JOINT SPECIAL FORCES AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

COL PK MALLICK

“Today we see a bewildering diversity of separatist wars, ethnic and

religious violence, coups d’état, border disputes, civil upheavals, and

terrorist attacks, pushing waves of poverty-stricken, war-ridden

immigrants (and hordes of drug traffickers as well) across national

boundaries. In the increasingly wired global economy, many of these

seemingly small conflicts trigger strong secondary effects in surrounding

(and even distant) countries. Thus a “many small wars” scenario is

compelling military planners in many armies to look afresh at what they

call “special operations” or “special forces” — the niche warriors of

tomorrow.”

- Alvin and Heidi Toffler

War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century

INTRODUCTION

Special operations (SO) are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically

sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or

economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad

conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or

discreet capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military

operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of

conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations by,

with, or through indigenous or surrogate forces. Political-military considerations

frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low-visibility

techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from

conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational

techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and

dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Special

Operation Forces (SOF) are more than just what they do. SOF are comprised of

specially selected, trained, and organized special operations soldiers, sailors, and

airmen from the Armed Services. Their training, education, maturity, initiative, and

experience set them apart from all others. SOF personnel form the core of our nation’s

ability to combat terrorism and conduct unconventional warfare. Despite their

demonstrated capability and successes SOF face significant challenges in the years

ahead. SOF must develop capabilities to defend the country from terrorism and other

threats wherever they occur, as well as prepare to meet the uncertain challenges of the

future. Transforming the force from one designed to combat specific threats to one

with capabilities that can address a broad range of contingencies will not be easy, but

it must be done. They must be prepared to wage war “everywhere, all the time.”

In India we have different types of Special Forces (SF) each having their own tasks,

organization, equipment, training and command and control arrangements. Even the

controlling ministries are different in some cases. We are using Special Forces more

and more frequently. Situations like Maldives, hijacking of Indian Airlines aircraft to

Kandahar, Akshardam temple, attack on parliament, eliminating terrorist camps in

Pakistan/Bangladesh/Mayanmar with or without permission of respective countries are

definite probabilities. Recent terrorists actions by Chechan rebels in Moscow and

Beslan are pointers to things we should anticipate and prepare for. The army has Para

Commandos and Special Forces battalions and the Parachute Regiment units, the navy

has Marine Naval Commandos (MARCOS), The National Security Guards, a federal

contingency force not to be clubbed with CPOs or PMFs directly under cabinet and

Special Frontier Force and VIKAS units under cabinet secretariat. All these forces

have overlapping responsibilities, different ethos, fierce pride in their outfits,

2

dissimilar training and are controlled by different agencies. There is an imperative

need to evolve a philosophy for tasking, equipping, and training of Joint Special

Forces in the interest of optimal utilization and enhancement of operational efficiency

as all types of war, be it conventional or unconventional , has to be fought jointly.

HISTORY

“When the hour of crisis comes, remember the forty

selected men can shake the world”

- Yasotay

Mongolian Warlord

One of the earliest recorded examples of a conventional army beset by

difficulties imposed by bands of special purpose forces was during Alexander the

Great’s march through Afghanistan on his way to India. Ancestors of today’s

Mujahideen harried his rear from horseback, while others attacked him from the

heights. Alexander countered by employing many of the same counter SF

principles that hold true today—the employment of specially skilled, mobile light

infantrymen. Alexander recruited and trained volunteer troops with mountain

climbing experience who scaled the mountain peaks at night to surprise and

defeat those irregular forces. Further, Alexander recruited the defeated

irregulars and added them to his army, frequently to be used against the next

irregulars encountered.

The need for commandos was seen early in World War II, first by the German and

British. The United States formed six battalions of U S Army Rangers as well as

additional battalions of Marine Raids, Navy Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT)

3

and such units as Merrill’s Marauders in the Far East. The Germans formed their

Brandenburg Regiment and the British formed several different commando units: the

Special Air Services (SAS), Special Boat Squadron (SBS), Long Desert Petrol, and so

on.

Wingate’s Chindits operations in Burma campaign is part of the folklore. However

everybody was not convinced about the pay off of such operations. In Defeat into

Victory, Field Marshall Sir William J. Slim concluded that most special units are

wasteful and have more disadvantages than advantages. He believed there was one

type of special unit that should become an essential component of any modern army.

This special unit is one that operates deep behind enemy lines, whose purpose is to

disrupt the enemy, to collect information, to work with indigenous people, to sabotage

enemy installations, to assassinate enemy commanders. The troops who made up this

unit would require many qualities and skills not expected in the ordinary soldier and

would use many methods beyond his capacity. Field Marshal Slim felt they could

achieve strategic results if handled with imaginative ruthlessness.

