‘After the Genocide:

An Evaluation of Sustainable Security in Paul Kagame’s

Rwanda’

Andrew Sutherland

200067525

Submitted in accordance with the requirements of

MA Conflict, Development and Security

School of Politics and International Studies

University of Leeds

September 2009

Word Count: 12576

Dissertation Supervisor: Dr. David Hall-Matthews

Background

The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 is one of the darkest episodes in

recent world history. Around one million ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus

were slaughtered by extremist Hutu militia in less than one hundred days.

The killing campaign was characterised by methodical planning and

organisation, directed through mass media and propaganda and driven by

the political elite, resulting in countless acts of unspeakable brutality. It

has been argued that the genocide was facilitated by a combination of

French financial and military support and the failure of the international

community and the United Nations to recognise and act upon the

macabre end product of European colonial-era classification and division

of people along racial lines.1

The genocide was ultimately brought to an end by the invasion of

the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an army of exiled Tutsi rebels led by

Major-General Paul Kagame. After the new regime had consolidated power

Kagame ruled from behind the scenes, eventually becoming President,

and sought to rebuild a devastated Rwanda through a series of ambitious

social, political and economic measures unveiled as the ‘Vision 2020’

1 Rwanda was colonised by Germany in 1880. It was governed by Belgium in a League of Nations mandate following WW1. The Belgians are particularly responsible for introducing a system of identification and classification along racial lines that previously did not exist in the country, although this process was also started by German colonialism. Perhaps the most complete account of the origins and evolution of the Rwandan Genocide comes from Pruniér ‘The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide’ (Hurst & Co 1995). Alison Des Forges provides a highly detailed empirical account of how the genocide was orchestrated in ‘Leave none to tell the Story’ (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The complicity of France, China, Egypt, the international community and the United Nations is best explored in Linda Melvern’s excellent ‘A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide’ (Zed Books, 2009 rev ed). The French role is examined in even greater detail in Wallis ‘Silent Accomplice: The Untold story of France’s role in the Rwanda Genocide’ (IB Tauris, 2007).

development strategy2. Some of these measures will be evaluated below

in terms of the contribution they have made to sustainable security,

particularly Kagame’s attempts to transform Rwanda into a regional trade

and technology hub whilst breaking from French influence and gravitating

toward American and British investment.

Kagame sought to move allegiances towards the US and UK and

away from France as revenge for the Mitterrand administration’s financial

and military support for the Habyirimana and Bagosora regimes that

culminated in ‘Operation Turquoise’ which has been described as a

‘rescue mission for the perpetrators of the genocide.’3 This decision saw

an upsurge in DFID/USAID funding for his economic stimulus, educational

and healthcare programmes as well as an enhanced political relationship

with both states and improved access to, particularly American, corporate

investment.

Kagame also consolidated power in a manner seen in many other

African states, retaining a personalised control of the security apparatus

and state bureaucratic-administrative functions, with a widespread and

secretive intelligence network. The administration is dominated by Tutsi

and ex-RPF. While explicitly pledging to remove ethnic divisions and bring

prosperity a continuing state of inequality where Hutus are discriminated

against in education, commerce and the military exists. An increasing

amount of disaffected Hutu males are fleeing the country to join Hutu

2 For an account of power relations in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide and details of Kagame’s socioeconomic and political objectives see Kinzer ‘A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man who Dreamed it’ (Wiley, 2007). Although Kinzer’s work is illuminating it is also hagiographical and based on interviews with Kagame and therefore should be qualified by a reading of Waugh’s more tempered ‘Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front’ (McFarland & Co, 2004). 3 See Kinzer chapter 10 or Gen. Roméo Dallaire’s memoir ‘Shake Hands with the Devil’ (Random House, 2003).

rebel groups in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), made up of

the remnants of the génocidaires. This has led to a series of conflicts and

a state of insecurity in the region, exacerbated by the presence of

valuable natural resources such as gold and diamonds in the DRC. While

an understanding of regional conflict dynamics and resource exploitation

is essential in addressing the question of Hutu-Tutsi coexistence in East

Africa and is an important facet for a complete analysis of the

sustainability of Kagame’s project, this focus of this dissertation will be on

the internal political dimension, the lifespan of donor support and

international perceptions and attitudes towards Kagame and Rwanda4. As

will be expanded upon below, the involvement of Rwanda and its proxies

in the eastern DRC can be viewed as a product of the culture of political

tolerance that up until this point has been seemingly related to direct

financial assistance and the need for African examples to support western

‘Good Governance’ agendas5.

This dissertation will also explore Kagame, his methods and his

vision, posing and answering questions about the extent to which the

4 For a detailed analysis of Rwanda’s relationship with its neighbours and a history of regional conflicts see Turner ‘The Congo Wars, Conflict, Myth and Reality’ (Zed Books, 2005), Adelman and Suhrke’s ‘The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire’ (Transaction, 2000) or Prendergast and Smock ‘Reconstructing Peace in the Congo’ (USIP, 1999). For empirical accounts of Rwandan complicity in and profiteering from the illegal exploitation of minerals in the Eastern DRC see the special edition of The Review of African Political Economy 93/94 (2002), particularly the article by Jackson which is frank about Kagame’s sponsorship of rebel army CNDP and controversial General Laurent Nkunda and meticulously details the methods used by his administration to export resources. Also Samset’s article on Rwandan involvement in the diamond trade is highly useful. Finally, The United Nations ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC’ (UN, 2008 ed) contains vehement accusations against Kagame and his administration regarding military involvement in the area, theft, looting and controlling of mines which the government has yet to provide a satisfactory response to, and have led to cessations in aid which will be examined towards the end of chapter 1. 5 The Good Governance Agenda refers to a qualification of the neoliberal institutional approach of the 80s and early 90s in which African countries are to be rewarded with aid, trade and debt relief if they are determined to have a government that is moving towards Western liberal-democratic standards on issues including corruption, democratisation, peace building/reintegration and welfare. The argument is that governmental aid organisations such as DFID are struggling to find examples that fit all of the criteria they ask for, but need to reconcile this with the huge amount of expenditure on ODA and therefore are willing to compromise on some of the points, which describes the relationship with Rwanda and will be discussed in chapter 1.

reconstruction of Rwandan society is built around a single man and,

indeed, whether this can be described as sustainable. It will also discuss

what characteristics Kagame shares with certain other contemporary

African patrimonialists, and the extent to which he is unique, which will

highlight the plausibility of Kagame’s authoritarian development strategy

by comparing it to the variously unsuccessful economic plans of other

leaders in the region, again examining the differences for Rwanda.

Aims, Objectives and Chapter Description

Analysis of post-genocide Rwanda is important because it can

provide information about the manner in which authoritarian systems of

government emerge in response to conflict, reconstruction and ethnic

divides. Rwanda also holds data relating to the way in which regimes akin

to Kagame’s are supported and develop, but also on the potential ways

that they can collapse into renewed chaos. Examining the contemporary

Rwandan scenario in this way can offer perspective on the persistence of

one-party regimes and strongmen in wider African political economies and

also the recurrence of conflict. A critique of international attitudes toward

an authoritarian response to genocide, and of the response itself

contextualised within the problematic history of authoritarianism and

conflict within post-independence Africa is therefore necessary. It can help

to identify improved methods in which donors and recipient states can

work together to create participatory, prosperous and therefore

sustainable and secure political economies in the region, bringing a

reduction in conflict, tension and aid profligacy.

The hypothesis of this dissertation is that ‘’Security created by

Kagame’s regime is not Sustainable.’’ It argues that the manner in

which Kagame has rebuilt Rwandan society in the post-genocide years has

led to an improved but ultimately unsustainable security situation, as the

reconstruction of security and stability remains dependent on overseas

assistance and is built around Kagame’s elite.

It tests this hypothesis through addressing two main research areas.

Chapter one discusses the extent to which stability is based on a move

towards US/UK overseas assistance and international tolerance of

Kagame’s authoritarian tendencies which have undeniably brought short-

term economic recovery and political stability. It touches on the problems

of criticising Rwanda which are related to Western ‘guilt’ over its inaction

in 1994, and whether Kagame has been able to exploit this. It then

focuses on the changing nature of international assistance and the

possibility and consequences of a reduction or cessation of aid on

security. This chapter reviews caveats on aid and precedents for its

cessation. It also examines the viability of the President’s declared aim to

phase out international assistance altogether, replacing it with an attempt

to become ‘the Switzerland of Africa’, a regional finance, trade and

technology hub with a multi-ethnic and stable society despite the absence

of natural capital to finance this. It will show that despite overtures to the

abolition of aid dependence, Kagame operates in a climate of international

support, or at least indifference. The dissertation argues that this

ultimately cannot be reconciled with DFID and USAID’s good governance

agenda and therefore it is probable that memories of inaction during the

genocide subside and questions and more stringent conditionalities on

support arise which will cause problems for Kagame’s regime. Can

Kagame reduce aid dependence, stimulate economic growth and improve

security?

