T8 B3 Boston Center Dan Bueno Fdr- 9-22-03 2 MFR

8/14/2019 T8 B3 Boston Center Dan Bueno Fdr- 9-22-03 2 MFR

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Commission SensitiveM E M O R A N D U M FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview withJoeseph Cooper, Traffic Management U nit Coordinator.Type of event: InterviewDate: Monday, September 22, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Number: 8Location: FAA Boston A ir Route Center, Nashua, New HampshireParticipants - Non-Com mission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 2387045]Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey BrownNO T E: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

BackgroundJo e Cooper has been with the FAA since 1991, primarily working in Area B. He

ha s been with the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) since 1999. At TMU Coopergenerally manages traffic flows and considers T MU to be the "hub"of traffic for BostonCenter. The Boston T MU com municates with Boston sectors and coordinates what isongoing in Boston airspace with the TMUs of other national centers. Cooper identifiedT MU positions as departure spacing, en route spacing, arrival flow, military c oordinator,an d severe weather management. The en route spacing coordinator is responsible for the"metering" of air craft - at a rate of about 38 aircraft entering into a new air space perhour.

T he military coordinator is responsible fo r clearing airspace for military trainingpurposes. "Al Trav" is the term used when the military makes an "altitude reservation" -they receive these reservations when they plan on using an air "track" for m id-flightrefueling. Reservations for this space c an be done through He rndon Com mand Center.Herndon also handles any national severe weather coordination. C ooper never deals withthe Region Operations Center or the Washington Operations Center.Morning of 9-11

On 9-11, Cooper first heard from Pete Pasquali in Area B that AA11 had lostcommunication capabilities and radar. T he next step was for one of the T MU personnelto contact company (American Airlines). Cooper remem bers thinking it odd that an air


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carrier wo uld loose both radio and transponder at once.TM U pulled the call sign fo r AA11 to monitor the flight. Controllers were alertedto move air craft away from the possible route of AA11 since the altitude was unknown;the last registered altitud e was FL 290 . At that point Area C told TM U that AA11 was apossible hijack. Terry Biggio told Bob Jones [Quality Assurance] to "pull the tapes" (the

record of communication between the pilots and the ATC).AA11 veered to the right. The prim ary target had been tagged, so the data blockof the last know n inform ation stayed with the primary. At first, with only three factors, noradio, no transponder, and serious course deviation C ooper thought AA11 hadexperienced serious electrical damage. But after the hard left turn and the confirmation ofa hijack through the cockpit communication, there was no doubt in Cooper's mind.After Bob Jones confirmed the cockpit communications, Dan Bueno askedCooper to call for military assistance. He asked Hun tress to send F16s out of Otis AirForce Base. Cooper did not know the physical location of Huntress [Rome, New York].Cooper asked Bradley {Hartford CN International Airpo rt] to stop departures headed

towards New York when AA11 was roughly five miles south of Albany.W hen speaking with the military, Cooper believes he spoke w ith Sergeant Pow ell.Cooper was unaware of any specific military exercises that were taking place on 9/11.Cooper believes there was a lack of understanding on the military's part of the FAAdefinition of "primary target", but he was ev entually able to give the m ilitary a roughlatitude an d longitude location. Cooper thought they might vector an aircraft from theFalcon Axe area [over Griffiss AFB, Rome NY] that is composed of airspace 7,000 ft to49,000 ft.Concerning the attempt to gain an altitude on AA11, Cooper believes that ColinScoggins asked the m ilitary to use its height finding capability on AA11. [Staff note: theJoint Surveillance System radars feed both FAA and NORAD sites. The NORADportion of that feed can determine altitude on a primary-only target, the FAA feedcannot.]Cooper stated that Terry Biggio, the Boston Operations M anager in Charge, wason a conference call that included New York Tracon and New York Center. He does notbelieve those calls were recorded, but the hotline on the New York side m ay have beenrecorded. They w ere still attemp ting to locate AA11 when Terry Biggio told the TMUthey lost radar contact with AA 11, and sho rtly after that one of the facilities personneltold the TMU a plane hit the WTC. Cooper went to the TV at the facilities an d Cooperimmediately knew it was AA11.Cooper was caught in "disbelief, but he then imm ediately thought of the strain

on his controllers who were attem pting to slow down traffic. New Y ork Center thencalled an d informed Boston Center of a possible second hijacking an d that New Yorkairspace was being shut down. Cooper stopped all departures planned through New Y orkair space. He then heard of the second hit on the WTC.He im med iately realized that control in order to keep the planes still in the skywas all he could do. He told Dan Bueno that maybe they should call ATC Zero. Buenosaid to do it, and they sent out the message for a Boston AT C Zero.