Indian Scenario.

India first formed a commando force, composed largely of Tibetan exiles, after getting

the worst of it in a 1962 border war with China. As relations improved with China

over the years, the “Special Frontier Force”(SFF) switched from its original mission of

stirring up guerilla operations inside China, to counter-terrorism. Size (about 10,000

troops) and organization (six battalions, each of six 123 man companies plus a

headquarters) of the units has not changed much in 40 years. Training is still rigorous,

but there are fewer Tibetans in the unit now. There is also a para –commando

battalion, used as a quick reaction force. A small (about a hundred men) National

Security Guards force is organized and trained to deal with hostage situations. A very

competent outfit. There are 1200 Marine Commandos, who sought assistance from

British Royal Marine Commandos and U.S. SEALS to set up their training program.

[ Courtesy www.strategyPage.com ]

During the 1965 Indo-Pak War, an ad hoc commando unit comprised of volunteers

from various infantry regiments was organized by Lieutenant Colonel Megh Singh of

4

the Brigade of the Guards. The unit was nicknamed, Meghdoot Force, and performed

well in combat. Thus in June 1966, the Government authorised the Parachute

Regiment to form a permanent commando unit. Known as the 9th Battalion, it was

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Megh Singh and he used members from the

Meghdoot Force as its backbone. In June 1967 elements of the 9th Battalion, were

taken to form a second commando unit, designated as 10th Battalion, at Gwalior. In

1969, these battalions were renamed as the 9 and 10 Para Commando battalions.

Para Commandos had their first taste of combat in the 1971 Indo-Pak War where they

performed gallantly. The Nine Para Commando saw action through a daring raid on a

Pakistani gun position at Mandhol. This raid resulted in the destruction of six 122mm

guns belonging to the Pakistan Army's 172 Independent Battery. Apart from the

destruction of guns, ammunition and other vital equipment, the Pakistanis suffered 37

killed, 41 wounded and a great loss of face. This raid won the Nine Para Commando

the Battle Honour of Mandhol. The 10 Para Commando was baptised in combat with

successful raids on enemy posts at Chachro and Virawah, under Maharaja Bhawani

Singh who won a Maha Vir Chakra for these daring raids.

The late 1980s saw the Para Commandos in action in Sri Lanka. However, lack of

proper planning by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and insufficient

intelligence on the LTTE's whereabouts, led the initial heli-borne assault on 11

October 1987 to be a tragic failure. Six Para Commandos lost their lives in that ill-

fated mission.

With the capture of Maldives, an island-nation of the coast of south-western India on

03 November 1988 by PLOTE mercenaries, the Para Commandos were once again

called into action. 10 Para Commando along with the 6 Para flew in on 04 November

1988 in a fleet of IL-76s, An-32s and An-12 transport aircrafts. Later that morning,

Mi-8 helicopters were used to fly the 10 Para Commando to the outlying islands to

search for escaping mercenaries. Operation Cactus, as it was called, was successful

and ended without any loss of life for 10 Para Commando the other Indian troops.

Since the mid-90s the role of Para Commandos as a counter terrorist force has

increased substantially. [Courtesy www.bharat-rakshak.com ]

5

OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

“It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the

strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done better.

The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is

marred by the dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs

and comes short again and again; who knows the great enthusiasms, the

great devotions and spends himself in a worthy course; who at the best,

knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at worst, if

he fails, at least fails while daring greatly; so that his place shall never be

with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory or defeat.”

---Theodore Roosevelt (Paris Sorbonne, 1910)

Special Operations are defined as operations conducted by specially trained, equipped

and organised forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military,

political, economic or psychological objectives. These operations may be conducted

during periods of peace or hostilities. They may support conventional operations, or

they may be undertaken independently when the use of conventional forces is either

inappropriate or infeasible. In this regard it is worth pointing out that special

operations, usually carried out by specially formed units or teams are tactical military

operations, very often with the aim of achieving a disproportionate strategic outcome

of a campaign.

SOF Attributes . Seven attributes describe what SOF will need to develop, preserve

or enhance in order to fulfill the SOF vision and mission of the future .They are :-

Precision Strike and Effects.

Tailored and Integrated Operations.

6

Ubiquitous Access.

Regional Expertise, Presence and Influence.

C4ISR Dominance.

Decision Support.

Communications / Data Exchange.

Disruption and Denial.

Agile and Unconventional Logistics.

Force Protection and Survivability.

Enduring Truths . Four truths remain the cornerstone shaping the development of

special operations capabilities:-

Humans are more important than hardware. The special operations soldier,

sailor, or airman is the most critical component of any special operations

capability.

