T8 B2 Boston Center Bob Jones Fdr- Alt MFR Re Sept 22-24 2003 Staff Visit to Boston Center

8/14/2019 T8 B2 Boston Center Bob Jones Fdr- Alt MFR Re Sept 22-24 2003 Staff Visit to Boston Center

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Staff visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA

Type of Event: Briefing and Scheduled Interviews

Date: September 22-24, 2003

Special Access Issues: NATCA (National Air Traffic Control Association) representatives sat in onsome interviews. A FAA legal representative from the New England Region attended all staff contactswith FAA personnel

Preparedby: Miles Kara

Team Number: 8

Location: Nashua, NH (Boston Center) and Burlington, MA (New England Region)

Participants - Non-Commission: See individual interview reports

Participants- Commission: Miles Kara, John Azzarello, Geoff Brown

Background Summary

Commission staff were able to efficiently and effectively formally interview 18 people, tour facilities atboth the Boston Center and the New England Region, and accomplish discovery of four additionalrelevant document sources, thanks to a forthcoming, responsive reception by the Operations-Manager-in-Charge, Terry Biggio. Mr. Biggio fine-tuned the visit schedule on-site to ensure that we talked to thepeople that would do Staff the most good in the time allotted. That required dropping some potentialinterviewees and adding others and making several schedule changes that impacted the FAA work force.

The work force accommodated those changes and the representatives of FAA Counsel appointed toattend Staffs presence pitched in and helped out. NATCA representatives, when requested byintervieweesto be present were also helpful in the overall process. The Staff left with the impressionthat Boston Center, Mr. Biggio in particular, wanted us to gain a complete and accurate view of theircollective work under near-unprecedented pressure on September 11, 2001. The Regional Administratortook a brief exit brief from the team at which time she was advised of the support provided by MrBiggio and staff and of the document discoveries made by the Commission staff.

Major Points

Discovery. Staff learned of additional responsive information that had not been provided through thedocument request process.

Accident File. Staff learned from Mr. Bob Jones, Quality Assurance Office, of theexistence of an accident file, different from the "accident package" provided by FAA to both theFB I and NTSB, and subsequently provided to the Commission in response to a document requestto DoT. Among other items in the package is a reconstructed time-line based on telephonecompany records. Mr Jones, locally considered a hero because of his quick work in replaying thetapes of cockpit conversations that day was insistently steered our way by Mr. Biggio.

After Action Review. Staff learned that the New England Region convened a round table twoweeks after Ssentemrier 1 1 " tn r.nnHnr.t a HetaileH review of events of the Hav Staff is not aware

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of an y formalprodu ct that ensured, but asked that associatedfiles and records of that event bemade available to the Commission. A member of the Region's 24-hour operations center, duringinterview, produced a region log, a document previously not providedstaff, but one thatstaff wascertain must exist since a similar document was produced by the Eastern Region in New Y ork.Staff has a copy of that log.

Additional Transcripts. During one interviewStaff became aware of a radar controller positionthat controlledthe scrambledOtis fighters. Staffasked for informationfrom that position.It isStaffs understan ding that the only inform ation that went into the"accident packag e"was datapertainingto FAA 's actually contact withor handlingof the four hijackedaircraft,possiblybecause thatwas theFBI/NTSBfocus. That excludedany accident file information that pertainedstrictlyto the Otisfighters them selves. The FAA legal representative said he would m ake surewe got the inform ation we needed. Separately, and previously, Staff had brought to H eadquartersFAA attentionthe lack of transcripts pertainingto the Otis fighters,aircraft that we know fromother sourceshad been controlledby FAA, at least in part. FAA providedthe tapes of BostonCenter radarcontrolpositions 17R and 18R to Staff on September25 , 2003.

Personal Notes. Two persons interviewed brought with them personal no tes at least one set ofwhich had been con structeda few days after 9/11. Staff askedfor andvoluntarilygot both setsofnotes. Those notes are im portant because bo th individuals worked in theTraffic Management

Unit that day,the focal pointfo r decisions madeby and information flowingto the OM IC, Mr.Biggio.

