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1

pontaneous Order

ritain, rivers almost always kee to the lefthand side of the road.y It is temting to answer Bease that is the law in Britain. ainly someone who drove on the right wold be in danger of

pr etion for dangeros driving. Bt British drivers dont keevshly to a the laws governing the se of the roads. It is a riminale for a driver not to wear a seat belt, to drive a vehile whose

sreen wiers are not in working order, or to sond a horn at night1 a bilt area bt these laws are often broken. Even eole who

rh rflly break the law against drnken driving a very serios offene,c ying heavy enalties sally kee left.

e answer to the original qestion, srely, is Bease everyone elsevs on the left. To drive on the right in a ontry in whih eoleally drive on the left is to hoose a qik rote to the hosi tal ort metery The rle that we shold drive on the left is selfenforing.

o we do not always need the mahinery of the law to maintain orderial affairs sh order as we observe is not always the reation

l vernments and olie fores. narhy in the literal sense (abseneil venment) annot be eqated with anarhy in the ejorative sense der olitial or soial onfsion). The notion of sontaneos d r- to se Friedrih Hayeks hrase or orderly anarhy to se s Bhanans 95, . 4-6)-is not a ontradition in terms s driving on the left is a rare eamle of sontaneos order, and m st ases the absene of government does lead to disorder and

'u on bt this is not a selfevident trth. The ossibilities ofaeos order deserve to be looked into.

s book I shall investigate the etent to whih eole an o" heir behavior an maintain some sort of soial orderwithot


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4 Spontaneous Order

Everyone ends up trapped in a situaton n whch everyone would preferit f everyone contributed towards the supply of the publc good; buteach person finds t n his interest not to contribute. This problem sknown varously as the problem of publc goods', the problem ofcollective action', the prsoner's dilemma problem' and the tragedyof the commons'.

In realty, however, some public goods are suppled through the

voluntary contributons of prvate individuas, without any pressure fromthe government. In Brtain, for example, the lfeboat service is paid forin ths way If you are n danger at sea, the boats of the Royal NationalLfeboat Insttution will come to your rescue, even f you have nevercontrbuted a penny towards their costs; and you wll be charged nothingSo the existence of the lfeboat service is a public good to everyone whomght have to call on its servces. The same applies to blood banks. Ifyou need a blood transfuson n Brtan, t he National Blood TransfusionService wll supply the blood wthout charge; so the existence of ablood bank s a public good to everyone who mght some day need atransfuson Ths public good s supplied by unpaid donors Countlessmore examples could be given. Works of art, great houses and stretches

of countrysde are bought for the naton through fund-raisng appe als;the work of the churches n many countres s almost entire ly financedby private gifts; and so on, and so on

Economics has found it extremely diffcult to explain this sort ofactvity, which run s counter to the theoretical predicton of free-ridngbehavour2 It seems that economics underestimates the ablity ofindividuals to coordinate ther behaviour to solve common problems:it s unduly pessmstc about the possbility of spontaneous order.

1 3 THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT

The power of governments is not unlmted: some laws have provedalmost impossible to enforce The most famous example is probablythe American experence of Prohibtion. Prosttuton, too, is notorouslyresistant to the laws of purtanical governments In centrally plannedeconomes, black markets are smilarly resistant to the forces of lawThe attempts of successve Britsh governments to regulate trade unionactvty have had, at best, mixed success.

Wise governments do not risk losng credibility by passing laws thatcannot be enforced; and when such laws are passed, w se polce forcesturn a blnd eye to violations of them Britsh polcy towards speed lmitson roads provides an interesting example The speed at whch most people

Spontaneous Order 5

actually drive on a paticlar road is used to help determne the levela whch the speed limit s set. If the vast majority of drivers are observedo break a speed lmit on a particular stretch of road, ths is taken tobe evdence in favour of rasng the limt

One mplcaton of this is that governments mus t, i f only as a matterof prudence, take some account of the possiblty that the laws they mightwish to pass may be unenforceable The willingness or unwillngness

of indivdus to obey the law s a constraint on the government's freedomof acton. Obvously, for any law, there will always be some people whowll not obey t except under threat of punshment; but the system ofolicng and punishment is lable to break down if everyone is in thisostion In other words, if a law is to work t must not go too muchanst the grain of the forces of spontaneous order. Adam Smth puts pont well in The Theory of Moral Sentiments:

The man of system . . . is often so enamoured with the supposed beautyof his own ideal plan of government, that h e cannot suffer the smallestdeviation from any part of it. . . He seems to imagine that he can arrangethe different members of a great society with as much ease as the handarranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider

that the peces upon the chessboard have no oter principe of motionbesides that which the hand impresses upon them; b ut that, in the greatchessboard of human socety, every single piece has a principle of motionof its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuseto impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and act in the samedirection, the game of human society will go on easly and harmonously,and s very ikely to be happy and successful. If they are opposte ordiferent, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at allimes in the highest degree of disorder (759, Part 6, Section 2, C. 2)

A ore fundamental mplicaton s that it may sometmes be misleadingI thnk of the law as the creation of the government, imposed on tszens This characteristcally utiltarian vew s the one economistsally take; the law, for most economsts, s a policy nstrument' tohe controlled by a benevolent socal-welfare maxmizng government.(conomsts often recommend that the government corrects' a marketr 1 lre by means of some change in the law for example that monopolyp wer should be limted by antitrust law , or that the law of propertyd be changed so as to internalize' external effects) But t mayh hat some mportant aspects of the law merely formalize and codfyventions of behavour that have evolved out of essentially anarchic aions; as n the case of the speed limts , the law may refect codesor eavour that most ndividuals impose on themselves

The ritish rule of driving on the left provides another example If


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6 Spontaneous Order

you were caught driving on the righthand side of the road you wouldnormally be charged, not under any aw specificay requiring you todrive on the eft, but with the catchall offence of dangerous driving' .Cleary it is dangerous to drive on the right, but only because everyoneelse drives on the left. In other words, driving on the right is ilegalbecause it is contrary to convention: the law foows the regularity inbehaviour, and not the other way round. To admit this possibility isto say that if we are to understand why the law is as it is, and how it

works, we must study anarchy as wel as government.There is another way in which the power of governments is limi tedevery government inhabits a word that contains other governments. Thedifficulties that this creates are often swept under the carpet in theoreticaeconomics, where the typical mode is of a selfcontained society presidedover by a single government. As I mentioned earier, economists t endto talk about the government' rather than governments'.

Writing in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes noted that internationa affairs provided one of the best examples of pure anarchy(Hobbes, 165, Ch. 13) . Three hundred years ater, that insight remainstrue; we are no nearer to the prospect of a word government with thepower to enforce its rulings on recalcitrant states. In the meanwhie,unfortunately, the dangers of internationa anarchy have increased

immeasuraby. Quite apart from the continuous increase in the destructivepower of miitary weapons, there is a growing tendency for the peacetimeactivities of one nation to impinge on the citizens of others. Considerthe problems of acid rain, polution of the sea, overfishing anddeforestation. In al these cases and there are many others - conservationis a pubic good on an internationa scale. Each nation has an incentiveto take a free ride on the conservation efforts of other nations.