Quality is better than quantity. A small number of people, carefully selected,

well trained, and well led, are preferable to larger numbers of troops, some of

whom may not be up to the task.

SOF cannot be mass-produced. There is no easy formula for creating special

operations personnel. Experience - a key element of special operations

capability - can only be produced over time.

Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur. Time is perhaps the

most critical element involved in the creation of competent SOF: time to select,

assess, train and educate personnel; and time to gain the experience necessary to

perform operations with a reasonable assurance of success. Since competent

forces cannot be created instantly, decision-makers must plan ahead to create

forces that are sufficient in size, capability and speed of response.

Operational Mission Criteria. The employment of SOF in support of the joint

force campaign or operation plan is facilitated by five basic criteria. These criteria

7

provide guidelines for both conventional and SOF commanders and planners to use

when considering the employment of SOF.The criterias are :-

Is this an appropriate SOF mission?

Does the mission support the overall joint campaign or operation plan?

Is the mission operationally feasible?

Are required resources available to execute the mission?

Does the expected outcome of the mission justify the risk?

Characteristics of Special Operations . The various characteristics of Special

Operation are:-

Special Operations normally require operator-level planning and detailed

intelligence.

Knowledge of the culture(s) and languages of the geographical area in

which the mission is to be conducted.

Rigorous training and rehearsals of the mission are integral to the success

of the mission.

They are often conducted at great distances from the supporting

operational bases.

They may employ sophisticated communications systems.

They frequently require discriminate and precise use of force. This often

requires development, acquisition, and employment of equipment not standard

for other forces.

They employ sophisticated means of insertion, support, and extraction to

penetrate and successfully return from hostile denied, or politically sensitive

areas.

8

Characteristics of Special Operations Forces (SOF)

SOF are unique because they provide the government a broad range of capabilities.

The demands of SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them from

conventional forces :-

SOF personnel undergo careful selection processes or mission-specific

training beyond basic military skills. These programs make unlikely any rapid

replacement or generation of personnel or capabilities.

SOF personnel maintain a high level of competency in more than one

military specialty. Selected SOF are regionally oriented for employment; cross

cultural communications skills are a routine part of training. (Under most

circumstances, SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces, but a

necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities.)

SOF operations are frequently clandestine in nature to ensure mission

success. Much of the equipment used by SOF has been designed or modified

to meet specific operational requirements. As such, SOF equipment is often

delivered in small quantities and is difficult and costly to repair and replace.

SOF maintain a very high level of pre-conflict readiness, and are often the first

echelon of any commitment of Forces. This emphasized the importance of

joint, collective training tailored to achieve and maintain mission capabilities.

SOF Capabilities . SOF can be formed into versatile, self-contained teams that

provide a force commander with an extremely flexible force capable of operating in

ambiguous and swiftly changing scenarios. They can :-

Be task-organized quickly and deployed rapidly to provide tailored responses to

many different situations.

Gain access to hostile or denied areas.

Provide limited medical support for themselves and those they support.

Communicate worldwide with organic equipment.

Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments without extensive support.

9

Survey and assess local situations and report these assessments rapidly.

Work closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations.

Organize people into working teams to help solve local problems.

Deploy with a generally lower profile and less intrusive presence than larger

conventional forces.

Provide unconventional options for addressing ambiguous situations.

SOF Limitations . Improper employment of SOF could result in the depletion of

forces. SOF require a long lead-time to be effectively fielded. SOF cannot be quickly

replaced/reconstituted nor can their capabilities be rapidly expanded. Improper

employment of own resources in purely conventional roles or on

inappropriate/inordinately high-risk missions runs the risk of depleting these resources

rapidly. SOF should normally be employed against targets with strategic or

operational relevance. Such employment is congruent with the use of limited SOF

resources.

SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces. In most cases SOF are neither trained

nor equipped to conduct sustained conventional combat operations, and therefore

should not be substituted for conventional units that are able to effectively execute that

mission. SOF logistic support is austere. A large number of SOF units generally

cannot maintain themselves for extended periods of time without significant support

from a conventional support structure.

Furthermore, in the cases were SF’s have been used as counter-terrorist forces, a

‘shoot-to-kill’ policy has often been used (the SAS in Northern Ireland is a good

example of this). In addition to potentially criminalise a soldier, that is a policy that

could also undermine government’s claim as upholder of law and order, something

that in the long run can affect society adversely. These two contrasting positions are

not mutually exclusive. Rather, it is important to bear this dichotomy in mind when

looking at the role of SF.

10

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PRINCIPAL MISSIONS

First break down the wall that has more or less come between special

operations forces and the other parts of the military……second,

educate the best of the military; spread a recognition and an

understanding what you do, why you do it, and how important it is that

you do it. Last integrate your effects into the full spectrum of our

military capacity.

