Sub-conventional Operations 2006

DOCTRINE

FOR

SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

: December 2006.

: Headquarters Army Training Command.

: Headquarters Army Training Command,

Shimla - 171 003,

India.

First Edition

Published By

Copyright

Reserved

This document will be reviewed after every five years.

Comments/Suggestions may be forwarded to Headquarters

Army Training Command, Shimla.

INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS

OF MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

(ARMY)

DOCTRINE FOR


There can be four dangers to a State;

That which is of external origin

and internal abetment;

That which is of internal origin

and external abetment;

That which is of external origin

and external abetment;

And that which is of internal origin

and internal abetment.

- Kautilya

General JJ Singh

PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC

Chief of The Army Staff

FOREWORD

I am pleased to release the Indian Army's Doctrine on 'Sub

Conventional Operations'. This document encapsulates our collective

wisdom and philosophy that we have acquired over almost five decades

in fighting such warfare.

As against conventional operations, such operations are fought in

the lower end of the 'Spectrum of Conflict' and entail application of combat

power to enhance the 'civil control' in an affected area rather than cause

`destruction', which generally is the motive in conventional warfare.

Therefore, while in the initial stages of a sub conventional war fighting

campaign, the use of minimum force by the security forces is inescapable

to create a secure and conducive environment, such campaign has to

necessarily hinge on addressing the root causes of the conflict, in line with

our national policy and strategy. It is in light of this fundamental principle

that I have emphasised the concept of 'Iron Fist with Velvet Glove', which

implies a humane approach towards the populace at large in the conflict

zone. This also entails the use of overwhelming force only against foreign

terrorists and other hardcore inimical elements, while affording full

opportunity to indigenous misguided elements to shun violence and join

the mainstream. It underscores scrupulous respect for Human Rights,

upholding laws of the land and encourages 'neutralisation' of terrorists by

seeking surrenders and apprehensions rather than only seeking 'kills'.

Concurrent conduct of perception management is also an operational

imperative and must be imaginatively undertaken as part of the public

information drive which hinges on effective dissemination of information

through the media.

Such a campaign demands that all military operations are people

centric and conducted in a manner that generates a groundswell for

peace and creates redundancy of the terrorists in the environment.

Therefore, the rules of engagement have to be formulated imaginatively,

in the backdrop of political, legal and moral parameters. It must always be

remembered that populace constitutes the centre of gravity of such

operations and, therefore, winning of their hearts and minds is central to

all our efforts during conflict management and resolution.

Training and junior leadership assume added significance in sub

conventional warfare. To be successful, leaders must learn and train their

command to perceive and react expeditiously with minimum force to

neutralise the target, without causing any collateral damage. Suitable

'frames of reference' coupled with the ability to generate hard intelligence

in a synergised manner and its real time exploitation are as such, key to

the success of such operations. We must force the terrorist on the back

foot by seizing initiative and making him reactive and resultantly,

insecure. This calls for perseverance and unstinted commitment towards

the populace to ensure the terrorist gets no safe sanctuary and people

willingly contribute to his neutralisation. An effective interface with the

media as part of our public information and perception management

operations also merits necessary attention.

Sub conventional operations are likely to remain a major

responsibility for the Army in the foreseeable future. In view of the same,

the imperative of inter service and inter agency synergy for successful

conduct of operations is essential. This publication provides guidance

and doctrinal basis for the planning and execution of sub conventional

operations by the Indian Army. This guidance is authoritative and will be

followed except when, the judgment of local commanders, dictates it

otherwise.

I compliment the Army Training Command for its evolution.

31 December 2006 (JJ Singh)

General

iiiii

1. The 'Sub Conventional Operations Doctrine' for the Indian Army

has been evolved from the varied experience of the Indian Army. A thin

line divides success and failure in such operations. Experience has

shown that the end results favour the side that adheres to the

fundamental principles for the execution of such operations.

2. The Doctrine encompasses the essence of these experiences and

outlines the fundamental principles and guidelines for the Army, in the

backdrop of current and emerging trends. This document is a logical

derivative from the Indian Army Doctrine and will provide a common

platform for the military professionals. It will also facilitate better

understanding of the application of military resources for effective conflict

management.

3. This Doctrine will be reviewed every five years and updated in

consonance with the prevailing environment.

31 December 2006 (KS Jamwal)

Lt Gen

PROMULGATION

Lt General KS Jamwal

AVSM, VSM**

GOC - in - C ARTRAC

DOCTRINE FOR SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE FOR SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONSDOCTRINE FOR SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE FOR SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONSDOCTRINE FOR SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE FOR SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONSDOCTRINE FOR SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE FOR SUB CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

Insurgency

Proxy War

Terrorism (Undertaken as part of

Insurgency/Proxy War, may also

be undertaken independently)

Border Skirmishes

Sub Conventional

Asymmetric Warfare


Asymmetric Warfare entails unconventional ways and means to

target various elements of national power, to include Command,

Control, Communications, Computers, Intel l igence,

Interoperability, Surveillance and Reconnaissance infrastructure,

services based industry, banking and financial services,

transportation and power sector. This type of warfare also

includes cyber and information operations, which are not covered

in the document.

Border skirmishes are also not covered in the document due to

security reasons. These will be dealt with in accordance with the

operational plans of concerned Commands and Integrated

Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Army) policy on the subject.

Subject

Introduction

Environmental Trends and Dynamics

of the Conflict Zone

Formulation of Military Strategy

Operational Facets

Intelligence

Winning Hearts and Minds

Training

Human Rights

Leadership

Emerging Challenges

Conclusion

Appendices

Serial

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Page

1

5

14

27

40

44

48

53

56

60

63

64

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is the greatest national security threat our country faces

today. Combating this threat presents unique and unprecedented

challenges. The tactics adopted by terrorists, often with the

assistance of State-sponsors, require constant study and

analysis.

Dr Manmohan Singh

Prime Minister of India

1. Total war as an instrument of state policy has become less relevant

than ever before and resultantly, the probability of full-scale conventional

wars between nations is gradually receding as an option for settling

disputes. However, this has given further impetus to sub conventional

operations as the predominant form of warfare.

2. Sub conventional warfare is a generic term encompassing all

armed conflicts that are above the level of peaceful coexistence amongst

states and below the threshold of war. It includes militancy, insurgency,

proxy war and terrorism that may be employed as a means in an

insurrectionist movement or undertaken independently. Border

skirmishes also fall within this category. These are not being covered in

the document. Sub conventional warfare figures at the lower end of the

spectrum of conflict and entails protracted struggle. It could also be

characterised by asymmetry of force levels between the regular forces

and irregulars, wherein the force applied and the violence generated

depends on the modus operandi of the weaker side and the laws of the

land, which bind the actions of the Armed Forces. The modus operandi of

weaker side is generally characterised by irrationality, indiscrimination,

unpredictability and ruthlessly destructive behaviour.