In cases like these, the economist's traditiona recommendation ofgovernment intervention' is useless; there is no government to intervenein the affairs of nations. The institutions and conventions of anarchyare the ony ones we have within which to find soutions for some ofthe most pressing problems of our time. This aone would be sufficient

reason for studying spontaneous order.

1 .4 MORAL VIEWPOINTS

Practica economists are expected to draw poicy conclusions' from theirstudies of human behaviour. A policy conclusion, as every economistknows, i s a recommendation about what the government ought to do.The economist's job , it seems, is to observe and explain the behaviour

Spontaneous Order 7

of private individuals - workers, consumers and entrepreneurs - and thento advise the government. I t is a curious fact that academic economistsarey think of doing things the other way round - observing the?eh

aiour of governments and then using their ndings to advise private

dvduals Such work is done, but only in response to a demand, andor pay it is consutancy' . In contrast, advice to governments - unaskedor and unheeded - can be found in any economics journa.

In a sense, the usua stance of the economist is to pretend he is thegovernment, and free to impement any policy he wishes. Appied

conomics is argely about predicting the consequences of alternativeoicies that the government might adopt. In order to make theseedictions, the economist has to try to mode the behaviour of privatedividuas as accuratey as possible; he has to understand how they tuay behave. But there is no need to do the same for the government; e concern is not with how governments actually behave, but ith whatwoud happen if particuar policies were adopted. In the jargon ofconomics, the behaviour of governments is exogenous to the theory.

s is part of what I have caled the US Cavary' model in which thevernment is an unexplained institution, always on ca to impement

watever solutions to social problems the economist can devise.his government'seye view of the world has led economists to take

ather onesided view of moral questions. The normative branch of oomics caled, significanty, wefare economics' or social choiceI ory' - is concerned with questions of the kind What is best forety?' or What would generate most wefare for society?' o r Whatgt society to choose?' Notice that these are the sort of mora questionsI hat would be faced by a benevoent and allpowerfu government ofI h ' ind that the economist imagines himsef to be advising.

s, however, is only one aspect of morality, and one that is rather1 ote from the concerns of the ordinary individual. For most of us,Wat ought Ito choose?' is a much more pressing moral question thanWat ought society to choose?' Economists have hadvery little tosay >t the morality of individua behaviour. The prevaiing view, I think,1

at we should take individual moraity as we find it, and treat it as d of preference. There is even a tendency to restrict the words' a and ethical' to judgements about the good of society as a whoe.M y economists (including mysef, I must confess) have made use of ayi's (1955) distinction between subjective preferences' and ethicalp f ences' A person's subjective preferences, which by implication ethical, are those that govern his private choices, while his ethicalP ces are his disinterested judgements about the welfare of society t woe arsanyi argues that in order to arrive at ethica preferences,


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8 Spontaneous Order

a erson mst try to imagine himself in a osition where he doesnt knowhis own identit and has an qal hane of beoming anyone in soiety.The log of ths aroah that the roer viewoint from whih tomake moral dgements is that of an imartially benevolent observerlooing on soiety from above; in a literal sense we an never take thiviewoint bt when we think morally we mst try or best to imaginehow thgs wold look to s if we were imartial observers. Thisonetion of moral thinking is not of orse eliar to moderneonomis; it is the view harateristially taken by writers in thetilitarian tradition and an be traed bak at least as fa r as Smith (59)and Hme (40)

ne of he mai thes of this book is that there is another viewointfrom whh an dVdal an make moral dgements his ownviewoint. Individals living together in a state of anarhy I shall argetend to evolve onventions or odes of ondt that rede the etentof interersol onit this is sontaneos order. The origin of theseonventns the terest that eah individal has in living his ownfe wthot omg into onflit with others. Bt sh onventions anbeome a basi omonent of or sense of morality. e ome to believe

that we are entitled to eet that other eole reset these onventionsin their delings with s; when we sffer from other eoles breahesof onventOns we omlain of instie.

So I shall are someof or ideas of rights entitlements and stiemay be rooted onventns that have never been onsiosly designedby anyone. They have merely evolved. soiety that ondts its affairsn aordane with sh standards of stie may not maimize its welfare any sense that wold be reognized by an imartial observer. To tth the other way rond a benevolent government may find that itanot aimize soial welfare evalated from some imartial viewt thot vlatg onventions that its itizens regard as rinilesof JUte.

It is of orse oen to the tilitarian or the welfare eonomist tosay Too bad abot the itizens ideas of stie or dty is to maimizesoal welfare. Bt to a this is to take a viewoint something likethat of a oloal admstrator benevolently trying to advane thewelfae of a natie olation. r as Bhanan (95, . ) ts itther s a sgestn of laying God. In a demorati and oen soiety mrat not be something searate from the morality thatgdes vate dVdal the ondt of their own affairs. gooddeal of or vate moraty I shall be arging has nothing to do withthe ratnal refletns of an imartial observer. To nderstand it wemst nderstand the fores of sontaneos order.

2Games

2 THE DEA O A GAME

Thenotionofspontaneousordercan,Ishall argue,bestbeunderstood

byusing thetheoryof games. InthischapterIshall explainhowIintend

tousethis theory, illustratingmyargument withavery simple game

whichprovidesausefulmodelofhowsocial conventions mightevolve.

Agameis asituationinwhichanumber of individualsorplayers

interact, andinwhichtheoutcomeforeachofthemdependsnot only

onwhatheorshechoosestodo, butalsoonwhattheotherschoose

todo.Here isasimple example,whichIshall callthe'banknotegame .

Twopeople, AandB, aretakentodifferent rooms, andarenotallowed

tocommunicate withone another . Theorganizerofthe gamethentells

eachplayer: 'I have donateda5noteanda 10notetoenablethis

game tobeplayed. Youmust saywhichofthetwonotes youwantto

claim . Ifyouclaimthe samenoteastheotherplayer, neither ofyou

will getanything; buti f you claimdifferentnotes,youwilleachget

the noteyou claim. Notice that both playershaveaninterest inthe

existenceofsomeconventionaboutwhotakeswhichnote, eventhough

theywouldnotagreeabout whichconventionwasbest .

I havedeliberatelychosenagamethatcouldbeplayedinacontrolled

experiment, soastoexclude the complications that would bebound

toarise inanydiscussionofreal social relationships.Forthepresent,

mypurposeisonlytosetout thelogicofgametheory. However, there

aremanyrealproblemswhosestructureissimilar tothatofthebanknote

game; someofthese will bediscussedinchapter 3 .

Inthebanknotegame,eachplayer hastochooseoneoftwostrategies.

