Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–01–4 Fall 2001 Vol. 14, No. 4

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

Today, more than one-third of the world’ssix billion people live in cities. But theUnited Nations predicts that by 2025, theworld’s population will increase to 7.8 bil-lion people, and that more than half of thatnumber will be urban residents. Moreover,the vast majority of the population growthis expected to take place in developingnations, burdening already strained infra-structures and possibly leading to dissatis-faction, violence or revolt. Because theUnited States is committed to maintainingglobal stability, the future will likely seeU.S. forces engaged in urban operations.

It is also likely that those urban opera-tions will require the capabilities of U.S.special-operations forces, or SOF. Opera-tions conducted among city walls and in citystreets do not permit the relatively clear-cutbattle lines and the decisive maneuver ofopen battlefields. Urban warfare is oftenasymmetric, and in some cases, the superi-ority of U.S. technology and sophisticatedweaponry will offer no advantages. But for-tunately, SOF’s unique capabilities are tai-lor-made for such situations. Whether per-forming direct-action missions, gatheringintelligence, communicating the command-er’s message to the local populace, or assist-ing in the rebuilding of a country’s infra-structure, SOF can offer a range of capabil-ities that can mean the difference betweensuccess and failure in urban operations.

To prepare SF detachments for conductingoperations in urban areas, the Army SpecialForces Command has implemented the Spe-cial Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course,or SFAUCC. SFAUCC teaches the collectivetasks, combat skills and teamwork that areimportant in urban operations. Equallyimportant in urban operations is SOF’sunderstanding of the population. It is a SOFtruth that humans are more important thanhardware, and SOF have the necessarytraining and experience for dealing with theessential element of urban operations — the

human element. Recent operations inAfghanistan have reinforced SOF’s ability towork with the soldiers and the citizens ofother countries and other cultures. Withtheir language skills, cultural awareness andknowledge of the various regions of the worldacquired through specialized training andfrequent deployments, SOF possess a famil-iarity with the human terrain that isunequalled in DoD. Because SOF are trainedand skilled warriors, they have credibilitywith their counterparts.

Training ARSOF soldiers is more criticalnow than it has been at any time since theSpecial Warfare Center was founded in1952. Training the soldiers and future lead-ers of ARSOF is a challenging responsibili-ty, and it is a job of which we are justifiablyproud. But our pride must never make uscomplacent. Although we will retain a rev-erence for our history and maintain conti-nuity with our past, we will transform asnecessary to meet the needs of the futureand to continue to produce the finest SOFsoldiers in the world. God bless America!

Major General William G. Boykin

Features2 Joint Urban Operations: Special Forces in Urban Campaign

Planningby Colonel Joseph D. Celeski

14 The New Asymmetry: Unconventional Warfare and ArmySpecial Forcesby Dr. Keith D. Dickson

20 Urban Warfare: Lessons from the Middle Eastby Norvell B. DeAtkine

30 PSYOP Radio Operations in Bosnia: A Steady, PositiveDrumbeatby Major John Mills

40 Historical Vignette: Two Combat Glider Landings in One Dayby Dr. C.H. Briscoe

44 From OSS to USSOCOM: Lessons Learnedby Colonel James M. Coyne

Departments47 Letters

50 2001 Index

52 Enlisted Career Notes

54 Officer Career Notes

56 Foreign SOF

57 Update

60 Book Reviews

Cover: This composite illustration provides a generic view of the conditions that SOF mayface during urban warfare (graphic by Bruce Barfield).

PB 80–01–4 ContentsFall 2001 Special Warfare Vol. 14, No. 4

Commander & CommandantMajor General William G. Boykin

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia W. McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkGloria H. Sawyer

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the USASOC internal web(https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Eric K. ShinsekiGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

0125001

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Worst of all is to besiege their city for-tifications. Besiege city fortificationsonly when no other option is left. Thebuilding of large protective shieldsand armored carriers and the prepa-ration of siege equipment requirethree months. A city blockade requiresanother three months. When com-manders cannot rein in their rage butorder the scaling of city fortifications,one third of their warriors will be sac-rificed, yet the city shall not be occu-pied: this is the tragedy of siege.

— Sun Tzu, “Planning an Offense”(from The Art of War)

Every year, U.S. Army Special Forces,or SF, are deployed to more than 145countries around the world. Because

SF may at any given time be required toparticipate in global operations, they mustpossess an in-depth knowledge of many ofthe major urban areas that might seefuture conflict. This article provides guid-ance for SF operational planners, both atthe SF group and at theater SOC J5 levels,to assist them in planning the employmentof SF as part of the campaign plan for ajoint urban operation, or JUO.1

SF has a long history of urban-warfareoperations, primarily at the operationallevel. During World War II, one of SF’spredecessors, the First Special ServiceForce, or FSSF (a combined U.S. and Cana-dian commando organization), served asthe lead task force in the Allied operationto capture Rome. During the assault,Brigadier General Robert Frederick, com-mander of the FSSF, was provided tankand artillery assets.

Almost 45 years later, during OperationDesert Storm, members of the 3rd and 5thSpecial Forces groups provided advice tothe coalition during the recapture ofKuwait City. Over the last 10 years, SF sol-diers have conducted urban-combat opera-tions in Somalia, and they have conductedurban-peacekeeping operations in Bosniaand Kosovo. Recently, SF teams trained inunconventional warfare, or UW, assistedthe Northern Alliance in regaining major

2 Special Warfare

Joint Urban Operations: Special Forces in Urban Campaign Planning

by Colonel Joseph D. Celeski

Trend predictions out to 2010 forecast increases in the likelihood of urban combat. Train-ing for future urban operations must include lessons learned from recent urban operations.

Photo by Thomas Witham

cities throughout Afghanistan. In futurecampaigns, SF will likely focus on restrict-ed and limited warfare in urban areas.

All trend predictions out to 2010 foreseeincreases in the size and in the populationsof urban centers, as well as in the numberof urban combat operations. The urbanenvironment has changed, and if we are toremain relevant, we must change our con-cept of urban operations. Incorporating thelessons of urban warfare into an SF urban-campaign plan (in accordance with thedemands of the national military strategyand the tenets of Joint Vision 2020 andSOF Vision 2020) will ensure the viabilityof our SF teams as part of any JUO.

To ensure that the JFC will have the toolsnecessary for conducting an urban opera-tion, SF must be properly orchestrated withother forces, and the roles assigned to SFmust be consistent with SF’s missions, capa-bilities and limitations. Given their uniqueroles and missions, SF, in conjunction withjoint and coalition forces, can provide aunique capability for accomplishing theobjectives of an urban campaign. AlthoughSF are not sufficiently robust to conduct anurban campaign single-handedly, they canachieve a synergistic effect by performingtheir operational roles and missions

through, with or by coalition forces.SF soldiers are trained to apply their wide

range of cultural, regional, language andinterpersonal skills in any operational envi-ronment.Acutely aware of the political impli-cations of their missions, SF soldiers canwork with coalition, multinational and non-governmental agencies to enhance the unityof effort in urban operations. Modern surveil-lance techniques and state-of-the-art com-munication equipment enable SF to provideprecise and timely information to the JFC.

Characteristics of urban areasIt is easy to perceive the urban environ-

ment as just another medium in which SFsoldiers operate and conduct their mis-sions. After all, the U.S. has been conduct-ing urban combat in varying degrees forthe last half-century. So why are we nowemphasizing the possibility of future warin urban areas? Simply put, the socialdynamics of urbanization have changedthe environment; as a result, we need tomake minor adaptations to our currenturban tactics, training procedures andequipment.

The urban environment is divided intovarious categories, each of which places

Fall 2001 3

DoD photo

Because Special Forcessoldiers are frequentlydeployed for training andfor operations, they areexperienced in applyingcultural, language andinterpersonal skills in avariety of environments.

unique demands on operations and equip-ment. In order to be prepared for each cat-egory’s demands, we must adapt andexpand our urban capabilities.

Military operations in urban terrainhave their own unique characteristics.These operations mandate that we be pre-pared for the change from clearly definedbattles in a horizontal plane to ambiguousbattles in the vertical battle plane (rangingfrom sewers and subway systems to pent-

houses). Urban areas consist of fragmentedterrain that will isolate our operations andrequire that we have knowledge of urbanplanning, urban infrastructure, and sup-port systems. Streets often cannot bebypassed, and obstacles may be insur-mountable. While situational awarenesswill be a prized commodity on the urbanbattlefield, human intelligence, orHUMINT, will be the most prized commod-ity of all. Knowledge will be a key enabler.

If we view a city as an organism, we cansee its interlocked municipal systems —power, water and sewage, information,transportation, emergency, and medical —as the organs that must function togetherin order to support life. These interlockedsystems are not depicted on military maps.In urban operations, commanders willrequire databases that can provide blue-prints, three-dimensional graphics, engi-neer studies and operational manuals forinfrastructure nodes. Aerial photomaps,

which were quite useful in Mogadishu, willbe more beneficial than paper maps. Pre-cise, up-to-date information on the positionand the status of enemy and friendlyforces, as well as the numbers, locationsand flow of civilians, will be the intelli-gence coin of the realm in urban combat.2

In the urban environment, informationon civilians will be critical, because non-combatants are ubiquitous, and distin-guishing between friend and foe can bechallenging. The presence of civilians onthe battlefield will force us to expand ourforms of combat to include nonlethalmeans. Because our adversaries may rangefrom military combatants to armed gangsto criminal elements, commanders will alsoneed to protect noncombatants and infra-structure in accordance with The HagueConventions and the Geneva Conventions.

From the beginning, urban combat will bea war of information. Increased battlefieldaccess for the media will call for new para-digms of openness for the military com-mander charged with conducting the urbanoperation. Media reporting will becomemore significant, given that urban combatusually produces high casualty rates. Wheninformation is targeted at the will of thepeople and at their reaction to casualties,the information war can well determine theoutcome of the combat operation.

Urban warfare creates changing terrainconditions: Damage caused by weaponrywill reduce many structures to rubble, andnew structures (bunkers, refugee tentcities, etc.) will be formed almostovernight. Tarps, mirrors, lasers or high-intensity lights can be used to block orreduce visibility. With the increase of“urban sprawl” and the downsizing of mod-ern armies, it is becoming impossible tomarshal the military assets needed to com-pletely surround a modern city. Cities are“porous,” in that they provide severalavenues for infiltration and exfiltration.Subterranean avenues of approach can beflooded, and air corridors in urban“canyons” can be blocked with cabling andnetting devices, but attempts to shut offinfil/exfil avenues will only lead to the cre-ation of new avenues.

Urban warfare is the most resource-

4 Special Warfare

This aerial photo showsan intersection in Bosniawhere clashes betweenethnic groups have beenfrequent. During urbanoperations, aerial photosmay be more up-to-dateand more informativethan paper maps.

Photo by Cesar Rodriquez

intensive form of warfare, and it is also themost difficult to supply and support. Urbanwarfare is personal: Direct-fire weaponsare preferred over indirect-fire weaponsbecause of the need for precision andbecause of the need to limit collateral dam-age. Urban warfare is asymmetric. Its low-tech requirements negate the high-techstrength of modern conventional armies,making urban combat attractive to anyonewho intends to fight U.S. and allied con-ventional forces.3

Recent urban operations have yieldedthe following lessons for conventionalforces:• Combined-arms teams operating as part

of specially trained urban-warfare unitsthat have decentralized control havebeen proven successful.

• Urban operations require surprise,speed, intelligence (particularlyHUMINT), and the isolation and con-tainment of enemy forces.

• Tanks employed in pairs, with infantryprotection, provide the best means ofachieving an overwhelming superiorityin heavy direct-fire capability in urbancombat.

• Vehicles equipped with some kind of armorprotection are required in urban conflict iffor no other reason than to ensure medicalevacuation and logistics supply.

• Control of the key terrain surrounding acity can facilitate the use of indirectartillery fire and close air support, or

CAS, to prevent the enemy from eitherescaping or obtaining reinforcements.

• Any means of clearing an urban area ofnoncombatants prior to fighting is moredesirable than having to account for andprotect noncombatants during the battle.4

Unconventional conflictThe trend toward unconventional urban

conflict is rising. The resistance activitiesin Kuwait City during the Gulf War, thepseudo-volunteer militia forces in Saraje-vo, and the insurgents in Chechnya havedemonstrated to their oppressors thatdefeating them can be expensive. Uncon-ventional warriors use operating stylessimilar to those used by gangs and crimi-nal factions, and in many cases, today’sunconventional urban warriors were yes-terday’s urban criminals. The secretivemeeting places, arms and weapons cachesand clandestine communication systemsused by criminal elements all have intrin-sic military value in unconventional war-fare. Quite often, pre-conflict smugglingroutes become the guerrilla force’s mainavenues for moving supplies and for infil-trating and exfiltrating personnel.5

Information technologyHigh-tech, information-based warfare

works best against enemies that possessequipment similar to ours. Such warfarewill be less effective against enemies

Fall 2001 5

Photo by Glenn W. Suggs

A U.S. Abrams tankdefends a checkpoint inBosnia. During urbanoperations, tanks can pro-vide valuable assets suchas direct-fire capabilityand armor protection.

whose cultures have not yet entered theIndustrial Age.

No government to date has been able tocontrol the proliferation of cell phones,computers, night-vision devices, commer-cial surveillance-and-detection sensors,and radio-transmitting devices. Becauseaccess to the Internet cannot be controlled,the Internet has become a great mediumfor clandestine command and control.Novice PSYOP units, equipped with print-ing and copying devices, have the ability toprint full-blown, sophisticated leaflets,newspapers and disinformation products.6

Establishing communications in anurban environment will be difficultbecause high-rise buildings, enclosed struc-tures and subterranean systems will blockelectronic signals. The electrical and mag-netic emanations from power sources andtelecommunications nodes will also con-tribute to the distortion and interference ofcommunications.

In urban operations, knowledge of thecommander’s intent will take on increasedimportance if units are forced to operatewithout communicating with their higherheadquarters. Military communicationssystems are predominantly FM and UHF;in the urban landscape, communicationssystems consist of public telephones, cellphones, microwave repeater systems, fiber-optic-based communications systems, faxmachines and computer nets. Militaryforces should train on all these systems sothat they can use them to augment their

communications capabilities.Employing directional transmitters,

radio retransmitters and repeaters, andtapping into existing telephone, fiber-opticand computer networks are all good work-around methods for enhancing communi-cations capabilities. The use of civiliancommunications systems will demand ahigh level of operations security, becausethe same systems can be accessed by theenemy. Finally, military forces should beable to monitor, jam and disrupt civiliancell-phone and electronic telecommunica-tions emissions, in both the analog and dig-ital bands.7

Close air supportCAS has been used in most urban battles

since World War II, and its importance inurban combat will likely continue. CASsorties should be performed above theranges of shoulder-fired weapons andground-fire. Russia’s loss of two SU-25s inSeptember and October 1999 during theRussian campaign to quell Islamic rebelsin Grozny, Chechnya, demonstrated theimpact that a low-tech air defense can haveon low-flying aircraft.8 How will the needfor CAS be reconciled with the need to com-ply with urban rules of engagement? U.S.war fighters exercise great care to limit col-lateral damage, but the recent air cam-paigns in Kosovo and in Afghanistan makeclear how difficult doing that can be. Evenduring optimal conditions (e.g., air superi-

6 Special Warfare

Soldiers assigned to the 3rdSF Group set up communi-cations equipment atop ahotel in Nigeria. Establish-ing communications inurban operations is difficultbecause of interferencefrom high buildings andpower sources.

Photo by Jim Hampshire

ority, suppressed enemy air defenses andgood weather conditions), achieving pin-point accuracy of CAS in urban areasremains challenging. Clusters of urbanbuildings that block the line-of-sight tar-geting needed for laser-designatingdevices, unreliable communications, thenot-so-precise weapon that does not workas it was intended to, and the lack of clear-ly definable initial points for target run-insall contribute to the difficulty of providingCAS in an urban environment. The plat-form of choice for providing urban-combatCAS to U.S. forces has been the AC-130USpectre gunship, although it is the mostvulnerable aircraft to enemy threats (onewas shot down over Kuwait during DesertStorm). Nevertheless, the AC-130U proveditself in Somalia and continues to proveitself in Afghanistan. The pinpoint accura-cy that can be provided by attack heli-copters firing miniguns or laser-guidedmunitions has been proven repeatedly bythe Israeli air force in its recent attacksagainst Palestinian terrorists. In the lastyear alone, the Israelis have achievedamazing accuracy in dozens of hits on keyinfrastructure and on moving vehicles.

LogisticsThe Russian experience during the bat-

tle of Grozny, conducted in January andFebruary 1995, provides a good example ofthe impact that urban combat can have onthe operational level of logistics. The Rus-sian army found itself not only having toprovide food, medicine and shelter to theinhabitants of Grozny, but also having torepair and restore the civilian logisticsinfrastructure. Incorporating the basicnecessities for the civilian and refugee pop-ulace into logistics planning proved to bean extremely difficult task. Acquiring cleanwater, operable sewage systems, electricityand medical facilities demanded time andeffort that otherwise could have been dedi-cated to the battle.

Another logistics concern for the Russianarmy was its need for an armored combatresupply system operated by combat-trained infantrymen or logisticians. Supplytrucks and vehicles were too thinly pro-

tected from enemy fires, and logistics sol-diers lacked the combat training thatwould have enabled them to move through-out the urban fighting.

Three characteristics of urban warfaremake logistics resupply a priority at thetactical and operational levels: Urban com-bat is intense, requiring the heavy use ofammunition and explosives; urban combathas a heavy requirement for medical-treat-ment facilities, equipment and supplies;

and urban combat makes higher energydemands on soldiers, who require a caloricintake of about 5,000 calories per day.

Another logistics concern deals with theneed to seize control of external lines ofcommunication that support the urbanbattle space. To ensure an adequate flow of

Fall 2001 7

Italian soldiers and a U.S. Civil Affairs soldier survey damage to arail bridge in Bosnia. Urban operations often involve restoring acountry’s logistics infrastructure.

Photo by Brian D. Thompson

supplies, forces should seize control of air-ports, rail lines, highways and port facili-ties early in the urban campaign. Aerialresupply methods will be in heavy demandfor delivering urgently needed supplies tofighting pockets within the city.9

MedicalUrban combat will produce high num-

bers of battle casualties, psychologicalstress, and diseases such as cholera andtyphoid. Comparing the medical casualtyrates of two major urban-combat opera-tions is illuminating.

The Russian experience in Grozny pro-vides one recent lesson. The Russians suf-fered a high disease rate because ofunclean drinking water and unsanitaryconditions. Losses due to psychologicalstresses from sustained, high-intensitycombat were extremely high. The lack ofproperly trained medical personnel, insuf-ficient supplies of antibiotics, and insuffi-cient capabilities for medical evacuationdrove combat casualty statistics higher, to4,379 KIA.10

More relevant to SF operators are theresults from the analysis of combat casual-ties suffered by Army Rangers inMogadishu, Somalia, during the Oct. 3,1993, raid otherwise known as the “Battleof the Black Sea.” The statistics depict anurban battle typical of those in which SFtroops may find themselves in the future —

battles involving ethnic, tribal and terror-ist enclaves in overpopulated urban areas.

It is worth noting that in Mogadishu,small-arms fire and fragments from rocket-propelled grenades produced the highestpercentage of injuries to U.S. soldiers.Because the soldiers were wearing protec-tive vests and Kevlar helmets, most of theinjuries involved wounds to the extremities.

Other factors of urban warfare are worthconsideration: Urban warfare and openstreets will produce increased numbers ofcasualties; well-aimed sniper fire is thenumber-one reason for fatal head wounds;more IVs will be required in forward areasduring urban combat; evacuation will takelonger, and medics should anticipate pro-viding prolonged care at the scene of thefight; the liberal use of tourniquets will becrucial in preventing early blood loss; andbecause of the delay in getting casualties tosurgery, antibiotic therapy will be increas-ingly given by medics in the field.

Medical evacuation will be challengingduring urban combat. Medical personnel willhave to perform triage at the battle scene,and litter teams will need to move casualtiesto areas that are relatively safe from enemyfires, from which the casualties will awaitmedical evacuation. Prior to deployment, sol-diers should receive inoculations that, whencombined with the appropriate antibiotics,will help prevent not only the infectious ill-nesses common in populated areas, but alsoinfections that can develop in open wounds.

8 Special Warfare

Because medical evacua-tion can be difficult dur-ing urban operations,medics should anticipateproviding prolonged careat the scene of the battle.

Photo by Victoria Romena

The unique capabilities, equipment andskills now typically seen in civilian urban-search-and-rescue teams will be required bymilitary forces who assist in clearing debrisand searching for casualties. Speciallytrained dogs may also play a role in locatingvictims. When there is a lack of sanitationmeasures, supplies of potable water will haveto be brought in.

Adopting these lessons and incorporat-ing new skills and new equipment into SFtraining will ensure the viability of SFurban-combat forces.

Levels of warWhen a joint force commander analyzes

the requirements of an urban campaignplan, he must consider the three levels ofwar — tactical, operational and strategic.Although the most important aspect of anoperation is its contribution to the achieve-ment of the strategic end-state, actionswithin urban conflicts may sometimes tra-verse all three levels of war.

Campaigns orchestrate battles and oper-ations in order to achieve strategic objec-tives within given constraints of time andspace. It is worth noting that a single the-ater of war may have more than one cam-paign plan. A campaign plan describes theway in which time, space and purpose con-nect the various operations.11 Shapingevents to achieve strategic results is theessence of the operational art of war.