1


32

Sub Conventional Operations Arena

Routine Law and

Order

Insurgency

& Proxy War

Conventional War

Heightened Law

and Order

Nuclear War

Unlikely

Most Likely

Level

of

Violence

Amy

may

get

r

emloy

edp

unde

r CrP

C

State

Police

Central Para

Military Forces

(CPMF)

Army & CPMF

Management of Conflict

Point where Army gets involved as an instrument of last resort

High Intensity

Conflict

Medium

Intensity

Conflict

Low Intensity

Conflict

Sub conventional operations arena comprises armed conflicts that

are above the level of peaceful coexistence amongst states and

below the threshold of war. These include militancy, insurgency,

proxy war and terrorism either employed as part of an insurrectionist

movement or independently. Border skirmishes also fall within this

category.

3. The management, and finally the resolution, of such conflicts

necessitates a multi-pronged thrust by all elements of national power to

address the root causes. The application of Armed Forces in the initial

stages is aimed at providing a secure environment, wherein various

institutions of the government can function devoid of any inimical

interference. Having provided this environment, the Armed Forces,

thereafter, function in a manner that strengthens the hands of the civil

authorities.

4. The Indian Army has been engaged in sub conventional

operations for over fifty years. These years have left footprints of both

success and failure. While each success was a reason for satisfaction,

failure was an occasion for introspection and learning. These five

decades have yielded wide and varied experience in our approach and

methodology to combat sub conventional threats. This period has also

enabled us to refine and hone our strategic and operational concepts,

besides refining our tactics to operate effectively in such conflicts.

5. The most pertinent aspect, which has influenced the evolution of

the doctrine, is the philosophy of 'Iron Fist with Velvet Glove' enunciated

in 2005. It emphasises a humane and people-centric approach,

underscores the need for scrupulous upholding of laws of the land, deep

respect for Human Rights and minimum use of kinetic means, to create a

secure environment, without causing any collateral damage. It

propagates the use of overwhelming force against foreign and hardcore

terrorists, while affording a fair chance to indigenous inimical elements to

shun violence, surrender and join the mainstream as per laws of the land.

6. This Doctrine, besides encompassing our collective wisdom and

philosophy on fighting such operations, also endeavours to highlight to

civil society, the very basis for the Army's employment in such operations.

It also aims to provide an insight into various lines of operations

undertaken by the Army to create a secure and conducive environment

for the fulfilment of national policy and strategy.


Arme

d Reb

ellion

- Sua

t on

iti

mark

d by b

reakd

own o

f

e

civil a

dmini

strati

on

an l

w& o

der m

acine

ry.

da

r

h

54

7. The Indian Army is widely regarded as one of the most

experienced and battle-hardened forces combating sub conventional

threats in the world today, on the basis of its strategic vision and functional

achievements. Its success manifests across inhospitable terrain

and climate, amidst complex and adverse circumstances. The Doctrine

for Sub Conventional Operations takes all these aspects into

consideration without being unduly affected by any particular conflict or

region, to give it a wider perspective.

8. Explanation of various terms used in the Doctrine are given at

Appendix A.

ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMICS

OF THE CONFLICT ZONE

Chapter 1

Dr APJ Abdul Kalam

President

The constant threat of low intensity proxy war and terrorism has

become a disturbing feature of national life. This constitutes the

new face of war

Environmental Trends

1. Global. Some of the trends manifesting in sub conventional

warfare at global level are as follows:-

(a) The communist ideology inspired insurgencies have

receded in the post Cold War era. However, insurrectionist

movements are likely to continue on account of religious, cultural

and socio-economic disparities. These will continue to be

exploited by state and non state actors to further their nefarious

designs as also to offset the asymmetry in combat power.

(b) Sensational terrorist acts in the international, regional and

domestic arenas have brought the scourge of terrorism into sharp

focus and vindicated India's long standing position on the

issue.

(c) Trans-national character of sub conventional conflicts has

galvanised a multi-national and multi-lateral approach to tackle

ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT ZONE


76

such form of warfare. Resultantly, this has dissuaded Nation

States from employing terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

(d) Notwithstanding the positive fallouts of globalisation, the

virtues of the same are also being exploited by terrorists to their

advantage.

(e) Terrorism related to weapons of mass destruction, cyber

and information warfare have given a new dimension to this form

of warfare.

(f) The armed cadres of almost all contemporary insurgency

movements are increasingly showing scant regard for the security

of civilians, which the traditional insurgent or guerrilla of the

yesteryears showed. Today, almost all insurrectionist movements

are witnessing a very high profile of criminal terrorist activity that

aims to cause paralysis and disorder in civil society, which helps

the perpetrators to shape the asymmetrical battle space to their

advantage.

2. Regional. India shares land borders with six neighbouring

countries. Instabilities in the region are likely to have trans-national

spillover effects. Some of the major regional trends are as follows:-

(a) South Asia has emerged as the epicentre of global

terrorism.

(b) The vast and porous nature of our borders continues to be

exploited by inimical elements to vitiate our internal security

environment. Such trends are characterised by illegal

immigration, gun running, drug trafficking, circulation of counterfeit

currency, money laundering and other asymmetrical means to

impede initiatives to consolidate our comprehensive national

power.

Communism inspired insurgencies are on the decline.

Religious, cultural and socio-economic disparities emerging as

reasons for new conflicts.

Rise in terrorism marked by trans-national foot prints.

Benefits of globalisation being exploited by non state actors.

Weapons of mass destruction, cyber and information warfare

emerging as new threats.

State support to terrorism giving rise to asymmetric form of

warfare.

Requirement of multi lateral and multi national approach to

meet new challenges.

South Asia has emerged as the epicentre of global terrorism.

3. Domestic. Some of the trends on the domestic front are as

follows:-

(a) While good governance and honing of our law and order

mechanisms at the Centre and State levels have improved the

internal security dimensions, the socio-economic disparities

coupled with some of the religious and ethnic fault lines could still

provide grounds for vitiation of our internal security environment.

(b) Our multi-pronged national initiatives in J&K, North East

and the Naxal violence affected states are yielding positive results.

However, considering the prolonged nature of such campaigns,

conflict resolution is likely to take some time.

(c) The insurgencies in our extended neighbourhood are also

likely to impact on our national security matrix and, therefore, need

to be monitored.


ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT ZONEENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT ZONE

Environmental Trends

98

Causes

Proxy War

Terrorism

Insurgency

Militancy

Ideological, Ethnic and

Linguistic Differences

Politico-Socio-

Economic Reasons

Fundamentalism and

Extremism

Catalysts

Interference by neighbouring states

Inept handling of the

situation

Causes for the Vitiation

of Internal Security Environment

Dynamics of the Conflict Zone

4. Movements based on political aspirations generally

commence from the urban centres and more often than not from the state

capital or power centres of the estranged political factions. On the other

hand, movements driven by socio-economic aspirations generally begin

from deprived areas, which are often inaccessible and under developed.

