblemsasRooseveltandKennedydid.Despitethis,duringhistermsomethereweresomeespeciallyimportantevents.

Regarding the issueofhumanrights,whenhewasalready inhispresidency,Carterdeniedallkindsofeconomicandmilitaryaidtothosecountrieswheretheserightswereinfringed(Mendietaetal,1993).Thispolicywasapplied,forexample,tothegovernmentsofArgentinaandChilebutalsotoCentralAmeri-cangovernments,eventhoughtheirlinewasfavorabletothenorthernsuper-power.However,attheendofhisadministration,CartergaveintotheSalva-dorandictatorship, fearing that thiscountrywouldbecomeanewNicaragua(Raymont,2007,p.263).AndthisisbecauseCarterwasawarethattheissueofhumanrightshadnotbeenaconstantinthevariousUSadministrations,whichiswhyhesoughttoapplyamoreconsistentpolicy.Specifically,Carterunder-stood that:


Idonotsaytoyouthatwecanremaketheworldinourownimage.Irecognizethelimitsonourpower,butthepresentadministration—ourgovernment—hasbeensoobsessedwithbalanceofpowerpoliticsthat ithasoftenignoredbasicAmericanvaluesandacommonandproperconcernforhumanrights.Oursisagreatandapowerfulnation,committedtocertainenduringidealsandthoseidealsmustbereflectednotonlyinourdomesticpolicybutalsoinourfor-eignpolicy.Therearepractical,effectiveways inwhichourpowercanbeusedtoalleviatehumansufferingaroundtheworld.Weshouldbeginbyhavingitun-derstood that if anynation [...] deprives its ownpeople of basic human rights,thatfactwillhelpshapeourownpeople’sattitudetowardthatnation’srepressivegovernment[...]Nowwemustberealistic[...]wedonotandshouldnotinsistonidenticalstandards[...]Wecanlivewithdiversityingovernmentalsystems,butwecannotlookawaywhenagovernmenttorturespeopleorjailsthemfortheirbeliefs.(Carter,1996,pp.142-143)

Carter’scommitmenttohumanrightswasalsoreflectedinthesupportgiventotheAmericanConventiononHumanRights,whichledtoratificationbysev-eralcountriesintheregion.Additionally,theUSincreasedthebudgetandstaffof the Inter-AmericanCommissiononHumanRightsbased inWashington tomultiplytheirwork.Finally,hismessagecausedaconsiderabledecreaseindis-appearancesandpoliticalprisonersinvariouscountriesofAmerica,nowawarethathumanrightswereapriorityforthesuperpower(Pastor,1986b,p.212).

Regardingitsbilateralrelations,undoubtedlythemostimportantissueinthisadministrationvis-a-vistheregionwasthatofthePanamaCanal.In1964,asaresultofpopularpressure,theUSAandPanamabeganconversationstore-view the agreements on the canal, which were interrupted by external andinternalreasons inbothcountries.However, in1974, thesituationenteredacritical phasewhenGeneral Omar Torrijos and theNational Guard annulledtheelectionsandtookpower.Sincethen, therevisionof thetreatybecameanationalcauseintheCentralAmericancountry.Carter,meanwhile,consideredthatnegotiatingtheagreementwouldmeanagoodopportunitytoresumere-lationswiththeregionandstartanewera,sohespentalotoftimegettingthetwo-thirdsmajorityherequiredintheSenateforapproval.Nevertheless,whenCarterhimselfgave thisnegotiationa substantivecharacter,hegeneratedanindirectandperhapsundesiredeffect,whichwastoturntheaforementionednegotiationintoaLatinAmericancause.ProofofthiswasthemessagesenttoPresidentCarterbythepresidentsofColombia,CostaRica,ElSalvador,Hondu-ras,Mexico,NicaraguaandVenezuela,whourgedhimtoacceleratenegotiationsforanewtreatyonthecanal,addingthatthePanamaniancausepertainednotonlytoanationbuttoallLatinAmerica.Theyconcludedthatifthistreatywerenotnegotiated,abarrierwouldbecreated in thegoodrelationswith there-gion.Finally,in1977,Carterachievedapprovalofthetwotreatiesthathadbeennegotiated, although this didnotmean a relaunching in relationswith Latin


Americabutratheraweakeninginthedomesticfront,inviewofpositionssuchasthoseofRonaldReagan,thenCaliforniagovernor16(Raymont,2007,pp.264-267; Pastor, 1986b, pp.202-204).

Another issue that affected negatively the attempt to relaunch of US - LatinAmericarelationswastheNicaraguaaffair.As iswellknown,thecivilwar inthatcountrybeganduringthefirstyearofCarter’sadministrationandinten-sified in1978after themurderofPedro JoaquínChamorro, theeditorof thenewspaperLaPrensaandmainopponentofAnastasioSomoza’sdictatorship.The Somoza family had controlled the country since 1934 and had committed anumberofabusesandhumanrightsviolations,whichledanimportantsec-tor of the Nicaraguan population to rise up against the Somoza dictatorship by joiningtheSandinistaNationalLiberationFront(Pastor,1986b),p.221).Inthiscontext,CarteraddressesalettertoSomoza(1978)inwhichhepraisedhisef-fortstoachievegreaterrespectforhumanrightsinhiscountry,whichwasin-terpreted by the rest of Nicaragua as an endorsement of the dictatorship that hadbeen cruelly repressing theopposition.Asof thatmoment, theUSA lostlegitimacy for theNicaraguanpopulation regardingwhat shouldbe their fu-tureafterSomoza’sresignationofthepresidencyandflighttoMiami(July17,1979),despitethefactthattheWhiteHousehadfinallyforcedtheresignation(Raymont,2007,pp.269-271;Fonseca,2001).Inanycase,theSandinistajuntathat tookpoweracceptedCuba’sadviceand implementeda clearly left-winggovernmentthatbefriendedtheUSSR,whichnotonlymeantafurthersetbackforCarterininternalpublicopinionbutalsoafailureofitsforeignpolicy,notbeingabletopreventanothercountryintheregionfromleavingUSsphereofinfluenceduringtheColdWar.

Also,GeneralCarlosRomeroassumedthepresidencyinJuly1977inElSalva-dor, after the scandal caused by the fraudulent elections held on February 20, whichledtouprisingsofthepopulationthatendedupbeingmassacredbythearmy.TheCartergovernmentadoptedsomeeconomicsanctionsagainst this,also threatening to cut military aid. Meanwhile, right-wing terrorist groups(deathsquads)begantooperateandgeneratenumerousdeaths,allofwhichledagroupofyoungliberalofficerstosuccessfullyoverthrowGeneralRomeroinOctober1979.However,theGoverningBoardestablishedbythesefailedto16 ThusonMarch31,1976, inhistelevisionappeal forthepresidentialnomination,candidateReagansaid: “Well, theCanalZone isnota colonialpossession. It isnotalong-term lease. It is sovereignUnited StatesTerritory everybit the sameasAlaskaandallthestatesthatwerecarvedfromtheLouisianaPurchase.WeshouldendthosenegotiationsandtelltheGeneral:Weboughtit,wepaidforit,webuiltit,andweintendtokeepit“(Reagan,1946,March31).However,Carterhadadifferentconceptwhenhesaid“Wewilldemonstratethatasalargeandpowerfulcountryweareabletodealfairlyandhonorablywithaproudbutsmallersovereignnation”(Carter,1978,February2).


stop thewaveofmurders. In1980, thesituationworsenedwhenSalvadoranarchbishopOscarRomerowasassassinatedwhilecelebratingmassintheca-thedral,turningitintooneofthe9,000deathsthatyear.FourAmericanCath-olicmissionaries fellvictimtoSalvadoransoldiers,anaction thatcaused thesuspensionofalleconomicandmilitaryaidtothatGovernmentfromtheUnit-edStates.Finally, in1981, twootherAmericanswerekilled,but this timebythedeathsquads,leadingCartertosendmilitaryaidtotheNicaraguangovern-ment.CarterfinishedhistermwithoutmakinganyprogressontheSalvadoranaffair,ratherleavingtheimpressionofcontradictoryandinsufficientdecisions(Raymont,2007,pp.276-277;Pastor,1986b,p.228).

As forCarter’s foreignpolicy towardsMexico,hedidnotgetbetterresultseither.Infact,anumberofissuescameupbetweenbothcountriesinwhichtheyheldoppositeviewssuchas thesaleofMexicannaturalgas, the fightagainstdrugs,thecontaminationofborderrivers,Carter’sCentralAmericanpolicy(inparticularregardingtheUSsaleofmilitaryequipmenttoElSalva-dor and its opposition to the Sandinista regime), among others. In February 1979,Carter tried to improve thebilateral relationshipbyvisitingMexico,but this did not achieve the desired effect (Raymont, 2007, p.278; Pastor,1986b, p.216).

RegardingtheCaribbeancountries,CarterrealizedhisproposalforcreatingtheCaribbeanGroupofCooperationforEconomicDevelopmentinDecember1977.ItwasdirectedbytheWorldBankandincluded31countriesand15interna-tionalinstitutions.Thepurposeofthisgroupwouldbetoincreaseforeignaidtothisregion,whichactuallyoccurredwhentheamountsofcooperationthatitreceivedincreasedfourfold(Pastor,1986b,p.217).

AsfarasCubaisconcerned,theCarteradministrationsuccessfullyconcludednegotiationsonfishingandmaritimeboundaries,afterwhichtheyagreedtoes-tablish“sectionsofinterest”(insteadofembassies)ineachcapitalonSeptem-ber1,1977.Inthesummerof1979,CastrofreedAmericanpoliticalprisonersaswellasthosewhohaddualcitizenship.However,Cuba’smilitarycooperationwiththeUSSRinAfricapreventedanysubstantialimprovementinitsrelationswiththeUS.(Pastor,1986b,p.218).AsCarterpointedout:

Thereisnopossibilitythatwewouldseeanysubstantialimprovementinourre-lationshipwithCubaaslongashe’s[Castro]committedtothismilitaryintrusionpolicy in the internal affairs of African people. (Pastor, 1992, p.36)

Finally,regardingPeru,theCarterregimesawitsreturntodemocracywithen-thusiasm,and itwasencouragedbyWashington in itsquest toconsolidateademocratizing process in the region. (Madalengoitia, 1987, p.300).


1.1.7. Reagan, between “friendly” autocratic and totalitarian regimes (1981-1989)

RepublicanReagan’sgovernmentbeganwithstrongcriticismofJimmyCarter’sforeignpolicy,particularlytowardstheLatinAmericanandCaribbeanregion(Linares,1993,p.76,VanKlaveren,1987,p.329). Intellectualsupport for thiscriticismcamefromJeaneKirkpatrick,professorofPoliticalScienceatGeorge-townUniversity17,whomadeCarterresponsibleforSomoza’sfallandsandini-stariseinNicaragua,aswellasfortheemergenceofleftleadersintheregion.Shealsoshedescribedhispolicyas“sentimentalist”becauseofhisexcessiveconcernforhumanrights,whichinheropinionheshouldmoderateinviewofthefightagainstcommunism.Shefinallyconcludedthatitwasnecessarytodis-tinguish right and left dictatorships. She called the former, autocratic regimes, whichshouldbesupportedwhenevertheycommittedthemselvestofightcom-munism. The latter, she called totalitarian regimes,andtheUnitedStateshadtofightthem(Pastor,1986a,pp.8-9,Raymont,2007,pp.281and283,Ospina,2012, p.513, Linares, 1993, p 79).

Accordingly,oneofReagan’sfirstmeasureswastoeliminateCarter’seconomicsanctionsagainstvariousLatinAmericandictatorshipsforhumanrightsviola-tions,astheywereregimescontrarytocommunism,forwhichtheywerecon-sidered friendly authoritarians.Thus,accordingtoReagan,“itwasnotsurpris-ing that friendlynations like [themilitarygovernmentsof]Argentina,Brazil,Chile,Nicaragua,GuatemalaandElSalvadorweresnubbedbyCarter’spolicies”(Pastor,1986a,p.8).EveninthecaseofElSalvador,theunpunishedkillingsofAmericansdidnot lead to tightenUSpolicy tosaidcountry.On thecontrary,USambassadorRobertWhitewasdismissedforspeakingpublicly infavorofsuspendingmilitaryaidtotheSalvadoranregimeuntiltheperpetratorswerefound.Moreover,inPresidentReagan’sfirstyear,militaryassistancetoElSalva-dortripled(Raymont,2007,pp.288-289).Inthissense,ReaganlookedtoLatinAmericaasaninstrumenttowintheColdWar.

Ontheotherhand,Reagan’sregimewasparticularly interested incounterin-surgency,bothovertandcovert,ontheunderstandingthatitcouldbeatooltotakepro-CubanorSovietregimesoutofpowerandestablishsimilarregimes.Thisbecameevidentbothinfinancingthe“contras”inNicaraguaandinusingHonduranterritoryfortheirtraining,whichnotonlycausedrepudiationintheregionbutalsoasentenceoftheInternationalCourtofJustice(Raymont,2007,p.286;Smith,1984,p.254).Reagan’spolicywassimpleinthecaseofNicaraguaandElSalvador,because itbasicallyconsistedofpressingand intervening toachievethefalloftheSandinistaregimeinNicaragua,andtheguerrillacapitu-

17 JeaneKirkpatrickbecamePermanentRepresentativeoftheUSintheUnitedNationsunderReagan’sgovernment.


lationinElSalvador.Bothobjectiveswereunrealandwerenotachieved.ThissamepolicywasappliedinPanamawhenaidwasreducedbecauseofPresidentNicolásArditoBarletta’sresignation,duetopressurebythemilitaryin1985,andalsowhen,aftersometime,heimposedaneconomicboycotttoforcetheresignationofGeneralManuelAntonioNoriega,anobjectivethatwasnotat-tained(Pastor,1986a,p.42,Raymont,2007,pp.292-293).

Likewise,ReaganaffirmedtheUSright toactunilaterally, that is,outsidethemultilateralframeworkandinternationalorganizationssuchastheUNandinparticulartheOASand,hence,againstinternationallaw.UndoubtedlythemostobviouscaseofthisfeatureoftheReaganadministrationwastheinvasionofGrenada.

InGrenadathedecisionwasmadetobuildanewairportinPuntaSalinaswithSovietfundingandCubantechnicaladvice.ThiswasseenbytheUSStateDe-partmentastheestablishmentofafutureSoviet-Cubanbasefromwhich,theypointedout,maritimeroutescouldbeinterceptedintheCaribbean,Venezue-lanoilfieldscouldbethreatened,guerrillascouldbetransportedtoAfrica,etc.(Ospina,2012,pp.515-516).ThisfactaddedtosuccessivecoupsledbyBernardCoardandHudsonAustin-whoendedupexecutingPresidentMauriceBishop-weretherealcausesthatledtotheinvasionoftheislandonOctober25,1983(Smith,1984,p.255).Todoso,theUSAdecidedtoundertaketheUrgentFuryoperationwithAntiguaandBarbuda,Barbados,Dominica,Jamaica,SaintLuciaandSaintVincentandtheGrenadines,withwhichhesoughttogivetheappear-anceofacollectiveinterventiontowhatwasactuallyaunilateralintervention.

However,astheReaganadministrationprogressed,itbegantorealizethatsup-port to dictatorships caused more problems than solutions, particularly because CongressandtheAmericanpublicbegantocriticizesupportgiventounaccept-ableregimes,sincesomeoftheseturnedagainsttheinterestsofthegreatpow-er(Pastor,1986a,p.41).Thus,withregardtotheArgentineandictatorship,theFalklandsinvasionin1982mustberemembered.ItnotonlygeneratedsurprisefortheReaganadministrationbutalsomeantabreakingpointinthealliancebetweenthem,whentheUSdeclareditwasfaithfultofulfillitscommitmentswithNATOandthereforewithGreatBritain(Raymont,2007,pp.294-295).ThisandtheprogressivefallofthedictatorshipsthatReagansupportedchangedthecourseandsince1983theUSagainplacedhumanrightsasafundamentalcon-ditiontoreceiveeconomicandmilitaryaidfromtheUnitedStates.(Raymont,2007, p.300).

Regarding the latter, several democratic presidents assumed government inLatinAmerica, suchasRaúlAlfonsín inArgentina, JoséSarney inBrazil, JoséMaríaSanguinettiinUruguay,FernandoBelaúndeinPeru,amongothers,which


alsoinducedPresidentReagantochangeinrelationtotheregion.Thiswasreaf-firmedwhenin1985ForbesBurnhamdiedafterrulingGuyanafor25yearsandwhen1986Jean-Claude“BabyDoc”DuvalierinHaitiandFerdinandMarcosinthePhilippineswereoverthrown,bringingaboutthedefinitiveabandonmentoftheKirkpatrickdoctrineandagreatercommitmentwithdemocracyandhumanrights(Raymont,2007,pp.304-305;Linares1993,p.79;Pastor,1986a,p.30).

Inthissense,anotherpositivechangeintheReaganadministrationwasitsac-ceptanceofgreaterflexibilityinconnectiontopaymentsofLatinAmericanfor-eign debt, that amounted to approximately 400 billion dollars.18 In the same vein, Reagan accepted the principle of “shared responsibility” regarding thefightagainstdrugs,aLatinAmericanthesisthatsoughttomakeallStatespar-ticipating in the chain of illicit drug trafficking responsible (Raymont, 2007,p.301).Hence,itwasduringhisgovernmentthattheUSpassedtheInternation-alNarcoticsControlAct(1986)19,Thisactcreatedaunilateralcertificationsys-tem,underwhichtheUSunilaterallyevaluatedcountriesrelatedtoillicitdrugproductionortrafficking,determiningwhetherornottheycompliedwiththeobligationstheyhadassumedwithintheframeworkoftheUnitedNationsandcollaboratedwiththeUSauthorities. Incaseofnon-compliancetheUScouldordersuspensionofaidmilitary, tariffpreferencesandguarantees forUS in-vestments in such countries. In addition,drug traffickingwas identifiedas anationalsecurityproblemduringthisgovernment,literallyraisingtheneedtowageawarondrugs,inwhichpoliceandmilitaryhadaroletoplay(Linares,1993, p.77).

AfinalpositiveaspectwashispolicytowardstheCaribbean.Inthisregard,theCaribbeanBasinInitiative(CBI)waslaunchedinFebruary1982afterstudiesconductedbyacommissionchairedbyHenryKissinger.Itconsistedofcommer-cial facilities,an investmentprogramwith tax incentives, financialassistanceamounting to 350 million dollars and another amount for military aid. This ini-tiativewasverysuccessfulinincreasingtradeandinvestment(Pastor,1986a,p.22,Raymont,2007,p.287).

AsregardsPeru,certainelementsoftensionwiththisLatinAmericancountryemergedduringReagan’sgovernment.First,withFernandoBelaúnde’sgovern-18 Attheendoftheeighties,mostLatinAmericancountrieshadfailedintheirdevelop-mentmodel,alsoacquiringalargeforeigndebtthatexceededtheirabilitytopay,whichledtoaseriouscrisis.Inthiscontext,theonlyviablealternativewasachangeinthedevelopmentmodelandasofteningindebtpayments,analternativethatwouldbethemainofferofPresidentReagan’ssuccessor,GeorgeH.W.Bush(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,p.5).19 ThislawwaspassedafterDEAagentEnriqueCamarena’smurderin1985tortureagainstagentVíctorCortezin1986.


ment(1980-1985)duetocommercialproblemsarisingfromUSprotectionismthathinderedentryofPeruviantextilesintotheUnitedStatesandtoretractionof credit fromUSbanks causedby thedebt crisis, a situation thatworsenedwhenPeruwasunabletocomplywiththedebtrenegotiationagreementswiththeParisClubandenteredintodefaultwithUSprivatecommercialbanks.(Li-nares,1993,pp.153-154).PresidentBelaúndetraveledtoWashingtontomeetwiththeUSpresidentpreciselytoresolvethissituationandobtainUSsupportbeforetheInternationalMonetaryFundandinternationalbanks,buthedidnotget any support (Madalengoitia, 1987, p.316).

AnotherproblemstemmedfromtheweaknessshownbythePeruvianGovern-mentinthefightagainstdrugtrafficking,whichledtheUSHouseofRepresen-tativestoreduceaidby50%(Madalengoitia,1987,p.316).Besides,anewpointof friction arose in relation to thePeruvianposition regarding theFalklandsWarbetweenArgentina andGreatBritain.Although at thebeginning, Peru’smediationinitiativeincoordinationwithWashingtonplaceditinasituationofclearalignment,thesituationchangedwhentheUnitedStateschoseitscom-mitmentswithNATOandthereforewithGreatBritain,andPerurather ledaposition to supportArgentina,whichhadbecomeantagonistic to theUnitedStates.One last problem to highlight occurredwhenBelaúnde’s governmentdecidedtoauthorizetheEasternairlinetoflytoSantiagoandLaPaz,underanagreementsignedwiththeUnitedStatesin1946.ThisgeneratedthereactionoftheFaucettandAeroPerúcompaniesaswellasofthePeruvianAirForcewhowereopposedtosaidauthorization,allofwhichledthePeruvianGovernmenttoannulthemeasure,therebycausinganewincidentinthebilateralrelation-ship (Madalengoitia, 1987, pp.304-305 and 310).

The problems continuedwith the first of Alan García’s governments (1985-1990) due to his position on paying the foreign debt and his harsh criticism ofUS policy in Central America.On the former, theUSA applied to Peru theBrooks-AlexanderAmendmentforlatepaymentofinterestonmilitaryaidloansand Amendment 620K for late payment of principal and interest on loans grant-edundertheForeignAidLaw(Linares,1993,pp.125-126,154).Regardingthelatter,thePeruvianproposaltoformtheContadoraSupportGroupin1985in-creasedLatinAmerica’sroleinthesearchforanegotiatedsolutiontotheCen-tralAmericancrisis.ThiscontrastedwiththemilitarysolutionproposedbytheReaganadministration,addinganewdissentintherelationshipwiththesuper-power(Madalengoitia,1987,p.318).

1.1.8. The return to good relationships with George H.W. Bush (1989-1993)TheRepublicangovernmentofGeorgeBushcalleditselfa“morefriendlyandmoderate”regimetowardsLatinAmerica,whichmaterializedinpracticebyof-fering payment aid to Mexico and the rest of Latin American countries in the for-


eigndebtcrisis,inseekinganegotiatedandnon-militarysolutiontotheCentralAmericanproblem(Guatemala,ElSalvadorandNicaragua)andinitstendencynottoactinisolationbutwithintheframeworkofinternationalorganizations,with theexceptionofextremesituationssuchas thoseofPanama,whereUSnationalsecuritywasatstake.

Regardingtheforeigndebtissue,BushwasinterestedinalleviatingLatinAmer-ican countries and thereby contribute not only to strengthening their democra-ciesbutalsotopromotereformstowardsfreemarketsandattractionofforeigninvestment.Indeed,thesocalled“WashingtonConsensus”wassetupbyBritisheconomistJohnWilliamsonattheendofthe1980s,consistingof10majorprin-ciples of economic policy promoted by the International Monetary Fund and the WorldBank-bothwithheadquartersintheUScapital-andthatLatinAmericancountries should accept as a condition to negotiate the restructuring of their debt (CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,pp.5-6).

Inthisregard, inordertoalleviatetheburdenof foreigndebtasanecessarycondition to create an attractive climate for investment, Treasury SecretaryNicholasBradydraftedaplantowriteoffdebtortosetuppaymentswithmoreflexibleterms,inreturnofwhichdebtorcountriesshouldimplementtheabovementionedreforms.ThiswascomplementedwiththeBakerPlansothattheUSincrease its share in the IDB to support these reforms and debt restructuring in LatinAmericancountries.Inaddition,thereductionofthedebtburdenwouldnotonlyoccurwithcommercialbanksbutalsowithofficialentities.Besides,thetwoplansincludednegotiatingtariffreductionsonproductsofinteresttotheregion,creatingafundtofacilitateprivatizations,debtswapfornaturalre-sources(consistingofallowinginterestonthedebttobepaidinlocalcurrencytofundsthatwouldbeusedtodevelopecologicalprojects)and,ingeneral,cre-ateacontinentalfreetradezone(Raymont,2007,pp.312-314and319;Perry,1990, pp.108-109).

InBush’swords:

FromthenortherntipofAlaskatothesouthernmostpointofTierradelFuego,wesharecommonheritages.Ourpeoplecantracetheirrootstoallthenationsoftheworld.Wesharetiesofcultureandofbloodandofcommoninterest.Andnow,asdemocracy sweeps theworld,we share the challengeof leadership throughexample.Wecanleadthewaytoaworldfreedfromsuspicionandfrommercantilistbarri-ers,fromsocialistinefficiencies.Wecanshowtheworldhowprosperitypreservesthesocialorder,andtheland,airandwateraswell.Wecanshowtherestoftheworldthatderegulation,respectforprivateproperty,lowtaxrates,andlowtradebarrierscanproducevasteconomicreturns.Wecanshowtherestoftheworldhowtobuilduponeachother’sstrengths,ratherthanpreyinguponweaknesses.


[…]Ifwecanbuildahemispheredevotedtofreedom,onethatprefersenterprisetoenvy,we’regoingtocreateourownnewworldorder.(Bush,1991,June27)

As for the Central America problem, Bush’s governmentwas pragmatic andbackeduppeacenegotiations thatCentralAmericangovernmentswerepro-motingthroughtheContadoraGroup20,aprocessthatwouldfinallyleadtotheEsquipulasagreement.

BushproposedMexicotoestablishaNorthAmericanfreetradezonethatwouldhenceincludeCanada.ThisproposalwaswelcomedbyMexico,whosepresident,CarlosSalinasdeGortari,undertookaninternalandexternalcampaignaimedatachievingthatgoal.TheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)wasfinallysubscribedonOctober41988followinganegotiationperiod.ThiswouldbethefirstofasuccessionofagreementsthatthesuperpowerwouldsubscribewithvariouscountriesofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.

InthecaseofPanama,theUSAtriedtocarryoutaninterventionthroughtheOASwith the intention of acting collectively and not in isolation. PresidentReaganhadalreadyunsuccessfullysoughtanegotiatedwayoutofpowerforGeneralNoriegaand thenapplieda financialblockade.Thesituation, there-fore,wasquitecomplexforPresidentBush,whowasbeginningtobeinternallycriticized.Thecrisiswouldendupunleashingwhenthedictatorrefusedtoac-knowledgetheelectionsresultsthatproclaimedGustavoEndaraasthewinner,and also ordered the opposition leaders to be beaten. This caused a reaction fromtheUSgovernmentthatunilaterallyappliedafinancialboycott.However,giventhe failureof thismeasure, inDecember1989, thedecisionwasmadeto invadePanama, captureNoriega and take him to theUnited States to beprosecutedfordrugtrafficking(Smith,1984,pp.255-256).Althoughthismea-surewascondemnedbyallthecountriesintheregion,itwasnotindefenseofNoriegabutbecauseoftheviolationofPanamaniansovereignty(Raymont,2007, pp.325-326).

ThefalloftheUSSRandtheconsequentendoftheColdWarledPresidentBushtoredesignUSforeignpolicybasedonnewobjectivesandinterests.Itmeant,toagreatextent,tofaceaneworderinwhichtheenemyoffortyyearswouldnotbepresent.InBush’swords:

20TheContadoraGroup-madeupofColombia,Mexico,PanamaandVenezuela-wasin-ceptedinJanuary1983anditwassupportedbytheContadoraSupportGrouporGrupodeLimasinceJuly1985,inturnmadeupbyArgentina,Brazil,PeruandUruguay.BothwereknownastheGroupofEight.


WeenvisionanassociationofnationsthattranscendstheColdWar.Anassocia-tionbasedonconsultation,cooperationandcollectiveaction,especiallythroughinternational and regional organizations. An association united by the principle andtheruleoflawandsupportedbyanequitabledistributionofcostsandcom-mitments.Anassociationwhosegoalsaretointensifydemocracy,increasepros-perity,strengthenpeaceandreducearms.(Calderón,2000,p.4)

This redesign should include the Latin American and Caribbean region, forwhich the US administration argued the need to promote democracy andstrengthen free trade among their countries.

Inthiscontext,BushmadeanextensivetripthroughSouthAmericaattheendof1990,aftersuccessivevisitstoMexicoandCentralAmerica.Inthisjourneyheannouncedhisintentiontostrengthendemocracyintheregion.Itwasthenthat,withintheframeworkoftheOAS,hesoughttoachieveagreatercommitmentofthecontinenttodemocracy.ThisledtheOASGeneralAssemblytoapprovereso-lution1080-SantiagoCommitment-onJune5,1991,fosteringdemocracyandthe renewalof the inter-Americansystem.The resolutiongave theSecretaryGeneralandthePermanentCouncilnewpowersinthefaceofbreaksofconsti-tutionalorder.ThisresolutionwasappliedearlytotheHaiti,PeruandGuate-malacases.Also,theWashingtonProtocolwasapprovedinDecember1992.ItreformedtheOASCharter,providingamoresolidfoundationforstrengtheningdemocracy in the region, since it ruled suspension of the member state that interrupteddemocraticprocess(Calderón,2000,p.65).Withthis,theUSAwasdefinitively abandoning the policy aimed at protecting like-minded dictator-shipsintheregion,whichhadalsolostitsmeaninginacontextinwhichtheUSitwastheonlysuperpowerintheworld(Raymont,2007,p.328).

Ontheotherhand,PresidentBushproposedtheInitiativefortheAmericasonJune 27 1990. It consisted of supporting the liberalization of Latin American economies(privatizations,deregulation,eliminationoftariffbarriers,policiestoattractforeigninvestment,etc.)andopeningtheirmarkets.Inaddition,theinitiativeimpliedthepossibilityofconcludingbilateraltradeagreementsthatwouldeventuallyleadtoalargefreetradeareafromAlaskatoTierradelFuego.Inthefieldofinvestment,theIDBproposedthecreationofafundof300milliondollarsperyearforfiveyears,andingeneral,thepromotionofforeignandpub-licinvestmentinLatinAmerica(Mendietaetal,1993;,1993,pp.80,113-114).