A can claimthe 5 note (which may be called strategyA1 ) or the

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44 Free idersstabe equiibrium strategy This, of course, is conditiona on the vaueof being sufficienty high, as defined by (7A.)-(7A3) Since c2cq,these conditions may be compressed into the singe condition

(7A.4)

t is a specia case of this proof that the strategy of icensed free riding

is a stabe equiibrium for the (extended) snowdrift game. t is aso aspecia case of this proof that the titfortat strategy Tt is a stabeequiibrium for the (extended) snowdrift game and for the (extended)prisoner' s diemma game For the snowdrift game, q = 2 and v>C> sothe restriction on that maes T a stabe equiibrium strategy is

This is the resut stated in Section 73 For the prisoner's diemmagame, q = 2 and c >v, so the restriction is

We may reproduce the exchangevisit version of the prisoner's diemmagame- the version set out in Figure 6. and discussed in chapter 6 - bysubstituting v b, c = b + c and c2 c. Then the restriction on 1 reducesto >clb, the resut proved in Sections 62-6.3

8Natural Law

8 . 1 CNVENTINS AS NATAL LAW

n the preceding chapters have shown how socia ife can be reguatedby rues that evove spontaneousy and that, once estabished, are sefenforcing These rues are conventions.

The conventions have anaysed fa into three broad categories Thefirst of these is made up of conventions of coordination - the inds ofconvention examined in chapter 3 These conventions evove out ofepeated pay of games of pure coordination, ie Scheing's rendezvousgame, or out of games of the crossroads or eader' ind, in which thedegree of confict of interest between the payers is reativey minorTypica exampes of these conventions in socia ife are: eep eft' (o reep right') and give way' rues on the roads; the use of money; weightsand measures; maretpaces and maret days; and anguages

The second cass of conventions is made up of what sha caconventions of property - the inds examined in chapters 4 and 5 Theseconventions evove out of the repeated pay of games of the haw -doveor chicen ind, or reated games such as the war of attrition and the

division game n a of these games there is a rea confict of interestetween the payers they are in dispute over something that they aant, but a cannot have This something may be a physica obect, e the $2 bi of Friedman's exampe (Section 5 ) , or an opportunitych as the use of a pubic teephone or a seat on a train, or the priviege

f taing a free ride on other peope' s contributions towards the suppyof a pubic good Typica exampes of these conventions in socia ifee: the finders eepers' rue; the principe of prescriptive rights' (that. , the principe that a right can be estabished by ong occupation or

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46 atural Law

sage); the mortane of stom andrate' n abor dtes;

qees; and the rne that everyone resonsble for the tdessof hs own front garden The fna ass of onventons s made of onventOns

_of

reroty -the knds I examned n haters 6 and . These onve_n10ns

evolve ot of the reeated ay of games of the exhngevt rrsoner's dlemma knd, or reated games ke the mtaad, snowdtand bgood games. In these games ndvdas hoos betwen

strateges of ooeraton' and defeton'; t ontraryo the mmedatenterest of an ndvdal to hoose ooerate' bt by og so he_nfersbenefts on others. Conventons of reroty resbe that dVdasshold ooerate wth those eole who ooerate wth tem- bt notwth others Conventons of ths knd an be fond rates f malrestrant ( reset yor nterests f yo reset mne), mtal ad (I heyo when yo need my hel f yo he me when I need yor), tadeand exhange (I kee my romses f yo keeyors), and ontbt10nstowards the sly of bl goods (I ontbte towards goods thatbeneft both of s f yo ontrbte too). . These onventons reglate nteratons between _dvdas statons n whh ther nterests are n onft. (The onflt o teests most obvos n the ase of onventons of roerty and of rero

ty,

bt there s some onflt of nterest n many of the games from whhonventons of oordnaton evolve. nly n the sea ase_of a re

oordnaton game do ndvdals have ometey ommn trests )Statons of onft of nterest are ones n whh we tyaly vokedeas of ustice; n ases of seros onft we may be able to aealto the orts Ths onventons flfl some of the same ntOns asostve laws (that s, aws romgated by some atoty, sh asParament or Congress or the Kng); bt whereas stve laws are therodt of onsos hman desgn, these onvent10

_ns ve evoled

sontaneosy, ot of the reeated ntratons of nddas wtonfltng nterests. In ths sense, onventOns of oordat10n, roertyand reroty are natral laws

In sayng ths I am- as n so mh ese - olog Hne. The an1 have gven of the evolton of onventOns s, I beleve, essentalthe same as Hme's aont of the orgn of jste - fleshed ot wtmore detas and formlated n gametheoret terms. H e arges thajste s a vrte that rode(s) leasre and arbat10n by meansof an artfe or ontrvane, whh arses from the rmstans anneesstes of manknd' (40, Book 3, Part 2, Seton ), by whh seems to mean that rnes of jste are soal onventon o,r senof jste s not nnate n the way that or natral affetOns (s

Natural Law 147asourfeelingstowardsourownchildren)are. Hume'swayofputtingthisistosaythatjusticeisanartificia'ratherthannatura'virtue. But:

wh dy justc to a atural vrtu, I mak us of th word, ntul,oly as opposd to ticil I aothr ss of th word as o prcplof th huma md s mor atural tha a ss of vrtu so o vrtu smor atural tha justc Makd s a vtv spcs ad whr avto s ovous ad asolutly cssary, t may as proprly sad to atural as ay thg that procds mmdatly from orgal prcpls,

wthout th trvto of thought or rflxo Tho th ruls ofjustc ticil thy ar otity Nor s th xprsso mproprto call thm Lws of Ntue 1740, Book 3, Part 2, Scto 1)

Notice thatforHume justiceis avirtue.Oursenseof justicehasevovedout of repeated interactions between individuas pursuing their owninterests; but it isamoralsense: webelieveweought tokeep to theLawsof Nature' . In Hume'swords, we annexthe idea ofvirtuetojustie' (1 740, Book 3, Part 2, Section2

InthisrespectHume'sconceptionofnatura lwshoudbedistinguishedfrom another conception that has been much discussed by poiticatheorists - thato fThomas Hobbes's Leviathan ( 165 1) Hobbes startsunashamedly fromeachindividua' spursuitof hisown interests. Natural

aw,for Hobbes, is asystemof ruesthat it is ineachindividua'sinteresttofollow - and nothingmore. Sofar, Imustconcede, my approach hasbeenessentiallyHobbesian. Conventions, Ihave argued, arestablebecauseoncethey havebecome established,itisineveryone'sinteresttokeeptoemI havebeenmoreoptimisticthan Hobbesaboutthepossibiitiesforcooperationinastate ofnature,butmystartingpointhasbeen the sameas is . (Thesimilaritiesbetween Hobbes'stheory andthosepresentedinisbookareexploredinan Appendix.) However, Inowwishto foowumeinsuggestingthat natura awscancometo have moralforcefors. Let me make itc earthat I amnot presenting a moral argument: I amnotgoingtoarguethat weought to behave according tonaturalawWat Iamgoingtoargueisthat we tendto beieve thatweoughtto.

8.2 BREACHESOFCONVENTIONS

nastrictappication ofmydefinitionof convention ' (Section2. 8, canneverbe inaperson's interest tobehavecontrary toaconvention,ovidedhe canbesurethatotherpeoplewilabidebyitNevertheless,oplesometimes dobehave contraryto the sortof practica rulesthatI aveclaimed areconventions .


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150 Natural Law

.

