Soviet Military Power 1983

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SOVIET MILITARY POWERFint Edit'on

SSeptember 1981SOVIET MILITARY POWER

Second EditionMarch 1983

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.70CONTENTS oI SOVIE M19rJTRY fOWEJ~j ................................... 5"imf ITRATEGIC. fORCIS- .13

f e feo foo o oee0 0o00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o o o Go e s o o0-1 1 THIEATER FORCES) ......... .......o.3Western Theater ..... ............... o ......... .... 35Southern Theater . . ................ .......... o. ...... ..... 48Far Eastern Theater ... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51General Naval Forcee ............... . ................... . 55NATO/Warsaw Pact ................ o........ o................ o62V SOVIET SPACE S.YSTEMI!.o....o ...... 65

"*V RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY.o................... 71Y-I TSIE CrWER . . . .......... C oo....... o ......@ @.8 101

This dooument has been approvedfor publi release and sale; It#distribution. is unlimite.L

Th e illustrations of new Soviet weapons systems introducing eachchapter are deriv*d frorm various US sources; while no t precise Inevery detail, they are as aithentic as posible. LECr /aontalls qOop A16P1ates: All I)TIC reProduer,,,i ,B

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PREFACE"There is nothing hypothetical about the Soviet military machine. Its expansion, mod-ernization, and contribution to projection of power beyond Soviet boundaries are obvious. A

clear understanding of Soviet Armed Forces, their doctrine, their capabilities, their strengths,and their weaknesses is essential to the shaping and maintenance of effective US and Alliedarmed forces."Those words from Soviet Military Power, published in September 1981, provide a fittingpoint of departure for this updated second edition. Soviet MilitaryPower1983 reports on thesize, capabilities, and deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces -and documents the improve-ments and the R& D which are shaping the increased capabilities of the Soviet StrategicRocket Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and theNavy--forces numbering more than 4.9 million men.Since late 1981:0 The USSR has begun test flights of two new land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Mis-siles, while continuing modernization of the deployed SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBM force.T*The USSR has begun test flights of a new generation of strategic, manned bombers--theBLACKJACK bomber, larger than the US B-1." The USSR has beguui test flights of a new generation of ground-, sea- and air-launchedcruise missiles, missiles with nuclear capability with ranges in excess of 1,600 kilometers, sig-nificantly expanding the flexibility of Soviet strategic options.* The first of the USSR's 25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class strategic ballistic missile subma-rines ha s test fired its MIRVed, nuclear-warhead, 8,300-kilometer-range, submarine-launch-ed ballistic missiles. A second TYPHOON has been launched.* Modernization and forward deployment of increasing numbers of Soviet intermediatenuclear forces--land, sea, and air-have proceeded at an unparalleled pace.

0 More than 330 mobile launchers for the SS-20--a Longer-Range Intermediate-RangeNuclear Force (LRINF) missile with three nuclear warheads and reloads for each launcher-are now arrayed against Western Europe, the Middle East, parts of Africa, and most of Asia,including China and Japan.* Su-24/FENCER ground-attack aircraft have been forward-deployed to nations of East-ern Europe and to border bases in Asia, extending the combat radius of these new nuclear-capable aircraft to include Japan and most of NATO Europe.* The USSR has introduced additional nuclear-capable weapons systems to its forward-de-ployed divisions in Eastern Europe. The new SS-21 mobile, short-range ballistic missile systemis operational in Eastern Europe as is the 152-mm self-propelled gun, adding to Soviet con-ventional, chemical, and nuclear war-fighting options. The USSR's T-80 main battle tank, in development in 1981, is in the field with SovietTank Divisions in both the USSR and Eastern Europe, adding to the extended combat capa-bilities of the more than 190 Soviet ground force divisions.* In 1981, two Soviet KIEV-Class aircraft carriers were operational. Now, three units are onthe high seas; a fourth unit has been launched; and development continues on a newer, largerclass of aircraft carriers.

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* In shipyards on the Baltic and Black Seas, series production continues on four new classesof surface warships-- a new generation of nuclear- and conventionally powered Soviet cruisersand guided missile destroyers enhancing the Soviet Navy's air defense, antisubmarine war-fare, and cruise-misile, surface-strike capabilities.0 Five Soviet shipyards have continued to produce new attack submarines fo r the world'slargest submarine force. In 1980, the first of the new, extremely large OSCAR-Class guidedmissile submarines was launched, a submarine capable of firing up to 24 long-range antishipcruise missiles while submerged. That lead unit is no w on sea trials, and a second unit hasbeen launched.a The USSR's military-related space program ha s grown in manned missions, more recon-naissance/surveillance/targeting satellites and antisatellite space systems.0 The USSR's combat operations have continued to expand in Afghanistan, and now in-volve more than 105,000 Soviet troops with some of the newest Soviet weapons.0 From Indochina to the Caribbean, the USSR has continued to expand its global militarylpresence. To cite just one example, a Soviet Navy task force operated in the Caribbean andGulf of Mexico from November 1982 to February 1985.* Expansion of the USSR's technology and industrial production base has matched thegrowth and deployment of its armed forces, reflecting a top priority investment in defenseproduction aided by continuing acquisition of Western technology.0 Despite economic difficulties, the USSR allocates an estimated 15 percent of GNP to itsmilitary buildup, an increase from the 12-to-14 percent reported in 1981, which in turn repre-sents a continuance of the trend of the last 21 years.To place this modernization and growth of the USSR's Armed Forces in perspective, Soviet

MilitaryPower 1983 includes substantial data on US and Allied forces enhancement as wellas some comparative US-USSR and NATO-Warsaw Pact tables. Comprehensive informationon US forces, of course, is regularly made available to the public in such publications as theSecretary of Defense's Annual Report and the MilitaryPostureStatement of the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ours is a free society; the Soviet Union is not. The updated factspresented in this report leave no doubt as to the USSR's dedication to achieving military su-periority in all fields.

It is our duty to have a full awareness of Soviet military growth, modernization and capabil-ities and to shape our defense forces and our deterrent capabilities accordingly. We can do noless if we are to provide fully and wisely fo r our security, and that of our Allies. Ours isa for-midable task, made more difficult by a decade of our neglect coupled with two decades ofmassive Soviet increases. But, we and our Allies can accomplish the task if we have the will,the courage, and the resolution possessed in ample measure by our predecessors who won ourfreedom, and who have kept it fo r us all. This is at once our most precious heritage and ourmost solemn responsibility to posterity.March 1988 spar Weinber

Lr Secretary of Defens


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The continuing growth and modernization ofthe Soviet military have enabled the SovietUnion to structure and posture its forces for of-fensive use on short notice. Consequently, theneed for the fullest possible information on themission, capabilities and deployment of theSoviet Union's Armed Forces is today greaterthan ever before.

In the nuclear area, the Soviets continue tobuild far greater numbers of missiles and war-heads than are necessary for a credible deter-rent capability. Soviet conventional forces haveincreased offensive capabilities, and the Sovietshave demonstrated detailed plans for the offen-sive use of these forces. Soviet tactical air andmissile forces continue to acquire advancedweapons systems and support systems designedfor the conduct of large-scale air offensives. So-viet ground force modernization, deploymentand training permit rapid and sustained for-ward movement from peacetime locations toobjectives well beyond Soviet/Warsaw Pact bor-ders. At the same time, it is clear from Sovietstrategic planning and operations that its navalships and aircraft are committed to denying op-posing navies use of adjacent seas and conduct-ing strikes against enemy land targets.In September 1981, Soviet Military Powerwas published to make available to peopleeverywhere a factual report on the magnitudeof the Soviet military buildup and the changingcharacter of Soviet military objectives. Thatfirst report:

examined the Soviet and non-SovietWarsaw Pact military industrial base, the

1 I, The new Pushkino Antiba llistic Missile Ra dar-part of the continuing modemization of Sovietmilitary power-provides 360 0 strategic defensecoverage from tho phased array radars n its four-sided structure 120 feet high and 500 feet wide.Silo-launched interceptor misriles contrihute tothis improvedABM defense of Moscow.