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They reviewed more of the audiotape and Biggio relayed the "we have someplanes" through the conference call. The Pentagon then got hit and Herndon called for aNational Ground Stop.Cooper discovered that UAL 175 was also a Boeing 767 headed to Los Angeles.The TMU decided to check for planes in the air that were also flight planned from Loganto Los Angeles. They found that Delta Flight 1989 was a similar flight and immediatelyinformed Cleveland Center.NE AD S was called and the TMU asked what to do with military aircraft in the airbu t not part of the response to the attacks. NEA DS announced that all military aircraft no ton mission would return to base.The facility man ager then ordered everyone evacuate Boston Center except forone supervisor pe r area, one controller per area, and two TM U personnel.Cooper is clear that any suspicion, today, of another airborne threat the DEN(Defense Event Netw ork) line is the abso lute first place to report to. It is open at alltimes. Coo per is not aware of how he w ould get the military involved except to use theDEN line.

NO TE: Cooper provided Comm ission staff with a personnel account of the events of 9-11 he made a few days after the event.


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[Classification]M E M O R A N D U M F O R THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation A dm inistration (FAA) B oston C enter Field Site Interview 1 withDaniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center.Type of event: InterviewDate: Monday, September 22, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Num ber : 8Location: FA A Boston Ce nter, Nashu a, N ew HampshireParticipants - Non-C omm ission: Chris , FAA G eneral ConsulParticipants - Com mission: John A zzarello, M iles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases th e response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Daniel D. Bueno began with the FAA in March of 1982, an d began his career at BostonCenter. He spent 6 to 7 years as an ATC (air traffic controller), then worked as a trafficmanag ement specialist in the Traffic Management Unit (TMU), then as both an Area Dand Area C Supervisor, an d finally in his current position, as Traffic ManagementSupervisor. The TMU "umbrella" includes Eastern Region and Boston Center, CarmineG allo is its overall head .Bueno first becam e aware of a possible hijacking from Area C Operation Supervisor(OSIC), John S chippani. Area C covers airspace of Flight Level 240 (24,000 feet) toFL600 at and to the west of Boston, Massachusetts. Bueno paged Terry Biggio, who hasOperations M anager in Charge (O M IC) at the time. The possible hijack w as identified toBueno and B iggio as American A irlines 11 by Schippani, who was informed from the airtraffic controller (ATC) cov ering Sector 46 (R46), Peter A. Zalewsk i. Biggio broughtAA11 up on his display mod ule (MDM ), and Bueno called the FA A 's H erndon, Virginia


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air t raffic control headquarters via the Boston Center ATCSCC (air traffic controller) to inform them that A A 1 1 was "no radio communication" (NORAC), more

commonly referred to as N O RD O (no radio), and had turned off its transponder, whichtransferred it s radio signature to a primary target, which consisted of no altitudeinformation. Bueno stated that Terry Biggio asked Robert Jones to pull the "tape" fromth e recorder. Bueno identified the speaker at Herndon as "Tony". A A 1 1 took a sharpright turn at 1227 UTC , and headed south. W hen AA11 started to slow down, Buenocalled New York TRACON to advise them of a the situation. Bueno's experience as anATC led him to believe that A A 1 1 's slow down was indicative of a drop in altitude, andthus NY Center would need to clear all air t raffic at all altitudes along the possible pathof AA11. Based on Bueno's m em ory of the 19 hijack of , Bueno called CapeTRACON for an imm ediate fighter escort out of OTIS Air Force B ase. He knew that thecall should have gone to North East A ir Defense (NEADS), but due to the urgency of thecircumstance called directly to the FAA contact point for Otis .Bueno explained that he understood normal procedure for a NOR AC airplane was tocheck the NAV 80, try to raise th e aircraft by various means (check previous transponderfrequency, use AIR Inc., notify th e aircraf t 's company, ask other aircrafts to try and raiseth e NORDO airplane), but noted that although prior to 9/11 it was usual for pilots to beinattentive to ATCs at times, and that often there were 5 to 20 minute lapses incommunica t ion , th e combination of circumstance (NORAC, no transponder, seriousdeviation off course) was infrequent. Despite this it was still unusual to call this to theattention of the "aisle supervisor" (area supervisor).Bueno stated that prior to 9/11, a hijack would be predicted as a flight to Cuba or aransom dem and, but not as an act of terrorism. He also noted that with AA 11, until thethreatening cockpit communication was confirm ed, predominately th e Boston Centerstaff was c oncerned the place had experienced serious mechanical or electrical failure. Henoted that there was an occurrence of this sort involving a generator malfunct ion post-9/11, and it was addressed imm ediately.According to Bueno, the key that alarmed Boston Center over A A 1 1 before thethreatening com m unication was the hard southern turn. The southbound course com binedwith a dropping altitude had already been reason enough for Terry Biggio to call for an