The second chapter discusses the extent to which Rwandan society

and security is built around Paul Kagame himself. This area examines the

extent to which Kagame is a neo-patrimonial leader in the tradition of

post-colonial Africa and looks at the advantages, dangers and inherent

fragility of (re)structuring a society around the vision of a single leader. It

will include a focused biography of Kagame which illuminates his thought

and motivations and discusses the problems associated with having a

‘pole in the centre of the tent.’ It briefly looks at Tutsi consciousness and

the discourse of persecution before focusing on the extent to which

Kagame has reconstructed Rwanda along ethnic lines whilst

simultaneously preaching a dialogue of inclusion. While the first chapter

focuses more on the potential consequences of the capricious nature of

international aid, the second is concerned with the reality of Rwanda as an

authoritarian state and builds a picture of the variety of reasons for

Kagame’s predilection towards authoritarianism.

These two areas form the basis of the chapterisation of the piece,

followed by an extended conclusion which introduces prospects for

Rwanda and draws conclusions on sustainable security through a

comparison with other incumbent sub-Saharan African leaders, within a

theoretical context. This final area expands on the discussion of Kagame

as an authoritarian ‘strongman’ and Rwanda as an archetypal post-conflict

authoritarian state. It works with other examples across the region in

order to formulate a discussion of what a reading of Kagame’s regime can

give about authoritarianism in sub-Saharan Africa. This area implies a

critique of the effect of neo-patrimonialism on development strategies in

sub-Saharan Africa and assimilates into reflections within the conclusion

which critiques authoritarian responses to conflict as a provider of long-

term sustainable security, and particularly the Rwandan example of an

authoritarian response to genocide.

Finally, the dissertation will revisit the hypothesis and aims in order

to comment on what has been proven and finishes by identifying areas for

further research. The conclusion highlights what issues are peculiar to

Rwanda and to Kagame and summarises the approach that Rwanda is

dependent on aid, but at the same time has much dynamism and

foresight for removing this dependence, especially in comparison to its

peers. It also finds that the personality cult of Kagame is an obstacle to

long-term security. Whilst Kagame is a proven and visionary leader, it is

argued that this has been the case with a pattern of other African leaders

who have ultimately stagnated and compromised to remain in power.

Whilst a discussion of the lack of democracy in Rwanda is covered briefly

in the article’s first chapter, It is perhaps more important to highlight the

lack of viable alternatives to Kagame, the lack of opposition and the

failure to deal with ethnic grievances such as the complicity of the RPF in

war crimes, or the perceived leniency of the gacaca system as

potentialities for renewed conflict in a Rwanda after Kagame has gone.

One question is if Kagame himself was removed from the scenario

tomorrow, would security prevail and, if not, how can this be described as

sustainable?

The conclusion poses questions about the motivations for western

support of authoritarian regimes and asks whether the ‘Good Governance’

agenda, as an instrument of the neoliberal project, really rewards

economic stability and growth at all costs and even constitutes a

tolerance of repressive authoritarianism. It also discusses the example of

Burundi as a postscript, which from a broadly similar starting position to

Rwanda in the mid-nineties has created a constitutionally-enshrined

power-sharing democracy between Hutu and Tutsi, asking whether this

form of democratisation and admission of ethnic differences is an

alternative approach for Rwanda that could bring about the sustainable

security that authoritarian governments in sub-Saharan Africa have a

history of failing to deliver.

Chapter One

Going Anglophone: The Importance of Aid and ‘Tolerance’ for

Kagame’s Strategy.

The Role of Aid

This first chapter discusses Rwanda’s continuing Anglicisation as an

aspect of Kagame’s vision. It maps out the extent of Rwanda’s

dependence on aid and situates these financial relationships within the

context of the evolving global academic debate on the impact that aid is

having. The chapter looks at examples of cessation of aid to Rwanda and

discusses what action Kagame is taking in light of the uncertainties that

increasingly surround international aid flows. It also defines and discusses

‘Tolerance’ of Kagame, in relation to military interventions, human rights,

the justice system, free press and the difficulties of criticising Kagame.

This chapter argues that tolerance is another form of assistance that

Kagame is reliant on. This primary area of the essay finds that Kagame’s

regime remains heavily reliant on international allies and their money,

which has helped to create security but that this assistance may end or be

reduced for several reasons. However, it also recognises that Kagame has

already realised the pitfalls of aid dependence and is making attempts to

wean Rwanda’s economy from aid. Highlighting some of the ways in which

the administration is attempting to do this the chapter concludes by

proposing that should Kagame be successful in his vision of an

economically independent Rwanda, the effect on long-term stability could

in fact be very positive, although this strategy will be exceptionally

difficult to achieve.

Following Kagame’s accession to power after the genocide, mutual

enmity between the RPF and France rapidly increased, with actions

including the severance of diplomatic relations, direct accusations of

French support for the genocidal regime and French responses such as

the cessation of aid to Rwanda and the implication of Kagame and other

figures in the 1994 assassination of Habyirimana culminating in the 2008

detention of presidential aide Rose Kabuye6. Kagame sought to fill the

void left by French assistance for Rwanda by capitalising on traditional

Anglo-French rivalry in Sub-Saharan Africa and soliciting new support from

the UK, amongst other nations. The UK is now Rwanda’s biggest provider

of bilateral development assistance, totalling some £380m since 1998.

This figure is set to rise to £55m per annum over the next four years7.

Following the UK the biggest donors to Rwanda are currently Belgium, the

Netherlands and the US, which is also greatly increasing the volume of its

ODA.8 Currently, Rwanda is seeking to deepen its association with the UK

through promoting English as the official language and applying for

6 See, for example BBC News ‘New Thaw in Franco-Rwandan relations’ (news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7011047.stm 24.09.07 accessed 25.07.09) and BBC News ‘France releases Rwandan official’ (news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7797024.stm 23.12.08 accessed 225.07.09). 7 See DFID-Rwanda (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-West--Central/Rwanda/ accessed 25.07.09), and ‘The UK Government’s programme of work to fight poverty in Rwanda’ (DFID, 2008 available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/cnty-plan-rw-2008-2012.pdf accessed 25.07.09) 8 See USAID/Rwanda Annual Report 2007.

membership of the Commonwealth which is voted upon in November

20099.

This influx of aid has been instrumental in Rwanda’s staggering

improvement in education, healthcare, access to water and general

economic performance, according to DFID and USAID.10 Whilst working

with these overseas agencies, Kagame’s government has created a

development strategy known as ‘Vision 2020’ which seeks to reduce the

proportion of the workforce involved in agriculture, improve transport and

communication links, promote gender equality, foster private investment

and increase accountability and transparency.11Specific goals include a

50% reduction in poverty and infant mortality by 2020, an increase in

average income to $900 per annum, 100% literacy and targets on

electricity, clean water and access to doctors. The overarching aim is to

move toward a knowledge-based economy and reduce dependence on aid

through creating macroeconomic stability, embodied in Kagame’s oft-

quoted dream to turn Rwanda into ‘the Switzerland of Africa.12’

However, there is a lot of work to be done to achieve these goals

especially if they are to coincide with a reduction in aid leading to a

complete phase-out. Today, Rwanda is one of the most aid-dependent

9 See The Guardian ‘Rwanda’s Commonwealth hopes dented by Human Rights criticism (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/19/rwanda-commonwealth-human-rights-criticism 19.07.09 accessed 25.07.09)10 See DFID (2008)11 See Kinzer p227, or USAID/Rwanda 2005 report p4. 12 See Kinzer p242-3. From ‘Rwanda Vision 2020’ (Government of Rwanda 2000). The entire Vision 2020 document is available at http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/docs/H%20&%20A/H%20&%20A%20Local/?dir=&download=Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf . This government document details in full the utopian vision of Kagame and states his explicit economic goals and the pathway to aid independence. What requires scrutiny is the ability of the government to achieve the development goals set out, which require increased spending at the same time as reducing dependence on international aid.

countries in the world with aid at around 20% of GDP.13It currently

receives around $350m per annum in aid. Economist Jeffrey Sachs

recently pointed out that Rwanda’s imports are currently at $800m, with

export earnings languishing at $250m. The difference is accounted for

mainly through aid and for Sachs, ‘’without foreign aid, Rwanda's path

breaking public health successes and strong current economic growth

would collapse14.’’Rwanda’s own governmental policy documents in no

way contradict this finding. The white paper on development of aid policy

throws out some interesting figures. 69% of all government expenditures

are financed externally. Domestic revenue can only account for 80% of

total fixed expenditure, which is the expenditure the government is legally

obliged to make and unable to cut, such as salaries. Aid is equivalent to

77% of imports15. Currently, by all accounts and by its own admission,

Rwanda would not be able to continue to function without aid. Clearly, the

concomitant effects on stability and therefore security if a government is

unable to pay the bills are grave.

