T8 B3 Boston Center Richard Beringer Fdr- 9-22-03 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 750

8/14/2019 T8 B3 Boston Center Richard Beringer Fdr- 9-22-03 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 750

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[Classification]

M E M O R A N D U M FOR T HE R E C O R D

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with

Richard Beringer,Type of event: Interview

Date: Monday, S eptember 22, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Preparedby : Geoffrey Brown

Team Number:8

Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire

Participants- Non-Co mm ission: JohnR. Donnelly,FAA Senior Attorney[(781)238

7045]

Participants - Co mm ission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara,Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of

th e interviewee. Pleaserefer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Beringer started as an ATC in the Air Force in1979 and with the FAA as an ATC in1983. From there he became an Area C Specialist.

Beringerinformed C omm issionstaff that prior to 9/11 NORDOaircraftwere consideredto "eventually comeback",and wo uldn't be thought of as a hijack. Occasionally it wouldoccur with a c omm ercial airliner, and then an A TC wouldinform the superviser,whomight then have called the airliner compa ny. There were other techniques at the disposalof an ATC in the pre-9/11 environment. A n ATC m ightattamptto contact otheraircraftto check altitude, or to contact theaircraft incase there was something w rong with theATC equipment.If an aircraft took a serious deviationfrom course, thenit would beconsidered a higher priority. The priority of a NO RD Odiffered on the type ofaircraft.MostlyATC's did not pay asmuch attention toprivately owned aircraft. Whenan aircraftwas NORDO it was highly uncom mon evenin the pre-9/11 environmentfor the aircraftto go more than a sector without someform of comm unication with the AT C. Beringernoted thatfor the transponderto turn off and fortheir to be noradio contactwas unusualan d would callfor a supervisor's attentionin pre-9/11, but now isviewed w ith highsuspicion. With the thirdfactor of a serious course deviation Beringer noted that it wouldbe viewed even prior to9/11 with extreme seriousness.Beringer considers hijackingspre-9/11 as extreme ly out of the ordinary, even though they


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are trained in the basic ATC response on a yearly basis. Beringer believesthat multiplesituations are practiced in the dynsim and CB I training, and also believes that a situationwith the multiplefactors that occurred on 9/11 has been practiced.

On 9/11 Beringer was at the BoSox SectorRA position. This position covers the airspaceabove 10,000ft includingFL 230. He took AA11and carried it through westboundafterthe handoff from Boston Tracon position. Beringer would normally intiate a handoff toth e Boston High Sectorfrom there. Beringer remem bersa routine handofffrom BoSox,an d climbed theaircraft towards Athens 38. He then was releaved and w ent on break.

When Beringer returned both AA11 andU AL175 had hit the W TC, and the airtrafficsystem was about to close.

He heard from his colleagues corroborating informationon the flights.

Beringer noted that it was a widely held assumption in ZBWthat U A L175 was thesecond hit onWTC, sinceit had been reported when it "left" the ATC system.

Pre-9/11 Beringer notedhis understandingthat it was thesupervisor'sresponsibilitytocontact the military. Beringer stated there is no need for FAA controllers to contact themilitary. In the case of9/11, Beringer would not have known who to contact at themilitary. He noted also that his ability to vector afighter for intercept, if a case c alled for,would be due to his military experience and notfrom his training with the FAA.Regarding thefighters in W hiskey Warning Area 105, Beringer was responsible forworking them overto Kennedy. Beringer stated that typicallyZNY would not work thosefighters.Beringer did bring the aircraft overfrom W 105 but did notbring their Otisreplacem ents over. His e xperience w ith the military is that they wo rk closely together inupstate New York, but that his experience is more extensive because of his training. Heacknowledged that there are sometimesdifficultiesin dealing with m ilitary pilots, butthat because of the high performance levelof their fighter aircraft they are often verywilling to follow a controlle r's gu idance to rapidly change their position. Ov erallBeringerbelieves the FAA and military coexist well in their shared airspace. Beringerstated that he has ha ndledfighter aircraft in FAA dynsim training.