" 1 SOVIET MILITARIY POWEl-II 983


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world's largest in facilities and physical different aspect of the current dimensions ofsize; Soviet military power.0 described the organization of Soviet The US-USSR and NATO-Warsaw Pact

Armed Forces, the USSR's strategic comn- charts and tables in the chapters that followmand structure, command and control, help to depict the shift in the military balance.logistic support and combat doctrine; These charts are not all-inclusive. Comprehen-* described the Soviet conventional and sive information on US forces is regularly madenuclear land, sea and air forces available to the people of the United States anddesignated for theater operations; throughout the world in such publications as

reviewed the increasing capabilities the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report andof Soviet strategic forces, including the the Military Posture Statement of the Chair-SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, and the man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Sovietcontinuing modernization of the subma- Union does not make such information avail-rine-launched ballistic missile force; able. Thus, the focus of Soviet Military Power

* described the research and develop- 1983 is on the Soviet Union's Armed Forces.ment effort behind the USSR's drive for Weapons production, for example, is an indi-modem military technology; cator of the shifting balance over the past reported on the USSR's projection of decade. The Soviets have manufactured ap-military power around the world; and proximately 2,000 ICBMs; 54,000 tanks and

* summarized the challenge posed to other armored vehicles; 6,000 tactical combatthe United States and its Allies by the aircraft; 85 surface warships and 61 attack sub-Soviet Armed Forces. marines--with much of this stockpile of materi-

Two fundamentally important considerations al comparable in quality to US counterparthave now led to this updated report, Soviet systems. US production over the same periodMilitary Power 1985. First, the USSR during has been considerably less -approximately 350"the past year has pushed ahead with force ICBMs, 11,000 tanks and other armored vehi-modernization, expansion and forward deploy- cles, 3,000 tactical combat aircraft, 72 surfacement on a scale even larger than before. Sec- warships and 27 attack submarines.ond, the American people and free people In 1982, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-everywhere have continued to seek the most re- tion published NATO and the Warsaw Pact-cent information on Soviet military develop- ForceComparisons, a publication carrying thements, as well as information comparing the conviction and authority of all the NATO na-forces of the Warsaw Pact with forces of the tions that participate in the integrated militaryUnited States and other NATO nations to per- structure of the Alliance. In his foreword,mit a fuller appreciation of the magnitude of NATO Secretary General Joseph M.A.H. Lunsthe Soviet force buildup. Such comparative stated:data are included in this report. "The numerical balance of forces has mov-

The chart, "Soviet Military Forces," on pages ed slowly but steadily in favor of the War-8 and 9 summarizes the size and composition of saw Pact over the past two decades. Duringthe USSR's strategic nuclear forces, ground this period the members of the North At-forces, air forces, air defense forces, and naval lantic Alliance have lost much of the tech-forces. Each chapter in this report develops a nological edge which permitted NATO to


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rely on the view that quality could compen- modernized their sea-based strategic force. Asate for quantity. It is clear that the trend second TYPHOON-Class nuclear-powered bal-is dangerous. Nevertheless, the overall de- listic missile submarine (SSBN) has beenterrent continues to safeguard peace." launched at the Severodvinsk Shipyard, whileNATO-Warsaw Pact comparative data from the first TYPHOON is now with the Northernthis report-data that address the totality of Fleet. Armed with 20 launchers for the MIRV-

Soviet/Pact forces that could be brought to ed SS-NX-20 solid-fueled submarine-launchedbear against NATO in the event of war--are ballistic missile (SLBM), the first submarine ofpresented in the concluding section of Chapter its class should be fully operational by the endIII of this document. of 1983. Moreover, the 8,300 kilometer range ofThe illustrations opening Chapters I and the SS-NX-20 places all of NATO Europe,11-the new ABM radar in the Moscow area North America and Asia well within TY -and the new strategic BLACKJACK bomber - PHOON's reach, even when operating in homedramatize the continuing upgrade of Soviet waters.

strategic force capabilities. Chapter II examines As detailed in Chapter II, the USSR's strate-Soviet strategic force developments in detail. gic defense force is the most massive in theThe third and fourth generations of Soviet world. It includes active defenses such as mod-ICBMs currently deployed and under develop- em interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air mis3ilesment continue to emphasize the missile force (SAMs) and ballistic missile defense (BMD) sys-improvements of more than a decade-greatly tems; and passive defenses such as surveillanceimproved nuclear-warhead accuracy; multiple, and warning systems, hardened bunkers, elec-independently targetable re-entry vehicles tronic countermeasures (ECM) and civil defense.(MIRVs); reliability and survivability. At least In the first edition of Soviet Military Power,two new solid-propellant ICBMs are under de- more than 180 Soviet Ground Force divisionsvelopment; flight testing began in 1982 and azid some 25 0 SS.20 LRINF missile launchers in1983. the field were identified. Today there are overNew, long-range, air-launched cruise missiles 190 Soviet Ground Force divisions and morecurrently under development and the strategic than 330 SS-20 missile launchers positioned forBLACKJACK bomber will significantly enhance delivery of nuclear warheads against Westernthe USSR's strategic offensive capabilities. The Europe, the Middle East, parts of Africa, andBLACKJACK is a variable-geometry-wing- most of Asia including China and Japan. Chap.swing-wing- aircraft similar to, but larger ter III presents an updated review of the full ar-than, the US B-I bomber. It will be capable of ray of Soviet nuclear and conventional theaterlong-range subsonic cruise with supersonic forces and their readiness for deployment in thehigh-altitude dash and subsonic/transonic low- three theaters of operations-the Western,level penetration. This new bomber will likely Southern and Far Eastern Theaters. Thesebe a multiple-role aircraft that can deliver both forces, opposite NATO and arrayed against thefree-fall bombs and air-launched cruise missiles nations of Southwest Asia and East Asia, haveto intercontinental range. It is particularly been further strengthened during 1982 by thesignificant given the weakness of North Ameri- addition of new SS-20 launchers, and by theca n air defense, forward deployment of additional nuclear-cap-At the same time, the Soviets have steadily able weapons systems such as the long-range

7 1 SOVIET MILITARY POWER-1983


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soyBALTIC FLEET NORTHERN FL

TOTAL SHIPS M4NAVAL AVIATION 275______ TOTAL SHIPSNAVAL AVIATIONU NlON*SOVIET WARSAWPACT DIVISIONS I~IIVISIONS

BLACK SEA JF~LEETCASPIAN FLOTILLATOTAL SHIPS ouNAVAL AVIATION 430

______ _____ STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCESIcBam LRINF SOsSRITO

MN 4 BACKFIR584718232 38*-17 M1+ IO56.13 55.20 333 55-NX.20 *AI)GIR/BUNDIII 40ANR~r II*200 +,* noludingSoviet Naval Aviation

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FORCES

PACIFIC FLEETTOTAL SHGIPS 715NAVAL AVIATION 445

AIR DEFENSE FORCES

OUND FORCES NAVAL FORCESINTERCEPTORS 142100~ SURFACE COMSATANTS 1,324A .~ SUBMARINES 367

RIllED RIFLE DIVISIONS 1344 AUXILIARIES 770DIVISIONS ADM IIIOMINDIVISIONS7 * LAUNCHERS3U II LAUNCHERS 9,000+ NAVAL AVIATION I'MK9 1 SOVIET MILITARY POWER-1983


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... .only the USSR's theater military capabilities,.- ' but also its capability to conduct aggressive sea. - control and sea denial operations on the world's4. . " oceans.-- Chapter IV , Soviet Space Systems, examines.. - the serious threat posed by the USSR's increas-ing use of space for military purposes. The.. majority of Soviet space programs has been spe-cifically designed to support terrestial militaryoperations. However, the long-term develop-ment of an antisatellite system has extendedSoviet military use of space from support opera-tions to a direct space warfare capability. Therelative scope of the overall military program is

demonstrated by a launch rate that is four-to-five times that of the United States, and by anannual payload weight placed into orbit:660,000 pounds-ten times that of the UnitedStates.Chapter V reports on the magnitude of pro-., .. duction and the cost of supporting the USSR's- "-- continuing military buildup. It reviews the._._- ' technology and industrial resources of the' . *,., ~-USSR's defense industrial base; the effort being"dedicated o research, design and test programsand the commitment to training needed scien-tific and engineering manpower. It summarizesli l !ALy'C. do -usk the results of this effort in terms of the steadyUsl ,,'sas ALFA-Oui teepmdom~w*, &do woeWdf - whu delivery of new and modernized weapon systemsa sbmw-ed qasek f over49 knom. to Soviet forces, and in terms of future weaponsystems that will be available to the forces. It ex-FENCER ground attack aircraft, the SS-21 amines the intensity with which the USSR pur-short-range ballistic missile system and the 152. sues the acquisition of Western technology, andmm nuclear-capable, self-propelled gun. In lit- the overall impact of its military program ontie more than a year, Soviet forces in combat in the Soviet economy. The USSR's current mili-Afghanistan have grown from 85,000 to more tary capabilities reflect the achievements of athan 105,000. The weapon systems being used Research and Development (R&D) and indus-

in Afghanistan are among the most modern trial base that has grown steadily since the lateavailable to the Soviet Armed Forces, including 1950s when top priority was accorded militarythe formidable Su-25/FROGFOOT ground at- R&D and production. Soviet defense continuestack aircraft. New attack submarines, surface to receive regular and large infusions of capitalships and naval aircraft further strengthen not investment allocations, legally and illegally ac-