Therefore, insurgencies, given their mass support base, have a strong

rural backing, while low support terrorist movements are generally urban

centric, where sensational terrorist acts can draw maximum publicity and

media mileage. Some of the dynamics of a sub conventional war fighting

arena are:-

(a) In the initial stages of the movement, there is great support

for the cause and the populace practically nurtures the armed

cadres as their 'military'. This support starts to decline as

fatigue from the conflict sets in and the population begins to feel

the privations and becomes disenchanted with the armed

struggle.

(b) The terrorists manipulate the environment to enhance the

credibility of the cause and their relevance to the environment by

justifying the armed struggle as the most plausible option to fulfil

societal aspirations.

(c) The terrorists can strike anywhere in the sub conventional

conflict zone. Hence, the distinction between the front and rear,

which is well defined in conventional operations, gets blurred. Also

on account of this nuance, there are no non combatants amongst

the security forces as every individual has to remain prepared not

only to defend himself but also to carry out operations against such

threats, when required. Additionally, sub conventional operations

also blur the distinction between the strategic and tactical levels,

as an incident at the tactical level may have strategic implications.

(d) Terrorists also resort to direct and indirect measures to

psychologically influence various sections of the environment

and to keep the disenchanted segments of the populace

committed to the cause.

(e) The methods employed to terrorise the populace are either

mass disruptive or mass destructive.



1110

(f) When security forces get involved in conflict management,

the challenges posed are on account of lack of support from the

population and to some extent, possible subversion in various

institutions of the State.

A - Low Violence Low Base

B - Low Violence Large Base

C - Mid Violence Mid Base

D - High Violence Low Base

E - High Violence High Base

Correlation between Violence and Local Support

5. Various Scenarios. An analysis of the past and ongoing

insurrectionist movements reveals that the level of violence and the

degree of popular support for the movement are two major factors, which

impact the security spectrum. The correlation between these two factors

creates five possible scenarios. (a) Low Violence Low Base (A). This situation generally

indicates the beginning of a sub conventional conflict scenario,

wherein the insurgents commence employing subversive

activities to gain a foothold and create their support base. This

threat is often overlooked due to its low intensity. However, its

progression to the next level remains a distinct possibility and

needs pre-emptive multi-pronged initiatives employing various

elements of national power.

Blurring of the distinction between:-

o Front and rear.

o Strategic and tactical actions

o Combatants and non combatants.

Manipulation of the environment by terrorist to enhance his

relevance and credibility.

'Mass disruptive' or 'mass destructive' methods employed by

terrorists.

Terrorists also resort to direct and indirect measures to

psychologically influence various players of the environment.

Some Distinctive Features of Sub Conventional Conflict Zone

B

E

C

A

D

Violence

Population Base



Chapter I : ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT ZONEChapter I : ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS AND DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT ZONE 1312

(b) Low Violence Large Base (B). This level characterises

the next state of a sub conventional threat, where the insurgents

are able to successfully establish a viable population base on the

strength of their popular cause. This stage normally marks the

beginning of violent activities. It is often the last stage when a

movement can be contained through multi-pronged initiatives

before a full-blown violent insurgency takes root. Such threats

need to be tackled with urgency.

(c) Mid Violence Mid Base (C). Such a scenario is

characterised by full-blown insurgency. At this stage the

movement can either be in the ascent or descent cycle of its

popularity and violence. By virtue of its mid level violence and

popular support, the situation is at a stage where it can be

contained by a judicious mix of politico-military action.

(d) High Violence Low Base (D). This scenario indicates a

typical terrorist threat, emanating from a small cadre base, with the

aim of influencing political decisions and creating a fear psychosis.

This form of terrorism can be employed by an external adversary

as part of proxy war or by an internal organisation to gain public

attention and influence international opinion. The struggle in this

case can strike sudden panic, but its ability to retain the tempo is

suspect given the lack of popular support. It can be defeated

through proactive operations based on sound intelligence.

(e) High Violence High Base (E). This stage of sub

conventional threat perpetuates when there is widespread popular

support for the insurgency accompanied by a high degree of

violence. This is often seen in civil war type of situations.

6. Certain additional aspects defining the correlation between

violence and popular support, which merit attention, are as under:-

(a) Intensity of threat has inherent capability of moving from

one stage to the other and does not remain compartmentalised.

The level of popular support and degree of violence can vary due

to the success of either the Government or the insurgent / terrorist

groups.

(b) Increasing popular support is crucial for the success of both

the insurgency and the counter insurgency operations. Therefore,

popular support is the final determinant of any movement or the

success of a counter insurgency campaign.



FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY 1514

FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY

NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVES

Chapter 2

Military strategy is formulated based on the national security imperatives

that include the national policy, strategy and various directions given out

by the government from time to time. This strategy entails the interplay of

ends, ways, and means to create military conditions that facilitate the

realisation of the political end state.

General

1. The management of national security has been subjected to a

comprehensive reappraisal based on the recommendations of the Group

of Ministers set up as a sequel to the Kargil Review Committee Report.

This reappraisal was undertaken to review the national security system,

including the internal security mechanism, in its entirety. Chapter IV of the

recommendations deals with the internal security issues. (Note - various

aspects of the Group of Ministers' recommendations quoted in this

document have been extracted from the declassified text of the Report

available on the internet).

2. While law and order is a state subject, at central government level

the nodal agency dealing with the maintenance of internal security in the

country is the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Legal Provisions

3. Aid to civil authority is a constitutional obligation for the Indian

Army. The provisions governing its employment in aid to civil authority are

contained in the following documents as amended from time to time:-

4. Primacy of Civil Authority. When deployed in aid to civil

authority, the Army operates in the State concerned in cooperation with

the civil authority so that the situation affecting maintenance of public

order, which had necessitated its deployment, is effectively dealt with and

normalcy is restored. The Armed Forces Special Powers Acts of 1958 and

1990 do not displace the civil power of the State by the Armed Forces and

these only provide for the deployment of Armed Forces in aid of the civil

authority. The term Aid postulates the continued existence of the

authority to be aided. This means that even after deployment of the

Armed Forces of the Union, the civil power continues to function, thereby

implying that while upholding the above principle, all actions of the Armed

Forces must contribute to strengthening of the hands of the State

authorities.

In the conflict zone, all actions of the security forces must have a civil

face and be directed towards strengthening the hands of the civil

authorities.


(a) Constitution of India, Articles 352 and 355.

(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, Sections 127 to 131.