Beringer noted thatafter ATC Zero was declared all aircraftwas directed to the nearestairport, and by the time the ZBW building was empty the only aircraftleft in the sky weremilitary.

In a 9/11 type event Beringer reiterated that there is not much the ATC system can do

short of passing along time ly inform ation and vectoring a militaryaircraft to intercept. Heis skeptical thoughthat flight time to an intercept will allowa fighter to make adifference.Beringer stated that the only security would be to make cockpits completelysafe from intrussion. But he also n oted the threat posed by privateaircraft.He also notedthat a terrorist with thorough ATC knowledge could develop a m uch m ore sophisticatedplan.


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Beringer was the last ZB W controller to leave the building because he wascontrollingtwo military tankersand giving them instructionsto get below his 18000 ftceiling onairspace,at that po int they couldfly by visuals. One tanker called23k visual, the othergot belowthe 18000mark.


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Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with

RichardBeringer,Type of event: Recorded Interview

Date: Monday, September 22, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Preparedby: Geoffrey Brown

Team Number:8

Location:FAA Boston Air Route Center (ARTCC, Nashua,New Hampshire

Participants- Non-Commission: JohnR. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney[(781) 238

7045]

Participants- Commission: JohnAzzarello,Miles Kara,Geoffrey Brown

NOT E: Unless otherwise noted,the following paraphrasesthe response an d opinion ofthe interviewee. Pleaserefer to the interview transcript for a comp lete account.

Background

Beringer startedas an AirTraffic Controller (ATC )in the AirForce in 1979 andjoined the FAA as an AirTraffic Controller in 1983. From there he becam e an A rea CSpecialistand has been in that position his entire career. (Area C is one portion of theART CC 24-hour operation. That means that Beringerhas worked the same B oston-controlledair space his entire career.)On themorning of 9-11 Beringer was assigned asthe Sector 47 Radar Asso ciate (RA), assisting the S ector 47 Radar C ontroller, S tephenRoebuc k. It is not uncom mo n for senior controllers to "sit" the associate po sition.Accordingto Beringer'sstatement signedon October 31, 2001, he was onduty as Sector47RA from 0737 to 0828EOT on 9-11. Sector 47 is the"Bosox" sector and handlesaircraft at lower altitudesafter they are handed off from or before they are handed of totraffic approach/departure.Beringer's statement shows thathe "removed the AAL11

strip from the active bay" at 1208UTC, meaning thatAAL11 had been handed off to theen route con troller.

AnomaliesNORDO, no transponder, course deviation

Beringer informed Staff thatprior to 9/11 NORDO (no radio) aircraft were treatedas if they would "eventually comeback", and wouldn 't be thought of as a hijack.Occasionally a NORDO situation would occur with a commercial airliner, and then an


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ATC wouldinform the supervisor, who might then have called the airliner company. Thepriority of aNORDO differed on the type ofaircraft. Mostly ATC's did not pay as muchattentionto privately ow nedaircraft.When an aircraftwas NORDO it was highlyuncommoneven in thepre-9/11 environmentfor theaircraft to go more than a sector(Sectors are the divisions w ithin an area, such as area C , thatfurther define the air spaceto be m anaged by a given controller.without som eform of comm unication with the ATC.

There were also other techniqu es usedby an A TC in the pre-9/11environment.An ATC would try to contact anotheraircraft in case there was som ething w rong with theATC equipmentitself, or contact otheraircraftto check altitude of the NO RDOaircraft.If an aircrafttook a serious deviationfrom course, then it would be considered a higherpriority, but still not a hijack. Pre9-11, a supervisor wou ld also attem pt to call the"company" (in this case Am erican Airlines)

Beringer noted thatfor the transponderto turn off and forthere to be no radiocontact was unusual and would call for asupervisor'sattention inpre-9/11;but now isviewed with highsuspicion. He said it was rare for anairplane to lose a transpondersince theyhad abackup. The normalATC response was to ask thecrew to "recycle" thetranspond er or go to backu p. He could not recall anaircraftever losing bothcommunicationsand transponder"neverheard of it."