There is a growing debate in academia surrounding the efficacy of

aid, particularly to Sub-Saharan Africa. The dominant paradigm in the

post-cold war years has been that massive increases in aid are a

necessary prerequisite to stimulate economic development. The idea is

that if political economies are injected with vast sums of money to

13 The UN places Rwanda within the top 10 most aid-dependent countries on earth (Javno.com ‘Sweden halts $15m in development aid to Rwanda http://www.javno.com/en-world/sweden-halts-usd15-mln-aid-to-rwanda-over-un-charge_215890 17.12.08 accessed 25.07.09). Nationmaster.com ranks Rwanda as the 13th most aid-dependent state, with aid as 17.9% of GDP (http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_aid_as_of_gdp-economy-aid-as-of-gdp accessed 25.07.09) , whilst Rwanda’s own government policy puts aid as 21% of GDP (See ‘Development of the Government of Rwanda aid policy’ (Government of Rwanda, 2006)) 14 Jeffrey Sachs ‘Aid Ironies’ in Huffington Post 24.05.09 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-sachs/aid-ironies_b_207181.html accessed 25.07.09)15 See ‘Development of the Government of Rwanda aid policy’ (Government of Rwanda, 2006)

provoke government spending in conjunction with other neoliberal

economic processes such as privatization and removal of barriers to trade,

socioeconomic development will follow in the shortest possible space of

time16. It is in the climate created by this paradigm that Rwanda and many

nations like it have been able to access increasing sums of aid,

purportedly for development projects but too often misappropriated to

fund conflict or the lifestyles of corrupt officials. Recently, several

controversial texts have been published from perhaps surprising sources

which are adding to the growing clamour that aid to Africa, in fact, causes

more damage than good. Ex-World Bank economist Robert Calderisi, for

instance, argues that the root cause of African underdevelopment and

economic exceptionalism is misgovernance. In ‘The Trouble with Africa’,

he advocates forcing greater transparency on recipient governments at

the same time as an instantaneous 50% reduction in aid. Arguing that

only five African countries have demonstrated any real improvement as a

result of aid and therefore are the only ones who should continue to be

supported17 and also rebuking the influence of colonialism on the present

day, Calderisi blames corruption and lack of accountable governance for

Africa’s devastated economies and believes donors should cease support,

16 For an academic discussion of this see, for example, any of Jeffrey Sach’s texts, particularly ‘The End of Poverty’ (Penguin 2005). For policy responses to this theory, see ‘Our Common Interest: The Report of the Commission for Africa’ (2005) which continues the ‘aid as a panacea’ tack which is also promoted by a range of international humanitarian organizations, the well-known ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign and the IMF and World Bank. Critiques of the ‘holy triumvirate’ of aid, trade and debt relief are abundant, with a multitude of academics on the left arguing that these neoliberal measures are ultimately a means of deepening the incorporation of developing countries into the global capitalist economic system on unequal terms. Excellent examples of this viewpoint with specific reference to Africa can be found in Bond ‘Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation’ (Zed books 2006) and Bush ‘Poverty and Neoliberalism: Persistence and Reproduction in the Global South’ (Pluto 2007). 17 Rwanda is not one of Calderisi’s five countries. They are Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana and Mali. Calderisi somewhat tenuously argues that better governance is the reason for their success, arguing that issues of corruption and conflict can effectively be cast aside in these cases because of their economic performance.

a minimal amount of which reaches its intended targets in any case.18 In

‘The Trouble with Aid: Why Less could mean More for Africa’, Christian

Aid’s Jonathan Glennie delivers an argument that has broadly similar

conclusions to Calderisi; Less Aid is required and needs to be targeted in a

more accountable manner.19

Most recently, renowned Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo has

published a bestseller which calls for all aid to be removed within 5 years.

In ‘Dead Aid’, Moyo argues that high-level governmental aid has resulted

in dependency, corruption, further poor governance and the reproduction

of extreme and widespread poverty20. The fact that Moyo and Calderisi are

both respected pro-market neoliberal economists bursting with credentials

and direct experience of Africa makes their mutual rebuttal of current aid

policy more surprising, more creditworthy and more interesting for

policymakers in governments who don’t like to hear that their money may

not be having the desired effect or that their policies could be failing.

Perhaps it is still too early to say whether this represents a turning point in

aid policy, but a furious debate is certainly underway and attitudes

towards aid are changing and moving toward a search for other solutions.

For governments such as Rwanda’s that has a development strategy

which, as demonstrated above is wholly reliant on aid, any international

movements towards a reduction or cessation of aid represent a concern

and require a response.

18 See Calderisi ‘The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working’ (Yale 2007). Calderisi’s policy prescriptions make up Part IV, chapters 12 and 13 whilst his scathing criticisms of African governance are found throughout but summarized in Part 1, particularly Chapter 1. 19 See Glennie ‘ The Trouble with Aid: Why Less Could Mean more for Africa’ (Zed Books 2008)20 See Moyo ‘Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa’ (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux 2009). Moyo is at pains to distinguish between governmental assistance and humanitarianism and/or emergency aid which a) dwindles in comparison and b) is reacting to a crisis, not planning for development.

Interestingly, Kagame recently invited Moyo to Kigali to discuss

ways in which her recommendations could be implemented to help

Rwanda achieve aid independence. His support for Moyo’s ideas show a

recognition of the necessity of the need for economic independence, but

also a recognition of the very real possibility that this theoretical

perspective on aid could soon become reality and constitutes an

admission that a solution must be found as the cessation of foreign aid

will threaten Kagame’s project and stability in Rwanda21.

The Role of Tolerance

The discussion of the importance of international assistance as a

vehicle for the preservation of stability and security in Rwanda now moves

to consider the role of ‘Tolerance.’ This is to be defined as extra-financial,

public or implicit support for Kagame, and can also include inaction.

‘Tolerating’ Kagame implies that international allies will disagree with

aspects of government policy and may find certain actions incompatible

with their own policy, but continue to support Kagame for other reasons,

examples of which will be discussed below. ‘Tolerating’ something also

implies that some force is being withheld, which could have negative or

destructive consequences if tolerance ends. In this case, the argument is

21 See Paul Kagame ‘Africa has to find its own road to prosperity’ in Financial Times 07.05.09 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0d1218c8-3b35-11de-ba91-00144 accessed 26.07.09). Sach’s article referenced above also contains a virulent criticism of both Kagame and Moyo.

that the donors examined (the US and the UK), tolerate repressive,

divisive and authoritarian domestic policies in Rwanda and

interventionism regionally. This tolerance is based on a desire for a need

for African role models to display to their electorates that expensive aid

policies in the region are having some effect and also because of a sense

of guilt stemming from the sickening inaction during the genocide. This

discussion shows that tolerance is another facet of aid, the consequences

of its removal being again detrimental to Kagame’s project and Rwanda’s

internal security.

Recognising a link between Conflict, Security and Development is a

fundamental found throughout DFID’s policy documents. On its website,

DFID has a wide range of development goals which it seeks to achieve but

for the purpose of this argument let us consider the following statements:

‘’ Long-term, sustainable peace depends on a number of factors: a

political settlement that includes all groups and regions of a country; a

government that is representative of the population, is able to provide

security and justice for all, regardless of their status, ethnicity or religion,

and can ensure that the basic needs of all the population - for a decent

living, healthcare and education - are met.22

Whilst what DFID describes can be seen as effectively a utopia that

exists in few places on earth, it is also a model, an ideal that it seeks to

use its resources and political influence to move toward for the benefit of

22 DFID ‘Building Peace’ (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Global-Issues/How-we-fight-Poverty/Conflict-and-Security/Building-peace/ accessed 26.07.09)

the countries that it works with. Elsewhere on the website, DFID claims

that:

‘’ Poor governance is a cause of poverty. People suffer when

governments don’t allow participation in political life, provide access to

justice, deliver adequate public services or control corruption23.