1 th t conventionsofthekdI hav

eThepointoftheseexames_

sdYsomethingmorethantheinterest

analysedintibookamate

- mostofthetime.Weexpectthateachindvdualhaskeepgt

ohere ulatedbyconvention,but

thatourdealngs_withotherpeople!entffact: wefeelentitledtothisexpectatOnmorethanaJU g hen they deal withus, and we

expect others to follow c?nventOsethesameofus.Inotherwords,recognizethattheyareenttledto e

pto use Hume's expression,

conventions are often also norms, or '

principlesofnaturallaw.

8.3 WHYOTHERPEOPLE'SEXPECTATONS

MATTERTOUS

f m some actionX ou also have a

Suppose you want_me to per our experience of other people'sconfident expectt10n based Yth tIwilldox. IntheeventI do

behaviour in simlacrcumstancesi

f tanyouhadexpectedto be. Thensomethingelse,leavgyouworseo

.yon-d;

o

ap: ,: E t' ; d !:c

necessarytocallonanys h istict f n wouldhavedoneXmynotmetodoX; otherpeople,

hnmysuacesresentmentisaprimitivedoingXhashurtyou. Int eseccu

huafsturalhumanresponsetofeeluY0i:focus ofanoher person's rese_

ntmeia:ed by other people' s

our evaluatOns of our actOnbl all remember foolish actionsexetations

ous o:attimethatwedidmerelybecauseactOnsthatwe new o them and expected us to do themother people wanted us o tdodbywhatwetaketobeotherpeople'sC 1 we canbemotVaeuousY,h thoseotherpeoplearetotalstr

angers,expectationsaboutuseven

bw en

rd easonforustocareabouttheir

andwhenthereseemsto enoso r

opinionsofus. dwaitingtopullout into amainSupposeyou aredrvga cr an

trafficandyouhavewaitedsome

road.Itisdifficulttodagapni behindyou. Doesn'tthe meretime. Aqueueofve:Icles

ha

es

uwith

pdrivers whoarewaitingfor

yo

presenceoftheseot ervec ' u I can only recordmy

topullout, putpschologalpresueIooowhatthedriversbehindownresponsetothssorto saOdhappentomeetagain,sotherewillneverrememberme,

de;orw:ctingintheirinterestsorpunishmeisnowaytheycanrewar

atural Law 5

for not dong so. (Thus the reatonsh between them and me s notke those of the games that generate onventons of mutua assstane.)But at t he tme t does seem to matter what the drver behnd thnksof me. know he wants me to u out as quky as ossbe I knowhe has eetatons about norma drvng behavour and beause ofths fee under some knd of ressure not to behave n a way that hemght judge overautous.

Here s another eame. Suose you take a ta rde. Y ou knowt s norma to gve the drver a t, but you have reahed your destnaton

safey and you an be as good as sure that you w have no more deangswth ths artuar drver. (Perhas you are a tourst n a ty to whhyou do not eet to return.) In any ase, the drver s unkey toremember your fae. So, n the ordnary sense of the words, t s notn your nterest to gve a t. Nevertheess, many eoe do t nrumstanes ke these others (and here, I regret to onfess, I sakaso from ersona eerene) kee ther hands n ther okets - butwth senstons of unease and gut. It s one thng to adot a oyof not tng, and another thng to arry t off wth anahe. hysnt t easy for us not to t? arge art of the answer, I suggest,s that t matters to us what the tadrver thnks of us. e know hewants a t. e know he eets a t. e know that he knows that

we know he eets one. If we dont t we sha be the fous of hslw , f ony for a few mnutes. dmtt edy, there s very tte he ando to us the worst we an eet s a sarast remark. But snt theere knowedge of hs w towards us a soure of unease?

In eah of these eames t s mortant that the other erson notony wants us to do somethng but aso expects us to do t and hseetaton s based on hs eerene of what other eoe normayo. If we were motvated smy by a desre that other eoes wantsoud be satsfed - that s, by atrusm- ther eetatons woud notatter to us. But n these knds of ases eetatons do matter. eee under ressure not to sow down other road users by drvng nusua ways, but we do not fee under the same knd of ressure to

eed them aong by showng them uneeted degrees of ourtesy. eont fee under ressure to gve the tadrver a bgger t than weink he eets. No doubt busdrvers are as muh n need of etraiome as taidrvers, but we dont fee under ressure to t them.

n the eames I have gven, the eoe whose onons o f us matter s are, n the gametheoret sense, our oonents they are eoeose nterests are drety affeted by our atons. But thers are not ony onons that matter to us. hen we ay a game we aso areout the onons of thrd artes eoe wth no dret nterest n


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I

1 62 Nturl Lw

I hae caed natura aws are grounded n each nddua's ursut of hsown nterests they are aswersto the queston, How best cn I roemy nterests a word whch other eoe are romotg thers

Notce howeer that Hobbes 's natura aws are found out by reasonThe dea' seems to'be that natura aws can be deduced by a chan ofogc from a few sefedent frst rnces Ths s n marked cotrastto Hume' s dea that natura aws evolve and are lerned by expeence.If natura aws can be found out by reason, then resumaby there sa unque code of natura aw that can be dscoered

b

any ratona

erson n any socety Ths eaes no room for the ossby that somenatura aws mght be conentons rues that hae eoed artcuarforms n artcuar socetes, but that mght hae eoed otherwse

So much for what Hobbes men by natura aw What about tscontent? Hobbes formuates no fewer than nneteen aws of nature, butthe core of hs system seems to be contaned n hs frst three aws Thefrst aw of nature s that eery man shoud seek eace, and foow t' ths s resented as art of a more comrehense rue

i is a precep or general rle of reason tht evey mn ought toendevou pece s f s he hs hope ofotining it; nd when he cnnototin it tht he my seek nd use ll helps nd dvntges of w

(Hoes 1651 Ch. 14)In thestateof nature - thatis , inasocietywithoutgovernm

ent - noma

has anyhopeofobtaining peace; and so,inaccordance with Hobbes'

generalruleof reason' , thereisastateof war ofallagainst all: eve

man, Hobbessays,has aright toevery thing. Thesecondlawofnatu

expandsonthepreceptthatevery manought to endeavourtowardspeac

Ths aw s

ha a man e willing when ohers are so oo as far-forh as for.peceand defence of himself he shall hin i necessary o lay down hs gho all hings; and e conened wih so mch liery agains oher menas he wold allow oher men agains himself (Hoes 1651 Ch 14

This requiresthat men bewill ingtomakecovenantswithoneanot

ifthesecovenantsaretobe morethanemptywords, theremustb

thirdlawofnature: 'thatmenperform theircovenantsmade Ths lu

is the fountainandoriginal ofJUSTICE' (Ch . 1 5) . But in thestat ol

naturethis lawhas littleforce, because:

Ifacovenantbemade,wherein neither ofthepartiesperformpresenly

but trust oneanother;intheconditionofmerenature, whchis aconditi 1

Nturl Lw 163

of war of every man agains every man pon any reasonale sspicioni is void: if here e a common power se over hem oh wih righand force sfficien o compel performance i is no void. For he haperformeh firs has no assrance he oher will perform afer . . .. Andherefore he which performeh firs does eray himself o his enemyconrary o he righ he can never aandon of defending his life andmeans of living. (Hoes 1651 Ch. 14)

Hobbes s descrbng a robem whose structure seems rather ke thatof the rsoner' s demma game and artcuary ke the erson ofthat game that I caed the tradng game (Secton 6 . 1 see aso Tayor,1976 1 0 1 - 1 1 ) . In the state of nature, two or more eoe may beabe to beneft from some agreement roded that a the artes tothe agreement kee t But each arty s temted to make the agreementand then break t, n the hoe that the others w st kee to t Snceeeryone knows that eeryone ese s temted n ths way, no one cantrust anyone ese to kee an agreement; and so agreements can neerbe made Ths robem stands n the way of any escae from the warof a aganst a, snce the ony way to achee eace whch eeryonerefers to wars by an agreement to cease fghtng

Contrary to my arguments n ths book , Hobbes seems to be camngthat ths robem has no souton within the tte o nture agreements

can be made ony f there s a common ower' set oer a ndduaswth suffcent force to come them to kee agreements Th s s why,accordng to Hobbes, eeryone w agree to subect hmsef to somesoeregn ower, roded that eeryone ese does the same; once thsagreement has been made, the state of nature s at a end

For my ont of ew, howeer, what s most nterestng aboutHobbes's aws of nature s that ther centra rnce seems to berecrocty Each erson must endeaour eace, as far as he has hoeof obtanng t'; as the second aw of nature makes cear, ths meansthat each must be reared to make eace roded that eeryone esemakes eace too Smary, each erson must kee hs art of anyagreement he has made, roded that the other artes to the agreement

kee thers To am for more than ths to refuse to make eace eenthough eeryone ese s wng, to break your sde of an agreement eenthough you know the other sde w be ket s contrary to natura awIn other words, t s contrary to ratona sefnterest As Hobbes utst, ustce [s not contrary to reason' ( 165 1 , Ch 15)

Hobbes takes the case of an agreement between two ndduas,accordng to whch on e erforms hs art of the agreement before theother (Comare Hume's case ofthe two farmers - see Secton 6. 1 )Suppose one of the parties has performed already'. Then:


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164 Naural Law

here is he quesio wheher i be aais reaso ha is aais hebeefi of he oher o perform or o Ad I say i is o aais reasoFor he maifesaio whereof we are o cosider frs ha whe a madoh a hi which owihsadi ay hi ca be foresee adreckoed o edeh o his ow desrucio howsoever some accidewhich he could o expec arrivi may ur o hs beef ye sucheves do o make reasoably or wisely doe Secodly ha i acodiio of war wherei every ma o every ma for wa of a commopower o keep hem all i awe s a eemy here is o ma who cahope by his ow sreh or wi o defed hmsef from desrucio

wihou he help of cofederaes where every oe expecs he same defeceby he cofederaio ha ay oe else does ad herefore he whichdeclares he hiks i reaso o deceive hose ha help him ca i reasoexpec o oher meas of safey ha wha ca be had from his ow slepower. He herefore ha breakeh his covea ad cosequelydeclareh ha he hiks he may wih reaso do so cao be recevedio ay sociey ha uie hemselves for peace ad defece bu by heerror of hem ha receive him or whe he s receved be reaied ii wihou seei he daer of heir error which errors a ma caoreasoably recko upo as he meas of his securiy . . . . (Hobbes 65 Ch. 5)

Hobbes's argument here seems rather ke the gametheoretc arguments

I presented n chapters 6 and 7 showng that strateges of recproctycan be stabe equbra. Hobbes s sayng that n the state of naturesefnterest w ead each nddua to foow the strategy Keepagreements ony wth those who keep agreements wth others'. (Thsseems to amount to what I hae caed mutatera recprocty' comparethe mutuaad game of Secton 7 2) It s n each nddua's sefnterestto foow ths strategy proded eeryone ese does.

It seems that after a Hobbes recognzes that some agreements wbe made and kept n the state of nature. How ese coud men combnento confederatons' for sefdefence? And Hobbes specfcay mentonsthe case of a coenant to pay a ransom . . . to an enemy' whch the condton of mere nature s] obgatory' ( 165 , Ch. 14) These

agreements work because sefnterest eads eeryone to foow a strategyof recprocty. Howeer Hobbes s extremey pessmstc about the enof cooperaton that can be expected n the state of nature. Here I hato confess that I cannot understand Hobbes's argument He seems tobe sayng that athough t s ratona ( .e. n your sefnterest to perforyour part of an agreement f the other party has aready performet s not ratona to perform frst because you hae no assurance thathe other party w perform after you. Ths seems nconsstent f yoknow that t s n the other partys nterest to perform why doe snt th

Natural Law 1 65

gieyoutheasuraceyouneed? Hobbes'spictureofthestateofnatureseems soethglkeanextendedprisoner'sdilemmagameinwhicherne1s followga strategyofcautiousreciprocity; sincenooneISwlngtomak.e the firt moe nooneeercooperates. But iftheanas1s. of SectOn 6.4 1s correct this is not necessarily a stableqbu . Inaworldofcautiousreciprocatorsitmaypaytobebraetmaybeeachindiidual 'sinteresttomakethefirstmoe. Inothe;words cooperatncan eole inaHobbesian state ofnature.


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9Rights , Co-operation

and Welfare

9 . 1 SYMPAHYANDSOCIALWELFARE

f myargumentsofarisright, arueis ikeytoacquiremoraforce

if it satisfies two conditions: Everyone(or amosteveryone)inthereevantcommunityfoowsthruf

le d d 1 foows the rue it is in his interest that hi2 any v1 ua f t topponents that is ,thepeopewith whom hedeas - o ow ooAnyruethatisaconventionnecessariy satisfiesathirdcondition: Providedthathisopponentsfoowtherue, itisineachindividua interesttofoow it.NoticethatnoneoftheseconditionsrequiresanycomparisontoebetweenawordinwhichtherueisgenerayfooweadoneV . IC

it is not . This leadstoanimplicationthatmanywill

fsurp

aconvention can acquiremora forcewithoutcontbutgtosoc< wefarei nanyway h 1 d puTake forexampe,thoseconventionsofpropertyt at resove sinfavorofpossessors Suchconventions, havargue.arekeyto becomenorms .Yetin manycasestheymaintainequaes tatse. l arbitraryfromanymora pointofview(except, ofcourse,avewpo thatmakesmoraityamatterof convention) . Theasy.mmetryet possessor andchaengertendsto beprominent,unambgousahhut

proof, sowecaneasiyunderstandhowsuchaconventOnmg


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70 Rights Cooperation and Weare Ri ht C ti d W 7


19/28

70 Rights Co operation and Weare

ations of othrs yt w fail not to xtnd it to our own ations. Thgeneral rule rahs byond thos instans from whih it aros whilat th sam tim w naturally sympathize with othrs in th sntimntsthy ntrtain of us (Hum 740, Book 3, Part 2 Stion 2)