Finally,regardingPeru,afirstpositiveaspectduringtheBushadministrationwasitsrecognitionoftheprincipleofsharedresponsibilityinanti-drugmat-ters,whichwasperfectlycompatiblewiththePeruvianposition.Thisresultedin the enactment of the Andean Trade Preferences Act in December 1991, under whichtheUSgrantedcommercialfacilitiestoAndeancountriescommittedto


fightingdrugs.Thus,whileBoliviaandColombiaaccededtothebenefitsofthislawinJuly1992,EcuadorandPerudidsoin1993.Ontheotherhand,PeruandtheUSAsignedtheAgreementonDrugControlPolicyandAlternativeDevel-opment thatwould allowgreater collaboration to achieve this goal (Linares,1993, pp.129 and 132). A second positive aspectwas that the USA stronglysupportedPresidentAlbertoFujimori’sgovernment (1990-2000)decision toreinsertthecountryintheinternationalfinancialsystemandtoassumeafreemarketpolicy21.

However,twosituationswouldcooldowntherelationship:firstly,PresidentFu-jimori’sself-couponApril5,1992,generatedPresidentBush’sdecisiontoputpressureonPeruforitsreturntodemocracy.BushactedbilaterallyandwithintheframeworkoftheOAS,whichorderedthePeruvianpresidenttoassumetheso-calledBahamianCommitmentinMay1992,beforetheOAScountries.Itcon-sisted of a timeline for a return to democratic institutions. The second situation was the concernof theUSDepartmentof StateandCongress for thehumanrightsviolationsperpetratedasaresultoftheanti-subversivestruggle,whichled to cuts in economic and military aid to Peru. (Linares, 1993, pp.127, 129 y 130-132).

1.1.9. Bill Clinton, expansion of democracy in the region and frustration with the FTAA (1993-2001)

AlongthefirstyearsinthegovernmentofDemocraticPresidentWilliam(Bill)Clinton, the rhetoric favorable toLatinAmericawaspositive, although itdidnotfindanechoinreality.ThisisduetothefactthatitsforeignpolicyfocusedonseekingAmericaneconomicprosperity,concentratingonitsinternalneeds,modernizing its armed forces and consolidating democracy in the post-ColdWarworld(“democraticwideningdoctrine”)(Linares,1993,p.86-87).Clinton,moreover,ruledouttheroleoftheUnitedStatesasaninternationalgendarme,arolethatshouldbefulfilledbytheUNandinternationalregionalorganizations(Calderón,2000,p.5).

Withrespecttotheregion,PresidentClintonsoughtacontinentalsocietybasedonrespectforhumanrights,consolidationofdemocracy,developmentofeco-nomicreformsandestablishmentoffreetradeinLatinAmericaandtheCarib-bean(Linares,1993,p.89).Tothisend,ClintonconvenedtheheadsofstateandgovernmentintheAmericastoacontinentalmeetinginMiamithatwouldbecalledSummitof theAmericas,whichwouldbeheld from9to11December1994.This includedthepresenceof33countriesandundoubtedlymarkedapositivemilestoneinUSrelationswiththeregion,asitwouldbethefirstmeet-

21 TheUSGovernmentactivelyparticipatedintheso-calledSupportGroup,madeupby Japan and other countries to support the reintegration of Peru into the International


ingwiththesecharacteristicsthatwasheldsince1964,undertheadministra-tionofLyndonB.Johnson(Calderón,2000,pp.55-56).

TheDeclarationofPrinciplesandtheActionPlanweresignedatthismeeting-towhichCubawasnotinvited-.Theseinstrumentsestablishedpreservationand strengthening of democracies as priorities in the region:22 through pro-motionofprosperity thanks toeconomic integrationand free trade,eradica-tionofpovertyandsustainabledevelopmenttogetherwithconservationoftheenvironment (Palmer, 1998,p.24,ValverdeLoya, 1998,p.238) .Also, Clintonpresentedhismostimportantproposalfortheregionatthismeeting.IttookupPresidentBush’sinitiative,thecreationoftheFreeTradeAreaoftheAmer-icas(FTAA)for2005.Itwouldbebasedonexistingbilateralandsubregionalagreementsandtakeintoaccountthevariouslevelsofdevelopmentaswellasthesizeoftheeconomiesinthehemisphere.Asafirststep,Clintonofferedtoin-corporateChileintoNAFTAforthenextcontinentalsummit,scheduledfor1998inSantiago,Chile(Linares,1993,p.121,Raymont,2007,pp.344-345,Calderón,2000, p.59) ; Moniz, 2010, p.53).

However, this lastofferwas frustrated in theUSCongressmainlydue to theoppositionoftradeunionsandenvironmentalists(Ospina,2012,p.576).Twomonths before leaving the presidency, a bilateral trade agreementwith saidcountrywassigned.Thatwasnotwell receivedbyBrazil,whichat that timewaslookingtoincorporateChiletoMercosur.This,addedtoClinton’sfailuretoobtainauthorizationfromCongresstoactquicklyincommercialmattersandtoBrazilandArgentina’soppositiontotheFTAA,discouragedtheinitialenthusi-asmoftheLatinAmericancountriesthathadwelcomedthisinitiative,afeelingthatdeepenedwhenClintondidnotvisitanycountryintheregionthroughouthisfirstterminoffice.Indeed,theUSpresidentjustmadehisfirstofficialvisittoMexicoinMay1997(wherehesupportedPresidentErnestoZedillo’spoliticalandelectoral reformsandhighlightedhissupport for theapprovalofNAFTAbytheUSCongress)andtoCentralAmerica(offeringcommercialbenefitsthatwouldmaterializefouryearslater).InOctoberofthatsameyear,Clintontrav-eledtoVenezuela(wherehepromisedRafaelCalderaUSinvestmentinthelocaloilindustryandcalledforgreatercooperationinthefightagainstdrugtraffick-ing),Brazil(where,togetherwithFernandoHenriqueCardoso,theyannouncedthe intention to begin negotiations in 1998 for a commercial agreement that nevertookplace)andArgentina,whereheofferedPresidentCarlosMenemtoincorporatehiscountryasastrategicallyofNATO,inrecognitionofhiscollab-

Monetary Fund. (Linares, 1993, p.128). 22 Itwasestablishedthatdemocracywastheonlypoliticalsystemthatguaranteedhu-manrights,ruleoflaw,culturaldiversity,pluralism,rightofminoritiesandpeaceamongnations.The latterrecalled theWilsonian theoryof “democraticpeace,”according to


orationinUnitedNationspeacemissionsandofhisparticipationinthewarofthePersianGulf(ValverdeLoya,1998,pp.242-244,Raymont,2007,pp.344-346and354,CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,p.8).

Inanti-drugmatters,althoughClintonwasinitiallyagainstmilitarizationasapolicy,hefinallydiditintheColombiancasethroughtheso-calledPlanColom-biatowhichheassigned1.3billiondollars.ThissupportwouldbefundamentalforthelatercorneringoftheFARCbytheColombianarmedforces.TheFARCwouldfinallylaiddowntheirarmsinJune2017.

Inthefieldofdemocracy,Clintonproposedthedemocraticwideningdoctrine,consistingofincorporatingnationsintoaninternationalcommunityofmarketdemocracies.This in turnwasbasedon theapproachof “democraticpeace”,accordingtowhichindemocracytheriskofarmedconflicts,breachofinterna-tionalcommitments, terrorismorenvironmentaldegradationis lower. Itwasunderstood that the greater the number of democracies and the closer they are,themoresecureandprosperousAmericanswillbe(ValverdeLoya,1998,pp.239-240).

ItisinthiscontextthatClintonhadtofacethedecisionofGuatemala’spresi-dent JorgeSerrano (May25,1993) to suspend theConstitutionanddissolveCongressandthecourts.Facedwiththis,theUSgovernmentsuspendedallaidtothatcountry,urgedtheotherstatestotakethesamedecisionandpressuredtheSerranogovernmenttoreturntodemocratic institutions.Finally,Serranoendedupresigning,anddemocracywasrestoredinGuatemala(Linares,1993,p.104).As forHaiti, PresidentClintonwas finallybackedby theUNSecurityCouncilthroughresolution940ofJuly31,1994,foramilitaryinterventioninthatcountry,inordertoreinstateJeanBertrandAristide’sgovernmentthathadbeenoverthrownbyGeneralRaoulCédras.TheinterventionmaterializedinOc-toberthatyear(Ospina,2012,p.254,Linares,1993,p.92).Similarly,theelectionofHugoChávezaspresidentofVenezuelaandhisinaugurationonDecember6,1998, generated great concern.

ThecaseofCubastandsoutregardingbilateralrelations.ItshouldbenotedthattheClintonadministrationmaintainedatoughpositionsupportingtheTorri-celliproposaltotightentheembargoagainsttheisland,whichwascriticizedbymostcountriesintheregion.Notwithstandingthelatter,thetighteningcontin-uedandClintonenactedtheHelms-BurtonActthatangeredevenextra-conti-nentalpartnerssuchastheEuropeanUnion,whilethenormsoughttosanctionnon-UScompaniesandtheirdirectorswhotradedwithCuba.(Raymont,2007,

whichdemocraciesdonotwagewaragainsteachother.Additionally,itwasagreedtostrengthentheOASUnitforDemocracyPromotion(Calderón,2000,p.57).


pp.337,339and351).Ontheotherhand,ClintonwouldenterintotalkswiththeCubangovernmenttoamendtheCubanAdjustmentAct,insuchawaythatanypersonwholeftCubaillegallyandenteredtheUS.wasauthorizedtoobtainthepermanentresidencecard;whatwouldnothappenwiththeCubancitizenswhowereinterceptedatsea,becausetheywouldbereturnedtoCuba(“dryfeet,wetfeet”policy).Thisamendmentwasapprovedin1995andwasinforceuntilJanuary12,2017,finaldaysoftheBarakObamaadministration(CenterforIn-ternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,pp.6-7).

InthecaseofPeru,relationswiththeUnitedStatesrevolvedaroundthe“sixD’s” (in Spanish), that is, democracy, human rights, drugs, defense, debt andeconomicdevelopment (ScottPalmer,1998,p.25). In this regard, thereweresome problems that affected the bilateral relationship. The firstwas the USdecision, adopted in February 1993, to suspend its participation in the second PeruSupportGroupinwhichitwouldcontribute105milliondollarsoutofato-tal of 410 million dollars, due to the human rights situation in Peru, mentioned in the State Department annual reports and in the allegations of Amnesty In-ternational,HumanRightsWatch,amongotherentities(Linares,1993,pp.136-137,Calderón,2000,p.70).AsecondcloselyrelatedfactwasthedecisionbytheInternationalMonetaryFundboard,atUSrequest, to suspend thesigningoftheagreementbywhichPeruwouldbeagaindeclaredeligibletoaccessinter-nationalcredits,whichwouldallowittospecificallyaccessaloanof1.4billiondollars(Linares,1993,p.137).BothmeasuresforcedthePeruvianGovernmenttoresolvespecificcasesofhumanrightsviolationsinwhichtheUnitedStateshadplacedspecialinterest,tosubscribeanagreementwiththeRedCrossIn-ternationalCommitteeandtoinitiateadialoguewiththeNationalCoordinatorofHumanRights,withwhich theClintonAdministrationdecided to lift bothvetoes(Linares,1993,pp.137-138).From1995,apositivechangeintherela-tionshipwasgeneratedbyexpanding thebilateral agenda.Thus, since1996,Peruwascertifiedby theUSA in theanti-drug fight,whichwouldallow it tohaveaccesstothecommercialbenefitsoftheATPA.Asof1997itwasdeclaredeligible formilitary financing by the US Congress. Between 1996 and 1997,PerumanagedtorefinanceitspublicdebtwiththeParisClubanditsprivatedebtundertheBradyPlan,inbothcaseswiththesupportoftheUnitedStates.And, likewise,BillClinton’sGovernmentsupported thePeruviangovernmentin1996regardingthehandlingofthecrisisofthehostagestakenbytheMRTAterroristmovementundertheUSconstantprinciplethatitdoesnotnegotiatewith terrorists.Besides, theUS incorporated theMRTAand theShiningPathinthelistofterroristmovementsoftheworldinOctober1997(ScottPalmer,1998,p.30).However,sincetheendof1999,frictionsbeganagainduetoissuesrelatedtodemocraticinstitutionsinPeru,inparticular,byPresidentFujimori’sdecisiontorunforathirdpresidentialterm,whichwouldgeneratesuccessivepronouncementsbytheUSgovernment,itsactiveleadershipforanOASinter-


ventionandtheimplementationoftheCoverdell-3521amendmentforthepur-poseof suspendingall economicaid toPeru ifnoprogresswasmade in thedemocraticsystem(Calderón,2000,pp.72and86).

1.1.10. George W. Bush’s national security doctrine (2001-2009)TheinaugurationofRepublicanGeorgeW.BushasPresidentoftheUSwasveryauspicious in termsof relationswithLatinAmericaand theCaribbean, eventhepresident-electhimselfhadclearlystatedthatLatinAmerica“isourprior-ityasaneighbor“(FernándezdeCastro,2001,p.56).Thissentimentnotonlyremained in the speech but also translated into a series of facts and decisions adoptedinthefirstmonthsofhisGovernment.Thus,wehavehissupportex-pressedtotheimplementationofPlanColombia,hisdeterminationtoinsistontheFTAAproject,hisannouncementthatMexicowouldbethefirstcountryhewouldvisit,whichmaterializedonly20daysaftertakingoffice,conductingin-terviewswith fiveotherLatinAmerican leaders inthe first3monthsofgov-ernment, his attendance at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec on April 20, 2001-wherehesupportedtheapprovalofthe“democraticclause” linkedtofreetradeagreements-aswellashissubsequentsupportfortheapprovalofthe Inter-AmericanDemocraticCharter,at theOASGeneralAssemblyheld inLimaonSeptember11,2001(Ospina,2012,pp.598-599,FernándezdeCastro,2001, pp.58-59).

However,theterribleattacksofAlQaedaagainsttheTwinTowersoftheWorldTradeCenterinNewYorkandthePentagoninWashingtonandathirdthatoc-curredinPennsylvaniaoccurredonthatsameday.ThelasttimetheUSterritoryhadsufferedanarmedattackwaswhentheBritishburnedWashingtonin1814.SomealsorememberthebombingofthemilitarybasesatPearlHarbor.Inthiscaseitwasaterritorythathadbeenannexedin1898,butitonlybecamepartoftheUnitedStatesonAugust21,1959,whenitbecamethe50thStateoftheUnion(Chomsky,2002,p.19;Belmont,2003,p.23).

TheseunprecedentedattacksdeterminedaradicalchangeintheprioritiesofthenewUSpresident,givingrisetowhatbecameknownastheBushdoctrine,whichleftbehindthecontainmentordeterrencepoliciesofpossibleenemiesto assume a national security doctrine23wheremilitaryaspectswouldprevailoverpoliticalones(Ospina,2012,p.599)andheframedafrontalfightagainstterrorism,usingunilateralinterventionactions,regardlessofinternationalor-ganizations,andwiththis,internationallawwasviolated.BushpointedoutthattheUSwouldnothesitatetoactonitsown,ifnecessary,todefendthecountry’sinterests and security (Busso, 2003, p.13).

23 TheUSNationalSecurityStrategywaspresentedbyPresidentGeorgeW.BushonSeptember 20 2002.


Thus,Bushwouldestablishalistofcountries(Afghanistan,Iraq,IranandNorthKorea)whichhewouldcallthe“axisofevil”thathadtobefoughtbecausetheywereUnited States enemies. (Youngers, 2002, p.41). In this regard, itwouldclearly indicate in itsNationalSecurityStrategy that theUSwouldnotallowany foreignpower todispute itsmilitarypowerandwould likewiseproposepreventivemilitaryactionagainstthestatesthatarepartofthelistmentioned(Busso,2003,p.13).Likewise,militaryactionswouldbedirectedagainst ter-rorist groups regardlessof the territorywhere theywere found,becomingauniversalenemythatisdifficulttoidentify.Finally,thisdoctrinewouldalsorel-ativize theprotectionofhumanrightsbyputtingUSsecurity first. (Belmont,2003, pp.16 and 24).

While it is truethatthefightagainstterrorismhasfocusedonotherpartsoftheworld,determiningacertainmarginalizationofLatinAmericavis-a-vistheUnitedStates(Belmont,2003,p.21),itcannotbedeniedthatthesecuritydoc-trinehasnotreachedtheregion.Specifically,theUSAItshouldhaveahighstra-tegic interest inColombia,since therewerethreegroups(theFARC, theELNand the paramilitaries) that the State Department considered terrorist organi-zations.Onthecontrary,Castro’sCubaandChávez’sVenezuelawereperceivedaspartoftheLatinAmericanaxisofevil(Youngers,2002,p.43).

Likewise,PresidentBush’sdecisiontointerveneinIraqfracturedthesolidarityoftheregion,asthemajorityopposedit,causingtherelationshiptocooldown.Additionally,theFTAAdefinitelyfailed(dueinlargeparttooppositionbyBra-zilandquestioningbyArgentina),whichheldbackUSinteresttopromotefreetradethroughouttheregion.ThentheUSfocusedonthesigningofbilateralfreetradeagreementswithcertaincountriessuchasPeru(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,p.11).

USAestrangementfromtheregionfacilitatedresurgenceoftheleftinvariouscountries.Thus,in2008,11ofthe18countriesofCentralandSouthAmericaweregovernedbypresidentsof the leftorcenter-leftwhobegantoquestionneoliberalism(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,p.11),commercialopening,foreigninvestment,amongothervaluesandmod-elspromotedbythesuperpower.Evenrepresentativedemocracyitselfwouldbecalledintoquestionbysomeofthesecountries,implementinganumberofconstitutionalreformstoholdpowerperpetually.ThisgeneratedasomewhatdelayedreactionoftheBushadministrationaimedatreducingtheVenezuela’sinfluenceintheregionledbyHugoChávez,throughadiscreetdiplomacythatdidnotachieveitscontainmentpurpose(Reid,2017,p.335).

Asforimmigrationpolicy,morethan8millionmigrantsarrivedintheUnitedStatesinthefirstfiveyearsofthe21st.Halfofthemdidsoillegally,despitethe


fact thatPresidentBushhadadoptedamorerestrictivepolicyagainst illegalmigrantssince2001asaresultoftheattacksagainsttheTwinTowers.Thus,BushcontinuedwithOperationGuardianlaunchedbyPresidentBillClintonin1994,consisting in theconstructionofawallon the3,180kmof theborderwithMexico,seekingtoreduceMexicanandCentralAmericanmigrationtotheUnitedStates.(Morgenfeld,2016a,p.16).

Additionally, PresidentBushwould sign a treatywithMexicanPresident Fe-lipeCalderónwherebytheyrecognizedtheirsharedresponsibilityinthefightagainstdrugtraffickingandtheformercommittedtochannelingUSaidthroughtheMéridaInitiative.ThisaidwouldconsistofprovidingtechnicalassistancetotheMexicansecuritysystemanditsjudicialinstitutions.Inaddition,theso-calledBilateralSecurityCooperationGroupwasestablished,whichwouldserveasafollow-upbodywithrespecttofulfillmentofstatedobjectives.TheSecre-taryofStateandtheSecretaryoftheNationalSecurityoftheUnitedStatesweretoparticipatewiththeirMexicanpeers(Reyes,2017,pp.8-10).

1.1.11. Barak Obama and his approach to the region (2009-2017)WhenDemocraticPresidentBarakObamatookofficeinJanuary2009,hecon-centratedhisworkagendamainlyonresolvinginternalproblems,inparticular,tofacetheseriouseconomiccrisisleftbyhispredecessor,asaresultofinterven-tionsinAfghanistanandIraq.Hispolicyendedupbeingsuccessfulbecauseattheendofhistermthecrisishadbeenreversed,therewaseconomicgrowth,UScurrencywasconsolidatedasaworldreserveandthebankingsystemprovedsolid (Molteni, 2016, p.45).

However,thismeantsacrificingUSleadershipinsomewayinanumberoftop-icsontheglobalagenda.Andit isbecauseObamawasconvincedthattheUSshould not remain the guarantor of global order as it had been since the Second WorldWar,asitwaseconomicallyunsustainable,thenaffirminghisvocationformultilateralism.InMolteni’swords(2006):

It is important to note that Obama considers that there are limits to the pro-claimedAmerican“exceptionalism”-basedonitsgeopoliticalcharacteristicsthattransformitintotheindispensablenation-whenappliedtothedirectionofworldevents.Inhisopinion,theUnitedStatesisnotessentialtosolveallproblems,norresponsibleforthemaintenanceofworldorder,becauseitisadifficultandexpen-sivemanagementandoftenhasnoconnectionwithUSownsecurityneeds.[...]HeunderstandsthatitstaskistogetotherAlliedStatestoactontheirown,withoutwaitingforWashingtontofightorguidethem;otherwisetheyonlyhaveadvan-tages[...]byrelyingontheUnitedStatesfortheirsecurity,withoutrespondingforthat help. (p.14)


ThispositionisfullysharedbyPalaciodeOteyza(2017),whenheconcludesthefollowingaboutObama’sforeignpolicy:

Ultimately,itisaboutavoidingconstantomnipresenceinallinternationalaffairs,in the traditionalhegemonicway, andnotmeasuring realpowerexclusively intermsof“hardpower”,militaryandeconomic.Obamaunderstoodthattheread-justmentofworldpowerthatbeganinthefirstdecadeofthe21stcenturywiththeriseofemergingeconomies,changesinvastregionsoftheworldandinterde-pendenceasaresultofglobalization,wouldconditiontheUSscopeofactioninthefuture.HerealizedthatnobodydominatestheworldandthattheUnitedStates,despitebeing“themostpowerfulnationonearth,”cannotdoeverythingalone[…].(pp.53-54)

Notwithstandingtheforegoing,thefact isthatObamahadtodedicateeffortstorestoretheimageoftheUnitedStatesontheexternallevel,inparticular,vis-a-vis its traditionalEuropeanpartnersandotherpartsof theworld,becausethesehadfeltmistreatedbytheunilateralismdisplayedbyPresidentBush.HealsofocusedhisinterestinimprovingrelationswiththeMuslimworld,reducedUSparticipationinAfghanistanandIraq,negotiatedagreementsinthenuclearfieldwithRussiaandIran,andcontainedChinainAsia-bymeansofthepivotpolitics then called rebalancing24(Abad,2017,p.319)—andfosterpeaceintheMiddleEast(Molteni,2016,p.4).Thesemeasureswerenotexemptfromcrit-icism,suchashavingdistancedthemselves fromtheir traditionalpartners intheMiddleEast(SaudiArabia,EgyptandIsrael),nothavingachievedrespectorfearfromcountriessuchasRussia,IranorNorthKorea,anerraticpolicyinthefaceoftheArabSpring,laterecognitionoftheseriousnessofthecivilwarinSyriaandIraqinmid-2014,limitedactionagainsttheIslamicState,amongothers (Molteni, 2016, pp.5-6).

RegardingLatinAmerica,earlyonattheSummitoftheAmericasheldinTrini-dadandTobagobetweenApril17and19,2009,BarakObamainvitedthecoun-tries of the region to form an egalitarian society based on mutual respect, on commoninterestsandonsharedvalues,whichmarkedacleardifferencewithitspredecessor,announcinganewtypeofrelationshipbetweentheUS.andtheregion(Smith,1984,p.266;Reid,2017,p.336).

Thispositionwouldbeputtothetestveryshortlyafter(June2009),whentheHonduranpresidentManuelZelayawasdismissedfollowingadecisionofthe

24 Toachievethispurpose,Obamasethimselffourobjectives:1)toposition60%oftheUSfleetintheAsia-Pacific;2)EnhancedialoguewithcountrieswithwhichChinahasterritorialconflicts;3)negotiatetheTPPasacounterweighttotheChinesepresenceincommercialmatters;and,4)maintainallmechanismsofdialoguewithChinaopen(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,February8,p.4).


SupremeCourtof Justice thatcondemnedhimfor thecommissionofseriouscrimes,beingreplacedtemporarilybyRobertoMicheletti.BothBrazilandtheALBA countries thatmakeup theOAS considered this a coupd’état andde-manded immediate reinstatement of Zelaya,whichneverhappened. Initially,ObamasupportedthisrequestwithintheOAS,whichwascriticizedashehadnotweighedtheHonduranpresident’sattachmenttotheALBAcountries,evi-dencedinhisdecisiontoformallyincorporateHondurasintothisblocinAugust2008.Nevertheless,thedefendersofObama’sdecisionemphasizedthatitwasa principled position of respect for the multilateral mechanism, differentiating himselffromGeorgeW.Bush’sforeignpolicy.However,laterObamawouldpro-motemediationthroughÓscarArias,theCostaRicanpresident,knowingthathewouldonlyachieveanadvanceofthegeneralelectionsdatethatwouldallowtherisetopowerofacandidateopposedtotheALBAand,therefore,favorabletotheinterestsoftheUS.(Novak,2009).

However, itwillbeduringhissecondterminofficethatBarakObamawouldregainsome leadership in theregionbyadoptingasetofactionsthatwouldbesupportedbyallora largepartof itsmembers.ThefirstofthesewastherefusaltoacknowledgethevictoryofNicolásMaduroin2013untilarecountofthevoteswasmade,mobilizingtheEuropeanUnionandtheOAStodoso.Sub-sequently,theObamaadministrationimposedasetofsanctionsonvariousau-thoritiesoftheVenezuelanregime,blamingthemforviolatingthehumanrightsofthecivilianpopulationinthesocialproteststhattookplaceinVenezuelain2014orfortheirlinkstodrugtrafficking(Reid,2017,p.337).WashingtonevendescribedVenezuelaasan“unusualandextraordinarythreat” toUSnationalsecurity.(Colmenares,2018,p.18).

As forColombia, theObamaadministrationgave cleardiplomatic support tothepeaceprocessinthatcountry.Ineffect,Obamasupportedthenegotiationscarriedoutbetween theColombianGovernmentand theFARC toarriveat apeacefulsolutiontothearmedconflict.ThusheappointedBernieAronsonasspecialenvoyofhisgovernmentforthesenegotiations.Also,duringhisvisittoCuba,SecretaryofStateJohnKerrymetwithgovernmentnegotiatorsbutalsowiththoseoftheFARC,whichmarkedahistoricmilestone,ifonetakesintoac-countUSpolicyofnottomeetoragreewithterrorists.Finally,Obamamanagedapackageofeconomicaidamountingto450milliondollarsforimplementingthepeaceprocess(Reid,2017,p.337,Bassets,2016,July10).

Ontheotherhand,wecanhighlightthedecisionmadeonDecember17,2014toreestablishdiplomaticrelationswithCuba,removetheislandfromthelistofstatesthatpromoteterrorism,liftthebanontravelbyAmericanstotheislandandprogressivelyconcludewithitsisolation.Inaddition,BarakObamaelimi-natedtherestrictionsonsendingremittancesfromCuban-Americanstotheir


relatives inCubaandestablished facilities forbilateral tradeand conductingbankingtransactions(GilbertoBosquesInternationalStudiesCenter,2017,Oc-tober9,p.12).).ThisrapprochementwascrownedattheSummitoftheAmeri-casheldinPanama,whenthehistoricpresidentialmeetingtookplaceonApril11,2015,betweenBarakObamaandRaúlCastro,abilateralmeetingthathadnottakenplacesince1959whenPresidentFidelCastrometwithVicePresidentRichardNixon(Reid,2017,p.336).Ayearlater,BarakObamawouldofficiallyvisitCuba(BBCWorld,2016,March20).Intotal,attheendofhisGovernment,22bilateralagreementsweresignedwithCubathatincludedsuchdiversetop-icsasthefightagainstdrugtrafficking,theeliminationofthe“dryfeet,wetfeet”policy, the establishment of regular air connections, protection of marine spe-cies,thefightagainstcancerandtheEbolaepidemic,amongothers(Alzugaray,2017, p.215).

AnotherhighlightintheObamaadministrationwasthecreationoftheAlliancePlanforProsperityoftheNorthernTriangle-APTN,preparedbythegovern-ments of Guatemala, El Salvador andHonduraswith advice from theUnitedStatesandIDBfinancing.ItwasapprovedinWashingtonD.C.inDecember2014,anditspurposewastoaddressthecausesthathadbeengeneratingstrongmi-grationsofCentralAmericanminorsunaccompaniedbytheirrelatives(morethan60,000)totheUnitedStates.In2015,Obamarequestedaone-billion-dol-lar support for thisplan fromCongress; inDecember2016,750milliondol-larswereapprovedand in2017another655milliondollarswereapproved.Althoughmigrationcontinued,itdeclinedsignificantlyasof2017(VillafuerteSolís,2018,pp.95,98-99).

Obamaalsopromisedbroad immigration reform.However, he couldnot im-plementitduetooppositionfromRepublicansintheHouseofRepresentativesbutalsoduetothejudicialblockadeofapresidentialexecutiveactionaimedatcurbingdeportations, especiallyundocumentedyouthandparentswith chil-drenwhohadpermanentresidencyorUScitizenship;thus,finally,duringhisGovernment an average of 400 thousand illegalmigrantswere expelled peryear (Morgenfeld, 2016a, pp.17 and 21).

Twootherissuesofglobalscopebutwithdirectandpositiveimpactinthere-gionwerethesigningoftheParisAgreementonclimatechangeinDecember2015(weshouldbearinmindthatseveralcountriesinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanareparticularlysensitivetotheeffectsofthisphenomenon)andthenegotiationoftheTrans-PacificTreaty-TPP,whichincludedcountries intheregionsuchasChile,MexicoandPeru(PalaciodeOteyza,2017,p.52).Thislastagreementwaspromotednotonly for economic reasonsbutparticularly forgeo-economicreasons,sincetheUSsoughttoachievevariouspurposes,suchas:a)promoteaninternationaltradeandinvestmentregimeoflastgeneration


accordingtoitsprinciplesandbasedonitsinterestsintheAsia-Pacific;b)ob-tainapreponderantroleinthisregion,especiallyinthefaceofChina’sresur-gence;c)usethisagreementtodeepenitseconomicpartnershipwith Japan;and,d)encouragepolitical,economicandsocialreformsinVietnamandMalay-siathroughthisagreement(VegaandCampos2017,pp.795-796).