There are a number of reasons why theJFC may choose to conduct a joint urbanoperation. He may wish to conduct a show-of-force mission in an urban area todemonstrate the presence of friendlyarmed forces. The JFC may wish to con-duct an operation that will contain enemyforces inside the city or that will isolatethem from reinforcements or from theircommand and control. He may seek to usean urban area as a major logistics base oras part of his communications zone. Hemay wish to conduct operations to retainthe city and to ensure that it will not fallunder the military or political control of hisadversary.

The JFC may conduct denial operationsoutside the boundaries of the city to ensure

that approaching enemy forces will beunable to occupy the city. He could alsodeny the enemy legitimacy by using uncon-ventional warfare (including subversionand sabotage activities) to mount a resist-ance campaign. Conversely, the JFC maydecide to employ counterinsurgency forcesif the adversaries are using asymmetricalforms of urban warfare, such as terrorismand insurgency, to gain an operationaladvantage.

On a larger scale, a city may be consid-ered a political objective and a militarystrategic objective because of its historical,cultural or economic significance. In such acase, the JFC might initiate deliberateoffensive actions to retake the city. Theactions could be joint urban operations, orthey could be coalition or multinationaloperations. Finally, as an economy-of-forcemeasure, the JFC may bypass the hostileurban area and employ forces to keep itunder surveillance.

Five phasesHow can SF help establish the opera-

tional conditions for limited warfare in anurban environment? The draft concept forJCS Pub 3-06, Joint Urban Operations,suggests a framework for an urban opera-tion within a campaign plan. The opera-tions may be sequential or simultaneous.The phases of the framework are under-stand, shape, engage, consolidate andtransition.12

SF soldiers can perform their primarymissions as part of urban operations, andthey can participate throughout eachphase of a joint urban operation’s cam-paign plan. SF’s primary missions are allrelevant in joint urban operations: directaction, or DA (including command-and-control warfare, or C2W, as part of infor-mation operations); special reconnais-sance, or SR; foreign internal defense, orFID; UW; and combatting terrorism. SFhas two collateral missions that enhanceurban operations: coalition support, andurban combat search and rescue. As glob-al scouts during regional engagement, SFsoldiers have unique access to the popu-lace. That access allows them to perform

Fall 2001 9

key activities during the understand andshape phases (e.g., providing informationto build the operational net assessmentconcerning urban areas in each CINC’sregion).

Understand and shape phases. To deter-mine the implications of an urban opera-tion, the JFC must conduct a thorough mis-sion analysis. Urban intelligence prepara-tion of the battlefield, or IPB, provides thecritical information required by campaignplanners. Knowledge of the urban area’s ter-rain, noncombatants, infrastructure andpolitics will allow the JFC to determine thecorrect task organization and sequencing offorces for a particular JUO. It is worth not-ing that the Defense Intelligence Agencypredicts that transnational infrastructurewarfare, or TIW, will be one of the “newforms of warfare” in the coming decades.

DIA defines TIW as follows:Attacking a nation’s or subnational enti-

ty’s key industries and utilities — to includetelecommunications, banking and finance,transportation, water, government opera-tions, emergency services, energy and power,and manufacturing. These industries nor-mally have key linkages and interdependen-cies, which could significantly increase theimpact of an attack on a single component.13

SF soldiers’ familiarity with various

urban environments could be a valuableasset when urban-operation planners aredeveloping the personnel-recovery mecha-nisms for the operation, planning its infor-mation operations, establishing its intelli-gence and reconnaissance architecture,and planning its operational fires.

Because of their worldwide presence asglobal scouts, SF soldiers would be anexcellent choice as an early-response force.During the early phases of an urban oper-ation, SF soldiers could use their skills inSR, sensor-emplacement and information-gathering in several ways:• To establish the conditions needed for

surprise (operational art).• To provide intelligence and communica-

tions that would enhance the JFC’s battle-space awareness by adding “ground truth.”

• To provide commanders with opera-tional freedom of maneuver by coordi-nating with nongovernment organiza-tions, private volunteer organizations, orthe United Nations or other agencies tohelp with force protection.

• To increase maneuver commanders’force-protection capabilities by utilizingspecialized SF skills and training. Theforce-protection capability could be fur-ther enhanced through employment ofchemical-reconnaissance detachmentsand special-operations teams-Alpha.During the first two phases, SF could con-

duct direct-action missions as part of opera-tional fires, targeting enemy C2W nodes,weapons of mass destruction and lines ofcommunication. If required, SF could assistthe ongoing UW efforts of resistance forcesor insurgents. SF could initiate FID mis-sions to prepare coalition forces for urbancombat. (Once hostilities begin, FID wouldtransition to coalition-support operations.)Finally, SF could assist in or conduct non-combatant-evacuation operations to protectnoncombatants from impending harm.

Engage phase. During the urban opera-tion, the JFC will conduct offensive ordefensive operational fire and maneuver inorder to achieve the strategic objectives ofthe campaign plan. Urban operations willbe costly to armies and to noncombatantsalike. Political and public pressures willdictate some of the operational-level rules

10 Special Warfare

An Albanian man in Koso-vo receives relief suppliesfrom CARE workers. Toassist the commander, SF soldiers can coordi-nate force-protection ac-tivities with nongovern-ment organizations.

Photo by Christina Ann Horne

of engagement, or ROE, and combat will berestricted in urban areas.

SF can help establish the operational con-ditions by continuing to provide DA as ameans of precision engagement and by per-forming the SR needed to maintain infor-mation dominance. During penetrationoperations, SF may be required to seize keyterrain or infrastructures. Most likely, theJFC will assign the direct, offensive urban-combat missions to coalition forces. SF willprovide support to enhance the combatcapabilities of coalition forces and to helpprevent fratricide, and they will provideground truth to the JFC commander.

During coalition urban mop-up opera-tions, SF will ensure compliance with ROEand with the law-of-land-warfare protocols.Joint-force planners should ensure that SFsoldiers are properly employed duringdeliberate offensive actions. Because of theconstraints of urban environments, SF willoperate closer than usual to conventionalforces. It will be necessary to attach a com-mand-and-control organization, such as aspecial-operations command and controlelement, or SOCCE, to the ground-forcecommander in order to conduct link-upoperations and to help prevent fratricide.

During defensive operations, SF can pro-vide operational support to economy-of-force measures designed to prevent theenemy from gaining control of an urbanarea. Unconventional warfare, conductedthrough, with or by guerrillas, insurgentsor resistance forces, can be employed to tiedown and harass enemy forces. SF canestablish urban mechanisms for unconven-tional assisted recovery. Such mechanismswill facilitate efforts to recover isolatedpersonnel from enemy-controlled areas ofthe city. SF can help isolate the enemyfrom the city by advising UW forces to con-duct hit-and-run activities on key terrainand on the LOCs surrounding the urbanobjective. Conversely, SF can assist friend-ly forces whose counterinsurgency effortsare designed to contain insurgents inurban areas.

Consolidate phase. Consolidation activi-ties are conducted in order to retain what-ever advantages have been gained, to miti-gate the impact of hostilities on the civilian

populace, and to deal with by-passed forces(or neutralized forces). To increase the JFCcommander’s battle-space awareness dur-ing this phase, SF will continue to provideSR in selected areas. During DA missions,SF soldiers can perform personnel recov-ery, and they can ensure that surrenderedenemy forces remain compliant.

SF can contribute to the efforts of otherspecial-operations forces, such as CivilAffairs and Psychological Operations, in theconduct of civil-military operations. Untilthey are relieved by larger organizations,SF can help coordinate the provision of food,water, sanitation, and medical assistance tononcombatants. At the operational level,SF’s assistance will help in winning thehearts and minds of noncombatants and indenying the enemy legitimacy.

SF will continue to provide force-protec-tion measures through ongoing assess-ments of both the urban populace and thearea’s critical structures, and they will con-tinue to provide their expertise on ways oflocating and destroying any remainingweapons of mass destruction, or WMD.Employed in the urban role, SF snipers canprovide an extraordinary force-protectioncapability, as they demonstrated inMogadishu. SF engineers can restore keyinfrastructure in isolated areas. Finally, SFcan play a critical role in the link-up oper-ations between UW forces and convention-al forces (in fact, SF are the only forcestrained for those operations), and they will

Fall 2001 11

Photo by Jean-Marc Schaible

During U.S. operations inHaiti in 1994, a PSYOPspeaker team warns resi-dents to evacuate a tar-geted building. Whennecessary, SF can assistother SOF in civil-militaryoperations.

play a role during the demobilization ofUW forces.

Transition phase. During the transitionphase, the objective is to achieve an order-ly and rapid turnover of the JUO to otherforces, whether they are forces of the for-merly deposed host-nation military or des-ignated international peacekeeping forces.The transition phase is the most importantphase of urban operations, and SF can playan integral role in establishing the condi-tions for transition to the support-and-sta-bility operations.

SF soldiers will revert to their FID rolein order to train and restore the hostnation’s paramilitary or military forces.Aided by their cultural and language capa-bilities and by their long-term, profession-al foreign military associations formedduring regional-engagement activities, SFcan be instrumental in integrating foreignforces into peace operations as part of thebattle handover from U.S. forces. SF canmonitor cease-fire agreements and enforcecompliance with peace treaties, as the Spe-cial Forces Joint Commission Observersdid in Bosnia.

SF can provide support to CA andPSYOP efforts during the transition phase.That support will be strengthened throughSF’s contacts in the interagency arena andthrough SF’s habitual contacts with NGOs

and PVOs. To alleviate the sufferingimposed on noncombatants by the urbanoperation, SF may have to perform its col-lateral mission of humanitarian assist-ance. During personnel-recovery missions,SF can continue to search for combatantswho are listed as missing in action.

Finally, during the transition phase, SFcan assist in measures to combat terror-ism. The final gasp of urban insurgentscould still be affecting stability operations.SF can provide antiterrorism and counter-terrorism training to security forces tostrengthen their capabilities. Should ter-rorists employ WMD, SF can provide afirst-response capability until conventionalforces arrive. SF’s organic assets, such aschemical-reconnaissance teams, can con-duct initial assessments and provide localauthorities with immediate secure commu-nications, medical assistance, security andadvice.

SOF 2020 emphasizes the need toachieve full-spectrum dominance by con-ducting prompt and sustained joint specialoperations. To ensure SF’s role as globalscouts with a worldwide presence, SF canparticipate in regional-engagement activi-ties to develop the coalition interoperabili-ty and the information databases that willbe critical in conducting future joint urbanoperations. The specific tasks that SF are

12 Special Warfare

A boy watches as Serbianresidents of Sarajevo burntheir house rather thantransition to the control ofthe Bosnian Federation.SF can provide invaluableassistance during the crit-ical transition phase.

Photo by Andrew McGalliard

capable of conducting during a joint urbanoperation must be included in the planningphase of the campaign. Joint SOF plannerscan provide this information through awell-developed SF joint-urban-operationssupporting plan.

Colonel Joseph D. Celeski isthe deputy commander of theU.S. Army Special ForcesCommand. Colonel Celeskienlisted in the Army in 1974and served as an armor crew-man in the 1st Armored Divi-sion. He graduated from Army Officer Can-didate School and was commissioned inFebruary 1978 as an armor officer. He servedin the Federal Republic of Germany with the3/64th Armor, 3rd Infantry Division, asleader of an M-60A1 tank platoon, as battal-ion motor officer, and as commander of anM1 tank company. In 1983, Colonel Celeskicompleted the SF Qualification Course andwas assigned to the 5th SF Group as adetachment commander. His other assign-ments in the 5th Group include companycommander, battalion S3, group S3, andbattalion commander. Colonel Celeski hasalso served as an adviser to the Royal Jor-danian 1st Armor Battalion; as the J3ground operations officer and as the deputyJ5 for plans in the Special Operations Com-mand-Central; as G3 and as chief of staffwith the U.S. Army SF Command; and ascommander of the Combined Joint SpecialOperations Task Force in Sarajevo, in sup-port of NATO’s Operation Joint Forge.Colonel Celeski is a graduate of the ArmorOfficer Advanced Course, the Infantry Offi-cer Advanced Course, the Marine Amphibi-ous Warfare Course, the Army Commandand General Staff College, the Air ForceCommand and General Staff College, theArmed Forces Staff College, the Army WarCollege and the Army Force ManagementCourse. He holds a bachelor’s degree in polit-ical science from Columbus College and amaster’s degree in public administrationfrom Shippensburg University.

Notes:1 “Special Operations Forces Employment in the

Urban Environment.” Draft SOF Input to J8 WorkingGroup, JCS Pub 3-06, November 1999, p. 1.

2 Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, “Urban War-fare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025,” Parameters29 (Summer 1999):78.

3 Ralph Peters, Fighting for the Future (Mechanics-burg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1999), 70-83.

4 Department of the Navy, Military Operations onUrban Terrain, MCWP 3-35.3 (Quantico, Va.: MarineCorps Combat Development Command, 4-98), 1-12 –1-20.

5 Martin Libicki, “The Mesh and the NET – Specula-tions on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon,”Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNairPaper 28, Chapter 5 (National Defense University,www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair28/m028ch05, 14September 1999):2-4.

6 Ibid., 1-2.7 Lester Grau, “Urban Warfare Communication: A

Contemporary Russian View.” Foreign Military Stud-ies Office (Fort Leavenworth, Kan., July 1966):1-8.

8 Associated Press. “Chechens Say They Shot Down2 Russian Jets,” Baltimore Sun, 24 October 1999;accessed on the Internet, 24 October 1999.

9 Retired Lieutenant Colonels Lester W. Grau andTimothy L. Thomas, “Soft Log and Concrete Canyons –Russian Urban Combat Logistics in Grozny,” MarineCorps Gazette 83 (October 1999):67-74.10 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya – Tombstone of RussianPower (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 108.11 Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Feb-ruary 1995), III-4.12 “Draft Operational Concept for Joint Urban Opera-tions.” JCS J8 JWG, JP3-06 Draft, 4 October 1999, 6-10.13 Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, “GlobalThreats and Challenges — The Decades Ahead.” Insti-tute of Land Warfare, Association of the United StatesArmy, March 1999, 15.

Fall 2001 13

The adversaries of freedom … subver-sives and saboteurs and insurrection-ists … send arms, agitators, aid, tech-nicians and propaganda to every trou-bled area. … [They] conscript talentand manpower for any purpose, and[have] long experience in the tech-niques of violence and subversion. It isa contest of will and purpose as wellas force and violence — a battle forminds and souls as well as lives andterritory. And in that contest, we can-not stand aside.

— John F. Kennedy, message to Congress, April 27, 1961

President Kennedy’s long-forgottenwords take on a new meaning in theaftermath of the events of Sept. 11,

2001. Kennedy was describing unconven-tional war. Today, the Bush administrationis attempting to define a new direction fornational security while conducting a globalwar against terrorism. As our nationalleaders examine how best to characterizethe threat and how the nation willrespond, we should remember Kennedy’scharacterization of what we increasinglyrefer to today as asymmetric warfare.

The United States must develop a grandstrategy that will allow us to pursue ourinterests and objectives through peace, cri-sis and war. In developing a grand strategy,we must establish a clear definition of our

national interests, and we must have athorough understanding of the threats thatour nation faces. Before becoming the cur-rent national security adviser, CondoleezaRice published an article in Foreign Affairsin which she emphasized the need for “a dis-ciplined and consistent foreign policy” thatwill focus on pursuing our top priorities forthe protection of national interests. Amongthe priorities she identified was the need todevelop a strategy for dealing decisivelywith “rogue regimes and hostile powers.”1

Rice leans heavily on nuclear deterrenceand strategic missile defense as methods ofdealing with the threats presented by ourpotential adversaries. While both of thosemethods are effective in dealing with classicstrength-against-strength confrontations,American power and dominance now forceour adversaries to seek new approachesthat do not center on strength-on-strengthchallenges. In the future, an adversary willmost likely apply its strengths against U.S.weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Asymmetric warfareThe 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review

first described the danger that a futureadversary could “delay or deny U.S. accessto critical facilities; disrupt our command,control, communications, and intelligencenetworks; or inflict higher-than-expectedcasualties in an attempt to weaken ournational resolve.”2 Strategists have called

14 Special Warfare

The New Asymmetry: Unconventional Warfare and Army Special Forces

by Dr. Keith D. Dickson

this approach asymmetric warfare, a con-cept that encompasses virtually any kindof attack by an enemy employing a varietyof means and methods designed to exploitour weaknesses.

In essence, asymmetric warfare is a wayof “acting, organizing, and thinking differ-ently” from one’s opponent.3 Asymmetricwarfare demands sophisticated planning; athorough understanding of the adversary’sstrengths and weaknesses; and the abilityto attack with a number of techniques,weapons and technologies at several levelsat once. The goals of asymmetric warfareare to deny and degrade the enemy’s capa-bilities; to destroy and disrupt the enemy’ssystems; and to dislocate and dislodge theenemy’s political will.4 The attacks on thePentagon and on the World Trade Centercertainly reflect these goals.

Joint Vision 2020How does the U.S. military currently

approach the possibility that an adversarycould employ asymmetric warfare tonegate our capabilities? Our military blue-print for the future, Joint Vision 2020, pre-dicts that our armed forces will gain acapability called “full-spectrum domi-

nance.” Full-spectrum dominance isintended to counter and defeat any adver-sary by employing dominant maneuver,precision engagement, focused logistics,and full-dimensional protection at anylevel of warfare.

The military capabilities described inJV 2020, however, appear to be similar toconventional war-fighting capabilities —although the forces described in JV 2020would be more technologically sophisticat-ed, better-organized, and better-led.Although JV 2020 recognizes the possibil-ity that an adversary could employ asym-metric threats, it assumes a static enemycapability that largely mirrors our own.JV 2020 implies that the U.S. military willbe able to choose the conditions underwhich it will fight and will thus be able toapply its full-spectrum dominance to anythreat.

These conditions may very well turnout to be true. But while JV 2020 definesthe ends, it does not describe the ways ormeans, and it leaves unsettling ques-tions: What if our potential adversariesrefuse to challenge our ever-growingstrengths directly, either now or in thefuture? What if they neutralize our supe-riority by identifying and attacking our

Fall 2001 15

DoD photo

The terrorist attack on thePentagon is an exampleof asymmetric warfare.

vulnerabilities through asymmetricmeans at times and places not of ourchoosing? Even if the U.S. military doesbecome the force described in JV 2020,engaging an enemy who chooses to fightasymmetrically would most likely bringus only a Pyrrhic victory.5 As StevenMetz has noted, strategy documents likeJV 2020 recognize the importance ofdealing with an adversary or adversarieswho employ asymmetric means, yetAmerican strategic practitioners havenot been able to capture asymmetry,either in strategy or in doctrine.6

An adversary’s asymmetric warfaremethods would most likely focus on his-

toric American vulnerabilities that haverarely been targeted: force-deploymentcapability, information transfer and popu-lar will. Particularly disturbing for strate-gists is the potential of asymmetric war-fare to negate not only our conventionalmilitary strength, but our moral and orga-nizational strength as well — the three pil-lars upon which rests the status of the U.S.as a superpower. It is galling for Americansto think that an enemy who has relativelylimited means, but who has the rightaccess and the right methods, could laythis nation low quickly and cheaply.

Countering the threatIt is this basic idea that has caused some

in the Department of Defense and in otheragencies to devote much thought and agreat deal of ink toward finding methods ofcountering what appears to be an ever-expanding number of asymmetric threats.The general approach has been to developways of mitigating the consequences of a

possible attack. While much of this efforthas been productive, it has also been short-sighted. By examining asymmetric warfarein only one dimension — the defensive —the U.S. in effect yields the strategic initia-tive to the enemy.7

Because some rogue states and non-state actors cannot, or will not, faceAmerican conventional military powerdirectly, they are more likely to adoptasymmetric means of attack. AlthoughAmerican strategic culture is uncomfort-able with the idea of employing the sameasymmetric-warfare strategies that ouradversaries might adopt, asymmetricwarfare can be practiced by the strong aswell as by the weak. In fact, asymmetricwarfare is attractive to the U.S. for thesame reasons that it is attractive to ourpotential adversaries:• Our enemies have moral, informational

and organizational vulnerabilities thatcan be exploited asymmetrically.

• Strategic goals can potentially beachieved with far less cost throughasymmetric warfare than through con-ventional warfare.

• Asymmetric warfare can be conductedovertly, clandestinely and covertly.

• Asymmetric warfare can be employed atthe tactical, operational and strategiclevels.

• Given proper timing and proper selec-tion of objectives, asymmetric warfareattacks can produce effects that far out-weigh the cost of the resourcesemployed.If asymmetric warfare can be advanta-

geous to a great power as a component ofits grand strategy, what then are themeans that the U.S. could employ to pursueits national interests and objectives asym-metrically? The answers lie in our doctrinefor unconventional warfare, or UW, but weneed to reinvigorate that UW doctrine andredirect it into the realm of asymmetricwarfare.

The current definition of UW, as statedin Joint Pub 1-02, the Department ofDefense Dictionary of Military and Associ-ated Terms, is:

A broad spectrum of military andparamilitary operations, normally of

16 Special Warfare

Although American strategic culture isuncomfortable with the idea of employingthe same asymmetric-warfare strategiesthat our adversaries might adopt, asymmet-ric warfare can be practiced by the strongas well as by the weak.

long duration, predominantly conductedby indigenous or surrogate forces whoare organized, trained, equipped, sup-ported, and directed in varying degreesby an external source. It includes guerril-la warfare and other direct offensive, lowvisibility, covert, or clandestine opera-tions, as well as the indirect activities ofsubversion, sabotage, intelligence activi-ties, and evasion and escape.8

SF capabilityIn the U.S. military, the responsibility for

UW resides with Army Special Forces, orSF. Established in the 1950s with the spe-cific mission of waging UW around theworld, SF has retained the organizationalstructure that was intended to facilitatethe conduct of guerrilla operations. SF iscomposed of tactical units whose opera-tions produce strategic effects. SF’s low-visibility, low-cost assets are organized intosmall, rapidly deployable groups of highlyskilled, culturally attuned, and independ-ent troops.