USAID has a similar, if slightly less stringent set of conditions for

African partners:

‘’ U.S. foreign assistance supports the overall goal of

transformational diplomacy: to help build sustained and well-governed

states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread

poverty, and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.

USAID assistance to Africa works to help African

governments...incorporate good governance principles and innovative

approaches to health, education, economic growth, agriculture, and the

environment24.’’

Paul Kagame has presided over an era of greatly enhanced

economic performance in Rwanda and his policy of allying with the US and

UK has improved its international relations. But in light of the statements

above it should be pointed out that he is first and foremost a military

23 DFID Rwanda: Major Challenges (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-West--Central/Rwanda/Major-challenges/ accessed 26.07.09) 24 USAID in Sub-Saharan Africa (http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/ accessed 26.07.09 emphasis added)

leader. Kagame stood virtually unopposed in two presidential elections

most recently obtaining 95% of the vote, which was not accepted by his

Hutu opponent and has been described as ‘not free and fair.25 This type of

election result generally warrants international suspicion and often

condemnation but in the case of Rwanda donors were much more

diplomatic in their response26. This would therefore imply that DFID is

contravening its policy supporting a government that may not be elected

and representative.

Continuing to examine how the excerpt of DFID policy applies to

Rwanda we can see that the Tutsi ethnic group constitutes around 15% of

Rwanda’s population, with Hutu accompanying for the 85% majority.

Kagame’s cabinets have been based around political appointments and

contain very few Hutus. This cannot be described as ethnically

representative. In internal politics there are widespread concerns

surrounding justice and the gacaca court system set up to deal with the

vast amount of genocide suspects which human rights groups argue is

open to manipulation and score-settling in villages and can often deliver

unfair verdicts.27Kagame is consistently accused of not allowing free press

and of maintaining a widespread and secretive domestic intelligence

network, two hallmarks of repressive authoritarianism. Various groups

criticise the one-sided (ethnic) nature of justice systems. A widespread 25 See BBC News ‘Rwandan poll not entirely fair’ 27.08.03 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3183051.stm accessed 26.07.09)26 Reyntjens explores the manner in which the election was ‘supervised’ by RPF elements, the complexity of the registration system and the use of fingerprints which removes anonymity and therefore makes votes against the RPF traceable. One only needs to think of the international uproar provoked by accusations of election rigging in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya and Iran. But when similar accusations are levelled at UK recipient countries such as Rwanda, Uganda or Zambia the response seems to differ greatly. See ‘Rwanda Ten Years On: From Genocide to dictatorship’ in African Affairs 103 (2004) p177-210.27 See, for example, Amnesty International ‘Prisoner of Conscience: Francois-Xavier Byumba (http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/rwanda/page.do?id=1011229 accessed 26.07.09.)

grievance amongst the Hutu population is that RPF revenge killing

campaigns after the genocide have never been dealt with publically or

satisfactorily. There are arbitrary arrests and detentions, even

disappearances are common and Freedom House has reported a

‘downward trend’ in respect for civil liberties. Reporters without Borders

rates Rwanda as the fourth-worst country on earth for press freedom.28

The 2008 UN Development report places Rwanda below a large majority

of African countries in terms of GINI index, which measures social

inequality.29

Regionally, Rwanda has been accused of natural resource

exploitation on an industrial scale in Eastern DRC, sponsoring proxy Tutsi

militia, playing a role in overthrowing the government of DRC and aiding

resistance movements in Uganda and Sudan30. Clearly this cannot be

reconciled with USAID’s criterion of responsible conduct in the

international system. As detailed above, DFID and USAID continue to

increase financial support for Rwanda in direct opposition to their stated

policy. Therefore it can be concluded that the US and the UK exercise a

tolerance of Kagame’s activities. As tolerance is directly related to the

provision of aid, it is also a facilitating factor for the activities of the

government. The discussion now considers briefly why this tolerance is

applied in order to argue that it is possible that it could be removed and

that this removal could also have a detrimental effect on sustainable

security in Rwanda.

28 Kinzer p32829 UN Human Development Report 2007/8 (UNDP 2008 available online at www.undp.org accessed 26.07.09.) 30 This dissertation focuses mainly on internal issues in Rwanda, and largely discounts the Rwanda-DRC relationship. This is for reasons of focus, clarity and economy. Recommended reading on Rwanda and the DRC is mentioned in reference 4.

The Fragility of Aid

There are several reasons that the US and UK would continue to

contravene their declared criteria for financial and political support in the

case of Rwanda. Some of these are unique to the country, and some are

not. The UK government, for example, spent £5.3bn on aid in 2007/831. As

a growing amount of humanitarian organisations, pressure groups and the

public become more frustrated about the perceived inertia in Sub-Saharan

African development, governments need to increasingly be able to justify

why expensive aid policies have a positive effect. This is going to be put

under increasing scrutiny as the global economic downturn becomes a

greater factor, and with a strongly-placed Conservative opposition on the

record as saying it will increase caveats on aid such as more transparency

and accountability, DFID is in need of examples to continue its mandate32.

This is where Kagame and his economic resurgence based on aid steps in.

DFID needs models like Kagame and Rwanda to show that aid programs

can be effective and it is willing to overlook some of the ‘flaws’ in

Kagame’s style of governance in order to achieve this. However, this

contradiction cannot be permanent and with a Conservative government

31 DFID ’Who we are and what we do’ (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/About-DFID/Quick-guide-to-DFID/Who-we-are-and-what-we-do/ accessed 27.07.09)32See http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/International_Development.aspx for details of introducing a watchdog on DFID and other conditionalities, despite stating that aid will also increase. Also see BBC News ‘Cameron Defends Foreign Aid Plan’ 13.07.09 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8147024.stm accessed 27.07.09)

pledging to introduce a watchdog for DFID expenditure and introduce

measures that will tie large amounts of aid to governments working with

indigenous NGOs, DFID’s aid relationship with Rwanda is subject to

change.

There is the idea that the US, UK and other countries continue to

support Rwanda, ‘no questions asked’, because of guilt stemming from

the inaction during the genocide. The US government was one of the most

evasive when pressed to take action in 1994, refusing to use the word

‘genocide’ as this creates a legal duty to intervene militarily. The UK

ambassador to the UN was instrumental in delaying action being taken.

Although they sent peacekeeping troops, Belgium and the Netherlands

were quick to withdraw them. It is widely accepted that these acts amount

to complicity and unconditional aid to Rwanda can perhaps be seen as an

admission of this.33Again, this is not a permanent arrangement. Concerns

about Rwanda’s growing authoritarianism and militarism regionally will

become more important to donors who are, as detailed above, keen to be

seen to be rewarding good governance and democracy and discouraging

dictators and conflicts. Indeed, the Netherlands set a precedent for this

very viewpoint last year by withdrawing financial support to Rwanda in

light of the UN allegations surrounding mining in the DRC, as well as

33 Tolerance is what Reyntjens has called ‘The Genocide Credit’ and his similar idea can be examined in ‘Rwanda Ten Years On: From Genocide to dictatorship’ in African Affairs 103 (2004) p177-210. The idea that Rwanda is tolerated or somehow exceptional has also been explored by Van Leeuwen who argues that ‘Rwanda has succeeded in promoting a ‘narrative of difference.’ See M. van Leeuwen, ‘Rwanda’s Imidugudu programme and earlier experiences with villagisation and resettlement in East Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 39 (2001),pp. 623–44.For more details on specific country roles see Melvern (2009). For articles arguing that donor tolerance is motivated by guilt see, for example, Declan Walsh ‘Exploiting our Guilt over Rwanda’s Genocide’ in The Independent 07.04.09 (http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/declan-walsh-exploiting-our-guilt-over-rwandas-genocide-559156.html) accessed 27.07.09 or The Economist ‘Rwanda: A Flawed Hero’ 21.08.08 (http://www.economist.com/books/displaystory.cfm?STORY_ID=11959125) accessed 27.07.09

domestic governance concerns.34In 2000, the Bush administration

threatened to withdraw its support for IMF aid to Rwanda unless it

withdrew its troops from the DRC. Kagame subsequently agreed to this

demand with the qualification that Rwanda would reserve the right to

invade again if Hutu militia threatened its security. IMF aid was granted as

well as a $1.4bn debt write-off under the HIPC initiative35. This shows that

while donors tolerate actions such as Kagame’s threats or chiding, the

withdrawal of aid and tolerance is not without precedent and the

argument is that further tensions will arise as international politics moves

on from the genocide.