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quired foreign technology and equipment and Over the past decade, the growing capabilitythe most highly qualified science and engineer- of Soviet armed foices to project power to greating graduates. In return, the defense industrial distances has helped the USSR to sustain andestablishment is justifying its preferential treat- consolidate many new military outposts. Thisment by producing a steady succession of new geographic expansion of Soviet influence hasand improved weapon systems for the Soviet ar- impowtant military implications. The basing fa-serial. These continuing efforts reflect the cur- cilities now available to Soviet maritime forcesrent high-priority Soviet intent and commit- in Cuba, Vietnam, South Yemen, Angola,ment to the development and production of Ethiopia, and elsewhere greatly extend thefuture weapons. reach and the staying power of Scviet naval andThe cumulative dollar costs of Soviet invest- air forces. While the Soviets' - cetime use ofment for the decade were 80 percent higher these bases might not translate .utomatically tothan US investment outlays. The estimated dol- wartime access, the potential for such accesslar costs for the Soviets were more than twice places added burden on US and Allied forces.the US outlays in the mid-1970s, but, because of This expanding access to basing facilities re-the slower growth of Soviet programs and mote from the Soviet periphery provides newgrowth in US costs, this margin had decreased possibilities for long-range projection of Sovietsomewhat by 1981. The slower growth of Soviet power. The Soviets have traditionally maintain-programs during the perod was elue to the cy- ed their naval infantry and airborne forces atclical nature of Soviet military production. The high levels of readiness. Since 1972, naval infan-large Soviet research and development effort, try and airborne unit training, equipment, andcoupled with observed expansion in military deployments have also been matched by col-production facilities, suggests that the dollar parable enhancements to Soviet airlift, sealift,costs of Soviet military procurement may soon and mobility infrastructure. The trend of Sovietresume their historical growth. The estimated geographic expansion is especially apparent ifdollar costs for Soviet RDT&E were 70 percent one recognizes that most of the Soviet Union'sgreater than US RDT&E outlays for the period new military outposts are in countries that onceas a whole, and were more than twice as great in supported the Western alliance system by pro-1981. The dollar operating costs for Soviet ac- viding transit rights or other facilities. Centraltivities were about 25 percent higher both for America and the Caribbean are now clearly thethe period and in 1981. target of a concerted Soviet-inspired penetra-The illustration at the opening of Chapter tion effort. Further spread of Soviet militaryVI, of a KIEV-Claws aircraft carrier riding in a outposts throughout the world increasinglyJapanese-built floating drydock now serving threatens the lifelines of the Western allianceswith the Soviet Pacific Fleet, symbolizs the and makes it even more difficult and costly tocontinuing growth of the Soviet Navy, and the defend essential national interests.mounting capability of the USSR to project In Chapter VII, Soviet Military Power 1983military power wherever required in the world. assesses the challenge posed by the continuedChapter VI provides a detailed examination of growth and modernizat;on of the USSR's Arm-the USSR's multi-tiered approach to plrwer pro- ed Forces, and summarizes th'e nature of the re-jection ranging from Soviet "active measures," spouse which the Unitcd States and its Alliesto the use of arms sales and military advisors, must sustain to deter Soviet aggression.the use of proxy forces, and the deployment ofS ilitary forces beyond the Soviet border.

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II TRTEGC ORCES

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The buildup of Soviet strategic forces con-tinues. The following introductory paragraphsoutline the long-standing policies and objectivesbehind Soviet strategic nuclear force develop-ment and provide the backdrop for Soviet activ-ities since the First Edition of Soviet MilitaryPower was published.

Soviet leaders since Khrushchev's time havefollowed a consistent policy for nuclear develop-ment. Their main objective is to capitalize, inpeacetime, on the coercive leverage inherent inpowerful nuclear forces, to induce paralysis andcreate disarray in the free societies. In wartime,they regard employment of those forces as thekey to their survival and winning.

The Soviet policy calls for forces which aredesigned to destroy Western nuclear forces onthe ground and in flight to their targets, and forthe capacity to survive should nuclear weapons

' reach the Soviet homeland. The overall mis-"sions encompass the likelihood that interconti-nental nuclear war would evolve from a generalEast-West conflict across the face of Eurasia.These missions are: protect the homeland, sup-port the land war in Eurasia and eliminate theUnited States' capability to conduct or supportwarfare beyond its own shores.

Protection of the homeland is the most diffi-cult mission. The strengths and weaknesses ofWestern forces determine the tasks of theoffensive and defensive forces assigned to it.Hence, it is closely linked to Western weaponsdevelopment programs. Because of this, theSoviets attach great importance to workinghard to keep Western modernization programsto a minimum during peacetime.With the ffight-testing of the new BLACKJACK Aswing-wing bomber during the past year, theUSSR is nearingproduction of a new-generation,strategic manned bomber to add to Soviet offen-sive power provided by new gjenerations of land-based and sea-based strategic ballistic missilenuclearforces.

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Alk-MVlc Nuall r Forces

ICBM$ FIN

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Protection of the homeland in a nuclear war active development designed to accomplishwould involve: these tasks include:* disruption and destruction of the * hard-target-capable ICBMs andenemy's nuclear-associated command, LRINF missiles,control and communications, * bombers capable of penetrating US destruction or neutralization of as defensive systems and SLBMs which canmany of the West's nuclear weapons as be postured for short flight times,possible on the ground or at sea before * antisubmarine forces capable of at-they can be launched, tacking US SSBNs,* interception and destruction of sur- * air and missile defenses, includingviving weapons -aircraft and missiles- early warning satellites and radars, inter-before they can reach targets, ceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, protection of the party, state, and in- ABM radars and interceptors, and somedustrial infrastructure and Lhe essential anti-aircraft artillery,working population against those weap- 0 passive defense forces, including civilons that reach their targets. defense forces, and troops and equipmentThe forces and programs in place or under devoted to confusing incoming aircraft,

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* hardened facilities numbering in the * war-supporting industries, arsenalsthousands, command vehicles, and evac- and major military facilities,uation plans designed to protect party, * ports and airfields in the Unitedmilitary, governmental, and industrial States and those along sea and air routesstaffs, essential workers and, to the extent to European and Asian theaters of war,possible, the general population. andSupporting a land war in Eurasia and elimi- 0 satellite and grou.nd-based surveil-nating the United States' capability to fight lance sensors and facilities andbeyond its ow i shores require a capability to communications.employ intercontinental forces useful over a Offensive forces (ICBMs, LRINF, SLBMs,variety of ranges and the destruction of : and bombers) and antisatellite weapons are* other military-associated command generally assigned these tasks although someand control, special operations troops could be used, es-

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The SACKMRE EMWAu, CAAuh ofMJhW f A 6 - do- Atbak An*.IWu aRom__ - - CF-,JM C ... ..

16 HI 9"'IWAIC MFOR9J-1963


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pecially in Eurasia. These tasks are generallyless demanding than those for the first mission.Soviet intercontinental forces are designed tofulfill their missions under the best and worst ofcircumstances. In the Soviet view, the most fav-orable circumstance is a first or preemptivestrike; the least favorable is a follow-on strikeafter nuclear weapons have hit the USSR. In be-tween is the launch-under-attack circumstance:that is, executing offensive forces after weaponsaimed at the USSR have been launched but be- ,fore they hit their targets. The Soviets havewide-ranging programs designed to provide ons under the stringent time constraintsnuclear forces able to operate under each of that would prevail under hypotheticalthese circumstances. Moreover, the Soviets ap- launch-under-attack circumstances. Theypear to believe that nuclear war might last for have established a satellite-based ICBMweeks, even months, and have factored this into launch detection system, have built antheir force development, over-the-horizon radar missile launch

* In a first or preemptive strike, the es- detection system to back up the satellites,sentials are effective coordination of the and have large phased-array radars ring-strike and sound intelligence of the ing the USSR.West's intentions. Soviet nuclear forces 0 Follow-on strikes stress the survivabil-practice almost constantly, emphasizing ity of the command, control and commu-practice alm constrolyndernications systems and that of the weaponsommand and control under various con-thme.TeSoishaenvtdditions. During wartime, the main mis- theamelves. The Soviets have investedysion of Soviet intelligence is to determine heavily in providing this survivability.the West's nuclear attack intentions. The SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs arehoused in the world's hardest silos. Silo

I he Soviets practice launching weap- deployment has been adopted for ABMs

DELTA II.Cmas 889N

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and personnel have been developed andRUKW jY practiced. Resupply ships are available to. . .. reload Soviet SSBNs in protected waters.Despite these comprehensive warfighting ojectives and ambitious development and deploment programs over the years, the Soviets acontinuing to modernize all aspects of th

strategic forces.Much of what the Soviets have done sinSeptember 1981 involves the consummationprograms begun in the 1970s and offers the fYANKME-Om WON signs of new programs designed to help remeweaknesses still remaining and to allow themas well. The SS-20 LRINF missile is attain their ow n objectives in the face of pmobile, and a mobile strategic SA M is spective Western programs.being developed. The launch control fa- Olderpro rams:cilities for offensive missiles are housed in * replacement of older missiles with SSvery hard silos or on off-road vehicles. 19 Mod S and SS-18 Mod 4 MIRVedCommunications are redundant and ICBMs, the world's most lethal ICBMs,hardened. Higher commands have multi- * construction of DELTA III SSBNs,ple hardened facilities and mobile corn- fitted with 16 SS-N-18 MIRVed SLBMs,mand vehicles and aircraft available for with YANKEE and HOTEL SSBNs dis-

their use. Bombers have alert procedures mantled in compensation,and dispersal airfields. Ballistic missile 0 continuation of the SS-NX-20 MIRVsubmarines can be placed in tunnels near ed SLBM testing program (Thetheir home ports, submerged in deep TYPHOON/SS-NX-20 weapon systemfjords just off their piers, dispersed and will become operational in 1983.),protected by Soviet surface and Bubma- continued production of BACKFIRErine forces. bombers,0 The Soviet belief that war might be * further deployment of the SA-10 lowprotracted requires the survivability need- altitude SAM around Moscow anded for follow-on strikes, along with war throughout the USSR,reserves, protection for people and equip- * initial production of the II-76/ment, and the capacity to reload launch- MAINSTAY airborne warning and con-ers. For their ICBM, LRINF and air de- trol systems (AWACS),fense forces, the Soviets have stocked ex- * continued development of a high-tra missiles, propellants, and warheads speed ABM interceptor and a modifiedthroughout the USSR. ICBM silo launch- version of the older GALOSH ABMere can be reloaded in a matter of days, interceptor,and provision has been made for the de.. * additional construction of largecontamination of those launchers. Plans phased-array radars around the peripheryfor the survival of necessary equipment of the USSR,