But SF soldiers have rarely practiced theart of UW since the early years of the Viet-nam War. As a result, SF’s role in UW hasbeen steadily de-emphasized for more thana generation in favor of other operations.SF is used to support large–scale conven-tional operations (in the aftermath of theGulf War, General Norman Schwartzkopfdescribed SF soldiers as “the eyes and earsof Desert Storm”). They also provide train-ing and assistance called foreign internaldefense, or FID, to foreign military organi-zations. FID is a much-watered-down ver-sion of UW’s focus on establishing indige-nous combat organizations.

The strategic situation in which theU.S. finds itself in the post-Cold Warworld has created the need for us to recastour UW capabilities to fit the require-ments of asymmetric warfare. SF remainsbest-suited by organization, culture andtraining to adapt traditional UW conceptsinto the tools of asymmetric warfare. Aspractitioners of this new form of UW, SFsoldiers could provide a powerful deter-rent and a stinging offensive capabilityagainst an adversary who employs an

asymmetric strategy.Formulating a new definition of UW is

the first step in adapting SF to the practiceof asymmetric warfare. Shown below is aworking definition of unconventional oper-ations. The definition is the result of com-bining various definitions of UW since1969 and applying them to the conduct of

asymmetric warfare in the 21st century:Unconventional operations consist of

military and paramilitary operationsinvolving political, psychological, ortechnological actions of a covert, clandes-tine, or overt nature conducted unilater-ally by the United States or in conjunc-tion with small, independent, indige-nous, or surrogate forces organized,trained, equipped, supported, directed,and employed in varying degrees by an

Fall 2001 17

An SF soldier gives marksmanship training to a Nigerian soldier. SFsoldiers serve worldwide in FID missions.

Photo by Jim Hampshire

external source. These actions includesubversion, sabotage, intelligence collec-tion activities, propaganda, and offen-sive information operations.9When directed by the President or by the

Secretary of Defense, SF would conductthis new brand of UW anywhere in theworld, with the objectives of putting adver-saries on the defensive and forcing themoff balance. SF’s job would be, in the wordsof one analyst, “directly or indirectly pre-venting an enemy from gaining ascendan-cy over the local population, denyingorganizations the use of safe areas, dis-

rupting cash-flow and other supplies,negating effective use of the media, expos-ing corruption, disgracing the leadership,[and] breaking power relationships.”10

SF soldiers could achieve their objectivesin any number of ways. They could conducttheir operations unilaterally; they couldconduct them with an irregular force thatthey have trained and assisted; or theycould conduct them in conjunction withother agencies of either the U.S. govern-ment or its allies. Subversion, sabotage,and intelligence collection would be thecommon components of these operations.Thus, by applying traditional UW skills,SF could achieve asymmetric objectives.

Information operations will become one ofthe main weapons of the new UW, and pub-lic opinion will be the decisive battlegroundin achieving asymmetric success. By taking

advantage of the global information envi-ronment, UW practitioners could manipu-late print and broadcast media to weakenthe resolve of the opposing leadership andto undermine its public support. The craftand art of propaganda should be the center-piece of an information-operations cam-paign conducted in conjunction with com-puter-network attacks that could paralyzean opponent’s systems of public communica-tion, transportation and power. Informationoperations can also employ countermea-sures to limit the effectiveness of an oppo-nent’s information-warfare systems.11

Asymmetric fightersThis new UW mission is not old wine in

new bottles. UW would have to become thesole mission of SF — the reason for itsexistence. Achieving this would require aredirection of doctrinal concepts and areturn to the ethos of the warrior as arti-san. Versatile and agile, the asymmetricfighter embodied by the SF soldier must beable to employ combat skills (sniping,raids, ambushes and close-quarter battletechniques) and to train irregular forces.But the SF soldier must be equally skilledin the political, psychological, technologicaland intelligence-collection techniques thatare the primary weapons of asymmetricwarfare. The SF soldier must have a thor-ough appreciation of the roles that ethnicand nationalist ideologies play in the areaof operations, so that he will be able toexploit or neutralize them. He must be ableto work effectively in urban environments,either unilaterally or through surrogates,across the spectrum of conflict.

Applying asymmetric means through anew adaptation of UW would provide theU.S. with a better capability for dealingwith asymmetric threats and for maintain-ing an advantage over our enemies. Theasymmetric approach would complementCondoleeza Rice’s advocacy of the pursuitof clearly-defined, broad strategic goalsthat support U.S. interests and objectives,thereby invoking the national will to pro-tect the homeland and American interestsaround the world.

Two of Rice’s observations bear repeating:

18 Special Warfare

SF soldiers work withforces of the NorthernAlliance in Afghanistan.SF can achieve asym-metric objectives bytraining and assisting anirregular force.

DoD photo

(1) The U.S. is the only guarantor of globalpeace and security. (2) As a great power, theU.S. must employ its power judiciously andeffectively.

The new UW, as practiced by SF, could bea realistic and viable means of employingthe military and political aspects of nation-al power in pursuit of U.S. strategy. Rice alsomakes clear the often-overlooked truthabout the choices that great powers mustmake in pursuit of national goals. “If it isworth fighting for,” she says, “you had betterbe prepared to win.”12 If adapted to asym-metric concepts, UW would allow the U.S. tomeet and neutralize threats with a varietyof methods that demonstrate the Americanwill to win those battles that we decide areworth fighting.

In his inaugural address in 1961, John F.Kennedy summoned America to heed thebattle call of a new trumpet that called thenation “to bear the burden of a long twi-light struggle.” Forty years later, ournation has been reawakened to that strug-gle in an outrage of blood and death on ourown shores. Placing a well-defined UW doc-trine, adapted to the principles and tech-niques of asymmetric warfare, in the handsof properly trained and equipped SF sol-diers would give the U.S. a means of meet-ing the asymmetric challenges that areinevitable. Linking the concepts of UW tothose of asymmetric warfare wouldreshape the mission of SF to provide thenation with a powerful offensive and defen-sive weapon with which to fight the twi-light war that our nation faces.

Dr. Keith D. Dickson is anassociate professor of mili-tary studies at the JointForces Staff College, Nor-folk, Va. He has a Ph.D. inAmerican history from theUniversity of Virginia andhas taught at the Virginia Military Insti-tute, where he also served as comman-dant of cadets. In addition, he has servedmore than 23 years of active and reserveservice as an Army officer. The majority ofthose years were in special-operationsunits, where he served as a detachment

commander, company commander, groupS5 and PSYOP plans officer. As a lieu-tenant colonel in the Army Reserve, he iscommander of the Joint Reserve Unit,Special Operations Command, JointForces Command.

Notes:1 Condoleeza Rice, Foreign Affairs 79 (January/Feb-

ruary 2000):46-47.2 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Qua-

drennial Defense Review, “Section II: The Global Secu-rity Environment” (May 1997).

3 Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, “Asymme-try and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Back-ground, and Strategic Concepts,” January 2001(Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute), 5.

4 David L. Grange, “Asymmetric Warfare: OldMethod, New Concern,” The Officer 77 (March2001):31-32.

5 Ibid.6 Steven Metz, “Strategic Asymmetry,” Military

Review 51 (July-August 2001):24.7 For example, see Robert David Steele, “The Asym-

metric Threat: Listening to the Debate,” Joint ForcesQuarterly (Autumn/Winter 1998-1999):78-84. On theissue of initiative and asymmetry, it is important torecall that the issue of asymmetry has always been aconcern for strategists. “Asymmetry recognizes thereality of limited resources, and stresses the need topick and choose the manner of one’s response. … Itconcentrates not so much on a multiplicity of optionsas on a variety of means, emphasizing the need to actin circumstances, at times, and in ways calculated toapply one’s own strengths against adversary weak-nesses. It retains, thereby, the initiative.” John LewisGaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1982), 353.

8 Joint Pub 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictio-nary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington,D.C.: GPO, June 1998), 469-70.

9 Gary M. Jones and Chris Tone, “UnconventionalWarfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces,” SpecialWarfare 12 (Summer 1999):4-15. I have drawn heavi-ly on this article to arrive at this working definition,which reflects many of the ideas that Jones and Toneproposed in their own revised definition of unconven-tional warfare.10 Grange, “Asymmetric Warfare,” 32.11 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Asymmetric Warfare,” Forumfor Applied Research and Public Policy 14 (Summer,1999):34-38. Vincent J. Goulding Jr., “Back to theFuture With Asymmetric Warfare,” Parameters 30(Winter 2000-2001):29-30.12 Rice, 52.

Fall 2001 19

In a series of outstanding monographsthat address the more recent urban war-fare in the Middle East, author Ron

McLaurin states, “In general, even thosearmies devoting considerable time toMOUT [military operations on urbanizedterrain] training do not address the keyarea of psychological operations and civilaffairs despite the fact the residents of a cityare generally its most important resource,and are often the target of the battle.”1

Throughout the modern post-world-warhistory of the Middle East, urban warfare

has become an increasingly important fac-tor, particularly in those Middle Easternconflicts that fit into the low-intensity-con-flict pattern. Many of the Middle Easternnations are simply pieces of real estatewrapped around cities that are growingastronomically in size and in population.

Lebanon functions around Beirut; Egyptaround Cairo; and Iraq around Basra, Bagh-dad and Mosul. For many years, the trend inthe Middle East has been for people tomigrate from the countryside to the city.2

It has long been recognized that urbanwarfare requires special techniques, spe-cial training and, in some cases, specialweapons. Very often, however, doctrine hastended to subsume urban warfare under anumber of other topics, giving the impres-sion that with only a little fine tuning, thetactics, techniques and procedures advo-cated for other forms of warfare can beapplied to urban warfare.3 From a reviewof recent U.S. Army doctrine on urban war-fare, it appears that the primary thinkingis that it is best either to simply avoid com-bat in cities or to mount some sort of siege.4

Despite the fact that we have, in recentyears, experienced combat in Third Worldcities, much of our doctrine and many ofour lessons learned are still based on Euro-pean models. However, the cities of Europeand America offer little utility in helpingour Psychological Operations, or PSYOP,and our Civil Affairs, or CA, personnelunderstand what they will encounter inthe traditional urban areas of the MiddleEast. These areas, which have their ownsocial environment, their own structureand their own problems, have been builtlayer upon layer over the course of dozensof civilizations.5

The Persian Gulf area, where many

20 Special Warfare

Urban Warfare: Lessons from the Middle East

by Norvell B. DeAtkine

It has long been recognized that urban war-fare requires special techniques. … Veryoften, however, doctrine has tended to sub-sume urban warfare under a number of othertopics, giving the impression that with only alittle fine tuning, the tactics, techniques andprocedures advocated for other forms of war-fare can be applied to urban warfare.

Americans have acquired experience, tendsto be misleading in its newness, sincemany of its glass-and-steel cities have beenbuilt since World War II. (As an Americanwho served with the British Trucial OmanScouts in 1968, I remember Abu Dhabi asbeing mostly a collection of burusti (palmfronds) huts and traffic circles that lednowhere.)

But even in the Persian Gulf area, theappearance of the new Western-style citiesbelies a very Middle Eastern social envi-ronment. Middle Eastern cities present aunique set of challenges, not only in termsof brick and mortar but, much more impor-tantly, in terms of the culture and the peo-ple of those cities.

Those who have been involved in urbanwarfare know the intense feeling of isolationthat an individual experiences during citycombat. In a conventional war — conductedin more open terrain — one draws a feelingof security from seeing his fellow soldiersaround him. In a Middle Eastern city, withits unfamiliar streets and twisting, narrowalleyways, where there is limited light evenat midday, one feels alone and vulnerable.

The feeling of isolation and uncertaintyis characteristic among those who have

been involved in recent Middle Easternurban conflicts. Correspondent DavidLamb wrote:

I learned a new kind of fear inLebanon, the fear of constant vulnera-bility. Covering the Vietnam War fortwo years, I understood where thelines were drawn. I knew who wasfriend and who was foe. A sixth sensetold me risks were worth taking. Evenon combat missions with the Marines,I felt strangely secure: I was with mypeople, and my life meant somethingto them. But in Beirut, there were nolines across which it was safe to tres-pass, no discernible differencesbetween allies and enemies.6While moving heavy units into a city

could give the attacking troops a psycholog-ical boost, it could also invite a tactical dis-aster. One such situation occurred in 1973,when over-confident Israeli armor unitsattacked Egyptian defenses within SuezCity. The attack resulted in heavy Israelilosses.7

As a former Army attaché officer whomoved around in Amman, Jordan, duringthe battle for that city in September andOctober 1970, I offer some observations

Fall 2001 21

Photo by Kit Thompson

A U.S. soldier patrols theroof of the Kuwaiti TV andRadio Broadcasting Build-ing in Kuwait City in 1991.The Western appearanceof many of the buildings inMiddle Eastern citiesbelies a Middle Easternsocial environment.

and reflections drawn from my personalexperience. During that battle, the Jordan-ian Arab Army, or JAA, drove the Palestin-ian regulars and the militia of the Pales-tinian Liberation Organization, or PLO,from Amman and ultimately from Jordan.Although the battle had begun as a strug-gle for power between the government ofJordan and Yasir Arafat’s PLO, it quicklydegenerated into an intracommunal civilwar, with east-bank Jordanians on one sideand Palestinians on the other. People were

dragged from their cars and killed merelyon the basis of the origin specified on theiridentity cards. It is this type of ethnic, com-munal strife in which the SOF soldier hasbeen involved and likely will continue to beinvolved for the foreseeable future,whether he is a peacemaker, a peacekeeperor a combatant.

Briefly, the genesis of the conflict was theearlier Arab-Israeli wars that had resultedin thousands of Palestinian refugees arriv-ing in Jordan with little more than theclothes on their backs. By 1970, West BankPalestinians made up about 50 percent ofthe Jordanian population. Large numbersof them were still being confined in refugeecamps, but thousands of others had crowd-ed into makeshift housing in urban areas.A number of the refugee camps eventuallyblended into the city itself.

While Amman did not have the tradi-tional ethnic quarters found in many Mid-dle Eastern cities, it did have a number ofurban areas that were almost entirelyPalestinian. Ever since Jordan hadacquired the West Bank during the 1948

war, an uneasy relationship had existedbetween Jordanians and Palestinians,despite the fact that they shared extensivefamily and economic ties. The more-educat-ed Palestinians tended to view the Jordan-ian army soldiers as primitive nomads andoccupiers. The Jordanian soldiers (ofBedouin or village stock) saw the Palestini-ans as being somewhat cowardly for hav-ing allowed Jewish settlers to drive themfrom their land.8

For the regular Arab armies, the 1948and 1967 wars were disastrous. The warsalso embittered the Arab masses, particu-larly the Palestinians, who believed thatregaining Palestine would never become apriority of the Arab rulers. Following the1967 war, Palestinian youth flocked to jointhe various Palestinian guerrilla organiza-tions, most of which were under the controlof the PLO. Soon after the March 1968 bat-tle of Karamah in the Jordan valley, duringwhich the Jordanian army severely mauledan Israeli task force, the Arab press turnedthe battle into a huge Palestinian victory,and the PLO became a powerful entitywithin the Jordanian state.

Indeed, the PLO became a threat to theexistence of the Hashemite kingdom. ThePalestinians imposed a nation within anation (as they would do later in Lebanon),collecting taxes and stopping motorists foridentity checks and shakedowns. Embold-ened by the lack of Jordanian resistance, thePalestinian groups virtually took overAmman, and the PLO established completecontrol of the majority of the downtownarea. One must remember that these eventsoccurred during an era in which the myth ofthe “invincible guerrilla” had reached itszenith. Myrmidons of the new left fromEurope and from the United States maderegular pilgrimages to the refugee camps ofJordan. The conventional wisdom of thetime was that the strategies and thephilosophies of Regis Debray, Franz Fanon,Che Guevara and Mao Tse Tung wereapplicable everywhere.

The Palestinian organizations them-selves were loosely organized, and theywere under very little central control. Inmany instances, thugs controlled thestreets and terrorized the people and the

22 Special Warfare

Although the battle had begun as a struggle forpower between the government of Jordan andYasir Arafat’s PLO, it quickly degenerated into anintracommunal civil war. … It is this type of eth-nic, communal strife in which the SOF soldier hasbeen involved and likely will continue to beinvolved for the foreseeable future, whether he isa peacemaker, a peacekeeper or a combatant.

foreign community. The insolence of theheavily armed Palestinian irregularstoward the Jordanian military infuriatedthe Jordanian soldiers, from privates togeneral officers.9 There is probably noother country in the world in which thearmy represents the national pride asmush as it does in Jordan. In fact, Jordanhas been called a nation wrapped aroundan army.10 That description was particular-ly true in 1970.

It was inevitable that a clash wouldoccur, and despite the reluctance of Jor-dan’s king to initiate an attack on thePalestinian forces, he eventually acqui-esced to the demands of the Jordanian mil-itary. Early on the morning of Sept. 16,1970, Jordanian forces attacked Palestin-ian strongholds in Amman.

Lessons from the conflict that ensuedmay be useful to special-operations unitsthat might need to deploy to urban areas inthe Middle East. I offer the followinglessons learned, which are derived from myobservations from the American Embassy

(which, perched as it was on the side ofJebel Luweideh, provided a panoramicview of the war, especially of the Palestin-ian area of Jebel Ashrafiyah), from my for-ays outside the embassy to find water,11

and from my many subsequent discussionswith the East Bank Jordanian officers withwhom I had formed friendships.

Lessons• The primary focus of CA and PSYOP

must be to separate the insurgent from hispopular base (i.e., the people from which theinsurgent draws his strength). Achievingthis goal will require the tactical integra-tion of CA and PSYOP detachments downto the battalion level or even lower. Whenthe Israelis invaded South Lebanon in1982, the initial Israeli combat forces weregreeted as liberators by the mainly ShiaLebanese. But as the invasion force sweptfurther north and as support units occu-pied South Lebanon, the goodwill evapo-rated, and the Shia became the most

Fall 2001 23

Photo by Luis Deya

A Bosnian woman tries tostop a PSYOP broadcastby striking the loudspeak-er. CA and PSYOP forcesmust work to retain thegoodwill of the populaceand to separate the insur-gent from the people.

implacable enemy that the Israelis hadever faced. This turnaround was the resultof a massive CA and PSYOP disaster.12

In the Jordanian conflict, the war quick-ly degenerated from a battle between theregular forces of the JAA and the PLO toan internecine and brutal war betweenJordanians and West Bank Palestinians.People were drawn into the conflict againsttheir own convictions. Neither side exploit-ed the psychological vulnerabilities of its

enemy. The immense ethnic, religious, trib-al and economic fissures extant in MiddleEastern society were not exploited. In fact,the recent history of the Middle East, withfew exceptions, offers more lessons inPSYOP failures than in PSYOP success-es.13 In this case, the fragmented nature ofthe Palestinian forces was a major weak-ness, but the massive and sometimes indis-criminate bombardment of Palestinianneighborhoods by the Jordanian armyearly in the conflict brought the feudingPalestinian factions together. Civilians

from the two communities used the occa-sion as an excuse to redress old grievancesand, in some cases, to simply loot thehomes of their neighbors. The urban battle,expected to last a few days, lasted forweeks.

• The fighting force should be composedof specially trained forces who have anurban background. In the 1970 war, theJordanians brought in two infantry divi-sions from the front that faces Israel. Mostof those infantry soldiers were not from anurban background, and many of them wereof Palestinian origin. The Palestinianinfantrymen were ineffective, and many ofthem, including a number of officers,defected. Defection is one of the majorproblems in an ethnic conflict. There wasno psychological conditioning of the sol-diers who were brought in to fight in thecity. The Jordanian soldiers were, in fact, adetriment, because after a few days, whenit was evident that the conflict would be aprolonged one, the Palestinians wereemboldened by success. I saw a group offive Palestinian fighters hold a Jordaniancompany at bay all day by moving fromhouse to house. The Jordanians employedCenturion and M-60 tanks in twos andthrees, and at close range, the Palestinians’RPGs took a toll on them. As soon as theJordanians located the source of the incom-ing fire, the Palestinians moved on.

• Often in urban and ethnic conflicts,separating the innocents from the combat-ants becomes a major issue. Such was thecase in 1982, during the Israeli invasion ofLebanon, when the Israelis cornered agroup of die-hard Palestinian fighters inthe Ayn-el-Hilwe refugee camp.14 ThePalestinians were holed up with their fam-ilies inside the camp, posing a problem forthe Israeli attackers. In 1970, the Jordani-ans faced the same problem: How do unitsof a civilized nation achieve their militaryobjectives without causing excessive civil-ian casualties? Rulers such as Hafez AlAssad, who reduced whole sections ofrebellious cities to rubble in 1980, and Sad-dam Hussein, who has used genocidal war-fare for years, are the only ones who do notconsider civilian casualties to be a prob-lem. The Jordanian forces made mistakes

24 Special Warfare

CA and PSYOP units assigned to the tactical front can assist refugeesby publicizing refugee escape routes and by administering aid.