This chapter has shown that Rwanda is dependent on aid and

tolerance to continue with its ambitious project to lift itself out of poverty

within a generation. It has shown that this assistance contradicts some

donor policy, but continues in spite of this. It has also shown that this

assistance is fragile, affected by potential changes in theoretical

approaches to and debates surrounding aid as well as more stringent

monitoring of where aid goes. Finally it has displayed how there are

precedents for the cessation of aid to Rwanda. Larger-scale cessation by

the UK, for example, would undoubtedly contribute towards economic and

political instability in the country and would have a consequent effect on

security in Rwanda; therefore security is not considered sustainable whilst

stability is reliant in a large part on international aid.

34 See, for example, The Independent “Rwanda seeks alternative to Aid’ 15.01.09 (http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/news/regional-news/471-rwanda-seeks-alternatives-to-aid) accessed 27.07.09. Sweden followed suit suspending all aid to Rwanda over the same concerns. This move prompted scorn and condemnation from Kagame who galvanised his public statements regarding the goal of aid independence. 35 See http://www.javno.com/en-world/sweden-halts-usd15-mln-aid-to-rwanda-over-un-charge_215890 accessed 27.07.09

As a postscript to the chapter, it is worth briefly looking at Kagame’s

attitude. This dissertation is not designed to be a total attack on Kagame’s

administration. There are arguably valid reasons for many of the

authoritarian tendencies described and this will be considered later, and

in the aftermath of the genocide with comparatively little international

assistance the policies and vision of Kagame have meant that Rwanda has

been able to achieve quite exceptional progress in comparison to other

post-conflict states, say Somalia or Sierra Leone.36

Paul Kagame is unusual amongst African leaders in the sense that

he has repeatedly called for aid to be reduced and alternative forms of

income to be sourced. “Aid is bad as it is. It is something they will give

you when they want and take away when they don’t want to give it to

you.37” This attitude comes from a distrust of the international community

after the genocide and from personal traits as a military leader who is

used to being in control, has struggled for independence and dislikes

operating in a climate of external constraint or insecurity38. In a bid to

improve entrepreneurship and investment in Rwanda and move away

from aid dependence, Kagame can often be found in the US courting

support from influential Christian groups and International Corporations

alike. Kagame sends fact-finding missions to Asian Tiger economies in the

search for transferable policy, and he keeps personal friendships with

influential people such as Tony Blair, Rick Warren, Google CEO Eric

36 One of Kagame’s most vitriolic criticisms of the UN was that most aid went to Hutu refugees, in camps which housed the remnants of the génocidaires after the RPF seized power, and not to the government to rebuild the country. Rwanda is considered one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies. 37 See The Independent “Rwanda seeks alternative to Aid’ 15.01.09 (http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/news/regional-news/471-rwanda-seeks-alternatives-to-aid) accessed 27.07.0938 See Kagame ‘Africa has to find its own road to prosperity’ in Financial Times

Schmidt, Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz and Costco CEO Jim Sinegal39. In

fact, Schultz has recently reached a deal whereby his corporation will

commit to purchasing a majority of Rwanda’s coffee crop as part of its

fair-trade initiative and has set up a $250,000 resource centre in

Kigali.40Rwanda’s dependence on aid could, therefore, possibly be partially

reduced as a consequence of these dealings and they certainly feed into

Kagame’s strategy of aid reduction. For the time being, however, Rwanda

remains heavily dependent on international support despite these

developments and it should also be noted that non-extractive industries

such as Starbucks or Google require a climate of security to facilitate

investment. Kagame is selling Rwanda to these organisations as an

example of positive transformation and of African renaissance. As detailed

above, this idea is nonetheless strongly related to the politics of aid and

tolerance.

39 See Kinzer chapter 17 and Jeff Chu ‘Rwanda Rising: A New Model of Economic Development’ on fastcompany.com 18.03.09 (http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/134/special-report-rwanda-rising.html?page=0%2C2 accessed 27.07.09)40 See Tim Adams ‘Starbucks founder spreads gospel of hope in Rwanda’ The Guardian 19.07.09 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/19/starbucks-howard-schultz-fairtrade) accessed 27.07.09.

Chapter Two

Only Rwandans: The Personality Cult and the Reformation of

a Tutsi Elite

This second chapter moves the focus of the dissertation to discuss

authoritarian tendencies considered earlier more fully. It examines the

extent to which Rwanda’s resurgence under Kagame is dependent on

Kagame himself and asks questions relating to the extent of the

centralisation of power in terms of government, intelligence, the military,

media and commerce in the hands of a new Tutsi elite personally loyal to

Kagame. Drawing on theoretical arguments which critique authoritarian

responses to armed conflict, the chapter assesses the sustainability of a

security environment that has been created through the leadership of a

small group of stakeholders loyal to the vision of an individual. After

reflecting on post-genocide Tutsi consciousness and its role in Kagame’s

politics, the chapter considers reasons why this centralised reconstruction

is both necessary and problematic before evaluating its sustainability. The

chapter concludes by arguing that certain actions must be taken

regarding processes of representation, inclusion and peaceable dissent in

order to diffuse the build-up of grievances which can lead to renewed

conflict and/or further repression both of which are detrimental to

security. The dissertation then moves into an extended conclusion which

critiques the record of visionary militant revolutionaries in contemporary

African conflict and raises questions about whether the examples of these

figures can be related to the Rwandan scenario, before raising further

questions and identifying areas for continued research.

Kagame, a Rebel Leader

This first section of the chapter briefly looks at the events in

Kagame’s career prior to government which can be seen to have formed

his authoritarian outlook and his motivation to reconstruct Rwanda in this

manner. It discusses the idea of a Tutsi consciousness with reference to

the work of Mamdani and examines the influence of a discourse of

persecution and the desire to establish a homeland on the actions of

Kagame and the RPF. The chapter then moves to analyse how these

beliefs have subsequently been implemented in the policies of the RPF

government and its response to genocide. It shows that these policies

have led to a reproduction of ethnic division, grievance and a state of

inequality which runs parallel to the economic resurgence and

stabilisation of the society. Displaying that this centralised system is

effectively built on the strong, authoritarian leadership of the individual,

the chapter then questions the efficacy of this as a long-term solution in

relation to sustainable security in Rwanda whilst considering why

authoritarianism is simultaneously problematic and, perhaps, necessary.

After escaping the anti-Tutsi violence in 1959 as a child, Kagame

became one of the many Rwandan refugees who settled in camps in

Uganda. Treated like second-class citizens and exiled from their

homeland, a sense of loss and of resentment developed which was fuelled

by the failure of early Tutsi attempts to reinvade Rwanda and was built

upon the myth creation of the homeland and a homecoming which

gloamed throughout the squalid camps.41 Paul Kagame was among a

group of disaffected Rwandan youth who went on to join Yoweri

Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, receiving military

training and taking part in the successful 1986 rebellion in which the NRA

overthrew the dictatorship of Milton Obote. Museveni rewarded Kagame

and his Rwandan counterparts with high-level positions in the NRA, which

Kagame was later to exploit for further training in the US and, eventually,

for using NRA resources to fuel the abortive 1990 RPF invasion. Close ties

with Museveni meant that the Ugandan leader also tolerated the presence

of Kagame’s rebel army and allowed free flow of arms, resources and

manpower between Uganda and Kagame’s enclave in the months and

years preceding the eventual RPF takeover. In his biography of Kagame,

Kinzer shows how a sense of persecution and alienation manifested

themselves in the young Kagame in malevolence and a distrust of others.

During military training in the Ugandan bush, Kagame was often sent on

lengthy solo reconnaissance missions and later drew on the skills he had

developed to clandestinely enter Rwanda alone and examine the country

41 For a discussion of Kagame’s early life in Ugandan IDP camps and the effect of the power of myth on the exiled youth see both Kinzer chapter 2 and Mamdani ‘When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda’ (James Currey 2001.)

from the inside. Kinzer believes that these experiences, in conjunction

with a lifelong sense of injustice and the competitive discipline that comes

from being a military practitioner who has spent most of his career living

with the hardships of a guerrilla lifestyle, have formed Kagame’s thought.