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r r

"8-11 ICBM* continued construction of hardened HOUND interceptor which can identifyshelters and command posts for passive and track targets flying far beneath it

defense. and fire air-to-air missiles against thoseNew programssince 1981: targets,* first tests of a new solid-propellant * testing of two additional new air de-ICBM similar in size and payload to the fense interceptor aircraft.US MX, While these efforts have continued, the Soviet, the first test of a new small solid- leadership ha s also been directing an activepropellant ICBM, which could be deploy- measures campaign to support and amplify on-ed on mobile transporters, going anti-nuclear movements in the West, in' preparations to begin testing other order to influence, delay, or frustrate Westernnew ICBMs, probably in 1983, nuclear program developments. Using this two-* development of a series of long-range pronged approach, Moscow seeks a new gain incruise missiles intended for ground, air relative capability despite the drive of Westernand sea launch platforms, governments to redress the imbalance which has,, preparations to begin testing another developed over the past decade.new SLBM, probably in 1983,* the first flight tests of the new INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK"BLACKJACK strategic bomber, Since the late 1950s, the Soviets have devel-" new ABM deployment around Mos- oped and deployed nuclear attack forces havingcow to include a new, very large phased- two fundamental capabilities: strikes against, array radar and deployment of new ABM enemy nuclear arsenals and command and con-interceptors, trol systems and support of land warfare in

- testing of high-energy laser systems Eurasia. While the character, composition, andfor land-based and sea-based air defense, technical sophistication of the forces have. Testing of a mobile version of the changed over the years, the missions have not.SA-10 SAM, The development of capabilities to satisfy the# the initial deployment of the FOX- missions ha s been done with patience and pur-

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pose derived from a realization that not all goals SS-18s, and 330 SS-19s. These missiles carrycan be achieved at once. ICBMs have the mis. some 6,000 nuclear warheads. Presently, thesion to attack the ICBM force of the United great majority of the 17s, 18s and 19s are equip-States and other hardened targets. ICBMs and ped with MIRVs. By the mid-1980s the SovietsSLBMs are earmarked for strikes against com- are expected to complete their current ICBMmunications, command and control systems modernization programs for fourth-generationand against the defense infrastructure of the systems. At that time, they will have 520 SS-11s,United States. Some ICBMs and SLBMs may 60 SS-13s, 150 SS-17s, 50 8 SS-18s, and 360have been designated as strategic reserves. All SS-19s. When this deployment is finished, theof the forces must operate in a variety of en- force will have onme 6,400 warheads.vironments. Bombers have become a supple- ICBM impiovements may be measured inmentary force for ICBMs and SLBMs. Finally, terms of quantity, quality and survivability.the majority of the systems have been designed Quantitative Improvements: Deployment ofto be capable for use not only at interccon- the Soviets' first (SS-6) and second (SS-7 and SS-tinental ranges against the United States but 8) generation ICBMs began in the late 1950salso at shorter ranges against targets through- and early 1960s. By 1966, deployment of thirdout Europe and Asia. generation missiles (SS-9, SS- 11, and SS-13) wasunderway. With this generation, the Soviets.. rapidly increased the number of ICBMs deploy-US and Soviet ICBM Lmmuhwm and ftw -y ed. ICBM deployment reached its peak in theVehids (RON DoployMwv t IM10.8 mid-1970s at approximately 1,600 launchers.tow " After this, the number of launchers graduallySoviet Rve decreased to the current level of approximatelyur4 0M 1,400 as the Soviets removed their less-capable

second generation missiles from the force. (The4X' first generation was phased out in the 1960s.)From 1975 to the present, however, there has3.0- /been a dramatic increase in the number ofdeliverable nuclear warheads as the MIRVedUS RVe 40 versions of the fourth generation ICBMs (SS- i7,Soviet ICBM& SS-18, and SS..19) have beer. deployed. Sincethese missiles can carry up to 10 reentry vehiclesUS ICBM@ (RVs), the number of deployed ICBM nuclearwarheads has increased by a factor of four, not* 1370 withstanding the reduction in the number of10ii 1370 10216 135 130 13 0 SALT-accountable launchers.

Qualitative Improvements: The dramaticICBMS: The Soviet ICBM force has been growth in nuclear warheads observed after 1975developed and deployed in four successive could not have been possible without majorgenerations, each representing significant ad - qualitative improvements. The first two genera-vances. The Soviet ICBM force currently con- tions of Soviet ICBMs were inaccurate, carriedsists of 550 SS-11s, 60 SS-1is, 150 SS-17s, 308 relatively small payloads and required lengthy

19 !1 STRATEGIC FORCES-1983

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launch procedures. To make up for these defi- are capable of destroying hard targets. To-ciencies, reentry vehicles were fitted with gether, these systems have the capability to de-high-yield nuclear weapons. With the third stroy most of the 1,000O US MINUTEMANgeneration, both accuracy and payload capabil- ICBMs, using only a portion of the warheadsity were improved to some degree. However, it available. The Sov'iets follow an incremental

not until the fourth generation that the improvementpolicy in the development of theirtechnology became available to the Soviets al- forces. They improve those components of alowing greater throw weight and greatly im- weapon system that need improving and retainproved accuracy so that high-yield MIRVs those portions that are satisfactory. In this man-could be carried by operational missiles. The ner, they have greatly improved the reliability

E"most accurate versions of the SS-18 and SS-19 and capability of their current ICBM force.

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SurvivabilityImprovements: One of the most they anticipate that a nuclear war might be pro-important improvements made in the ICBM tracted. The Soviets have made provisions forforce has been in the area of survivability. Most the delivery of reserve missiles, warheads andof the first- and second-generation ICBMs were propellants to ICBM complexes for reload pur-deployed on above-ground launchers with no poses. None of these extra missiles or warheadsreal protection for the launcher or the missile, are counted under SALT agreements. Only theDuring the deployment of the second-genera- launchers are counted.tion missiles the Soviets began to deploy missiles New ICBMs Under Development: Sovietat sites containing three underground silo ICBMs will continue to emphasize the force im-launchers. Third-generation missiles were de- provements that have been observed since theployed in hardened, underground, single-silo early 1960s: accuracy, MIRVing, reliability,sites. By using hardened and widely-dispersed and survivability. Two new solid-propellantlaunchers the Soviets increased the ICBM force ICBMs are currently being developed. One ofsurvivability. The fourth-generation ICBMs these is about the size of the US MX intended"were placed in launchers that, for the moat for silo deployment; the other is a smallerpart, had been converted from third-generation missile, which will probably be designed forsilos. In the process of conversion, the hardnesss deployment on mobile launchers similar toof the launchers was considerably increased to those used with the SS-20. Because of theirimprove missile and launcher survivability, up- capability fo r dispersal, mobile missiles aregraded communications facilities were added, highly survivable. Furthermore, they have anand silo-based launch control facilities were inherent reload capability, which is also abuilt. The Soviets have also undertaken several significant force improvement. Testing pro-programs to modernize and upgrade launchers grams fo r on e or two additional ICBMs, prob.for their third-generation ICBMs. The result is ably based on the SS-18 and SS-19, are expectedthat the current Soviet ICBM force is vastly to begin in 1983.more survivable than was the case a decade ago. SSBNs/SLBMs: Over the last two years the

ICBMReload Capability: The Soviets have Soviets have continued to modernize theircontingency plans for reloading and refiring submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM)ICBMs from launchers that already have been force. A second TYPHOON-Class nuclear-used to fire an initial round. The cold-launch powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) hastechnique employed by the SS-17 and SS-18 been launched at the Severodvinsk Shipyard;lends itself to such a reload capability. Addi- the first TYPHOON completed its sea trials andtionally, all currently deployed liquid-propel- has moved to port facilities on the north coast oflant ICBMs-SS-11, SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19-- the Rola Peninsula. Armed with 20 launchersre contained in a launch canister within the for the MIRVed SS-NX-20 solid-fueled SLBM,..ilo. This and the silo design minimize damage the first submarine of this class will be fully op-to the launcher during the initial firing and give erational by the end of 1983. The range of thethe Soviets the capability to reload each of these SS-NX-20, 8,800 kilometers, places all oflaunchers. The Soviets probably cannot refurb- NATO Europe, North America and Asia withinish and reload silo launchers in a period less TYPHOON's reach.than a few days; nevertheless, they believe that While the TYPHOON SSBN production pro-this capability is of significant value because gram is still relatively new, the Soviets' earlier

21 1i STRATEGIC FORCES-1983

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DELTA-Ill program is nearing completionModem URBN Dgloyments Thus far, 14 of these SSBNs have been launced; a few more will probably be built. Each ca, . ' 'ries 16 liquid-fueled MIRVed SS-N-18 SLBM/ Like the TYPHOON, the missiles on thDELTA-Ill, as well as the DELTA I and II, careach targets in almost all of North Americ,'' from home waters. By contrast, only the TR777 r DENT C-4 has similar range capabilities. However, the bulk of US SLBMs is much less capNON ble in terms of range, accuracy and yielTherefore, the quantitative US advantag