- Admiral William J Crowe, Jr

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA

Nine activities have been designated as Special Operations Principal Missions. These

are: Direct Action (DA), Combating Terrorism (CBT), Foreign Internal Defense

(FID), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Psychological

Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA), Information Operations (IO), and Counter

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CP). SOF are organized, trained, and

equipped specifically to accomplish these nine tasks. In our context Unconventional

Warfare and Combating Terrorism takes overriding importance for SOF.

Counter - Terrorism . The newest, and perhaps most dramatic, area of SF activity

is counter-terrorism. It is also one of the most controversial. Three basic tasks are

involved here; surveillance [of terrorists], interdiction and arrests (which also could

include killings) and rescuing of hostages. SOF’s today are among the most engaged

in operations worldwide.

Unconventional Warfare (UW)

11

Unconventional Warfare (UW) was the mission for which Special Forces was

founded. While since that time its employment has been limited and largely

surrogate, it remains a large part of the essence of Special Forces, having major

and important identity, psychological and training impacts. While other

organizations may, at different locations and levels of effort, have roles within

the board boundaries of Special Forces’ other operational missions, UW

remains uniquely Special Forces. It is the soul of Special Forces: the willingness

to accept its isolation and hardships defines the Special Forces soldier. Its

training is both the keystone and standard of Special Forces Training: it has long

been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations,

that “If you can do the UW missions, you can do all others.” The objective of

UW and Special Forces’ dedication to it is expressed in Special Forces’ motto:

De Oppresso Liber.

- Robert M. Gates, Remarks at dedication of OSS Memorial.

UW includes guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, evasion

and escape, and other activities of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. When

UW is conducted independently during conflict or war, its primary focus is on

political and psychological objectives. When UW operations support conventional

military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives.

UW Doctrine . The Special Forces must address the following in its doctrine for

Unconventional Warfare:-

Intelligence activities must be given maximum importance with an emphasis on

HUMINT collection in a Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

environment.

Employment of subversion and sabotage.

Support to insurgencies.

Guerilla Warfare aspects including weaponization technological developments.

It will continue to have some relevance for some time to come.

12

UW Characteristics.

Long duration.

Little or no logical support.

Usually exposed to harsher environment conditions and physically demanding.

Operation conducted in hostile area.

Constantly working/living with indigenous populace, operations conducted “by

with and through indigenous personnel”.

Greater ambiguity, flexibility is paramount.

Influenced felt from several external sources.

No “cookie cutter” panacea.

Necessity for sensitivity to the indigenous cultural.

Cross cultural communication and language skills are essential.

Higher level of independent action and decision making.

Multi-dimensional battlefields call for a multi-framed & mentally flexible

thinker.

High level of risk for personal physical harm.

Trend is that in conventional war, victory depends on defeating the

enemy’s armed forces in battle while in UW, it tends to depend less

on victory on the battlefield, and more on disabling the enemy’s

operational system and depriving him of popular support. This is

perhaps most clearly and poignantly illustrated in the now famous

conversation between Harry Summers and a North Vietnamese

counterpart:

“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the

American Colonel.

13

The North Vietnamese Colonel pondered this remark a moment.

“That may be so,” he replied “but it is also irrelevant”.

That UW requires a more indirect solution than conventional conflicts

is almost universally reflected in all the literature available. Andrew

Krepinevich, in discussing guerrilla warfare as it pertains to

insurgency, states: “In conventional wars, strategy prescribes the

conquest of the enemy’s territory, yet this seldom occurs prior to the

destruction of the enemy’s armed forces in battle. These rules do not

apply, however, against an enemy who refuses to fight for territory. In

an insurgency, the way to destroy the insurgent is to attack him at

the source of his strength: the population”.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FORCES

“In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems dispersed and largely undefined;

the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will

be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The

distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear. Actions will occur

concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural,

not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed

communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their

vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of

government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as

manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint

operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred.”

William S. Lind, et al

The Changing Face of War

Into the Fourth Generation, 1989

14

Special Operations Forces are often tasked by political leaders and monitored at the

national level. These operations cross all services and need detailed planning and

rapid coordination with other commands, services, and governments agencies.

Because of the nature of the missions, joint ground, air, and maritime assets must

communicate quickly and efficiently. Therefore, a common, responsive command and

control network is needed that interconnects the various commands, and government

agencies. In all cases, commanders exercising command authority over SOF should:-

Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command.

Avoid frequent transfer of SOF between commanders.

Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and

support the operations.

Integrate SOF in the planning process.

Match unit capabilities with mission requirements.

