T3 Bickerton Giegerig Menon Norhein-Martinsen

- How does the evolution of CSDP affect the EUrsquos standing as a lsquocivilian actorrsquo in international affairs - Is there a common agenda among the Member-States for a European Security and Defence Policy - Does the EU have a security strategy - Are EU capabilities in defence policy enough to play a role on the international stage

lsquoSecurity Co-operation beyond the Nation-State The EUs Common Security and Defence PolicyBickerton C J Irondelle B amp Menon A (2011) Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (1) pp 1-21

1 CSDP a moving target

Characterize by disagreements (st malo declaration UKFR)- Autonomy EU relationship with Nato- View FR tool for ldquoEurope politiquerdquo construction UK improve military capabilities and

revitalize NATO

Originality meant for military mission =gt evolved long term civilian stabilization ops

Achievements

CSDP ambitions

- to enhance the Unionrsquos ability to intervene in international security affairs through an internal process of institutional development

- to give the EU the practical means of intervening through a co-ordination and pooling of military and civilian capabilities

many opearation varying- term of size- autonomy (nato or not)- nature (civilianmilitary)

EU missionsrsquo impact seem to be beneficial Limit include

o Failure of interventiono Mission serve as an alibi to avoid broader intal securities responsabiitieso Lack of ressourcescapabilities

Capability improved via- 2001 CIC (capability improvement Conference)- 2003 Capability Development Mechanism- 2004 Headline Goal 2010 +European Defense Agency creation (EDA)

Institutions

the institutional system of CSDP overlaps to some extent with that of CFSP

Initial steps include creation of

- Political and Security Committee- EU Military Staff - EU Military Committee

Later Civilian Crisis Management Committee

Decision-making is characterised by complex interactions between the Council Secretariat (headed by the Secretary GeneralHigh Representative for CFSP) the Brussels-based Political and Security Committee and decision- makers in national capitals Require consensus between MS

2 Evolution performance effectiveness the debate

Discussion often on technical matters of militarycivilian capabilities (lack of) =gt descriptionprescription - Capabilities-expectation gap - Distincion presenceactorness- Assessment often on the policies but not on the process

+ lack of institutional history

Apparence of CSDPExternal drivers- declining American interest in euorpe- return of cold war- growing demand for for international crisis management resources- changing balance of power of the international and European state systems

Internal drivers

- permissive public opinion- leadership of some governments (in particular that of France) - concerns on the part of the Labour government in the United Kingdom to avoid

marginalization in the EU- the need to ratio- nalize the European defence industry - the habits of co-operation developed between Europeans within Nato and the WEU - awareness on the part of European governments that ever increasing costs have led to a need

to share the defence burden

Critic of EU CSDP

Pragmatic (impracticability)+ ethical concerns

3 Theoretical Approaches to CSDP Towards a lsquoSecond Waversquo

4 core concerns characterize all the approaches adopted

1 Debates interested with notion of power

2 Impossible to study CSDP without having some- thing to say about the nature role and impact of institutions

3 Debates about CSDP are intimately concerned with questions of structure and agency4 Relative balance between material and ideational factors in constituting state interests and

driving their behavior (p11)

Question asked

What is CSDP exactly and why and how has it developed How does CSDP work and what aspect of its functioning does the article explore Finally what impact has it had

CSDP and IR theorizing

structural realism EUrsquos adaptation to the changing structural dynamics of the international system but structural realismrsquos inattention to agency means that it cannot account for the peculiar nature of CSDP

classical realism focus on the agency of political leaders and the importance of their own social and historical background Understand the EU in the perspective of a small power its dependence on leading powers its reliance upon multilateral frameworks as means through which it can exercise its influence its risk-aversion

Neo-realist and constructivist scholars over the relationship between material and ideational factors in determining state behavior changes in economic growth and spending the distribution of coercive capabilities and the adequacy of existing capabilities to deal with emergent problems can all help understand ideational change

Focus on institutions

- synthesis of the of realist and institutionalism in an attempt to grasp some of the distinctive features of the CSDP as an emerging institution in its own right

- institutional overlap is a key feature of the CSDPrsquos development and its operational capacities (overlapping of nato OSCE UN) p15

less conventional approaches

CSDP kind of governance different approach from p15m

- network analysis- CSDP through the lens of Foucauldian governmentality theory- CSDP as a process is driven above all by the transformation of the nation-state in Europe

o a preference for consensus and compromise over any conflicts of interesto dominance of bureaucratic rationales over ideologically driven political narrativeso a functional organization and treatment of issue areao a leading role for national officials and representatives in lieu of leading political

representatives

lsquoThe Struggle for Value in European DefencersquoGiegerich B and Nicoll A (2012) Survival Global Politics and Strategy 54 (1) pp 53-82

defence spending is in a decline that is unlikely to be reversed

Defense spending in Europe

Defense spending in NATO decreased by 7 between 2006-2010 Decrease doesnrsquot obviously mean Europe military capability diminishes

