Still punching below its weight? Coherence and effectiveness in European Union Foreign PolicyDaniel C. ThomasJCMS 2012 Volume 50, number 3, pp 457-474

General claim among scholar: weakness of EU FP is a lack of coherence between member state.BUT does coherence = effectiveness?

Coherence

Definition: Adoption of determinate common policies and the pursuit of those policies by EU member states and institution. (p458 b)

2 dimensions:

- Policy determinacy: how clearly a policy adopted by the EU articulates the union’s goals and how narrowly it specifies the behaviors incumbent upon EU MS and institutions in order to achieve those goals. (high determinacy make it easy to distinguish between Compliance and NC.) Measure: interpretation, by the wording.

- Political cohesion: how fully EU actors support whatever common policy has been agreed. Measure: familiarity with the content and nuance of policy in question and how MS actually do

Political cohesion may be less likely if there is a high determinacy.

Effectiveness

Union ability to shape world affair in accordance with objectives it adopts on particular issues (p460).

Objectives can take many forms Pursue of objectives through use of sanctions, demarches, persuasiveness of arguments,

institutions…Measure:

- Evidence of the influenced outcome: before and after the EU’s position.- Evidence linking this change to the EU effort

Competing hypotheses

H1: EU coherence increase effectiveness of EU foreign policy (p461). Expectation probabilistic, assumptions:

- Collective material resource and persuasive powers are deployed on the common obj.- A policy with high determinacy reflect stronger commitment- Strong commitment are seen durable

H2: EU coherence reduces the effectiveness of the EU foreign policy:- Preference of MS can be so different, they only can reach a non-constraining common

position- Too long deliberations (no timely fashion response on evenement) Effectiveness reduced if : principal representative of coherent EU position lacks credibility

or commitment to representative prevent MS from palying good cop/bad cop

H3: EU coherence has no impact on EU FP effectiveness.: International politics is too complex or too powerful

Study case:

EU clash with the US over bilateral ICC non-surrender agreements : Considerable political cohesion

o Medium determinacy, guideline was also applying to non MS.o High cohesion: despite a group of against (led by germany) and a group favoring

(led by Italy and Britain), no BNAs were signed amongst MS. (p463 b, 464 t)

Evidence does not support H1, achieving actorness is no guarantee that the EU will punch its weight politically (p472)

Causal mechanism for H2 does not apply in this case

EU general inefficacy seems related to the disproportionate pressure apply by the 2 sides (p472):- EU have moral and legal arguments: only soft power- US cutting military and economic aid: use of hard power

Coherence might be necessary, but clearly not sufficient.

Toward a social Theory of EU Foreign and Security PolicyChris J BickertonJCMS 2011 Volume 49, Number 1, pp171-190.

This article argues that the study of EU F&SP has been hampered by its conceptualization of the sovereign state.

Realist sees CFSP as the sediment remaining once the rivers of the national interest have run dry.Constructivist focuses on identity rather than interests.

Yet judge the EU upon state standards and it will fail.

I. Supranationality without supranational institutions

EU classified in 2 useless categories: State embryo & clash of national sovereignty.

Original conception (Haas): 1. Institutional structures2. specific relations developing between civil servants & minister, Trade unions & cartel

executives, coal consumer & administrator.

Supranationalism:- Haas: Style of politics, orientation on the part of national governments and its

representatives toward the pursuit of compromise and accommodation with other MS.- Keohane & Hoffman: cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants

refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of compromise upgrading comon interest

Subjective orientation of national political elites + creation of institution

II. EPC & CSCE: bureaucratic victory

WWI dismantling sovereignty in Europe. Duirng détente, growing pragmatism of EU states combined with retreat of superpower confrontation permitted FP cooperation. (but sleeping, awaken after second cold war) (p176 m)

1975: Helsinki final act is signed after the conference on Security and cooperation in Euorpe (CSCE) 3 baskets:1. International security2. International trade3. Movement of people, ideas & info (commitment to Human Rights)

Unity on the matter permitted via disinterest of US (busy with the Vietnam & middle east), eg what relation indv state should have with the US (leadership, independence & self determination issues)

And interest also lost from European head of states, preferred that national pursue negotiation = empowerment of official on their own

EPC approach reflected EC working method: negociation super complex. (p177b)- Preparatory work conducted by exports seconded to purpose-built working group

- Among WG arose gradually a real community of imterest- CSCE WG of the EPC divided into sub committees = technical discussions rather than

political narratives /stated ideological position

III. COPS: pursuit of the necessary compromise

- Committee between intergovernmental & supranational policy making- Oriented toward consensus and compromise- Made of national representative of ambassadorial rank- Under the authority of permanent representatives, sit on the COREPER.

Created in the 60’s as part of the wider council pyramid, supposed to resolve disagreements between national capitals quietly, far from the medias.

Procedures are administrative, but the outcomes are political (Cops role as mixture of politics and techniques). When SEA passed, COPS remained.