Given the sensitivity and significance of their mission, Special Operations Forces

chains of command are understandably abbreviated. SOF needs a clear and

unambiguous Command & Control (C2) structure. Unnecessary layering of

headquarters decreases responsiveness and compromises security. The mission,

duration and scope of operations, security consideration, signals capabilities and the

desired degree of control over special operations determine SOF command

relationship. SOF commanders must be familiar with dealing with joint organizations

and other services as well as our organization of national security like Cabinet

Committee of Security, National Crisis Management Committee and Ministry of

Home Affairs.

SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan (war or

MOOTW). Successful execution of SO requires clear, responsive Command and

Control (C2) by an appropriate SOF C2 element. The limited window of opportunity

normally associated with the majority of SOF missions, as well as the sensitive nature

of many of these missions, requires a C2 structure that is, above all, responsive to the

needs of the operational unit. SOF C2 may be tailored for a specific mission or

15

operation. Liaison between all components of the joint force and SOF, wherever

assigned, is vital for effective employment of SOF as well as the prevention of

fratricide.

In recent times the international terrorists, guerrillas insurgents, drug smuggling

cartels, ethnic factions as well an racial and tribal gangs – are all organized like

networks. Although their leadership may be hierarchical. These organizations are

innovative, flexible, exhibit shared goal, focus on core competencies and are difficult

to counter. Perhaps the reason that military institutions are having difficulty in Low

Intensity Conflicts is because they are not meant to be fought by institutions. The

lesson is – institution can he defeated by networks. It may take networks to counter

networks. One of the reasons why Special Forces are remarkably successful in

operations in LICO is that their organization has eliminated numbers of layers and is

in the lines of networked organization.

Special Operation Force Structure

A model of the Special Forces organization of the US Armed Forces may be looked at.

United States special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was established as a unified

combatant command and commanded by a four star General. All SOF of the Army,

Navy and air force based in the United States are placed under him. The

organizational tree of USSOCOM is given at Appendix “A”.

Each of the theater Unified geographical commands have established a separate

Special Operations Command (SOC) to meet its theater specific operation

requirement. Theater SOC normally exercises operational control of SOF within each

geographic commander in chief’s area of responsibility.

Indian Context

“Our nation needs SFs, which are not merely better infantry or naval or air units, but

are structured comprehensively for as full spectrum capability, trained and ready for

victory, or, in other words – a total force of quality officers and soldiers, Like any

other country, India must decide the right type, quantity and quality of the SF it wants,

after conducting an in depth study relating to the likely threats to nation, how they are

16

to be tackled, the changing nature of war and conflict, impact of technology, the likely

roles for the SF and other operational requirements for them. As the SFs expand, the

specialized troops are likely to be confronted by several challenges. They would have

to learn to integrate seamlessly with conventional forces, civil authorities and even

international agencies.” Said Pranab Mukherjee, Defence Minister while inaugurating

a seminar on Special Forces organized by Centre for Land Warfare Studies(CLAWS).

Present Special Forces assets and their C2 arrangements are as under :-

• Para SF units under respective commands.

• Para Brigade for out of area contingencies under Army HQ.

• NSG under MHA.

• 4 VIKAS (special group) under cabinet secretariat. Provides muscle to RAW.

• Aviation Research Cell and SFF under cabinet secretariat.

• MARCOS under Navy.

Drawbacks of present system are:-

• Org not conducive to conduct strategic special operations.

• Compartmentalised functioning.

• No coordination of intelligence & resources at the highest level. Intelligence void.

• Lack of jointmanship.

• Special operations are being conducted at theatre level & are personality based.

• Continued commitment in CI ops.

• Manning & equipment profile of units are different.

• Outdated technology

• Lack of fast track equipment procurement process.

• Non incorporation of SOF commanders in planning process.

• Non availability of dedicated Special Air Transportation Squadron.

A re-organisation of Indian Armed Forces based on recommendations of Group of

Ministers Report after the Kargil Conflict has started. However, except Andaman and

Nicobar Command (ANC) there is no unified geographical Command. The Chief of

17

Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)

has been appointed and HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) has been created.

The Operation Branch of HQ IDS looks after Out of Area Contingences (OOAC),

Disaster Management, C4I2 and nuclear issues. IDS have also branches looking after

joint training, joint doctrine and intelligence. In fact various service intelligence

directorates are being coordinated by DG, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) who

also functions as Deputy Chief of Integreted Defence Staff (DCIDS), Intelligence.

Since the strength of Special Forces under Army, Navy and NSG are not balanced and

there is no unified command except ANC, establishment of a Special Forces

Command is not recommended. However a Special Operations Force branch may be

raised with Operations branch of CIDS. A suggested joint SOF organization is given

at Appendix B.