I have quoted ths passage at ength because t so cose paraes mown argument about how conventons become norms When other peopebreach conventons n ther deangs wth us, we are harmed; and weresent ths Ths, I take t, s the prejudce we receve mmedate from

the njustce of others When other peope breach conventons n deangsn whch we are not nvoved, our nterests are st endangered, becausewe ma have to dea wth these peope n the future Ths s perhapswhat Hume means when he speaks of the prejudce we recevemedate And we fee uneas about beng the focus of otherpeopes resentment: we natura smpathze wth them n thesentments the entertan of us ur dsapprova of other peopesbreaches of conventons, and our uneasness about our own breaches,are unversazed n our acceptance of the genera rue that all breachesare to be dsapproved of: conventons ought to be kept

Hume s argument dverges from mne, however, n stressng the roeof sympathy Accordng to Hume, we are dspeased b breaches of

conventons even n cases n whch our nterests are competeunaffected; and our dspeasure stems from smpath Whether ths cas compatbe wth m own argument depends on how we supposesmpath works

ne concepton of smpath s endorsed b Hume when he sa s thathe happness or mser of an human beng, or ndeed of an anmacapabe of these feengs, can affect us when brought near to us anrepresented in lively colours' ( 740, Book 3, Part 2, Secton 1 ; m tacThe dea here s that the extent of our smpath wth another persos usua a product of the reatonshp between hm and us: hs happne or mser has to be brought near to us f t s to engage our smpathesThus, other thngs beng equa, we tend to smpathze most strongwth those peope whose stuatons are most ke our own: these are tpeope wth whom we can most eas dentf Now suppose that I awafoow a partcuar conventon For exampe, suppose that I never p kpockets Ths respect for estabshed rues of propert ma be a mat 1of smpe prudence: I am not partcuar dextrous, and afrad of becaught But whatever the reason for m keepng to the convento have no experience of the pckpockets satsfacton at successfcompetng a job of work In contrast, I do have experence of th e f HIof havng m pocket pcked ; I ma aso have experence of feeg a 1

Rights Cooperation an d Weare 7

an reentment after beng robbed n ths wa Thus, I suggest, I shabe cned to spathze ess wth pckpockets than wth ther vctms More enera, f I foow a conventon I sha be ncned to smpathzeess th those who breach t than wth those who are harmed b thesebreaches Thus, to use Humes words, we can be dspeased b njustcebecause of a natura tendenc to smpathze wth the uneasness of thosewho are the vctms of njustce

So fr there s no contradcton wth the argument of ths book But,accordg t Hume, we smpathze wth the vctms of njustce because

we consder justce prejudca to human socet Hs poston s mademore cear n hs summngup of the passage I have just quoted:

Thus se-interest.is the rginal motive to the stablishmnt ofjustice:

but_a sympathy wth publc terest the source ofthe moral approbation,

whch attends that virtue (740, Book 3, Part 2, Stion 2)

oticethatHumeis takingaboutsmpathwithpublicinterest.Thedeahereseemstobethatwesmpathizeimpartiawitheveroneseasuresandpains; becauseprincipesofjusticeworkinthepubicteret,tebaanceofoursmpathiescomedownonthesideofjustice?nthsvew_ofsmpath,conventionscanacquiremoraforceonfthecontbute

to theoverawefareofsocietItisatthispointthatIpartcompanwithHume Theideathatwesmpathizonthebasisofsomekindofcost-benefit anasisseemspschoogca impaibe No doubt we arecapale ofimaginingoursevestothpostOnofwhat AdamSmith( 1 759,Part3 Ch3)caedan mpartaspectator , smpathizingequawitheveroneinsocet;_but, as Smith himsef recognized,4 this is not how oursmpathesnaturallywork

Tthisit mightbeobjectedthattheconceptofamorajudgementreqUresadegreofimpartiait; howeverpartiaoursmpathiesmae urmoradgementsmustbeuniversaizaber, asHumeputt,_tsacnvntnofanguagethatwefixonsomesteadyandgeneralPtsofVew whewemkem?raljudgements(cf. Section8.3)

Iaccepths,butwcanbempartalWthoutbeingimpartiallysympatheticAJu_dgewhompartiauphodstheawofpropertneednot(and,Ithink,w not)awasdecidecasesinthewathat woudbedictatedbanqua mpthfor evermemberofsociet;butheisnevertheessmpartal. Smilarly, if I amprepared tocondemn all breaches ofaconvention, incudingmown,mcondemnationissufficientsteadad gen

_era tobe recognizabeas mora; I need notbeievethat theconventOnworks fortheovera wefareofsociet

72 ihts Coopertion n Were ihts Coopertion n Welfre 73


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72 ihts Coopertion n Were

Some readers may sti think that conentions are too arbirar toform the basis for a system of moraity mora judgements t Jghtbe argued shoud foow from the impartia ppiatin of a few smpeand genera mora principes To answer ths obeOn sha try toshow that the moraity that grows up around conentOns - the moratyof natura aw oes hae a unifying principe

92 THE PRNCIPLE OF COOPERATION

Inthis book I havearguedthatcertaink indsofconventiostendto

evolvespontaneouslyinhumansociety,andthattheseconventOnscoe

tohave the moralstatus ofprinciplesofjustice, onaturallw It

temptingto suppose that ifthe members ofa socety suscbet oa

commonmoralcode then that code must serve somesocal purpose

Theremustbesome'sense,w earetemptedtosay, inwhich

thiscdeis goodforsocietyBut thisisamistake A I haveargednSecton9 1 conventionscanacquiremoralforceWthou

t contbutgtothe

oeallwelfareofsocietySoifthereisaunifyingprinciplebehindnaturallaw, it is not aprinciple ofsocial welfare

Nevertheless it ispossible to extract a general prcple from my

argument abouthow conventions acquire moral for

: Recall that,

accordingtomyargument, aconventionislikelytoacqremoralforce

ifit satisfiestwoconditions: first,thatalmost everyonetherlevant

communityfollowsit; andsecond, thatitis ineachindividal'sterest

thatthepeople with whomhedeals follow therule,provdedthath e

followsittoo(Section9 1 ) (Thefirstconditionensuresthat everne

expects everyone else tofollowtheconvention;the secondcondto

ensuresthateveryonewantseveryoneelsetofollowit) Sothemora

rules thatgrowuparoundconventionsarelikelytobeinstancesofthe

followingprinciple

Theprinciple ofco-operation .5 LetRbeaystrategythatc?uldbchoseninagamethatis playedrepeatedlym so

mecm

ty.Le

thisstrategybesuchthatifanyindividualfollowsR, t hsteret

thathisopponentsshoulddosotoo Theneachindividualhasamora

obligationtofollowR, providedthat everyone else6 doesthesame

Let memakeitclearthatIamnotclaimingthatthisprinciple

constitutes

thewholeofour morality I am claiming only thatherea stro

tendency for ustosubscribetomoral rules that arenstaces?fh1s

principle; toputthis anotherway,weareinclinedtogvethsprc1p

some mora weight

ihts Co opertion n Welfre 73

t does I beiee appea to some common mora intuitions Supposethat amost eeryone in the community foows Then if pay a gameagainst you it is reasonabe for me t o expect that you wi pay Forme to pay is for me to act in a way that can reasonaby expect tobe in your interests (since if you do pay my paying wi be inyour interests) Equay for you to pay is for you to act in a waythat you can reasonaby expect to be in my interests Then if pay but you do not hae acted in the way best cacuated to ccommodateyou but you hae faied to reciprocate The mora intuition behind the

principe of cooperation is that in such a case hae a egitimatecompaint against you Take for exampe the crossroads game Supposeit is the genera practice at crossroads to gie priority to the ehiceapproaching from the right Suppose you aways foow this practiceThen gien the way other driers can be expected to behae you arebehaing in the way that is best cacuated to benefit them eccentricaychoose t adopt the strategy of neer giing way to anyone and in doingso put your ife at risk Then you hae grounds for compaint against me