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shown in the chart below should not mislead. HOTEL-1I Class SSBNs (6 RVs) in compensa-With the addition of each new SSBN, the So- tion for a newly constructed TYPHOON. Theviet Navy has dismantled older submarines in acquisition of each new SSBN equipped withorder to remain within the number of launchers SS-N-18/SS-NX-20 SLBMs not only introduces(950) and number of hulls (62) allowed under more RVs but also allows the Soviets greaterprovisions of the SALT-I Agreement, as ex- flexibility in the use of their new submarines,tended. The addition to the force of some 200 Older SSBNs with shorter-ranged SLBMs havereentry vehicles (RVs) on each TYPHOON, to conduct lengthy transits in order to comehowever, greatly eclipses the temporary reduc- within range of targets in North America.tion caused by the dismantlement of one Future developments in Soviet SLBMs willYANKEE-Clas SSBN (40 RVs) and of two most likely center on improved RV accuracy toUS ad Soviet SL.M a & complement their estimated large nuclear yieldsVehi.l* (Ri Deploymnit 1MO-.183 and on the fielding of solid-fueled SLBMs ass.20s,o replacements for older liquid-fueled versions. A

new SLBM, possibly intended to replace the SS-US0iv N-18, probably will begin testing in 1983.4A Q us n Apart from its SLBMs, the Soviet Navy will

soon be the recipient of a sea-launched cruise3/Si missile (SLCM) that is currently under develop-Soviet RV * -3,0, ment, the SS-NX-21. With an estimated maxi-ZOM -M mum range on the order of 5,000 kilometers, its

mission is primarily nuclear strike, and its size is1,00. Soviet SLB ..... compatible with submarine torpedo tubes.S,..., US SL ,Bombers: The manned bomber has relin-S-,,0 quished primary responsibility for nuclear at-160 19.74 1979 18M tack to missiles, but the Soviets still view it as a

25 If STRATEGIC FORCLS-1983


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viable component of their nuclear forces. The can be further increased with mid-air refueling.manned bomber provides them flexibility and Six variants of the BEAR have been produced:diversity in their nuclear attack forces not three fo r strike missions, two for reconnais-available with ballistic missiles. Moreover, the sance, and one for antisubmarine warfare. TheSoviets clearly are prepared to use bombers in a antisubmarine warfare variant has continued invariety of roles, to include conventional strikes production in 1982.in the European and Asian theaters, antiship Complementing the BEAR in intercontinen-operations, reconnaissance and nuclear opera- ta l operations, the M.type/BISON is a four-tions in a protracted conflict, engine, swept-wing, turbojet-powered bomberContinuing Soviet interest in the manned capable of delivering free-fall bombs. About 45bomber is evidenced by the number of pro- are still configured as bombers, while some 30grams underway to upgrade the aging force, in- have been modified as air refueling tankers.cluding the development of a new strategic The Tupolev BACKFIRE is the latest addi-bomber and long-range air-launched cruise tion to the currently operational strategicmissiles. Moreover, sweeping organizational bomber forces. Introduced in 1974, some 100changes in the command structure of the Soviet are deployed with the Soviet Air Force, with aair forces are in part intended better to in- like number assigned to Soviet Naval Aviation,tegrate bombers into all types of air operations. Production of the BACKFIRE continues at aDeployment Trends: The current strategic rate of 30 per year. Most are based in thebomber force consists of almost 900 strike and western USSR, although over the last few yearssupport aircraft. The overall size of the force the Soviets have deployed a sizable number inhas remained relatively constant in recent years, the Far East.although modernization of the BACKFIRE and The BACKFIRE is a long-range aircraft cap-upgrades in weapons have improved the qual- able of performing nuclear strike, conventionality. Three-fourths of the bombers are position- attack, antiship, and reconnaissance missions.ed opposite NATO, while the remainder are Its low-level penetration features make it abased along the Chinese border. BADGER, much more survivable system than its predeces-BLINDER, and BACKFIRE make up the bulk sors. Carrying either bombs or AS-4/KITCHENof the force and would carry out missions pri- air-to-surface missiles, it is a versatile strike air-marily against Europe and Asia. BEAR and craft, currently intended for theater attack inBISON could perform similiar missions as well, Europe and Asia but also capable of intercon-but are reserved mainly for strategic maritime tinental missions against the United States. Theor intercontinental operations. BACKFIRE can be equipped with probes toLong-Range Bombers: The Tu-95/BEAR is permit inflight refueling, which would furtherthe primary intercontinental air threat to the increase its range and flexibility.United States. Capable of delivering free-fall Intermediate-RangeBombers: The over 600bombs or air-to-surface missiles, under opti- Tu-16/BADGER and Tu-22/BLINDER strikemum conditions this aircraft can cover virtually and support aircraft represent a significant ca-all US targets on a two-way mission. Introduced pability for use in theater attack. The BADGERin the mid.1950s, it is both the largest and is by far the most numerous aircraft in thelongest-range Soviet bomber currently opera- force. The ten variants of this twin-jet, subsonictional. The range and flexibility of some models aircraft have expanded its mission beyond

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Blackjack and Backfire Coverage from Soviet Banes(2-Way Milakon.

_ ;~IRE COVEFUELED*__

Moscow

Staged FromAArcticaBsse____S Backfire Base, Arctic Base -

standard bombing to include electronic wing, supersonic BLINDER has been deployedcountermeasures, air-to-surface missile deliv- in free-fali bomber, air-to-surface missile car-ery, reconnaissance, and refueling. The swept- rier, reconnaissance and trainer versions. The

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BADGER and BLINDER, in conjunction with level penetration. This new bomber is likely toBACKFIRE, form a potent force for air opera- be a multiple-role aircraft that could delivertions against NATO and the nations of Asia. both free-fall bombs and air-launched cruiseNew Bomber Developments: Until the in- missiles to intercontinental range. The BLACK-troduction of the BACKFIRE, the most glaring JACK could be introduced to the operationalweakness in the Soviet bomber force was the age force as early as 1986 or 1987.of the aircraft. However, as early as the middle The Soviets are developing at least one long-1980s, major improvements are expected which range air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) withwill give new life to the force and significantly a range of some 3,000 kilometers. Carried byenhance Soviet long-range bomber and cruise the BACKFIRE, the BLACKJACK and pousiblymissile attack capability, the BEAR, it would provide the Soviets withA new strategic bomber, designated the greatly improved capabilities for low-level andBLACKJACK A by NATO, is currently under standoff attack in both theater and intercon-development. The BLACKJACK is a large, var- tinental operations. ALCMs could be in theiable-geometry-wing aircraft. It will be capable operational force by the mid-1980s.of long-range subsonic cruise with supersonic A new aerial refueling tanker based on the Il-high-altitude dash and subsonic/transonic low- 76/CANDID has been under development forseveral years. If operationally deployed, the newtanker could support either tactical or strategicUS and USSR .aircraft and would significantly improve theCUSAPno, h I a l- ability of Soviet aircraft to conduct longer-Inventory Inventory range operations.EM -u US StratcgicDeterrentForces: By mid-1983,

US strategic deterrent forces will consist of:-0 . 0 1,000 MINUTEMAN ICBMs0- us .0 43 TITAN ICBMsUSSR (INCLUDING * 241 B-52G/H model bombers360- BACKFIRE .360 0 56 FB-111 bombersASSIGNED TO - 496 POSEIDON (C-3 and C-4) Fleet3W.0NAVAL AVIATION) ,M0,NV AVA ND3allistic LaunchersWUSSR , 72 TRIDENT Fleet BallisticLaunchers

2,00 The US force structure dates from the 1960s.The TITAN ICBMs and the B-52D-modelbombers are being retired in view of their age

10D0. ,0 and declining military effectiveness. The B-52Dis scheduled for retirement this year and the50 . TITANs by 1987. The aging B-52G/H bombers0 ,__ will not be capable of effectively penetrating the1M io 19M 1a1 19 6 Soviet air defenses in the mid-1980s. The MIN-US data Include 642, FB.111a; Soviet dats Include Soviet Air Force, UTEMAN force is increasingly vulnerable to a

BEAR, BISON, and BACKFIRE, Soviet ICBM attack.