Photo by Michelle Leonard

such as not creating a well-advertisedescape route for families; not mounting apsychological campaign focused on thesafety of families; and not providing CA-type units to administer aid to refugeefamilies who had fled the area in anattempt to avoid the fighting. CA andPSYOP units should be assigned to the tac-tical front, as well as to the follow-on eche-lons of troops who will occupy the clearedareas. For example, the Lebanese civilianswho initially welcomed the Israeli troops in1982 turned against the Israelis because ofthe excesses of support and auxiliary unitsthat followed the attacking units intosouth Lebanon.15

• The control of information, internallyand externally, is of critical importance. Inthis era, we assume that controlling infor-mation is impossible, and certainly thattask has become more difficult. In the Jor-danian-Palestinian conflict, the press was,from the outset, anti-Hashemite and pro-Palestinian, but the Jordanian regime didlittle to combat the unfavorable image ofthe Jordanian army that became commonin the Western media. U.S. news magazinescarried stories of blood-crazed Bedouin sol-diers looting and killing in the refugeecamps — creating an image that was neverentirely erased, even after the truth wasknown. In reality, because of the fighting,most of the Western correspondents wereconfined to one or two hotels, from whichthey could see very little through thesmoke and haze. For news about the battle,the correspondents relied upon hotel serv-ice personnel (most of whom were Palestin-ian) and erratic telephone contacts. Moreimportant, there was an empathetic rela-tionship between the Western correspon-dents and the leadership of the Palestinianmovement. Modishly attired, speakingexcellent English and often having beeneducated in the West, many of the Pales-tinian leaders moved smoothly among thejournalists. As a result, the news emanat-ing from Amman was entirely hostile to theregime.16

The Jordanians could rely on the Jor-danian news and, to some extent, on theIsraeli news, but the majority of the newswas anti-Jordanian, including that of the

premier Arab news service, “Voice of theArabs,” which was broadcast from Cairo.Even the well-respected BBC was vitriolicin its condemnation of the Jordanian gov-ernment. The reason was simple: Most ofthe news personnel were Palestinian andviscerally anti-Hashemite.17

The lesson here is that information goingout, as well as information coming in, mustbe carefully monitored, and an informationtask force must be assembled to fight theincreasingly important media war. The Jor-danians had very little contact with thecorrespondents, who within their own con-stricted informational circles, created akind of “story of the day” atmosphere.Information that went out was recycledand beamed back in. The value and thetruthfulness of reports were dependent

upon the correspondents’ objectivity andcompetence, but with only a few excep-tions, neither quality was present. Corre-spondents who felt obligated to reportsomething often filed reports that were lit-tle more than street rumors. Those rumors,however, were then presented as factual,with the prestige of the news networks andof the news anchors to give them an air ofindisputability. Radio broadcasts fromBaghdad, Damascus and Cairo made out-side intervention seem imminent, givingadded confidence to the beleaguered PLO.For many days, the Palestinians, whilebeing squeezed into ever-smaller enclaves,were convinced that the Iraqis and the Syr-ians would come to their aid.18

The Jordanians also made a mistakewhen they tried to bolster morale by broad-

Fall 2001 25

The fragmented nature of the Palestinianforces was a major weakness, but the mas-sive and sometimes indiscriminate bom-bardment of Palestinian neighborhoods bythe Jordanian army early in the conflictbrought the feuding Palestinian factionstogether. … The urban battle, expected to lasta few days, lasted for weeks.

casting extravagant claims of victory.Radio Amman claimed that, except forsmall pockets, Amman was in the hands ofthe government by Sept. 16. In fact, fiercefighting continued until Sept. 27. To thehunkered-down residents of Amman, theclaims of victory, which were barely audi-ble over the artillery explosions and theroar of gunfire, did little to promote thegovernment’s credibility. Once lost, credi-bility is very difficult to regain.

• Perhaps the most significant of thelessons learned from this conflict is theimportance of what Ralph Peters calls the“human terrain.”19 Reviewing the availableliterature on urban warfare, one is struckby the paucity of material dealing with thehuman aspect of urban warfare. The pre-ponderance of the literature deals with thetechnical and tactical aspects; there is verylittle information on the sociology andcharacter of the people. Knowledge of thepeople is imperative. In the Middle East,cultural knowledge, so sadly lacking in the

U.S. experiences in Beirut and in Somalia,is by far the most critical factor.

In Middle Eastern cities such as Cairo,there is a much more stable and orderlysociety than anything that we find in ourown very mobile culture. In that stablesociety, everyone belongs somewhere. Citi-zens carry a card that identifies who theyare and where they belong. The society’sleadership is informal, but it is enduring,having passed through generations of thesame family. The zuama, as they are calledin some Arab countries, provide a stableleadership, even when the country is in

political chaos. It is essential that we knowwho those leaders are, who their con-stituents are, and where they reside.

Increasingly important also are the Mus-lim ulama, or religious leaders. Particular-ly in the poor districts or in immigrant“squatter” villages inside the city, themosque is the center of daily life. In thesedistricts, sectarian identification as Christ-ian, Shia, Sunni, etc., has strengthenedover the years. For example, the massiveinflux of Shia villagers from southernLebanon into Beirut has produced a corre-sponding increase in Shia identificationand militancy.

The SOF soldier must know the manyfissures and the fault lines that defineMiddle Eastern urban society. A class sys-tem that resembles a caste system, a per-vasive sense of religion, sectarian identifi-cation, and an inbred sense of distrust forauthority combine to create a psychologi-cally “target rich” environment. However,the Jordanian government did not capital-ize on those fissures. The Palestinian com-munity was by no means monolithic.20

Some of its members had tied their for-tunes to the Hashimite regime, and thewell-known rivalries among Palestinianfamilies and villages carried over into therefugee camps, but the actions of the Jor-danian government served to drive togeth-er not only the disparate wings of thePalestinian community but also the fac-tions within the PLO. Many of the Pales-tinian Fedayeen organizations were underthe control of outside countries: Saiqa bySyria, the Arab Liberation Front by Iraq,etc. The Jordanians also failed to capitalizeon that situation. Other groups, such asthe Circassians and the Chechens, wereallied with the Hashemite regime, whilethe Christians, for the most part, simplytried to stay out of harm’s way.

However exploitable those fissures are,they are not amenable to amateurapproaches. The subtle nuances of anurban Middle Eastern society are not read-ily visible to an unpracticed eye, and a lit-tle knowledge, poorly applied, may be moredamaging than no knowledge at all. Ill-considered actions can generate enduringhostility, as did the actions of U.S. forces in

26 Special Warfare

Radio Amman claimed that, except for smallpockets, Amman was in the hands of the gov-ernment by Sept. 16. In fact, fierce fighting con-tinued until Sept. 27.To the hunkered-down res-idents of Amman, the claims of victory, whichwere barely audible over the artillery explo-sions and the roar of gunfire, did little to pro-mote the government’s credibility.

Lebanon, when they allowed themselves tobe identified as simply another warringfaction in a civil war. Information, as wellas psychological themes, must be focusedlike a narrow beam of light on the groupswho are susceptible to the message.

Acknowledging the difficulty of under-standing the urban society leads us to theissue of the advisability of using indige-nous personnel either to formulate andimplement the information and PSYOPprograms, or to administer the populationduring a peacekeeping operation. Here,too, there are many pitfalls. This issuearose at the conclusion of the fighting inAmman, when the International RedCross, with a large American medical con-tingent, arrived in Jordan. The difficultyof interfacing with the two mutually hos-tile populations — Jordanian and Pales-tinian — surfaced the prevailing customof wasta, or third-party intercession.Wasta can be very useful, but only if it isthoroughly understood.

As Americans, we too easily fall prey tothe notion that an Arab is an Arab, and wetend to view the Arab world as a monolith-ic ethnic and social entity. Nothing could bemore erroneous.21 The Middle Eastabounds with people who purport to beinfluential and who will carry your mes-sage for a fee. Many of them do more harm

than good. Subtleties of names, dialectsand pronunciation quickly identify peopleof the Middle East in terms of their socialclass, religion and origin — even to thepoint of identifying their village. Thestereotypes by which Arabs label oneanother are often grotesque. For instance,the Palestinian cause is nearly sacred, butthe individual Palestinian is everywheresuspect. Nor are Arabs particularly athome in Arab countries other than theirown.22

While astute observers of the Arab worldin no way denigrate the very real and oftenpassionate feeling of Arab solidarity, theyhave noted that the people of the MiddleEast have a multiplicity of identities, anddepending upon the current environment,political or otherwise, those identities maychange. In short, the indigenous ally whoassists you in constructing an informationprogram may not be knowledgeable of thetarget audience, or, as it often happens, hemay have his own agenda, as did the Pales-tinian BBC newscasters in 1970.

Not only is urban warfare a unique formof war, it is by far the most prevalent formof war in the Middle East.23 Going into aMiddle Eastern city, hostile or otherwise,requires meticulous preparation and plan-ning. In no other type of deployment willthe immediate usefulness of a sound

Fall 2001 27

Photo by Andrew Lockwood

A Bosnian local interpreter(left) talks to a Bosnianresident who has a com-plaint about the construc-tion of a road through hisfarm. In the Middle East,the use of indigenous per-sonnel has many pitfalls.

knowledge of PSYOP and CA be so evident.Middle Eastern cities not only house themajority of their countries’ populations,they also serve as the political, economicand military centers of their nations, andthey will be the center of gravity in anyconflict. As the Israeli, Syrian, Jordanianand Lebanese armies found out, even over-whelming force does not guarantee suc-cess. Knowing the infrastructure of the city(e.g., the water lines, the power stationsand the telephone exchanges) is a necessi-ty, but knowledge of the city’s infrastruc-ture alone will not suffice.

Within the study of urban warfare, Mid-dle Eastern style, there must be additionalemphasis on studying the people. The SOFsoldier must understand the “social map”of the city. He must know the various dis-tricts; their sectarian identities; their for-mal and informal leadership; the way thecitizens live their daily lives; their meansof supporting their families; their history;and their social, religious and culturalenvironments. The level of knowledgeshould be commensurate with thatrequired by John Paul Vann of Americandistrict advisers in Vietnam. Vann exhort-ed the newly arrived U.S. advisers to learnthe names of the village chiefs and tobecome familiar with the chiefs’ familiesand political connections. Advisers alsoneeded to know the local prices of rice,pork, sampans, beer, soft drinks, etc.24

Knowledge of Arabic, or of the languageof the region, is imperative. True fluency isa standard that few achieve, but all sol-diers must have a working knowledge ofthe language. The ability to read signs,insignias and slogans; to ask directions;and to recognize ethnic and sectarian iden-tities by name is a life-saving asset. Beingable to recognize that the roadblock aheadis manned by the Shabiya (Popular Frontfor the Liberation of Palestine) rather thanby the Fatah is crucial. In 1970 Amman,that ability could have meant the differ-ence between a Westerner being asked togive money or being dragged out of hisvehicle and shot. Today, recognizing the dif-ference between Amal, Hizbollah, Hamasand the Palestinian security police mayhave the same importance. This is the kind

of knowledge to which there are no short-cuts. There are no easy methods of assess-ing or quantifying it, and there is no way ofprogramming it into a computer. The “ter-rain walks” so useful to tactical study havetwo counterparts in urban warfare: fre-quent on-the-ground exposure of the SOFsoldier to the people of the cities and totheir “rhythm of life,” and the reinforce-ment of firsthand observations through astudy of the region’s literature and culture.Studying should not be confined to bookson political science or history. Studyingshould include watching newscasts, soapoperas, and movies such as A Wedding inGalilee, West Beirut, or the Egyptian docu-drama Nasser. Reading the stories ofNaguib Mahfouz, particularly “MidaqAlley” or “The Thief and the Dogs,” cantake one into Egyptian urban life in a waythat no tract on political science can.

Certainly the lessons of Beirut, Amman,Mogadishu, Sarajevo and, lately, Grozny,should be readily apparent. But it oftenappears that the American fascinationwith technology, quick fixes and rapid,quantifiable results works against thetime, depth of knowledge and patience thatare necessary for educating and trainingSOF soldiers to the level of competencethey must achieve if they are to be effectivein a Middle Eastern urban environment.While it is apparent that there has been arecent reawakening of interest in urbanwarfare, the building of mock urban areasand training in block-to-block, city-fightingtechniques is not sufficient for conditioningthe force for urban combat. The brick-and-mortar approach to urban warfare, howev-er useful and necessary, cannot substitutefor political-military analysis and anunderstanding of the human terrain.

Norvell B. DeAtkine isdirector of Middle East stud-ies in the JFK Special War-fare Center and School’s 3rdBattalion, 1st Special WarfareTraining Group. A retiredArmy colonel, he served morethan 26 years as a member of the FieldArtillery Branch and as a foreign-area offi-

28 Special Warfare

cer. A 1959 graduate of the U.S. MilitaryAcademy, he completed the Army War Col-lege in 1981. In addition to his bachelor’sdegree from West Point, he holds a master’sdegree in Middle East studies from theAmerican University in Beirut.

Notes:1 R.D. McLaurin, “The Battle Of Sidon” (Technical

Memorandum 13-89: Aberdeen Proving GroundsHuman Engineering Laboratory, 1989), 53. See alsoRalph Peters, “The Human Terrain of Urban War-fare,” Parameters 30 (Spring 2000).

2 Daniel Bates and Amal Rassam, Peoples and Cul-ture of the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren-tice-Hall, 1983), 183.

3 Speech by Major General Jack A. Walker to theAmerican Defense Preparedness Association, Adelphi,Md., 9 December 1980.

4 Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, “Urban War-fare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025,” Parameters29 (Summer 1999):77.

5 Based largely on the work of Dr. Paul Jureidini ofArmitage Associates, who with R.D. McLaurin (nowdeceased) was one of two pre-eminent experts in MiddleEastern urban warfare. Dr. Jureidini has studied andresearched this aspect of warfare for more than 20 years.

6 David Lamb, The Arabs: Journey Beyond theMirage (New York: Random House, 1988), 175.

7 R. D. McLaurin and Lewis D. Snider, “Recent Mili-tary Operations on Urban Terrain” (Technical Memo-randum 12-92) (Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.:Human Engineering Laboratory, 1982), 20.

8 The Palestinians often referred to the Jordanian sol-diers as the al-huffa (barefoot ones). See Abdullah M.Lutfiyya, Baytin: A Jordanian Village (London: Mouton,1966), 87. On the other side, a senior Jordanian officertold me that the West Bank was lost to the Israelis in1967 because the Jordanian army units that had a highproportion of Palestinians “ran like rabbits.” This was acommon refrain among East Bank Jordanians.

9 I saw many examples of this. This is also men-tioned by James Lunt in Hussein of Jordan (NewYork: William Morrow, 1989), 122-23.10 P.J. Vatikiotis, in his excellent study of the JAA, Poli-tics and Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legionfrom 1921-1957 (London: Frank Cass, 1967), 132, wrotethat the Legion virtually created the state of Jordan.11 The U.S. Embassy was surrounded by Palestinianforces for two weeks, and the water tanks on top of thebuilding were riddled by mortar fragments and small-arms fire early, necessitating forays into the sur-rounding vacated homes to find water. An old lessonrelearned was that one can do without food for a con-siderable time, but not without water.12 R.D. McLaurin, “The Battle of Tyre” (TechnicalMemorandum 15-87) (Aberdeen Proving Grounds ,Md.: Human Engineering Laboratory, 1989), 37-39.13 Philip P. Katz and R.D. McLaurin, “PsychologicalOperations in Urban Warfare: Lessons from the 1982Middle East War” (Technical Memorandum 12-87)(Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.: Human Engineering

Laboratory), 4. The fragility of the social structure inboth Iran and Iraq was not affected in any significantmanner by propaganda from the opposing side. TheIraqi Shia remained loyal to Iraq, and the Iranian Arabsremained loyal to Iran, although as was subsequentlyseen, neither group was trusted by its government.14 McLaurin, “The Battle of Sidon,” 30-31.15 McLaurin, “The Battle of Tyre,” 37-39.16 Attending the American University of Beirut, orAUB, from 1967 to 1970, I was struck by the symbioticrelationship between the Palestinians and Westernersattending the school. The university became knownonly half facetiously as “Guerrilla U.” Symbolic of thisrelationship were the lectures to the university stu-dents by the world’s only two-time aircraft hijacker, themodishly attired, English-speaking Leila Khaled. Shewas a former AUB student, as were two other leaders ofthe militant PFLP, George Habash and Wadie Hadad.17 Lunt, 138.18 On Sept. 20, the Hittin Brigade of the PalestinianLiberation Army, with elements of the Syrian 5thMechanized Division (displaying Palestinianinsignias) crossed the border, but they were denied airsupport by the commander of the Syrian air force,Hafez Al Assad, and they retreated three days later.The elements of two Iraqi divisions deployed in Jor-dan at the onset of the conflict returned to Iraq. Sad-dam Hussein was instrumental in the decision torecall them, and some believe that Jordan’s stance inthe 1991 Gulf War was a way of returning the favor.19 Ralph Peters, “The Human Terrain.”20 Joel Migdal, Palestinian Society and Politics (Prince-ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 118-19.21 For one survey of attitudes, see Ralph R. Sell, “Inter-national Affinities in Modern Egypt: Results from aSocial Distance Survey of Elite Students,” InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies (February 1990), 71.22 An Egyptian military psychologist who had accom-panied the Egyptian forces into Yemen told me thatthe Egyptian forces had enormous problems withtroop alienation and depression. The very provincialEgyptian soldier was an alien in the unique Yemeniculture. The same point is made in Manfred W. Wen-ner’s book, Modern Yemen: 1918-1966 (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 198-223.23 Since World War II, the majority of the conflictshave occurred in or around cities. The intense conflictin Jerusalem, in both 1948 and 1967; the Lebanesecivil war; the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; theSyrian Sunni urban revolts in 1980 and in 1982; andthe various phases of the Palestinian intifadah allattest to the primacy of urban warfare in the MiddleEast. As is the case in the rest of the developingworld, the percentage of urbanites in the total popu-lations continues to rise dramatically as the highbirth rates and continuing migrations to the citiesadd thousands monthly. Cairo now has nearly 15 mil-lion people.24 Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advise and Support: The FinalYears: The US Army in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), 66.

Fall 2001 29

From January 1997 to August 1997,elements of the United States ArmyReserve’s 11th Psychological Opera-

tions Battalion and personnel attached fromother USAR PSYOP battalions deployed toBosnia-Herzegovina. As the PsychologicalOperations Task Force, or POTF, they pro-vided support to Operations Joint Endeavorand Joint Guard.

The POTF’s operations were a continuationof the support that USAR PSYOP had been

contributing to theImplementat ionForce/StabilizationForce, or IFOR/SFOR,since late 1995,when the NorthAtlantic TreatyOrganization, orNATO, began itsintervention in Bos-nia-Herzegovina.

The deployment ofthe POTF markedthe beginning of anew operationalconcept for PSYOPin Bosnia — theestablishment of

an effective national commercial radionetwork that would support theIFOR/SFOR information campaign.1 Thenetwork would enable the POTF to coun-teract virulent statements being broad-cast in the national media, particularly on

radio, against the Dayton Peace Accords,or DPA.2

Bosnia situation — 1997Bosnia-Herzegovina is a former state of

the Yugoslavian Republic. Severe ethnicfighting began in Bosnia in 1992, but withthe signing of the DPA in 1995, NATObegan enforcing the peace there. The DPAestablished a zone of separation, or ZOS, arestricted area that separates the twomajor ethnic groups, the Bosnian Muslimsand the Bosnian Serbs. A third ethnicgroup, the Bosnian Croats, live in pocketsscattered throughout the areas occupied bythe two major groups.

Bosnia is also separated into threemultinational divisions, or MNDs: MND-North (headed by the Americans), MND-Southwest (headed by the British) andMND-Southeast (headed by the French). Ineach of the MNDs, additional NATO andnon-NATO forces support IFOR/SFORoperations. During the period covered bythis article, MND-North contained aNordic-Polish brigade (NORDPOL), aTurkish brigade, a Russian brigade and aU.S. brigade.

Information campaignThe POTF received a mission-guidance

letter from the headquarters of the Com-bined Joint Information Campaign TaskForce, or CJICTF, in Sarajevo.3 The letter

30 Special Warfare

PSYOP Radio Operations in Bosnia: A Steady, Positive Drumbeat

by Major John Mills

listed 11 major tasks, but the followingfour were considered the most important:• Enhance the safety and security of SFOR.• Facilitate orderly peace implementation.• Establish SFOR as a credible source of

information.• Limit the effectiveness of hostile propagan-

da, disinformation and political warfare.Using the letter as a guide, the POTF

developed the mission statement for theinformation campaign of MND-North. Themission statement said in part that PSYOPwould “Educate and inform the local targetaudience of SFOR’s role and objectives inMND(N) and shape the opinions and behav-iors of the population.”

It was clear that the operation would becomea media war. While the members of the POTFwere not media experts, they were experienced

in preparing PSYOP campaign-control plans.That experience enabled them to developthemes and to find methods of communicatingthose themes to the target audiences.

Disposition of PSYOP elementsThe POTF headquarters was located at

Eagle Base, an old airfield of the formerYugoslavian air force. Located south of Tuzla,Eagle Base held all the command-and-con-trol resources for MND-North.

The POTF’s subordinate elements werethree brigade PSYOP support elements, orBPSEs (now called tactical PSYOP detach-ments). Each BPSE was composed of 12-16personnel who were organized into tacticalPSYOP teams, or TPTs.

BPSE 10 was based at Camp McGovern,which was located in the ZOS,south of the city ofBrcko.BPSE 10 had a satellite camp,Camp Colt,that had one TPT, which was led by an NCO.