The moraity that grows up around conentions then is a moraityof coopertion t is aso a moraity of rihts f eeryone ese in mycommunity is foowing am obiged to do the same Notice thatthis obigation arises out of my reationship with other indiiduas

am obiged to benefit them because they are benefiting me yobigation then is to prticlr other people Corresponding with myobigation to foow is eeryone eses riht that shoud do so eachother person is entited to demand that meet my obigation to himThis is quite different from the sort of obigat ion imposed by a moraityof maximizing socia wefare or of maximizing the sum of happinessin the word - which are obigations to no one in particuar

Any system of moraity that rests on an idea of cooperation mustincorporate some reference point from which benefit or disbenefit isto be measured The idea is that if benefit you am entited to demandthat you benefit me in return but benefit is a comparatie conceptWhen say that I hae benefited you am saying that hae madeyou better off than you woud hae been in some other state of affairsthis state of affairs is the reference point What then is the referencepoint for the principe of cooperation that underies natura aw? Thereference point is the status quo

Why do say thi s? Notice that the principe of cooperation obigesan indiidua to foow a strategy ony if eeryone ese is doing s oThus there can be a genera obigation for eeryone to foow onyin a state of affairs in which is being generay foowed n otherwords to suppose that there is such a genera obigation is to suppose


21/28


22/28

Notes 179


23/28

Notes

PONTANEOU ORDER

1 s ontaneousorderisthecentralthemeofHayek'sthree-v

olumework

La. Legislation andLiberty (1979). InThe Constitution ofLzbert! (1960,160) Hayek attributesthephrase spontaneousorder'toPol.anyp2 Sme economists (eg Becker, 1974)have tried to exla voluntay

conributionstothesupplyofpublicgoodsintermsofonentnalecooc

theory eachindividualisassumedtochoosethecontbutontataxmzes

hisowutility takingotherpeople's contributionsas given. ItISclamedtha

such a theor is consistent with the observation tat some vluntary

contributionsaremade_eventhoughthetheoryalsopredctsthatpublic

goods

will besuppliedinless-than-efficientamounts.Ihaveargedthatthe

ledne

ofvoluntarycontributionstopublicgoodscannotplausblyb

eexpae m

thisway(Sugden,1982,1985;seeaso.rargos,1982,PP1921).3. ThisshrewdanalogyisduetoWllams

(1973,p.138).

2 GAME

1. Thispieceofterminologyisdueto l


24/28

2 A stategy coesponing to T1 (ie Play "ove if you opponet isin goo staning o if you ae not othewise play "hak ) can be effo the hawkove game But with the paticula utility values I use mpesening the hawkove game this staegy tuns out n_ot to be a stableeuilibium howeve close the value o 1 IS to 1 . My veson of the hwk_ove game is euivalent to the snowft game wth v = 4, Ct = 2, c2 = , thsgives max [c2v c2(c1c2)] = 3 Hee I am assuming the pobability of mstakes to be sgfcantly small

4 Mackie (1980, pp 88-9) offes two iffeent intepetations of Humesowing example On one intepetation the owes poblem eely tocooinate thei stokes (pehaps each owe has one oa): ths IS a puecooination game On Mackies othe intepetation it is a pisones ilemmagame in which the playes aopt titfotat stategies

5 The iea that the voluntay supply of public goos can be moell bythe chicken game has been evelope by Taylo an Wa (?82); as I poteout in ection 73 the snowift game is a fom of the chcken game

6 To simplify he pesentation I shall ignoe the possibility that v mightbe exactly eual to one of c Cn

7. Moels in which public goos ae suppl e ths k of way have beenpesente by among othes Taylo (1976, Ch 3) an Guttman (978)

8 This iea is evelope by Nozick (1974, Ch 2) 9 Lifeboat sevices coul no oubt be oganize on the club pncplepovie lifeboatmen wee pepae to be sufficientl uthless an esce onlythose who ha pai subsciptions But given the pncples on whc the lifeboatsevice actually opeates its lifesaving activities ae to the beneft of anyonewho goes nea the sea

8 NATURAL LAW The poblem of wishful thinking is exploe by lse (983)2 Hobbess fifth law of natue is OMPLAISANE; that to say that ever

man strive to accommodate himse to the rest' (1651, Ch 15) Hobbes sagument is that a man who wishes to suvive an ospe am_ong othe menought as a matte of puence to cultivate a complasant o soabl chaacteIf this agument is coect we shoul expect some tenency fo blogcal natualselection to favou the same chaacte taits . 3 ee Hume (1740, Book 3, Pat , ection 1) fo a statement of ths law

4 The iea that moal jugements ae univesalizabe is evelope by Hae

(19S2) It will be clea fom what follows that I o not ccept Hes 82)moe ecent agument that univesalizability entails some k of utltaasm5 In the ivision game thee is one symmetical convention- that of eualivision But all the othe conventions in this game an all the conventnsin the hawkove an wa of attition games ae asymmetcal6 An iniviual who benefits fom the fact that a paticula convention hasbecome establishe might pehaps esent such meekness because of ts tenency

to unemine the convention; but as long as the conventio is secue theexistence of a meek minoity woks to eveyone elses beneft

Notes 183

7. Ihavedevelopedthisideamorefullyinarecent paper(Sugden1984).AsIemphasizeinthatpaper the ethicofreciprocityisnottobeconfusedwiththeprinciple oftencalledKantian thatingameswithaprisonersdilemmastructreeachindividualhasanunconditional moral obligationtoplaythecooperativestrategy(cfLaffont 1975;Collard978;Harsanyi980)Aprincipleofreciprocityobliges aperson toco-operateonlyif others co-operate too.