(c) Armed Forces (Special Powers) Acts 1958 and 1990.

(e) Government of India (Ministry of Defence) Publication,

Aid to Civil Authority - 1970.

(d) Regulations for the Army, 1987 Edition, Paragraphs 301

to 307.

1716

National Strategy

5. Strategic Centre of Gravity. Populace invariably emerges as

the Centre of Gravity in all sub conventional operations as, without

popular support, no insurrectionist movement can be sustained

indefinitely. Since grievances of the population are the likely cause for

commencement of any insurrectionist movement, the remedial measures

would involve their redressal in correct perspective. The role of the Armed

Forces in such a conflict is to act as facilitator to bring down the level of

violence so that a political process can be initiated. It is for this reason that

the military operations aim at enhancing the 'control' of civil authority in

the conflict zone rather than applying the military force for causing

'destruction'.

When the Army gets employed in combating insurgency, the 'A'

arm is always thicker than the 'B' arm.

While the strategy of the terrorists is to thicken 'A' arm, the

government agencies including the security forces, strive to

thicken the 'B' arm.

The common node in the two arms is populace, which is the

CENTRE OF GRAVITY.

At the operational level, various antagonist population centres

emerge as the operational centres of gravity.

Strategic and Operational Centres of Gravity

6. End State. The end state sought by a national counter

insurgency campaign is always 'conflict resolution', which generally

succeeds 'conflict termination'. This entails demilitarisation of the conflict

zone and shaping the environment, wherein the remaining differences

can be pursued without violence. The requisite shaping of the

environment is affected through a concurrent application of all elements

of national power. This involves addressing the root causes of the

problem in right earnest. It is an arduous long haul, which requires clarity,

consistency, credibility and consensus. A counter insurgency campaign

would normally have multiple prongs, each being addressed

simultaneously by two or more elements of national power.

Various Prongs of the National Initiative

7. The national strategy aims to employ various elements of national

power to gain control of the affected area and address root causes of the

conflict. Since this entails dealing with the attitudes and mind-sets of

people, the process is long drawn and laborious. Various prongs of such

a process are:-

(a) Creation of Secure Environment. The creation of a

secure environment is important to enable other elements of

national power to operate without fear of the terrorist gun and to

facilitate the initiation of the political process (where political

aspirations need to be addressed). The Army along with other

security forces have a lead role to play in the accomplishment

of this goal, ie, of creating a secure and conducive environment.


FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY

B

FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY 1918

Smooth and

effective

functioning of

government

institutions.

(Schools,

hospitals,

public utility

services etc)

Transformation of the public

law and order marked

security environment into an

environment that can be

handled by the police.

(Law and Order)

Absence of fear of the terrorists

gun.

Secure

Environment

Return of the

normal way of

life, wherein civil

liberties get fully

restored and the

people are able

to pursue their

lifestyles with

freedom, respect

and human

dignity.

Indicators of Secure Environment

(b) Isolation of Conflict Zone. The prevention of any

external support to the terrorists could entail targetting diplomatic,

moral, financial, material or personnel assistance. The

accomplishment of this goal has both internal and external

dimensions and therefore, while the security forces are applied on

the internal scene for preventing infiltration and/or exfiltration by

terrorists and the smuggling in/out of warlike material, other

elements of national power address the external dimension.

(c) Addressing Local Aspirations and Winning Hearts

and Minds. The addressing of local aspirations in terms of

developmental activities and restoration of full liberties along with

effective functioning of various institutions of the State

Government and their accessibility to the populace are important

to generate a groundswell for peace and for winning the hearts

and minds in the desired perspective. In addition, a political

dialogue should also be accompanied by suitable political

initiatives in pursuance of national policy objectives.

(d) Public Information and Perception Management. The

management of perceptions of all state and non state players in

the domestic, regional and international environment is of

paramount importance. These are essentially information

operations that are conducted concurrently throughout the

campaign. In fact, these operations must also cater to the needs of

the security forces so that all government and military personnel

view various developments in the correct perspective and

activities of inimical forces are not able to impact adversely on their

morale.

8. In addition, the national strategy also spells out tenets for the

application of various elements of national power besides highlighting the

mechanism for inter-agency cooperation and effecting synergy with

respect to developmental activity and for attaining operational and

intelligence synergy. This must be coordinated at the highest level. As per

the Group of Ministers' recommendations, the Chief Minister of the State

is recommended to head the 'Apex Body' that not only formulates conflict

zone specific policies and strategies but also coordinates and oversees

the functioning of all the agencies, including security forces, in the conflict

zone.


2120

National Policy

National Strategy

Military Strategy

Rules of Engagement

(Evolved in the backdrop of political, legal and moral constraints)

Risk Assessment

MILITARY STRATEGY

Formulation of Military Strategy : Process

Military End State

9. Military end state entails creating conditions that are conducive to

the attainment of political objectives. Since conflict termination and their

political resolution are the ultimate end states sought, such conditions,

besides enabling the initiatives by the economic and informational

elements of national power to consolidate, also facilitate initiation of

political dialogue for a negotiated settlement.

Overarching Concept

10. Since the centre of gravity for such operations is the populace,

operations have to be undertaken with full respect to Human Rights and in

accordance with the laws of the land. The application of military power in

such operations is so regulated that it enhances the control by civil

authorities in the conflict zone besides strengthening their hands. This

underscores the importance of people friendly operations that are

conducted with a civil face.

Concept of Application of Military Force

11. People Centric Operations. T o a t t a i n a s e c u r e

environment, the military operations should aim, firstly, at neutralising all

hostile elements in the conflict zone that oppose or retard the peace

initiatives and secondly, at transforming the will and attitudes of the

people through a dexterous and integrated application of all resources.

The neutralisation of terrorists and their support base must be in

consonance with laws of the land so that the civil face of governance is

always visible. Terrorists must be afforded full opportunity to surrender

and only those terrorists, who do not accept the offer and continue to

resist, should be neutralised through kinetic means. The handling of over

ground workers too must always be as per laws of the land. The

orchestration of the military operations should be such that they also

induce the desired degree of agitational fatigue amongst the supporters

of the cause. However, since this lever works both ways, it should be

imaginatively employed, as it can prove to be counter-productive and can

at times, convert even the champions of non-violence into violence

seekers. The endeavour should be to bring about a realisation that

fighting the government is a 'no win' situation and that their anti

government stance will only delay the process of restoration of peace and

normalcy. Therefore, distancing from the terrorists is in their own interest

and the only plausible course of action.



2322

However, the manifestation of such a realisation can take from a couple of

years to decades as attitudes take time to form and to change.

