T2 B8 DEA Fdr- DeA Information Sharing- October 2003 Report for 911 Commission 685

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    Revenue Service's (IRS) Crim inal Investigation Division. Throughparticipation at SOD,DBA is able to share its investigative and intelligence information in a concentrated andcentralized environm ent conducive to open information sharing.

    Information Sharing through DEA's Foreign Program

    DEA's Foreign Program assists host nationallaw enforcementagencies in theirenforcement efforts through informa tion sharing. Investigative information gathered byDEA's foreignoffices, as well as any foreig n intelligence that it collaterally develops, isshared with these p artner foreignlaw enforcem ent agenciesto the extent possible, as wellas with the U.S. country team mem bers. BecauseDBA often has extensive and veryproductivesources in these foreign countries, it frequently collects information that is notrelated to drugs. That informationis also passed immediately to the appropriate agenciesfor their use and further development, withDB A assistance if necessary. DBA isrecognized worldw ide as an effective law enforcem ent partner, and a DBApresence oftenfacilitates and encourages informa tion sharing between our foreign counterparts and otherU.S. agencies. An example of the overseas cooperationis that many U.S. EmbassiesinLatin Am erica have established m ulti-agency, mu lti-mission Tactical Analysis Teams(TATs) that focus, in part, on drug activities. TATs are U.S.assets deployed to supportUnited States Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) requirements, but they supportU.S. drug law enforcementefforts, in part, by correlating national foreign intelligenceinformationwith drug law enforcement information. The Information Analysis Center(IAC) in Mexico Cityis similar to a TAT. TATs generally have access to all DB Ainformation for analytical and targeting purposes. Through the IAC , law enforcementinformation is fused with other U.S. inform ation and passed to Mexican authorities forappropriate law enforcement action.

    Intelligence Com munity Sharing

    In order to promote the ov erall strategy and goals of the U nited States ininternationaldrug control, DEA routinely shares extensive am ounts of drug-relatedinformationwith the 1C through its worldw ide drug investigations, programs, andoperations. In the course ofperformingtheir duties, DEA personnel may obtaincollateral inform ation of significant value to the1C and those agencies charged with theformulation of U.S. foreign policy. DEA and the1C agree that, because of the criticaland time-sensitive nature of much of this information,its value is enhanced by sharing atthe field level. At the same time, in order to ensure that other national intelligenceconsumers also be nefit, this info rm ation is disseminated at the headq uarters level as well.Therefore, informationin the follow ing categoriesis shared immediately withthe

    appropriate age ncies in country and, in turn, reported to DEA Headquarters fordisseminationto other consumers: threatsto U.S. citizensoverseas, including U.S.military and gove rnment personnel; international terrorist and insurgent activities;information relating to nuclear/chemical/biological weapons; and the illicit transfer ofmilitary weapons. DE A 's collection also sometimes resultsin the acquisition ofinformation related to foreign political, economic, and military issues. T his inform ation isshared with the appropriate U.S. agencies.

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    DBA also conducts information sharing by assigning DEA personnel to various1C organizations in both liaison and participative working capacities. In exchange, DEAHeadquarters hosts liaison officers fromthe same organizations to reside in DEAHeadquarters work space. Through this exchange, both the 1C and DEA are better able toensure that the critical information needed by each organization flows on adaily, realtime basis. DEA currently has liaison personnel assigned to the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA), the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the USSOUTHCOM,the U.S. Interdiction Committee, and the Joint Interagency Task Force -South. DEA also has personnel assigned to INTERPOL, the National Drug IntelligenceCenter, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Office ofNational Drug Control Policy, and others.

    Intelligence Publications

    Another means used by DEA to fulfill its intelligence sharing responsibility is theproduction and dissemination of reports based on DEA reporting. These reports rangefrom strategic assessments of worldwide trends and patterns to assessments of theoperationsand capabilities of specific drug organizations to information on specific drug-related events. DEA intelligence products are disseminated as widely as possible toensure maximum availability of the informationto analysts in other agencies and topolicy makers. In general, DEA strategic reports are distributed to federal, state, andlocal agencies with a counterdrugrole, along with various drug policy making entities.The information contained in these strategic reports generally is available fo r inclusion inthe databases and information systems of the agencies on distribution for these reports.