Boston Center Performa nce.To a person, Boston Center is proud of its perform ance that dayand the Ce nter has internalized that it did all that it could do, given the events of the da y. The SeniorTraffic Management Controller, Mr. Bueno,carefully and repetitively described to Staff "the box," hisdescriptionof how the Center perceived thathijackingswould proceed. No one seriously considered anyoutcomeother than an airplane proceeding to an airport somew here and landing, perhaps Cuba. Theview prevailed evenafter the content of the cockpit comm unications was learned. Therefore, BostonCentercontrollers proceeded to do what they were trained to do; they notified supervisors as eventsproceeded,and then continued to try and ensure safety in the sky by keeping planes separated,from eachother an d from AA11, and notifying adjoining sectors within theCenter and other Centers, as necessary.

Determining a hijack. No one factor or combination offactors that day, other than the cockpitcommunications, definitely led Center personnel to a hijacking awareness. There are three such factors.

Loss of Radio C ontact .This phenomenon w as com mo n, to the point of being notorious.Pilots and crews w ere simply lax in maintaining contact. O ne interviewee m ade sure weunderstoodthe commonlymisunderstoodacronym "NORDO." That m eans "noradio" in theliteralsense that theaircraft's radio(s) are not w orking . It is in thatsense that controller38R iscapturedon tape early in the AA 11 story designatingAA11 "nordo," implying that the pilot is incontrolan d unableto comm unicate. Thatis different froman aircraftwith a working radio,butdeliberately not com m unicating. T he term for that,Staff was told, is"NORAK," (ph)

Loss of Transponder. This phenomenon is m uch rarer, but notin-and-of-itself,alarming.

Controllers routinely ask theaffected plane to"recycle your transponder." [That is the pro tocolused withUA175by NewYork Center controllers.]Controllers generally agreed thattransponderloss w ould be reported to the supervisor. The com bination of"nordo" an dtransponderloss is highly unusual and many controllers had never experienced that comb ination.According to Mr.Biggio that combinationis a sign of major equipment m alfunctionand atthatpoint in the flight of AA11wouldnot have triggeredan y notion of a hijack.

Course Deviation.One controller, a supervisor on duty that day as a radar associate tocom plete m onthly qualification requirements, citied minor course deviationA A1 1failure toclimb to 35000 feet asan additionalwarningsign. There was noconsensus on that point,but all



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controllers agreed that the co mbination of"nordo," transponder loss, and significantcourse deviation the AA11 turn to the south was serious. How ever, Mr. Biggio on that pointsaid that given amajor equipment ma lfunction what might be happening w as a pilot turning toland at a "heavy" capab le airport. One controller supported that thesis, describing a"heavy" pilotas one who wo uld try to land at Kennedy, vice elsewhere. A"heavy" aircraft is a term used byFAA controllers todescribe a large aircraftsuch as a 747/757/767.Center personnel whoobserved the turn south also observed a unusually rapid rate of progress, indicatively of a pilotwho wanted to get somewhere in a hurry.

The Intervening Variable, Unusual C ockpit Com munications. After AA11 lost itstransponderand just before it made a significant course deviation to the south, unusual communicationsof unknow n source were heard o n the AA11 assigned fre quen cy of controller 46R. It was q uite clear tothe controller that he had a problem and he immediately and loudly made thatfact known. In a rapidsequenceof events a quality assurancestaff member, BobJones,personally went to the basement andreran the tapes and made the call that the voice said "we have someplanes." Mr. Jones' accident filetimeline willprovidethe exact timehe communicated thatfact to the watch deskand to Mr.Biggio.TheOMIC log shows that Biggio declared a hijack, based on co ckpit comm unications at 0825 EDT. Thattime appears tostaff to be the time of the original com mun ication itself and not the time that Biggio w asnotified by Jones.The accident file log will be determiningfactor.