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To redress the imbalances and US force vul- strategic defense force. It includes active de-nerabilities which have resulted from the Soviet fenses such as interceptor aircraft, surface-to-drive for strategic superiority, the United States air missiles (SAMs) and antiballistic missilehas initiated a comprehensive and integrated (ABM) and pasive defenses such as surveillancestrategic modernization program. In the area of and warning systems, hardening, electronicUS strategic retaliatory forces this program countermeasures (ECM), and civil defense.includes: When combined with the strong counterforce* Deployment of more survivable and orientation of Soviet strategic offensive forces,effective command, control, and commu- these efforts point to a strategic concept ofnications systems, layered, in-depth defense of the homeland.* Development of the new TRIDENT- Early Warning: The Soviets have aboutClass submarine-launched ballistic missile 7,000 radars throughout the USSR dedicated toand continued procurement of TRI- detecting and supporting the engagement ofDENT-Class submarines, enemy aircraft. The Soviets have steadily im-&Procurement of 100 B-IB bombers in proved their ability to overcome the many dif-the near-term and deployment of the Ad- ficulties associated with providing air warningvanced Technology Bomber (ATB) for for such a large country. The chief improve-the 1990s. Similarly, selected B-52 ments are the continued development of an Air-bombers are being modernized and the borne Warning and Control System (AWACS)air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) in- aboard the 11-76/CANDID airframe, whichtroduced into the force, could begin deployment soon, and the deploy-* Deployment of the new PEACE- ment of many new types of ground-based airKEEPER (MX) land-based missile as soon warning radars and control systems.as possible. For detecting and tracking ballistic missiles,Other Nuclear Forces: China maintains its the Soviets have a redundant system of sensors.own long-rainge nuclear force, which is not part The first layer is the large over-the-horizon

of any alliance. In planning for theater opera- (OTH) radars that can detect the launch of UStions, the Soviets take this force into account. and Chinese ICBMs. These have been supple-Nuclear forces in Europe include four United mented recently by a launch detection satelliteKingdom submarines carrying 64 POLARIS system. The second layer is the network of HENA-3 missiles. The POLARIS missiles themselves HOUSE radars near the borders of the USSR.are being modified to upgrade warhe id surviv- The Soviets have made a major commitment toability and effectiveness on target. Plans call for improving this network by building new phas-replacement of the POLARIS SLBM, but this ed-array radars on the borders. These large"program is not scheduled until the 1.990s. radars, about the size of a football field se t onFrance also maintains both land-based inter- edge, take years to complete. When finished,mediat.-.range nuclear forces and submarines they will close gaps in HEN HOUSE radar cov-with ballistic missiles. erage and provide Soviet leaders with better in-"formationabout the size and objectives of anySTRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES enemy missile attacks.Since the end of World War II , the Soviets BallisticMissileDefcnse: In conjunction withhave built and maintained the world's largest ballistic missile detection and tracking systems,

27 I! STRATEGIC FORCES-1983

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C0VW9MV of N Mt N Defodo ers. To support these launch sites, the SovandTmakhw ,yw are building the new ABM radar in the Moscarea shown in the illustration opening Chapteof this report. It is a phased-array radar w560 degree coverage, somewhat like the MisSite Radar from the now defunct US SAFGUARD ABM system, although the Moscradar is about twice as large. These improments to the Moscow defenses, which couldcompleted by the mid-1980s, are allowed by1972 ABM Treaty as long as the numberlaunchers does not exceed 100.

Air Defense: Soviet air defenses are the mmassive in the world. They include an extensvariety of aircraft and missile weapon systwith mutually supporting capabilities. Heavconcentrations are in the European USSR athe military/industrial areas east of the UrQualitatively improved weapon systems are

Launch detection zateiritne ing developed and will continue to be introdOver-the-hori -on red__ __ _ __* ed into the force.Han Hous radar - The Soviet air defense system should notNew phae.d-array radar@ under conhtruction - confused with those employed by client stMoscow AD M radar.s-- using some Soviet equipment. No Soviet clstate has been provided with anything compthe Soviets maintain at Moscow the world's only able to the highly integrated Soviet air defeoperational antiballistic missile (ABM) system. system. Examples of the failure of air defenThe Moscow defenses currently include battle in those states when faced with attacks by fmanagement radars and four launch complexes line aircraft should not be used to judge Socontaining engagement radars and ABM-1B/ air defense capabilities.GALOSH interceptor missiles. Trhe system can- Aircraft: Evolutionary changes continuenot presently cope with a massive attack, how- the interceptor force. Approximately 600 mever, and the Soviets have continued to pursue em, strategic air defense interceptors withextensive ABM research and development pro- least some ability to engage low-altitude targgrams, including a rapidly deployable ABM now make up half of the force. The Soviets hsystem and improvements for the Moscow been converting FOXBAT A aircraft, origindefenses. designed to counter high-altitude threats,Some of these ABM developmental programs FOXBAT E, giving them limited low-altitare coming to fruition, as the Soviets are in the capabilities somewhat comparable to FLOprcces of upgrading the Moscow ABM de- GER. The Soviets have begun deploymenfenses. They are building additional ABM sites the FOXHOUND A, their first interceptor wand are retrofitting sites with new silo launch- a true look-down/shoot-down capability. T

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MIG-25/KOXBAT E Intweeptor.more look-down/shoot-down fighters are cur- mobility; increased target handling capabilityrently in development and should enter service and increased firepower. Deployment of thesoon. As these three types of aircraft replace oi, SA-1O system, which can engage multiple air-augment older types, the Soviet capability to craft and possibly cruise missiles at any altitude,defend against low-altitude aircraft, including has steadily increased. In addition to deploy-cruise missiles, will increase. ment around the USSR, the system is replacing

SAMs: As in the interceptor force, im- the 30-year-old SA-is around Moscow. Devel-in the Soviet surface-to-air missile opment of a mobile SA-10 is underway.force are continuing. Again, the primary Passive Defense: The Soviet Ministry of De-appears to be a counter to low-alti- fense controls the nationwide civil defense pro-tude targets. Newer systems demonstrate longer grams of the USSR. The Chief of Civil Defenserange, particularly at low altitude; improved is a Deputy Minister of Defense and general of

29 II STRATEGIC FORCF1983


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the army. Full-time civil defense staffs exist at the essential workforce 7y sheltering at workeach echelon of the Soviet administrative struc- and by the dispersal of ofl-shift workers to areasture. Civil defense staffs also exist at significant away from worksites. Although much urbanindustrial, utility and other installations. In shelter space is available for the use of generalwartime, the civil defense administrative struc- urban populations, their protection is to beture, assimilated into an integrated command achieved primarily through mass evacuation ofsystem, would play a significant role in mainte- cities. In peacetir..'e, more than 150,000 peoplenance of the government and the economy. work full-time in the civil defense program. InThis goal is supported by the protection provid- wartime, the numbers could swell to 16 million.ed leadership through deep, hard, urban shel- The program costs the equivalent of $5 billiontering and an extensive network of hardened annually.relocation sites outside the cities, with redun- US DefenseForces:The United States deploysdant communications systems. The program fewer than 120 ground and AWACS air defensealso provides for continuity of support for the radars, no SAMa for defense of North Americaeconomy in wartime through the protection of and less than 300 interceptors (most 1950s vin-

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tage). Moreover, the US has had no ballistic and Canada have developed a North Americanmissile defense (BMD) capability since 1976, Air Defense Master Plan. At least six additionalwhen thc single SAFEGUARD site was closed. AWACS aircraft will be procured to augmentThe US currently has almost no civil defense current forces available for kturveillance andcapability, command and control for the air defense of"The US strategic modernization program ad- North America, In all, five squadrons of F-15dresses some of the major deficiencies in strate- interceptors will replace the 1958-vintagegic defense, the most critical being lack of F-106. The strategic modernization programadequate air defense. Programmed initiatives also provides for the vigorous pursuit of

to improve long-range surveillance include research and development on BMD.moder microwave radars for the DEW Linean d over- the-horizon-back-scatter (0TH-B)radars looking east, west, and south. The US ____________

31 If STRATEGIC FORCES1983

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THEATER FORCES

II T

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* FN

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!JIn 1981 Soviet Military Power described So-

"".....viet theater forces by category. Soviet AfilitaryS..Power 1983 examines these forces as regionally

deployed. For military purposes, the Sovietshave divided Eurasia into three theaters: West-ern, Southern, and Far Eastern. Each theater"has ts own political and economic significancethat determines Soviet military goals and objec-"tives in the area and the strategy employed toachieve them.

The forces positioned for operations againstNATO continue to be given the highest priorityin receiving the newest and most capable sys-tems. For example, since 1981 the Soviets haveproduced 4,500 tanks, including the T-80 de-ployed to forces opposite NATO. At the sametime they have introduced ne w ground-attackaircraft and armored fighting vehicles into Af-ghanistan and are modernizing their forces inthe Far East. This strengthening of forces is in -tended to enable the Soviets to achieve their po-litical/military objectives as rapidly as possiblewith the most modern and capable theaterforces, either through intimidation or directmilitary action.

SA Renewed Concept for Combined Arms~ Combat: Capitalizing on their improved and, \.. - .... modernized forces, the Soviets have reintro-

......... : duced the World War II Mobile Group conceptin the form of Operational Maneuver GroupsS........ (OMGs). OMGs are task-organized, self-sus-taining, tank-heavy raiding forces constitutingdivision- and corps-size formations at army andfront levels, respectively. Organized for com-mitment from the outset, OMGs would be ex-

The new Su-25/FROGFOOTgroundattack aircraft,armed with 30-mm gun, rockets, bombs and mis-sies, is deployed to forwardbases in Afghanistanto provide close air support to the more than105,000 Soviet troops engaged in intensive ground

r" combat operations n Afghanistan.