12. Manoeuvre versus Attrition Warfare. As the endeavour in

such a campaign is to enhance the control of government agencies in the

conflict zone, military power should be predominantly employed to target

the minds of the terrorists and other antagonist players in the

environment. This in turn highlights the importance of manoeuvre

warfare, which ensures placing of our resources at a position of

advantage vis--vis the terrorists. It also helps in creating insecurity for

the terrorists that resultantly forces them on the back foot and makes

them reactive to our proactive approach. However, such application

alone cannot achieve the desired military conditions. Therefore, taking

recourse to attrition warfare concept in the initial stages of the campaign

cannot be avoided. The inset figure highlights this aspect.

Manoeuvre versus Attrition Warfare

Employ-

-ment of

Kinetic

& Non - Kinetic

means

(Transition from public

order to law and order domain) (Maximum application of attrition

warfare

Kinetic Means

Non Kinetic Means

Initial stages of conflict

Stage where conflict

resolution is in sight

Time Line: Conflict Management

Employment of Kinetic & Non Kinetic Means During Various Stages of

13. Integrated Approach. Since the ultimate aim of the military effort

is to strengthen the hands of the local civil authorities, the management of

the campaign must always show a civil face. Therefore, the counter

insurgency operations, notwithstanding the primacy of the military in the

initial stages, should always be coordinated at the highest levels through

the creation of an 'Apex Security Mechanism' headed by the senior state

executive. Such an arrangement facilitates the monitoring of various

prongs of the campaign in the proper perspective. However, for

facilitating synergy, the senior most Army Officer should have the clear

responsibility and authority for all operational planning and execution.

Some of the recommendations of the Group of Ministers on Internal

Security in this regard are placed alongside.



Encourages surrender and enables apprehension of

terrorists and over ground workers.

Also entails minimum use of force to eliminate

terrorists.

Manoeuvre

Terrorists / Antagonist players of the enviornment.

While in the initial stage of the campaign attrition warfare concept has to be applied, in the later

stages, the application of military resources through manoeuvre and attrition warfare concept yields

better results.

Armed Forces

Attrition

(Elimination of Terrorists)

2524

Paragraph 4.62

14. Lines of Military Operations. The thrust of military operations in

the sub conventional conflict management scenario will be on executing

coordinated operations ranging from the border areas to the hinterland.

Various lines of military operations are:-

(a) Effective sealing of the borders to preclude trans-border

movement of terrorists and war waging material. This should be

undertaken in an integrated manner to ensure that the terrain,

obstacle system, troop deployment and surveillance devices are

optimally enmeshed to enable effective sealing operations.

(b) Establishment of a comprehensive counter terrorist grid in

the hinterland with focus on:-

(i) Denial of population centres to the terrorist.

(ii) Providing security to the military lines of

communication.

(iii) Ensuring security of various vulnerable areas and

vulnerable points.

(c) Effective public information and perception management

initiatives constitute a vital component of the campaign.

(d) Undertaking civic actions to address the aspirations of the

populace and winning their hearts and minds.



SALIENT ASPECTS OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF

GROUP OF MINISTERS ON INTERNAL SECURITY

(CHAPTER IV)

OPERATIONAL FACETS 2726

15. Constitution of 'Think Tanks'. Responses at various levels in

the sub conventional operations arena need to be continuously analysed

and refined. This is best achieved by constituting in-house pool of

qualified officers as think tanks at Corps and Command levels, who are

fully dedicated to carry out an in-depth analysis of various developments

and events related to the conflict zone. This will also include evaluating

various personalities associated with the conflict to enable forecasting of

their likely moves and machinations.

OPERATIONAL FACETS

Chapter 3

General JJ Singh

Chief of the Army Staff

Despite adverse conditions, the Army will present a much more

humane face since we are, after all, dealing with misguided youth of

our country. Use of minimum force with least collateral damage

shall be the approach, while conducting operations where civil

population is involved. However, the hardcore terrorist will be dealt

with firmly.

Mapping of the Conflict Zone

1. It is imperative that the physical, human and informational facets of

the conflict zone are correctly understood and necessary data base

created. This entails liaison with other intelligence agencies including the

affected State Police. In specific terms, an intelligence mosaic should be

created on the following important facets:-

(a) Terrain. The terrain should be analysed in detail to

enable its effective domination and exploitation to our operational

advantage.

(b) Population Profile. To discern supporters, as well as

hostile and neutral sections of the populace.

(c) Root Cause(s) of the Problem. The causes that have

led to the conflict situation must be clearly understood prior to

deployment. These form the basis for assessing the challenges


FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY

2928 OPERATIONAL FACETSOPERATIONAL FACETS

and for evolving operational imperatives. The causes must be

classified as primary and secondary, or in other words, causative

and aggravating factors. There is a tendency to fight the symptoms

of terrorism and violence in the area of conflict instead of

addressing the root causes. It is, therefore, imperative that in any

sub conventional scenario reasons for the unrest amongst the

populace are clearly understood before action is initiated to

administer the cure. Attempts to customise the response to all

kinds of challenges can lead to side affects, which may end up

aggravating the problem rather than solving it.

(d) Profile - Terrorist Organisations. This should include:-

(i) Political and military structures.

(ii) Indigenous and foreign support structures of the

terrorists.

(iii) Ideologies and 'Code of Conduct' of various terrorist

organisations.

(iv) Inter-se equations and nexus between various

terrorist organisations.

(e) Details of other security forces, governmental and non

governmental agencies operating in the conflict zone including

various intelligence agencies.

(f) Local, national and international media.

Orientation

2. Sub conventional operations are fundamentally different from

conventional operations. There is, therefore, a need for the Army to

orientate itself to the nuances of such operations, which are conducted

over sustained periods with restrictive rules of engagement vis--vis the

conventional operations. This orientation besides focusing on altering the

frames of reference amongst commanders at various levels, should also

endeavour to give them an insight into various facets of the multi-agency

integrated operations. The orientation of junior leaders and other ranks

must also endeavour to highlight that they would be fighting their 'own

people' and not an 'enemy' in an asymmetric environment. All ranks must

be made to understand the overriding importance of people friendly

stance and the civil face of military initiatives, which underscores the

importance of non kinetic measures as against the use of kinetic means.

3. Pre induction training for orientation of the troops should be

imaginatively planned and conducted in theatre battle schools. Where

feasible, the training facilities available at Counter Insurgency and Jungle

Warfare School, Vairengte should be optimally utilised. Details of

important training aspects are covered in Chapter 6.

Induction and Deployment

4. The induction into the conflict zone should be preceded by detailed

reconnaissance and liaison with the state government functionaries and

heads of various governmental and non governmental agencies in the

area of operations. The visits to the conflict zone should also be utilised

to understand the command and control structures besides confirming or

negating intelligence details that would have been mapped earlier.

5. To obviate depredatory activity against the inducting columns, it is

imperative that plans of induction, to include routes and timing, are

divulged strictly on need to know basis. Necessary deception during

reconnaissance and liaison stage is also essential.