This is arguably reflected in discourses of self-reliance and attitudes

towards leadership, social discipline and crime and punishment that

permeate Rwandan government today. 42

As an ethnic Tutsi who grew up with enduring memories of

communal violence and racism, Kagame is driven by what Mamdani has

called ‘Victor’s Justice.’ In ‘When Victims become Killers’, he argues that

Tutsis have been consistently branded an ‘alien settler race’ throughout

colonial transformation, and this ‘race branding’ allowed the other ethnic

group to set the Tutsi apart and exterminate them with a clear

conscience, seeing themselves as ‘sons and daughters of the soil…their

mission is one of clearing the soil of a threatening and alien presence.43’

He argues that ‘Victor’s Justice’ is the mentality that has developed in

Tutsi and in Kagame that believes that Tutsi must have power and their

own state in order to survive, the welfare of Tutsi must be paramount,

armed peace is the only viable peace and the doctrine of ‘Never Again’

legitimates any action for the perseverance of Tutsi power, including

repression, ethnism and authoritarianism. Mamdani and other writers

have interestingly compared this mentality to Israeli Zionism, arguing that

the myths of a homecoming, the discourse of persecution, the perceived

international exclusion, the suffering of genocide, the diasporic nature of

42 See Kinzer chp 643 Mamdani p13

the ethnic group and the creation of a militaristic state on the ashes of

this violence are common to both experiences44.

The difference, however, comes in from the fact that following the

holocaust, the Jews were relocated in Israel, away from the perpetrators of

their genocide but no divorce of Hutu and Tutsi has taken place. It is this

fact, in combination with ‘Victor’s Justice’ that leads Mamdani to conclude

that a resurgence of ethnic conflict is likely or in other words that the

security situation is not sustainable45. This is echoed by former President

Pasteur Bizimungu, whose abdication paved the way for Kagame’s

accession to President in circumstances that have been seen as a forced

abdication from the real power behind the scenes, and which signified the

end of the ‘multi-ethnic’ experiment in the aftermath of the

genocide.46Bizimungu, a preacher and moderate Hutu installed as

President by the RPF after the genocide and designed to act as a unifying

figurehead argued from his Kagame-imposed house arrest in 1999 that;

‘We are convinced that if the current state of affairs continues the

Hutus will prepare for war and in 15 or 20 years they will have driven out

the Tutsi with all the foreseeable consequences that this would entail.

Mechanisms need to be set up so that each community can genuinely

participate in the government, until we have forged a national identity

44 This paragraph draws on the argument from Mamdani p271-3. See also Waugh p97-99 who, perhaps sarcastically, also remarks that Kagame renamed Rwanda’s Army ‘Rwandan Defence Force’, echoing Israel’s IDF. 45 Mamdani p27246 See Waugh p153

that transcends the Hutu-Tutsi divisions. If the situation does not change,

the only possible outcome is violence. The War of 1990 is not over.47’

Kagame, an Authoritarian Leader

Continuing with Mamdani’s thought; the central problem Kagame

was faced with following the RPF’s seizure of power was how to

‘incorporate a guilty majority with a fearful and aggrieved minority.’ The

Tutsi demand justice, the Hutu want democracy. Due to their minority

status and the nature of ‘Victor’s Justice’ discussed above, Tutsi were

immediately inclined to see a democratic transition as threat, rather than

‘a form of improvement.48’In order to prevent a repeat of the 1994

disaster, Kagame was therefore motivated to centralize power within RPF

ranks and those that could be trusted, which effectively would result in

the retention of power and influence within a new Tutsi elite with token

Hutu moderates such as Bizimungu in place to maintain a perception of a

post-ethnic revolution. How, then, was power centralized within this elite

and was this a necessary action in order to stabilize and to create and

preserve security?

‘’While it officially rejected ethnic discrimination and even the notion

of ethnicity, the RPF rapidly reserved access to power, wealth and

47 Quoted from Waugh p15548 Mamdani p280

knowledge to Tutsi. The only exception was the Cabinet, where a number

of Hutu served as ministers in order to give a symbolic expression of

national unity. The RPF vigorously and categorically denied any ethnic

factor, a denial which was an essential element of the hegemonic

strategies of small Tutsi élites, such as that powerful in Rwanda during the

1950s and in Burundi between 1965 and 1988… this ‘Tutsization’, which

was also a means of consolidating the hold of the RPF on the system, was

quite spectacular at most levels of the state: by 1996, the majority of MPs,

four of the six Supreme Court presiding judges, over 80 percent of

mayors, most permanent secretaries and university teachers and

students, almost the entire army command structure and the intelligence

services were Tutsi.49’’

Reyntjens argues that creeping authoritarianism has occurred in

Rwanda throughout the post-genocide period. He cites incidents such as

two mass exoduses of previous RPF supporters in 1995 and 2000, mainly

complaining that the RPF has banned political parties and used the tag of

‘divisionism’ to criminalize dissent. The staff of Imboni newspaper, in the

first issue from exile sarcastically ‘apologized’ for ‘having publicly

expressed our indignation at the spirit of sycophancy, the deliberate

process of impoverishment of society and public opinion to vassaldom.50’

In 2007, International Crisis Group stated that the political parties that

49 Reyntjens (2004) p187 and p188 50 Ibid p184

exist today in Rwanda are only tolerated if they agree not to question the

definition of political life drawn up by the RPF.51’

During the reconstruction process, Kagame was quick to identify the

ethnic divisions of the past as a cause of the violence and the government

outlawed ‘divisionism’, which included using ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ as means

of identification and campaigning that was based on or played on ethnicity

but the term also came to incorporate further actions such as denial or

questioning of genocide, or any actions that could detract from stability

including any criticism of government policies. Bradol & Guibert argue

that ‘political discourse opposed to ethnism attempts to hide the

domination of society by the self-proclaimed representatives of the Tutsi

community’ and therefore whilst ‘the elimination of ethnicity is a

worthwhile goal, shared by many Rwandans, the cynical manipulation of

this objective as a tool for the monopolization of power in the hands of a

small group is something quite different.52’

What it constitutes is a classic strategy of authoritarian governance.

Whilst alluding towards democratic reforms and participation to placate

mass rebellion, dissent is increasingly restricted and punished through the

creation of crimes ostensibly designed to portray the perpetrator as linked

to the widely-despised previous regime or its ideology but surreptitiously,

the regime uses the elastic definition of sedition to deal with obstacles to

the reinforcement of its hegemony and ideology and the reproduction of

its own power. The regime then can restrict and discredit opponents to

51 International Crisis Group, ‘Consensual Democracy’ in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluatingthe March 2001 district elections (October 2001), p. 35.

52 Bradol & Guibert cited in Reyntjens.

the extent that a viable alternative cannot possibly exist which, in turn,

deepens the authoritarian system.53

In the case of Rwanda, Reyntjens sees the fear of a ‘Burundi

Syndrome’, in which large-scale manipulation of the political process and

rigging of elections is seen as necessary by the minority Tutsi to protect

against the danger that the predominantly Hutu electorate could refuse to

vote with the government, however unlikely. Therefore, the move to

include high profile Hutus in cabinet in conjunction with the manner in

which the electoral process was manipulated is seen as a mechanism for

the centralization of power within the Tutsi elite loyal to Kagame. An overt

politics of ethnicity and repression could be met with widespread rebellion

in a society still riddled with related grievances, therefore Kagame the

ruler saw it necessary to criminalize divisionism and be seen to create a

post-ethnic society at the same time as using these policies to effectively

do the opposite, centralizing power in a loyal, ethnocentric and all-

powerful elite54.

Kagame, the ‘Strongman’

Kagame’s argument is that restriction of opposition is necessary in

an environment in which security and stability are still being formed. A

53 For a useful discussion of how authoritarianism works see, for example, Vestal ‘Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War State’ (Greenwood 1999) 54 Further discussion can be found in Reyntjens (2004), Lemarchand ‘The Politics of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda’ in Clark (ed) 2008 or The Economist ‘A Flawed Hero’ 21.08.08.

strong military and intelligence network is essential in order to protect the

state against domestic and foreign belligerents, of which there are

numerous examples. In the economic sense, Kagame also subscribes to

the theory that authoritarian governments have a history of delivering

economic progress, reflected in his strong interest in the Asian ‘Tiger’

economies in which much of the population has arguably accepted an

authoritarian reduction in civil liberties in return for improvements in

living conditions with the assumption that participation can follow once

stability, then prosperity have been achieved. It is in the confluence of

threat and opportunity that Kagame and the RPF seem to be arguing that

an authoritarian response to the genocide can be validated. It ‘makes

sense’ that a military leader who has ostensibly fought to liberate the

Tutsi from genocide should play a central role in the reconstruction effort,

as if it something that is ‘earned.’ A breakdown in security and stability

linked, in one way, to ethnic categorization of society must be resolved

through focusing on regaining control, instilling a narrative of

reconciliation, post-ethnicity, nationalism and progress.

Therefore, debate surrounding democratization, government policy,

Tutsization, military interventions, discrimination and justice are all

dismissed as detracting from socioeconomic progress. It is this obsession

with securitization, self-reliance and progress combined with the

personality described above that wields immense power yet feels

threatened and persecuted that creates the conditions for the politics of

authoritarianism in Rwanda.