First Aircraft Impact into WT C and A A 11 .The Boston Center learnedof developingproblemsin New York one of two ways. F irst, a CNNfeed is maintained in aoffice contiguous to thewatch deskin the center proper. Second, controllerson break typically wentto the cafeteria whereaCNN feed was also available. Intuitivelyan d instinctively, Center personnelwho were awareof andfollowedAA11 on its flight south knew thatit was AA11 that impactedthe north tower, irrespectivelyof differing informationavailablefrom CNN. At least at the supervisorylevel, if not at the individualcontrollerlevel, Boston C enter personnel also understood A A11 to be slowing and descending.Stafftentativelyconcludes that Boston Center itself was not the initial source ofconfusion aboutAA11 afterthe impac t of the first plane into the WT C. Nevertheles s, Center personnel aware of the altitude searchfor AA11, southbound, were also awareof two other factors. Firstthe last know accurate altitudefo rAA11 was 29,000feet. Second, UA175, under direct query by a Boston Center controller sited AA11 atabout 0837 EDT andestablishedits altitude to be 27-29,000 feet.

The A ltitude Problem. FAA controllers cannot determine altitude on anon-transponding,primary-only,aircraft. Center personnelconfirmedthat to Staff several times over. O n the other hand,air defense scope operators at the Northeast Air De fense Sector (NEAD S) can determine a ltitude in thatcircumstance.Accordingto the Dep uty Com mande r at the 84 Radar EvaluationSquadron,FAA didno t purchase that altitude-determining capability and,further, w as consideringthe eliminationof allprimary radar returnsfrom its en-route radar system. Most Center personnel werenot aware thatth eSectorArea Operations Center (SAOC) at NEADS could read altitude and that might have been a reasonto contact NEADS. One key person did, Colin Scoggins, a member of the TMU and the person mostoften in contact with NEADS. He arrived at the Sector about 0825 EDT and immediately became awareof a developing situation. His initial instinct was to stay out of theroadtoomany onlookers impededthe task at hand. As he became awareof a primary-only possible hijackedaircraft his immediateresponse wasthat NEADS neededto be notified so they couldget altitude on the airplane.He headed fo rthe TMU and by thetime he arrived Jo e Cooper was in contact withNEADS.Mr. Scoggins spendthemajority of his time thereafterin intermittent direct phone contact with NEADS, primarilyMajorDeskins,tryingto assist NEA DSin gaining scope contact with AA11.His calls, however, werenot on ataped line. He believes those calls were taped at NEADS . Thedifficulty was that NEADS wanted"latsand longs" and he was trying to give them positionfrom a knownVOR, e. g. "x" miles south of Albany.He recalled that he passed two d istinct sets of lat-long coordinates to NE AD S.

Military Notification.No person Staff interviewed seriously considered contacting NEADSthroughthe process on paper FAA -NMC C-NOR AD, if they were even aw are of it. Dan Bueno getshigh marks from Center personnelfo r instinctively callingFAA traffic approach personnelat thelocationwhere he knew the fighters to be Otis AFB. Bueno called Otisbecausehe knew "from the

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eighties"that is where military assistance camefrom. He also considered BurlingtonVT andAtlanticCity NJ for thesame reason. EvenM r. Scoggins,who knew thatthe call had to go to NEA DS,did notfault Bueno fo r trying to call the AF Wing directly through other FAA personnel.The responseto Bueno's callwas that Otis needed N EA DS authorization. Accordingto available transcriptstheCooper call directlyto NEADS and the Otis tower callto NEADS basedon Bueno'scall reachedNEADSat nearlythe same time, approximately 0838 EDT.

The Scramble. Staff learned from the controller who w as on position 18R that he vectored thefighters to a holding position in area Whiskey 105, a military controlled area south of Long Island. Fromhis perspective thatwas the result of several factors. Therewas no defined mission. Therewasuncertaintyabout the continuingthreatthefirst impact was an event of the past. There w ere alsomultiplecontrollers involved. An entity known as Giant Killer at Oceana,VA controls militarytraffic inthe trainin g areas,but they only controlto a certain altitude. High altitudeis controlledby H untressNEADS.The Center controller's situational awarenesswas that the military wantedto be positionedtovectorin any direction as required and that overhead New York City did not provide that. He also ruledou t supersonicflightbecause it, in-and-of-itself,introducedcomplicating air traffic control factors.Moreover,withouta defined m issionthe usefulnessof such flight was problematic.The controllerha dexperience working C oncordeflights and wasused to the complicating natureof such flight.