BPSE 20 was based at Doboj and sup-ported NORDPOL, which was composed ofbattalions from different Scandinavian andBaltic countries (some of them former mem-bers of the Warsaw Pact). NORDPOL per-sonnel were highly trained, highly motivat-ed and dedicated soldiers who proved to beeager to learn and willing to work with theAmerican PSYOP forces.

BPSE 40 was based at Camp Dobol, asmall camp located east of Tuzla. CampDobol and its satellite, Camp Demi, were

Fall 2001 31

The commander of BPSE 10 (center) and the TF Eagle publicaffairs officer (right) lead the media working group in Brcko.

Photo courtesy John Mills

This map shows thelocations of the variousunits of the POTF.

also located in the ZOS. BPSE 40 was laterreorganized to provide support to CampBedrock, which focused on servicing Mus-lim areas in and around Tuzla.

Concept and implementationWhen the POTF took the hand-off from

the outgoing PSYOP task force, there wereseveral issues that helped shape and focusthe operational concept for the informationcampaign in MND-North.

The most pressing issue for the POTF was itslack of credibility with the supported unit, TaskForce Eagle. Credibility suffered because it wasvirtually impossible for the POTF to provide arapid response with hard-copy products.All of theinformation campaign’s planning staff and pro-duction assets were located in Sarajevo,a three- tofour-hour drive from Eagle Base. The centraliza-tion of production activities without a correspond-ing capability for quick delivery made the POTFappear to be unresponsive to the needs of tacticalcommanders.4 As a result, some of the leaders ofMND-N formed an unfavorable opinion of thePOTF.The production delays also meant that therapidly rebuilt national media system (includingbroadcast and print journalism) was running cir-cles around the information campaign and, insome cases,making it irrelevant.

Unreliable communications was anotherissue. Voice communications were accom-plished via unsecure voice satellite, orVSAT, and via mobile subscriber equip-

ment, or MSE. Unfortunately, both methodsexperienced frequent outages because oftechnical difficulties. With VSAT, the timedelay created by the bouncing of communi-cations signals caused many conversationsto be confusing. E-mail was sporadicbecause of technical problems, varying lev-els of user proficiency, and low processorspeeds of the available laptop computers.The process of downloading large attach-ments was extremely slow. Overall, the reli-ability rate for internal and external com-munications efforts was below 50 percent.In June 1997, commercial phone service wasintroduced. Even though the commercialcontractor greatly increased the quality andthe reliability of telephone service, the lineswere still unsecure.

Information-systems support was also aproblem. The laptop computers were suffi-cient for report-writing, but because oftheir low processor speed, it was difficultfor the POTF to produce graphics and pic-tures or to send products and reportsbetween the different camps.

The final issue was that the SFOR leadershipwas afraid of releasing improperly screenedmaterial,5 and many high-ranking officers andpolitical advisers insisted on reviewing andapproving PSYOP products. The requirementnot only slowed approvals down but also made itmore difficult to get themes approved. As aresult,some PSYOP themes that could have hada high impact were watered down, and thethemes that received emphasis were “soft” —such as, “Be a courteous driver” and “Bosnians,please stay away from unexpended ordnance.”

BrainstormingWe saw that our first challenge was to

re-establish credibility. Our next challengewas to become more responsive to the oper-ational and tactical situations in MND-N.

Resources were limited. We had no internalmedia-production capabilities. Our best turn-around time for a product to be delivered totactical PSYOP teams was 2-3 weeks — woe-fully behind the response time of local media.Our primary printed products were the Her-ald of Peace and the Herald of Progress.These were good products, but they con-sumed most of our planning, approval and

32 Special Warfare

A member of the POTFuses a laptop computer tosend e-mail. The lowprocessor speed and thelow memory capacity ofthe POTF’s computersmade it difficult to sendand receive graphics files.

Photo courtesy John Mills

production resources in Sarajevo. It was clearthat we lacked a rapid-turnaround product.After brainstorming numerous concepts, wehit on the solution — radio.

Our radio-production capability was limit-ed. Radio Mir in Sarajevo was producing vari-ous types of music tapes that contained inter-mittent soft-sell, radio-announcer voice-overs.Sometimes the voice-overs were in English,but most of the time they were in Muslimdialects of Serbo-Croatian. Most of the Bos-nian stations played the music tapes, becausethey had very little of their own music to play.

Bosnia already had a well-developednational radio network whose stationswere linked by phone, fax and, sometimes,e-mail. Because of animosities between theethnic groups, civilian communicationsacross the ZOS were denied by the variousgroups. In Muslim listening areas, therewere normally multiple radio stations.Serb listening areas were usually limitedto one station. Many of the Croat pocketsalso had a radio station. In all areas,unquestioned political allegiance to thedominant political party was required ofradio-station management personnel.

We still had to resolve issues of productionand distribution, and we had to improve theabilities of our radio announcers.6 We receivedguidance from headquarters regarding specificthemes, and we produced our own list ofthemes for our sector: the decisiveness andeffectiveness with which NATO and SFORenforced the DPA; the benefits of cooperatingwith SFOR; the penalties for not complyingwith SFOR directives; economic success stories;and other positive aspects of the successfulimplementation of the DPA. Our goal was tobroadcast a steady, positive drumbeat of open-source information that would, over time,reduce the aggressiveness of the target audi-ence toward other ethnic and social groups.

MND-N urgently wanted more respon-sive information-campaign support, butthe existing information products did notfill the voracious appetite that radio hasfor news. We decided to use radio to broad-cast translations of open-source informa-tion from existing international newsmedia (Reuters, the Associated Press andUnited Press International) to supplementthe information products produced by the

headquarters of the CJICTF.By offering stations translated products, we

provided them with alternative news sourcesand a more balanced view of current events.Atthe same time,we chose products that matchedthe themes developed by the MND-N informa-tion-operations working group.7

Initial operationsThe POTF’s initial radio operations

focused on producing tapes, which seemedto be the best way of packaging a preparedproduct and providing it to local radio sta-tions for replay. Lacking an organic tape-production capability, we borrowed a pro-fessional-quality portable cassette deckthat was equipped with a microphone.

Our initial tapes were unacceptablebecause of background noise. We tried produc-ing tapes in several locations, including thebasement of our dormitory building at EagleBase, but we experienced constant interrup-tions and noise. We needed a dedicated broad-cast booth and professional-quality equip-

ment. The answer was an MSQ-85B shelter.The MSQ-85B mobile audiovisual shel-

ter was at the time one of the primary sys-tems of the PSYOP community. ThisHMMWV-mounted shelter was fielded dur-ing the 1980s. The shelter provided a com-plete capability for recording, editing andreproducing audio and video products. Had

Fall 2001 33

Photo courtesy John Mills

A PSYOP specialist of thePOTF (left) and one ofthe POTF’s local inter-preters work inside theMSQ-85B shelter.

it been equipped with an FM transmitter,it would have been a complete broadcaststudio.8 The only MSQ-85B shelter in the-ater was located in Sarajevo, at the head-quarters of the CJICTF. The headquarterswas initially averse to releasing the systemto us, but after several weeks of writingmemorandums, negotiating and pleading,we were able to obtain the MSQ-85B.

The MSQ-85B gave the POTF a dedicat-ed place in which to record, edit and repro-duce audio tapes, and the quality of ouraudio tapes greatly improved. In additionto significantly reducing background noise,the shelter allowed us to mix in back-ground theme music and to copy tapesmuch faster. We were also able to use high-er-quality, metal tape rather than vinyltape, which deteriorates rapidly.

We reproduced between 15 and 35 copies ofeach tape for dissemination through thethree BPSEs. It took 2-3 days to translate,produce and copy a tape. At one point, wewere measuring success by whether or notstations were playing our tapes. But severalfactors made us realize that tapes were not

the ideal solution: (1) Tape production waslabor-intensive, requiring three translatorsand two or three soldiers from the Tuzlainformation-campaign team. (2) Tape qualitystill was not optimal, even though we wereusing higher-quality tapes and had a dedi-cated sound booth. (3) Our announcers need-ed to become more polished — the two Bos-nian/Serbian announcers were fine, but theAmerican translator spoke with a distinctCroatian/American accent. (4) Stations werestill hesitant to play our tapes because theywanted control over the production of theproducts they were broadcasting. To alleviatethe stations’ concerns, we began writing anddelivering scripts that stations could use inproducing their own tapes.

Radio Mir operationsThe POTF had one asset that could give

us unfiltered access to the population inand around Brcko — the radio station atCamp McGovern. Its range was approxi-mately 30 kilometers. Although the stationprovided a steady stream of “classic rock”into Brcko, its full capability was not beingrealized. Housed in a CONEX shippingcontainer, the station was designed forreplaying tapes, and it had no live-broad-cast capability. We began planning to har-ness the potential of this radio operation.

In order to encourage the peace process,Ambassador Robert Farrand, the deputyhigh representative for Brcko, needed toencourage the populace to resettle and torebuild. Major General Montgomery Meigs,then-commanding general of MND-N andTF Eagle, wanted to give Ambassador Far-rand direct access to the population.

As a result, TF Eagle provided the fundingwe needed to construct a new radio facility.Once completed, the station included a soundbooth, a control room, a production room anda reproduction room. With the finishingtouches provided by our own personnel, thefacility soon became an outstanding field-expedient broadcast facility.We also procuredand installed a full suite of professionalbroadcast equipment.With the support of theTF Eagle division staff, the procurementprocess had moved along rapidly. What hadbegun as a brainstorming session in late Feb-

34 Special Warfare

A member of the POTF displays a box of the audio tapesprepared for distribution to Bosnian radio stations.

Photo courtesy John Mills

ruary had evolved into a fully operationallive-broadcast facility by late May.

Although TF Eagle had provided themoney for building the facility, the head-quarters of the CJICTF considered the sta-tion to be a direct-support asset that shouldbe controlled out of Sarajevo. But in order toproactively advocate Ambassador Farrand’sthemes and issues, the station would haveto greatly improve its operating procedures.Eventually, we made arrangements withthe Information Campaign Task Force togive the ambassador and his designatedspeakers live airtime twice a week.

To operate 18 hours per day, the stationwould require personnel and labor to fill the air-time. In the end, the additional personnel need-ed to operate the radio station came from thestaff of BPSE 10. However, the resulting short-age of personnel degraded the other BPSE 10operations and detracted from other importantradio-support operations such as polling andsurveying. The labor shortage was never fullyresolved;as a result,neither the radio operationnor the field activities of the Brcko informationcampaign could be fully exploited.

MaturityIn late May, the radio operation hit its full

stride, producing and distributing 5-10scripts per week. Our first real opportunityto affect the local situation came in July1997, when the SFOR captured two Ser-

bians who had been indicted as war crimi-nals. We produced and released 27 scriptsthat addressed this first direct action bySFOR against indicted war criminals. TheSerbian stations, which served the primaryaudiences we wanted to reach, initiallyrefrained from using our scripts. For severaldays (in some cases, weeks) after the arrestof the two Serbians, some of the radio-sta-tion managers who had been cooperatingwith BPSE 20 would not even allow BPSEpersonnel to visit their stations. Their reluc-tance reflected the anxiety that all of theradio-station managers felt about appearingto be too friendly to SFOR.

Our major objective was to put out amessage that would forcefully explain theSFOR’s right, under international law andunder the DPA, to seize indicted war crim-inals. We translated press releases fromthe Coalition Press Information Center, orCPIC, in an attempt to counter the tiradeof messages being broadcast in Serbian-controlled areas. Only a handful of Serbstations accepted our translated pressreleases, but the Muslim stations readilybroadcast them. We counted on Serbs lis-tening surreptitiously to Muslim broad-casts in order to get a different point ofview on current events.9

We also focused our messages on other sit-uations. Doboj, a predominantly Muslim townbefore hostilities began, had been seized bySerbian elements. One objective of the DPA

Fall 2001 35

Members of the POTFshow a visitor the newlycompleted radio broad-cast facility at CampMcGovern.

Photo courtesy John Mills

was to encourage Doboj refugees to return toDoboj and to resettle in their former homes.The SFOR mission around Doboj was to mon-itor the resettlement process and to ensurethat it was peaceful. We produced radioscripts addressing resettlement. These wereaimed at Serbian elements around Doboj.Themessage was clear — SFOR had the resolveand the ability to enforce peaceful resettle-ment. Although fewer than 100 familiesbecame involved in the resettlement effortsduring the summer of 1997, the fact that theyattempted to move back was remarkable.

We also produced eight scripts thataddressed the problem of illegal policecheckpoints. One of the basic tenets of theDPA was freedom of movement. However,after the withdrawal of SFOR forces fromZOS checkpoints in mid-May 1997, policein the Republic of Srpska, or RS, set up anumber of illegal police checkpoints to“shake down” Muslims and Croats and toextort payments from them for havingcrossed into Srpska. The checkpoints hada distinctly chilling effect on cross-ZOStravel. SFOR took direct measures to dis-arm and detain the police officers, and bymid-July 1997, RS police had abandonedthe illegal practice.

Other radio scripts encouraged the com-mercial markets that had developed atcheckpoints Arizona and Virginia.10 The mar-kets provided civil and economic interactionbetween the ethnic entities. Scripts also pre-sented economic success stories, promoted

cross-ZOS trade, informed listeners ofemployment and aid opportunities in areasthat cooperated with the implementation ofthe DPA, and carried news of decisive actionsby SFOR to disrupt and detain elements thatopposed the implementation of the DPA.

Other POTF communication projectsincluded planning cooperative efforts withthe USAID and Voice of America, or VOA;broadcasting live weekly radio shows overRadio Tuzla; broadcasting scripts of jointpress conferences with the U.N. and theOrganization for Security and Cooperationin Europe, or OSCE; and establishing themedia working group at Camp McGovern.

Our efforts with the USAID and VOA didnot bear fruit while we were in country, butthey laid the groundwork for future imple-mentation efforts. We proposed to USAIDand to VOA that we would provide an on-the-ground “sales force” that would offergrants from the USAID Office of Transi-tion Initiative to key local stations. Thegrants were to be cash awards and equip-ment purchases worth up to $20,000 — anamount that would greatly enhance a localstation’s broadcast capability. We also pro-posed establishing e-mail connectivitybetween our production facilities and thelocal stations, and providing a satellitedish for down-linking VOA programmingfrom satellite.

Each week, at Radio Tuzla, we producedand broadcast a 30-minute show that cameto be titled “The Week in SFOR.” We used the

36 Special Warfare

A U.S. PSYOP soldier anda DoD translator patrolthe Arizona market areaof Bosnia during Opera-tion Joint Endeavor.

Photo by William E. Lee

show to broadcast our themes to the Tuzlavalley corridor. The show incorporated a seg-ment during which our interpreters inter-viewed U.S. Army Reserve personnel abouttheir lives, their duties as citizens, and theircivilian careers in the U.S. Our goal was topresent a model of a functional society.

The CPIC held weekly press conferenceswith both the U.N. and the OSCE. We tookthe transcripts of the press conferences, con-verted them into radio scripts, and distrib-uted the scripts to local stations. Followingup a press conference with a translatedradio script proved to be an effective pack-age for presenting a message.

We also developed a media working group(at Camp McGovern) to encourage interac-tion between journalists of the hostile ethnicfactions. The public affairs officer for TFEagle gave information briefings to the jour-nalists on the roles and responsibilities ofjournalists in a democratic society. Althoughthe journalists did not talk a great deal withtheir colleagues from the other factions, theirwillingness to be seen in the same room withthem was an indication of success.

Impact and effectivenessThe impact and the effectiveness of our

radio broadcasts were difficult to pinpoint.While we cannot say that broadcasts alone

converted Bosnian opponents to the DPA,certainly when we evaluate the combinedeffects of SFOR activities, including theradio campaign, there is no question thatthe SFOR was successful in slowly quellingthe rebelliousness of the Bosnian Serbs.

One of the best ways of measuring the effec-tiveness of radio broadcasts is to conductinterviews with samples of the population, butsurveys are labor-intensive, and it was diffi-cult for the POTF to shift personnel from pro-duction and distribution to conducting sur-veys. In one survey that we did conduct, wefound that among the stations in the Brcko lis-tening area, Radio Mir was one of the top five,having earned a market share of 10 percent.

Short of conducting interviews, one of themost effective ways of determining the suc-cess of the POTF’s radio campaign wouldhave been to assess the willingness of localradio-station managers to accept our radioproducts. In the Muslim areas, managersaccepted almost all of our products, eventhose that presented Muslim participationin the DPA in a less-than-positive light. Butin the Serb areas, the managers did not hes-itate to reject any product they felt wasquestionable. PSYOP soldiers built relation-ships with the Serbian station managers inorder to give those managers the confidenceto accept U.S. products on a regular basis.

After we began offering the station man-

Fall 2001 37

An interpreter working forU.S. PSYOP forces inter-views residents of Brcko.While interviews are oneof the best ways of mea-suring the effectivenessof radio broadcasts, theyare labor-intensive.

Photo by Henry S. Block

agers scripts instead of tapes, their willing-ness to accept our products increased. Usingour scripts allowed them to have more con-trol over production and presentation thanusing our tapes did. Because radio-stationmanagers held their positions at theapproval of the dominant party, they could beconsidered key members of the area. Theiracceptance of the scripts was a good indica-tion of the area’s cooperation.

Lessons learnedWe learned a variety of lessons in Bosnia.

Some involved areas of information opera-tions and PSYOP that had not been previ-ously addressed.

We learned that producing and disseminat-ing paper products (such as posters, handbillsand magazines) was extremely labor-intensive.

Many of the legal, political and militaryleaders insisted on having input in thedevelopment of PSYOP themes and prod-ucts. This is not the way media organiza-tions are run. We learned that when morethan a few people are involved in develop-ing a concept, the administrative burden ofstaffing destroys timeliness.

The information campaign initially focusedon soft themes in hard copy; there was a hesi-tancy to use radio to compete with existinglocal radio news media. Part of that hesitancy

stemmed from a lack of appreciation for mod-ern media procedures. PSYOP training shouldemphasize the media’s focus on immediateresponses. Without the confidence and theability to respond rapidly, the PSYOP taskforce will appear to be lethargic.

Although we increased the number ofPSYOP products and shortened the turn-around time,11 the product-approval processfrom Sarajevo still took at least 10 days — toolong to achieve decisiveness, momentum andagility. Compared to the local media, SFORappeared to be cumbersome. The onlyapprovals that came quickly from CJICTFwere those for leaflets and loudspeakerbroadcasts. Those products are effectivewhen modern media systems have beendestroyed by warfare, but by January 1997,Bosnian radio had been re-established.

Training for PSYOP and for informationoperations should include aspects of commer-cial sales training. Establishing relationshipswith radio-station personnel should be consid-ered a long-term campaign of persuasion.Rapport with radio-station personnel can eas-ily be damaged or destroyed by a lack of appre-ciation for the sensitive nature of the relation-ship. U.S. Army Reserve personnel who werefamiliar in their civilian professions with rela-tionship-building excelled at establishing thisrapport. However, those who did not havesales backgrounds were easily disappointed

38 Special Warfare

A U.S. PSYOP soldier dis-tributes leaflets to citizensof Brcko, urging them toturn in arms and ammu-nition. Designing, pro-ducing and distributingprinted products requireslarge amounts of time.

Photo by Henry S. Block

by the brusque nature of some radio-stationpersonnel, and they “sold” the radio programseither half-heartedly or not at all.

More emphasis should be placed on inte-grating and coordinating the informationactivities of all elements involved in interna-tional political-military operations. There waslittle apparent coordination among the ele-ments of the International Stabilization Force,U.S. government agencies, foreign governmentagencies and nongovernment entities.

Interpreters were key to the success of theoperation in Bosnia. Local nationals weremore effective as interpreters than hiredAmericans who had a Slavic background. TheAmericans could not compare in speed,expression or overall ability to read or producea script. The local nationals also assisted usduring the process of building relationshipswith the local radio stations.

SummaryFrom January to August 1997, the infor-

mation campaign in Bosnia used local radioto communicate the SFOR message to theformerly warring factions. While it was diffi-cult to precisely measure the program’s effec-tiveness, the success of the combined effortsof the SFOR was reflected by a lack of activehostilities. The radio program laid thegroundwork for establishing long-lastingrelationships with the local radio-stationmanagers and personnel — some of the peo-ple who controlled what was being communi-cated in Bosnia. Unless an information oper-ation develops a strategy for buildingalliances with these personnel, as well as forusing the most effective media and produc-tion processes, the operation will only begoing through the motions of establishinginformation dominance.

Major John Mills is secre-tary of the general staff for the352nd Civil Affairs Commandin Riverdale Park, Md. He hasserved with the 3rd ArmoredCavalry Regiment, the 2ndInfantry Division, the U.S.Army Intelligence Center and School, andwith several PSYOP and Civil Affairs units.

Major Mills has served overseas assignmentsin Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Korea and Bosnia dur-ing peacetime and in combat operations. Incivilian life, he is a management and pro-gram analyst at the Federal Aviation Admin-istration. Major Mills has a bachelor’s degreefrom the University of Washington and a mas-ter’s degree in business administration fromGolden Gate University. He is currently mobi-lized and assigned to the J-33 Special Opera-tions Division as a CENTCOM action officer tosupport Operation Enduring Freedom.

Notes:1 “Information campaign” was the official title for

U.S. military psychological-operations activities inBosnia during the period covered by this article.