Gvt wishes to decrease but not always possible eg long-term deployments

Rudimentary measure of the efficiency of spending is the break- down between personnel equipment and operations and maintenance

Deploying and using European forces

2008 study showed that armed forces of European countries with some exceptions were falling short of the ambitions defined by governments

up to 2011 still decline of deployed troops reason

- EU MS reduced manpower of the militaries EU is doing less with less- Withdrawal from Iraq reduce Kosovo Lebanon- Intervention fatigue Always mixed results

Not all cuts are harmful eg governments use the financial pressure to retire obsolete equipment focus on what is needed for modern operations

BUT lack of coordination

Huge difference in spending per MS some countries have adjusted their levels of ambition and have shed capability

MS cuts in defense are made on a national basis No coordination with NATO EU or other MS P62

Governments must collectively decide to balance cuts within a multinational setting in a complementary way

Closer cooperation in NATO and the EU

Progress in both organizations so far appears limited EU always lacking behind MS (ex Libya) NATO did send a mission but seem to have problems with states participation was possible thx to US filling the gap

A crucial constraint on the CSDP is willingness of member states to spend enough on defence to spend wisely and to deploy the capabilities so acquired

Pooling and sharing is a solution Benefit in financial and capability terms but at cost of national autonomy

Condition for pooling and sharing to work

- similar strategic cultures- countries whose forces were roughly similar in quantity and quality- defence-industrial policies of states wanting to cooperate needed to be compatible and risks

needed to be shared-

BUT will not allow governments to avoid difficult political choices about capabilities it require investment and will not simply be a vehicle for cost-cutting

Equipment procurement and industry

Why collaboaration only way to build complex platforms that could no longer be produced by any single countryrsquos industrial base

BUT limited cost effectiveness Work had to be alllocated to each countryrsquos industry based on the proportion of the production that its government planned to buy rather than on the efficiency of particular companies

2008 analysis showed few projects were collaborative and nhealthy proportion of equipment spending was on programmes that had begun during the Cold War

2011 ratio of collaborative project is higher but there are no new one

- no visible move in larger programmes towards greater pooling of requirements and collaboration (despite MS say so)

- signs that countries are moving more towards lsquooff-the-shelfrsquo purchases (that is buying versions of tried and tested products) approach avoids high development costs and at least in theory opens procurement to more straightforward competition on value-for-money grounds

Off the shelf good option for countries needing to replace obsolete equipment or expand military capabilities + purchases of lsquomodularrsquo platforms is that they are simply the vessel for the systems that they contain and that it is these systems that provide modern technology

But in the long run manufacturers want to be able to develop new technologies for both platforms and the systems they contain meaning MS should invest in new research to compete with American firm who receive high amounts

Mostly cooperation is done now in civilian sector No new significant entrance into the European defence business (established companies)

the driving aim should be that militaries have access to the technologies theyneed at the best value P77t

2010 UK amp FR signed Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty lsquoto develop co-operation between our Armed Forces the sharing and pooling of materials and equipment including through mutual interdepen- dence the building of joint facilities mutual access to each otherrsquos defence markets and industrial and technological co-operationrsquo

Combined Joint Expeditionary Force to be established

Promising they are by far the largest defence powers in Europe they could catalyse cooperation across Europe more e1113175ectively than the many previous NATO- and EU-wide ini- tiative

However for now strong cultural barriers

CONCL defence in Europe remains primarily a national affair If European countries are to build future capabilities that match the still significant amounts that they spend on defence there is no escaping the fact that more effective cooperation on investments force structures and equipment requirements will be necessary

Power Institutions and the CSDP The Promise of Institutionalist Menon A (2011)Theoryrsquo Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (1) pp 83-100

RQ institutionalist approaches can enhance our understanding of CSDP and using it as a case study it can illustrate some of the strengths and weaknesses of institutionalism

Institutions here are defined as formal humanly devised rules stipulating expected behaviour lsquoInformalrsquo institutions such as conventions and customs are deliberately excluded

I Debating International Institutions

Realist emphasis on state power its evolution will be dictated by the most powerful states and institutions whatever their precise nature will not exert any independent effect on outcomes Institutions = no impact on the returns to power

Institutionalist emphasize the way that institutions shape outcomes not least because in reducing the returns to power they empower smaller states + institutional lsquostickinessrsquo and resistance to change render it difficult for new institutions to emerge or for existing ones to change ndash whatever the preferences of their Member States

II Institutional Change

Why institutional stability

- lock inrsquo whereby social groups and individuals invest in existing institutional structures and hence create resistance to change

- lsquoincreasing returnsrsquo involve high start-up costs for new institutions imply significant learning effects when groups and individuals operate under a particular institutional framework and are char- acterized by interlocking relationships with other institutions ndash all of which increase the costs involved in change

critics

- stability is assumed but When institutionalist see change they see it as dramatic infrequent critical Thus not continual adjustment

- elide the notions of lsquoinstitutionrsquo and lsquoorganizationrsquo =gt tends to equate organizational persistence with institutional stability