Having detailed some examples of the authoritarian nature of the

regime in Rwanda and used both pro and anti-Kagame sources to explain

why this was deemed the correct response it is also essential to

summarize a critique of the alternative avenue that this authoritarian

system could take in the future. Criticisms of authoritarianism tend to also

be endorsements of democratization. An abundance of literature argues

that liberal democracy is the only progressive form of governance as the

repression of individual rights in order to achieve collective goals neglects

the immediate and egocentric instincts of the human being55 or, again, as

DFID phrases it (ironically on its Rwanda homepage), ‘People suffer when

governments don’t allow participation in political life, provide access to

justice, deliver adequate public services or control corruption.’56

Critics of authoritarian regimes point towards a multitude of socio-

economic reasons why autocracy is damaging for societies. These include

studies finding, variously, poorer indicators of health, life expectancy,

education, nutrition and happiness in autocracies. In his studies on

famine, Sen has argued that famine, and certain other humanitarian

catastrophes are avoidable and tend not to occur in systems that involve

democratic participation and representation.57

55 The most famous example of this viewpoint is Fukuyama ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ (Penguin 1993). Written in the aftermath of the collapse of authoritarian communist regimes after the Cold War, Fukuyama delivers a detailed and widely criticised eulogy of authoritarianism, arguing that liberal democracy is the only system of governance that can incorporate individual instincts towards competition and fulfilling potential, and that authoritarianism is likely to be fully and globally discredited in the 21st century. The Kantian theory of democratic peace, on which Fukuyama builds much of his theory has been explored empirically notably by Hegre et al in ‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace: Democracy, Political Change and Civil War’ (Cambridge 2002) in which they find that authoritarian regimes are more likely to cause interstate and civil wars and with higher casualty rates. 56 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-West--Central/Rwanda/Major-challenges/ accessed 14.08.0957 See, for example, Sen ‘Development as Freedom’ (Oxford 2004)

Authoritarian regimes repress political freedom by their nature, but

this also manifests in higher potential for state-sponsored violent

repression, the legitimization of violence and the current buzz-word;

‘state-sponsored terrorism.’ By removing grounds for debate,

disagreement, participation and individual expression of discontent in

government, authoritarianism manufactures political grievance.

Theoretically, if mass grievances are left unaddressed and are allowed to

become organized or worse still, militarized, the effects on regime

survival, security and stability in the state can become highly

destructive.58

Applying this outlook to Kagame’s Rwanda provokes thoughts. In

terms of development indicators, Rwanda is progressing better than most

of the states in the region and has shown improvements in economic

performance, healthcare, education, gender equality and combating

pandemic diseases as well as the obvious decrease in violence and crime.

While it still has many problems and a long way to go, there is unlikely to

be a humanitarian crisis such as a famine under the current

administration, particularly if Kagame’s anti-corruption drive, nation-

building and financial projects continue apace.

Unless there is renewed conflict. Kagame’s belligerence has found

him new enemies to join the French and the génocidaires who wait in

exile. Kagame has broken from his alliance with Museveni over the DRC.

Despite recent co-operation, the government in Kinshasa continues to

58 On State Collapse, see Zartman ‘Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority’ (Lynne Rienner 1995). This theory is widely employed by exponents of the democratisation agenda as evidence that authoritarian regimes in Africa should not be funded as, statistically, they increase the likelihood of conflict. For a discussion of this see Collier et al ‘Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy’ (World Bank 2003).

deliberately obfuscate the location of FDLR commanders. A growing

amount of disaffected young Hutus flee to the DRC to join the FDLR, who

claim to have 20,000 men under arms, or other exiled rebel groups.

Domestically, the twin exoduses of members of his own cabinet have

diminished Kagame’s ability to portray his government as a post-ethnic,

inclusive, participatory force and the voices of those who have joined the

diaspora are added to a clamor of grievance. It has also stripped away

much of the pretence that Kagame was not the central powerbroker in the

cabinet, which has heightened the perception, falsely or not, that Rwanda

is another African country being run according to the direction of a

‘Strongman.’ Dissenting voices are repressed but still prevalent. One must

only consider the run-up to the previous elections in which all manners of

parties attempted to challenge Kagame running on platforms of, to quote

one manifesto ‘mobilizing the Rwandan people of all ethnic groups to put

an end to the autocratic regime of President Paul Kagame.59Another party,

the ADRN, threatened ‘‘…the armed forces of the political-military

organizations shall all be put at the disposal of the Alliance for the

accomplishment of its mission60, referring to its willingness to exploit its

links to the FDLR army and therefore claiming a military capacity, if its

campaign was restricted by the RPF. Kagame still retains a firm hold on

power, dictatorially or not, but these are worrying developments and

theory and experience tell us that despite socio-economic performance,

authoritarianism in Sub-Saharan Africa has a history of failing to deliver

what it promises as, ultimately, it regularly has a destructive effect on

59 Reyntjens (2004) p192.60 Ibid

long-term sustainable security and stability. The following conclusion

looks briefly at some other cases that this theory can be applied to before

remarking on what can be drawn from the two chapters, revisiting the

hypothesis and identifying some areas for further investigation.

Conclusion: Kagame in a Regional Context

There are many examples of authoritarian strongmen coming to

power following successful insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst their

reasons for fighting have been different, the events following their

accession to power often bear similarities. The purpose of the following

remarks is to situate Rwanda within the context of the experience of some

of its neighboring countries in order to more fully address the hypothesis

of this dissertation. A good starting point is Rwanda’s neighbor ran by

Kagame’s historical ally. Similarities within the Ugandan scenario include

a history of recurrent conflict in the post-colonial period, and an

incumbent government which seized power through a guerilla insurgency

run from the bush. After winning control some 23 years ago, Museveni laid

out a vision of a ‘No-Party state’ as a means to reduce the ethnic discord

that had led to conflict, as part of a wider development strategy that was

generally praised and lavishly funded by Western donor organizations.

Until the early part of this decade, the NRM government was widely

credited as an African example of good governance. However, Museveni’s

no-party state has been criticized as a means of outlawing political

opposition in a manner that echoes Kagame’s ‘divisionism.’ Northern

Uganda has one of the most acute humanitarian crises on earth, the result

of decades of brutal insurgency and ethnically based violence. It is

generally accepted that the national bias towards the Buganda region,

where Museveni originates from and draws his political constituency, has

resulted in a localized increase in prosperity that Museveni can use to

appease the donors on whom he remains dependent at the same time as

preventing opposition from other ethnic groups consolidating due to

chronic impoverishment and through his use of clientelism and patronage

systems for redistributing international assistance. Again echoing Rwanda,

the West largely ignores this domestic discrimination, inability to resolve

low level conflict despite massive amounts of military assistance,

reformation of an elite loyal to the Presidency and regional

interventionism and looting in the DRC as Uganda can point to adherence

to neoliberal structural adjustment programs and improvements in various

development indicators61.

Like Kagame, Museveni pledged to increase prosperity and embark

upon a nation-building exercise that would free Uganda from ethnic

conflict and impoverishment but has continued to reproduce corruption,

grievance and aid dependence through his policies. Internal conflicts

continue in the North and East and dissent is increasing in the country.

The NRM has not been able to bring security and stability to the entire

country and Uganda remains a non-hegemonic state with security forces

personally loyal to the Presidency. Museveni’s regime has survived for so

long due to his strategy of pandering to one region of the country whilst

courting massive donor support. These two options are unavailable to

Kagame unless he alters his ‘vision’, the argument being that if he

61 See, for example Allen ‘Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army’ (Zed Books 2006) chapter 2, Mwenda ‘Foreign Aid and the weakening of Democratic Accountability in Uganda’ (Cato Institute Policy Briefing #88 12.07.06, or Tangri & Mwenda ‘Politics, Donors and the Ineffectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions in Uganda’ Journal of Modern African Studies 44.1 (2006)

continues to show similarities to Museveni’s political path it is likely to

affect security in Rwanda.

In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe has been in power for even longer

than Museveni. While Mugabe’s accession to power as the leader of an

armed rebel group was an anti-colonial independence struggle, once

power had been obtained Mugabe was quick to install a one-party regime,

firing members of the cabinet from the Ndebele-speaking South and

consistently favouring figures from his Shona-speaking northern homeland

in a campaign that culminated in the infamous massacres in Matabeleland

which brought security and stability to Mugabe’s strongman authoritarian

rule. Mugabe’s development strategy saw him revered as an African hero

and parallels with Rwanda can also be seen in the subsequent

(temporary) improvements in development indicators and Mugabe’s

consistent and vehement criticisms of the colonial power, the UK.