2 On July 3, 1997, during a press conference in Sara-jevo, David Foley, of the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe, said, “It is clear that RadovanKaradzic [the leader of the Bosnian Serbs] continuesto exercise influence in Pale. … We believe he exercis-es a pernicious and destructive influence on the peaceprocess and the Dayton Agreement. … It is obviousthat Republik Srpska authorities will not live up totheir commitments under the Dayton Agreement todeliver him to the Hague.” Foley’s quote shows thecontinuing influence of hostile Bosnian Serbs. Some ofthat influence was evidenced in vitriolic radio broad-casts from stations in the Republic of Srpska.

3 Mission-guidance letter dated Feb. 1, 1997.4 The best possible turnaround of products occurred

during the initial capture of indicted war criminals andduring the crisis in the Republic of Srpska. However,even then, the length of time from the initiation of aproduct to the dissemination of the product to the targetaudience was 10 days for hard copy and seven days for aradio script. When compared to local media-responsetimes, these times rendered the products irrelevant.

5 This concern was constantly relayed by leaders ofthe Sarajevo information campaign and by others inSFOR leadership positions.

6 This was further discussed with personnel fromthe 4th PSYOP Group during a meeting in Sarajevoin July 1999. Concern over the reliability of radio per-sonalities had been expressed by members of EUCOMstaff from the very beginning of information opera-tions in Bosnia.

7 The Land Information Warfare Activity, based atFort Belvoir, Va., maintained a forward presence atEagle Base to coordinate information operations.

8 U.S. Army public-affairs units have similar sys-tems with a broadcast capability.

9 Feedback from tactical PSYOP teams supportedthis “cross-listening.”10 The Arizona Market was also known as a hub oflegal, semi-legal and illegal trade.11 A review of the message log of the previous rotation ofPSYOP forces showed only a 10-percent approval rate —and the response time for the items that were eventual-ly approved and received was several weeks.

Fall 2001 39

In August 1944, the Allies conductedOperation Dragoon, the invasion ofsouthern France, in an attempt to

secure southern French seaports and torelieve German pressure in the Normandyarea. Although nearly one-third of MajorGeneral Robert T. Frederick’s First Air-borne Task Force, or FABTF, became casu-alties during the controversial operation,1General Jacob L. Devers, commander of theVI Army Group, and Lieutenant ColonelWilliam P. Yarborough, commander of the509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, orPIB (which was part of the FABTF), later

called Operation Dragoon themost successful Allied air-borne assault of World War II.

Technical Sergeant DaneWolfe, a soldier in the newlyactivated 512th Airborne Sig-nal Company (the ancestor oftoday’s 112th Special Opera-tions Signal Battalion) had adifferent view of the operation.

Many of Operation Dra-goon’s glider-assault casual-

ties were later attributed to the soldiers’“failing to properly absorb instruction.”2

Official after-action reports detailedextensive pre-mission glider training forthe quickly assembled U.S. units of theFABTF. The 512th AB Signal Company, asit was referred to, along with its sistercompanies (antitank, chemical, aviationand medical), had received glider training

in Italy from the 550th Airborne InfantryBattalion in July and August of 1944. Sol-diers learned to load and secure equip-ment in the CG-4A Waco gliders, and torapidly exit the gliders and assembleunder simulated combat conditions.3

Planners of Operation Dragoon had cal-culated that the FABTF would requiremore than 400 American Waco and 50British Horsa gliders for the assault. Butduring the hectic weeks before the inva-sion, they discovered that there were fewerthan 100 Wacos in the Mediterranean the-ater. As the Allies frantically attempted toassemble and flight-test more than 300new gliders before the mission, very few ofthe newly designated glidermen got thechance to make practice flights. Drawingon lessons learned in Normandy, the Alliesassigned two pilots to each glider, andplanned to use Griswold devices (irontripods) to reinforce the noses of the Wacogliders. The tripods were meant to protectthe aircrew and deflect anti-glider obsta-cles, but because of a shortage of the Gris-wold devices, none were installed.4

When Major William L. James, theFABTF signal officer, asked Wolfe if hewould go in without any glider training,Wolfe replied: “Let’s get this ‘GD’ war overwith … but give me that 50 dollars more amonth for my wife!” Wolfe said that he was“familiarized” with the glider when the512th took off for France on the morning ofAug. 15, 1944.5

40 Special Warfare

Historical Vignette: Two Combat GliderLandings in One Day

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

TechnicalSergeant

Dane WolfeUSASOC archive

Around 7 a.m., Wolfe’s glider was pulledairborne from one of the three departure air-fields near Rome. The Waco carried twopilots, Major James, Wolfe and four othersignalmen, a Harley-Davidson motorcycle,several reels of W110 telephone wire, a foot-locker filled with field phones, and twocrates of carrier pigeons. Once their serial of35 Wacos had cleared the mainland, Jamesinstructed Wolfe to send a pigeon back witha message. While watching to make surethat the pigeon flew away unharmed, Wolfewas suddenly pitched forward. The gliderhad been prematurely released by its C-47tug. One of the glider pilots said, “Boys, we’regoing down,” and the pilots aligned the craftfor a landing in the three-foot waves of theMediterranean.6

A perfect landing kept the glider intact.Wolfe, who had been unable to strap him-self in, was the first to scramble out andinflate his Mae West life preserver. An air-rescue plane circling overhead spotted theWaco and dropped three rubber boatsnearby. Because the soldiers had not beenbriefed on emergency-ditching proce-dures, they continued to wear their boots,clothing and equipment. Wolfe evenretained his steel helmet. One soldier, Pri-vate Tommy Wright, was injured duringthe landing. Once Wright had been putinto a rubber boat, Major James men-tioned that there was a bottle of whiskeyin his field pack. James’ driver quicklydove to recover the bottle, and by the time

a Royal Air Force rescue boat arrived, thesix glidermen and two pilots had taken onmore than seawater.7

The six glidermen were soon ashore, buttheir relief that their misfortune had got-ten them out of the invasion was short-lived. Soon Major James announced, “We’llbe going back in this afternoon,” and by 5p.m., Wolfe was aboard another Waco,bound for Le Muy, France. The six menwere spread among 350 gliders assigned totransport the 550th Airborne Infantry Bat-talion and the 676th Medical Company.Wolfe joined a “bunch of pill-rollers”(medics) and a jeep trailer loaded withmedical supplies. Only Wolfe and the twopilots were armed. On this trip, Wolfe madeit to France, but his glider lost its leftwheel upon landing and spun into a vine-yard. Again, Wolfe was the first one to exitthe Waco. He was met by two Scots para-troopers from the British 2nd AirlandingBrigade of the FABTF who offered him adrink from a liberated bottle of Germanschnapps. Thus, Wolfe had survived twocombat glider landings — one wet and onedry — in a single day, and he had celebrat-ed each landing with a toast.

Unbeknownst to Wolfe and the rest ofthe FABTF, the morning and late-after-noon paratroop and glider assaults hadbeen observed by Prime Minister WinstonChurchill from the British destroyer Kim-berley offshore.8

Wolfe’s relatively safe glider-landing

Fall 2001 41

Members of the 512thAirborne Signal Compa-ny stand alongside aglider prior to OperationDragoon.

112th SOSB archive

experiences were the exception to the rulein the Le Muy area on Aug. 15. Morningand afternoon glider landings encounteredthick smog produced by aircraft bombing,naval gunfire, and the fires that the bomb-ing and gunfire produced. In the smog,some gliders were released early. Othersoverflew their landing areas and circledback, squarely into the path of the follow-on C-47 flights. Scores of gliders wereweaving and darting about, trying to avoidmid-air collisions and dangling tow ropes.

As they approached the ground, pilotscould see that the landing areas were lit-tered with obstacles known as Rom-melspargel (Rommel’s asparagus) and with

gliders that had wrecked during earlierlandings. The pilots instinctively looked forclear areas, and, inevitably, too manyselected the same areas. Glider wings weretorn off as the Wacos crashed throughorchards, vineyards and fields of Rom-melspargel. Fuselages burst apart as thegliders slammed into poles and ditches athigh speeds.9 Waco pilot LieutenantEllsworth Dewberry remarked: “You couldmush those bastards (Wacos) in at 50 milesan hour real easy with a full load. A lot ofguys landed at 60, 70, 80 miles an hour.”10

Landing areas were total chaos. Para-troopers moving to their assembly areasdarted about, zigzagging among the treesand vineyards in an attempt to avoid thegliders that were crash-landing all aroundthem. “Gliders were coming in all over theplace. You were more scared of being hit bya glider than by enemy fire,” recalled Tech-nical Sergeant Dave Muñoz, a medic inCompany C, 551st PIB. “As one Waco came

down in an orchard between the trees, itswings were shucked off before the glider hita big tree and disintegrated. The bodies justflew,” said Technical Sergeant Ralph Wen-thold, S-2 section, 551st PIB. “One gliderwas going to crash into some tall trees, sothe pilot pulled it up on its tail and bankedit over to miss them. Then a wing tip caughtone of the big anti-glider stakes and (theglider) just cart-wheeled, crashing into theground. There were quite a few that camesliding in just fine. Then another gliderwould land from another direction andsmash right into them,” said Sergeant DougDillard, Company A communications, 551stPIB.11 Surveying the carnage around thewrecked gliders, Major Ray “Pappy” Her-rington, 551st PIB, muttered to a compan-ion, “I’ll stick to parachutes.”12

Yet in the midst of the chaos, jeepengines rumbled, motorcycles roared andsquads of glidermen stumbled from thedebris of wrecked Wacos and headedtoward their unit assembly areas.13 Out-side the initial FABTF command post nearLe Mitan, Wolfe found one of the other sig-nalmen who had crashed into the Mediter-ranean with him that morning. As the fel-low worked to repair French telephonelines so that he could make his switch-board operational, medics were splintinghis broken leg.14

Ironically, one of the missions assigned tothe French resistance and the FABTF para-troopers was to cut underground and over-head telephone, telegraph and teletype linesto disrupt German communications. Bothgroups did outstanding jobs, but as the Ger-mans had already learned, the mountainousplateaus along the coast of southern Francecreated enough interference to make radiocommunications ineffective.15

Despite all problems, by early evening onAug. 15, the FABTF had established com-munications between all elements, and theorders for the following day had beenissued.16 According to Wolfe, it was a con-stant effort for the 512th wire teams tokeep the switchboards connected, especial-ly as the battalion command posts movedinto more rugged mountainous terrain.Theater signal units rehabilitated morethan 1,700 miles of French telephone lines;

42 Special Warfare

The landing area at Le Muy was chaos as gliderscrashed into trees, poles and ditches.

USASOC archive

they had to string less than 150 miles oftheir own W110 telephone wire to main-tain telephone and teletype circuits. Tacti-cal wire was used only to fill gaps in areasstill under German artillery fire. Artilleryfire caused major command posts to relo-cate into the Riviera cities. But even whileoperating out of the Hotel Alhambra inNice, the FABTF had to establish switch-board relays at the edge of the plateausabove the coast in order to maintain com-munications with forward-deployed com-bat units.17

After the FABTF was dissolved, the512th Signal Company became the basis ofthe 112th Airborne Signal Battalion, whichsupported the 1st Allied Airborne Armyheadquarters in Maisons Laffitte, nearReims, France. Wolfe’s final mission withthe 112th was to supervise the VIP andgeneral-officer switchboard during thePotsdam Conference, which was held July17-Aug. 2, 1945.18

During the Sept. 7, 2001, reunion of the112th Signal Battalion, Wolfe, now 82, wasawarded a maroon beret with the 112thflash. Although Wolfe is proud of his WorldWar II combat service with the 45thInfantry Division in Sicily and at Cassinoand Anzio in Italy, he says that his servicewith the 512th AB Signal Company topshis war memories. “When I got the call tojoin the 512th AB, I knew the ‘AB’ stood for‘Airborne,’ and I was thrilled. I was happy.I had worked with the 82nd Airborne guysbefore, in Sicily and Anzio, and really likedthat.”19

Very few World War II glidermen madetwo combat assaults in a single day.Fewer still were fortunate enough totoast their accomplishments in theMediterranean Sea and on the FrenchRiviera afterward.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori-an for the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand.

Notes:1 William B. Breuer, Operation Dragoon: The Allied

Invasion of the South of France (Novato, Calif.: Pre-sidio Press, 1987), 13, 247; Robert H. Adleman and

Colonel George Walton, The Champagne Campaign(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969), 129.

2 Adleman and Walton, 72.3 U.S. Department of War, 512th Airborne Signal

Company: Historical Record – 14 July 1944 to 10 Feb-ruary 1945 (Berlin, Germany, 1945); Michel De Trez,First Airborne Task Force: Pictorial History of theAllied Paratroopers in the Invasion of SouthernFrance (Wezembeek-Oppem, Belgium: D-Day Publish-ing, 1998), 444.

4 Milton Dank, The Glider Gang: An Eyewitness His-tory of World War II Glider Combat (Philadelphia: J.P.Lippincott Co., 1977), 157; Breuer, 200.

5 Recorded interview with Dane Wolfe by Dr. C.H.Briscoe, at Fort Bragg, N.C., 7 September 2001; Jef-frey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, United StatesArmy in World War II: The European Theater of Oper-ations: Riviera to the Rhine (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Army Center of Military History, 1993), 91.

6 Wolfe interview.7 Wolfe interview; Dank, 144; Breuer, 150.8 Wolfe interview; Dank, 164-65.9 Breuer, 196.

10 Dank, 159.11 Dan Morgan, The Left Corner of My Heart: The Sagaof the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion (Wauconda,Wash.: Alder Enterprises, 1984), 185, 186, 189, 190.12 Breuer, 198.13 De Trez, 448; Wolfe interview.14 Wolfe interview.15 Clarke and Smith, 80-81, 96; Adleman and Wal-ton, 111.16 Adleman and Walton, 111; Breuer, 150.17 George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Harris,United States Army in World War II: The TechnicalServices: The Signal Corps: The Outcome (Mid-1943Through 1945) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chiefof Military History, U.S. Army, 1966), 129; Clarke andSmith, 212-13; Wolfe interview.18 Recorded interview with Myron Berman, formermember of the 112th Airborne Signal Battalion, byDr. C.H. Briscoe, in Raleigh, N.C., 1 May 2001; Wolfeinterview.19 Wolfe interview.

Fall 2001 43

On Sept. 11, 2001, the continentalUnited States was the victim of ter-rorist attacks of unprecedented

nature and scope. The U.S. military was ourfirst line of defense, and on Oct. 19, 2001, the

U.S. began conduct-ing raids into Af-ghanistan, usingArmy Special Forcesand Rangers. Today,more than ever, spe-c i a l - o p e r a t i o n sforces, or SOF, arecritical to thenational securitystrategy of the U.S.

Many of today’sSOF can trace theirorigins to WorldWar II and theefforts of William J.Donovan.1 Dono-van, a Wall Streetattorney who hadearned the Medalof Honor duringWorld War I,

approached President Franklin D. Roo-sevelt with the proposition of creating asmall organization consisting of highlytrained and motivated individuals whowould be invaluable at the strategic level.

In 1941, in response to Donovan’s propo-sition, Roosevelt established the Office ofthe Coordinator of Information, or COI.

Later, when it became clear that the COIwas to be disbanded, Donovan recommend-ed establishing an organization similar tothe British Special Operations Executive,or SOE. SOE was a paramilitary offshoot ofthe British Secret Intelligence Service.SOE’s mission was to harass the Germanarmy by building and arming Europeanresistance movements.

In June 1942, the COI was dissolved. Inits place, the Office of Strategic Services, orOSS, was established. The OSS comprisedthe Research and Analysis Section, theSecret Intelligence Section and the SpecialOperations Section. The OSS was the pred-ecessor of both the Central IntelligenceAgency and Army Special Forces.

From the beginning, Donovan had tofight for money, not only for hiring theOSS staff, but also for OSS recruiting,training and operations. Although thebattle for money persisted throughout thewar years, Donovan succeeded in acquir-ing necessary funds, mainly because of hisdominant personality.

OSS charterThe OSS charter included “the planning,

development, coordination and executionof the military program for psychologicalwarfare” and “the compilation of such polit-ical, psychological, sociological and eco-nomic information as may be required bymilitary operations.” Throughout the war,

44 Special Warfare

From OSS to USSOCOM: Lessons Learned

by Colonel James M. Coyne

Major General William J.Donovan’s vision led tothe creation of the OSS,the predecessor of boththe CIA and today’s ArmySpecial Forces.

National Archives

the OSS participated in sabotage, espi-onage, subversion, unorthodox warfare andpropaganda against Germany and Japan.Donovan’s idea of unorthodox warfareincluded destroying the will of enemyforces; collecting information on theenemy’s capabilities and intentions;destroying or disrupting the enemy’s linesof communication before, during and afterthe battle; and preparing the way for con-ventional forces. The job of executing theseunorthodox-warfare missions in enemy ter-ritory fell to the OSS operational groups, orOGs.

OG missionsThe OGs were efficient, mobile, self-suf-

ficient units capable of raising and organ-izing resistance groups; coordinating theoperations of resistance groups with themain forces; gathering intelligence; con-ducting hit-and-run operations; rescuingprisoners of war; countering enemy guer-rilla units; and conducting sabotage andsubversive operations. They operated insecret, and they often served as the per-sonal troops of the supreme commander.The OGs demonstrated not only that sabo-

tage could be as effective as aerial bom-bardment, but also that saboteurs weremore accurate, more economical and lesslikely to suffer casualties than aviators.

The qualifications of the men andwomen that the OSS recruited were cru-cial. The OSS sought volunteers who wereparatroopers; had language skills; werespecialists in demolitions, special weaponsand scouting; were wireless operators; andwere skilled in fieldcraft.

Those early “special forces” deserve agreat deal of credit for today’s special opera-tions, which are characterized by smallunits involved in direct and indirect mili-tary activities. Modern SOF perform mis-sions that are generally of an operational orstrategic objective. SOF are regionallyfocused, and they possess the languageskills, cultural familiarity and maturitythat are crucial for operations in politicallysensitive areas. SOF operations are inher-ently joint, and they differ from convention-al operations in the degree of risk thatforces encounter. Regardless of the militaryservice involved, SOF’s operational tech-niques, modes of employment, independencefrom friendly support, and dependence ondetailed operational intelligence and indige-

Fall 2001 45

File photo

The regional focus, lan-guage skills and culturalfamiliarity of today’s SOFare critical to operationsin politically sensitiveareas.

nous assets remain common factors.Although the special-operations commu-

nity has progressed greatly since the earlydays of World War II, many of the lessonslearned 60 years ago are still being appliedtoday in the areas of recruiting; training;military missions; unity of effort; and legalconsiderations and restraints.

USSOCOM creationTwo lessons that were slow to be applied

were the need for unity of command and theneed for an independent budget. In 1986,the creation of the U.S. Special OperationsCommand, or USSOCOM, finally put thoselessons into effect. USSOCOM is a unifiedcombatant command under which all theservice-component SOF (the Army SpecialOperations Command, the Naval SpecialWarfare Command, and the Air Force Spe-cial Operations Command) fall.

The existence of a unified command forSOF has provided three distinct advan-tages. First, as a supporting and supportedcommand, USSOCOM can provide readyand trained SOF to the regional command-ers in chief, and when directed by thenational command authorities, USSOCOMis capable of conducting selected specialoperations of a strategic nature under itsown command. Second, having a singlecommander for all SOF has promoted SOFinteroperability. Command and controlduring operations is simplified because ofthe creation of an in-theater special-opera-tions command and the ability to establisha joint special-operations task force. Third,the establishment of Major Force Program-11 funds has given the commander in chiefof USSOCOM his own checkbook for fund-ing special-operations programs and pur-chasing special-operations equipment.

SOF still have unique requirements forrecruiting and training. In fact, thoserequirements are more critical now than inthe past, because SOF missions haveexpanded since World War II. SOF mis-sions now include direct action, specialreconnaissance, foreign internal defense,unconventional warfare, combating terror-ism, psychological operations, civil affairs,counterproliferation, information opera-

tions and numerous collateral activities.The four SOF truths are:

• Humans are more important than hardware;

• Quality is better than quantity;• Special-operations forces cannot be

mass-produced;• Special-operations forces cannot be cre-

ated after emergencies occur.The order of the SOF truths is appropri-

ate, for the single most important asset ofSOF has always been people. Of the nearly16,000 men and women who served in theOSS, only 143 lost their lives during WorldWar II; approximately 300 were woundedor captured. These numbers show that itdoes not necessarily require an outpouringof blood to cause the enemy severe damage.Members of special-operations units aregallant, honorable and valuable soldierswho should not be wasted.

The OSS is the foundation of today’s SOF,and the lessons learned by the OSS arereflected in the recruiting, training, capabil-ities and command and control of USSO-COM. Considering the unsettled nature ofthe threats to the U.S., the capabilities ofboth SOF and USSOCOM are critical insupporting the national security strategy ofthe 21st century.

Colonel James M. Coyne is the staff judgeadvocate for V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany.He wrote this article while he was a studentat the U.S. Army War College in 2001.

Notes:1 Anthony Cave Brown, Wild Bill Donovan – The

Last Hero (New York: Vintage Books, 1984).

46 Special Warfare

New UW definitions mayaffect clarity of doctrine

I read the recent issue of Spe-cial Warfare [Winter 2001] thatwas dedicated to the subject ofunconventional warfare, or UW,with great interest. I also can saytruly that I read it with mixedemotions.

First, I was pleased to see themagazine being largely employedfor professional discussion. For toolong, the Army’s branch maga-zines have had to see honors inthis important area go to theNaval Institute’s Proceedings andto the Marine Corps Gazette.

At the same time, I was con-cerned about the UW directionthat some of the authors advocat-ed. Colonel Kershner’s statement,“All other tasks are subsets of thisoverarching mission [UW],” andCaptain Wilson’s statement,“Under the new definition, manymissions of foreign internaldefense, or FID, are better classi-fied as UW. Coalition support andcounterinsurgency missions alsofall under the UW umbrella,” wereequally disturbing.