With the thirdfactor of a serious course deviation B eringer n oted that it wou ld beviewed evenprior to 9-11 with extreme seriousness. He had never encountered a situationsuch as presented itself on9-11. He said that the appropriate response for an ATC was to"notify everyoneyou can," especiallythe supervisor. [B y "everyone you can," Beringerlikely means, as other controllers toldStaff, adjacent, lower, and highersectors.]

Beringer considers hijackings pre-9-11 as extremely out of the ordinary, eventhough such events are part of ATCrefreshertraining on a yearly basis. Beringer believesthat m ultiple situationsare offered in the dynamic simulationan d computer-based

instruction,and also believes that a situation with the m ultiple factors that occurred on9/11 had been practiced.

The standard in place on9-11 concerning any of the three anomalies was for thecontroller tonotify the supervisor. It was the supervisor's respo nsibility to take otheractions.

Morning of 9-11

On 9-11 Beringer was at the Bosox Sector RA position. This position covers theairspace above 10,000 ft includin g FL(flight level) 230 (23,000 ft). He tookAA11 an dcarried it through westboundafter the handofffrom Boston Departure. Beringer wouldnormally intiatea handoff to the Boston High Sector from there. Beringer remembers aroutinehandofffrom departure,an d climbedthe aircraft towards Athens38, an enroutesector. He then was relieved and went on break. W hen Beringer returned both AA 11 andUA L 175 had hit the W TC, and the airtraffic system was about to close. He had nopersonal know ledgeof events after he went on break an d heard whathe knew from hi scolleagues.

The first thought "in the building" was that AA11 w as a hijacking to Cuba.

Contacting the Military


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Pre-9-11 Beringer noted his understanding that it was the supervisor'sresponsibility to contact the m ilitary; there is no need for controllers to do so. In the caseof 9-11, Beringer wo uld not have known who to contact at the military. He noted alsothat his ability to vector afighter for intercept, if a case called for, would be due to hismilitary experience and not from his training with the FAA.

Regarding fighters operating in the W hiskey Warning Area 105(W 105) [W 105,off the southern Long Island coast, is one of m ultipleoff-shore areas used by the militaryup and down the Atlantic seabord and controlled b ythem.] Beringer's Sector wasresponsible for controlled them initially and then handing them off to Kennedy Sector.Beringer stated that typically New York Center would not work those fighters. Beringerdid bring the aircraft over from W105 [must have returnedfrom break] but did notbringtheir Otis replacements over.

His experience withthe military is that they work closely togetherin upstate NewYork, but that his experience is more extensive becauseof his military training.Heacknowledged that there are sometimesdifficulties in dealing with military pilots, butthat because o f thehigh performance level of their fighteraircraft they are often verywilling to follow a controller'sguidance to rapidly change their position. OverallBeringer believesthe FAA andmilitary coexist wellin their shared airspace.Beringerstated that he has handledfighter aircraftin FAA training.

He does not know whatATC could have donedifferently on 9-11, unless themilitary had autonomo us authority to shoo t.

Other Information

Beringer noted thatafter ATC Z ero was declared allaircraft was directed to thenearest airport, and by the time the Boston b uilding was empty the onlyaircraft left in thesky were m ilitary.

In a 9/11 type eventBeringer reiterated that thereis not much the AT C systemcan do short of passing along timely info rmation and vectoring a militaryaircraft tointercept. He is skeptical though thatflight time to an intercept will allow a fighter tomake a difference. Beringer stated that the only security would be to make cockpitscompletelysafe from intrussion.But he also noted the threat posed by privateaircraft. Healso no ted thata terrorist with thoroughATC knowledge could developa much moresophisticated plan.

Beringer was the last Boston controller to leave the building because he wascontrollingtwo military tankers and giving them instructions to get below his18000 ftceiling on airspace, at that point they could fly visually. O ne tanker arbitrarily called23,ooo ft"visual," the other got below the18000 mark.


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T8 B3 Boston Center Richard Beringer Fdr- 9-22-03 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 750

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