A finalhighlightwas the intensecontactsbetweenPresidentObamaand theLatin American and Caribbean heads of state, as well as with his SecretaryofStateHillaryClinton(shemade24tripsto18countriesintheregionuntil2012),which evidenced a fluid dialoguebetween these and the superpower(Garrido,2012,p.54).

ItwasundoubtedlyaperiodofrapprochementandgreaterconcernonthepartoftheUnitedStatesvis-a-vistheregion.

1.2. Distinctive features or permanent guidelines of US foreign policy towards the region

Intheeighteenthcentury,bothforeignpolicyandUSsecuritypolicydefendedandpromotedcertainvaluesand ideals that constitute the “Americancreed”andthathavebeenthebasisoftheirnationalidentity(Huntington,1996,p.251).

In effect, values such as freedom (political and economic), equality, humanrights,representativegovernmentandprivatepropertyhavebeenaconstantinthepoliticaldiscourseofthesuperpower.

However,afterabriefreviewofUSforeignpolicytowardsLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanitispossibletoconcludethatalthoughthesevaluesandidealshavebeenpermanentindiscourse,theyhavenotalwayshadacorrelationinreality.Indeed,wehavebeenabletoseehowinsomemomentstheUSAopt-edforisolationism(Washington,Jefferson,Monroe,etc.),inothersthiscountrydeployedcontinentalandworldleadership(F.Roosevelt,GHWBush),andevenwentsofarastoestablishinterventionaspartofitsforeignpolicy(T.Roosevelt,Kennedy, Johnson, etc.).

Also,someUSadministrationschosetoactunilaterally(Reagan,G.W.Bush),whileotherswereclearlyinclinedtowardsmultilateralism(G.H.W.Bush,Clin-ton,Obama). There have also been administrations that have promoted freetrade,deregulation,privatization,theeliminationoftradebarriersandthepro-motionofpoliciestoattractforeigninvestment(GHWBush,Clinton,GWBush)andothersthathaveappliedprotectionistpolicies,aswasthecasewithPresi-dentHooverinthe1929crisis.Asforthepromotionofdemocracy-anotherpil-larofUSforeignpolicy-,therearealsoupsanddowns.Althoughseveralpresi-dents(Ford,GHWBush,Clinton,Obama)soughttosupportdemocraticregimes


intheregionbyrejectingdictatorshipsofanyorigin,therewereothersthatdidnotfollowthesameline(Truman,Eisenhower,Johnson,Nixon,Reagan).Final-ly,humanrightswerenotanexceptioneither,giventhatinsomepresidentialperiodstheirstrengtheningandrespectwassought(Carter)andinotherstheysufferedacleardeterioration(Reagan,G.W.Bush).

Inotherwords,inouropinion,USforeignpolicytowardsLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanhasnot followedpermanentguidelines,valuesandprinciplesbut,giventheneedsorintereststhatthesituationdemandedorbecauseofthepar-ticularassessmentthateachpresidenthadoftheregion,thesehavebeenratherfluctuating,regardlessofwhethertheAmericanpresidentcamefromtheDem-ocraticPartyortheRepublicanParty.

ThesamehashappenedwithUSinteresttowardsLatinAmericaandtheCarib-bean,thatis,althoughpresidentssuchasF.Roosevelt,KennedyorG.H.W.Bushwereparticularlyconcernedtoprioritizerelationswiththecountriesinthere-gion,others-thevastmajority-werenot.

Inthissense,Coronado(2005,p.159)arguesthatwhenreviewingUSforeignpolicytowardsLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanthereisoftenafeelingoffrus-trationanddisappointmentaswellasafeelingthattheregionislocatedinarelegatedplaceonthesuperpower’slistofpriorities.

Indeed,whilethepresenceandleadershipoftheUnitedStatesintheregion,re-gardingtrade,investmentandcooperationhasbeenfundamental,aswellasinthevaluesandprinciplesweshare,itcanbepointedoutthatexceptforspecificmoments,ourrelationshavenothadtheintensityordiversitythattheregionexpected.

Thisfindsitsexplanationinseveralfactors:

a) Since1945,theUSAbecameaglobalsuperpowerwhichledittorethinkits interests and priorities in terms of foreign policy. Europe becomes its priorityfollowedbyAsia,andLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanwererele-gated.

b) Linkedtotheabove,thelowpolitical,economicandmilitaryweightoftheLatinAmericanandCaribbeanregionaswellastheabsenceintheregionoflargecrisesthatwouldcalltheUSattentionhavecontributedtomain-tainthesuperpower’spriorities.

c) Likewise, thegood intentions towards the region thatmanyUSgovern-mentshadat thebeginningof their termwere frustratedby successiveglobal(WorldWarII,ColdWar)orinternal(crisisof29‘,11/9)crisesthatchangedthesuperpower’sfocus.


d) TheUSforeignpolicycomplexstructure-inwhichnotonlythePresidentoftheRepublicandtheStateDepartmentintervene,butalsoCongressandotherprivateactors- tends togenerateoverlappingofpowerful groups’interests.

e) AbsenceofacomprehensivestrategybytheUSthatunderstandsandat-tendstheprioritiesoftheregion.ExceptforFranklinD.Roosevelt,JohnF.Kennedy,andtoalesserextentGeorgeH.W.Bush,nootherUSpresidentdesignedacomprehensiveplanfortheregion.

Thecontentsof thischapterwillbeparticularlyusefulwhenanalyzingPres-identDonaldTrump’sforeignpolicytowardstheregion,sinceitwillallowtoestablishwhichaspectsofhispolicyarereallynewandwhicharenot.

Chapter IIPresident Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy

Guidelines in Connection to Europe, Asia and the Middle East

TheelectionofRepublicanDonaldTrumpaspresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericahasledtovariousstudiesandanalysis,asaresultofthefeaturesinhischaracter and of his approach to internal and external policy.

Beyond the internal reasons that could explain this choice25, most agree in es-tablishingthatthisnotonlyimpliesachangeatthehelmofthesuperpowerbutisinitselfasymptomofthestructuralchangesthathavebeengraduallyoccur-ringintheworld(Orjuela,Chagas-BastosandChenou,2017,p.109).

Indeed,Trump’selectiontookplaceamidsttheemergenceofstrongnational-ism(culturalandeconomic)intheworld,theemergenceandconsolidationofextremerightpoliticalpartiesormovements,isolationistorpolarizingmove-ments,andxenophobicapproaches,whichquestionintegration,globalizationand, generally, the international liberal order created at the end of the Second WorldWar (Orjuela,Chagas-BastosandChenou,2017,pp.107,109and110;Stockes,2018).Forthisreason,manyanalystsarguethatDonaldTrump’selec-tionwillnotonlybe thecauseofanumberof transformations inUS foreignpolicybutthatitisalsoaconsequenceofhistime.

Next,wewillestablishwhathavebeentheguidelinesinDonaldTrump’sfor-eignpolicytowardsregionsorsub-regions-withtheexceptionofLatinAmer-icathatisaddressedinthethirdchapterofthiswork-ofparticularrelevanceforthisadministration.Thiswillalsoserveasthegeneralframeworkforthefinalchapter.

25 Forexample,dissatisfactionamongthewhiteAmericanmiddleclassduetotheirlowwages,unemploymentandtheclosureoffactories(Gambina,2016,pp.115-116).Like-wise,rejectionofthesystemandofthetraditionalAmericanpoliticalclass,aswellasdisenchantmentwiththeeconomicsituation,despitetheimprovementachievedduringtheObamaadministration.Therefore,Trumpfocusedhisspeechonpoorwhites,espe-ciallyinruralareas,andtookadvantageofhisbeinganoutsider.ThetycoonnotonlybeatClinton,butalsocrushedJebBush,TedCruzandMarcoRubiointheRepublicanprimary,threecareerpoliticianswhowerefavoritestoachievetheparty’snomination.Trump“channeledthefuryofaverageAmericansagainstWashington,knewhowtoex-ploittheiranxietyaboutthepresentandtheirfearaboutthefuture.Hespoketothepaintheyfeltforworkingveryhardandbeingforgotten“(RestonandCollinson,2016,November9;Ten,2016,November9;Rodríguez,2016,November10).


2.1. EuropeInrecentyears,Europehashadtofaceanumberofproblemslinkedtothein-tegrationprocessitself,fundamentallydamagedbythedepartureofGreatBrit-ain,whichmustbeaddedtoamajoreconomiccrisis.Similarly,thiscontinenthasbeenconcernedbytheemergenceof far-rightgroupsthathavebeguntoachievepowerquotasand,also,thefactthatcomplexsecurityscenarioshavebeendevelopingasaresultofvariouseventssuchastheannexationofCrimeabyRussia in2014ortheterroristattacksperpetratedbytheIslamicState invariousEuropeancapitals.Thelatterhasledthevastmajorityofcountriesinthiscontinenttoincreasespendingondefense(suchasGermany,Austria,Bul-garia,Slovakia,Spain,Estonia,Finland,France,Hungary,Ireland,Lithuania,Lux-embourg,Malta).,Poland,CzechRepublicandRomania),butalsotostrengthencooperationwithintheNATOframework,whichwasrecordedintheWelshandWarsawsummits(Kellner,2017,pp.99and106).

Inthisdifficultcontext,DonaldTrump’selectionimpliedaseriesofquestionsforEuropemainlywithregardtowhatitwouldmeaninthetransatlanticrela-tionship, particularly in matters of security and trade.

In terms of security issues, it should be remembered that candidate Donald TrumpsupportedBrexitandfar-rightpopulistcandidates,callingNATOobso-leteduetoitslackofresultsinthefaceofjihadistterrorism,hintingatthesu-perpower’slossofinterestinsaidinternationalorganization,vitalforthesecu-rityofEurope(PalaciodeOteyza,2017,p.66;Kellner,2017).

Onthislastissue,alreadyaspresident,Trumpcorrectedhimselfbutaskedthemembercountriesofthisbodytocomplywiththeconstitutivetreatyregardingnationalcontributions for itsmaintenance,demandingahigher levelofcom-mitmentfromitsEuropeanpartners.Asisknown,theUnitedStatescovers72%oftheNATObudgetwhiletheother28%isdistributedbetween27Europeancountries and Canada. Specifically, Trump demands that its European NATOallies complywith contributing2%of their nationalGDP to the expenses oftheorganizationasorderedbytheirowntreatyofcreation.ThiswasclearattheBrusselsmeetingofMay25,2017, inwhichhealsoaddedthattheEuro-peanallieshadtocoverthedebtsaccumulatedwithNATOafterseveralyearsofnothavingrespectedthequota.Trump’srequest,whilefair-aslongasitisprotectedbythetreatyof theorganization- is impossibleto fulfill inashorttime.Moreover,mostagreethat2024istoosoontoachievethispurposeinascenarioofeconomiccrisis,wherethereareextremistforceswithinEuropeancountriesofferingpopulistsolutions.Fortherest,Europeanslacktheadmin-istrativecapacitytohandleanincreaseinweaponsandequipmentsodrasticinashorttime(ElComercioEditorial,2017,October13;Kellner,2017,p.102,Arbiol, 2017, p.268).

President Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Guidelines in Connection to Europe, Asia...| 61

Asifthiswerenotenough,Trumpomittedtoaffirmhisembracingofarticle5ofthisorganizationintheaforementionedBrusselsConference,26whichworriedtheEuropeanswhoexpectedaconfirmationofthisdefensivepactvis-a-vistheeffectivenessoftheRussianthreat.TheproblemwithRussiaisnotonlytheille-galannexationoftheCrimeanPeninsula,buttheredesignofitsmilitaryarsenalandthedevelopmentofawebsystemthatisbeingusedtounderminestabilityandinterveneinEuropeandUSAelectoralprocesses(ElComercioNewsroom,2017,October13;Kellner,2017,p.102,Arbiol,2017,p.268).Consequently, itisonlylogicalthatEuropeaspirestohavetotalclarityaboutUScommitmentinviewofanythreatthatseekstoaffectthesovereigntyorintegrityofNATOmembers.

However,incontradictionwiththeaforementioned,PresidentTrumphascon-tinuedtosupportEasternEuropecountries.Specifically,theUShasratifieditscommitmenttoUkraine,hascontinuedtheconstructionofairbasesinRomaniaandcontinuewiththeturnoveroftroopsintheBalticcountriesandPoland(Ar-biol,2017,p.260).Also,TrumphasrequestedanincreaseintheUScontributiontoNATOfrom53.504milliondollarsto70.177milliondollarsforthe2019bud-get,whichhasincreasedtheconfusionofhisEuropeanpartners(LaVanguardiaDrafting, 2018, February 12).

AlltheabovehasgeneratedadeepreflectiononthepartofEuropeancoun-triesthatfeeltheneedtohavegreaterautonomyintermsofsecurityinordernot tocontinuedependingon thevagariesof thesuperpower.ThisbecameveryclearonMay28,2017intheBavariantownofTrudering,whenGermanChancellorAngelaMerkelnoted:“thetimesinwhichwecouldfullytrusteachotherhavebeenleftbehind,Ihavesoexperiencedinrecentdays,henceIcanonlysaythatweEuropeansmustreallytakethereinsofourdestiny“(Kellner,2017, p.104).

ThisexplainswhycountriessuchasGermany,France,SpainandevenItalyinsistontheambitiousgoalofstrengtheningtheCommonSecurityandDefensePol-

26 NATO,Article5:“ThePartiesagreethatanarmedattackagainstoneormoreoftheminEuropeorNorthAmericashallbeconsideredanattackagainstthemallandconse-quentlytheyagreethat,ifsuchanarmedattackoccurs,eachofthem,inexerciseoftherightofindividualorcollectiveself-defenserecognizedbyArticle51oftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,willassistthePartyorPartiessoattackedbytakingforthwith,in-dividuallyandinconcertwiththeotherParties,suchactionasitdeemsnecessary,in-cluding the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.AnysucharmedattackandallmeasurestakenasaresultthereofshallimmediatelybereportedtotheSecurityCouncil.SuchmeasuresshallbeterminatedwhentheSecu-rityCouncilhas taken themeasuresnecessary torestoreandmaintain internationalpeaceandsecurity.”


icyinordertohaveastrongEuropeanarmy.Thisgoal,however,isnotsharedbyall;thus,countriesthatfeeldirectlythreatenedbyRussia-suchasCroatia,Slovakia,Estonia,Latvia,Lithuania,Poland,theCzechRepublicandRomania-considerNATOandtheUnitedStates.asthemainguarantorsoftheirsecurity,sothataEuropeanarmyisperceivedasaweakeningfactorofthatguarantee.Perhapsthisiswhytheneedtoreconcilebothpositionstoachievegreaterco-operationbetweenNATOandtheEuropeanUnion,followingtherouteoutlinedinthe2016NATOSummit,isstartingtogetsupport.27.Inthisway,EuropecanstrengthenitsownsecuritystructurebutatthesametimeconsolidateNATOasaEuropeanpillar(Kellner,2017,pp.109-110,PalaciodeOteyza,2017,p.68).Likewise,Europewouldbenefitbecauseitwouldachievegreaterautonomyintheprotectionofitsownsecurity,tothedetrimentofAmericaninfluenceintheOldWorld,whichhasprevailedsincetheendoftheSecondWorldWar.

AsecondproblemthathasarisenbetweentheUSandtheEuropeanUnioniscommercial.Thus,asacandidate,DonaldTrumpcalledtheEuropeanUnionacommercialcompetitorandquestionedthetradeagreementwiththatbloc.Lat-er, Trump, as president, moderated his criticism and left in suspense for some time an announced imposition of tariffs against certain European products.

However,attheendofMay2018,PresidentTrumpfinallydecidedtoimposetariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imported from the Europe-anUnion, after talksaimedatmaintainingexemptions failed.Thispromptedan immediateresponse fromtheEuropeanUnionstating that itwouldapplycountermeasurestotheUS.(RPPNewsroom,2018,May31).Thus, theEuro-peanCommissionapprovedimpositionoftariffsonthesuperpowerasofJuly2018,afterhavingnotifiedtheWTOandfiledacomplaintonJune1,inresponsetotheimpositionoftariffsonsteelandaluminum,whosedamageisestimatedat6.4billioneuros.Theproductssubjecttothemeasurearesweetcorn,orangejuice, blueberries, makeup, tobacco, construction materials, etc. (EFE, 2018,June 6). As Steinberg points out:

[…] theEUhaschosen tostandup toTrumpanddefend themultilateral tradeorder,whichreinforcesthevisionoftheEUasanormativepower,evenatthecostofeconomicdamagethatwillnowbemoresubstantialbythemorethanpredict-abletariffescalation.It isacourageouspositionthattheEUprobablyhadbeenpreparingforsometimeincasetheUSadministrationbegantounderminethemultilateralsystemexplicitly.Insomeway,theEUhasfeltthemoralobligationtoprotectthesystem,intheconvictionthatothercountries(fromCanada,JapanorSouthKoreatotheMercosurcountriesorMexico,butevenChina)willjoinin,sothatthesystemcansurviveevenwithouttheUS(March6,2018).

27 For more information, see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/press/press-re-leases/2016/12/06/eu-nato-joint-declaration/


Inotherwords,Europenotonlymaintainsitsprinciplesofdefenseoffreetradebut also legitimately uses the tools that the system offers to defend itself from unilateralUSaction.

A third problem between the US and Europe has been Trump’s decision tofreeze,untilfurthernotice,thenegotiationsthatweretakingplaceforthecre-ationoftheTransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnership(TTIP).This ini-tiative,launchedin2013,soughttoreducetradebarriersbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnionaswellas toreconcile thedifferences inreg-ulatorymatters in order to reach an economicblock thatwould account formorethan30%ofthegrossworldproduct.Bytheendof2016,15negotiationmeetingshadbeenheld,buteverythingchangedinApril2017(Thomas,2017,pp.1-4),whenPresidentTrumpacknowledgedtheneedtoreachsomekindofagreementwithEurope.Inpractice,thenegotiationsstopped.Itis,inshort,an-otherexampleofPresidentTrump’slackofattachmenttotradepartnershipsand also an additional reason for distancing himself from Europe.

2.2. RussiaAs forRussia,althoughduring theelectoralcampaignbothTrumpandPutinshowedcoincidences,thetruthisthatbilateralrelationsremainedtenseduringthefirstyearoftheUSpresident’sgovernment.

Indeed,duringthecampaignTrumpraisedthedesirabilityofcollaboratingwithRussiatodestroytheIslamicStateinSyria.Thiswasbasedonthefactthatal-thoughtheRussianpresencedisturbedinitialUSAplansinthatcountry,therewas also awareness that Russia had played an important role in the IslamicState’sfailuretomarchonDamascus,thankstoitsactionsintheNorthCauca-susandsupportforBasharal-Ásad’sregime.

However,anumberofeventsthatoccurredshortlyafterTrumpassumedthepresidencyofhiscountry,defeatedhispurposeofpartneringwithRussia.Thus,theUSCongresshasnotonlyincreasedsanctionsagainsttheEurasiancountrydue to theannexationofCrimea,butalso limited thePresident’scapabilitiestomitigatethem.Besides,thegrowingUSmilitarypresenceinEasternEuropeandinparticularmissiledefenseplacedinPolandandRomania,havetriggeredtheRussian reaction. Investigationsand findings thatbegan toappearaboutRussianinterferenceintheUSpresidentialelectionsof2016infavorofTrump’scandidacycompletethepicture(García,2018,January18).

ThedisagreementswithRussiaextendedtoitsinvolvementinSyria.So,onApril7,2017,USAlaunchedaseriesofcruisemissilesataSyrianairbaseinresponsetothefactthataRussianwarplanehaddroppedachemicalbombinthetownofKhanShaykhuninIdlidprovince,afactthatwascondemnedbyRussia(Hen-


riksen,2018).Then,onApril13,2018,USAmadeasecondattack,butthistimetogetherwithFranceandtheUnitedKingdom,inviewofanewuseofchemicalweaponsbytheSyrianregime,whichgeneratedapronouncementbyRussianleaderVladimirPutin.

AnewexampleofthecrisisinUS-RussianrelationscamewiththeapprovalofthenewUSNationalSecurityStrategyonDecember18,2017.Initsthirdpillarconcerningnationalintereststobeprotected,calledPreservingPeacethroughForce, it identifiesRussiaasacountrythatdividesWesternalliesfromNATOandtheEuropeanUnion,butalsoaccuses itofusingsubversivetacticsto in-terfereinthedomesticaffairsofdifferentcountriesintheworld,toconcludethatRussiaseekstorestoreitsstatusasagreatpowerandestablishspheresofinfluencenearitsborders(PresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,2017,pp.25-26) .

Inthis line, theVostok-2018militarymaneuversareworthmentioning.TheywerecarriedoutinconjunctionwiththeChinesePeople’sArmyonSeptember13.OnthatoccasionPutindeclaredthattheseStates,togetherwithMongolia,“fulfill todayan importantcommontask: together theyguaranteestability intheEurasianspace“(EFE,2018,September13;Bushuev,2018,September11).Besides,hadlaunchedaproposaladayearliertosignapeacetreatywithJapanwithoutpreconditions,pendingfromWorldWarII,underwhichRussiawouldreturnallorpartofthefourinvadedKurdishislandsduringthatconfrontation(RPPNewsroom,2018,September12).

However,TrumpinitiatedaclearbutalsounexpectedapproachtotheEurasianpowerat theG7Summitheld inQuebec,Canada,on June9,2018.There,hedemandedreincorporationofRussiatothisgroup.Hespecificallynoted:“IamRussia’sworstnightmare,buthavingsaidthat,Russiashouldbeinthismeet-ing.WhydowehaveameetingwithoutRussia?Likeitornot,anditmaynotbepoliticallycorrect,wehavetomanageglobalissues[withthem].”Asisknown,Russiawasexpelledfromthethen-so-calledG8followingtheillegalannexationoftheCrimeanPeninsulain2014,asituationthatcontinuestothisday,whichiswhytheUSproposalwasnotacceptedbytherestofthemembers(Germa-ny,Canada,France,GreatBritainandJapan)withtheexceptionofItalywhich,through its PrimeMinisterGiuseppeConte, declared itself in favor. This andotherreasonsshowedwhysomeanalystsprefertocall thisgroupG6+1(ElPaís,2018,June9).

TherapprochementattaineditscoronationwhentheTrumpadministrationan-nouncedjointlywiththeRussianForeignMinistrytheholdingofapresidentialsummit,which tookplace inHelsinki (Finland),on July15,2018.At theendof it,PresidentTrumpwasharshlycriticizedbyRepublicansandDemocrats,


whoreproachedhimforhavingtakenastruePresidentPutin’sassertionsthatRussiahadnotintervenedinthe2016USpresidentialelection,therebyputtingintoquestion theofficial informationdeliveredbyUSagencies.Hewasalsoaccused of not challenging President Putin for maintaining the illegal occu-pationoftheCrimeanPeninsula;towhichtheUSpresidentrespondedinthesense that the two largest nuclear powers in theworld should understandeachother(AFP,2018,July16).ThisattitudehasnotonlyworriedAmericanpoliticiansbutalsoEuropeanpoliticiansandleaders,whoseeRussiaasarealthreat to their security.

But thebiggest criticismaimedatPresidentTrumpwasdue to thepassivityandlackofproposalsshownintheaforementionedsummit,whichconcludedwithoutanystatement.Onthecontrary,Putinraisedasetofproposalssuchastheregulationof internationaloilandgasshalemarkets,cooperationamongsecurityagencies,collaborationtoachievepeace inSyriaand,cooperation inthefightagainstterrorismandincybersecurity.Inthisway,PutinwasplacedinabetterconditionbeforethesecondroundoftalkstobeheldinWashington,sinceitwastheonetosettheagendaforit(Rooney,2018).

WhileyoucanagreewithPresidentTrumpontheneed-andevenonthecon-venience-ofUSandRussiareachingofcertainagreementsonissuesofglobaland regional concern,Europe’suneasiness is legitimatebecause it isnot thesuperpowerwho leads these talks and establishes clear conditions to reachagreements.USpermissivenessandlackofinitiativeinthefaceofRussia,cangenerateveryseriousproblemsforallinthefuture,evenfortheAmericanpow-eritself,duetoalossofspacesofinfluence.

2.3. China and East Asia

ChinaAsinotherissues,asfromhiscandidacy,TrumpharshlycriticizedChinaaccus-ingitof:manipulatingthevalueoftheircurrencytofavortheirowncompaniesagainstcompetitionofforeigncompanies;competingunfairlyintradeachiev-ingasurplusinthetradebalancewiththeUS;buildingafortressintheSouthChinaSea;amongothercharges(Abad,2017,p.321).Forallthesereasons,hepromisedthatuponreachingthepresidencyhewouldreviewthetradeagree-mentwiththisgreatAsianpoweraswellasAmericansupportfortheOne-Chi-na policy.

Inthisregard,aspresident-electonDecember22016,Trumpreceivedatele-phonecallfromTaiwanPresidentTsaiIng-wentocongratulatehim.Thiswasthe firstcommunicationof thatnaturesince1979, thedateonwhich theUSbrokediplomaticrelationswithTaiwantoembracetheOne-Chinapolicy.This


communicationreceivedan immediatereactionfromtheChineseMinistryofForeign Affairs in which the US president was asked to avoid “unnecessarybreaks”aswellasto“honorthecommitmentoftheOne-Chinapolicy”.TrumpdidnottakeintoaccountthisstatementandpubliclyquestionedremainingtiedtothispolicywhichagaingeneratedaChinesereaction.Subsequently,however,PresidentTrumpwouldacknowledgethevalidityofthisprinciple,whichhasledsomeanalyststoconsiderthatthetelephoneconversationwasinsteadpartofastrategytoputpressureonChinainhisgoalofachievingbettertermsinthebilateraltradefield.(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,February 8, pp.1 and 9).

SuchacknowledgmentdidnotimplyachangeinTrump’swilltocomplywiththerestofthepromisesmadeduringhiselectioncampaigninrelationtoChi-na.ThisisbecauseTrumprecognizesChinaasitsrival,addingthattheAsiancountryseekstodisplacetheUSAfromtheIndo-Pacificregionandexpandto-wardsAfricaandEurope,as indicatedby thenewNationalSecurityStrategyin its third pillar of national interests to protect called Preserve Peace through Force.(PresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,2017,p.25).

Inthissense,theTrumpgovernmentcontinuedtostrengthenUSmilitarypres-enceinAsiainordertocontainChina’scontrolovertheSouthSeaandtheEastChinaSeaandtheislandsthatareinthosespacesthroughtheconstructionofmilitarizedartificialislands.Onthisparticularpoint,thesuperpowerhasbeenclearinitsmessagetotheAsianpowerthatitshouldrefrainfromcontinuingtobuildartificialislandstoextenditspowerovertheChinaSea.Inthisway,TrumpratifiedhisoldallianceswithJapanandwithSouthKorea,directlyaffectedbythis expansion.

However,thedisagreementsbetweentheUSandChinaintheTrumpperiodarenotlimitedtothisarea.Incommercialmatters,itiswellknownthattheUSitisthelargestexportmarketforChina(16%ofitstotalexports),butitisalsothesecondlargesttradingpartnerinservices,akeypartnerintechnologyandcul-turaltrade,andinthelargestcontractingmarketinChina(Yang,2017).How-ever,atthesametime,theUSDepartmentofCommercemaintainsthatChinaisthecountrywithwhichithasthelargestdeficitinthebalanceoftradewithanegativebalanceof-347billiondollars,followedbyJapanwith-68.9billiondollarsandGermanywith-64.9billiondollars.AccordingtotheDepartmentofCommerce,thisisduetothefactthatChinaisaprotectionistcountrythatdoesnotpracticefairplayincommercialmatters,forwhichitmustbepunished.ItisalsostatedinthisreportthatChinadoesnotplayonanequalfooting,over-burdensUScompanies,forcesthemtosharetheirsecretstoaccesstheirmarketandforcestechnologicaltransfer,whichiswhyitisjustifiedtotakemeasuresagainsttheAsiancountry(MartínezandPérez,2018,March23).Thevoicesof


someAmericanuniversitiesthatcriticizeChinesesubsidiestocertainsectorsandimpositionofrestrictionsonexportsofcertainrawmaterialsforthebene-fitofChineseproducersjoinedthiscriticism.AllofthisstrengthenedPresidentTrump’s position of reactingwithmeasures. Thus, theUSpresident broughtseveralactionsagainsttheAsiancountrytotheWTOforsteelandaluminumimportsaswellasfortheissueofsolarpanels.ItalsorefusedtograntChinamarketeconomystatus(whichshouldhavebeenautomaticafter15yearsofChina’saccessiontotheWTO),whichallowsit toapplymorestringenttradedefense instruments (Steinberg, 2018, January 15).

Subsequently,hebegantothinkaboutstartingatradewarwithChinainorderto press for a renegotiation of their trade agreement in order to guarantee a bet-terpositioningofhistradebalance(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,February8,p.8and9).

Whilealltheeconomistsagreedthattheso-called“tradewar”wouldnotma-terialize,thetruthisthatTrumpfinallydecidedtotakeitforward.Indeed,hisgovernmentadoptedasetofmeasuresclearlydiscriminatoryandinviolationoftheWTOagreements,suchastherestrictionsimposedontheimportationofChinesewashingmachinesandsolarpanels,thevetoagainstBroadcom’sacquisitionofQualcomm-thelargestmanufacturerofprocessorsformobiledevices-for117billiondollarsand,particularly,theimpositionof25%tar-iffsonsteel(equivalentto60billiondollarsinimports)and10%onalumi-num,bothproducts imported fromtheAsiangiant(Vásquez,2018,March6).Immediately,themeasureproducedafallof3%onWallStreet,whichledtheWhiteHousetopointoutthatittemporarilysuspendedthesameunilat-eralmeasurewithEurope,ArgentinaandBrazil(MartínezandPérez,2018,March 23).