4 33 I1I THEATER FORCES-1983, ... . i i': .. . N


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pected to penetrate the enemy rear areas quick- SOVIET THEATERSly and independently of the main body of The Western Theater encompasses all offorces. Europe. Because it contains those nations thatThe Soviets believe that successful OMG op- possess a substantial portion of the world'serations could severely disrupt the NATO rear wealth, technology, indmitrial capacity, andarea, thereby increasing the likelihood of main- military power, it is the focal point of Soviettaining a rapid advance without early resort to strategic planning. The Soviet goal in thenuclear warfare. Operationally, the OM G Western Theater is to weaken the Atlanticwould facilitate commitment of reinforcements Alliance to the point that it is no longer a viableby securing terrain over which additional Soviet military entity. In wartime, the primary Sovietforces must pass while hindering NATO's ef- objective would be to seize the initiative quicklyforts to reinforce its forces. Additionally, and defeat NATO forces before they could bealthough the OMG concept has been developed substantially mobilized or reinforced. To man-for conventional offensive operations, it is also age military operations against NATO, thewell-suited for exploitation of nuclear strikes. Soviets subdivide the Western Theater into sev-SOVIET THEATER FORCES

BALTIC FLEEr NORTIMERN J

54FLOTILITO TAL SIPI ..MlNAVAL AVIATION

~ TION 44l

L.OCATID IN

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eral Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs) - Japan from increasing its contribution to West-continental, oceanic and intercontinental -in em security, to unify Korea under communistwhich designated forces operate to achieve spe- rule, and to expand Soviet influence in South-cific military objectives derived from political east Asia. In the event of war, the Soviets wouldgoals. strive to control western and northeasternThe Southern Theater encompasses South- China, to preclude Japanese participation in awest Asia, to include the Arabian Peninsula. In war in Asia and to defeat US and South Koreanthis theater, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan forces in Korea.are of particular importance because of theirproximity to the Soviet border and their loca- THE WESTERN THEATERtion near Persian Gulf oil reserves. Moscow's Soviet forces in the Western Theater arelong-range aim in the region is to establish itself those that pose the most direct threat to NATOas the dominant power at the expense of the and encompass all forces located primarily inWest. To further this aim, the Soviets' policy is the Western USSR and Eastern Europe. Sovietto modernize and strengthen their military ca- forces from other areas of the USSR can, ofpabilities, promote dependence upon the course, be shifted to combat against NATO.USSR, expand ties with sympathetic pro-Soviet The following review of the Soviet force mod-elements, orchestrate anti-Western propaganda ernizat~in program fo r the Western Theaterand obtain access to strategic port and air will show that the Soviets are balancing theirfacilities in the nationr of the Indian Ocean conventional and nuclear forces to be able tobasin. fight a range of conflicts.The FarEastern Theater encompases China, Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear For'eJapan, Korea and Southeast Asia. The Soviets' (INF)Missiles: The Soviets will employ thesepolitical goals are to improve relations with the systems to achieve strategic objectives within thePRC at the expense of US/PRC ties, to prevent theater. Since late 1977, the nuclear striking:

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Lcngw.Ranm In Wm-eRange Nuo Fome Dq Fio .mp0 ag 4W0 O goo 1000 I=

1031

REITYVIGIlD

poe fove an-ageIFmisls utplidependently targetable reenhas more than doubled, even though th oa eils(MIRVs).SIllnumberf launchers has decrea~sed. This mark- Today's LRINF missiles, consisting of 2lJ Illed increase in force capability is due to deploy- older SS.4 and $S-5 launchers, and more thment of the SS-20 missile with its three, 330 mobile SS-20s, can deliver an initial salvo

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some 1,250 nuclear warheads. Of the total missiles, tanks, artillery and helicopters.number of launchers, more than two-thirds are Surface-to-SurfaceMissiles: Complementingpresently located within range of NATO, and the formidable array of intermediate and medi-nearly one-fourth of them have been deployed um range systems, the Soviets are continuing tosince 1981. The accuracy and reaction time of upgrade their tactical nuclear-capable surface-the SS-20 provide a marked improvement over to-surface missile force.the older systems. In addition, the mobility of 0 The SS-21 is replacing the FROG-7the SS-20 greatly enhances survivability. Fur- in the Western Theater. The SS-21 has athermore, each SS-20 unit is assessed to beequipped with refire missiles-one perlauncher-and each refire missile also carriesthree warheads.GroundForces: The full impact of improve-ments to Soviet ground forces opposite NATOmust be viewed in the context of the totalground forces available. Out of the total of over .....-.190 active divisions in the Soviet force, 94 are a Lmnherlocated opposite the Central and Northern re-gions of NATO. Another twenty divisions arelocated in the Transcaucasus and North Cau-casus Military Districts; these divisions couldlikely be committed against Turkey or South-west Asia. Some 16 additional divisions that canbe allocated to combat operations in Europeconstitute the Strategic Reserve and are central- .. .ly located. The six Warsaw Pact Allies of the ,_Soviet Union have a total of 55 active divisions.In 1982, the NATO Allies in their force com-parison counted a total of 173 USSR/WarsawPact divisions which could be mobilized againstNATO. Today, that number has risen.

Since 1978, the Soviets have made majorquantitative and qualitative advances in theirground forces. While technological improve-ments to hardware continue unabated through-ou t the Soviet force, priority is given to theforces opposite NATO, enabling them to con-duct rapid offensive operations, characterizedby shock action, massive firepower and highmobility. These recent improvements in West-ern Theater ground forces are highlighted' inthe areas of surface-to-air, surface-to-sudace SCUD B TacdoW Nualw Mhmi.

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range of about 120 kilometers, 50 tial to defend against tactical ballistic missiles.kilometers greater than the FROG-7, and Tanks: The Soviet tank force has beenit is more accurate, thus enabling greater undergoing a major upgrade since the mid-targeting flexibility and deeper strikes. 1960s when the first truly modern post-Worlda The SCUD, normally deployed in War II tank, the T-64, was introduced. Thebrigades at army and front level, is be - first model of the T-64 was followed by at leasting replaced by the SS-23; a tactical one improved version, the T-64A, and severalsurface-to-surface missile with improved known variants of the T-72. The most modemaccuracy and a range of 500 kilometers, Soviet tank, the T-80, featuring collectiveversus the SCUD's 300 kilometers. nuclear/biological/chemical protection, en-0 Soviet SS-12/SCALEBOARD missiles, hanced firepower and survivability, is in pro-with a range of about 900 kilometers, are duction, and at least several hundred have beenexpected to be replaced by the SS-22 of deployed to the Soviet Groups of Forces insimilar range but greater accuracy. Eastern Europe. A dramatic shift in the propor-Tactical Air Defense: The Soviets have de - tion of these modem tanks, as part of the total

veloped a massive, layered air defense fo r their Soviet inventory opposite NATO, has occurred.ground forces to provide air superiority over the The impact on the most critical area -the onebattlefield. They have integrated frontal avia- opposite the NATO center-is particularly sig-tion, radioelectronic combat, SAMs and associ- nificant, In this area T-64/72/80 tanks makeated radars and anti-aircraft artillery into an up about 50 percent of the total, and continuedunparalleled tactical air defense system. Soviet deployment of the T-80 will increase the pro-tactical SAMs-SA-4, SA-6, SA-8, SA-9, SA- portion of modem main battle tanks.11 , and SA-13-shown on page 31 are mobileand are a functional part of ground force unitsat several levels of command. The ZSU-23-4supplements the SAMs and interceptors de-scribed below. These defenses will continue tobe modernized in the future. Of particular noteis the development of a new SAM with enhanc- - "ed low-altitude capabilities and with the poten- T4" Mat n Raub To*

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Artillery: The Soviets are pursuing a com-prehensive program of upgrading and expand- U F "ing the artillery fire support available to groundforces. Several new artillery pieces, some of 'which are nuclear capable, and one new multi- "4pie rocket launcher are being introduced.Simultaneously, an ongoing divisional reorgani-zation has resulted in increases in the towed andself-propelled gun firepower of artillery assets.The addition of artillery battalions to tankregiments is intended to make tank and motor-ized rifle divisions fully capable combined armsforces. The multi-faceted reorganization has 122-mm Golf ftP p HOWIresulted in a 30 percent increase in the com-bined tube artillery, multiple rocket launcher As an additional complement to surface-to-and heavy mortar assets since 1978. surface missiles, the Soviets are continuingIn addition to the increase in numbers, sever- deployment of nuclear-capable heavy artilleryal developments illustrate Soviet emphasis on brigades armed with the mobile 240-mm self-technologically improving the artillery force. propelled mortar and the 203-mm self-propell.Two new 152-mm guns, one self-propelled and ed gun. The recent deployment of the 203-mmone towed, have been fielded since 1978, and gun outside the USSR, coupled with the ap-both are deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern pearance of the new 152-mm guns, indicates theEurope. They are nuclear capable and replace importance Soviet doctrine places on the capa-older pieces which were not nuclear capable. bility to deliver low-yield nuclear strikes rela-t;veiy close to Soviet forces.A new 220-mrnr multiple rocket launcher ha s

been deployed opposite NATO since 1978. Eachmobile launcher has 16 tubes and can firechemical as well as conventional high explosivemunitions.152-nm lf.P# 9 d (tn The Soviets are also increasing the strength oftheir artillery units. For example, army level ar-

, tillery regiments are being expanded to bri-gades - involving an increase of 30 to 80 percentof their previous strength.