Since SF operations are planned and cleared at the highest level it would be prudent to

place all Joint Operations Forces under CIDS. Though individual characteristics and

eliteness specific to each type of forces would not be interfered, however, integration

of all the services, intelligence, interaction with MOD or CCS would be easier. In case

of Disaster Management CIDS is now co-coordinating all the activities as an

institutional mechanism is in place now. Similarly SF operations also can be

coordinated by CIDS.

Since all future operations are going to be joint, Special Operation Forces branch of

CIDS may be responsible for the following:-

Readiness of assigned forces and monitoring the readiness of SOF.

Monitoring the professional development of all SOF personnel.

Developing joint SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Conducting specialized courses of instruction.

Training assigned forces.

Executing its own program and budget.

18

Conducting research, development, and acquisition of Special Operations

peculiar items. Fast track equipment procurement.

Formalise command & control setup for all SF assets.

Dedicated air assets for special ops.

Intelligence to be coordinated and made available at the highest level for spec

ops.

Air Force. Indian Air Force does not have Special Forces per se, however, it has the

most important role in transportation or insertion of Special Forces, Search and Rescue

mission, Fire Support, reconnaissance, intelligence and host of other activities.

Earmarking of resources, close integration between components of other SOFs and air

crews are must before undertaking any Special Missions as time would be of

paramount importance. Our inability to block hijacked Indian airlines aircraft at Raja

Sansi Airport in Amritsar is an example of how important is the time factor.

LESSONS LEARNT

We are preparing for the war we want to fight…not for the conflicts we cannot

avoid..avoid.”

No matter how hard we try to take our world with us, we will still find that we

tsometimes must fight the enemy on his sground, by his rules. ground, by

t -- Ralph Peters Ralph Peters

Lessons learnt by SOF over the last two decades and demonstrated in Afghanistan and

Iraq provide some signposts for future forces. The lessons are:-

Lesson One . You don’t know what you need until you need it. A wide range of

capabilities in effective quantities is a good hedge against tomorrow’s threat.

Lesson Two . Network-distributed may be more effective than network-centric

warfare. The best way to speed up the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop

is to shorten it by getting it into the field.

19

Lesson Three . Interoperability comes by interoperating regularly, routinely, and

often. No royal road exists.

Lesson Four . Existing forces are nothing more than tools to provide the

commander with combat capability. This capability and the ability to employ it

are what matters- not the specific tool.

Lesson Five . The “tooth to tail” ratio may no longer be a relevant measure of

merit because it draws an artificial distinction between integral elements of

combat power.

Lesson Six . Human beings are more important than hardware.

The final lesson From the war in Afghanistan may be that the revolution in

military affairs has already happened.

The success of Perfect soldier in Afghanistan was due to the following new

developments:-

Revolution in air war control. AWACs made Bombers to be over Afghanistan

24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Well trained commandos. Experience and battle tested Special Forces troops.

Smarter Bombs.

More accurate reconnaissance Drones, JSTARS.

Satellite communications.

SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS

20

“Don’t ever take a chance you don’t have to.”

- Major Robert Rogers

Standing Order #5, Rogers’ Rangers, 1759

.

Fourth Generation Warfare. It is based on the assumption that the nation-state

societies of the world will be violently challenged and eventually thrown into chaos.

The fighting will not be limited to nation-state relationship, the opposing forces will be

divided by race, religion or class. Fighting such a conflict could be barefoot peasants

fighting for a better way of life to a religious extremists fighting for their God. They

will be less organized and poorly equipped but may be more willing to die for their

cause than the uniformed professional of a nation-state.

The emergence of these loose-knit, lightly armed organizations with flexible and

decentralized command and control call for a shift in tactics. Guerilla tactics may begin

with targets of terror and not what we might define as legitimate military targets.

Attacks in fourth generation will be much more fluid, shifting across the spectrum of

military, political, informational and economic operations.

There seem to be some very distinct characteristics that we have not experienced in any

recent wars or even in times before the nation state was identified as the sovereign

entity. Some of these characteristics may have been present in historical examples, but

taken together, they amount to a new breed of war, Fourth Generation Warfare, has the

following characteristics:-

• Global (not just isolated or even regional) threat.

• Loose-knit cellular organizations of self-generating action groups.

• Strong religious, moral, and/or ethnic convictions on the part of action groups.

• Vulnerable open-societies with even more vulnerable economic targets.

• State sponsorship of or acquiescence to terrorist cells (funding, facilities,

sanctuary).

21

• Wide use of the media by groups to influence public opinion and obtain recruits.

• Terror is the tool of choice.