ThemeasureadoptedbyTrumpdidnotseemtotakeintoaccountthatChinaisnotevenamongthe10countriesthatexportmoresteeltotheUS.Besidesthesteel industryemploys140,000workers inthesuperpowerthatmightbeaf-fected. Additionally, an increase in costs for American companies and consum-erswouldhavederivedfromtheadoptedmeasure.Inthisregard,itisrecalledthatwhenPresidentGeorgeW.Bushimposedtariffsonsteel,200,000jobswerelostintheUnitedStates.(Vásquez,2018,March6).

EvensomeexpertsarguethatthemeasurestakenagainstChinawerepartofapressurestrategy,similartotheoneClintonusedwithJapaninthe1990sto open the Japanese market. However, China presents a different realitydue to the importanceof its factories in theUSsupplychainand thehugeholdingsofUSpublicdebtheldbyChinesehands(MartínezandPérez,2018,March 23).


Later,Trumpannouncedtheimpositionofa25%taxonChinesetechnologi-cal imports totaling60billiondollars.Facedwiththis,Chinaannouncedtheimpositionofreprisals,startingwiththeapplicationofa15%taxonimportsoffreshfruits,wines,nuts,denaturedalcoholandsteelpipesand25%onim-portsofporkandaluminum(García,2018,March23),reaffirmingwhatwascalledan international tradewarbetweenthe two largesteconomicpowersintheworld.ThesemeasuresdidnotmakePresidentTrumphesitate.Onthecontrary,hedeclaredthat“tradewarsaregoodandeasytowin”(EFE,2018,March 2).

InMay2018,aChinesedelegationledbyVicePremierLiuHevisitedWashing-tontoseekanagreementtosuspendthetradewar,apurposethatwasreached.In effect, in a joint communiquédatedMay19, both countries declared thattheyhad reached an agreementwhereby they suspended the tradewar andtheincreaseofmutually-imposedtariffs.Theyalsosaidthatmeasureswouldbetaken“tosignificantlyreducetheUSdeficit intheexchangeofgoodswithChina, “adding that the two countrieswould strengthen their cooperation inthefieldofenergy,agriculturalproducts,medicalcare,technologyandfinance(ElComercioEditorial,2018,May19).AllthismeantaclearriseinWallStreetindexes,suchas“the industrial indexDowJonesrose1.21%upto25,013.29points,theNasdaq,oftechnologicalvalues,gained0.57%reaching7,394.04andtheS&P500added0.74%upto2,733.01units”(Estrategias&Negocios,2018,May 21).

NotwithstandingtheannouncementofMay19,thenegotiationsfinallyfailed,whichledtotheJuly6USannouncementontheimpositionoftariffs(25%)on818Chineseproductssuchasautomobiles,harddrives,aircraftcomponents,amongothers,whichadduptoatotalof34billiondollars.Likewise,thismea-surewasextendedtoasecondbatchofproductsworth16billiondollars.Allofthisaddedupto50billiondollarsinChineseimports.Thesemeasures,accord-ing toTrump,seektocompensate for the“theft”of intellectualpropertyandtechnologybyChina(RPPNewsroom,2018,July6).

Facedwiththis,ChinaimmediatelyreactedbyimposingcustomsdutiesonUSproducts,specifically91%ofthe545agriculturalproductsimportedfromtheUS,intotheautomobilesector(wherebycompaniessuchasChryslerandTeslawillbeaffected)andmedicalproducts(Vaswani,2018,July6).


Graph1IndustriesaffectedbytheChina-USAtradewar

Source:Vaswani,2018,July6 Data from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, to June 15 2018

Later,onSeptember17,2018,PresidentTrumpimposedasecondtariffpack-ageonChineseimportproducts(airconditioningequipment,furniture,mat-tresses,perfumes,toys,food,etc.)foranapproximatevalueof200billiondol-lars,whichwouldbeeffective7dayslateratarateof10%,andthenincreasedto25%towardstheendoftheyear.Withthis,theamountofChineseproductsaffectedwould addup to 250billiondollars (ABC International, 2018, Sep-tember 18).

Facedwiththismeasure,theChineseMinistryofCommercewouldreactbyim-posingtariffson4,000productsimportedfromtheUnitedStatesforavalueof60billiondollars,onthesamedatesestablishedbythesuperpower(EFE,2018,September 18).

AllthishasgeneratedadeepconcerninAmericanindustrialfirmsaswellasamongseveralleadersoftheRepublicanParty.TheUSChamberofCommerce,which has a great influence in commercialmatters, has admitted that trademeasuresagainstChina,Canada,MexicoandtheEuropeanUnionarealreadyaffectingUS$75billionofUSexports (RPPEditorial, 2018, July6). In addi-tion, the impositionof tariffswillgeneratean impact forconsumersof theseproductsastheywillhavetopaymoretoacquirethem.Additionally,severalofthese affected products are intermediate or capital goods, that is, they are goods thatareneededtomakeothertypesofproducts,withwhichtheimpactwouldextendto the latter(Vaswani,2018, July6).Amongthecompanies thatmost


use these products are the defense, automobile and infrastructure industries, whoseproducedgoodswillobviouslybemoreexpensive, losingcompetitive-nessintheinternationalmarket(Bown,2017,June;Steinberg,2018,March6).Linkedtothelatter,theincreaseintariffsonsteelandaluminumincreasesthecostoftheindustriesthatdependontheseproducts,affectingtheirworkers,calculatinganetlossof400thousandjobsintheUS.(Vásquez,2018,July10;Steinberg, 2018, March 6).

OneproofthattheeffectsofthistradewarstartedbyTrumparebeingfeltintheUSAisthedecisionofhisgovernmenttolaunchaplanvaluedat12billiondollars to compensate American farmers harmed by tariffs of other countries, mainlysoybean,milkandporkproducers,someofthesectorsmostpunishedbythismeasure(RPPEditorial,2018,July24).

Itcanbeconcludedthenthat, likeEurope,ChinahasnotgivenintoUSpres-suretonegotiateanew(“moreflexible”)tradeagreement.Onthecontrary,ithas been implementing trade response measures in the face of unilateral action fromthissuperpower.

A thirdproblemannounced in theSino-USrelationship is that related to theAsiangiant’spresenceinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(LAC).Asitiswellknown,Chinahasbeenintensifyingitsrelationswiththisregionsincethebe-ginning of the 21st century, becoming increasingly important.28 This insertion processcanbestrengthenedwithsomeactionsdevelopedbyPresidentTrumpwhoseesLACasaregionthatproducesdrugs,criminalsandrapists.ThishascausedarecentLatinobarómetropolltorecordahistoricdropintheapprov-al level regarding theUSpresident. in theregionreachingonly2.7outof10(Oppenheimer,).

AwareofthenegativeimpactoftheseactionsonUS-LACrelationsthethenUSSecretaryRexTillersonpubliclyconfrontedChinaonFebruary12018regard-ingitsattempttoprogressivelyinfluenceLatinAmerica.Hespecificallypointedout that theAsianpower intendedto“bringtheregionto itsorbit”andthenaddthat“LatinAmericadoesnotneednewimperialpowers”.HealsobroughtbacktheMonroedoctrine(declaredobsoletebyBarakObama)andstatedthatitis“asimportanttodayasbefore”,toconcludethatLatinAmericais“apriorityfortheUnitedStates”(Oppenheimer,2018,February5).Thisisawarningfornowanditmayreachgreatersignificanceinthefuture,astheChineseinsertiondeepensandreachesareasthattheUSconsidersofvitalinterest.

28 ForemoreinformationonChina’sinsertioninLAC,seeNovakandNamihas,2017.


North KoreaAs for this country, the problemswith the United States are not limited tothe bilateral sphere, but compromise other countries in the region, such as China,SouthKoreaandJapan.InthecaseofChina,althoughChinaandtheUSwantadenuclearizedKoreanpeninsula,theydonothavethesameinterestsregardingthefutureofthatcountry.Inthissense,ChinaisnotinterestedinanabruptfallofKimJong-Un’sregime,whichmightgenerateawaveofrefugeestowardstheircountry,norinthereunificationofthetwoKoreasasitwouldgeneratetheemergenceofonemorepower,strongerandpossiblymoredem-ocratic and close to the American axis (Abad, 2017, p.323). South Korea and Japan for their part coincidewith both powers in the need to denuclearizetheKoreanpeninsula,aswellasinthesearchforamorelike-mindedandlessdestabilizing regime.

RegardingtheUS-NorthKoreabilateralrelationship,themessagelaunchedbytheNorthKoreanleaderKimJong-unwhentestinganintercontinentalballis-ticmissileinJanuary2017negativelyaffectedthisrelationship,evenmoresowhenhepointedoutthattheultimatepurposeofsuchatestwas“toreachUSterritory.”Facedwiththis,TrumpredoubledthethreatsagainsttheNorthKo-reanregimebutalsoaccusedand lobbiedChina fornoteffectivelycooperat-ing incontainingNorthKorea.Tothe latter,Chinawouldrespondthat ithadbeenmakingalleffortstoachievethispurpose,butthatitcouldnotendupbyimposingasolution(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,February 8, p.11).

DuringtheObamaperiod,USpolicyregardingNorthKoreawasStrategic Pa-tience,inwhichthesuperpowerwouldnotinitiatenegotiationswithKoreaun-til that country demonstrated a serious commitment to denuclearization, a pol-icythatwasbackedbyJapanandSouthKorea.Inparallel,theUSAappliedasetofeconomicsanctionsagainstNorthKoreawithintheframeworkoftheUNandbilaterally,butalsostrengthenedmilitarycooperationwithSouthKorea.Thispolicy failed and did not stop North Korea from conducting four underground nuclear tests, accumulating plutonium and producing highly enriched uranium; nordidhewinChina’ssupporttopressurePyongyang.NorthKoreadidnotbowtothepressure,onthecontrary,itmaintaineditspositionandevenamendeditsconstitution declaring itself as a nuclear-armed nation (Kim, 2017).

WithTrump,theAsiancountrycontinuedtocarryoutitsnucleartestsandevenlaunchedtwointercontinentalballisticmissiles.Therefore,theUSpresidentde-cidedtoadoptwhatinhisopinionwouldbeanewpolicyagainstPyongyangcalled Strategic Responsibility.However,andbeyonddiscoursehardening,therearenogreaterdifferenceswiththeObamapolicyorwithitscomponents.So,theUSAhascontinuedtoimposesanctionsonthecommunistregime,collab-


oratingwiththesecurityofSouthKoreaandJapanandnegotiatingwithChinasothatthiscountrycandevelopamoreactiverolewithNorthKorea.However,itshouldbenotedthatTrump’spolicywasgenerallymoreaggressiveineachofthesepoints;inthissense,thesanctionsimposedhavebeenbroader,thepres-suretowardsChinahasbeenmoreintense(imposingsanctionsthataffecttheirinterestsorthoseoftheircompanies)andefficient(sinceithasmanagedtogettheAsianpowertoimplementUNresolutions),andhasseriouslyconsideredthemilitaryoption,whichisevidencedbytheexecutionofanextensivemilitarydeployment in the Korean peninsula (Kim, 2017).

The aforementioned generated a softening in the hard North Korean position that initially agreed toholda summitbetween theheadsof stateof the twoKoreas,andthenacceptameetingwithUSPresidentDonaldTrumponJune12,2018, on the island of Sentosa (Singapore). In this historic meeting both pres-idents committed toestablishnewrelationsbetween the twocountries, joinforcestobuildapeaceregimefortheKoreanpeninsula,workforthecompletedenuclearization of the aforementioned peninsula and repatriate or recovertheremainsoftheprisonersofwarand/ordisappearedintheKoreanWar.Also, theUSAhas offered security guarantees to theDemocraticRepublic ofKorea,andbothStateshavebeenobliged tomaintain follow-upnegotiationsontheseagreements, ledbyUSSecretaryofStateMikePompeoandaseniorofficialofKorea.While it is true thatnooneexpected the solution toall theproblems caused by the North Korean regime as a result of this meeting, the genericnatureofthecommitmentsmade,therewascriticismaboutabsenceofaprocedureanddeadlinesforcarryingoutthedenuclearization,vaguenessof the guarantees offered by theUnited States, and enormous distancewiththepurposeindicatedbyTrumpbeforethemeeting,inthesenseofachievinga complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of North Korea’s nucleararsenal(BBC,2018,June12).Inthisregard,RichardHaass,presidentofCouncilForeignRelations,said:“TheSingaporedeclarationsimplycontainsaspirations:thereisnodefinitionofdenuclearization,thereisnotimetableordetailsaboutverification.Themostdisturbingisthat,inreturn,theUnitedStatesabandonedsomething tangible, itsmaneuverswithSouthKorea “(ElComercioEditorial,2018, June 13).

Weeksafterthesummit,satelliteobservationsmadeonJuly20,2018,indicatedthatNorthKoreahadbegundismantlingthetestbenchforfuelengines(liquidusedtodevelopkeytechnologyforspacerocketsandintercontinentalballisticmissilesICBM)initsbaseinSohae,aswellasthedismantlingofthebuildingusedforassemblyofprojectilespriortotheirplacementonthelaunchingplat-form(RPPNewsroom,2018, July23).This comes inaddition to cessationofnuclear and missile tests, and destruction of three tunnels in an underground site, carried out before the presidential meeting. The Declaration of Pyongyang


atameetingheldonSeptember192018betweenthepresidentsofNorthKoreaandSouthKoreafollowsthissameline.There,theypledgedtoeliminatenucle-arweaponsfromtheKoreanpeninsula,andNorthKorea,inparticular,toper-manentlydismantletheYongbyonnuclearpowerplant,thecentralelementofits program, and to close its Tongchang-ri missile test complex, although again withoutspecifyingdeadlines(Espinosa,2018,September19).

However,itshouldbenotedthatothersatelliteobservationshavebeenshowingthatNorthKoreawouldbeinparallelconsolidatingotherlaunchingsites.Inanycase,itisrecognizedthatalthoughtheseagreementshaveloweredtheleveloftensionsinthepeninsula-whichhasbeenpossibleduetopressurefromtheUN(includingChina)andTrumphimself-theyhavenotsolvedthecentralproblem,sothatthecrisiscouldbeunleashedagainatanymoment,especiallywhentheUSAhasunilaterallyindicated-throughSecretaryofStateMikePompeo-thatthe denuclearization of North Korea must be materialized by January 2021. (El ComercioEditorial,2018,September19).

South KoreaAfterPresidentTrump’svisittoSeoulonNovember7,2017,theUSAratifieditsalliancewiththatcountry,expresseditssupportagainsttheNorthKoreanthreatbydeployingwarshipstotheareaandestablishingananti-missilede-fensesystem.Additionally,afterthemeetingbetweenTrumpandKim-Jong-Un,theUSAhas continued to carry outmilitary practiceswith SouthKorea andmaintaineditsmilitaryforcesinthearea.Similarly,theUSAhassupportedtheKoreanpositiononChina’sillegalpracticeofbuildingartificialislandsinordertoexpanditssovereigntyoverthesea(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,February8,pp.10-11;CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,November17,p.11).

However,sincethebeginningofhisterm,TrumpinsistedontheneedtoreviewthecommercialtermsofthebilateralrelationshipwithSouthKorea,whichledboth States to begin negotiations. These ended in late March 2018. In fact, the twocountriesreachedapre-agreementtomodifytheir2012tradetreaty,whichestablishesatariffexemptiononKoreansteelexportedtotheUS,butmaintainstariffsof10%onKoreanaluminumexportedtotheUS.Althoughtheexpertsagreethattherearenomajorvariationsbetweenthetwoagreements,thefactisthatthe2018pre-agreementallowsusforeliminatinganimportantpointoffrictionbetweenbothstrategicpartners(InfobaeNewsroom,2018,March28).

JapanAsithappenedwithSouthKorea,theUSAhasratifieditsstrategicalliancewithJapan.ThiswasclearlyestablishedwiththevisitofPrimeMinisterShinzoAbetoDonaldTrumpinWashingtonweeksaftertakingofficeandthelatter’svis-


it to JapanonNovember5and62017.Thus, thenewUSadministrationhasreaffirmedthemutualdefensetreaty, itssupportregardingtheNorthKoreanproblemanditssupportinrelationtothedisputesthatJapanhaswithChinaintheSouthSeafortheDiaoyuIslands(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,February8,pp.10-11,CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,November17,pp.9-10).

Somethingthatdrewattentionwasthatdespiteinsistingontheneedtoelimi-natethetradedeficitthatitmaintainswiththeJapanesecountry,theUShadnotimposedanycommercialsanctionsonit-asithaddonewithothercountriesorblocs-norhaditbegunnegotiationsforanewagreement,whichwasinterpret-edasademonstrationthatthesuperpowervalueditsassociationwithJapanabovecommercialinterest.

However, theUSA finallyendedup imposing traderestrictionson Japan thatenteredintoforceonJune1of thisyear,whichnotonlyreceivedharshcriti-cismfromtheJapaneseGovernmentduringthelastG-7meeting,butalsotheJapanese country has informed theWTO itswillingness to adopt retaliatorymeasures,consistinginimposingcustomstaxesonimportsofUSgoodsintheamountof340milliondollars(EFE,2018,June5).ThishasconfirmedthattherearenoexceptionsinTrump’scommercialpolicy.

2.4. Middle East Palestine and IsraelIn this region, particularly in regard to Palestine and Israel, President Trump gaveanimportantturntoformerPresidentObama’sforeignpolicy,whichwasverycriticalofthepolicyofsettlementsintheWestBankdevelopedbyIsraelthatledtoheavyfightingwiththeGovernmentofIsraeliPrimeMinisterBen-jaminNetanyahu.EvenintheSecurityCouncil,theObamaadministrationor-dered-forthefirsttimeinitshistory-thattheUSabstainedanddidnotvoteagainst the resolution contrary to Israel for executing the aforementioned poli-cy(PalaciodeOteyza,2017,p.75).

In contrast, Trump not only stressed the strategic importance of his relations withtheJewishState,butalsoadoptedsomemeasuresinfavorofthatcountryfrom the beginning.

ThefirstwastoordertheUSwithdrawalasa fullmemberof theUnitedNa-tionsEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization(UNESCO),maintaininganobserverstatusuntil itsdefinitivedepartureonDecember31,2018,justi-fyingsuchameasureinsaidorganization’salleged“anti-Israeliposition.” Al-thoughtheObamaadministrationfailedtocomplywithitsobligationtopayitsmembership to that organization in 2011 as a protest against the admission of


PalestineasfullmemberofUNESCO,Trump’sactionwasevenmoredrasticanddefinitive.(PardoandEmergui,2017,October12).

Itmust be remembered that UNESCO has been adopting some resolutionsthathavebeenprotestedbyIsrael.Oneofthem,forexample,wastheresolu-tionapprovedonOctober13,2016,bytheWorldHeritageCommitteeofthatorganization,whichdrewattentiontoIsraelforexcavationsinwhatiscalledthe“TempleMount”(Har Habayit)bytheJewsor“EsplanadeoftheMosques”(Haram al ShariforNobleSanctuary)bytheMuslims(Emergui,2016,Octo-ber26)Also, inanotherresolutionofJuly7,2017,thesameCommitteede-claredtheHebron’shistoriccenterasaworldheritagesiteofPalestine,whichearnedtherejectionofIsrael,whichconsidersthisplacesacredbecauseoftheremainsofthepatriarchsAbrahamandIsaac.Finally,similarmeasureswereadoptedwith the Church of theNativity of Bethlehem andBatir (Emergui,2017, July 7).

Thesecond-evenmoreimportant-measuredecreedbyTrumpinfavorofIsraelwasthedecisionmadeonDecember6,2017toacknowledgeJerusalemasthecapitalofthatcountry,orderingthetransferoftheUSembassyfromTel-Avivtothatcity.Thismeasurewaswidelycriticizedbytheinternationalcommunityandtheworld’smajorleaders,becausealthoughthenegotiationsbetweenIs-raelandPalestineduringtheObamaperiodwerestalled,thisdecisionmeantanewproblemforanyfuturenegotiations.

Beyondthemotifsofreligiousorder thatmake Jerusalemareason forcon-frontation(consideredasacredcitybytheCatholic,JewishandMuslim),thereareothersofahistoricalandpoliticalnature.Asiswellknown,UNresolution181ofNovember291947dividedthePalestinianterritoryinthree.Besides,Jerusalemwas to remainasan international territoryadministeredby thatbodyforaperiodof10years,afterwhichaplebisciteshouldbeheldtodecidethefateofsuchacity.However,thewarbetweenIsraelandtheArabcountrieswasunleashed in1948 ,which causedEast Jerusalem tobemaintainedbytheArabs(Jordan)andWestJerusalembytheJews.ThissituationwouldbemodifiedbytheSix-DayWar(1967)inwhichIsraeloccupiedtheentirecity.Then,in1980,IsraeldeclaredJerusalemasits“eternalandindivisible”cap-ital,whichledtoresolution478ofAugust201980onthepartoftheUnitedNations Security Council condemning the fact and calling the internationalcommunitytonotadmitsuchsituation.Sixotherresolutionswereaddedtothisone.(BBCWorld,2017,December6).Later,onSeptember131993,theso-calledOsloAgreementswereestablishedbetweentheStateofIsraelandtheOrganizationfortheLiberationofPalestineinwhichtheUSalsopartic-ipated.According to these the situationof Jerusalemwouldbe resolvedbymutual agreement later.


So,Trump’sdecisionnotonlybreaksthestatusquo,itgoesagainstbindingUnit-edNationsresolutionsandeveninternationalagreementsinwhichtheUnitedStatesitselfactedasagentandguarantor.Allthisalsoremovesthepossibilitythatthesuperpowerwillpresentitselfinthefutureasaneutralactorwiththeabilitytoleadpeacenegotiationsbetweenbothparties.

Finally,Trump’sthirdmeasureinsupportofIsraelwastheUSwithdrawaloftheUNHumanRightsCouncil,announcedonJune192018byNikkiHaley,USam-bassadortotheUN.Thewithdrawalwasjustifiedinanalleged“chronicbiasandprejudice”ofthatbodyagainstIsrael,aswellasbythepresenceofcountriessuchasChina,VenezuelaandCuba in theaforementionedbody,even thoughthese states do not respect human rights.

All the above shows that Trump has dramatically changed the position oftheUnitedStatesintheareaopenlyoptingwithoutlimitinfavorofitsrela-tionshipwith Israel.Additionally, hehas also taken away support from thePalestinians.

InthissensewehavetheUSAdecisiontosuspendfundingtheUNagencyforPalestinianrefugees(UNRWA),anentitythatprovidesservicesandassistancetomorethan5.4millionPalestinianrefugeesintheWestBank,EastJerusalem,Gaza,Jordan,LebanonandSyria.Thisprogramallows,forexample,humanitar-ianwork,girls’accesstoeducation,highhealthstandards,foodassistance,etc.Already in January 2018 Trump had announced a cut of 300 million dollars of the364millionthattheUScontributedin2017.Later,inAugust,heannouncedatotalcutoffunds,withwhichtheagencylostitsmaincontributor(ElComer-cioNewsroom,2018,September1).

SyriaTheTrumpadministrationhasshownsomechanges inrelationto thepolicyimplementedbyPresidentBarakObamaregardingtheSyriancrisis.

AfirstchangeisrelatedtothelackofpermissivenessofthenewUSGovernmentontheuseofchemicalweaponsbytheregimeofBasharal-Ásadagainstitscivil-ianpopulation.Thus,onApril7,2017,USPresidentDonaldTrumpauthorizedthe59-missilebombingofaSyrianairbaseinresponsetoachemicalweaponsattackperpetratedinIdlibbytheArmyofthatcountry.Then,onApril13,2018,itcarriedoutasecondattack,butthistimejointlywithFranceandtheUnitedKingdom, in response toanewuseof chemicalweaponsagainst civiliansbytheSyrianGovernment, launchingat least105missiles thatreached2of theproposedobjectives: a scientific research center andamilitary airport.Bothmilitary actions undoubtedly showed a greater determination of the TrumpgovernmentagainsttheuseofprohibitedweaponsbytheSyrianregime,com-


paredtoBarakObamawhoneverwentbeyondthreats(Cooper,Gibbons-NefandHubbard,2018,April13).

Likewise,theUSarmedforceshavebeenmoreeffectiveintheiractionsinSyriathanduring thegovernmentofPresidentObama,beingdecisive in the liber-ationof twobastionsof the IslamicState in that country, suchasMosulandRaqqa(Namihas,2017,October23).

Similarly, Trump decided to freeze funds aimed at reconstructing Syria by up to 200milliondollars,thushardeningtheUSpositionvis-a-vissaidcountry.

Finally,PresidentTrumphasannouncedhisdesiretowithdrawhistroopsfromSyriaand let thecountries in theregionbecomechargedwiththe finalsolu-tioninthatcountry(Ansorena,2018,March31),whichhasopenedaseriesofquestions,insofarasthiswouldimplythatthefinalsolutionisfundamentallyfavorabletoRussia,thecurrentSyrianregimeanditsallies,withthegeopoliti-cal implications that this entails.

TurkeyMonthsbeforeTrump tookoffice in theUS, this country andTurkey facedatensesituationduetoWashington’srefusaltogranttheextraditionofFetulláGulenrequestedbyAnkara.ThisTurkishtheologianisaccusedofbeingthein-stigator of the coup attempt of July 2016 (Brieger, 2018, August 16).

However,relationswouldbefurtherstrainedbytherefusal,thistimebyTurkey,toreleaseUSpastorAndrewBrunsonarrestedinOctober2016,accusedofes-pionageandterroristactivities(ElComercioEditorial,2018,August17).

Asaresultofthis,theUSAimposedsanctionsagainsttwoTurkishstatemin-istersinAugust2018,whichwasreplicatedbythiscountry.Later,thetensionincreasedduetoTrump’sordertoraisetariffsoncertainTurkishexportprod-ucts,whichcausedtheTurkish lira tocollapseand, in turn, that thiscountryalsoimposesanctionsontheUnitedStates.(ElComercioEditorialBoard,2018,August 17).

Althoughthisisacrisisfocusedonjudicialissues,subsequentactionsadoptedbybothgovernmentshaveaggravatedthesituationofthebilateralrelationship,whichcouldbecomemorecomplexduetoTurkey’sgaspartnershipwithRussiaandtheparticipationoftheformerintheSyrianwar.

Iraq, Syria and Yemen: the immigration problemWithrespecttothesethreecountriesthathaveaMuslimmajority,theTrumpadministrationpromoted threemigratoryvetoes.The first of theseoccurred


through a decree signed on January 27, 2017,which suspended the refugeeprogram for 120 days and prohibited the entry of citizens from 7 countries for3months,amongwhichwere these three - inaddition to Iran,Libya,So-maliaandSudan-underthepretextofprotectingthecountryfromthearrivalofpossibleterrorists.Thisdecreedeterminedthat60,000visaswererevokedand 700 travelerswere retained at the airports. However, US federal courtssuspended this measure throughout the territory (Nuruzzaman, 2017; Excel-sior,2017,December14;ABCInternational,2017,September25;ElNacional,2017, December 4).

ThisledtoPresidentTrumpsigningaseconddecreeonMarch6,2017,with-drawingIraqfromthelist(duetothecommitmentassumedbythiscountrytocarryoutmorerigorous investigationsof itscitizensrequestingvisas for theUnitedStates.andthecontributionofmanyofthemwiththeUStroopsduringtheoccupation)andmodifiedtheprohibitiononSyrianrefugees.Thisdecreealsostatedthattherestrictionwouldnotaffectthecitizensofthesecountrieswhopossessthepermanentresidentcard(greencard)andanymentionofthecitizens’religionwassuppressed.However,thisdecreewouldalsobeblockedbysomeUSjudgessuchasthoseinHawaiiandMaryland,ontheunderstandingthatitviolatedtheUSconstitutionbydiscriminatingagainstMuslims(Nuruz-zaman,2017;Excelsior,2017,December14;ABCInternational,2017,Septem-ber 25; El Nacional, 2017, December 4).

The last decreewas issued on September 24, 2017 against citizens of Chad,North Korea, Iran, Libya, Syria, Somalia and also Venezuelan officials,whichscopewouldthenbemodifiedbytheCourtofAppeals(conservativemajority)thatestablishedthatdenyingentrytocitizensofthe6Muslim-majoritycoun-tries thathadno familyorpersonal ties to theUnitedStates couldbe ruled.(Nuruzzaman,2017;Excelsior, 2017,December14;ABC International, 2017,September25;ElNacional,2017,December4).This lastdecree tookcare tolookformorereasonablefoundationssuchas“thereliabilityofpassportsandidentitydocumentsandthefluencyintheexchangeofinformationaboutter-roristsuspicionsandcriminalrecords”. Inaddition,by includingnon-Muslimcountriestheargumentthatthedecreediscriminatedforreligiousreasonswaseliminated.However,formanycivilrightsassociationsthedecreewasdiscrim-inatory and disproportionate (Ahrens, 2017, December 5).

However,onJune26,2018theSupremeCourtoftheUSAfailedby5votesto4infavorofTrump’simmigrationveto,consideringthatthepresidenthadlegallyexercisedhispowertosuspendtheentryofcertainforeignersintothecountry.ThismeantthattheExecutivecouldasklowercourtstorevoketherulingswithwhichtheyhadblockedthepreviousrestrictionmeasures(ElComercio,2018,June 26).


theinternaljudicialbattle,theresentmentcausedintheMuslimcountriesaf-fected by the measures remains intact.

2.5. South Asia Iran

WemustrememberthatIranwasincludedbyPresidentGeorgeW.Bushwithintheso-called“axisofevil”in2002andthatithasbeenthesubjectofnumerouspressures for its nuclear program since 2003.