6. Induction should be undertaken speedily employing all possible

means. In areas where threat from improvised explosive devices exists,

road opening by units of Central Para Military Forces or by own troops

must be ensured.

7. The deployment in the area of operations should be on a grid

pattern, which should provide security to various population centres,

vulnerable areas/points and military lines of communications. This

deployment should be coordinated under the aegis of the apex security

mechanism, if in place; otherwise it should be undertaken in consultation

with other security agencies already operating in the conflict zone. For

better accountability by various security forces, it is imperative that these

are assigned clear roles and areas of responsibility. The Army, when

employed, assumes the lead role for operational planning and execution,

which has also been endorsed in the Group of Ministers

recommendations (Chapter IV, Paragraph 4.64). In addition, various

formation and unit headquarters should be preferably co-located with

state, division and district headquarters, for optimal civil-military liaison

and synergy of effort.

Intelligence Generation

8. To enable conduct of surgical operations with precision, emphasis

should be laid on generation of intelligence rather than its acquisition. The

former underscores the importance of proactively working towards

tasking and gathering of intelligence rather than passively waiting for

various sources and agencies to provide intelligence. It should be

ensured that intelligence is also generated in depth, whereby we

develop sources right up to the terrorists' trans-border safe sanctuaries.

Although human intelligence will form the main stay in a sub conventional

campaign, electronic and signal intelligence also need to be suitably

dovetailed into the overall plan. The generation of intelligence, once the

contact has been established should also be given due importance and

suitable mechanism for its continuous generation should be co-opted into

the operational plans. This aspect has been dealt in detail in Chapter 5.

Lines of Operations - Important Tenets

9. The Army resources are applied essentially along four lines of

operations as given in the preceding Chapter. The tenets for the conduct

of operations along these lines are given in succeeding paragraphs.

10. Counter Infiltration Operations. It is important to isolate the

conflict zone from external material assistance for optimal utilisation of

Army resources. It is, therefore, essential that any external support is

intercepted and neutralised along the borders. Effective sealing of

borders, therefore, not only prevents external assistance to reach the

terrorists but also precludes their exfiltration to safe havens. The sealing

of borders should be undertaken in an integrated manner to ensure the

most effective use of terrain, troop deployment, artificial obstacle systems

and surveillance devices. The endeavour should be to create an all

weather, day and night detection and interception capability. It is also

important that measures are instituted to elicit accountability of the

civilians residing in the border belt, in consultation with civil authorities. A

seamless interface of the counter infiltration force with the troops

deployed on the counter terrorist grid is operationally imperative. While

border skirmishes also fall under the sub conventional operations

domain, these are not being covered in this document for security

reasons. These should be undertaken in accordance with the operational

plans of various formations and units deployed along the border.

Border sealing

Physical presence of troops.

Use of artificial obstacles.

Integrated employment of surveillance means.

Elicit support of locals residing in border areas.

Seamless interface with counter terrorist operations in the

hinterland.


Counter Infiltration Operations


11. Operations in the Hinterland. The operations carried out in the

hinterland include patrolling, ambushes, raids, cordon and search,

search and destroy, establishment of vehicle and personnel check posts,

road opening, convoy protection and security of various static

installations, that includes various operating bases. The following

aspects should be borne in mind while carrying out counter terrorist

operations in the hinterland:-

(a) People Friendly Operations.

(i) To obviate inconvenience to the populace,

operations should be based on hard intelligence rather than

being conducted on prophylactic basis.

(ii) Where operations result in causing inconvenience

to the locals, measures should be instituted to address their

daily basic needs. These measures should be instituted in

consultation with the state administration, where feasible.

(iii) The conduct of all ranks should be governed by

concept of Iron Fist with Velvet Glove. In addition, the Ten

Commandments of the Chief of The Army Staff and the Do's

and Don'ts pomulgated by the Army Headquarters must

also be adhered to. The same are given at Appendix B and

C respectively.

(iv) To ensure that all army actions depict a civil face,

civil police personnel should be co-opted during

operations. Where the handling of women cadres is

visualised, Mahila Police should be incorporated during

operations. Contact with women folk in the area of

operations should only be through Mahila Police.

Battlefield Turnout Tenets for Conduct

(b) Rules of Engagement. The use of force should be

judicious and governed by explicit rules of engagement that must

hinge on the principle of 'minimum force', besides taking into

account the political, legal and moral stipulations. The endeavour

of security forces should be to neutralise the terrorists rather than

merely seeking their elimination. To obviate collateral damage, it is

imperative that operations are well planned, coordinated and

carried out with precision. All ranks must guard against any

provocations that may be induced by the terrorists or their

sympathisers. It must be remembered that any unsavoury

incident can act as a retrograde step to our initiatives for creating a

secure environment. Such situations demand extremely mature

handling.

(c) Comprehensive Surrender Policy. A comprehensive

policy that addresses the security and esteem needs of the

terrorists is important to encourage surrenders in the conflict zone.

This policy is promulgated by the government and entails a multi-

agency coordination to preclude its misuse and to ensure that post

surrender rehabilitation is implemented in the desired manner.



(d) Ingenuity in the Application of Combat Power. Such

operations mandate an ingenious approach and 'out of the box

thinking' to seize the initiative from the terrorists and to keep them

on the back foot. Concurrently, it is imperative that own activities

do not depict a pattern that can be exploited by the terrorists.

Ingenious methods for intelligence generation and for interfacing

with the sources should be adopted.

Important Ground Rules for Operating In

(e) Small Team Operations. In a sub conventional battle

field scenario, terrorists are eternally illusive, operate in small

groups, follow no pattern, don no uniform and mingle easily with

the civilian population. Moreover, resources of the security forces

are deployed over a large area of responsibility. In this

environment, operations based on small teams increase chances

of contact and success against terrorists. However, these teams

must possess the capabilities to group and regroup to cater for

various contingencies in the area of operations. The strength of

these small teams will vary according to the task and modus

operandi of insurgents.

(f) Conserving Combat Power. Friendly losses occur

because of a terrorist action, fratricide or 'blue on blue'

engagement, stress related attrition and battle accidents.

Measures should be instituted to obviate such losses. Training,

fool proof communications, detailed coordination and

management of stress, thus, assume added significance.

(g) Optimal Utilisation of Force Multipliers. Integration of

all force multipliers in overall plan is a must for attaining military

ascendancy in the conflict zone. Such force multipliers

encompass both human and technological elements. The human

element of these force multipliers include village defence

committees and surrendered terrorists, who voluntarily cooperate

with the security forces. The technological element of various force

multipliers includes surveillance devices, signal interception

devices, anti improvised explosive detection and neutralisation

devices, direction finding equipment and unarmed aerial vehicles.