COPS as supranational COPS members initially were active deputies to the political directors (shall COPS not rival COREPER), but as too much workload, political director gradually disappearedToday, is a permanent brussel based body.

COPS as intergovernmentalMS set up cops to ensure national political control of EU FP making. COPS main role is to run ESDP missions.

Both COPS and COREPER however are consensus generating machines. (p180b)

Consensus must and will be found (p181m) = > solve problems above national interests considerations

IV. Toward a social theory of EU F&SP

The EU distils in a unique concentrate a more general, diffuse transformation of the modern state (p182m)

Modern state:

- Multiplicity of the political forms contained within it: tension between rule of men & administration of things (diff government & governance)

- Shift from a representative conception to a regulatory one (p183 t)- Sovereignty as a form of rule supplanted by the rise of the state bureaucracies and

their regulation of populations.- Contrast between democracy and bureaucracy: struggle isn’t between capitalism &

socialism, but between individual self realization & soulless technocracy.

According to the Marxists:

Bureaucracy: the power of the bureaucracy is inversely proportionate to the strength of democracy ( Bureaucracy is the result of inability of party to sustain democratic involvement of the masses)Bureaucratic rule subvert democracy by actualizing the claim of popular sovereignty .(p183 m)

Competition between demo and bureau is a feature of the modern state. Balance of power reflects the struggles of the moment. (p183b)

European integration can be therefore considered as the result of the failure of political experiment, empowering conservative national bureaucracies. Every international relationship affect sovereignty (p184b)

The EU as such, depoliticize all MS (EU: consensus oriented) , we obtain “policy without politics”

Issues in the COPS lacks interconnected political philosophy: taken on individual merit and treated as such (p185m) -> lack of coherence.

Changing relation between bureaucracy and democracy explain EU pragmatism in F&SP. EU strategy favor crisis management role where as mediator it can adopt ethically neutral stances, this is the legacy of Europe’s destructive attachment to the secular absolutisms of communism and facism. Pragmatism belong to bureaucratic world view where abstract matters of principles are subordinated to concrete gains. (p186t)

The European External Action Service: Antidote against Incoherence?Simon DukeEuropean Foreign Affairs Review 17, no1. (2012): 45-68

This article compliment existing literature by considering coherence in the EEAS, at level of services.

1. Terminology, coherence and EU external action

Coherence:

Oxford Dictionnary: action of fact of sticking together or harmonious connection of several parts of a discourse, system etc, so that the whole hangs together.

Hillion: aside from absence of legal contradiction, coherence is about synergies and added values.

Consistency:

Quality, state or fact of being consistent.

Background:

December 2002: Convention Working Group VII on external Action echoed the 1970 EPC statement noted in the final report: Need for an enhanced coherence between institutions and actors as well as within each institution (specifically reffered as coherence at the level of the service). (p 47 t). + if a HR post was to be created, the potential EEAS should assist this HR (enhancing coherence + efficiency)

Subsequent document did mention coherence only in term of output

April 2010: - council agreement on political orientation for EEAs, aims to enable greater

coherence and efficiency in the EU external action and increase its political and economic influence in the World.

- Ashton three jobs meant to increase coherence and efficiency similarly. 1. Chair of foreign affair council (draw agendas for monthly meetings), VP of commission, HR for CSDP.

2. Coherence, the Lisbon treaty and the EEAS

Coherence or consistency is ensured in:- TEU (article 21(3))- TFEU (article 7)

consistency is an obligation. Horizontal coherence is mandatory and vertical coherence is extended by TEU at 4 (3)

BUT

Issue: to which extend vertical coherence is an obligation in area where it has no conferral of power? (neo-westphalian resistance of MS!) p49 b

Vertical coherence difficult if who do what is contested.

EEAS stipulations about coherence:- Should assist the HR/VP, should ensure coherence, shall work closely with MS,

shall assist the pres of the European council, pres of comm and comm. => all ensure coherence (p50t)

- Role of the EEAS defined by what falls beyond the scope of “normal task” of the commission services and the council secretariat (p51m). therefore institutional and legal space of the EEAs will depend on a number of factors (p 53m)

BUT

How? By mutual consultation. Does not stipulate how extensive (p51t), nor which area! CFSP specific rules and procedures, a pillar in everything but name. Who do what is not very clear, when does it fall as a normal task, or when is it relating to

“exclusively or principally to the common F&SP”? Question status of the EEAS. Has a legal capacity but n explicit legal personality. Is coherence a shared task with the commission when specific responsabilties are involved?

In case of question of competence, legal services of the commission and the council secretariat to decide. Ultimately, European courts.

A bit vague.

3. Programming and instruments

HR shall ensure coherence […] in particular through external assistance instruments

EEAS is responsible for preparation of the decision of the commission regarding the strategic, multiannual steps within the programming cycle (= external assistamce instruments p54):1. Determine the financial envelope for each region2. Country and regional strategy papers (CSP/RSP)3. National and regional indicative programmes (NIP/RIP) -> identifies priorities4. Annual action programme established within CSP/RSP NIP/RIP5. Implementation of the instruments, full cycle project management by relevant body.