DuringBarackObama’sgovernmentandafterHasanRouhani-amoderatere-former-joinedthepresidencyofIraninAugust2013(andre-electedonMay192017),talksresumed29 to reach an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program and on the sanctions imposed on that country as a result of that program, and certainlinesofactionwereagreed.However,itwouldbeonlyonJuly14,2015,inVienna,thattheso-calledJoint and Complete Action Planwouldbereachedand that, in addition to Iran, the so-called 5 + 1 Group participated, that is, the fivepermanentmembersof theSecurityCouncil (USA,Russia,China, FranceandUnitedKingdom)plusGermany.Throughthisplan,Iranwouldcommitnottoproducehighlyenricheduraniuminthenext15years,getridof98%ofthenuclearmaterial itpossessedat that time,eliminatetwothirdsof thecentri-fuges installed,maintaina limitednumberof tonsofheavywater, andallowinternational inspectorstomonitorcompliancewiththesecommitments.Foritspart,theinternationalcommunity-mainlytheUnitedStates.andtheEurope-anUnion-wouldeliminateseveralofthesanctionsimposedandIranwouldbeallowedtoaccess100billiondollarsthatithadinthebanksofChina,JapanandSouthKorea,aswellasmorethan50billiondollarsoffrozenassets(Yubero,2017, pp.4, 5, 23 and 24).

However,sincetheelectioncampaignandaftertakingoffice,DonaldTrumpwasverycriticalofthisagreement,statingat firstthat itwouldbeterminated,tolaterpointoutthatthisshouldbereviewedand,finally,arguethathewouldnotcertifyitandwouldratherasktheUSCongresstore-establishsanctionsagainstIran. In this line, onOctober13, 2017,USA refused to certify Iran regardingcompliancewiththe2015agreement30andplacedinthehandsofCongressthedecisiononthefutureofthisagreement;dayslater,thatis,onOctober23,theHouseofRepresentativesendedupapproving-with423votesinfavorandonly2against-theimpositionofsanctionsagainstIranrequestedbythepresident(Europapress,2017,October26;Galbraith,2018).

29 Thefirstnegotiationstookplacein2006tothenbeabandoneduntil2013.30In2015,theUSCongressapprovedtheLawtorevisetheIraniannuclearagreement,bywhichtheUSpresidentmustdetermineevery90dayswhetherornottheconditionsof the aforementioned agreement are being respected; if the president comes to the


Trump argues that Iran has not been respecting the commitments made in that agreement, despite the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)hascertified10timessince2015thatIrandidnotviolatethetermsoftheagreement(Aguirre,2018,May10).Perhapsforthatreason,TrumpvariedtheargumentaccusingtheIranianGovernmentofintimidatingtheverifiersoftheIAEA.However,thisorganizationhasrepeatedlypointedoutthatIranhasbeenstrictlycomplyingwiththe2015agreement, thattheenricheduraniuminventoryhasremainedwithintheagreedlimits,thattheamountofheavywa-terhasremainedbelowthemaximumlimitsestablished,thattheentranceofinspectorstotheIraniannuclearinstallationsiscarriedoutwithoutproblemsandthattheverificationregimeimposedonIranisthe“mostdemandingintheworld”(Yubero,2017,p.28).

Despite this, President Trump continued to lash out at the agreement, point-ingoutthatthistimehehadnotincludedanythingabouttheIraniandefensiveballisticmissileprogram,whichisstillbeingdeveloped.Inthisregard,theIra-nianGovernmenthasalwaysbeenopposedtorenouncingitssovereignrighttomaintainadefensivedeterrentsystem,butthetruthisthatthesemissiles-withacapacitygreaterthan2,000kmandthereforewiththepossibilityofreach-ingUSbasesinBahrain,KuwaitandOman,aswellasIsrael,itsmainstrategicpartner-justifiablyconcerntheUSGovernment.However,thepointraisedbyTrumpisnotincludedintheagreementsignedin2015and,whatiscriticizedisnottoseekanegotiationtoincludeit,butrathertotrytoinvalidateit,takingeverythingbacktozero.Additionally,Trumpaddsotherargumentsthathavenothingtodowiththeagreementsigned,suchasIran’ssupportforterrorism,human rights abuses, among others (Yubero, 2017, pp.30-36).

Inthisregard,duringthemeetingsheldwithFedericaMogherini-highrepre-sentativeoftheEuropeanUnion-GermanChancellorAngelaMerkelandFrenchPresidentEmmanuelMacrontriedtoconvinceTrumpthattheIranianballis-ticsprogramhasnorelationwiththeagreementof2015andthatnegotiationscouldbeopenedforthispurpose(CNNNewsroom,2018,April24);butsuchapossibilitywasquicklyandsharplydeniedbyIranitselffortheargumentsindi-catedinpreviousparagraphs.

ItwasthenthatonMay9,2018,PresidentTrumpannouncedthattheUSaban-doned thenuclearagreementwith Iranand imposednewsanctions, causingIran’sprotestandtherespectivepronouncementsoftheothersignatorypow-ers,whoregrettedthefactandratifiedtheirdecisiontocontinuewiththeagree-ment(ElPaís,2018,May9).

conclusionthathecannotcertifycompliancewithsuchconditions,Congressisempow-eredtoimposesanctions(Galbraith,2018).


Giventhisdecision,differentinternationalpolicyanalystsdrawdiverseconclu-sions.Thefirstisthatitisawrongdecisionbecausealthoughthe2015agree-mentdoesnot solve all theproblemsbetween theUnited States and Iran, ithadindeedallowedtoeffectivelycontroltheIraniannuclearprogramuptothatdate.Thesecond is that theUSdecisionwill strengthenhard-linepoliticiansandleadersinsideIranwhoalwaysopposedtheagreementthatthethencan-didateandtodayPresidentRouhaniencouraged,thusweakeningmoderateandreformist positions. The third is that, by abandoning this agreement, Trump weakensUScredibilityinfrontofitsmainpartnersandbeforetheworldonemoretime,becauseitconfirmsitsgreatfacilitytogetridofcommitmentsthatwereverydifficulttoattainandlongtobuildandthatalsoimpliedadifficultconsensus(Vásquez,2018,May15;Camacho,2018,May18).ThefourthisthatconfrontingIrandefinitelystrengthensthealliancebetweenthisStateandRus-sia,SyriaandHezbollahbutalsoleadstolosingapossibleallytoresolvecon-flictsinthatregion.Finally,thefifthisthatmeasuresagainstIrancanaffectUScompaniesthathaveorwanttohavedealingswiththeIslamicRepublic,losingamarketinwhichthereisincreasingpresenceofEuropean,RussianorChinesecompanies(OteyzaPalace,2017,pp.75and76;Black,2018,p.23).

Therefore, some argue that PresidentTrump’s decision actually has amoresubstantivemotivation,whichistohithardandcornerIran(politicallyandeco-nomically)toweakenitsactionsinSyria,Iraq,YemenandLebanon31,aswellasitsstrategicpartnershipwithRussia,TurkeyandQatar(Mansilla,2017,De-cember27).Thisstrategywouldseek,therefore,theconsolidationofitspart-nerSaudiArabiaand itsKingMohammedbinSalmanintheregion,withtheconsequentprotectionofUSinterests(Malley,2018,January9).Alongthesamelines,theTrumpadministrationhasmadeitclearthatitsharesSaudiArabia’sperspectiveonthenatureoftheYemenconflictasamajorsymbolofIranian-in-spiredsubversionofSunniArabgovernments(Feierstein,2017,March).

Additionally, President Trump has publicly endorsed popular protests in Iran, harshlyattackingtheAyatollahregime.

31 Iran, in its struggle against Saudi Arabia to become the leader of the region, has car-ried out a series of actions in different countries of this region. Thus, in Syria, Iran has beensupportingBasharal-Ásad’sregimethroughShiitemilitias,specialarmyforces,grantingloansandconnectingtheAssadgovernmentwiththeLebaneseHezbollahmi-litia;inYemen,ithasbeensupportingtheHouthisbylaunchingmissilesagainstSauditerritory;inIraq,ithassupportedthegovernmentinitsfightagainsttheIslamicStateandhasgranteditimportantloans,addedtothefactthatIraqisIran’slargestclientinthesaleofnaturalgasandthePersians’maintouristdestination;and,inLebanon,IranprovideseconomicandmaterialsupporttoHezbollah,whichpartakesintheNationalUnitygovernmentofLebanesePrimeMinisterSaadHariri,againsttheinterestsofSaudiArabia (Malley, 2018, January 9; Yubero, 2017, p. 6-14).


AnotherissueoffrictionalreadydiscussedinthepreviouspointreferstothetwodecreesissuedbytheTrumpadministrationthatestablishedmigratoryve-toesagainstIraniancitizens,whichhascausedprotestsbyPresidentRouhani.

A final issueof tensioncameat thebeginningofOctober2018,whentheIn-ternationalCourtof Justice ruledagainst theUnitedStatesandunanimouslyorderedit tocomplywiththesuspensionofsanctionsagainstIranrelatedtotheexportofmedical,food,agriculturalproductsandessentialequipmentforthesafetyofcivil flights, inapplicationoftheTreatyofFriendship,EconomicRelationsandConsularRightsheldbybothcountriesin1955.This,inturn,trig-geredtheannouncementbyUSSecretaryofStateMikePompeothathiscountrywoulddenouncethetreaty(ElComercioEditorial,2018,October3).

IndiaIn2017,US-IndiarelationsremainedatamagnificentlevelaftertheofficialvisitofIndianPrimeMinisterNarendraModitoWashingtoninJune.Bothcountriesthenagreedtointensifytheircooperationintrade,defenseandfightagainstter-rorism.Onthisoccasionbothleaderspraisedeachotherand,hoursbeforethemeeting, President Trump included Mohamed Yusuf Shah, leader of the Kash-miriseparatistgroupHizbulMujahideeninthelistofterrorists,highlightinghisbestdispositiontoensurethesuccessofthisMeeting(DW,2017,June26).

Alsoasaresultofthisvisit,bothStatesscheduleda2+2MinisterialDialoguebe-tweentheirMinistersofForeignAffairsandDefense,thefirstofwhichwastobeheldinJuly2018.However,thismeetingwasfrustratedaswellastwoattemptstorescheduleanewdate,duetothetradewarunleashedbytheUS. inwhichIndiawasaffected(Panda,2018,August30).Itshouldberememberedthatbi-lateraltradebetweenthesetwocountriesreached126billiondollarsin2017.

Indeed, thedecreepassedbyPresidentTrumpimposing25%tariffsonsteelimportsand10%onaluminumimportsfromIndia,enteredintoforceinMarch2018,whichgeneratedareactionfromtheIndiangovernment,whichalsoim-posedtariffsonUSimportsasfromAugustofthesameyear.Themeasuread-optedbyIndiaaffectsagriculturalfoodproducts(apples,almonds,chickpeas,lentils,nuts,crustaceans,amongothers)aswellasmetalsandsteel,imposingawiderangeoftariffsrangingfrom5to60%(InformationMacroeconomics,2018, June 21).

However,the2+2meetingwasfinallyheldonSeptember6,2018inIslamabad,inwhich theydiscussedconsensus issuessuchascontaining theChineseex-pansion, collaborating in the stabilization of Afghanistan, putting pressure on PakistaninitsfightagainstterrorismandsearchingforafreeandopenAsianregion(LaVanguardia,2018,September6).


Beyondthepositiveaspectsofthishigh-levelmeeting,thetradewarunleashedbyTrump,aswellashisthreatofimposing-asfromNovember-sanctionsonthosecountriesthatbuyoilfromIran(thusaffectingIndiawhichisoneofitsmainbuyersandwhohasalreadyannounceditsrefusaltoacceptsuchaban),sowdoubt about thegood forecast that theUSpresidentannounced in June2017,pointingoutinrelationtoIndiathat“thefutureofourcountrieshasnev-erbeenmoresparkly.IndiaandtheUnitedStateswillalwaysbetiedinfriend-shipandrespect[...].Thebilateralrelationshiphasneverbeensosolid“(DW,2017, June 26).

Afghanistan and PakistanWhileTrumpwasinitiallyopposedtothereconstructionmissionsandwasasupporterofthedepartureofAmericantroopsfromAfghanistan,USmilitarypresenceactuallycontinuesinthatterritory.Moreover,TrumphasannouncedtheincreaseofUStroopsandmoreairstrikesinAfghanistanaswellastheneedtorelaxtherulesofengagementthatgoverncombatoperationsagainsttheTal-iban(HumanRightsWatch,2018).

TheexplanationforthischangemaybefoundinthespeechdeliveredbytheUSpresidentattheFortMyermilitarybaseonAugust21,2017,wheninrelationtothatcountryhesaidthat“anhonorableandlastingresult[mustbesought]wor-thyofthetremendoussacrificesthathavebeenmade,especiallythesacrificesoflives“(Lalkovič,2017,p.1);thatis,TrumpunderstandsthattheUShasinvest-edalotoftime,money,materialaidandaboveallhumanlivesinAfghanistanand, therefore, it cannotwithdraw its troopswithout reaching a satisfactoryconclusionoftheconflict.

Inthissense, inthesamemonthofAugustof2017,Trumppresentedanewactionstrategy inrelationtoAfghanistan,which impliesthe increaseofsur-prisemilitaryoperationsinordertoavoidleaks,involvesomeStatessuchasPakistanandIndia,increasetheparticipationofmoretroopsfromothercoun-tries,etc.HeevensuccessfullymanagedtogetagreaterEuropeancommitmentthrough an increaseof the fundsof theEuropeanReinsurance Initiative for2018,whichwentfrom1.4billiondollarsto4.7billiondollars(Lalkovič,2017;Stokes,2018).

Trump’snewstrategy,however,willnotonlyhavetofacetheresurgenceofter-roristactionsinAfghanistan,butalsothattheTalibanhavebeendividedintoseveralgroupswhichmakes theircontrolby thePakistanigovernmentmorecomplex.Inadditiontothis,PakistaniscomingclosertoChina,weakeningitshistoricpartnershipwith theUnitedStates inCentralAsia (Armanian,2018,February1).Besides,wemustaddthefactthatTrumphasannouncedthefreez-ingofalltypesofaidlinkedtothesecurityofPakistan,whichhehasaccusedof


harboringterrorists(HumanRightsWatch,2018).ThismakesitclearthattheUnitedStatesdoesnotcountonPakistantocontrolthesituationinAfghanistan.

2.6. Southeast Asia Vietnam

Linked to the US policy of containing China in Asia, it is important to high-lightPresidentTrump’sdecisiontoconsolidatehisalliancewithVietnamandthePhilippines.Thus,duringDonaldTrump’svisittoHanoionNovember11,2017, he sought to continue the strategic military alliance initiated by Presi-dentObama.ThisallianceisconsideredusefulbyVietnamasitstrengthensitsclaimsoncertainregionsandisletsintheSouthSeaagainstChina,butitisalsoconsideredimportantbytheglobalsuperpowertoensurethatithasanallyinthat region.

RegardingVietnam’sterritorialdisputeswiththeAsiangiant,thejointpresiden-tial statement signed at the end of the conference emphasized the importance offreeandopenaccesstotheSouthChinaSea.ItalsoadjustedtheterritorialdemandstotheprovisionsoftheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea.Regardingmilitarycooperation,theyagreedtoincreaseexchangeinintel-ligence,securityanddefenseandtomaterializethevisitofaUSaircraftcarriertotheoldbaseinCamRanhBay(CookandStorey,2017,November23,pp.5-6).In addition, Trump obtained from President Tran Dai Quang the commitment toeliminatetradebarrierstotheimportationofUSagriculturalproducts,thusclearingtheonlycontroversialpointintherelationship.

PhilippinesAsforthePhilippines,thechallengeofTrump’svisit(November12,2017)wasmorecomplexbecauseitwasaboutreestablishingthehistoricaltieswiththatcountry,whichhadbeendamagedbythedifferencesbetweenPresidentsBarakObamaandRodrigoDuterte.Attheendofthevisit,TrumpandDuterteratifiedthevalidityoftheMutualDefenseTreatyof1951,aswellastheCooperationAgreementtoimprovedefense,expressedtheirconsensusregardingNorthKo-reaaswellastheneedtonegotiateafreetradeagreement,andanalyzedspac-esofcooperationforthePhilippinearmedforcesintheirfightagainstIslamicextremists(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,November17, pp.16 and 19).

IndonesiaAsforthiscountry,PresidentTrump’sdecisiontorestrictentrytotheUnitedStatesto7Muslimcountrieshavegeneratedgreatconcernamongtheauthor-ities and the people of this country, as it is the most populous Muslim state in theworld.


AlthoughmoderateIndonesianMuslimshaveexpressedtheirdiscontentthatthismeasure could exacerbate religious tensions between theWest and theMuslimworld,themostradicalmembersoftheIslamicDefendersFronthaverespondedwithgreatervirulence,harshlycallingthemeasureasdiscriminato-ryandproofofTrump’sreligiousintolerance(Fitriani,2017).

Chapter IIIPresident Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Vis-a-Vis

Latin America and the Caribbean

WhenanalyzingtheforeignpolicyofPresidentTrump,itisusuallyagreedthat,insomeway,itsimpactonLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanhasbeenlessdirectandrelevantor,simply,ofalesserdegreethanthatwithstoodbyEuropeandAsia.Althoughthere issometruthtothis, theLatinAmericanandCaribbeanregion is not excluded from the effects of this policy, on such important issues as democracy, trade, migration and human rights, cooperation and climate change, althoughatdifferentlevelsaccordingtoeachcountry,asshownbelow.

3.1. Selective Defense of Democracy Inthefieldofdemocracy,weshouldhighlightamoreenergeticpositionofthecurrentUSadministrationcomparedtothatofBarakObama,withrespecttocertainclearlyauthoritarianordictatorialregimes,suchasthecasesofVenezu-ela and Nicaragua, although, at the same time, the absence of a similar position againstHondurasisnoticed.

InthespecificcaseofVenezuela, it isnecessarytorememberthatthediplo-macyofboth countrieshas revolvedaroundwhat somecall the “diplomacyofthemicrophone”sinceHugoCháveztookoffice,becausethespeechesoftheheadsofstatehavemarkedtherelationship.Inaddition,bothcountrieshavenoambassadorssince2010,andtheleveloftheirdiplomaticrepresentationhas been reduced (Center for International Studies GilbertoBosques, 2017,October9,p.14).

Inthiscontext,whenDonaldTrumpassumedthepresidency,headoptedasetofmeasuresagainsttheVenezuelandictatorship.Thus,onFebruary13,2017,heimposedsanctionsonVicePresidentTareckElAissamiand,onemonthlater,placedhimon the list of persons and companies accusedofdrug trafficking(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,p.14).Dayslater,PresidentTrumpreceivedLilianTintori,wifeofoppositionleaderLeop-oldoLópez, apoliticalprisoner inVenezuela andexhortedPresidentNicolásMadurotoimmediatelyreleasehim.Inthissamemonth,theUSApubliclyman-ifesteditselfinfavoroftheapplicationoftheOASInter-AmericanDemocraticChartertoVenezuela,consideringthatthedemocraticorderinthatcountryhadbeenbroken (GilbertoForests International StudiesCenter, 2017,October9,p.14).Fivemonthslater,onJuly31ofthatyear,theTreasuryDepartmentim-posednewsanctions(onauthoritiesoftheExecutiveBranch,oftheelectoralbodies,magistratesoftheSupremeCourtofJustice,militaryandotherpolitical


figureslinkedtotheGovernment)inreactiontotheillegalelectionofaGeneralConstituentAssembly.Moreover,onAugust11,inastatementthatwasquicklyansweredbytheotherLatinAmericanpresidentsandevenbytheUNSecre-taryGeneralhimself,Trumpevenraisedthepossibilityofamilitaryinterven-tiontostopthewaveofhumanrightsinfractions,violationsagainstfreedomsandagainstVenezuelanpopulation’scitizenrights,whichforcedthePentagontoclarifythattherewasnoinstructioninthatregard.OnOctober15,Trump’sgovernmentignoredtheresultsoftheregionalelectionsheldinVenezuelathatday(Colmenares,2018,pp.17,20-23).

Thefollowingyear,specificallyonMay19,theUSagainimposedsanctions,thistimeonthe firstvicepresidentof theUnitedSocialistPartyofVenezuelaDi-osdadoCabello -number two in theVenezuelanpower- forbeing involved ina drug traffickingnetwork togetherwithNicolásMaduro and vice presidentTareckElAissami,amongotherofficials(SingerandCastro,2018,May19).Fi-nally,andaftertheforgedelectionsinwhichthere-electionofNicolásMaduroaspresidentofVenezuela(May20,2018),tookplace,hedescribedtheelectoralprocessasa“farce”andinthesamepublicact,PresidentTrumpissuedanexec-utiveorderprohibitinganyUScompanyorcitizenfromacquiringVenezuela’sdebt, assets or property, thereby limiting the possibility for that State to obtain liquidityinalmosttheonlywayithadleft(ElComercio,2018,May22).

As for Nicaragua, a number of protests by the population began on April 18 2018againstthesocialsecurityreformsannouncedbyDanielOrtega’sgovern-ment,whichextendednotonlytoManaguabutalsotothedepartmentsofLeón,Granada,Boaco,Carazo,EstelíandRivas.Facedwiththis,theGovernmenttooktheArmedForces to the streets inorder to suppressprotests,which causedthedeathofseveralcitizens.Then, theGovernmentdecidedtocancel there-formandconvenedadialogueroundtable,whichwasfinalizedonMay16be-tweenGovernmentrepresentativesandtheoppositionCivicAlliance(formedbybusinessmen,studentleaders,workers’unions,etc.),withthemediationoftheCatholicChurchEpiscopalConference.Theprotestshowevercontinued,butthis time the claims spread to other areas, such as, independent and credible in-quirytoinvestigatethemurdersthathadoccurredduringtheprotests,reformsto the electoral system that guarantee free and transparent elections, changes ingovernmentinstitutionstoensurethereestablishmentoftheruleoflawandsolvetheproblemsofsustainabilityandtransparencyattheNicaraguanSocialSecurityInstitute.OnMay23,theEpiscopalConferencesuspendedthedialogueduetotheimpossibilityofreachingagreements,butitwasresumedonJune15.Meanwhile,protestscontinueddemandingtheresignationofOrtega-whohasgovernedsince2007forthethirdconsecutiveterm-andthedemocratizationofthecountry.Inresponse,theGovernmentintensifiedrepressionbypoliceandparamilitarygroups,whoexecutedrealmassacresthathavecausedthedeath

President Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Vis-a-Vis Latin America and the Caribbean | 89

of295peopleandmorethan1,800havebeenwoundedtodate,accordingtofigures from theOAS Inter-AmericanCommissionofHumanRights, (Infobaenewsroom,2018,July25;AFP,2018,July20).

ItwasthenthattheTrumpadministrationraisedtheneedforNicaraguatore-turn to democracy on July 5, sanctioning three senior members of the Nicara-guanGovernmentforviolationsofthecivilianpopulation’shumanrights.ThesewereFranciscoJavierDíazMadriz,commissionergeneraloftheNationalPoliceanddeputydirectorofthatinstitution;JoséFranciscoLópezCenteno,treasurerof the rulingSandinistaNationalLiberationFront (FSLN)andvicepresidentof ALBA in Nicaragua, and Fidel Antonio Moreno Briones, general secretary oftheManaguaMayor’sOffice.TheyalljoinedtheListofSpeciallyDesignatedNationals andPersonsBlockedby theUSOfficeofControl of ForeignAssets(OFAC).Also,onJuly18,theUSandanother17countries,votedattheOASforaresolutioncondemningtheNicaraguanStateandrequestingadvancementofthe general electionsdate. Likewise, it ordered the evacuationofnon-essen-tial diplomatic personnel present in Nicaragua and their families, noting that newsanctionswerebeingevaluatedinthefaceofcontinuingviolenceinthatcountry.ThesesanctionsconsistedinthereturnofthevehiclesdonatedtotheNationalPoliceofNicaragua-whichhadbeenusedtoviolentlyrepresspeacefulprotests-andinstoppingthesalesanddonationsofequipmenttothesecurityforcesofthatcountry(InfobaeNewsroom,2018,July25;AFP,2018,July20).

Finally,onJuly31theWhiteHouseissuedanofficialstatementinwhichitdi-rectlyblamedPresidentDanielOrtega,hiswifeandvicepresidentRosaMurillo,aswellastherulingparty,fortheviolenceinthatcountryandtheconsequentdeath of almost 300 people. It also demanded the holding of free, fair and trans-parentelectionsas theonlyavenue towards the restorationofdemocracy inNicaragua (Peru21 Editorial Board, 2018, July 31).

DespitethesevereandjustifiedmeasuresadoptedagainstVenezuelaandNica-ragua,itisstrikingthatasimilarreactionhasnotoccurredwiththeHonduranregimeofPresidentJuanOrlandoHernández,despiteirregularitiesintheNo-vember262017electionprocessandthemaneuversofthatpresidenttoachievehisreelectionagainsttheHonduranconstitution,bymeansofitsamendment.

These factswerepointedoutby theOASElectoralMission in itsobservationreport,whichconcludedthat“theirregularities,errorsandsystemicproblemsthathavesurroundedthiselectiondonotallowtheMissiontobecertainabouttheresults”(OAS,December42017).TherehavealsobeennoobjectionstothecaptureofthemajorityofpowersinHondurasbyHernándezorthefactthathisassociatesareintheSupremeCourtandintheSupremeElectoralTribunal(Oppenheimer,2018,January1).


Theexplanation-notjustthejustification-wouldbeinthefactthattheHondu-ranregimeisakintotheTrumpgovernment,unlikeNicaraguaandElSalvadorgovernedbyex-guerrillasopposedtotheUSregimeinCentralAmerica;anditwouldalsobeduetotheproximitybetweenPresidentHernándezandGeneralJohnKelly,Trump’schiefofstaff(Oppenheimer,2018,January1).

However,thisambivalentposition-whichisnotnewinUSforeignpolicy,aswehaveseeninthefirstchapterofthisworkinthecasesofTruman,Eisenhower,Johnson,NixonandReagan-,bringstheunfortunateconsequenceofa lossofauthorityonthepartofthesuperpowertosignaloutandfightauthoritarianor dictatorial regimes in the region, as long as their position is not consistent, giventhatthiswouldbeguidedbythesatisfactionoftheirowninterestsratherthan by the defense of democratic principles.

3.2. Hostility for some and political cordiality for othersPresident Trump’s foreign policy towards Latin America is not uniform butrather it can be discerned in its differences depending on the country of desti-nation.Inthissense,countrieslikeMexico,Cuba,VenezuelaandNicaraguahavebeenthesubjectofspecialconcernandevenhostility(justifiedinsomecases)bytheUSadministrationandhavemeritedmakingdecisionsthathavecausedtensions in the bilateral relationship.

In the case of Mexico,therehavebeendifferentpointsoffrictionsincethear-rivalofTrumptopower,especiallythoserelatedtomigrationandtrade(whichwillbeanalyzedinsections3.3and3.4ofthiswork).ThishasledtoaconsensusamongspecialiststhatrelationsbetweentheUSandMexicohadneverreachedsuchalowlevelbeforeandwithsuchconfrontation,except-ofcourse-inthefirstdecadesof thetwentiethcentury. In thisregard,Chabat’s longand lucidreflection(2017)isparticularlypertinent:

Sincethe1938oilexpropriation,which, intheend,wassupportedbytheRoo-sevelt government,Mexico’s foreign policy has been articulated around a fun-damentalassumption:theUnitedStatessupportedMexicangovernmentsinex-changeforstability.TherestofMexico’sinternationalrelationswerearticulatedonthisassumption.GiventhattheUSgovernmentwaswillingtosupportMexicoin its economic right and, at the same time, pardoned the scant democracy that existedinthecountry,therestoftheworldwenttoasecondaryplace.Thetruthisthatthispolicymadesense:TheUnitedStateswasourmainmarketand,atthesametime,thefirstworldpowerthatwouldprotectthecountryfromanyexternalaggression.Thus,thebargainingpowerthatMexicohadbecauseof itsborder-andthatnootherLatinAmericancountryhad-allowedMexicangovernmentstonegotiatespecialtreatmentinseveralareas.SuchoutlookwasnotexemptfromconflictswithWashington,suchasthemas-sivedeportationofundocumentedimmigrantsin1954,inOperationWetback,or


thesurchargeonUnitedStatesimportsimposedbytheNixonGovernmentandofwhichMexicowasnotexempt.Therewerealsoseriousconflictsaroundtheissueofdrugtrafficking,suchastheoneunleashedasaresultofthekidnappingandmur-derofDEAagentEnriqueCamarenain1985.OtherpointsoffrictionwereMexico’sactivityintheContadoraGroupatthebeginningoftheeightiesandtherefusaltosupporttheUSwarinIraqin2003.However,intheendthoseconflictsweresubor-dinated to common interests and the logic of an interdependent relationship.DonaldTrump’svictoryintheNovember2016electionsposesaclearbreakwiththepatternestablishedinthebilateralrelationshipofrecentdecades.CandidateTrump’sandPresidentTrump’sdiscoursecallsintoquestionthelogicofthe“bi-lateralrelationship”withMexico.Inthisdiscourse,Mexicoisnolongerthecom-mercialorstrategicallywithwhichwemustcooperate,butasourceofthreatstotheUnitedStates.ThisisascenariothatwasnotpresentsincetheconflictswithWashington in the twentiesand thirtiesof the last century inwhich therewasevenspeculationaboutapossibleUSinvasionofMexico.Fromthispointofview,theMexicangovernmentfacesascenarioforwhichthereisnoimmediatepriorexperience. (pp.9-11)

However,notonlyUSGovernmentactions,butalsoitslanguagehavebeenespe-cially hard in connection to Mexico and the Mexicans.