• Access to latest high-tech weaponry available on world market.

Special Forces are the best organized, trained and equipped to fight this type of war.

However, the strength of the Forces have to be increased substantially, including

recruitment, training, organizing, equipping and keeping them constantly updated about

any future roles.

International Law.

Among the issues raised by the customary and conventional international law regulating

war conduct, the following have been particularly important in wars requiring special

operations:-

Denial of quarter and prisoner of war (POW) status and treatment.

Torture and mistreatment of POWs, collective punishment, taking of hostages,

terrorism, outrages against personal dignity, slavery, pillage, and threats to do

these things.

Denial to internees and detainees of reasonable treatment and due process of

law.

Starvation of civilians as a method of combat.

Forced movement of civilians.

Use of chemical-biological weapons.

In any clandestine operations out of the country if the operation fails and SOF

personnel are caught more often than not government would deny knowledge of such

operations. In such cases the welfares of next of kin of such SOF personnel must be

ensured at all costs. The modalities can be worked out.

SOF MANDATES FOR THE FUTURE

22

On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody; On the other

hand, you have to feed somebody. On the other hand, you have to

build an economy, restructure the infrastructure, build the political

system. And there's some poor lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier

general down there, stuck in some province with all that saddled

onto him, with NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and political

wannabes running around, with factions and a culture he doesn't

understand. These are now culture wars that we're involved in. We

don't understand that culture.

Gen Tony Zinni, Forum 2003. 4 Sept 03 .

A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change.

Guided by a comprehensive, enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly

reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team. As the

president of AT&T once said, "When the pace of change outside an organization

becomes greater than the pace of change inside the organization, the end is near.”

SOF must focus on emerging threats that either exceed the capabilities of conventional

forces or can be dealt with better by small, highly specialized units. We must carefully

assess those threats and, as appropriate, provide an effective solution through strategic

planning, resourcing, acquisition and operational support initiatives. As important, we

must identify those missions no longer relevant for SOF and recommend shifting these

missions to our conventional forces in order to better focus resources on critical

special operations activities. SOF must be a full-spectrum, multimission force --

providing a comprehensive set of capabilities to the nation. This means that we must

swiftly adapt to diverse and evolving threats from our neighboring countries and

prepare for Out of Area Contingencies.

We must continue to operate effectively in joint, combined and interagency

environments, yet must transcend these traditional parameters to fuse all of our

23

political, military, economic, intellectual, technical and cultural strengths into a

comprehensive approach to future challenges. This will allow SOF to tap into such

diverse areas as commercial information technologies, utilization of space,

biomedicine, environmental science, robotics, organizational design and commercial

research and development.

We must also have the intellectual agility to conceptualize creative and useful

solutions to ambiguous problems and provide a coherent set of choices to the

supported commander or joint force commander. This means training and educating

people how to think, not just what to think. SOF must examine every advantage our

technological genius can supply and selectively exploit those few required for success.

We must be quick to capitalize on emerging technologies with the potential for

significantly enhancing the human dimension, especially low-observable/masking

technologies, smarter weapons, long-range precision capability and information

technologies. Merging technology with the human dimension will improve the SOF

warrior's survivability, lethality, mobility and ability to access and use all relevant

information sources.

We must also recognize that the benefits of technological change cannot be fully

realized until they are incorporated into new organizational forms. SOF organizational

innovation is as important as innovation in weapon systems. Replacing technology

without replacing old structures will not work. Most importantly, we must remember

that the purpose of technology is to equip the man, not simply to man the equipment.

SOF people are at the heart of all special operations; platforms and equipment merely

help them accomplish the mission. The fingers on our future triggers still must be

controlled by willing warriors of courage, compassion and judgment -- individuals of

character with strong legal, moral and ethical foundation -- organized into dynamic

and agile joint SOF teams. As we move into the 21st century, we are evolving to meet

future challenges. We have to lead this change by transitioning from a traditional

military staff to an Information Age staff that is matrix-shaped around core functions,

more flexible and better postured to resource and support global SOF requirements.

24

CONCLUSION

If you wish for peace, understand war—particularly the guerrilla

and subversive forms of war.

— Liddell Hart

Special operations forces are particularly suited for many emerging missions which

flow from the National Security Strategy. Many of these missions require traditional

SOF capabilities, while others, such as counter proliferation, information warfare and

psychological warfare are relatively new and are the subject of developing SOF

doctrine. In order to be as effective as possible, SOF face two major challenges: they

must integrate—with conventional forces and other government agencies yet they

must preserve the autonomy necessary to protect and encourage the unconventional

approach that is the soul of special operations. This flexibility will facilitate meeting

the other major challenges of the future. SOF’s language capability, regional and

cultural orientation will continue to make them a peacetime force of choice that is

mature, discrete, low profile, and effective. Because of its low-cost/high-payback

ratio, SOF will continue to be called upon as the nation seeks to promote stability and

thwart aggression.