    Post September 11 , 2001 Information Sharing Activities

    In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many federal,state, and local agencies, as well as the security elements of the private sector, shiftedresources, focusing more of them on the fight against terrorism. It was easy to recognizethat the most effective way for theU.S. to prevent the next terrorist attack lay with theability of law enforcement and the 1C to exchange valuable information in a timelymanner. The need to have a capability to share critical information and intelligenceamong federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies is clearly evident.

    In the days immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,DEA immediately provided extensive, immediate intelligence support to the FBI andother 1C agencies in support of their counterterrorismefforts. These efforts were

    primarily focused in three areas: direct intelligence analyst support in the days followingthe September 11 , 2001, terrorist attacks; extensive, continuing support of ongoinginvestigations by the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC); and the creation of a systematicterrorism reporting process within DEA to ensure that any terrorism information obtainedby DEA is provided directly to the appropriate agency in a timely and effective manner.

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    Direct Intelligence Supportto Post September 11, 2001 InvestigationsIn the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September11, 2001, DBA immediatelyresponded to an initial FBI request for analytical assistanceby offering 50Intelligence Analyststo support terrorism investigations.By mid-September,36DBA analysts were detailedto FBI Headquarters where they provided supportto

    componentswithin the Telephone Analysis Unit (TAU) at the StrategicInformation Operations Center(SIOC). These DBA analysts were membersofteams that worked around-the-clockto analyze and synopsize voluminousamounts of data and forward that informationto the appropriate investigativeelements. By mid-October, as the FBI internal effort caught up with their initiallyoverwhelming workload,the 24-hour/7-dayper week work schedulewasmodified and only 12 DBA analysts remainedat the FBI. By early December, theDBA analysts returnedto their regularduties.

    DBA field offices also supportedthe FBI onpost-September 11 terrorisminvestigations. As an example, DEA's New York Field Division assigned an

    Intelligence Analystto the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forcefrom December 15,2001, to March 13, 2002, to provide and share extensive expertiseon telephonetoll information management.

    EPIC SupportEPIC is a DBA sponsored joint intelligencecenter whose mission is to serve asthe national tactical intelligence centerfor drug law enforcement. It has 15participating federal agencies and, throughits 24-hour per day, seven days perweek Watch Program, brings togetherin one place 33 federal databases and sixcommercial databasesto which all federal/state/local participating members haveaccess. EPIC further supports U.S. law enforcement and interdiction componentsthrough the timely analysis and dissemination of intelligence onillicit drug andalien movements. It also provides support to terrorism investigations.

    One notable supporteffort to terrorism investigationswas DEA's immediateresponses to the September 11 attacks. Within hoursof the attacks, databasechecks and analyses were providedby EPIC through its processing of multiple"watch lists of names" provided by the FBI. These lists, composedof thousandsof names, were processed throughthe 33 databases available to EPIC, andresponses were providedto the FBI within a matter of days. The supportprovided by EPIC continuesto be a mainstayin the intelligence sharingandanalysis efforts against terrorism suspects. Since September11, 43 percent ofEPIC's federal memberagencies', and 4 percent of EPIC's state and localagencies', inquiries have been relatedto counterterrorism,homeland defense,andhomeland security. This supporthas resulted in a greater than 50 percent increasein inquiries to EPIC, with virtuallyno increase in personnel resources. As a resultof these counterterrorism, homeland defense,and homeland security inquiries,EPIC checks hav e provided over 40,000 leadsand over 7,600 communiquesto

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    investigators. The support being provide dby EPIC has not ended. EPICanticipates providingthis level of support as long as it is needed.