To enable integrated employment of all resources including the

force multipliers, it is axiomatic that signal communications are

imaginatively planned and include redundancy. Use of helicopters

for enhanced mobility of security forces and specialist dogs for

detection and tracking purpose also prove as valuable force

multipliers.


-

(f) Importance of peace for the overall prosperity of the people

and details of the government's peace initiatives.

(e) People friendly approach of the Army and its efforts in

alleviating their sufferings that have been caused by the terrorists.

(b) Efforts of the government regarding relief and rehabilitation

schemes to restore normalcy.

(a) Futility of the armed struggle and secessionist designs.

(c) Eroding credibility of terrorists and secessionist elements.

(d) Importance and efficacy of own operations.

12. Public Information and Perception Building Operations.

Public information operations to influence perceptions of various players

in the conflict zone should be undertaken in accordance with

imaginatively evolved themes. At the operational level, these themes

could be:-


Media plays a pivotal role in influencing perceptions

13. Winning Hearts and Minds. Winning of the Hearts and Minds of

the populace is paramount to the success of sub conventional operations

and should be undertaken through deeds and by 'walking the talk'. This

reiterates the importance of people friendly operations. In addition,

sincere efforts must be made to address aspirations of the locals by

undertaking civic action programmes like resuscitation of schools,

medical facilities, communication network and projects that generate self

employment opportunities. Civic action programmes should be

preferably identified by the locals and their involvement from the inception

to completion is important. The upkeep of these projects must be ensured

till these are handed over to the local government authorities. To obviate

duplication of effort, these should be chalked out in conjunction with the

overall development plan of the area. This aspect has been dealt in detail

in Chapter 5.

Miscellaneous Issues

14. Management of Stress. Sub conventional operations generate

stress, which if not managed on regular basis, impacts adversely on the

efficiency of troops and their morale. It is, therefore, important that

management of troops is given utmost importance and mechanisms

created to identify personnel under stress so that appropriate corrective

Be factually correct in all your reports.

Provide timely information.

Allegations to be investigated with dispatch and transparency.

Details of own operations and achievements should be

appropriately shared. Where necessary, additional information

should be provided without compromising security.

Qualified officers to be detailed at various headquarters, who

should be accessible to the media at all times.

measures can be instituted in time. An intimate interaction by

commanders at all levels with their commands contributes substantially

to the creation of necessary organisational climate within units and

formations. It is equally important that rest and recoup is factored into the

daily routine at sub-unit and unit levels. Arrangements must also be made

at all operating bases to enable all ranks to speak to their families on

telephone and for timely despatch and receipt of private mail. In addition,

recreational facilities should also be catered for at all bases.

Attend to physical and psychological needs of the troops.

Keep your troops well informed.

Provide time to troops to pray and visit unit religious institutions,

as per their liking.

Timely grant of leave.

Ensure regular games and recreational activities.

Ensure regular interaction of commanders with troops.

Facilitate resolution of domestic problems and ongoing disputes.

15. Ethos and Traditions. Indian Army draws its strength from its

ethos, traditions and culture that have shaped the organisation's thinking

over centuries. The essence of these manifests amongst all ranks in the

form of a spirit of self-denial, moderation, tolerance, respect for women

and elderly members of society and an ability to live in peace and

harmony in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious environment. The need for

continued reiteration and consideration of these values to the troops is,

therefore, sine qua non.

16. Compatible Logistics Support. Commanders at all levels must

ensure that compatible logistic support, to include replenishment of war

like material, supplies, medical and postal cover, are given due attention.


Guidelines for Media Interaction

Stress Management


Gauging Success of Military Operations

17. The number of terrorists killed in action or captured alone cannot

help military commanders gauge the overall success of their operations.

This must also be measured by the enthusiasm or groundswell for peace

that operations generate within the populace.

18. Certain indicators for gauging success of military operations in the

conflict zone are as follows:-

(a) Success of border sealing operations, to include:-

(i) Number of infiltration attempts eliminated.

(ii) Terrorists killed in action during infiltration.

(iii) Number of terrorists who have managed to infiltrate.

(b) Success of operations in the hinterland to include:-

(i) Number of terrorists neutralised (killed in action,

apprehended and surrendered).

(ii) Recovery of war like material.

(iii) Attrition on own rank and file.

(iv) Violence profile (low and high risk incidents).

(v) Civilian casualties.

(vi) Recruitment of locals into various terrorist outfits.

(c) Groundswell for peace, to include:-

(i) General stance of locals towards the Army.

(ii) Number of overground workers neutralised.

(iii) Degree of real time intelligence.

(iv) Local assistance for various civic action projects.

(v) Protests against the Army for any alleged Human

Rights violations.

(vi) Number of seditious media reports.

(d) Functioning of state government's institutions in the conflict

zone.


4140 INTELLIGENCEINTELLIGENCE

INTELLIGENCE

Chapter 4

General

1. Intelligence is the medium for the real time flow of information

leading to conduct of successful operations. It ensures clinical execution

and specific targeting. It is also a manifestation of the support from the

people who are both a medium as well as a source, depending upon the

manner in which they are employed. Sub conventional operations are

synonymous with People's War due to wider representation of the

population and their capability to supplement security forces' effort

against the insurgents/terrorists.

2. Mapping of the environment would have already been undertaken

prior to the induction into the conflict zone. However, after induction,

intelligence effort should be utilised to fill the voids in the mapped

intelligence mosaic and to generate intelligence that facilitates creating

secure and conducive conditions.

Guidelines for Generation of Real-time Intelligence

3. Operational and Tactical Intelligence. This necessitates

acquisition of intelligence in relation to the operational centres of gravity

and critical vulnerabilities of the terrorists. In specific terms, this will relate

inter alia, to intelligence on various terrorists groups, their support bases,

nexus between groups, their hierarchical structures, combat potential,

over ground workers, infrastructure for logistic sustenance, hideouts,

caches, past patterns of violence and depredatory activities, hardcore

terrorist cadres, sources of religious and / or ideological motivation and

interface between external support base and methodology for the

movement of men and material. There is also a need to acquire

intelligence on terrain and weather and how these impact on the terrorists'

activity and conduct of own military operations.

4. Integrated Approach. Human, signal and electronic

intelligence must be integrated for providing a cogent picture of the

conflict zone. This also highlights the importance of efficient interface

between various intelligence agencies, which must be coordinated under

the aegis of the apex security mechanism in the State. Suitable signal

communications with redundancy should cater for real time vertical and

horizontal sharing of intelligence.

5. Collation, Analysis and Dissemination. Suitable mechanism

must be created for effective collation, analysis and timely dissemination

of intelligence. It is important that the think tanks created at Corps and

Command levels are given access to the data bank and their assessment

factored into the formulation of 'overall intelligence picture'. To enable real

time exploitation of the intelligence inputs, it is imperative that quick

reaction teams are earmarked at all levels.