Giventhis,Mexicoreactedwithprudence,designingastrategytofacethecon-frontationalstanceassumedbytheTrumpadministration,whichconsistedinkeepingthechannelsofformaldialogueopenwithcounterpartinstitutionsoftheUnitedStates.(foreignrelations,trade,finance,security,defense,etc.),re-gardless of the pronouncements issued by President Trump through social net-worksorofficialspeeches,seekingtoachieveconstructiveandwin-winpropo-sitions,andrespectingMexicansovereignty(Ostos,2017,p.59).

Additionally,EnriquePeñaNieto’sGovernmentsoughttodiversifyitsbusinesspartners. In this line, the recent trade agreement with the European Unionstandsout,whichnotonlyimprovestheonereachedintheyear2000,butalsoseekstosignificantlyincreasethelevelsoftradewiththeEuropeanbloc.

BeyondtheeffortsofMexicandiplomacy,Trump’smistreatmentof theMexi-can people has not only aroused a broad anti-American sentiment but also of nationalistreaffirmationthatdefinitelyfavoredtheelectionofpopulistleftistleaderAndrésManuelLópezObrador-acandidateofthecoalitionTogetherWeWillMakeHistory,formedbytheNationalRegenerationMovement(Morena),the Labor Party (PT) and the Social Encounter Party (PES) - as president of Mex-ico(Vásquez,2018,February20).

In any case, after themeeting between the already elected President LópezObradorandanAmericandelegation ledbySecretaryofStateMikePompeo


andintegratedbytheSecretaryofNationalSecurityKirstjenNielsen,TreasurySecretaryStevenMnuchinandJaredKushner-whoisTrump’sprincipaladvisorandson-in-law, itwouldseemthatbothgovernmentswouldbe interested infindingcommonpointsand reducing friction factors (Malkin,2018, July13).The latter, however,will notonlydependon strictlybilateral issuesbut alsoonthefuturerelationsthatLópezObradormaintainswithChinaandRussia-whichinfacthavealreadyexpressedtheirsympathyforthepresident-elect-asof December 1, 2018.

As for Cuba,CandidateTrumpexpressedfromthebeginninghisdissatisfactionwiththeagreementsreachedduringPresidentObama’sGovernment.Alreadyinpower,onJune16,2017-intheso-called“LittleHavanaofMiami”,surround-edbyCuban-Americancongressmenandinfrontoftheveteransofthe2506Brigade that invaded Playa Girón, Bay of Pigs, in April of 1961 (Dominguez,2017) -, Trump announced the end of these agreements and signed the pres-identialmemorandumofnational securityon the strengtheningofUSpolicytowards Cuba which establishes a set of new directives towards the island.Thus,theeconomic,commercialandfinancialblockadeisreaffirmed,economicactivitieswithcompanieslinkedtotheCubanarmedforces(especiallywiththeBusinessAdministrationGroup-GAESA)arecurtailed,touristtripsarerestrict-ed,obtaining travelpermits, oreducational trips fornon-academicpurposesthatwouldhave tobe in groups, amongothermeasures, become complicat-ed.However,diplomaticrelationsarenotbrokennortheembassy inHavanare-establishedwithPresidentObama is closed, the sendingof remittances isnotlimited,northemigratoryagreementsaremodified,thepolicyof“dryfeet,wet feet” is not reinstated, nor is Cuba placed back on the list of countriesthatsponsorterrorism(Morgenfeld,2018,p.161,CenterforInternationalStud-ies GilbertoBosques, 2017,October 9, pp.13-14). In addition, collaborationswouldbemaintainedinthemilitary,policeanddrugtraffickingfields,aswellasagreementsoncivilaviation,theenvironment,USagriculturalexportsandinternationalvisas.Finally, inhisdiscourse,TrumpexpressedhiswillingnesstonegotiateasCubamovesforwardondemocracyandhumanrights(Domín-guez, 2017).

Facedwiththesemeasures,analystssaythatsuchmeasureswillgenerateeco-nomiccomplicationsforCubaandprivatebusinessmenwhotradeorinvestinit(Alzugaray,2017,p.217),andthatthetoneTrumpemploystowardstheislandisstronger.Bydoingthis,heclearly,seekstosympathizewithbothanimport-antsectoroftheRepublicansaswiththeinfluentialCubanexilesintheUS,butalsogetthesupportofCubansenatorMarcoRubio,whoispartoftheSenateIntelligenceCommittee that investigates theRussianmeddling in the lastUSgeneral elections (Morgenfeld, 2018, pp.162-163).


Subsequently,attheendofSeptember2017,theUSAdenouncedanalleged“sonic”attackagainstUSdiplomatsinHavana,asaresultofwhichitordered22ofhisdiplomatsservinginthatcountrytoreturntoWashington,towhichitaddedthe freezingof thegrantingofvisastoCubansandtherecommen-dationtoitscitizensnottotraveltoCuba.Also,onOctober3,itexpelled15CubandiplomatswhoservedinWashington.Theselastmeasureswerecele-bratedbySenatorRubio,whostated:“TheUnitedStatesEmbassyinHavanashouldbereducedtoasectionofinterestsandwemustbepreparedtocon-sideradditionalmeasuresagainsttheCastroregimeiftheseattackscontinue”(Morgenfeld,2018,p.164,CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017, October 9, p.14). All of the above highlights the existing tensions intheCuban-AmericanrelationshipsincethearrivalofPresidentTrumptotheWhiteHouse.

AsituationsimilartothatofMexicoandCuba,althoughfordifferentreasons,iswhatVenezuelaandNicaraguafacewiththeUS,whichwasalreadydevelopedinpoint3.1ofthepresentwork.ThisisundoubtedlythecaseofthefourLatinAmericancountriesthatarefacingthemostdifficultieswithPresidentTrump’sadministration.

ThesituationoftheotherLatinAmericancountriesisverydifferent,althoughtheymaybe indirectlyaffectedbysomedecisionsadoptedbythecurrentUSadministration,thetruthisthatthediplomaticrelationshipwiththemiskeptatagoodlevel,evenmaintainingpoliticalagreementonspecificissueswithsomeof them.

PresidentTrumpshowedhehadmorethanonepointofcoincidencewithPeru,forexample,notonlyinthewayoffacingtheinstitutionalcrisisinVenezuelabutalsoinNicaragua.However,duringthevisitofPresidentPedroPabloKuczynski-thefirstmeetingwithaLatinAmericanpresident-onFebruary24,2017,thedifferencesinrelationtotradeagreementsandtheconstructionofthewallontheborderwithMexicowerealsoclear.Thus,onthefirst,Peruinsistedontheneedtodeepentradeagreements,whichwasevidencedinitsparticipationintheso-calledTPP-11;whereasonthesecond,Kuczynskideclaredthathepre-ferredbridgesthanwalls.

RegardingColombia,PresidentJuanManuelSantosvisitedhisUScounterparton May 18, 2017 with the double purpose of maintaining the commercialrelationshipthatispartofthebilateraltreatyinforcesince2012aswellastheUSassistanceforPeaceinthatcountry.EverythingindicatesthatTrumpwillmaintain a policy of continuity in relation to its predecessors on bothpoints (Center for International StudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,pp.18-19).


TakingadvantageofhistriptotheSummitoftheAmericasheldinLimaonApril 13 and 14, 2018, Trump scheduled a secondmeetingwith the thenPeruvianPresidentPedroPabloKuczynskiandanotherwithPresidentJuanManuelSantos inBogotá. Inapress release from theWhiteHouse, itwaspointedoutthattheUSpresidentwantedtomeetwithpartnersandallies“whoshareourvaluesandbelieve that thepromiseofa secureandpros-perous future is based on strong democracies, reciprocal and fair trade, and secureborders.”Inaddition,theUnitedStatessupportedPeru’sdecisiontowithdrawthe invitationtothesummit totheVenezuelanpresident.Whilethistripwaslatercanceled-forthatveryday,theUSrespondedmilitarilytoSyriafortheuseofchemicalweaponsagainstitspopulation(EFE,2018,March10)-,theintentiontomeetwiththeseleadersagainreflectshisde-sire tomaintain good relations with these countries, which he considersto be partners in the region. Moreover, theWhite House announced thatTrumpwouldvisitColombiatomeetwithPresidentIvánDuqueinNovem-ber2018, taking advantageof a trip toArgentina to attend theG20Sum-mit,anopportunityinwhichtheywoulddiscussagreatercollaborationonregionalsecurityandfightagainstdrugtraffickingissues(RPPNewsroom,September 1, 2018).

AsforArgentina,onApril27,2017,TrumpreceivedPresidentMauricioMacriintheWhiteHouse,whomhesupportedfortheimplementationofasetofpo-liticalandeconomicreforms,aswellasforhisparticipationandtakingrespon-sibilityforthepresidencyoftheG-20.Onthisoccasion,TrumpannouncedthatitwouldlaunchtheGlobalEntryProgramforReliablePassengersinArgentina,whichwouldfacilitatetheentryoflow-riskArgentineantravelersintotheUnit-edStates.(CenterforInternationalStudiesGilbertoBosques,2017,October9,p.17).InMay2018,followingameetinginWashingtonofArgentineanMinisterofFinanceNicolásDujovnewith theUnderSecretaryof InternationalAffairsof theUSTreasury,DavidMalpass, the latter reiteratedhis “firmsupport forthemarket-orientedreformprogram”oftheMacrigovernmentfor“Promotinggrowthdrivenbytheprivatesector.”Inaddition,theunder-secretaryhighlight-edtheofficialplantostrengthenfiscalpolicyand“decisiveactions”totrytoan-chorinflation.Afewdayslater,PresidentTrumpwroteonhisTwitteraccount:“[Macri]isdoingagoodjobforArgentina.Isupportyourvisiontotransformthecountry’seconomyandunleashitspotential!“(Mathus,2018,May10;ElEco,2018, May 18).

In June 2017, Trump met with Panamanian President Juan Carlos VarelainWashington, to discuss issues of illegal immigration, organized crime and ofdrugtraffickergangs.TheUSpresidentpraisedtherelationswiththiscountry,affirmingthat“thingsaregoingwell”andthat“therelationshiphasbeenverystrong”(BBCMundo,2017,July19).


Finally, in January2018,ChileanPresidentSebastiánPiñera,on theoccasionofhiselection,heldatelephoneconversationwithPresidentTrumpinwhichthey discussed theAndean country’s economic situation and the FreeTradeAgreementbetweenthetwoStates,thetaxreformapprovedbytheUSSenate,theprotestsinIranandthesituationinVenezuela.TrumpinvitedPiñeratotheWhiteHouseandstressedhisdesiretoworktogetheronissuesofmutualinter-est(CatenaandValenzuela,2018,January3).

Afinalpointthatshouldbehighlightedinthelineofeverythingnoted,isthatinSeptember2017,PresidentDonaldTrump,invitedtherulersofBrazil,Colom-bia,Panama,ArgentinaandPerutoadinnerattheTrumpTowerinNewYork,withtheintentionoffundamentallydiscussingtheVenezuelancrisis,thesitu-ationinCubaandotherissuesintheregion.Finally,Brazil’sPresidentMichelTemer,ColombianPresidentJuanManuelSantos,PanamaPresidentJuanCarlosVarela,andArgentineVicePresidentGabrielaMichettiattended.ThePeruvianPedroPabloKuczynskicouldnotattendduetoseriousinternalproblems(In-fobaeRedacción,2017,September18).

Ascanbeseenintheselastcases,therelationshipbetweentheUSandmostLatin American countries does not present confrontational features; on the contrary, through the exercise of a predominantly presidential diplomacy, they havebeenseekingpointsofencounterandcollaborationwiththesuperpower.Thisisfacilitatedbythefactthatthesearestateswheredemocracyandrespectforhumanrightsprevailandwithwhichtherearenocommercialproblems.

3.3. Hardening against immigrationHistorically, theUShasbuilt itselfbasedon thriving immigrants thatarrivedinthatcountryhopingtofindabetterfuturethere.AsMorgenfeldpointsout(2016b):

Evenbeforedeclaring independence, theUnitedStatesreceivedmillionsofmi-grants, who gradually displaced indigenous peoples. Between the seventeenthandnineteenthcenturies,theEnglish,Scottish,Welsh,IrishandFrench(Protes-tantHuguenots)predominated,inadditiontothenumerousAfricanswhowerebroughtbyforceasslaves.Alreadyatthebeginningofthe19thcenturythesouth-ern and eastern Europe contingents increased. The accelerated industrialization process and the Conquest of theWest demandedmore andmore labor. UntiltheFirstWorldWar,morethan30millioninhabitantsoftheOldContinenthadcrossed the Atlantic to settle in the promised land. In the second half of the 20th century,themainmigratoryflowstotheUnitedStatescamefromAsiaandLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.(p.16)

Contradictingthishistoricallegacy,sincetheelectioncampaignandaftertakingoffice,PresidentTrumphasspokencontemptuouslyaboutcitizensfromdiffer-


entpartsof theworld, includingLatinAmericans,whohavemigrated to theUnitedStates insearchof fulfillingtheso-called“Americandream”.Theseex-pressionshavealsobeenaccompaniedbyasetofmeasuresdesignedtotough-enUSimmigrationpolicy.

Thus, in theexternal field,Trumpannounced thewithdrawalof theUS fromtheUNGlobalCompactonMigration,approvedby193countriesattendingtheSummitonRefugeesandMigrants,heldinNewYork,inSeptember2016.Thispact, promotedbyMexico andSwitzerlandandbackedat the timebyBarakObama,aimsatmakingmigratoryflowsmoresecure,orderlyandlegal.How-ever,forTrump,itisaninstrumentthatisnotcompatiblewithUSsovereignty,addingthatthecountrymustenjoycompletefreedomtocontrolitsborders(ElNacional, 2017, December 4).

ThisdecisionisparticularlyregrettableifonetakesintoaccountthattheUSitisthecountrythathoststhelargestnumberofmigrantsintheworldandthatnoStatecanindividuallyconfrontinternationalmigration.

On the other hand, in the domestic sphere, beyond the threemigratory ve-toesdecreedbyPresidentTrump-essentiallyagainstcountrieswithaMuslimmajority(althoughthelatteralsoincludesVenezuelanofficials)- immigrationtighteningmeasureshavebeenmainlyaimedatagainstnationalsfromMexicoandCentralAmerica.

InthespecificcaseofMexico,therehasbeensomevariationbetweenTrump’sproposalsasacandidateandthosehehasfinallyexecutedsofaraspresident.Indeed,thefollowingstandoutamonghisinitialproposals:1)theconstructionofaborderwall;2)thereinforcementofsecurityattheborder;3)thecrimi-nalizationofundocumentedimmigrants(whomheaccusesofbeingresponsi-blefortheincreaseincrimeintheUnitedStates);324) deportation of undocu-mentedimmigrants(approximately11millionpeople,outofwhich5.6millionare Mexican)33; 5) refusal of any amnesty to the undocumented to regularize

32 Atthispoint,itshouldberememberedthatwhenlaunchinghiscandidacyinJune2015, referring toMexicanmigration,DonaldTrumpsaid: “Theyaresendingpeoplewhohavemanyproblems,theyaresendingustheirproblems,theybringdrugs,theyarerapists,andIsupposethatsomemustgoodpeople,butIspeakwithborderagentsandtheytellmewhatthereis“(Morgenfeld,2016b,p.24).33 OnNovember13,2016,Trumpsaid:“Whatwearegoingtodoistolookforpeoplewhoarecriminalsandhaveacriminalrecord,gangmembers,drugdealers.Wehavealotofthem,probablytwomillion,maybethreemillion.Wearegoingtothrowthemoutofthecountryorwearegoingtoimprisonthem.Butwe’regoingtokickthemoutofthecountryifthey’rehereillegally.”


andacquireAmericancitizenship;and,6)applicationofataxonremittancessentbymigrantstotheircountryoforiginthatwouldbeusedtofinancetheconstructionofthewall(Carrasco,2017,p.174;Morgenfeld,2016b,pp.24-25;2017, p.54).

However,alreadyaspresident,DonaldTrumplimitedthislist,concentratingontwoofitscomponents:theconstructionoftheborderwallandthestrengthen-ing of security on the border.

AsforconstructionorcompletionofawallontheborderwithMexico,itmustberememberedthatitisnotproperlyanovelproposal(DombrowskiandRe-ich,2017,p.23).Infact,duringtheBillClintonadministration,twostretchesofwallwerebuilt; thefirst, in1994, inCaliforniaundertheso-calledOperation Guardianandthesecond,in1997,inTexas,withOperation Rio Grande. Also, in thatGovernment,theImmigrant Responsibility Act(1996)wasapproved,whichexplicitlyindicatedtheremovalofphysicalbarriersattheborder(fences,bar-riersorwalls)aspartofthemigrationpolicy(Nájar,July292016).Thisnormwastheonethatservedasinspirationforthepassingofthe2005Protection of Borders, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act, during the presiden-cyofGeorgeW.Bush,consideredthemostextremeoftheUSAinthematterandfocusedpreciselyontheconstructionofaborderwall.AlthoughthisnormwaspassedbytheHouseofRepresentatives,itwasnotapprovedbytheSenate,soitnevercameintoforcebutbecametheflagofthemostconservativesectorsofthemainpoliticalpartiesintheUnitedStates.Thisledtosubsequentapprov-alofthe2006SafeWallAct,whichauthorizedtheconstructionofa1,125-kmfenceontheborderwithMexicotostrengthenbordercontrol(Carrasco,2017,pp.182,184-185).By2016,1,300kmofwallhadalreadybeenbuiltbyprivatecompaniesatacostof4milliondollarsperkilometer(Pozzi,2016,p.8).

WhenTrumptookoffice,heconfirmedhisdecisiontofinishawallonthebor-derwithMexico.Hesaid:“Thefirstthingweneedtodoissecureoursouthernborderandweneedtodoitrightnow.Wehavetostopthatavalanche,andthebestwaytodoitistobuildawall.[...]BadpeopledonotjustcomefromMexico.TheycomefromCentralandSouthAmerica,andprobablyfromtheMiddleEast“(Ostos,2017,p.58).

Inthissense,TrumpissuedtheexecutiveorderImprovementsintheapplica-tionofbordersecurityandimmigration(January25,2017),whichraisestheissueoftheconstructionofaphysicalwallalongthesouthernborderforwhichhe established the need to identify and allocate all sources of federal funds for

AtthispointitmustbeborneinmindthatduringtheBushandObamagovernments,fivemillionundocumentedimmigrantswereexpelled(Morgenfeld,2016b,pp.27and30).


itsmaterialization,whichcostwasestimatedat21billiondollarsanditscom-pletiondatein2020(Peña,2017,p.198).Theordermaintainsthat“foreignerswhoentertheUnitedStatesillegallywithoutinspectionoradmissionrepresentasignificantthreattonationalsecurityandpublicsafety”andthat“continuedillegal immigration constitutes a clear and present danger to the interests of the StatesUnited“(Carrasco,2017,pp.186).

Regarding thestrengtheningofbordercontrol,TrumphasbeenpromotingasignificantincreaseintheUSbudget.Indeed,Trumpincreasedthebordersecu-ritybudgetby$314millionfor2018,andtheapplicationoftheimmigrationactallowedhimtohiremorethan500BorderPatrolagentsandanadditional1,000workersfortheImmigrationandCustomsControlService(Disis,2017,March16;LaJornada,2017,March17;WashingtonPostStaff,2018,February16).Al-thoughCongressdidnotapprovemostoftheproposalsmadebythepresident,thefollowingyearTrumpinsistedonincreasingthebudgetforsuchpurposes.Thus,for2019,Trumphasrequested782milliondollarstohireandsupport2,750officersandagentsoftheImmigrationandCustomsEnforcementService,added 2.8 billion dollars to increase the detention of immigrants to 52,000 per dayandrequestedanadditional2.2billiondollarstohire450SecretServiceagents (WashingtonPostStaff,2018,February16; InfobaeNewsroom,2018,February 13).

The measures adopted by President Trump to control migration on the border withMexicoarebasedonconceivingthisflowofpeopleasathreat 34,withouttakingintoaccountthehumanitarianaspectofthisphenomenon.Butinaddi-tionthemeasuresarebasedondataandfactsthatarenotwell-foundedandhaveevenbeenerroneous.Thus,asPeñamaintains,ifofficialdatafromtheUSBorderPatrolandtheSurveyonMigrationintheNorthernBorderpreparedbytheCollegeoftheNorthernBorderaretakenintoaccount,itcanbeconcludedthattherearenogroundsthatjustifyTrump’sexecutiveorders,giventhat:

a) ThenumberofMexicanmigrantswithintentionstocrosstheborderwiththeUnitedStatesillegallyhasbeengraduallydecreasingsince2007anditnowhasthelowesthistoricallevelssince1972(US.BP.,2018);

b) According to the Center forMigration Studies, themajority of undocu-mentedimmigrantsarrivebyplaneorcarwithlegaldocumentsandthenstayintheUnitedStatesbeyondthetimeallowedintheirstudentortour-istvisas;

34 TheUSNationalSecurityStrategyof2017incorporatestheconstructionofthewallontheborderwithMexicowithinthefirstpillarofnationalintereststoprotectcalledProtecting the American people, the homeland and the American way of life (President of theUnitedStatesofAmerica,2017,pp.9-10).


c) ThepopulationofMexicanoriginresidingintheUSAismostlydocument-ed and the number of illegals has been in decline since 2011 (The North-ernBoardCollege,2016);

d) ThemajorityofdeportedMexicansareduetoroutinepoliceinspections(24%),third-partycomplaintstoimmigrationauthorities(19%),trafficinfractions(16%),drivinginastateofintoxication(16%),variousrea-sons(12%),possessionofdeportationorder(7%)andonly6%formi-norcrimes(Peña,2017,pp.199-201,203,205,207,Oppenheimer,2017,May 30).

In addition, these measures deny the political and sociodemographic rela-tionshipsthatexistbetweenthefourUSandsixMexicanstatesthatsharetheborderand thatnumbermore than83millionpeople.Thewall, therefore, isopposedtothecoexistenceandrelationshipofthesecommunitiesinfavoroftensionandconflict(Castorena,2016,p.112).Additionally,sinceitspurposeistopreventorhindermigration throughMexico, theonly thing thathasbeenattained is to increase harassment suffered by migrants in the hands of the so-calledcoyotes(humantraffickingmafias)andcorruptofficials(Morgerfeld,2016b, p.17).

Thatmaybecontributingtothefactthat,sofar,theUSCongressdoesnotap-provesufficientfundsinthebudgetforbuildingsaidwall,despitetheinsistenceofPresidentTrump,whohasrequested1.6billiondollarsinthe2019budgetforbuildingtheborderwallinSouthTexas.ThisisbecausemanyoftheAmer-icanpolitical leadersareconvincedthat thewall isan incorrectwaytosolvesuchacomplexanddiverseproblem.

As regards Central America, the United States government resumed the Ini-tiativeforProsperityoftheNorthernTrianglein2017.IthadbeenagreedbytheCentralAmericanpresidentsofElSalvador,GuatemalaandHonduraswithPresidentObama,althoughwiththreeimportantvariations.Infact,onJune15ofthatyear,intheframeworkoftheProsperityandSecurityConferenceheldinMiami,USA,heproposedtoaddthesecuritycomponentasafirstvariantintheinitiative,statingthatitshouldadoptcertaincharacteristicsofPlanColombia,suchasterritorycontroltheandanendtoviolenceandcorruptionininvolvedCentralAmericancountries.ThishasbeenamatterofconcernfortheCentralAmericancountries insofaras theyunderstandthat the initiativewouldturntowardsamoremilitarizedapproach,focusedonsecurityandwheretheroleoftheSouthernCommandinsaidregioncouldbeincreased(Martin,2017,p.169).Thevariationoftheinitiativeinsistingonthesecurityelementdoesnotpoint, in addition, to the underlying problem. The solution actually needs to change theeconomicand social conditions in the involvedCentralAmericancountries in order to reduce the causes of migration. A proof of the latter is that


thefiguresofCentralAmericanswhomanagetoentertheUnitedStateshavebasicallybeenmaintaineduntil2017,andratherthecostsforillegalentryhaveincreased(Villafuerte,2018,pp.111-113).

Thesecondvariantoftheinitiativeworthhighlightingwasthattheconven-ingof thisconference inMiamiwas inchargeof theUnitedStates,butalsoof Mexico, a country that until then had not participated in such meetings, tacitly implyinganactive involvementof theMexicanState intheachievingthepurposesforwhichtheinitiativewascreated.TheInitiativeforProsperityoftheNorthernTrianglewasoneoftheissuesdealtwithduringthevisitofSecretaryofStateRexTillersonandSecretaryofSecurityJohnKellytoMexicoin February 2017. Therefore, the participation of Mexico at the conference wasunderstoodasanattemptbythiscountrytoshowitselfasacollaboratoron immigration issueswith theUnitedStates inorder to seekanapproachin the face of the renegotiation of NAFTA and the solution of their migration problemswiththesuperpower.However,suchsuddenMexicanparticipationhasarousedcriticismintheCentralAmericancountries,sincetheyfeelthattheywillnolongerbedirectinterlocutorsoftheUnitedStates(Martin,2017,p.169).

Athirdvariantwasthereductionoffinancialsupporttothisinitiative,becauseitreached750milliondollarsin2016,itwasreducedto655milliondollarsin2017 and to 468 million dollars for 2018 (Martin, 2017, p.169).

However,themodificationoftheAllianceforProsperityoftheNorthernTrian-gleisnottheonlymeasureproposedbyPresidentTrumpinrelationtoCentralAmericanmigration.OnAugust16,2017, theCentralAmericaMinors(CAM)Programfortheprocessingofrefugeesandpermitsforminors,alsoknownasParole,wassuspended.Itpermittedchildrenandyoungpeopleundertheageof21fromElSalvador,HondurasandGuatemalaortothespousesofthepeti-tionerstoarriveintheUSAwithatemporarypermitrenewableeverytwoyearstostayandworktemporarilyintheUSAwithoutbeingsubjecttodeportation(CharlotteImmigrationLawFirm,2017,August15;Jaramillo,2017,August24;Martin, 2017, p.169).

Inthesamesense,inJanuary2018,theTrumpGovernmentannouncedtheend of the Temporary Protection Status Program (TPS), established in 1990 byPresidentGeorgeBushto favorpeople fromcountriesaffectedbynatu-raldisasters, riotsandarmedconflicts,whohadentered theUnitedStatesillegally, inorder togrant themaprovisional legal status thatwouldallowthem to live and work in that country. The suspension was decreed withrespect to the 200,000 Salvadoranswho had benefited from the program,bothbecauseofcivilwarinthatcountryandbecauseofthetwoearthquakes


in 2001.35. Weeks before, the program had been suspended for the 45,000Haitiansbenefitedafterthe2010earthquake,andayearearliertheprogramhadbeensuspendedforNicaraguans.Afterhavinggrantedthematemporaryextension, it has been officially reported that the programwill also end forHonduranimmigrants(Jordán,2018,January8;Villafuerte,2018,pp.100-101,GilbertoBosquesInternationalStudiesCenter,2017,October9,p.16).

TwootheractionsthatwillundoubtedlyimpactonMexicanandCentralAmer-ican migrants - but also migrants of other nationalities - are the cancellation of theDeferredActionforChildhoodArrivals-DACAthatwillaffectapproximately800thousandpeople(Martin,2017,p.169;Cahill,GeffenandWang,2008)andthegovernment’s failingtoapproveabudget toaidapproximately690thou-sand dreamersthreatenedwithdeportation.Asisknown,dreamers are minors whoenteredtheUSillegallyaccompanyingtheirparentsandwhohavebecomeintegratedtoAmericanlife.ThenamecomesfromthebillknownastheDream Act,whichwas first introduced in2001,butso farhasnotbeenapprovedatfederallevel.Onlysomestates,suchasMarylandandCalifornia,haveapprovedregulationsthatgrantthemthefacilitiestocontinueuniversitystudies,butnotmigratorybenefits.Besidesthesetwomeasures,Trumphasrecentlyaddedathirdoneinwhichimmigrantswhoreceivepublicbenefits(housingvouchers,foodassistance,etc.)cannotobtainthepermanentresidencethatallowsthemto live andwork legally in the US. It has been estimated that suchmeasurewouldaffect382thousandpeopleperyear(ElComercioNewsroom,2018,Sep-tember 23).

It shouldbenoted that, in general, Trump’s immigrationproposalshavenotonlybeenstoppedorcorrectedinmanycasesbytheUSjudicialsystembuthavealsobeenopposedbysomeUScities.calledSanctuaryCities(suchasSanFran-cisco,LosAngeles,NewYork,Chicago,amongothers)36,whichhaverefusedtoapplythefederalimmigrationactandwhichprotectundocumentedpeoplethatliveinthosecities,rejectingorprohibitingofficialagenciesfromdetainingordeportingthem(Castorena,2016,p.112).

Against these cities, President Trump issued the executive order ImprovingpublicsecurityintheinterioroftheUnitedStates(January25,2017),forwhichhewithdraws federal funds tosupport jurisdictions thatdonotcomplywith

35 TheseSalvadoranssentremittancestotheircountrythatamountedto4.6billiondollars,accountingfor17%ofElSalvador’seconomy(Jordán,2018,January8).36 Thetermwascoinedinthe1980s,whenthecityofLosAngelesordereditspolicetoabandonthepracticeofrequiringtheimmigrationstatusofpeopleintheirinterven-tions,andthecityofSanFranciscoapprovedanordinancetopreventtheuseoffundsinconnectiontoapplyingfederalimmigrationlaws(BBCWorld,2017,January26).


theaforementionedfederallaw.,makingspecialmentionoftheSanctuaryCit-ies,addingthat“thesejurisdictionshavecausedimmeasurabledamagetotheAmericanpeopleandtheveryfabricofourrepublic”(Carrasco,2017,p.187).However,thisledtheauthoritiesofthesecitiestohardentheirpositions(BBCWorld,January26,2017)and,federaljudgeWilliamOrrickruledinfavorofthelawsuitsfiledbySanFranciscoandSantaClara(bothSanctuaryCitiesofCalifor-nia)inNovemberof2017,nullifyingtheexecutiveorderinquestion(McKirdy,2017,November21).