Mugabe’s withdrawal from the IMF and belligerent rejection of

international conditions on assistance have resulted in Zimbabwe

currently suffering one of the most economically precarious situations in

Africa. Widespread condemnation followed multiple incidences of election

rigging as his security forces increased repression of dissent at an

alarming rate. Mugabe still leads government but with greatly reduced

power in an effective admission that democratic reform, power-sharing

and a reconciliation with international assistance was necessary in order

to attempt to alleviate the instability and insecurity that was created

through decades of clientelist, ethnist, authoritarian misrule62.

62 See, for example. Chan ‘Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence’ (IB Tauris 2003) or Holland ‘Dinner with Mugabe’ (Penguin 2008), as well as an abundance of articles from BBC News and IRIN news on

Clearly, each example will be different but Mugabe represents a

precedent for what can result from a militaristic African strongman’s

strategy of ethnically based rule that involves a violent discourse of

rejecting international multilateral assistance. While neither the Ugandan

nor Zimbabwean scenarios will necessarily take place in Kagame’s

Rwanda, the argument is to display that there are many examples of the

destruction of security and stability occurring involving broadly similar

starting points and development strategies but, also, strategies of political

power reproduction. Other examples from the region abound, Obiang

exporting natural resources in Equatorial Guinea in order to finance his

repression of minority and opposition groups, international donors

tolerating this dictatorship in order to deal with his regime. Or Hastings

Banda’s ability to counter international condemnation of his corrupt and

repressive one-party Nyasaland with improved development indicators in

a 33-year presidency that eventually made way for widespread

democratic reforms. Or, most controversially, with the rule of Habyirimana

in Rwanda itself in the years preceding the genocide, a corrupted

authoritarian strongman dependent on French financial and military

support who played on European power games in Central Africa to escape

wider condemnation for the discrimination against ethnic minorities, which

ended in the state-sponsored genocide of 1994; the ultimate

disintegration of security and stability, created through the reaction built

on the state’s own fear of the retaliation of the ethnic group it had

violently excluded63.

authoritarianism in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. 63 See Reyntjens (2004)

Findings: Aid, Authoritarianism and Sustainable Security

The first research area of the piece aimed to show that Kagame’s

regime is heavily dependent on aid. It has been able to do this through

using a wealth of figures from donor organizations but, tellingly, also

through widely available official government documents which is a

significant admission. It has also shown that this aid contravenes official

donor policy on the kind of development partners that it works with,

describing in brief some of the authoritarian tendencies being shown by

the Kigali administration which are expanded upon in chapter two. It goes

on to show that a growing amount of debate is taking place on the

effectiveness of aid to African regimes and also describes precedents for

aid cessation to Rwanda and to other states. The conclusion that can be

drawn from this is simply that in spite of the government strategy of

reducing aid dependence, combined with an at times vitriolic criticism of

the effects of aid itself, by his own admission the stability of Kagame’s

government still relies on aid flows which are being increasingly called

into question not only in an empirical, case-by-case basis to Rwanda but

also in a theoretical sense by leading academics. Reductions and

Cessations on aid, or increases in conditionalities in order to reconcile

funding with the good governance agenda are perfectly possible near-

future actions which would undoubtedly have a detrimental effect on

Rwanda’s nascent stability and the security situation in the country.

An interesting, if slightly conspiratorial perspective is that the good

governance agenda and indeed, the great neoliberal economic

restructuring project more broadly argues to have interests of

democratization and poverty alleviation at heart but demonstrates with its

approach to Rwanda, and also for example Uganda and Nigeria, that it is

willing to compromise some of its declared objectives in reward for sheer

economic output and adherence to command. Further research that

examines the argument for an, in reality, lower than professed level of

evolution in aid policy since the Cold War and the era of unconditional

reward for ideological support on the part of recipient countries would be

useful.

The second research area of the piece aimed to show that Rwanda

has descended increasingly into authoritarian politics in the post-genocide

years. It has sketched out a description of the motivations of the

authoritarian leader in the format of a biography of his time in the

military. It references many texts that can be examined in order to gain a

fuller picture of the undisputable horror of the Rwandan Genocide that

Kagame will always have at the centre of his politics and experience.

Using Mamdani’s research on Tutsi discourses of persecution it has drawn

these ideas together and shown how they converged under Kagame’s

leadership, manifesting a ‘Tutsization’ of Rwandan politics and a

repression of dissent which has been encapsulated in the new crime of

‘Divisionism’. Detailing how this authoritarian structure has led to the

breakdown of relationships with Hutu politicians, the formation of armed

and exiled rebel groups and ethnic exclusion, thanks mainly to the works

of Reyntjens and Lemarchand, the chapter has shown how ethnism and

authoritarianism reproduce political grievance which, time and again,

leads to increased repression and renewed conflict. The discussion then

continues to reinforce these points with various theoretical criticisms of

authoritarianism all of which share the common view that whilst

authoritarianism can produce various short-term security solutions and

stabilization, it also sows seeds of discord which over the months, years or

even decades repeatedly fails to deliver a sustainable, prosperous and

secure political economy. If he follows his role models in the Far East,

Kagame’s authoritarianism and protectionism must gradually be replaced

by increased levels of participation if prosperity is delivered and poverty is

truly alleviated.

This, however, is a big ‘If.’ The dissertation continues by showing

that the early and formative years of Kagame’s presidency bear many

similarities to African regimes that have degenerated into corruption,

instability and even ethnic conflict, all of which Kagame is adamant is not

the path that his ‘Switzerland of Africa’ is going to embark upon. If long-

term sustainable security for the duration of Kagame’s presidency and the

years to come after him is to be achieved in Rwanda the President would

do well to distance himself from examples from history which show that

an aid-dependent, regionally belligerent, repressive and ethnically divided

country with an authoritarian centralization of the state’s functions of

coercion must address grievances, deliver prosperity and become more

inclusive or risk degenerating into corruption, repression and farcical

compromise of its political ideals in order to retain control over a political

economy that it is simultaneously severely damaging.

To Summarize, the tested hypothesis of this dissertation has argued

that security in Rwanda is not sustainable, or lasting under present

circumstances. Kagame’s overtures regarding reducing aid dependence

must be implemented to guard against the increasing possibility that aid

will become reduced or more altered and tied to his relinquishment of

authoritarianism. At the same time, the security created by repression,

exile, ethnocentrism and strongman politics must be tempered with

addressing fomenting grievances if it is to endure. Otherwise, Kagame’s

Rwanda could find itself identified more with the ethnic patronage and

conflict of Uganda, the economic farce and international isolation of

Zimbabwe or, worse still, its own history of Hobbesian level uncontrollable

violence and less with the Security, Prosperity and Socio-Economic

Development of Switzerland64.

64 As a final Postscript, the situation in Burundi will be highlighted. Suffering its own genocide, with Tutsi massacring Hutu in 1993, Burundi continued to be plagued by chronic impoverishment and a series of rebel offensives leaving the countryside in ruins, the cities filled with refugees and the population decimated and terrified. From a broadly similar starting point to Rwanda in the sense that a genocide had taken place and society was largely destroyed, but also as a biethnic, Francophone, Belgium-administered, landlocked, under-reported and chronically impoverished state of similar size, geography, population and low natural resource endowment, Burundi tackled political reforms in an altogether different manner. South-African brokered peace talks throughout the early 21st century resulted in a constitutionally-enshrined and landmark power-sharing agreement between Hutu and Tutsi. A Hutu President and Tutsi Prime Minister preside over an elected cabinet constituting relative numbers of both ethnic groups and including previous rebels at the same time. The military and security forces are also divided equally. This has brought a tentative peace to the country that has held up over the last few years. Whilst it would be wrong to hold up Burundi as a ‘beacon of hope’ for conflict-ridden fragile states in Africa, nevertheless it represents an alternative, opposite, democratic approach to that of Kagame’s authoritarianism. Whilst its lower level of economic recovery compared to Rwanda can arguably be put down to Rwanda’s greater visibility due to the genocide and the resulting international interest, the potential for sustainable security can be compared favorably and the similarities and differences between the two responses to genocide in Rwanda and Burundi is definitely an area of research which this dissertation could expand into. Further information on Burundi is scarce, but Lemarchand’s article ‘Consocionationalism and Power-Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ African Affairs 106/422 p1-20 (2006) examines this to an extent and Uvin’s recent ‘Life after Violence: A People’s History of Burundi’ (Zed Books 2008) gives empirical accounts of the violence and restructuring project as well as discussing some of the theoretical questions.

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