Adopting their collective viewwould be a mistake that wouldaffect both doctrinal clarity andspecial-operations unity. Moreover,we would be taking a step 30 yearsbackward.

A bit of history — a look at the“bad old days” — may illuminatemy concerns. The services’ special-operations forces — Special Forces,SEALs, USAF Air Commandosquadrons — were born and grewup in organizational isolation, notonly within their parent services

but also (initially) from each other.At first, there were few joint

activities, and there was no jointstructure for special-operations, orSO. Many years of evolutionresulted in a very austere jointstructure. Eventually, each of theregional commands developed asmall staff organization for han-dling what is now called specialoperations. Each of these organi-zations was unique in size, struc-ture, authority, function and eventitle. Only the U.S. EuropeanCommand, or EUCOM, had even askeletal standing joint unconven-tional warfare task force, orJUWTF, which was the doctrinalpredecessor of the modern special-operations commands, or SOCs.

Nor did the joint structure haveany real charter for promulgatingdoctrine: With limited exceptions,doctrine was a service matter. Theresult of these conditions was thateach service developed its owndoctrine and terms. What the SFoperator called “unconventionalwarfare,” the air commando called“special operations.” The SEAL,bred in Navy self-sufficiency andindependence, used the term “spe-cial warfare.”

Each service’s warriors knewwhat their own terms meant andencompassed. The SF operatorsknew that “unconventional war-fare” and its major aspect, guerril-la warfare, were the principalactivities, followed by the later-added foreign internal defense(usually called counterinsurgency,or COIN), and special operations,the last term roughly equivalentto the modern “direct action.” TheAir Force operators knew equally

well that “special operations” wasthe collective term and thatunconventional warfare, COIN,etc., were its components. TheSEALs knew that the members ofthe other services were misguided,if not totally bereft of rationality:It was clearly evident that “specialwarfare” encompassed all thetasks required by the regionalCINCs and fleet admirals.

As long as the SO elements weresmall and had little contact outsidetheir services, the variationsamong their terms had littleimpact. Clearly, in order to conductan intelligent professional conver-sation, special operators of the dif-ferent services had to repeatedlydefine their terms, but this wasacceptable.

By the mid-1970s, the situationwas about to change. The SOforces had served with distinction(if little recognition) in the longSoutheast Asia war; they had sur-vived years of postwar neglect;and they were being increasinglysupported by the CINCs, if not(excepting the Navy) by their par-ent services. The war, commonmisery under service neglect, andmost important, years of activityin joint exercises, had creatednumerous bonds: personal, profes-sional and intellectual.

A common body of professionalterms was a necessity. Thisrequirement was broader thanjust communications between thecognoscenti. Joint staff actions —and most special operations-relat-ed actions were joint in nature —if they weren’t to be accompaniedby a glossary, required acceptedterms that adequately and pre-

Fall 2001 47

LettersSpecial Warfare

cisely described the subjects, par-ticipants and activities. If suchactions were to progress smoothly,they would have to be read andunderstood by the staff officersand the commanders receivingthem, regardless of their parentservices. There were enough prob-lems acquiring assets in analways-restrained environment: Itwas unacceptable to fail merelybecause some intermediate staffofficer had read an action through“service glasses.”

In the mid-1970s, an effort toestablish a JUWTF, similar toEUCOM’s, in each CINC’s head-quarters was unsuccessful. Theneed was acknowledged by thejoint commands, which was anindication of some progress, but theservice assets were not forthcom-ing. That effort, however, did givebirth to an alternative solution. Asingle JUWTF was establishedunder the title of Joint SpecialOperations Support Element, orJSOSE, with the duty of support-ing all the CINCs’ needs for spe-cial-operations expertise.

JSOSE was based at MacDillAFB, Fla., and was manned withhighly qualified personnel from thethree services. The JSOSE person-nel supported all the CINCs’ exer-cises that included UW/SO con-tent. This job was extremelydemanding, not only because of thenumber of activities and their oftensequential or overlapping sched-ules, but also because each CINChad his own war plans, his ownrequirements and goals, and hisown unique, small, UW staff organ-ization with which the JSOSE ele-ment had to meld. Worse, each the-ater had its own choice set of spe-cial-operations terms.

The variation in terms was aburden on JSOSE personnel, onthe national level SO organiza-tion, and on the service SO unitsthat in many cases supportedmore than one theater’s warplans. JSOSE, commanded succes-

sively by Army Colonels BudSkoien and Tim Gannon, and byAir Force Colonel Jon Zacharias,articulated the problem andpressed for its solution. As part ofthis effort, JSOSE drafted a pam-phlet containing a set of proposedUW/SO terms and practices.

The only national-level SOorganization then in existence wasa small staff division in the Officeof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J3SOD. Its members, led primarilyby Colonel Linc German, recog-nized the importance of the termi-nology problem and endeavored tosolve it.

Understandably, each serviceconsidered its position to be right(verging on being Holy Writ) andclearly the one that the other ser-vices should adopt. Of course, allthe CINCs and their SO elementsconsidered their solution to be theonly correct one. The efforts, urg-ing, cajolery, discussions and nego-tiations were extended. Service-based counterarguments werelong.

Gradually, the worldwide partici-pants came to recognize the necessi-ty for change and began to work forit. Their work engendered the com-promises necessary to produce asingle set of terms to which all couldadhere. The UW/special opera-tions/special warfare difference wascentral, and it was not amenable tocompromise. Only one of the termscould be the descriptor for the cap-stone activity. The adoption of oneservice’s term would require thatthe other services make major revi-sions in their doctrines.

Eventually, the Air Force’s posi-tion prevailed, and “special opera-tions” became the capstone title.“Unconventional warfare” becameone of SO’s component parts. “Spe-cial warfare” lives on in the Armyand in the Navy, primarily as anhonored title rather than as anactive term for a specific opera-tional activity. The Pacific Com-mand’s title for its UW/SO ele-

ment, “special operations com-mand,” became the standard titlein all the theaters.

And now, as evidenced by therecent Special Warfare issue, theeffort is to expand the meaning ofUW from its doctrinal definition of“guerrilla warfare, sabotage, andsubversion” to encompass numer-ous broader and heretofore unre-lated activities. But this is neither1952, when the doctrinal page wasboth blank and unilateral, nor is itthe 1960s, when the services couldpontificate their own doctrineswith little fear of challenge.

The Joint Staff now has a vast-ly expanded, law-based authorityin the field of military doctrine.UW and numerous other SO-related terms have well-estab-lished and joint-approved mean-ings. Redefining a central term,such as UW, is not to be donelightly. The U.S. Special Opera-tions Command, or USSOCOM,which normally recommends SO-related changes to the JCS, wouldhave to concur with the change.Adoption of the new UW meaningwould affect USSOCOM’s doctri-nal unity and the other services’doctrines. USSOCOM’s concur-rence is therefore not a foregoneconclusion.

Assuming for a moment thatUSSOCOM would concur and thatthe Joint Staff would accept a newArmy definition of UW, would wenot be in the process of re-creatingthe very conditions that existedbefore SO forces enjoyed a joint ter-minology? The loss of that joint ter-minology would be too high a priceto pay in order to please those whowould be entranced with conductingUW vs. some less dramatic-sound-ing activity, or who see the new def-inition as a return to the era whenUW was SF’s premier activity.

I would strongly recommendthat, for interservice unity and formutual comprehension, the cur-rent term “unconventional war-fare” and its accepted meaning be

48 Special Warfare

left undisturbed. If the term isimperfect or lacking in anyrespect, then supplementaryterms (e.g., “surrogate operations”or “irregular operations”) shouldbe developed to meet the per-ceived need. SOF’s doctrinal clari-ty was bought at too high a priceto be casually cast aside.

I trust my negative comments inthis instance will not discouragecontinued professional discussionin Special Warfare.

COL J. H. CrerarU.S. Army (ret.)Vienna, Va.

Legal points on humanrights merit clarification

I enjoyed very much readingColonel Rudolph C. Barnes Jr.’s“Human Rights and Legitimacyin the Foreign Training Mission”in the Spring 2001 issue of Spe-cial Warfare. Colonel Barnes con-tinues his longstanding record ofcontributions to ARSOF. Twominor points merit clarificationfor your readership.

On page 3, Colonel Barnesquotes a statement by GeneralBarry R. McCaffrey. [“If a cap-tain, colonel, or general knows ofa human-rights violation or warcrime and takes no action, thenhe or she will be held criminallyliable. That’s what we teacheveryone here at the School of theAmericas.”]

While I am not sure of the con-text in which the statement wasmade, in the context of Colonel

Barnes’ otherwise excellent arti-cle, the statement does not accu-rately reflect U.S. or internation-al law. A military commandermay be held accountable if he orshe ordered, knew or should haveknown, under the circumstancesruling at the time, of human-rights or law-of-war violations,and failed to take appropriateactions. ARSOF personnel shouldunderstand that one may notturn a “blind eye” when such vio-lations are being committed. AsColonel Barnes indicates later inthe article (page 5), ARSOF per-sonnel must report any evidenceof gross violations of humanrights.

On page 5, Colonel Barnesstates, “LOAC [Law of ArmedConflict] is not obligatory inOOTW.” Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff Instruction5810.01A (27 August 1999)declares, “The Armed Forces ofthe United States will complywith the law of war during allarmed conflicts, however suchconflicts are characterized and,unless otherwise directed by com-petent authorities, will complywith the principles and spirit ofthe law of war during all otheroperations.” The intent was tomake the application of LOACseamless across the conflict spec-trum. The essence of ColonelBarnes’ article reinforces thispolicy statement. DeployedARSOF members seldom are in aposition to determine where theyare on the conflict spectrum, orwhether emphasis is on humanrights vs. the law of war. As

Colonel Barnes notes, the overlapbetween the two addresses themany ARSOF missions.

W. Hays ParksSpecial Assistant to the Judge

Advocate GeneralRosslyn, Va.

Fall 2001 49

Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articlesthey have read in Special Warfare or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazinearticle. With sufficient input from the field, the “Letters” section could become a forum for new ideas andfor the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Ideally, letters should be approximately 250 words long, but theycan be longer, depending upon the subject matter. Include your full name, rank, address and phone num-ber. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-DM; JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool; Fort Bragg, NC 28310.

Articles

Army Values: The Epitome — Dick Meadows; Winter, 39.“ ‘Devils & Beasts’: Japanese PSYOP Posters from World War II”; Spring, 26-27.Adelstein, LTC Dan; “The State of SF, PSYOP and CA Personnel”; Spring, 38-43.Arquilla, Dr. John; “The Confederacy Could Have Won — Unconventionally: A Thought Experiment for Special

Warriors”; Winter, 10-17.Barnes, COL Rudolph C. Jr.; “Human Rights and Legitimacy in the Foreign Training Mission”; Spring, 2-11.Boyatt, COL Mark D., U.S. Army (ret.); “Special Forces: Our Core Purpose”; Winter, 8-9.Briscoe, Dr. C.H.; “Helicopters in Combat: World War II”; Summer, 32-38.Briscoe, Dr. C.H.; “Historical Vignette: Two Combat Glider Landings in One Day”; Fall, 40-43.Brown, LTG Bryan D.; “The 160th SOAR: The Quiet Aviation Professionals”; Summer, 2-5.Brown, MW4 Carl R., U.S. Army (ret.); “ ‘Green Platoon’: The 160th SOAR’s Training Program”; Summer, 12-13.Cahill, MAJ Dennis J.; “Is There a Role for CA in Domestic Support Operations?”; Winter, 32-38.Celeski, COL Joseph D.; “Joint Urban Operations: Special Forces in Urban Campaign Planning”; Fall, 2-13.Coyne, COL James M.; “From OSS to USSOCOM: Lessons Learned”; Fall, 44-46.DeAtkine, Norvell B.; “Urban Warfare: Lessons from the Middle East”; Fall, 20-29.Dickson, Dr. Keith D.; “The New Asymmetry: Unconventional Warfare and Army Special Forces”; Fall, 14-19.Finlayson, Dr. Kenn; “Helicopters in Combat: Korea”; Summer, 39-41.Glenn, SSG Amanda; “Advisory Missions: SF-Command Training Supports Human Rights”; Spring, 12-17.Gray, MAJ Sidney J. III and CW5 Charles W. Weigandt; “The 160th SOAR: 20 Years of Army Special-Operations

Aviation”; Summer, 6-11.Halstead, CW2 Brian D.; “Unconventional Warfare: Questions, Concerns and Proposals”; Winter, 28-31.Kershner, COL Michael R.; “Unconventional Warfare: The Most Misunderstood Form of Military Operations”;

Winter, 2-7.Marks, MAJ Paul; “Advisers and Advising in the 21st Century”; Spring, 28-37.Metzgar, MAJ Greg E.; “Unconventional Warfare: Definitions from 1950 to the Present”; Winter, 18-23.Milani, LTC Andy; “Evolution of the 3-160th SOAR Through Desert Storm”; Summer, 14-22.Mills, MAJ John; “PSYOP Radio Operations in Bosnia: A Steady, Positive Drumbeat”; Fall, 30-39.Rugen, MAJ Walter; “The Impact of Forward-Based Special-Operations Aviation”; Summer, 23-25.Stewart, LTC Greg and Thorwald Eide; “20 Years of Army Special-Operations Aviation Modernization”; Summer,

28-31.Terzian, SFC John; “SF Advisers in El Salvador: The Attack on El Paraiso”; Spring, 18-25.Turner, CPT Holly; “Company E: The 160th SOAR’s Newest Forward-Based Unit”; Summer, 26-27.Wilson, CPT Robert Lee; “Unconventional Warfare: SF’s Past, Present and Future”; Winter, 24-27.

Books

Air Commando One: Heinie Aderholt and America’s Secret Air Wars; by Warren A. Trest; reviewed by COL J.H.Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.); Summer, 48-49.

America and Guerrilla Warfare; by Anthony James Joes; reviewed by LTC Chris Tone; Spring, 52-53.Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Viet-

nam; by H. R. McMaster; reviewed by LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr., U.S. Army (ret.); Spring, 52.

50 Special Warfare

2001 IndexSpecial Warfare

Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Modern Warfare; by John Alexander; reviewed by MAJ Bill Gormley;Winter, 49.

The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon; by Bernard Norling; reviewed by COL J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.);Winter, 48-49.

The Principles of War for the Information Age; by Robert R. Leonhard; reviewed by Dr. David Bradford; Fall, 60-61.War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet; by Eric S. Margolis; reviewed by

Dr. Kenn Finlayson; Fall, 60.

Fall 2001 51

52 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

Recently, there has been some confusion about the prerequisites thatreserve-component soldiers must satisfy in order to attend training formilitary occupational specialties 37F (PSYOP) and 38A (Civil Affairs). DAPam 611-21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure, Chapter10, paragraph 10-122 (for 37F), and paragraph 10-123 (for 38A), identifythe prerequisites both for training and for the award of the MOSs. Theonly exception that can be made involves the prerequisite for a secretclearance. A soldier can begin training without a secret clearance if he orshe can furnish evidence that a background investigation has been initi-ated (a copy of SF Form 86, Personnel Security Questionnaire, authenti-cated by the unit S2). However, before the soldier can be awarded the MOS,he or she must have received a secret clearance or an interim secret clear-ance issued by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.Additionally, AR 140-158, Enlisted Personnel Classification, Promotion,and Reduction, Chapter 2, paragraph 2-9d, restricts reclassification intoMOSs 37F and 38A to soldiers in the rank of staff sergeant or below. Byexception, sergeants first class who have obtained written approval fromthe Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Operations ProponencyOffice, or SOPO, may also be awarded the MOSs. Approval will be basedon SOPO’s determination of the soldier’s qualifications. In addition tomeeting the requirements of DA Pam 611-21, the soldier must haveacquired civilian education or related civilian job skills that complementthe MOS to be awarded. Exceptions to either of the above policies must berequested through: Commander, USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-SP (SOPO).Exceptions must be granted before soldiers attend MOS training.

The 2001 master-sergeant promotion board has provided an analysis of therecords that it reviewed. Below are comments regarding CMF 18 records:Utilization and assignments. Almost all of the SFCs had served 24 monthsor more on Special Forces operational detachments or in special-missionunits. Most of the SFCs had also demonstrated highly successful duty per-formance as drill sergeants or as recruiters, or in assignments at the Spe-cial Warfare Center and School, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, or theJoint Readiness Training Center. Provided that those assignments lasted36 months or less, they contributed enormously to the board’s perceptionof the NCOs’ overall development. Through their job performance on oper-ational detachments, the top CMF 18 SFCs clearly established the CMF’sstandards.MOS compatibility within the CMF. The board considered NCOs’ dutytitles and descriptions, along with descriptions of all 18-series MOSs, todetermine what position an NCO was filling. For example, if a soldier’sduty description was “assistant operations and intelligence NCO,” he wasevaluated for that duty position, regardless of whether he held the 18FMOS.

Soldiers must meet MOSprerequisites

E8 promotion board analyzes CMF 18 records

Fall 2001 53

Training and education. With the exception of the static-line jumpmastercourse, the board did not weigh any course as a key to success. Instead, theboard viewed the entire range of NCO professional education. Many of thesoldiers’ photos were more than five years old, and many of the photos didnot reflect all the awards and badges that the soldiers had earned.CMF structure and career-progression assessment. The overall quality ofCMF 18 is extremely high. However, there are not enough E9 slots withinthe current force structure to allow CMF 18 soldiers to be promoted to E9at the Army’s average rate. The board carefully reviewed the files of sol-diers who are in special-mission units. Overall, the files and the photos ofthose soldiers were more current and better-prepared than those of the sol-diers in other units. For more information, telephone MSG Brian Nulf atDSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

54 Special Warfare

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The 2001 major promotion board considered 101 FA 39 captains who werein the promotion zone and selected 85, giving FA 39 a promotion-zoneselection rate of 84 percent, one point higher than the Army’s promotion-zone selection rate of 83 percent. During 2001, 29 officers career field des-ignated, or CFD’d, into FA 39: 11 FA 39Bs, 10 FA 39Cs and 8 FA 39Xs (anFA 39X is an officer who has had no FA 39 training or utilization). The offi-cers with FA 39 training who CFD’d into FA 39 must attend the FA 39Intermediate Level Education Program, or ILE Program, prior to assum-ing a branch-qualifying major’s position. The FA 39Xs must attend the ILEProgram and receive an additional 9-11 months of FA 39 training beforeserving in an FA 39 position. For additional information, telephone JeanneGoldmann at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

The 2001 major promotion board considered 148 SF captains who were inthe promotion zone and selected 137, giving the SF Branch a promotion-zone selection rate of 93 percent, 10 points higher than the Army’s promo-tion-zone selection rate of 83 percent. The board considered 156 SF cap-tains who were below-the-zone and selected 10. It selected four of the SFcaptains who were above-the-zone. For more information, telephone MajorWilliam Bender, SF branch manager in the SWCS Special Operations Pro-ponency Office, at DSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

The 2001 lieutenant-colonel promotion board considered 62 FA 39 majorswho were in the promotion zone and selected 49, giving FA 39 a promotion-zone selection rate of 79 percent, which exceeded the Army’s promotion-zone selection rate of 75.7 percent. The board selected two FA 39 majorswho were below-the-zone.

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Education System ensures training atevery level of progression throughout an SF warrant officer’s career. First,the soldier must attend the Warrant Officer Candidate School, or WOCS, atFort Rucker, Ala. This seven-week course focuses on leadership, academicsand stress management. After completion of WOCS, the newly appointedWO1 must attend the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course at FortBragg, N.C. This course technically certifies the WO1 in MOS 180A, SpecialForces Warrant Officer. The 19-week course focuses on leadership; the mili-tary decision-making process; training management; advanced special-oper-ations techniques, or ASOT; force protection; and personnel-recovery opera-tions. Upon selection for promotion to CW3, the SF warrant officer mustattend the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or SFWOAC, atFort Bragg. The advanced course focuses on joint operations and planning,interagency familiarization, regional studies, advanced targeting, ASOTadministration, force protection level II, and personnel-recovery operations.

Army selects 85 FA 39captains for promotion

Warrant officers shouldattend training as scheduled

2001 major promotion boardselects 151 SF captains

Army selects 51 FA 39majors for promotion to LTC

Fall 2001 55

In fiscal year 2001, 45 personnel were selected for promotion and for atten-dance in the SFWOAC, but 14 were deferred. Commanders and soldiersshould minimize deferments if possible. The education system, which pre-pares the warrant officer for future assignments, is tied to the Army’s selec-tion-board processes. When education is delayed, the effects can place thesoldier at a disadvantage for promotion. Education funding is allocated forthe year in which the soldier is selected to attend a course. If the funds arenot used, they are not carried over to the next fiscal year. Warrant officersmust have a top-secret clearance in order to attend the SFWOAC. To allowsufficient time for the clearance to be processed, SF warrants should applyfor their top-secret clearance as soon as they become CW2s. Once selectedfor promotion to CW4, the warrant officer must attend the Warrant OfficerStaff Course at Fort Rucker. This four-week course focuses on staff proce-dures. Upon selection for promotion to CW5, the warrant officer must attendthe Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course at Fort Rucker. This two-weekcourse focuses on how the Army operates. It is critical that warrant officersattend the appropriate courses as scheduled. To apply for any of the educa-tion courses, warrant officers should submit a DA Form 4187 to the SF war-rant-officer career manager, CW4 Eisentrout, at the Total Army PersonnelCommand.