Inshort,thetighteningofPresidentTrump’simmigrationpolicydoesnotonlycontradictUShistoryitself.asacountryformedbymigrants,butstemsfromareductionistperspective,erroneousdataand informationon themigratoryproblem,allofwhichhasgeneratedaresistancethathasnotbeenlimitedtotheaffectedcountriesbuthasspreadtopoliticalleaders,authorities,judges,civilorganizationsandpartoftheUScitizensthemselves,whounderstandthatthispolicywillnotsolvetheunderlyingproblem.

3.4. Impact on free trade Although the most drastic trade measures adopted by President Donald Trump havebeenaimedatextra-regionalcountriesorblocs, the truth is thatsever-alactionsexecutedbythenewUSadministrationhaveimplicationsforLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,whileothershaveadirect impact inaparticularcountry,asisthecaseofMexico.Next,letuslookatfourofthemostimportantmeasuresadoptedbytheUS.withrepercussionintheregion.

Thus, a first measurethatisrelatedtowhathasjustbeenpointedoutistheero-sionthatPresidentTrumpwouldbecausingtotheWorldTradeOrganization-WTO(whichallthecountriesoftheregionarepartto),particularlyagainstits mechanism of dispute settlement. Indeed, since 2017 the terms of three of thesevenmembersoftheappealbodyinthisorganizationhaveexpired,whileaquarterofthemexpiredinSeptember2018.Facedwiththat,theUSrefusestofacilitatetheappointmentofreplacements,whereby,Trumpisactuallycrip-pling the operation of the mechanism itself. Some interpret this as a deliberate strategy tonullify thepossibility that theWTOmayruleagainsteventualUSinfractionsoffreetrade,suchasunilateralimpositionoftariffsonvariouscoun-triesandblocsofcountriesintheworld,aswellassolutionofanycommercialdisputesthroughbilateralnegotiation(moreconvenient forthesuperpower)(Matsuno,2018).Besides, theUShas rejectedanynewcommercial initiativerelated toelectroniccommerceorany that linkscommerceand theenviron-mentattheWTOsummit,heldinDecember2017,inBuenosAires.AsSteinbergstates:“Withallthis,theUShasinitiatedastrategythatcouldendupwound-ingtheinstitutiontodeathbymakingitirrelevantandnotveryoperative[...]”(2018, January 15).


A second measuretakenbyPresidentTrumpwitheffectsintheregionwashisdecisiononJanuary20,2017towithdrawfromtheTrans-PacificPartnership(TPP),whichthreeLatinAmericancountrieswerepart to:Chile,MexicoandPeru.ThiswasnotonlyanAmericaninitiativebutwasledbythatcountryasaformulatostrengthenitspositionintheworldmarket,deliberatelyexcludingChina.Therefore,asnotedbyPalaciodeOteyza(2017),withdrawal fromtheTPPbreaks:

[…]withthelogicofallpreviousAdministrationssincethe90sinthelastcentury,fromClinton,G.BushandG.W.Bush,untiltheObamaadministrationandhisAsianPivot.TheyallsharedthefundamentalideathatthebestwaytotreatChinaisbyinvolving it in the international liberal economic regimeandmaking it respecttherules,andtheynevercontemplatedthewithdrawaloftheUnitedStatesfromthosesamerules.Inthatsense,theTPPsupposedforObamanottoisolateChina,buttoputpressureonittobendtotheAmericanliberalpatternontrade,invest-ment, public sector and intellectual property. (p.72)

While initially the US withdrawal generated confusion and discouragementamong TPP negotiators, and analysts predicted the end of that agreement, the factisthatinsubsequentmeetingstheotherparticipatingcountries,undertheleadership of Japan, decided to change the original agreement, dismantling the articlesthathadbeenexplicitlyraisedbythegreatpower,toarriveatanewtext.

Indeed, on March 8, 2018, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam signed the Trans-PacificPartnershipandProgressiveTreaty(CPTPP),bestknownasTPP-11,whichcre-atesamarketof498millionpeople that representsabout13%of theworldeconomy.Itisthemostadvancedtradeagreementofitskindthathasnotonlyaroused the interest of other countries (such as South Korea), but also implies a clear response to the policy proposed by President Trump.

A third measurethatisthemostworryingfortheregionasawhole,istheonereferringtothetakingofunilateralactionsbytheUnitedStates.againstvariouscountriesorblocsintheworld,clearlyinfringingfreetraderules37,givingwaytowhathasbeencalledatrade warthatcanhaveseriousimplicationsforLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.

Thisisthecase, forexample,ofthetariffs imposedbytheUSagainstCanada(25%tosteeland10%toaluminum)foranamountof12.6billiondollarsand

37 Forsomeauthors, theeminentlypragmaticsenseofTrump’s foreignpolicy leadshimtoleavemultilateralismasidetoachievecertainforeignpolicyobjectives,becauseit implies negotiation and time. (Magcamit, 2017, pp.22-28).


thatcausedthelattercountrytofileactionsattheWTOandthenrespondwithsimilar tariffs inretaliation.Tariffsonsteelandaluminumhavealsoaffectedothercountries,suchasIndia,whichhasrespondedbyraisingthetariffson30goodsimportedfromtheUnitedStatesto50%foratotalof240milliondol-lars.OrthecaseofMalaysiaandSouthKoreaaffectedbytariffsof30%ontheirexportsofsolarpanelsforavalueof4billiondollarsand20%onwashingma-chinesforatotalof1.3billiondollars(Vásquez,2018,March6).Anotheruni-lateralmeasureofthesamenatureadoptedbytheUSgovernmentwasPresidentTrump’sdecisiontoimposetariffsof25%onsteeland10%onaluminumtotheEuropeanUnionandMexico,adoptedattheendofMay2018.ThishasledEuropetoimposecountermeasuresontheUnitedStates.Besides,theMinistryofEcono-myofMexicohasannouncedequivalentmeasuresonvariousAmericanproductssuchasflatsteel,lamps,porklegsandshoulders,sausagesandfoodpreparations,apples,grapes,blueberries,variouscheeses,amongothers(RPPDrafting,2018,May31).Finally,wealsohavemorerecentunilateralmeasuresimposedagainstChinaanditsresponsemeasures,whichwehavealreadyreferredto.

These measures have generated great concern not only in directly affectedcountries but also in the rest of the international community, both because of themotivationsthathavedriventheiradoptionandbecauseoftheeffectstheymayhaveontheworldeconomy.

Onthefirst issue,someanalystsarguethatTrump’sbehaviorwouldseemtobebasedonthebeliefthattradeisazero-sumactivity,thatis,whatonegainsiswhattheotherloses,butalsothatatradedeficitisnecessarilybad.Inthisregard, Abusada responds (2018, July 10):

Ofcoursebothbeliefsare false.Commercialexchangeoccurspreciselybecausebothparticipantsbenefitbytradingthegoodsthateachcanproduceatlowercost.Moreover,theBritisheconomistDavidRicardoshowed200yearsagothatevenwhenoneoftwocountriescanproducetwogoodsatalowercost,itisconvenientforeachcountrytospecializeandexporttheproductinwhichitscostadvantageiscomparativelygreaterthanthatoftheothercountry.Thisprincipleofcompar-ativeadvantageiswhatdrivestradeinthewholeworld.

Ontheotherhand,tradedeficitsarenotinthemselvesneithergoodnorbad,andintheirorigintherecanbefactorssuchasexchangerates,countryproductivityormonetarypolicy.Morefundamentally,tradedeficitsaredirectlylinkedtoinsuf-ficientsavings.Ironically,allincreasesintradedeficitsintheUnitedStateshavebeen associated with periods of greater prosperity, lower unemployment andhugebenefitsfortheAmericanconsumer.Trump,ontheotherhand,talksabouttheUS$800billiondeficitasalmostatheftofwhichhiscountryisavictim.HedoesnotknoweitherthattradedeficitincludesexportsandimportsofservicesinwhichtheUnitedStateshasasurplusofmorethanUS$255billion.Heedlessof


thosewhosuggesttemperance,hehasfiredskilledcollaboratorssuchashischiefeconomicadviserGaryCohnorhissecretaryofstateRexTillerson,andprefersto listen to theadviceofPeterNavarro,aheterodoxeconomistof lowprestigeintheacademiccommunityandaconstantcriticofChina’sandGermany’stradesurpluses.

Lopez similarly states (2017):

For Trump, a negative trade balance with some nation simply represents notwinning.InhisDarwinianandgloomyvisionoftheworld,tradeconsistsofaze-ro-sumgameinwhichifoneexportsmorethanwhatoneimportsfromagivencountry,thenoneofthemwinsandtheotherloses.Herefusestounderstandthecomplexityoftheoverallglobalmarketpicture,orthediversityofcausesthattrig-gerUnitedStatesdeficits.

As for thesecondissue,thatis,theeffectsthatthetradewarunleashedbytheUnitedStateswillbringtointernationaltradeaffectingallStates-includingLat-inAmericancountries-,itisimportanttohighlightthat,todate,thefirstimpactscanalreadybeobserved.

Infact,thistradewarandtheclimatethatitgenerateshavecausedcollateraldamage in emerging economies such as Peru. Thus, since the failed meeting of theG7,thepriceofcopperandzincfellby14%,whichmayaccountforanan-nuallossof2.5billiondollarsinPeruvianexportsand1.3billiondollarsintaxcollection (Abusada, 2018, July 10).

Finally, a fourth measure taken by the US Government has been to call intoquestion somebilateral free trade agreements. In the case of LatinAmerica,questioninghasbeenaddressedtotheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement-NAFTA,withMexicoandCanada.

OnNAFTA,weshouldbeginbytakingintoaccountthatcommercialrelationsbetweenMexicoandtheUnitedStatesderivedfromthistreatyareintenseandofgreatimportance,whilethesuperpowersendstoMexico15%ofitsexportsandreceives13%ofitsimports.However,therealweightofexchangesforbothcountriesismuchgreater,sinceMexicoistheseconddestinationofUSexportsafterCanadaandthethirdinimportsafterChinaandCanada,allofwhichrep-resents a commercial exchange of 532 billion dollars per year. In addition, the USAisthefirstforeigninvestorinMexico,reaching57.7%oftotalinvestmentsinthatLatinAmericancountry(Ostos,2017,p.55).

Nevertheless,reproducingthecampaignagainstNAFTAthatpresidentialcandi-dateRossPerotundertookintheninetiesandrecallingcriticismstofreetrade


byPresidentHerbertHooverin193038(VegayCampos,2017,p.786)PresidentTrumparguedthatNAFTAwasanunfairagreementbecauseitacceleratedthelossofindustrialjobsintheUnitedStatesandtookentiresegmentsofworkerstolow-paidjobs.Healsopointedoutthattheagreementgeneratedatradedefi-citfortheUnitedStatesthatshouldbecorrected.Hesaid:“TheUnitedStateshas a tradedeficit of 60billion dollarswithMexico. It has been a unilateralagreementsincethebeginningofNAFTAwithamassivenumberoflostcompa-niesandjobs“(Ostos,2017,p.58).

Inthisregard,althoughatfirstDonaldTrumpannouncedthathewouldwith-draw from this agreement -using the complaint mechanism provided for inart.2.205ofNAFTA-he thenproposed toestablisha35%tariffonproductsimported from Mexico, but in the end he moderated his position by proposing therenegotiationofthistreaty(Matari,2017,pp.6-7).Thereweremanycoinci-dencesbetweenthenegotiatorsofthePartiesinthisnegotiation,sincetheyareprofessionalwhoarenotcontaminatedbypoliticaldiscourse.However,therehave alsobeen somedifficulties, such as theUS approach to eliminating thecompulsory settlement system foreseen in the agreement (arbitration) and the revisionofthetexteveryfiveyears(Vásquez,2018,February20).Finally,onAu-gust27,2018,afterthirteenmonthsofnegotiations,bothgovernmentsreachedanagreement,inwhichbothpartieshadtogiveintotheirmaximumproposals.Inthisregard,thefollowinghavebeenestablished(PozziandFariza,2018,Au-gust 28; Mars and La Fuente, 2018, August 28):

a) That the agreementwillbevalidfor16yearsandnotasproposedbytheUSthatitshouldincludeanautomaticterminationclauseeveryfiveyears,whichdidnotgivestabilitytotheagreementortotheeconomicagents;

b) Intheagriculturechapter,atariff-freezoneispreservedandtheUShasmanagedtoestablishaseriesofmeasurestoavoiddistortions,andtopre-venttheuseofsubsidiesforexportsorspecialsafeguardscontemplatedbytheWTO,butatthesametime,Mexicohasachievedtonotincludesea-sonalityrequirementsashadbeenproposedbytheUnitedStates;

c) Asfortheautomotiveindustry,Mexicohasacceptedthatthenewrulesoforiginestablishthatbetween40and45%ofthecontentofautomobilesmustbemanufacturedbyemployeeswhoearnatleast16dollarsperhourworked, limiting theautopartspresent inMexico.With this, theUSA ItaimstopreventmanufacturingcompaniesfromrelocatingproductiontoMexicobecauseofthelowcostoflabor.Inaddition,only cars that contain 75%(currently62.5%)ofNorthAmericancomponentscanbeconsideredas local products;

38 Hooverstatedthatitwasimpossibleforsomeindustriesinhiscountryto“success-fullycompetewithforeignproducersduetotheir lowsalariesandproductioncosts”(Message of June 16 1930).


d) In the field of intellectual property, strictermeasures are contemplatedtopreventthecirculationofcounterfeitorpiratedproducts,aswellastocombat the trade of industrial secrets;

e) Finally,withregardtoaluminumandsteel,therearenoagreements,whichwillmaintainthecurrentstatu quo;

In short, according to experts, this is the best possible agreement for Mexico, giventhecurrentcircumstances(PozziandFariza,2018,August28).

Thisagreementwasalsopossibleduetoseveralfactors,amongwhichtheelec-tionofAndrésManuelLópezObrador,whohastenedthenegotiatorstoclosetheagreement;thepressureofAmericancompanieshithardbythetradewarwithChinaandEurope;andtheNovemberlegislativeelectionsintheUS.thatledTrump to search fora result to show to thevoters (MarsandLaFuente,2018, August 28).

After this, thequestion thatarosewaswhether thisagreementwouldbeex-tendedtoCanadaorwhethertherewouldbetwoautonomousbilateraltrea-ties.TheUSstrategyofnegotiatingseparately,addedtothethreatofnotbeinginterestedinkeepingNAFTAinforce,incorporatedanelementofpressureonCanadathatwasreflected inthenegotiationsbetweenthesecountries.How-ever,bothfinallyreachedanagreementonSeptember30,2018withCanada’sconcessionthatUSdairyproducershavegreateraccesstothatcountry’smar-ketandtheUSconcessiontokeeptheNAFTAdisputesettlementchapterintact.Inthisway,Canadapreservesitsmainexportdestination(thatis,theUSAwith76%)and the trilateral tradeassociationof the threeNorthAmericanStatesgoeson(PozziandFariza,2018,October1).

AllthathasbeendiscussedinthissectionallowsustoconcludethatPresi-dentTrumpdoesnotunderstand-ordoesnotwishtounderstand-thefunc-tioning of international trade, assuming a simple but mistaken reasoningthat if there is no surplus in the exchange, it is a loss and also that the other party is responsible for it.Given this,heopts forbilateralnegotiationsce-narioscombinedwithverbal threatsandthe impositionofunilateral tradesanctions as a formula to obtainnewmore advantageous agreements thatmay,insomeway,guaranteeapermanentsurplus.Likewise,herejectsman-datoryformulastosolvecontroversiesandmultilateralscenariosthatentailacollectivenegotiation,sinceheprefersdirectnegotiationinwhichhecanimpose his conditions.

3.5. Decrease of cooperation Traditionally, theUSAhasbeenan importantsourceofcooperation forLatinAmericangovernments,whichhasbeenparticularlyusefulinfacingsituations


ofeconomicandsocialcrisis,butalsotostrengthentheruleoflaw,democracy,humanrights,thefightagainstdrugs,amongotherpurposes..

WhenDonaldTrumpassumedtheUSpresidency,hepointedoutfromthebe-ginninghisintentiontoreduceAmericancooperationtotheworld,whichobvi-ously included Latin America.

Abidingbywhathepromised,Trumpproposedadrasticcutof36%inforeignaid to Latin America in the 2018 budget administered by the State Department andtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),whichin-distinctlyaffectedseveralcountriesintheregion,cuttingfundsfromalmostalltypes of assistance and proposing the elimination of the Inter-American Foun-dation,asmallindependentagencyofUSassistancethatpromotesgrassrootsdevelopmentintheregion(Meyer,2018,SeptemberMay).

Ineffect, theTrumpgovernmentproposedtoreducetheUSAIDbudget,withpresence in 19 Latin American countries, to go from 1.11 billion dollars in 2016 to756millionin2018,leavingCubainzero(in2016itreceived20milliondol-larsforprogramspromotingdemocracyandrespectforhumanrights)andVen-ezuela(whichreceived$6.5millionin2016tosupporttheindependentmedia,aswellastoprotectandpromotehumanrightsandstrengthencivilsociety)(Bermúdez,2017,May29;Oppenheimer,2017,May30).

Similar cutsweremade forMexico (from160million to 87milliondollars),Nicaragua(from10milliondollarsto200thousanddollars),Guatemala(from131million to80milliondollars),Honduras (from98million to68million)dollars),ElSalvador(from68milliondollarsto46milliondollars),Colombia(from 391 million to 251 million dollars), Peru (from 75 million dollars to 50 million dollars), Brazil (from 13 million to 815 thousand dollars), among others (EFE,2017,May24).ForHaiti,whichinrecentyearshaddeservedspecialUSattention,a15%cutwasproposed(Meyer,2018,May9).

However,finallytheUSCongressdidnotcarryoutthecutsproposedbyTrump;forexample,inthecaseofCuba,20milliondollarswereapprovedtopromotedemocracy,inthecaseofVenezuela,15milliondollarswereapprovedforthesamepurpose,andsoon(Martí,2018,March24).TheCongress,therefore,exer-cisingitsconstitutionalcompetenceinbudgetarymatters,preventedPresidentTrumpfromaccomplishinghistaskand,withthis,havinganegativeimpactonvarioussupportprograms.

Additionally,DonaldTrumphasarrangedcuts inUScontributions tovariousfundsofinternationalorganizationsthatwillalsohaveanimpactintheregion,inareasasdiverseashumanrights,environment,gender,health,etc.This is


the case, for example, of reductionsmade in financing both theUNWomen,PeaceandSecurityAgenda(approvedbySecurityCouncilresolution1325ofOctober 31, 2000) and the 2030Agenda,which includes the 17 SustainableDevelopmentGoals(approvedonSeptember252015andeffectiveasofJan-uary 1 2016).

Similarly,programsfocusingexclusivelyongenderequalityhavebeenreducedby61%39andintheempowermentofwomen,eveniftheUShasshownaset-backonthisissueinrecentyears,evidencedinthe2017GlobalReportontheGenderGap(Montilla,2018,January17).

Anothercontroversialmeasure is therestitutionandexpansionof theGlobal Gag Rule,alawcreatedduringRonaldReagan’sgovernmentandsuppressedbytheObamaadministration,whichprohibitstheparticipationofforeignnon-gov-ernmentalorganizations financedbytheUnitedStates inactivitiesrelatedtoabortion,thatis,fundsareeliminatedifpartofthisaidisusedtoprovideabor-tionservices,informationonabortionorpromotetheliberalizationofthelawsthatregulateit(HumanRightsWatch,2018).Variouscivilassociationsinthiscountryhaveindicatedtheirconcernabouttheimpactthatthisrulewillhaveonthereproductivehealthofgirlsandwomenthroughouttheworld(Montilla,2018, January 17).

Additionally,wehavetheUSdecisiontowithdrawfromthefundingoftheUNPopulationFund,whichinthewordsofAntonioGuterres,UNSecretaryGener-al,willhavedevastatingeffectsonthehealthofthousandsoffamiliesaroundtheworld.

Inthesameline,PresidentTrumpproposeda31%reductionofhis2018bud-getforthefinancingoffoodaidprogramsintheworld,thatis,from3.5billiondollars to 1.5 billion dollars; in more concrete terms, this implies reducing the coverageof67millionpeopleto29millionpeople.Trumpalsoproposedelimi-natingaprogramoffoodaidforfaminesabroadendowedwithabout1.7billiondollars(Konyndyk,2017,May31;EFE,2017,May23).Withregardtointerna-tionaldisasterassistance,whichcovers the foodneedsof thevictimsofcon-flictsandcatastrophesintheworld,TrumpproposedreducingUSparticipation.from$2.5trillionto$1trillion,whichwouldaffectthethousandsofgrowing

39 ThecaseofLGTBIcitizensdeservesaspecialmention.WhileTrumppromisedinthecampaignthathewoulddoeverythingwithinhispowertoprotectthem,oncehebecame president on July 26 2017, he declared his decision to prohibit such persons fromservinginthearmy,whichmaterialized,whenashorttimelaterhedraftedamem-orandum addressed to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of National Security inthatregard(Cahill,GeffenyWang,2008).


refugeesintheworld,butalsodestroythehealth,drinkingwaterandnutritionprogramsthatbenefitthousandsofvictimsofconflictsintheworld(Konyndyk,2017, May 31; Krieg and Mullery, 2017, May 23).

Finally,Trumpproposedtoreduceassistancetoglobalhealthprogramsby25%forthe2018USbudget(EFE,2017,May23).Forexample,forHIVpreventionandcareprograms,AIDSproposedadecreaseof1.1billiondollars,whichcouldaffectauniverseofmorethan1millionpeople(Cahill,GeffenandWang,2008).

Itmustbekept inmindthat theUSAIthasbeenthe largestglobalsourceoffundingforglobalhealthprograms.Thus,underPresidentGeorgeW.Bush,thesuperpower’sfundingforglobalhealthincreasedsignificantly,whichgeneratedimportantfundinginitiativessuchasthePresident’sEmergencyPlanforAIDSRelief(PEPFAR)andthePresident’sMalariaInitiative(PMI),aswellassupportfortheMultilateralGlobalFundtoFightAIDS,TuberculosisandMalaria.ThesamehappenedintheObamaadministration;itisenoughtonotethat,in2015,theUnited States providedmore than36%of the global development assis-tanceforhealth.Contrarytothistrend,PresidentTrumpsoughttosignificantlyreducethissupport(KarimandSingh,2017).AlthoughtheUSCongressdidnotapprovethelevelofbudgetcutproposedbythepresidentintheseareas,therehasbeenadecreaseascomparedtopreviousyears.

Everythingstatedinthissectionmakesclearthat,forTrump,theUnitedStatesinternationalcooperationlackssensetoagreatextent-andonlyreportseco-nomic losses-,whether it isunderstoodasamanifestationof solidaritywiththelessdevelopedcountriesorasasoftpowerinstrumenttoinfluenceglobally.Thisrevealsalackofunderstandingoftherolethatcorrespondstoasuperpow-erinthisfield.AsMeyerpointsout(2018,May9),if“foreignaidcutsproposedbythe[Trump]administration,combinedwithotherpolicychanges,material-ize,theycouldcontributetoarelativedecreaseinUSinfluence.”

3.6. Denying climate change and disregarding environmental commit-ments

Sincetheelectioncampaign,PresidentDonaldTrumpquestionedthatclimatechangewasarealproblem,claimingthatitwasratheranissuecreatedbyandfortheChinesetomaketheUSindustrylesscompetitive(Trump,tweetofNo-vember6,2012)andthenadded“Iacceptthatclimatechangeiscausingsomeproblems:itmakesusspendbillionsofdollarstodeveloptechnologiesthatwedonotneed”(Ahrens,2017,June2).

Consistentwiththisposition,sinceheassumedthepresidency,Trumphasbeenadopting and promoting a set of measures aimed at getting rid of the climate commitmentsassumedbythepreviousadministration.Inthissense,onemea-


surewastodisregardfinancialcommitmentstotheUnitedNationsSustainableDevelopmentGoals(Escribano,2018,January11).

However,themostcontroversialofPresidentTrump’sdecisionswastoorder(June12017) thedenunciationof theParisAgreementonClimateChange40 -signedonApril22,2016bythecountriesattendingtheConferenceofthePar-tiestotheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange-COP21-41,whichwasfinallyimplementedonAugust4thatyear.

Whileitistruethatthewithdrawalwilltakeeffectonedayafterthenextpres-identoftheUnitedStateshasbeenelected,theTrumpgovernmenthasalreadyadoptedanumberofmeasuresaimedat“dismantlingPresidentObama’scli-mateinitiatives”aimedatcomplyingwiththeagreementgoals(Lázaro,2018,January 17).

AccordingtoTrump,theParisAgreement“isdebilitating,disadvantageousandunfair”(Ahrens,2017,June2)asitdiminishestheUScompetitiveadvantage,anditharmstheemploymentandthetraditionalenergyindustrieswhichop-erateinthatcountry.HealsoarguesthatthecampaignagainstfossilfuelssetsanagendaagainstUSgrowth,economyandsecurity.(PresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,2017,p.22)andimposescostoverrunsformitigation;thatistosay,Trumpmakesaneconomicandcommercialcalculationabouttheconve-nienceofthisagreementexclusivelyfortheUSA,whichverifiestheexpressionoftheAmericafirstprinciple(Zhangetal.,2017,p.221,Ahrens,2017,June2).

At first itwas thought that theUSwithdrawalof theParisAgreementwouldproduceastampedeofcountriescommittedtocombatingglobalwarming(Ai-zen,2017,p.45).However,thereactioninsidetheUnitedStates42 and the rest oftheworldhasbeenpositive,reaffirmingcommitmentwiththeobjectivessetforth intheParisAgreementonclimatechange. Inotherwords, thedecisiontowithdrawhasreactivatedenvironmentalmilitancywithintheUS.(AtkinsonandChi,2017,June3),butithasalsohelpedtherestoftheworldratifytheircommitment to the goals of the agreement. As Solano points out (2017):

40 Denouncingorwithdrawingfromthetreatyisallowedbyarticle28oftheagree-ment. 41 TheParisAgreementwassignedby195countries.OnlytwoUNmembersdidnotsign: Syria and Nicaragua. 42 SeveralAmericancompaniessuchasExxonMobil,Chevron,GeneralElectric,Apple,Google,Microsoft,Intel,Nike,Gap,Levi’sandStarbucksmadetheirvoicesheardinthefaceofthedecisionbyPresidentTrumptowithdrawfromtheParisAgreement(Pozzi,2017a,June2).Also,businessmenlikethepresidentofTesla(ElonMusk)andtheheadoftheWaltDisneyCorporation(RobertIger)resignedtheirpositionsasadviserstotheWhiteHouse(AtkinsonandChi,2017,June3)forsuchwithdrawal.


Regardlesslegalaspects,itisveryinterestingtoanalyzethereactionsbothinsideandoutsidetheUSwiththisannouncement.Americanpublic institutions,suchasthePentagonitselfandNASA,haveissuedreportsthroughtheyearswhereitisclearthattheyvalidatetheurgencyofseriouslytacklingclimatechange.ThediplomacyofthiscountryhasmadeitveryclearthattheParisAgreementrep-resentsaglobalpactwithsomanyadherentsandeconomicandsocialimplica-tionsthatitisabsurdthattheUSisnotanactivepart-andleader-ofit.ImportantstatessuchasCalifornia,orcorporationsasbigasApple,Google,ExxonMobilandChevronhaveratifiedtheircommitmenttoimplementtheParisAgreementandachievecompliancewiththeNDCsubmittedbytheUS,evenwithoutthesupportofthenationalgovernment.Theyensurethattheirdomesticandglobalcompeti-tivenessdependsonassumingthecontextofclimatechange.

InthespecificcaseofthestateofCalifornia,whichalonerepresentsthesixthlargesteconomyintheworldandoneofthemainemittersofpollutinggasesinthecountry,ithascommittedtoloweringemissionlevelsby40%comparedto1990,forwhichitmusthave50%renewableenergyby2030.Ithasalsoestab-lishedanewcarbonmarkettoreduceemissionsthroughthesaleofpermits.AllthishasinfectedvarioustownsandcitiesintheUSAinfrankdivergencewiththepositionoftheirGovernment(Aizen,2017,pp.51-52).

This support for the Paris Agreement is explained by the fact that it is a treaty basedonvoluntarycommitmentsinwhichnoStatecanforceanothertoachievegasreductiongoals,butrathereachcountryestablishesitsownobjectivesorgoals (national contributions).While thismaybeamatterof criticismwhenviewedasaweakness,itisalsoastrengthoftheagreementthathasalsocostalottoachieve.ForChina,forexample,ithasmeantthedecisiontoclose4,300mines and reduce coal production in the order of 700 million tons by 2019, and ithasalsomeantcanceling100thermalpowerplantsthatalreadyhadapprovalforconstruction.Foritspart,India,willnotsellvehiclesthathavecombustionengines in its territoryas from 2030- The same measure has been adopted by GreatBritainandFrancefortheyear2040(Aizen,2017,pp.46,50-51).

However,Trump’smeasuresarenot limitedtodisregardingthe internationalcommitmentsassumedintheenvironmentalfield,butincludeasetofinternaldecisionsthatimplyabandonmentofBarakObama’senvironmentalandenergypolicies.

Indeed,Trump’senergystrategyembodiedintheAmerica First Energy Plan and the Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth is basedontheuseofallenergysourcesmainlyofnationalorigin-withouttakingintoaccountwhethertheseemitgreenhouseeffectgases-,withthecentralob-jectiveofguaranteeingUSenergysecurity.Inthissense,thesearchforcleanen-


ergies,asestablishedinObama’spolicy,isleftaside;thisisclearlyestablishedwhenorderingtherevisionandsubsequentrevocationoftheClean Power Plan (Lázaro, 2018, January 17)43, aimed at reducing emissions in the electricity in-dustrybyrequiring federalstatestoreduceCO2fromgasandcoalplantsby32%basedon2005figuresby2030(Escribano,2018,January11).