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immediate "ground stop" in the Sparta/Carmella traffic corridor. Once Bob Jonescommunicated th e tape's content to the TMU, Biggio informe d ROC, W OC and NewYork Center of the necessity of an imm ediate ground stop at Logan. Bueno believes NewYork Center was work ing UA L 175 at this po int.When asked about a timetable for military involvement, Bunco stated he took an initialrole calling the hijacking to Collin Scoggins attention, who imm ediately called N EAD S.Bunco noted that Collin Scoggins was a military operations specialist (MOS) at BostonCenter, and is usually not on the ATC floor. The M OS is now part of the TMU . It becameCape TRACON's responsibility to coordinate th e fighter scramble, and Boston Centertook respons ibility for clearing the skies, and that Huntress took did not take control ofhigh altitude along the c oast until later in the d ay.

The procedure for active fighter scrambles was coordinated in the "Otis Cape TRACONLetter Agreement", and Bueno had experience in the early 1980s with a scramble toescort an airplane out of Kennedy A irport. Bueno has not participated in any tabletopscramble exercises. Regarding Operation Vigilant Guardian, a com mand post exercisethat was scheduled to take place on September 11 th, Bueno believes the military operationspecialists may have been briefed, but that Boston Center was not involved beyond aNOPAR (n o pass through air defense) order for the airspace involved in the exercise.

Bueno stated that the system "worked absolutely" on 9/11. Boston Center was able toshut down the airspace on the east coast in a relatively timely manner, and were able toreroute and land planes succ essfully. Bueno stated that the D ynam ic S imulation Training(DynSim) that AT Cs are required to perform yearly serve their purpose, even though theyare only sim ulation. He noted that in the past one of his D ynSims might have involvedvectoring an aircraft toward a hijack , but if so it is only a loose me m ory, but that hedefinitely has not exercised a NO RA C hijack with no transponder. Nor had their been ahijack simulation or exercise that included FAA and NORA D co-participation.

North Atlantic inbound flights on 9/11 were passed through to Canada.


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Prior to 9/11, Bueno rem emb ers numerous localized ground stops, but never a nationalone.

After Cape TRACON w as contacted by FAA personnel, Cape T R A C O N called Otis .Bueno mentioned the possibility of scrambling fighters from A tlantic City to CollinScoggins. Bueno never though t that th e scrambled fighters wou ld receive an order toshout down a commercial airliner.

Bueno recommended to heighten airline security passengers should no longer be allowedcarry-on luggag e, and all cargo should be thoroughly screened. Bueno commented thatBoston Center staff now have a security and national defense role that has been added totheir primary purpose of keeping aircraft separate from each other an d from weatherthreats. Bueno is concerned that just as hijacks in the past created a conceptual box fromwhich al l planning an d practice will be based on, the event of 9/11 was created anotherconceptual box, an d unless planning an d practice is exercised beyond this box, thecountry is still vulnerable.

Bueno stated that a benefit of the improved relationship between F A A and militaryentities is that they now com mu nicate daily over airspace caps and are linked through theDefense Event Network (DEN).

T8 B3 Boston Center Dan Bueno Fdr- 9-22-03 2 MFR

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