Military/FAA Relationships. There is a natural tension betweenthe two entities because both

desire the use of thesame airspacefo r different reasons.When both entities wantthe same spaceat thesame time coordination issues needto be worked out and, as in theparagraphabove,mu ltiple controllersget in the act.Staff observes, based on this single visit, that those relationships could have b eensmootheron 9/11, especially in the realm of inform ation sharing. O ne person interviewed put itsuccinctly.Paraphrased,he said the role of the F AA is tokeep planes separatedin the air, the role of themilitaryis to bring planes together. Those are m utually exclusive goals. Mr. Scogginsefforts in trying totranslatesufficient inform ation to allow N EA DS to acquire AA 11 are indicative of the need for betterinformationsharing. As a result of the inherent tension anddiffering protocols and languages, militarycells havebeen establishedin FAA towork day-dayair space managementissues.The New EnglandRegionhas one such cell, a cell that also provides support to the Eastern Region in New Yo rk.Staff helda short discussion with the senior Navyofficer in the cell. The cell has 2-3 person contingentsfrom eachof the three servicesan d each reports separatelyto a different boss. The Army and Navy representativesreportto their GeneralStaffs at Headquarters US Army and US Nav y, respectively. The Air Force Cell

reports to the Air Force LiaisonOfficer at FAA Headquarters. All of the assigned m ilitary personnel areeither flight or controller-trained and each cell exits to handle adm inistrative m atters only. There is noreason that they could have or should have been contacted or interjected themselves in the process on9/11. The senior Navyofficer put in succinctlyfrom a military perspective. Thereare defined linesofcomm unication and proc edures to handle eventslike that and if he or his other service co unterpa rts hadgotten involvedthey would have just confoundedthe situation.

Additional Items of Interest

Effect of Events of9/11. Staff experiencedthe breakdownof two controllersas they struggledtotell their storyof the events of 9/11.Both composed themselvesan d completed the interview.One wason e of the individualswho brought personal notesto the interview.All Staff membersas well as the

FAA legal representative encouragedhim to allow the Commissionto have a copy of valuablecontemporaneous records. He had incorporated personal thoughts and notes andStaff encouraged him toprovidejust the factual content. He said he would consult with hisfamily and consider our request overnight. He returnedthe next day andhanded staff a CD containing whatever portionof his notes hejudged of value to the C om mission. The second individual was the one who experienced discovery ofthe hijackingno rdo,no transponder, cockpit comm unications,an d turn to the south. He wasalsointerviewed by Tom Brokaw. He is upset that what is in the public domain is distorted and not whatfactuallyhappened that day.Staff told hi m that was the reason we had come to interview him .Hisprimaryconcernsare three-fold:

He isupset aboutthe AA11 pilot gettinga hero's creditfo r "keying the mike." He knows from

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first hand listening that the hijacker was speaking directly into the microphone. Thatunderstandingis supported by Bob Jones who listened to the tapes and then re-listened to themagain in the presence of an FBI agent. A ccordingto Jones, the Agent describeda man talking,even spitting, directly intoth e microphone.Staff will ask for the 302report concerning that eventan d has, but has notlistened to the tape.

He is also upset with his co-workers who did not share his sense of urgency that day, especiallyafter th e plane's transponder shutan d when th e first cockpit communication occurred.He knew atthat mom ent therewas big troubleand he literally screamedfo r assistance.He perceivedhissupervisor'sresponse as slow and his request for a"D side," a radar as sociate to ass ist, as notresponsive to hisneeds.

He is also not happy with Br okaw's portrayalof what th e controllerwas hearing and feeling thatday

The Region's Role. The New England Region's role appearsto be primarily administrative.However, Staff reserves judgm ent on this point until the R egion'safter action review is analyzed. Theso-called"ROC," Regional O perations Center, functions essentially as a s witchboard tofacilitate tele-conferences,variousROC line-of-business (i. e.security) requirementsto be on orenter HeadquartersFA A tele-netsand to essentiallyact as aclearing housefo r R egional management. Fortuitous ly,

according to Region personnel, an RM T (R egional M anagement Team) meeting was in session thatmorning and allRegion entities werenotified simultaneouslyof the developing situation.

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T8 B2 Boston Center Bob Jones Fdr- Alt MFR Re Sept 22-24 2003 Staff Visit to Boston Center

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