Helicopters:While other Soviet weapon sys-4ri tems and assets have been upgraded substan-

tially, the attack helicopter force has been. approximately doubled in size and technologi-cally upgraded. The total attack force opposite

NATO has grown from 400 helicopters in 197812-nm IfP*oaped Houw to a current level of 800. Manty of the attack

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ivlMI-/HIP E Attack HeHcap~wrhelicopters are now divisional assets due to a against personnel and lightly armored targets,general reorganization of air assets and the and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Thecrea tion of Army Aviation. ATGMs and rocket pods can be replaced with aThe establishment of Army Aviation repre- mix of up to 750 kilograms of chemical or con-sents the most dramatic change regarding heli- ventional bombs on each wing. Other arrna-copters and further reflects Soviet emphasis on ment on the HIIND D/E is a multi-barrelcreating well balanced combined arms forces atmany organizational levels. Inclusion of six Mi-4/HIND attack helicopters in divisional heli-copter squadrons is a tangible manifestation ofthis combined arms capability, comparable tothe previously mentioned establishment of artil-lery battalions in tank regiments.Most attack helicopters opposite NATO arethe heavily armed Mi-24/HIND D/E and Mi-8/HIP E. All three aircraft are armed with 57-mm unguided rockets, which are effective MI-N/HALO A Hoevyr6-LiftlHei

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12.7-mm turreted nose gun; the HIP E has a o aemmGod ANtuk Awuftsingle-barrel 12.7-nun gun. (x dsmuwgI.vok NATOJ)Soviet emphasis on a heavy-lift helicopter INAtO.aL A__transport capability is reflected in the develop-mcnt and recent appearance of the Mi-26/HALO. It is the world's largest helicopter, cap-able of can-ying internally two airborne infantrycombat vehicles or about 100 combat-loadedtroops.

The FENCER A/C, FLOGGERand FITTER H have had a particularlyprofound impact on Soviet offensivecapabilities. The FENCER with its all-

FrontalAviation: Frontal Aviation has been weather, low-altitude penetration capa-the focus of comprehensive modernization and bility manifestly increases Soviet ability toreorganization programs. The most impressive carry out deep strikes into NATO terri-changes have occurred in the last five years, and tory with little advance warning.are a result of the new Soviet emphasis on offen- * The Su-25/FROGFOOT ground at-sive capabilities. These changes, in the areas of tack aircraft, currently in use in Afghan-equipment, training, tactics, and organization, istan, may eventually be deployed in thehave not occurred spontaneously, but are the Western Theater. Its role there wouldresult of careful, long-range planning to in- continue to be close air support to thecrease frontal aviation capabilities against ground forces.NATO. The MiG-29/FULCRUM and the Su-Since 1978, the Soviets have introduced two 27/FLANKER fighters, currently beingn w fighters and three new versions of recon- tested, are twin-engine jets with improvednaissance/ground attack aircraft. These air- range, thrust-to-weight ratios and maneu-craft have increased range, improved avionics, verability. They represent a concerted ef-and better altitude and all-weather capabilities fort by the Soviets to close the technologythan previous Soviet models, gap with the West.

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I VI

Changes have also occurred in tactics and air missiles. They may have a secondary groundtraining that are less visible than equipment up- attack role; in particular, the FULCRUM maygrades, but have a potentially far greater effect have a true dual role capability similar to thaton frontal aviation effectiveness. Soviet doctrine of the US F-16 and F-18.places great emphasis on achieving air superior- BACKFIRE Bomber: Used in a theater role,ity from the very outset. To implement doc- the BACKFIRE has a greater combat range an dtrine, the Soviets have recently made significant payload capability than the Soviet BADGERchanges in their air combat tactics and training and BLINDER medium bombers. It also hasprograms. Pilot independence and initiative are better capability to penetrate modem airnow stressed. The continual technological up- defenses in that it can fly at high subsonicgrading of equipment and increasing proficien. speeds at low altitude. The BACKFIRE's capa-cy in combat employment of that equipment bilities will continually improve during its ex-have resulted in greatly increased Soviet avia- pected in-service life.tion capabilities in the Western Theater, partic- Reorganizationof Air Forces: A recent ma-ularly the ability to strike into the NATO rear jo r reorganization of the command structure forarea. Soviet air and air defense forces will signifi-cantly improve Soviet air warfare capabilities.Improvements in tactics and training are The new structure provides the Soviets with aaimed toward maximizing performance of a peacetime organization that closely approxi-new generation of Soviet aircraft that will have mates their anticipated wartime structure forbetter penetration capabilities. Two new fighter the employment of air power. This will allow aaircraft, the FLANKER and the FULCRUM, more rapid transition to a wartime posture andare expected to become operational in the mid- will enhance operational flexibility and coordi-1980s and will probably be widely deployed in- nation through centralized control of air assetsthe Western Theater by the late 1980s. These at front and theater levels.aircraft will be supersonic, all-weather counter- Soviet Navy: The Soviet Navy surface ships,air fighters with look-down/shoot-down weapon submarines and aircraft arrayed against NATOsystems and beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to- are in the Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet an d

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J ...- I"r. .. ' i ... , . .

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the Black Sea Fleet. Improvements in these combatants, Soviet construction programs haveforces during the course of the past five years produced minor combatants well suited tohave encompassed all aspects of naval warfare theater level combat operations. Since 1978,and have involved numerous individual weapon units of four new classes of ocean and coastalsystems. The principal missions of Soviet sur- patrol craft have entered service, includingface combatants, attack submarines and Soviet guided-missile patrol combatants, missile-naval aviation include the protection of the sea- equipped hydrofoil patrol craft, torpedo-borne approaches to the Soviet Union and War- equipped patrol hydrofoils and antisubmarinesaw Pact Allies and the isolation of NATO warfare patrol combatants. In addition to pro-10forces from reinforcement and resupply. viding rriodern platforms with significant offen-In addition to submarines and major surface sive firepower to supplant or replace obsolescent

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-k tITS, tional multiple rocket launchers, antitank~ ~;*~,,"'weapons and medium tanks.,,.',. Chemical Warfare: Soviet ground forces are

i-*v P A7 the world's best equipped for the employmentV- of chemical munitions. The forces are also

Ai1 "".'' capable of operating effectively in toxicenvironments., .,Soviet doctrine calls fo r the use of toxic.rt*.': che--achemical warfare agents in both offensive and-, ' ~defensive situations. They are to be used in closeV,- ",1 U, 4 coordination with high explosive and nuclear.... ,. strikes.... .This reflects the Soviet assessment that chem-, -.- ,, ical operations have a distinct advantage overnuclear weapons in limiting structural damage.Soviet doctrine indicates that nonpersistentchemical agents would be used prior to front-line combat engagements. Persistent CW agentswould be used in the deep rear and along troopflanks to protect advancing echelons.There are over 80,000 chemical defense per-sonnel in the Soviet Ground Forces. This num-

ber would significantly increase during periodsof war. In addition, the navy and the air forceshave personnel who perform chemical defenseS~~duties.RadioelectronlcCombat: In Soviet doctrine,

. . :, radioelectronic combat (REC), is designed to"systematically disrupt vital NATO commandand control at critical times during a battle.The Soviets plan to accomplish this disruptionunits, all of these minor combatants demon- of control through the integrated use of physicalstrate improved air defense capabilities, destruction, electronic jamming, and decep-A major responsibility of the Soviet Navy is tion, while concurrently providing protection ofsupport to Warsaw Pact ground forces to in- their own command, control and communica-clude defense of their maritime flanks and the tions (C0) systems.

conduct of amphibious warfare operations. To implement their REC doctrine, the Sovi-Soviet Naval Infantry units assigned to the ets have developed an impressive capability andNorthern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets have continue to field new systems for intelligenceundergone a major m,:organization, resulting in collection, and electronic countermeasures, asan increase in organic firepower. These units well as physical destruction of enemy assets.have received self-propelled howitzers and addi- Transport Aviation: Soviet Military Trans-

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port Aviation (VTA) is responsible for provid- lift airborne combh.tt divisions in time of war.ing airlift fo r Soviet airborne fors and air US andAllied Force Improvements: US andassault brigades as well at ; the air logistics system NATO allied forces have also been strengthen-for the armed forces as a whole. VTA continues ed in r-cent years, but at a less rapid and im -to modernize its air transport inventory. The pressive rate than the Warsaw Pact's. For thenumber of An-22/COCK long-range heavy lift 100s, the goal is to accelerate NATO's rapidturboprop transpcorts has remained constant in reinforcement capabilities, to modirnize USrecent years. The medium-range An-12/CUB and allied forces significantly, and to achieveturboprop transport is being replaced by the 11 - greater readiness and sustainability. NATO's76/CANDID long-range jet transport at the longer-range intemrdiate zange nuclear forcesrate of about 50 aircraft per year. The CAN- also are to be upgraded in the near future.DID can carry twice the CUB's maximum pa'- US ground and tactical air forces, in par-load about three and one-half times as fAi ticular, are programmed for major moderniza-While the overall VTA inventory has declintd tion over the next few years. An acceleratedby about 60 transports in the last five years, its procurement effort will introduce largercarrying capacity, measured in ton-kilometera, numbers of new tanks, combat aircraft an dhas risen almost 50 percent. other systems. The Army is receiving the newThe Soviets are also developing a new long- M-I tank and Bradley fighting vehicles and willrange heavy-lift transport comparable to the US be receiving the Multiple Launch RocketC-5A, which should enter service in the mid-to- System, improved anti-tank weapons, modernlate 1980s. When available in significant num- helicopters and air defense weapons, The resultbers, it will enhance VTA's capability to carry will be US forces that are more combat effec-outsized, very heavy loads. It will increase the tive, more ready and better configured for theirairlift potertial in support of power-projection NATO missions. For example, the M60ASgoals and provide greater wart~ime capacity to tank, first introduced into Western Europe in

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US Forca for Theater Warfare

1979, constitutes about .130 percent of the 5,000 aircraft and weapons and-more important-US tanks now in Europe. Although, it features in personnel and training. The US F-14, F-15,many technological improvements over earlier F. 16 , and F-18 today are among the best air su-M6

Soviet Military Power 1983

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