The 2001 lieutenant colonel promotion board considered 52 SF majors whowere in the promotion zone and selected 43, giving the SF Branch a pro-motion-zone selection rate of 82.7 percent, seven points higher than theArmy’s promotion-zone selection rate of 75.7 percent. SF’s rate exceededthe rates of all other combat-arms branches by an average of five points.Five SF officers were selected from the 54 who were considered below-the-zone, and one officer was selected from the 21 who were considered above-the-zone.

FA 39’s 2001 senior-service-college selection rate was 6.8 percent, slightlybelow the Army’s average selection rate of 7.7 percent. The 2001 SSC selec-tion board was the last one to be conducted under the old officer-manage-ment system. In fiscal year 2002, all officers whose records appear beforethe SSC board will be rated under the OPMS XXI system, and they will besingle-tracked, which should put FA 39’s selection rate on par with theArmy’s average selection rate.

The SF Branch’s 2001 senior-service-college selection rate was 7.6 percent,which was on par with the Army’s average selection rate of 7.7 percent.The rates for other combat-arms branches were as follows: Infantry, 9 per-cent; Armor, 7.7 percent; and Field Artillery, 8.2 percent.

FA 39 selections for SSCslightly below Army’s average

2001 LTC promotion boardselects 49 SF majors

SF SSC selection rate on par with Army’s average

56 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

Following a series of other actions taken by Mexican President Vicente Foxto reform Mexico’s law-enforcement and security establishment, Mexico isreplacing the Federal Judicial Police with a new law-enforcement bodycalled the Federal Investigation Agency, or AFI. The AFI will employ thelatest scientific means of criminal investigation. It is slated to receivetraining from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and from the U.S.Drug Enforcement Administration. The AFI’s strength is projected to be2,500 agents. Agents will concentrate their efforts in the areas of Mexicothat are experiencing the greatest problems with crime and conflict. Thereplacement of the Federal Judicial Police is being billed as a de-emphasisof the heavily armed federal police elements that based their activities onthe application of armed force. In contrast to those elements, the AFI rep-resents a move toward creating a multiskilled, investigative police force.

During the Cold War, Denmark was a potential target of the Soviet Unionand of other members of the Warsaw Pact. Regular Danish armed forces weretrained to defend against attacks by ground, airborne and amphibious forcesthat might attempt to seize the Danish offshore islands or conduct operationsalong the Jutland peninsula. Today, with substantial changes in the opera-tional environment and in the external threat, forces of Denmark’s regulararmy, air force, and navy are being reduced in size and are being assigned tointernational peacekeeping duties. Limited numbers of personnel in the Dan-ish home guard, which consists of about 62,000 volunteers, are also beingassigned to international peacekeeping duties. At the same time, Denmark isdeveloping a new approach to homeland defense. During the next 4-6 years,the home guard will form a 3,000-man special force that will be organizedinto 92 units. Those units will be assigned to guard key infrastructure (e.g.,bridges, communications centers and power stations) and other facilitiesaround the country. A number of the units have already been created. Theunits’ training approximates the training given to personnel of the regularDanish armed forces, and the units are under military oversight. In time ofwar, the guard units would be placed under the control of Denmark’s ArmyOperational Command, and they would be led by the commander of the localdefense region.

Mexico replaces FederalJudicial Police

Danes take new approachto homeland defense

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military StudiesOffice, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

USASOC announces NCO,Soldier of the Year

The U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command has announced thewinners of its competition for NCOand Soldier of the Year.

The NCO of the Year is SergeantWilliam J. Haynes of Headquartersand Headquarters Company, 112thSpecial Operations Signal Battal-ion. The Soldier of the Year is Spe-cialist Alan S. Kellermann, Compa-ny C, 2nd Battalion, 75th RangerRegiment.

Runners-up were Staff SergeantRobert L. Garnsay, U.S. Army Spe-cial Forces Command; and Special-ist Andrew S. Kirfman, 160th Spe-cial Operations Aviation Regiment.

U. S. Army Special ForcesCommand changes hands

Major General Geoffrey C. Lam-bert took command of the U. S.Army Special Forces Commandfrom Brigadier General Frank J.Toney during a ceremony held atFort Bragg’s Dick Meadows Field,Sept. 7, 2001.

“Today’s Special Forces soldier isbetter-trained, better-equipped andmore capable than ever in history,”said Lieutenant General DougBrown, commander of the U. S.Army Special Operations Com-mand. “These kinds of soldiersdeserve the very best in leaders.They just don’t come any betterthan Major General Geoffrey Lam-bert,” said Brown. “He is trained,ready and eager.”

Lambert’s previous assignmentsinclude several positions with the75th Ranger Regiment; operationsofficer, 7th SF Group; commander,

1st Battalion, 7th SF Group; com-mander, 10th SF Group; command-er, Special Operations CommandEurope; commander, Special Oper-ations Command (IFOR); anddirector of the Center for Opera-tions, Plans and Policy, U.S. SpecialOperations Command, MacDill AirForce Base, Fla. — SSG Amanda C.Glenn, USASOC PAO

SWCS producing ARSOFCSS, NEO, urban-ops manuals

The SWCS Directorate of Train-ing and Doctrine’s Joint and ArmyDoctrine Division is working toproduce three manuals during fis-cal year 2002:

FM 3-05.103 (63-31), ARSOFCombat Service Support, is a revi-sion and an expansion of FM 63-24, Special Operations SupportBattalion, dated 1995. FM 3-

05.103 (63-31) will provide userswith a base document for planningand conducting ARSOF CSS oper-ations. The initial draft is sched-uled to be staffed to SOF unitsearly in 2002. The project officer isCaptain George Northington,DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail,northg@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.106, ARSOF Noncom-batant Evacuation Operations, is anew publication that will providea basic reference for planning andconducting ARSOF noncombat-ant-evacuation operations, orNEO. The manual will outline thecapabilities and the organizationof SF, Ranger, Civil Affairs,PSYOP, and support units in theconduct of NEO in the joint, multi-national, and interagency envi-ronments. The project officer isMr. Jim Mong, DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail, mongj@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.109, ARSOF UrbanOperations, is a new publicationthat will acquaint ARSOF plan-ners and operational units withthe capabilities that SF, Ranger,CA, PSYOP and ARSOF supportunits offer in conducting urbanoperations, either unilaterally orin support of joint and multina-tional task forces. The project offi-cer is Mr. Guy Griffaw, DSN 239-5393; e-mail, griffawg@soc.mil.

PSYOP Division primaryreview authority for JP 3-53

The PSYOP Training and Doc-trine Division, Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine, SWCS, isthe primary review authority, orPRA, for the revision of Joint Pub3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychologi-

Fall 2001 57

UpdateSpecial Warfare

LTG Doug Brown (right) presents the colors of the ArmySpecial Forces Command to MG Geoffrey Lambert.

Photo by Amanda Glenn

cal Operations.JP 3-53 addresses the use of mil-

itary PSYOP assets in support ofjoint operations across the range ofmilitary operations.

As the PRA, the PSYOP Divisiondirected a thorough review andadjudication of critical commentsreceived from field units regardingthe manual. Working with the U.S.Special Operations Command’sjoint-doctrine officer, who is thelead agent for the revision, thePRA organized a two-day meeting,hosted by USSOCOM, thatbrought together representativesfrom the Army, Air Force, Navy andFleet Information Warfare Center.The representatives refined thescope of the revision, developed adetailed chapter outline for therevised manual, refined the publi-cation’s audience and establishedmilestones for production.

The participants also discussedthe integration of PSYOP andinformation operations; commandand control of PSYOP forces; andPSYOP concerns across the conflictspectrum, including flexible deter-rent options, theater-engagementplans and post-conflict operations.

The PRA will continue to coordi-nate with the doctrine writer, thelead agent and others to ensure thetimely development of JP 3-53,which is scheduled for completionin June 2003.

For additional information, con-tact Ms. Debra A. Weltz, deputychief of the PSYOP Training andDoctrine Division, at DSN 236-4010 or commercial (910) 396-4010; or send e-mail toweltzd@soc.mil.

5th SF Group receives newcommander

Colonel John F. Mulhollandassumed command of the 5th Spe-cial Forces Group from ColonelCharles Paxton during a ceremonyat Fort Campbell, Ky., July 26,2001.

Mulholland was previously astudent at the National War Col-lege in Washington, D.C. His otherSpecial Forces assignments includecommander, 1st Battalion, 1st SFGroup; operations officer and exec-utive officer, 1st Battalion, 7th SFGroup; and company and detach-ment commander, 5th SF Group.He has also served with the U.S.Army Intelligence and SecurityCommand and the Special Opera-tions Command-South.

Paxton’s new assignment ischief, Agency Support, U.S. SpecialOperations Command, MacDill AirForce Base, Fla.

Browski assumes duties as SWCS CSM

CSM Frank Browski succeededCSM Michael Bishop as the com-mand sergeant major of the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and Schoolduring a change-of-responsibilityceremony Dec. 3, 2001.

Browski was previously the com-mand sergeant major of the 4thPSYOP Group. His other special-operations assignments includeinstructor duty at the Special War-fare Center and School; and servicewith the 7th SF Group, 5th SFGroup, and 75th Ranger Regiment

SWCS to produce new UW manual

The Special Forces Division ofthe SWCS Directorate of Trainingand Doctrine is developing a user-friendly manual to explain the tac-tics, techniques and procedures ofunconventional warfare, or UW, toSF soldiers in the field.

FM 3-05.201, Special ForcesUnconventional Warfare (UW)Operations, will provide guidancefor the training, mission-planning,and employment of SF operationaldetachments A, B and C in a UWenvironment.

The need to include classifiedmaterial in the manual led to thedevelopment of FM 3-05.201 (ini-

tial draft) in two volumes —unclassified and classified.

The unclassified volume, con-taining four chapters and appen-dixes, will cover the variousaspects of UW and the seven phas-es of a U.S.-sponsored insurgency.It will also cover SF-detachmentmission-planning and the develop-ment of mission-essential tasklists; employment of SF detach-ments in joint special-operationsareas; and demobilization. Theunclassified manual will alsoaddress PSYOP and Civil Affairssupport in each phase of UW.

The classified volume willaddress sabotage, subversion andthe UW underground. It isdesigned to be used in conjunctionwith the unclassified volume andwith FM 3-05.220, Advanced Spe-cial Operations Techniques(ASOT).

In December 2001, the initialdraft of the unclassified volumewas distributed in hard copy andon CD, and it was placed on theASOCNET. The classified volumewill also be distributed in hardcopy and on CD.

FM 3-05.201 will help define cur-rent and future SF operations. Sol-diers in SF field units are encour-aged to review the manual; com-ments from the field are importantto the manual’s development andusefulness. For more information,telephone Major David Beech, chiefof the SF Doctrine Branch, at DSN239-7690 or commercial (910) 432-7690; or send e-mail tobeechd@soc.mil.

Soldiers can apply for admission to USMA

Each year, approximately 150Regular Army soldiers are offeredadmission to the United StatesMilitary Academy or to the UnitedStates Military Academy Prepara-tory School.

Soldiers who are interested inthis opportunity must possess high

58 Special Warfare

moral character and express a sin-cere desire to become an Army offi-cer. Applicants must be U.S. citi-zens, unmarried, and have no legalobligation to support dependents.They also cannot have turned 23before July 1 of the year of entry.For more information, telephoneCaptain Cliff Hodges, soldieradmissions officer, at DSN 688-5780 or commercial (845) 938-5780. His e-mail address istc2324@usma.edu.

The USMA is also seekingbranch-qualified, company-gradeofficers to serve as instructors; andsergeants first class to serve ascompany tactical NCOs. NCOsshould have drill-sergeant or pla-toon-sergeant experience and 12-15 years of active federal service.

Applicants should complete aUSMA interest form, which can beobtained either by visiting the USMAWeb site (www.usma.army.mil/adju-tantgeneral/) or by writing to:Management Operations Branch,AG Division, West Point, NY10996-1926.

USASOC distributes SERELevel-B products

In January 2002, the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command, incoordination with the U.S. ArmyJohn F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, began distrib-uting training materials for Sur-vival, Evasion, Resistance andEscape (SERE) Level-B to Armyspecial-operations units.

Department of Defense Direc-tives 1300.7 and 1300.21 requirethat U.S. armed-forces personnelwho are considered a moderaterisk for capture and exploitationreceive SERE Level-B training.Army personnel who serve inground combat units, provide secu-rity for high-threat targets, orserve in the vicinity of the forward-edge-of-battle area or the forwardline of troops are considered a mod-erate risk.

The Level-B training materials,produced by the Joint PersonnelRecovery Agency, or JPRA, com-prise 22 videotapes that teach sol-diers how to deal with a variety ofcaptivity situations, includingwartime detention, peacetime gov-ernment detention, and hostagedetention. Level-B training is aunit responsibility, and ARSOFunits must use the JPRA-pro-duced videotapes to meet the min-imum requirements for Level-Bqualification.

Because some of the videotapescontain classified information,service members who do not have asecret security clearance will notbe allowed to view the classifiedtapes. The unclassified trainingmeets the requirements for ArmySERE Level-B qualification. Serv-ice members who have a secretsecurity clearance must view all 22videotapes.

Units are also encouraged to pro-cure the Special Warfare Centerand School’s SERE Level-B train-ing-support package, or TSP. TheTSP contains field training exercis-es and practical exercises that willassist units in providing enhance-ment training in survival and eva-sion. The TSP will be available fordownloading from the Army Train-ing and Doctrine Command’sReimer Digital Library, or RDL, inMarch 2002.

The Special Warfare Center andSchool has also been revising twofield manuals that support SERELevel-B training. FM 21-78, Resist-ance and Escape, has been revisedand has been renumbered FM 3-05.71. The manual, published inJanuary 2002, is classified “confi-dential” and will not be availableon the RDL. FM 21-76, Survival (5June 1992), is being revised andwill be renumbered FM 3-05.70.The revised manual is scheduled tobe published in June 2002 and willbe available on the RDL.

In May 2001, the commander inchief of the U.S. Special Operations

Command authorized the use ofthe SERE Level-B training pro-gram as a temporary substitute forSERE Level-C training until theSpecial Warfare Center and Schoolcan increase its training capacityfor the SERE Level-C Course.SERE Level-C training is designedto prepare personnel who are at ahigh risk for capture.

To procure additional copies ofthe SERE Level-B training materi-als, units should telephone theJoint Visual Information ServicesDistribution Activity, TobyhannaArmy Depot, Pa., at DSN 795-7937.For additional information, tele-phone CW3 Daniel Wilke,USASOC DCSOPS, at DSN 239-2069 or commercial (910) 432-2069(e-mail: wilked@soc.mil); or SFCDaniel Baldridge, SWCS PersonnelRecovery Cell, at DSN 239-9362 orcommercial (910) 396-9362 (e-mail:baldridd@soc.mil).

Fall 2001 59

War at the Top of the World:The Struggle for Afghanistan,Kashmir, and Tibet. By Eric S.Margolis. New York: RoutledgePress, 2000. ISBN: 0-415-92712-9.250 pages. $26.

In some of the most inhospitableterrain on earth, ethnic, religiousand political factions clash daily.In the mountainous lands ofsouthwest Asia, long-standingconflicts between nations, tribesand religions has taken on newmeaning in the wake of the terror-ist attacks on the United States onSept. 11, 2001.

Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibetare the battlegrounds where the“great game” was played outbetween Russia and Great Britainin the 1800s. Today, India, China,Pakistan and the newly formednations of the former Soviet Unioncontinue to vie for dominance in amodern version of the game mademore deadly by the added threatof nuclear weapons.

In War at the Top of the World:The Struggle for Afghanistan,Kashmir, and Tibet, veteran jour-nalist Eric S. Margolis recountsthe history and the current stateof affairs in the most volatileregion of the world. Whether trav-elling with the mujahedin andobserving the struggle to oust theSoviet Union from Afghanistan inthe 1980s, or visiting the PanchenLama at the Potala Palace inLhasa, Tibet, Margolis exploresthe roots of conflict in the region.

Margolis looks at the long-standing war between Pakistanand India, fought on the three-mile high glaciers and peaks of

the Karakoram, and at the rela-tionships between the variousAfghani tribes that form the back-ground of his story. He alsoexplains the lingering unrest inTibet and in China’s adjoiningSinkiang Province over China’sannexation of Tibet in 1950. Thatunrest, as well as India’s rise toregional power, may one daydestabilize the Chinese commu-nist government and lead to warin the Himalayas. In his quest toexplain the direction that eventsare taking in the region, Margolisvisits all of the areas and groupsthat he discusses.

Well-written and informative,War at the Top of the World is anexcellent source for the readerwho is seeking to identify the keyplayers and the issues related tothe conflict in Southwest Asia.Part political-science primer, parttravelogue, the book is a fine com-

pilation of Margolis’ years of expe-rience with the people of thisvolatile, dangerous region.

Dr. Kenn FinlaysonUSAJFKSWCSFort Bragg, N.C.

The Principles of War for theInformation Age. By Robert R.Leonhard. Novato, Calif.: PresidioPress, 1998. ISBN: 0-891441-647-1.287 pages. $30.

Is the author of this book KevinCostner, the prescient farmer whoturns his cornfield into a baseballfield? Or is the author Thich NhatHanh, the Buddhist theologianwho asks his followers to alwayslook deeply?

The author could be Costner,because this book plows under amilitary doctrine that is in fullbloom and that has provided theUnited States military with abumper crop of successes. Theauthor could also be the monkHanh, because the book teachesthat one must “not be idolatrousabout or bound to any doctrine,theory, or ideology … (nor) thinkthe knowledge one presently pos-sesses is changeless, absolutetruth.” In a well-written, logical,and thought-provoking book, BobLeonhard is both characters: Withtotal sincerity, he plows militarydoctrine under while chantingHanh’s mantra.

The Principles of War for theInformation Age makes onerethink and reformulate thevaunted nine principles of warthat most military professionalshave read, studied, used and

60 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

taught for more than 125 years.Leonhard’s completely new set ofprinciples will be discussed in mil-itary organizations for years tocome. But know this: Bob Leon-hard is probably the best-qualifiedofficer to do what he has done,because he is exactly between thetwo groups of military officers whoare either too set in their ways tochange or too young in theircareers to bother with the “anti-quated nine.”

A reader might be inclined tobelieve that the principles of warmust be rewritten because thecomputer age demands that weeliminate anything that is anti-quated or obsolete. This is not thepremise of the book. True, Leon-hard writes that computer-drivenand digitized battle plans providea commander and his or her staffwith precise information, butthat is not why he calls for newprinciples.

Leonhard calls for new princi-ples because “(I)nformation domi-nance in future warfare is ‘not’built only upon the computer. Itdoes not rely solely on communi-cations. It is not based only onsensor technology. It is not merelya training innovation. It is ‘all’these things — and much more —welded together by doctrine.”

To put it more simply, Leonhardstates, “One of the skills of futurewarfare will be to actively managewhat we know and what we don’tknow.” Too bad Leonhard hasn’tspent a tour of duty with special-warfare types, for they are alreadypracticing the new principles ofwar, and they do know how to sep-arate the known from theunknown.

This book could very well serveas a stand-alone doctrinal manu-al for the U.S. Special OperationsCommand. It is based on the veryprinciples of war that special-operations forces have been prac-ticing for 30 years, especiallywhat Leonhard calls “precision

warfare.”Precision warfare, writes Leon-

hard, is based upon these “new”principles: dislocation — the art ofrendering enemy strength irrele-vant; distribution — the appor-tioned combat power used toaccomplish specific purposes inthe most economical and preciseway possible; activity — all thefriendly actions that advance thecommander’s plan, other thansecurity; opportunity — the free-dom to act; option acceleration —the delay of the decision concern-ing the desired end state of a con-flict, which then capitalizes onflexibility to achieve a precise andhigh-payoff end state; and com-mand — the practice of seekingunity of effort through authorita-tive direction.

Leonhard’s book could also pro-vide the basis for establishing spe-cial operators as a branch of thearmed forces, since they are themost experienced in using theseprinciples.

The book is intriguing. Thereare no footnotes or references.There is a “works cited” page onwhich Leonhard lists 20 books andprovides short critiques of most ofthem. Obviously, Leonhard has

read and studied them all. He haswritten two other military-orient-ed books — The Art of Maneuver(Presidio Press, 1991) and Timeand the Art of War (Praeger Press,1994) — and this book is a natur-al conclusion to the trilogy.

My predictions for The Princi-ples of War for the Information Ageare several years of denunciation,denial, discussion and decision.The old school will pick Leon-hard’s arguments apart word forword, reference by reference.These actions will parallel theattacks that Robert Asprey suf-fered when he published War inthe Shadows in 1975 anddenounced the military establish-ment for using antiquated doc-trine and conventional methods tofight a guerrilla war in Vietnam.

But attacking Leonhard’s bookwould be foolish and defeating.Here is a book that, while scholar-ly in scope, is written in a down-to-earth manner by an infantryofficer who is both literate andcombat-tested.

Leonhard’s work should betaken seriously and studied assid-uously. For those who serve in spe-cial-warfare units, this book is aclarion call to formalize doctrineand principles of war, alreadybeing done to the greatest extentpossible, into the special-opera-tions schools. Acquire this book,read it carefully, discuss it openly,and implement it fully.

Dr. David BradfordUniversity of Central FloridaOrlando, Fla.

Fall 2001 61

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the ArmyJFK Special Warfare Center and SchoolATTN: AOJK – DT – DMFort Bragg, NC 28310

Prstd StdU.S. Postage

PAIDNiagara Falls, NY

Permit No. 28

PIN: 079269–000