Faced with an increasingly volatile world, and diminishing resources, SOF will

provide access and promote stability with an affordable, yet effective, force for

implementing national strategies. When national interests are faced with unpredictable

threats, SOF will provide flexible and precise, lethal and non lethal options to the

government. SOF will provide core competencies not available anywhere else in the

military.

Reorganisation and training of Special Forces units in Indian Army are rightfully

drawing lot of attention including media. Recently in an article in Outlook Lieutenant

General RK Nanavatty, a former Northern Army Commander had been quoted as

saying “Our present Special Forces battalions arguably are the best type of infantry

units of the Army. They are robust, motivated and well-led, but despite their title, they

25

are not Special Forces and are not capable of special operations which are distinct

from special missions, commando operations and specialised operations”. In the same

article Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, a former Vice Chief of Army Staff has been

quoted as saying, “Club all our so called Special Forces units – be it the Army, Navy,

Air Force, National Security Guards and the Special Group – and we have more

manpower than what the Americans have and yet we don’t have a tenth of their

capabilities”.

Like the special operations forces of yesteryear, today's special operators face unusual

challenges. Our special operations forces must adjust to the nontraditional challenges

we face today and, at the same time, help transform our combat capabilities and

support structures to be able to shape the environment and respond effectively in the

face of future challenges.

APPENDIX-A

26

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND(USSOCOM)

APPENDIX - B

27

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY OFDEFENSE

U.S. SOUTHERNCOMMAND

U.S. NORTHERNCOMMAND

U.S. CENTRALCOMMAND

U.S. PACIFICCOMMAND

U.S. EUROPEANCOMMAND

U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

U.S. SPECIAL OPS COMMAND

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

U.S. TRANSPORTATION

COMMAND

SERVICE CHIEFS

CJCS

RECOMMENDED COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM AT THE SERVICES LEVEL

Addl DG (Special Ops) Joint Director (Special Air Ops) Deputy Director Under DGMO Under ACAS (Ops) Naval Special Ops Under DNO

* Special Operation Cell at every operational Command HQs incl ANC .Cell to be

established in all geographical Commands of Army, Navy and AF.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Joint Special Operations Committee(CIDS)

28

Jt Secretary

Cabinet Secretariat

DG NSG

1. James F Dunnigan, The Perfect Soldier, Citadel Press, NY 10022, 2003.

2. John M Collins, Special Operation Forces, An Assessment,

National Defense University Press, Washington DC, October,

1996.

3. Col John Jogerset, What’s so Special About Special Operation?

Lesson from the War in Afghanistan, Aerospace Power Journal,

Summer 2002.

4. Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,

5. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedure

for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 19

December 2001, U.S.A.

6. Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Psychological Operations.

7. U.S. Army Doctrine for Special Operations Forces, Field Manual

FM 100-25.

8. United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement,

2003-2004.

9. Special Operations Forces Performance Manual, January, 1998.

10. HQ Integrated Defence Staff, Report on the First Year Existence

by the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman Chief of Staff

Committee, available at www. ids.nic.in/research.htm.

11. Charles J Dunlop Jr, Special Operations Forces after Kosovo,

Joint Force Quarterly, Spring/Summer 2001

12. Wayne A Downing, Joint Special Operations in Peace and War,

Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1996.

13. John M Collins, Special Operations Forces in Peace time, Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999.

29

14. Pranab Assures Funds for Special Forces Modernisation, The Hindu, New Delhi, 30 November 2004.

15. Saikat Datta, Special Forces Circus, Outlook, 8 November 04, pp24-25.

16. Stephen Biddle, Special forces and the Future of War, Strategic Studies institute, US Army War College, 24 May 2004.

BRIEF OF BIO DATA.

A graduate of Electronics and Tele Communication Engineering from Bengal

Engineering College. Shibpur Col P K Mallick was commissioned in the Corps of

Signals. The officer has served in almost all types of signal units and has varied

experience in LICO Ops in Punjab, Assam and the Valley. The officer has done M Tech

from IIT, Kharagpur and is a graduate of Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He

was DAQMG of a division in Valley. He has been instructor Class A at MCTE, Mhow.

The officer commanded an Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment (AREN) in OP VIJAY

and OP PARAKRAM in Western Command. After attending Long Defence

Management Course at College of Defence Management, Secunderabad he is now posted

at Headquarters Eastern Command. A winner of COAS Gold Medal Essay Competition,

the officer contributes regularly in service related journals.

30