    While DBA has always shared on a timely basisany information it collected onterrorism, it was necessary after the September 11 attacks to assess whether additionalpolicies or procedures needed to be established. It was determ ined that DE A couldstrengthen its ability to share any terrorism related informa tion in the followin g ways:

    DEA HeadquartersCounterterrorismUnitThe DEA Terrorism Informa tion Sharing Program institutionalizes w ithinDEAthe A ttorneyGeneral's directive to coordinate information and activities toprevent and disrupt terrorist activities. Und er this program , all DEA entities mustidentify investigations that have a nexus or potential nexus to extremist andterrorist organizations, and must provideto DEA Headquarters a synopsis andstatus of those investigations, includingthe identificationof any otherparticipating agencies associated withthe case. The program is designed toidentify any pertinent terroristinformationdeveloped and pass it to theappropriate U .S.and foreign government components. Implementationof theprogram is carried out at both thefield and headquarters levels.

    At the field level, both domesticallyand overseas, all extremist or terrorist relatedinformation developed in the course of investigations,debriefings,or reported byother law enforcement sourcesis immediately documentedin a teletype and on aDEA 6 (Report of Investigation) to DEA Headquarters. If the information isdeveloped overseas,the DEA country office immediately providesa copy of theinformation to the respective U.S. Government agencies thatare part of the localCountry Team (such as the State Departm ent Regional SecurityOfficer, MilitaryAttache, FB I Legal Attache,etc.). If the informationis developed domestically,the responsible domestic D EA fieldoffice immediatelypasses the information tothe local FBIoffice and to the Jo int Terrorism Task Force, if oneexists in theirarea. The field's direct sharing of terrorist info rm ation with their counterpartsensures the timely sharing of theinformation and puts it directly and qu ickly intothe counterterrorismchannels best suitedto use theinformation.

    All reports forwarded by the field elements to DEA Headq uarters go to the ad hoccounterterroristtask force which is part of the Co unterterrorism Unit. This unit issupported by bo th the O perations and the Intelligence Divisions of DEA , and is apermanent, specialized unit within DEA He adquarters established to provideadditional support and coordination betweenDEA and outside agencies relative to

    terrorist related investigations.As a follow-on to the reporting by the DEA fieldelements, all terrorism related informa tion provided to the C ounterterrorism U nitat DE A Headquarters is also provided to both the FBI and the CIA via theirrespective liaiso n officers assigned to DEA H eadqua rters. Further, theinformation put into DEA databases is earma rked asextremist/terroristactivitieswith a specific file code so that all suchinformation is indexed and can be quicklyand accurately retrievedat any time in the future. This secondary reportingby

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    DBA Headquarters ensures thatall reporting by DBA field elements to their localcounterparts is matched by DBA Headquarters reportingto the headquarterscounterparts elements.

    Debriefing of Con fidential SourcesIn a review of its Con fidential Source (CS) policy, DBAhas made it mandatorythat all initialdebriefingsof potential CSs must include a determination of anyterrorism related information.The Agent's Manual specificallystates: "TerroristActivities. It is extremely important that the CS be questioned about theirknowledge of any terrorist activities,foreign or domestic. If the CS hasknowledge of any terroristic activities,the information willbe recorded in thedebriefingreport and appropriately disseminated."

    Conclusion

    On various levels, and in specific instances,DBA has been very successful inestablishing intelligence and inform ation-sharing exchange mechan isms thatfunctionacross all levels: local, regional, or natio nal. The challenge forDBA continues to be toidentify the 'best practices'of informa tion sharing so arduously developed for drug lawenforcementand use these as the basis for even better information-sharing support.DBAbelieves that thelessons learned, and the protocols established, in sharing dru g relatedinformation are directly transferable to com bating terrorism and other crime.DBAcontinues to identify and implem ent improved methods to share inform ation and remainsa strong partnerto those U.S. entities involvedin law enforcement, nationalandhomeland security,and counter terrorism activities.