9 RIGHTS, CO-OPERATIONANDWELFARE1 Lewis calls these sim

ply 'conventions; his definition of conventionexcludestherulesIhavecalledconventionsofpropertyandconventionsofreciprocity (seeSection2.8)2. ThegamethatshetakesasherparadigmhasthesamestructureasthebanknotegameIpresentedinchapter2: therearetwoplayersandtwoalternativeconventions onefavouringone player andonetheother 3 AnalternativereadingisthateverybreachofaconventiontendstoweakenitOnthisreadingwereceive 'mediateprejudicefromacts ofinjusticeonlyiftherulesofjusticeworktoouradvantageinthelongrun.4 IntheTheoryofMoralSentimentsSmitharguesagainsttheviewthatour approval of principlesofjustice is grounded in sympathywith publicinterest: 'Theconcernwhichwetakeinthefortuneandhappinessofindividualsdoesnotincommoncases arisefromthatwhichwetakeinthefortuneandhappinessofsociety(1759, Book2, Section2, Ch3).5 Thisprincipleisacloserela

tiveofthe'principleoffairnessformulatedbyHart(1955). ItalsohassomesimilaritieswiththeprincipleofreciprocitythatI havepresentedinarecentpaper (Sugden 1984).6 Or ifweareconcernedwithpracticalmoralityalmosteveryoneelseSuchaqualificationistheoreticallyawkward butunavoidable.7 ThispointismadebyBuchanan(1985,p63)8 'TakeupthewhitemansburdenIAndreaphisoldrewardITheblameothoseyebetterI Thehateofthoseyeguard

References 185


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Selten, R (1978) The chain store paradox Theory and Decision 9 127-59Selten, R (1980) A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal

conflicts Journal of Theoretical Biology 84 93-101Sen, A K (1970) Collective Choice and Social Weare Edinburgh: Oliver and

BoydSen, A K (1977) Rational fools: a critique of the behavioural foundations

of economic theory Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 31744Sen, A K (1979) Personal utilities and public judgements: or what's wrong

with welfare economics? Economic Journal 89 537-58

References 187Shubik, M (1971)The DollarAuctiongame: Aparadoxin noncooperativeehaviorandescalation. Journal ofConflictResolution, 15, 109-11.Slovc, P.andTversky,A.(1974) Whoaccepts Savagesaxiom? BehavioralScience, 9 368-73.Smith, A. (1759)The TheoryofMoral Sentiments, editedby D.D. Raphaeland A L.Macfie Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1976.Smith, (177

6) AnInquiry into theNature and Causes ofthe Wealth ofNatwns, edtedby R.H. Campbell, A S. Skinner andW.B. Todd. Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1976.

Sugden, R.(1982) On the economicsofphilanthropy.EconomicJoual 92

34150 'Sugden, R.(1984) Reciprocity: thesupply ofpublic goodsthroughvoluntarycontributions EconomicJoual, 94 772-87.Sugden,R. (1985)Consistent conjectures and voluntarycontributions topublicgoods: whythe conventional theory doesnot workJoual ofPublicEconomics, 27 11724.

Taylor, M(1976)AnarchyandCooperationLondon: John WileyandSons.Taylor, MandWard,H (1982)Chickens, whalesandlumpygoods: alternativemodels ofpublicgoods provision' Political Studies, 30 35070.Tullock, G. (1967) Thewelfarecostsof tariffs,monopoliesandtheft. WesteEconomic Joual, 5, 224-32UllmanMargalit, E (1977) The Emergence ofNorms.Oxford: ClarendonPressWalmsley,L (1932) ThreeFevers.London:CollinsW

illiams, B. (1973) A critique of utilitarianism. InSmart, J. J C. andWilliams, B. Utilitarianism: For and Against Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press

Index 189


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Index

Allais, M. 15-16ambiguity 99-101 136-8 166analogy 50-2 94-7 176animal behaviour 25-9 1013Arrow, K 23asymmetry: cross-cutting 157 in

crossroads game 3542 embeddedin structure of game 437 8991labelling 13 outcome 1213 inpublic-good game 135-8 141-4in snowdrift game 12932 see also

convention, game

attraction, zone of 21attrition, war of: see war of attritionAxelrod, R 28 110 113 115 1201

136 142 181

Bacharach, M 16banknote game 933 passim 183basic value judgement 154 177

Becker, G 178Bell, F. 123 1278Bishop, D 634bluffing 63-4 80-1brave strategy 11516 see also

reciprocity

Buchanan, A 183Buchanan, J I, 8 139 177

Camacho, A 178

Cannings, C 634cautious strategy 109 see also

reciprocitychainstore paradox 180Chammah, A 181cheat-proofness 99-101 138 166

chicken game 58 179 see alsohawkdove gameChristmas card conventions 54closeness (related to prominence) 89

93-4 97-9 137-8

clubs 139-40Collard, D 183collectively stable strategy 28commitment 80-3 140complementarity (in division game) 67confidence (in war of attrition) 77-8

83-6conspicuousness see prominenceconvention 31-3 and passim;

asymmetrical 157 of coordination

145 established 33 of property1456 of reciprocity 146symmetrical 157

cooperation, principle of 1724coordinaton game 15 33 489

934 133 139 1456 1568

1678credibility see commitmentcrossroads game 34-52 145 1567

173

188

Dawkins, R. 28Debreu, G 2developmentally stable strategy 28division game 66-73 87-8 91 98

158 182

dollar auction game 63 see also warof attrition

drift 74

Elster, J 182entitlement theory 175

equality 97-9equilibrium 1931 and passimevolution biological 25-9 152

contrast between biological andsocial 26 28 58 1013social 26 and passim

evolutionarily stable strategy 25-31exchangeviit game 104-5 181 see

also prisoner's dilemmaexpectations 150-61 1723expected utility 15-16 21experience, learning by 16-17 20-1

favoured role (in war of attrition)

75fertility (of conventions) 51 94first claimant 89 95-7forgivingness 115 166fragility (of conventions) 138-40

161

free riding 3-4 6 122 124 131-45161

game: 9 and passim; anonymous34-5 asymmetrical 1214 22-5of commitment 803

'

extended 78-80 iterated, seeextended; non-anonymous 7883repeated 12 symmetrical 12131922 see also coordination game,crossroads game, etc

game form 10generality (of conventions) 512

94Gibbard, A 178good standing 112-15 1257 130

1413

Guttman, J. 182

Hammerstein, P 75-8 86Hardin, G 133Hare, R 182Harsanyi, J 183Hart, H 183hawkdove game 58-62 70-1 7883

901 99-100 129 145-6 158 167

1812

Hayek, F 1 54Hobbes, T. 6 55-8 701 147 149

152 161-5

Hume, D 8 33 523 55 92-8106-7 124 132-3 146-7 153-4

161-3 168-71\

Hume's Law 153-4 175

impartiality 68 19 171 see also social welfare

international affairs 6 57 59 6287-8 97-9 137-8 140 176

invasion 27

Johnson, N. 139-40justice 146 see also natural law,

obligations, rights

Kahneman, D 15Keynes, J. 101Kipling, R. 176Kramer, R 139Krueger, A 179

labelling (of roles) 13labour (as source of property rights)

957

labour disputes 62 146Laffont, J-J. 183language (as convention) 53-4 145

176

leader game 34 see also crossroadsgame

Lewis, D. 33 156 167-8lifeboats 4 140Locke, J 52 956 175Loomes, G 16

Mackie, J 182Margolis, H 178market system 2-3mavericks 136 13940 157 15960


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