Asifthiswerenotenough,theUSCongressisdictatingrulesinthesamesense.Thus, the Energy Independence Actwaspassed,whichannulledthelegislationthatprohibitedthedumpingofwastefromcoalmininginwatersnearminingoperations(Solano,2017).Anunsuccessfulattemptinthissamesector,thanksto the opposition of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in January2018,wastherequestoftheDepartmentofEnergytoestablishacompensationmodel (subsidy) to nuclear and coal plants for their capacity to store fuel and provideresilienceto thenetwork,notextendingthesamemeasure forothersourcesofelectricitysuchaswindorsolar(Escribano,2018,January11).Like-wise, theDepartment of TerritorialManagement has temporarily suspendedthelegislationrelatedtoleaksandburningofmethane,whichhasahighglobalwarmingpotential(Lázaro,2018,January17).Inthesameway,theUSgovern-menthasreversedtheprohibitiondecreedbytheObamaadministrationtodrillintheArcticandtheAtlantic fortheexplorationofhydrocarbons,whichwillundoubtedlyaffecttheenvironmentalbalanceandthenativetribesinthearea(Escribano, 2018, January 11).

Additionally,inthe2017nationalbudget,Trumpproposedasignificantbudgetcutforresearchonclimatechangeanditsimpacts,theeliminationofweather-ization assistance programs and the energy program (State Energy Program), a 31% reduction of budget and personnel for the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA), the elimination of a NASA program that launched satellites to measurecarbondioxidelevelsintheatmosphere,areorientationintheobjec-tivesofvariouspublicentitieslinkedtothesubject;measuresthatcouldbeinpartmitigatedbyCongress(Lázaro,2018,January17;EFE,2017,May23).

Also in relation to the EPA, he appointed Scott Pruitt as its Director. Pruitt is one ofthemainclimatechangedeniersandopponentoftheCleanPowerPlanwho,asattorneygeneralofOklahoma,hadsuedtheEPAmorethanadozentimesforthepurposeofchallengingitsenvironmentalregulations(Mieldo,2017,p.14;Pfiffner,2017,p.10).HehasevengonesofarastoprohibittheDepartmentofAgriculture from using the expression “climate change” in its internal docu-ments, as if this determined a different reality of things (Aizen, 2017, p.52).

43 Some critics of the Clean Power Plan celebrate the decision because they maintain thatitwouldhavecost39billiondollarsayearandwouldhaveledtoadouble-digitincreaseinthepriceofelectricityinmostoftheUSstates(Mieldo,2017,p.10).


Thewholesetofmeasures(externalandinternal)thatarebeingimplementedbytheUSGovernmentwillnegativelyimpactonglobalwarming,causinggreat-er climatic disasters.

InthespecificcaseofthewithdrawalfromtheParisAgreement,thiswillcauseasetofnegativeeffectsofdifferentnaturewithdifferentiatedimpactsinworldcountries.Thus,inthefirstplace,thisretreatclearlyjeopardizesachievementofitsobjectives.Asisknown,thenext10yearsarecrucialtoreducefossilfu-elsconsumptionandachievethepurposeforearthwarmingnottoexceed2°C.However,USabsencemakesitalmostimpossibletoreachthatgoal.And,asLazaro points out (January 17 2018):

EvenifcountriessuchasGermany,China,FranceandIndia,amongothers,supple-menttheUScommitments,andassumingthatallcurrentclimatecommitmentsaremet,onlyonethirdoftheclimateactionnecessarytomeettheobjectiveoflimitingtheaveragetemperatureincreasetolessthan2°Cascomparedtothepre-industrialerawouldbeprovided.Thus,Trumphasonlyaccentuatedastruc-turalinsufficiencyinglobalclimateaction[…].

A secondnegative effect is referred to theUS economic contributions to thefundcreatedbytheParisAgreement,takingintoaccountthatthesuperpowerhasbeenthemaindonorof theGlobalEnvironmentFacilityandthatObamapromisedacontributionof3billiondollarsfortheGreenClimateFundin2014(40%ofthetotalfund)(Zhangetal.,2017,p.222).Infact,thenewUSadminis-tration has decided to terminate its participation in the latter fund - including its twosub-funds,namely theCleanTechnologiesFundandtheStrategicCli-mateFund(EFE,2017,May23;KriegandMullery,2017,May23)-whichistheonethatshouldhelpdevelopingcountriestomakethenecessarytechnologicaltransformation to counteract the effects of climate change. Many countries that subscribe to the Paris Agreement made their reduction pledges conditional on thisaid,whichwillbedefinitivelyreduced44 (Aizen, 2017, p.52).

ThisisparticularlycomplicatedforsomecountriesinLatinAmericaandtheCa-ribbeansuchasHaiti,Honduras,NicaraguaortheDominicanRepublic,butalsoforBolivia,ChileandPeru,sincetheseareamongthecountriesmostaffectedbyglobalwarming.Thus,accordingtothe2018GlobalClimateRiskIndex,duringthe1997-2016period,theformercountrieswereplacedonthelistofthe10

44 Nonetheless,therearealsosupportersofthismeasure,suchasMieldo,whomain-tainsthattheUSdoesnothavetobethefirstcontributoroftheGreenFund,becausealthoughitspurposescanbepraiseworthy,theydonotrespondtospecificobjectivesnoristhereaguaranteethatthefundwillachievethepurposesforwhichitwascreated(2017,p.9).Thisopinionis,however,inconsistentwhentheauthorrecognizes,atthe


mostaffectedcountriesintheworldbythisphenomenon(Ecksten,KünzelandHäfer,2017,p.4).),whilethelatterappearedintheannuallistingsofthisindexin certain years.

Peruisahighlyvulnerablecountry,whichisdemonstratedbythemeltingofitsglaciers,theincreaseofavalanchesandlandslides,thedependenceofitsagri-cultureandindustryonclimaticconditionsanditslimitedadaptivecapacity.Inthissense,between2003and2011,climaticemergencies increasedby45%,compromisingPeru’sGDPbyalmost8%.Moreover,inastudypreparedbytheCentralReserveBank,thecountryisestimatedtoloseapproximately20%ofitsGDPto2050duetoclimatechangeandunderscenariosinwhichthetempera-turewillincrease2ºC,whileanotherstudyestimatesthattheeconomiccostinagriculture,fisheriesandhealthmightreach510milliondollarsin2030and16billiondollarsin2100(Gutiérrez,2014,p.111,114-115).

A third (indirect) negative effect is that the quality of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change-IPCC-futurereportswillbecompromisedduetoPres-identTrump’sdecisiontoreducefundingforclimateresearchwithintheUnitedStates.ThisPanel’sresearchhasbeenandisfundamentalforthefightagainstclimatechange,aswitnessedbythefactthattheUSAproduced58%ofthemostcitedclimatedocumentsintheworldin2015,muchmorethananyothercoun-try(Zhangetal.,2017,p.223).

A fourth negative effect for theUS itself is that its departure from the ParisAgreementwillundoubtedlymeanalossofcompetitivenessaswellasleader-shipinthematter,asitcannotdirectlyinfluencethenegotiationsandthedirec-tiontofollowinthismatter(Solano,2017;Aizen,2017,p.47).

Consequently,theenvironmentalandenergypolicythatPresidentTrumphasbeen implementingwillhaveadirectnegative impactontheenvironmentofLatinAmericancountriesandtheentireworld,withsocialandeconomicreper-cussions.

sametime,thattheUnitedStatesisthesecondCO2emitterintheworldandthatitspercapitaemissionsarethehighestintheworld.

Chapter IVGeneral and Distinctive Characteristics of

President Trump’s Foreign Policy

ItispossibletoestablishcertaingeneralanddistinctivefeaturesoftheofthecurrentUSadministration’sforeignpolicystemmingfrompoints2and3ofthiswork.Thus:

a) Nationalist and partially isolationist:Aswehaveseeninthefirstpartofthispaper,thetrendtowardsanisolationistforeignpolicyhasbeenrecurrentinUShistory.Therefore,wehavefromthemostextremeisolationismraisedbyWashington, JeffersonandMonroeto themostmoderateproposedbyRichardNixon,whoatthetimesupportedtheneedforUSalliestodefendthemselves,withoutresortingtoUSaid.Forhispart,JimmyCarter,GeorgeW.BushandBarakObamainitiallyproposedtoreducetheprominenceoftheUnitedStatesintheworldtoinsteaddealwithinternalaffairs(García,2018,January18).Beyondwhethersuchpresidentsfinallyendedupfulfill-ingornotfulfillingtheirpromises,theaboverevealsthat“lookinginward”hasbeenatemptationofseveralUSadministrations.

This isolationism has arisen in situations of internal crisis, such as the one theUS is currently experiencing,which leads a largepart of thepopula-tiontocriticizeassumptionofcostsofseveralmilitaryinterventionsintheworld.

Inthissense,thepromisesbytheTrumpcandidateof“Americafirst,”“MakeAmericagreatagain”and“Americanism,notglobalism”seemedtogointhissameline(Aronskind,2017,p.69).

However,stemmingfrompoints2and3ofthiswork,itisclearthatPresi-dentTrumptakesintoaccountwhathappensintheworldwhenittheaf-fectsthesuperpower’sinterests.WitnessestothisishisinterventioninAsia,Eurasia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Latin America itself on issues related to democracy. Besides, it is also true that Trump has disregarded global commitments, multilateral treaties and international organizations withrespecttowhichheconsidersthathedoesnotobtainbenefitsbutonlyburdens.Therefore,wedaretoaffirmthathisforeignpolicyispartiallyiso-lationist,sinceitdependsontheinterestsatstake.

Thereisevidentdangerinthesuperpower’sabandoningofspaceatatimelikethisinwhichChinaisoccupyingitandotherregionalpowerslikeRus-


siaareinthesearchtorecoverpositions,notonlyintermsofpreservingUShegemonyandleadershipintheworld,butalsofortherestofcountriesthatsharetheirvaluesandprinciples.

Regardingthelatter,thereareclearsignsthattherestoftheworldhasbeenadaptingtothechangeofdirectionintheUS,nottofollowitsdictatesbutrathertocontinuedefendingtheprinciplesthatinformtheirrespectivefor-eignpolicies.Inthisregard,wehavetheTPP-11,theParisAgreementwith192membercountries, theresolutionof theUNGeneralAssemblyvotedfavorablyby128countriesonJerusalem,thesearchforEuropeofgreatersecurityautonomy,directnegotiationsbetweenSouthKoreaandNorthKo-rea,amongmanyotherexamples,whichonlyshowthat“theworldgoeson”(García,2018,January18).

Fromalloftheforegoing,itisalsoclearthatPresidentTrump’sforeignpol-icyisultranationalistinthatit iswillingtoabandonspacesandsacrificeprinciples,commitments,pledgesandglobalinterests,ifitbelievesthatitfavorstheUnitedStates.

b) Prone to Security:Also,Trump’smanagementhasbeencharacterizedbyfocusing different areas in his foreign policy from the angle of security, as didhispredecessorGeorgeW.BushaftertheSeptember112001attacks;proof of this is that his National Security Strategy includes issues such asenvironment,migration, free tradeagreements,asapartof it,amongothers.

Thistendencyto“secure”everythingfirstlypreventstheissuesfrombeinganalyzedinanintegralway,leadingtoadangerousreductionism.Secondly,bylinkingallissuestoUSsecurity,theparticipationoftheentitiesinchargeofthisisprioritizedoverthoseoftheStateDepartment,whichshouldbethemainactor.Thirdly,thepartnerStateshavereducedtheirmarginofac-tionforfearofaffectingthesuperpower’ssupposedvitalinterestsandfall-ing into the list of countries that are opposed to it. Fourth, the security trend necessarily leads to strengthening of asgencies in charge of defense and se-curity.ThisisveryclearlystatedintheNationalSecurityStrategywhereitispointedoutthattheUSmilitarystrengtheningisakeyelementtoguaranteeUSsupremacyanddefenditsinterests.

A sign of the importance that President Trump assigns to security issues over any other issue is the increase in the defense budget for 2018 and2019.Thus,for2018,herequesteda10%increase,thatis,54billiondollarsmore than thepreviousyear, setting the largestbudget since theReaganadministration(LaJornada,2017,March17);whileheproposeda13%in-

General and Distinctive Characteristics of President Trump’s Foreign Policy | 119

creasefor2019ascomparedtothepreviousyear,thatis,atotalbudgetof686billiondollars(LaVanguardiaNewsroom,2018,February12).

Linked to this is the fact thatmilitaryactiondecisionsareadoptedmorequicklyandwithlesscontrolsbytheWhiteHouseortheStateDepartment.Thishasbeenevidenced,forexample,withthelaunchingoftheso-called“motherofallbombs”inAfghanistanandwiththeincreaseofairstrikesinYemenandSomalia;andevenmoresoinmilitaryactionsagainstterrorism(García,2018,January18).

Notwithstandingtheforegoing,itmustberecognizedthatthechecksandbalancesintheUShavebeenkeytocontainthenewpresident’sdiscretionandpreventimplementationofsomeextremepromisesmadeintheelec-tioncampaign.Congressisacaseinpoint,sinceithasmanagedtostopthemultiple presidential attempts to repeal the public health system called “Obamacare”(BuchieriandMancha,2018,p.8).

c) Not institutionalist: USforeignpolicy,asithappenswiththerestofthecoun-tries,isdirectedbythePresidentoftheRepublicaswellasbytheDepart-ment of State.

However, since the beginning of his term in office, President Trump haspractically left aside this fundamental agency of the State, in many cases directingforeignpolicywiththesupportofWhiteHouseofficials.45

Thispresidential attitudeof a lackof interest in theStateDepartment isevidencedwhenmorethanhalfofthepositionsinthisbodythatrequiredconfirmationfromtheSenatehadnocandidateuntilearly2018.Besides,21%ofthecandidateshadbeenconfirmedand24%expectedconfirmation.Not appointing an ambassador to South Korea or an assistant secretary for EastAsiaandPacificAffairs(todate,SusanThorntonisInterimAssistantSecretaryofState),aswellasnewambassadorsinEgypt,Jordan,SaudiAra-bia,QatarandTurkeyshouldbenoted.ThesamesituationoccurswiththeSecretaryofState for theControlofArmsandInternationalSecurityandwithrepresentativestotheOAS,ASEAN,EU,OECD,OSCE,amongothers.Asifthiswerenotenough,morethanahundredseniorofficialshavelefttheStateDepartment, andpositions for career diplomats have decreasedby60%.Allthis,despitethedifficultiesthattheUnitedStatesfacesinforeignpolicymattersthroughouttheworld(García,2018,January18).

45 In its third pillar of national interests to protect called Preserve Peace Through Force, thenewUSNationalSecurityStrategy(NSS)pointsouttheneedtoimproveUSdiplo-macy, arguing in favorof a competitivediplomacy that improves its capabilities anddefendsUSinterestsabroad(PresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,2017,p.33).


Another sign that indicates the little importance that Trump attributes to theStateDepartmentwashisproposaltocutitsbudgetby28.7%in2018,thatis,gofrom52.8billiondollarsto37.6billiondollars,ofwhich25.3bil-lionwouldbeaimedatforeignaidprograms(Judge,2017,March16;EFE,2017,May23).WhilethiscutwasbasicallydisregardedbyCongresswhenapprovingthebudget,Trumphasinsistedonhisinitiative.Ineffect,initsbudgetproposalfor2019thepresidentproposesanevenbiggercutthanlastyear,reaching32%,whichhashitthemoraleoftheofficialsthatmakeupthisbody(LaVanguardiaNewsroom,2018,February12;DeLuceandGramer,2018,February12;WashingtonPostStaff,2018,February16).

The lastpresidentialact thatconfirmsPresidentTrump’s lowesteem fortheStateDepartmentwasthedismissalofSecretaryofStateRexTillerson,dedicated largely toserveasacounterweightandtomoderate thepresi-dentialspeechtotheeffectsofexercisingdamagecontrol,appointingMikePompeo,at that timedirectorof theCentral IntelligenceAgency(CIA), toreplacehim.Inthiswayitwasconfirmedthatsecurityinvolvesforeignpol-icy, for Trump.

d) With a low commitment to multilateralism and cooperation:Thelowcom-mitmentofthecurrentUSforeignpolicywithinternationalorganizationsandmultilateralagreementsofwhichthispowerisapartisconnectedwiththepreviouspoint.Somehow,Trumpconsidersthissystemtobedecadent,complexandnotalignedwiththesuperpower’sinterests,whichiswhyhepreferstoactonhisown,thatis,todirectlynegotiatewithhiscounterpartssinceheknowsthathewillobtainbetterresultsinthisway(Zaldívar,2017,October).

While President Trumphas appealed tomultilateralismon certain occa-sions-forexampletotheUnitedNationsSecurityCounciltoputpressureonChinatoimposesanctionsonNorthKorea,theWorldTradeOrganizationtoimposecertaintraderestrictionsontheAsiangiantortheOrganizationofAmericanStates topronounceagainst theVenezueladictatorship-hehasalsooptedtowithdrawfrominternationalorganizationsorfromsuchbod-ieswhenheconsideredthatthisfavoredsomeUSinterest.Thesamegoesfor multilateral treaties such as the TPP or the Paris Agreement. The use of unilateral measures or threats of applying them to settle disputes are signs thathedoesnot agreewith institutionaldispute settlement schemes.AsSteinbergpointsout(March62018)aboutthetradewarstartedbyTrump:

Untilnow(andsincetheSecondWorldWar),takinggoodnoteofhowdestructiveeconomicconflictshavebeen throughouthistory, the international communityhadchosentotrytoresolvetradeconfrontationsbyadoptingasetofrulesim-


bricatedintheWTO,formerlytheGATT.Atinternationallevel,WTOagreements(alongwithmanyothers)haveservedtocivilizeusandburyourlowpassions,lettingthelegitimacyofinternationallawtoreplacethelawofthestrongest.

Another indicator of the aforementioned is the reduction of its contribu-tions to multilateral organizations. In the same style as Ronald Reagan-who,havingbarelyassumedpower,reducedUScontributionstointerna-tionaldevelopmentbanksby25%(Pastor,1986a,p.37)-PresidentTrump,proposed a cut in the contribution of his country to international organiza-tions from 3.26 billion dollars to 2.19 billion dollars for the 2019 budget. Morespecifically,TrumphasproposedthattheUScontributiontotheUnit-ed Nations decrease from 593.26 billion dollars to 442.94 billion dollars, a cut that reaches all the agencies in this organization. The amount allocated topeacekeepingoperationswouldbereducedfrom1.90billiondollarsto1.19billiondollars; theproposal even seeks to close theUS Institute forPeace,anindependentfederalinstitutecreatedduringtheReaganadmin-istrationtopromotepeaceandstabilitythroughouttheworld(Konyndyk,2017,May31).ItmustbetakenintoaccountthatUSfundsTheyfunded11peaceoperationsaroundtheworldaswellasaUNsupportofficeinSoma-lia(LeonGoldberg,M.,2018,February13).Foritspart,theWorldHealthOrganizationwouldsufferareductionof50%asthecontributionwouldbereducedfrom111.40billiondollarsto58.176milliondollars(LaVanguar-diaNewsroom,2018,February12).InthecaseofUNICEF,wheretheUShadbeenannuallycontributing330milliondollarsforvaccineprogramstofightdiseases such as polio or measles, President Trump has proposed to elimi-natesuchcontribution(LeonGoldberg,2018,February13).

The Trump administration even projects measures against internationalentitiestowhichitdoesnotbelong.Inthissense,theUSAhasannouncedthroughJohnBolton-WhiteHouseNationalSecurityAdvisor-thatiftheIn-ternationalCriminalCourt,towhichtheUSisnotapart,continuestoin-vestigateUSsoldiersandintelligencepersonnelabouttheirperformanceinAfghanistan,theUSAwillprohibitjudgesandprosecutorstoentertheUnit-edStates,willprosecutethembeforetheUScourtsorwillimposesanctionsonfundstheymayhaveintheUSfinancialsystem,ameasurethatwouldbeextendedtoanyStateorcompanythatcollaborateswiththecourt(Guimón,2018, September 11).

Finally, it should be noted that, for the Trump administration, international cooperation is not a useful tool that contributes to its interests and aims as a superpower,notunderstandingthatcooperationisandwillbeasoftpowerinstrumenttoinfluencegloballyaswellasamechanismofsolidarity.ThisexplainsthedecisionoftheWhiteHousetoreduceUScooperationtoLatin


AmericanandCaribbeancountries,aswellastotherestofthedevelopingcountries.

e) Selectively protectionist:OneofthepillarsofUSforeignpolicytowardstheworldhasbeenthedefenseandpromotionoffreetradebasedonamultilat-eraltradeorder,whereopennessandcompetitivenesswereitscorecharac-teristics.

However,PresidentTrumphasshownaturnaroundinthispolicy,attackingfree trade, promoting protectionist and mercantilist measures, not only in-sidetheUnitedStates.butalsoandmainlyoutside.ItisnotgeneralizedbutratherselectiveprotectionisminthatitonlyprojectstothosecountriesthatTrumpconsidershavetakenadvantageoftheUnitedStatesthroughtradeagreementsthathadbeenbadlynegotiatedandwhereUSinterestshadnotbeenprotected.Hismainargumenttosupportthisperspectiveistheexis-tenceofa tradedeficit insometradeagreementssignedby thatcountry,suchas theonewithChina,wherethere isa375-billion-dollardeficit,orwiththeEuropeanUnion,153-billion-dollardeficit46.

Suchargumenthasnoeconomicsupport.Thus,severalstudiesshowthattheUShasgreatlybenefitedfromthefreetradesystemthatithasalwayspromotedand that tradeagreementshavebeen favorable for itscitizens,especiallythosewithmediumandlowincomes.Onthislastpoint,wehavetheUSITC2016Report, aswell as researchby thePeterson Institute forInternationalEconomicsthatarguethattheUSeconomyobtainedprofitsofmorethantwotrilliondollarsbetween1950and2016,thankstointer-national trade, that is,11%of thecountry’sGDP(USITC,2016,pp.17-23,Steinberg, 2018, January 15). Additionally, Trump claims that China hastakenfactoriesawayfromtheUSA,when in fact theUScorporations,de-pendingontheirinterests,weretheonesthatfreelydecidedtomovetheirplantsabroadtohirecheaperlaborandgetmoreprofits;thatis,theymadearationaleconomicdecision,typicalofthefreemarketsystem(Aronskind,2017, pp.69 and 71).

Trump’spolicythenimpliesaquestioningofeconomictheorythattheUSitself has built since 1945,which includes economic freedom, free tradeagreementsandtheinternationaldivisionoflabor,doingsowithnon-tech-nical but rather political populist arguments.

46 TheUSNationalSecurityStrategyincorporatesthereductionoftradedeficits,theeliminationofunfairtradepracticesandtheconclusionoffairbilateraltreatieswithinthe second pillar of national interests to protect called Promoting American Prosperity (PresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,2017,pp.19-20).


f) Frontal and informal:AnotherchangethatcanalsobehighlightedinUSfor-eign policy is that it is expressed by the president through frontal and infor-mal communication.

Onthefirstissue,indeed,DonaldTrumpnotonlyusesafrontal,directandunconventional language,but inmanycasesappeals toadjectives, todis-paragingandeventoinsulting,asifheneededthattobackuphisideasorapproaches.Forexample,hehascalledKimJong-Unt-hepresidentofNorthKorea- “fat”, “dwarf”, “rocketman”. LatinAmericanmigrants, particularlyMexicans,havebeendescribedas“criminals”.

Butperhapsthemostsalientistheuseofthreatstoachieveitspurposes.SomeanalystslikeTzilicallitbusinessdiplomacy(2018,p.424).Thus,hethreatenedtohaveNorthKoreadisappearinordertoachieveanegotiationaimedatdenuclearizingthepeninsula;hethreatenedtheEuropeanUnionwithabandoningNATOifitsmembersdidnotraisetheirmaintenancecon-tributions;hethreatenedMexicotoleaveNAFTAtoobtainitsrenegotiation,amongmanyothercases.AlthoughheisnotthefirstAmericanpresidenttousethistypeoflanguage,thelevelsreachedbyTrumphaveneverbeenseenbefore.Thiswasthecase,forexample,ofRonaldReagan,who“usedavir-ulentlanguagetounderminethelegitimacyofhisadversaries[communistbeasts]andmobilizehissupporters”(Pastor,1986a,p.35).

But that is not all. To confrontational language, Trump adds informal com-municationmechanisms.Indeed,theUSpresidentresortstowhathasbeencalled “diplomacy viaTwitter,” somethingunprecedented in themanage-mentofAmericanpublicaffairs(García,2018,January18;Meneses,MartíndelCampoandRueda-Zárate,2018)47.

Theuseofthisinformalandunconventionalmechanismofcommunicationinforeignpolicyhasgeneratednumerousandacuteproblemswithcoun-triessuchasNorthKorea,butalsowith formeralliessuchasGreatBrit-ain,GermanyorMexico.Whilethevastmajorityof ideasandapproachespointedoutbyTrumpviaTwitterhavenothadacorrelateinreality,theyhavealsocausedunrestinvariouspartsoftheworld,forcingUSofficialstopermanentlyinterpretthepresident’swordsinordertoreducetension,as

47 ThefirstpoliticaluseofTwitterintheUSAhadoccurredinBarakObama’selectioncampaign in 2008, becauseTwitter has two fundamental characteristics: “the speedof information management and the colossal amount of people who are accessed”(Márquez-Domínguez,López-LópezandEstévezArias,2017,p.1).However,aspresi-dent,ObamadidnotuseTwittertoformulatehisforeignpolicy,buttoexpressopinionsorsupportinitiatives.


theydid,forexample,withEuropeanalliesinrelationtoTrump’sstatementaboutthesuspensionofpaymentofhiscontributiontoNATOorwithSouthKorea,afterheannouncedtheterminationofthetradeagreementwiththatcountry.

AsGarcíastates(2018,January18):

USpresidents’wordshavealwaysbeenacurrencyofgreatvaluetothecountry.Theyhavebeen instrumental in reassuringallies, in informing thedomesticpublicandinwarningandpersuadingenemies.Trumphasdevaluedthiscur-rency.Evenhisownchiefofstaff,JohnKelly,hasadvisedtheworldtoignorehistweets.

AnimportantpointtokeepinmindisthatNewYorkfederaljudgeNaomiReiceBuchwaldhasratedDonaldTrump’sTwitteraccountasapublicfo-rumcontrolledbythegovernment.Thisisbecause,althoughthisaccountwas createdpersonally byTrump in 2009, he has continued to use it aspresidenttomakeanumberofofficialannouncements,butitisalsoman-agedbyDanielScavino,hisassistantandSocialMediaDirectoroftheWhiteHouse.Besides,theOfficeofNationalArchivesandDocumentAdministra-tionhasdescribedTrump’stweetsasofficialpublicrecords(Calderón,2018,May 28).

g) Contradictory and unpredictable: Finally, open contradictions in his man-agementandconductarealsodistinctiveelementsinTrump’sforeignpol-icy.Thus,heseekstocontainChinabut leavestheTPPaside,heseekstoimprovehiscountry’sinternationalpositionbutweakenstheStateDepart-ment,heproposestorescueAmericanvaluesbutatthesametimeaban-donsandattacksthemattheinternationallevel,amongothers.Thisbehav-iorbreaksthepredictabilityofhis foreignpolicyandgeneral trust in theentireworld,causinginstabilityandbewilderment(García,2018,January18).InTovar’swords:

The most opposite example to the model of doctrine as a stable set of ideas thatservesasaguidetothestatesmanwouldbeTrump’s“antidoctrine;”notonlybecauseitcontainsambiguities-whichalsohappenedintheObamapres-idency-, but because of its continuous variations and contradictions, whichmakeforeignpolicyunpredictable.Thisisinfluencedbythedysfunctionalde-cision-makingprocess,whereTrump’sowninexperienceaddstotheconflictbetweenhisinnercircleandtheestablishmentofWashingtonofficialsandex-perts.Allthishasledtoaclearincreaseintensionswithotherinternationalactors,whomustconfrontagreaterdegreeofuncertaintywhen itcomes topredictingandinterpretingUSintentions.(Tovar,2017,pp.196-197).


ThislackofpredictabilityandreliabilityhasparticularlyaffectedUSrela-tionswithitstraditionalandmainpartners,byprojectingthe“imageofanunreliableally”(Flores,2018,January19).

The characteristicsofPresidentTrump’s foreignpolicymentionedaboveareundoubtedlycomplexanddifficultfortherestoftheworldtoassimilate.OptimistsmayevenarguethatattheendofhistermtheUSwillbeabletoreturn to its traditional guidelines and formats; however, as it happenedattheendofPresidentGeorgeW.Bush’sterm,therewillbeconsequencesforthesuperpower’simageandprestige.InOssorio’swords(2018,January15):“DonaldTrumphasanexpirationdatebuthisparticulardiplomacywilloutlasthimandtheUSbrandasguarantorof theworldorderwill sufferafterhispresidency.”

Meanwhile,whatdowethinktheresponseshouldbetowhathasbeende-scribed?Well,whathasbeenstatedshowsthatitisnotpossibletoassumeasinglestrategy,giventhediversityofpoliciesestablishedby theTrumpadministration according to each country; that is, differentiated strategies to different realities.

However,weconsider, likeLowenthal, that ingeneraltermsit isveryim-portanttoavoidexaggeratedorexcessivereactions(Lowenthal,2017).Weshouldnot fall into thegameof confrontational rhetoric,but rather seekchannels of understanding and dialogue.

Inthisregard,maintainingopenchannelsofpermanentdialoguewithUSinstitutions. like the Department of State, theWhite House or Congressseemstobethemostadvisable,becausetheyhaveshownsomemarginofcapacitytocontrolandeventuallycorrectpresidentialexcesses.Likewise,itisimportanttoemphasizecoincidenceswiththesuperpowerandmattersthatarebeneficialforbothparties.Ifthisiscomplementedbyadiversifiedforeignpolicy,notonlycaneffectivedamagecontrol,butevenaconstructivelinkbeachieved.

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