6. Stability of Intelligence Grid. A frequent change in the

counter terrorist deployment also disturbs the intelligence grid, which

takes time to establish. Therefore, it may be prudent to ensure continuity

of the counter terrorist grid and obviate frequent changes in the

deployment. The fluid nature of terrorists' activity should be dealt with by

employing reserves at all levels.

7. Handling of Sources. It is axiomatic that the source

providing intelligence is protected. Tendency to launch post haste

operations, at times, results in the source getting compromised. While

speed in launching of operations is imperative, careless handling of the

source must be guarded against.


4342 INTELLIGENCEINTELLIGENCE

8. Establishing Interface for Passage of Intelligence. One of

the greatest challenges of sub conventional operations is the ability to

create suitable interface for the passage of human intelligence in a real

time frame. Terrorists institute checks and balances through the over

ground workers in a manner that it becomes virtually impossible for

anyone to visit or speak to security personnel either directly or on the

telephone. Not only do the over ground workers create necessary

deterrence for sources through their physical presence in the

environment, they also tap telephone lines at the telephone exchanges

for this purpose. Therefore, the interface must address the security needs

of the sources. While stale intelligence is available in plenty and only

contributes to discerning patterns, it is the real time intelligence passage

mechanism that has to be created imaginatively. The methods to be

employed should not disturb normal behavioral patterns and should not

catch the hostile eye.

Emphasis on proactive intelligence generation.

Integration of human, signal and electronic intelligence.

Effective mechanism for intelligence sharing.

Stability of intelligence grid.

Protection of source.

Co-opt assessment of 'think tanks' into intelligence picture.

9. Dynamic Employment of Technological Resources.

(a) The electronic warfare resources should be deployed/

redeployed in the backdrop of terrorists' movement patterns. It is,

therefore, important that regular plotting of terrorists' movements

is incorporated in the collation plans. Concurrently, technological

resources must also be optimally utilised to provide security to own

personnel, material, operations and information.

(b) It is imperative to exploit the Command, Control,

Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Interoperability,

Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability of security forces. It

will assist in intelligence sharing, tracking the movement of

insurgents / terrorists and timely decision making. A tracking

matrix, which entails constant plotting of movement inputs to

generate a pattern over a period of time, must be maintained.


Intelligence Operations

4544 WINNING HEARTS AND MINDSWINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

Chapter 5

Rigveda

Let not the fruits of action be the motive of your actions, otherwise

you might be disappointed and leave the path of right action.

General

1. Since populace comprises the centre of gravity, winning their

hearts and minds is central to the success of sub conventional

operations. To achieve this, it is imperative that military operations

besides being undertaken with a humane approach must also be

supplemented by developmental activity coupled with imaginative public

information and perception management initiatives. The inset figure

aptly highlights the success zone that is achieved by the application of

above initiatives.

Zone

comprising

maximum

yearning for

peace

People Friendly

Military

Operations

Civic Actions/

Developmental

Work

Public Information

& Perception

Management

Operations

2. Winning Hearts and Minds has active and passive facets. Both

help create a conducive environment, generate a healthy image for the

Army and resultantly a groundswell for peace.

Passive Civic ActionActive Civic Action

Construction and functioning

Concept of Civic Actions

3. These actions should be aimed at alleviating the sufferings of the

local populace and, as such, should always be identified by them. If not

undertaken imaginatively, these actions lose their relevance and begin to

be misconstrued as mere appeasement gestures. Therefore, the

involvement of the populace from inception to completion of various

projects is important. For better impact, preferably the local leaders

should inaugurate these projects. Necessary security arrangements

should always be provided until the project becomes an inseparable part

of the community life and its security is everyone's concern. Military

leaders should also cater for the upkeep of all civic action projects and

ensure these are maintained in good shape till taken over by the local

government agencies. For facilitating a coordinated development, all

civic action projects should be included in the government's overall

development plan of the conflict zone. This inclusion, besides eliminating


Respect to elders and

,

4746 WINNING HEARTS AND MINDSWINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

duplication of effort, also helps to strengthen the hands of local governing

bodies. Where the change in attitudes is likely to take a long time, it may

be prudent to undertake projects that target the youth, in terms of

addressing their needs for education and for generating jobs.

4. Relevance and Practicability. Each region and every struggle

is unique in its expression, given the peculiarities of terrain, demography,

economy and social development index. This complexity leads to a

plethora of variables that should be correctly correlated to the ground

realities. Therefore, civic action projects should be identified accordingly.

In the initial stages, such projects are generally undertaken in isolation.

However, when the state government machinery starts functioning, these

projects should be coordinated jointly to ensure optimisation of

resources.

5. Experience shows that in the initial stages, the Army's effort for

civic actions is generally focused towards facilitating running of the

schools, providing medical and veterinary cover in remote areas along

with resuscitation of the medical facilities of the state and improving

accessibility to the remote areas. In the later stages of the campaign, the

focus shifts to empowering and 'helping people to help themselves'. This

includes emphasis on vocational training, women empowerment and

initiation of projects that facilitate generation of self employment

opportunities.

Effort employed on civic action projects should not be at the expense

of primary task of neutralising terrorists and their supporters, which

should continue in accordance with the laws of the land, to create a

secure environment.

The focus of civic action projects should be to

`help the people to help themselves

Feedback on Civic Action Projects

6. An objective feedback system is important to ensure effective

monitoring to enable timely completion of projects. This feedback also

helps in understanding the aspirations of the locals so that future projects

can be planned accordingly. Such monitoring needs to be coordinated

under the aegis of the unified headquarters.

Participative

7. The 'Hearts and Minds' campaign should be participative in nature

with the local populace fully involved in its planning and execution. This

would find more acceptability amongst the locals, as it would meet their

aspirations. One such example is building schools. While our concept of

schools may follow a cosmopolitan outlook, each region may have

different needs in keeping with the local social fabric and economic

realities. Such needs must be catered for.


4948 TRAININGTRAINING

TRAINING

Chapter 6

General

1. Sub conventional operations differ from conventional war in

several ways and, therefore, the approach to training for such operations

warrants different focus. In sub conventional operations, success hinges

on thorough understanding of the genesis and nuances of these

problems in correct perspective, especially since these operations are

conducted under the scrutiny of the populace, media and human rights'

activists. There is a need to change a soldier's mindset from fighting the

'enemy' in a conventional conflict, for which he is trained, to fighting his

'own people'. There is, therefore, a need to lay down a clear philosophy in

keeping with the identified training requirements.

2. The system of training must ensure that the troops are launched in

operations only after necessary orientation, adequate pre-induction

Sub-conventional Operations 2006

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