Instruments are EDF (European development founds), DCI, ENPI, instrument for cooperation with industrialized countries, Instrument for Nuclear Safety cooperation, IfS (p54b)

EEAS responsible for different stages according to the instrument (p55t), nature of involvement and joint work with the commission within the first 3 stage is vague, and leave room for the commission to protect their traditional role. (p55m)

Moreover, pre-lisbon PCD program was meant to improve coherence in theEU external action. It raise post lisbn a dilemma on coherence because covering already many areas, should it become the de –facto benchmark? But problem on hw PCD which was meant for the commission apply to CFSP.

The criteria for coherence depend on the viewer.

4. Organizational culture, coherence and EEAS

- Coherence within EEAs assured by corporate board, smooth functioning of the service. Corp Board give guidance to policy board (BP)

- Policy Board ensure general coherence (under HR/VP). Bridge between the EEAs and the foreign affair council and general affair council and council secretariat with relevant commission DG. Policy board is the point to reach for potential agenda items.

- The HR will be abe to fulfill consistency depending on how she is perceived in the service. The service is newly staffed from different department & therefore bureaucracy and culture + national diplomats of considerable diversity. is reasonable to anticipate that each will keep their current modus operanti and character (p59t)

5. External security, coherence and the EEAS

Coherence impacted with the result of pre-lisbon division between area (diplomatic, trade, crisis management)Positive: CMPD, CPCC creation should ensure coherenceGaps: Gap remain between planning of military operations and implementation, as EUMS have no mandate to oversee those aspect (p61m)The position in the EEAS of SitCen may limit its abilities to service its other important roles

6. The EEAS, The MS and coherence

MS often seen in context of vertical coherence, but horizontal also important. Lisbon provides for it at a number of place.Pre-lisbon already proving, but novelty is in the involvement of the MS both in HQ and in the delegations. Factor for coherence:- the manner in which diplomats approach their assignment- extend of reciprocal support and info exchange EEAS/national diplomats- council require shift in loyalty from national to supranational, but issues vertically

because they then have ensure national position are coherent with the union and not vice versa. Trouble. (p64b)

7. Coherence, the EU delegations and visibility

Several risks:- Presence of commission staff in delegation, risk that commission interest are too

much represented- Head of delegation will principally occupied with early stage of programing, risk

that they get less into the field (ambassador in name only)- Concern of coherence related to communication and overall visibility of the EU in

the world (p65)

Recommendation from p 66.

Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?Stanley HoffmannJMCS, Vol 38, No2 pp189-98 june 2000

1. Conundrum of CFSP

West European unification was a natural framework for common diplomatic and defense policy. Reasons for creating a CSFP:

- makre war between france and Germany impossible- leaving diplomacy aside was somewhat clumsy- not doing it would be accepting dependence on American protection

First signal is Washington pressing for Germany rearment. => fiasco of france trying to limite it via creating of EDC + fiasco to recover from it via creation of Euratom and EEC.

Following fouchet plan failed for two reasons:- institutions: france wanted intergovernmental, Belgium and Holland wanted a more

supranational- purpose: European Europe emancipated from American tutelage. Other country

didn’t agree.

Timid declarations druing the cold war.

Reason to move toward CSDP:

o Early 1990, moving toward common diplomacy seems necessary:- need for common approach for the countries that were soviet satellite- relation with the US changed: 1. Power balance, huge gap with individual European states.

2. US was less concerned in what was happening in Europe.

o New threats perceived:- would be immigrant attracted by euorpe- flood of asylum seekers (yougoslavia)- fear of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and turmoil in Algeria.

o Incentive to reconquer at the central level what had been lost at national level

however few was accomplish. Only initiative was a French one stability pact in 94 by Balladur.

WHY?

- shadow of two fiasco’s- postion of france (autonomy from US) different from UK- constitutional limitation on Germany deployment outside NATo, buttressed the dream of

many germans- smaller of the EU reluctant to promote CFSP (replacing American seen as an issue).- The US did not like the idea.

2. revival of CSFP

- main reason was UK change in stance with sant malo, 1998.:

o UK wants to do smth awaiting delayed decision n joining euroland.o UK position could be maximized in world affair, re-axing the france/german link to

france/british (end of Kohl)- France was favourable for long- Germany wanted to reassure its partner by being a good European- Clinton administration was being less dogmatic about NATO predominance- Kosovo war gave a very strong push to the idea of CFSP, because of policy difference with

the US. EU was prefering of diplomacy to put an end to the war and excommunicating Milosevic.

- Soon Solana was appointed as the HR (secretary general of NATO) noted the potential shift from NATO predominance to a a EU security policy.

3. The Bumpy Road ahead

Several difficulties:- Kosovo unfinished business – ICC- Pushing CFSP & geographical expansion is not self-evident- Institutional aspect of CFSP remain problematic: requirement of unanimity to prevail- UK position is not resolved. Washington acceptance is still troublesome.