WHY

Core assumption is institutions are the object of consensus

Thus infrequent critical junctures when change occurs between these rare occasions settled consensual relations exist between members who all benefit from the fact that institutions lsquoenforce mutually beneficial exchange and co-operationrsquo

BUT

Institutions are not all about mutual benefit contest among actors to establish rules structuring outcomes to those equi-libria most favourable for them

In ESDP perpetual conflict shaped ESDP

- states favoring EUNATO joint action- states with different conception of balance betwwen militaryciviliam- states with contrasting views on the role of the military (force or territorial defense)

Trade off inevitable

III Power in Institutions

Inst Institutions reduce ldquoreturn to powerrdquo enjoy a capacity to lsquocushionrsquo the effects of anarchy notably by regulating the use of force and thereby reducing the importance of power asymmetries

desire to constrain stronger states can be the main intended function of international institutions

case in ESDP desire of other MS to equal weight European integration was born out of a desire to prevent aggression by Germany against its

neighbours translated into the so-called lsquoCommunity methodrsquo within which independent institutions

help insure against dominance by the larger Member States (consensus required between 27 MS)

power capabilities of the relevant states are highly constrainedrsquo

IV Institutions and Outcomes

Inst institutionalism is concerned institutions lsquoemerge as good things and it is their goodness that ultimately explains themrsquo

Rea U is engaged via ESDP in an attempt to lsquobalancersquo against American power Tensions

- European states have begun to aggregate resources through the EU to increase power and project it abroad thus raising their capability

- states are jealous guardians of their autonomy Major EU foreign policy and defence decisions have been made in European capitals rather than in Brussels

=gt effective centralization of decision-making implies a reduction in autonomy for individual Member States

BUT

treating the EU as if it were a state Unionrsquos attempts to lsquobalancersquo against American power have proven erroneous

these claims are based on predictions of the future rather than analysis of contemporary outcomes

Europeans are not unwilling to intervene militarily as long as the humani- tarian rewards are high the costs in blood and treasure are low ndash and twenty- seven states are able to agree that this is the case

supposed ability to lend legitimacy to military interventions activities that might be unacceptable in their original state- to-state form become acceptable when run through an independent [ ] IOrsquo p94b

- EU has fulfilled such a function states use organizations as a cover for the pursuit of their own national objectives (operation artemis) Dangers1 Member States might begin to resent the Union being used in this way2 resentment in those states that are the venue for such interventions

- Institutions can also play the role of an alibi (replacing costly policies at the national level with far cheaper multilateral alternatives ndash Czech nato membership)

impact of institutions is not always positive and that they can on occasion serve less than salutary purposes and even hamper the kinds of domestic reform they were intended to foster

-

- Giegerich B and Nicoll A (2012) lsquoThe Struggle for Value in European Defencersquo

Survival Global Politics and Strategy 54 (1) pp 53-82

- Menon A (2011) lsquoPower Institutions and the CSDP The Promise of Institutionalist

Theoryrsquo Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (1) pp 83-100

- Norheim-Martinsen Per M (2011) ldquoEU Strategic Culture When the Means Becomes

the Endsrdquo Contemporary Security Policy 32 (3) pp 517-534

Institutions

the institutional system of CSDP overlaps to some extent with that of CFSP

Initial steps include creation of

- Political and Security Committee- EU Military Staff - EU Military Committee

Later Civilian Crisis Management Committee

Decision-making is characterised by complex interactions between the Council Secretariat (headed by the Secretary GeneralHigh Representative for CFSP) the Brussels-based Political and Security Committee and decision- makers in national capitals Require consensus between MS

2 Evolution performance effectiveness the debate

Discussion often on technical matters of militarycivilian capabilities (lack of) =gt descriptionprescription - Capabilities-expectation gap - Distincion presenceactorness- Assessment often on the policies but not on the process

+ lack of institutional history

Apparence of CSDPExternal drivers- declining American interest in euorpe- return of cold war- growing demand for for international crisis management resources- changing balance of power of the international and European state systems

Internal drivers

- permissive public opinion- leadership of some governments (in particular that of France) - concerns on the part of the Labour government in the United Kingdom to avoid

marginalization in the EU- the need to ratio- nalize the European defence industry - the habits of co-operation developed between Europeans within Nato and the WEU - awareness on the part of European governments that ever increasing costs have led to a need

to share the defence burden

Critic of EU CSDP

Pragmatic (impracticability)+ ethical concerns

3 Theoretical Approaches to CSDP Towards a lsquoSecond Waversquo

4 core concerns characterize all the approaches adopted

1 Debates interested with notion of power




Question asked













representatives


















































critics



WHY



BUT


















BUT








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Question asked













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critics



WHY



BUT


















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critics



WHY



BUT


















BUT








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BUT


















BUT








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T3 Bickerton Giegerig Menon Norhein-Martinsen

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Transcript of T3 Bickerton Giegerig Menon Norhein-Martinsen