Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 70660 September 24, 1987EULALIO GALANIDA,petitioner,vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J:Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Employees' Compensation Commission's (ECC) decision affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of the petitioner's claim for disability compensation under P.D. 626.Petitioner Eulalio Galanida started working for the government on November 8, 1948 as a messenger/janitor at the Bureau of Agricultural Extension Office in Tagbilaran City. Subsequently, he was promoted to Clerk and, finally, to Administrative Officer II of the Ministry of Agriculture until he retired on December 10, 1983. Galanida's medical records reveal that sometime in 1955, he complained of facial distortion and numbness accompanied by the blurring of vision and headache. According to the petitioner, he suffered irregular sleep and heart palpitation, as well as pain in both extremities for several years. From May 15 to 29, 1972, he was confined at the Bohol Provincial Hospital for hemorrhoidectomy which was performed by Dr. Miguel C. Froilan.On January 18, 1983, the petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 with the GSIS. On March 9, 1983, the GSIS disapproved the claim on the ground that the claimant's ailments are not occupational diseases and there was no showing that his work had increased the risk of contracting the same. The petitioner elevated his case to the ECC and on November 27, 1984, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS.After a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, we find no justifiable reason to reverse the decision of the ECC.The petitioner's ailments were diagnosed to be the following: (1) Bells Palsy is an acute lower Motor Neuron Palsy of the facial nerve, characterized by pain, weakness or paralysis of the affected side of the face (2) Anxiety Neurosis is a progressive disintegration of personal instability arising in the course of the intercurrent illness. (3) Peripheral Neuritis is a syndrome of sensory motor, reflect and basomotor reflex symptoms produced by lesion of nerve root on peripheral nerves. (p. 27, Rollo)The above-mentioned diseases are not among those listed as occupational diseases under Annex "A" of P.D. 626 nor has the petitioner shown proofs that the risk of ' contracting the diseases was increased by his employment's working conditions as Administrative Officer II of the Ministry of Agriculture in Manila as provided by Section l(b), Rule III, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. As we have repeatedly held, the doctrines of aggravation and presumption of compensability under the former Workmen's Compensation Act are no longer provided by law under the present social insurance scheme (Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192).Considering that the illnesses are not occupational diseases, it was, therefore, necessary for the petitioner to present proof that he contracted them in the course of his employment at the Ministry of Agriculture. Unfortunately, he failed in this regard. In his petition for review submitted to the Employees' Compensation Commission dated May 16, 1983, the petitioner alleges that the "cleaning of rooms as janitor and subsequently the amount of paperwork thereby forcing him to render overtime, increased the risk of contracting said ailments." This is a mere allegation which needs to be proved. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. (People vs. Lumayok, 139 SCRA 1) Despite the request made by the respondent (letter dated July 9, 1983, rollo, p. 39) the petitioner failed to submit evidence or proofs such as a certification signed by the employer as to inclusive dates of leave of absences or sick leaves, medical certificates, hospital records and/or clinical records of confinement/consultation so as to substantiate his claim for compensation under P. D. 626. There is absolutely no showing how the work of a janitor increase the risk of contracting the petitioner's ailments. Moreover, the petitioner's attending physician, Dr. Segundo Racho categorically stated that the petitioner's ailments are not work-connected. Hence, the petitioner's claim for disability compensation under P.D. 626 has no factual basis.Even if we applied the ruling inCorales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission(88 SCRA 547), as contended by the petitioner, his claim for compensation wig still not prosper.The records show that the symptoms of the petitioner's ailments upon which he could base his claim for compensation under theCoralesdoctrine became manifest in 1955. His right to claim for compensation, therefore, accrued as early as that date. Hence, the law to be applied under his contention would be the Workmen's Compensation Act following the principle that in workmen's compensation commission cases, the governing law is to be determined by the date on which the claimant contracted his illness. (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation of the Philippines v. Dela Rosa, 146 SCRA 222). The right founded on statute prescribes in ten (10) years which are counted from the date of disability (Leonardo v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 58).In the instant case, the petitioner alleged that in the years 1954-1955, he was treated by several doctors and confined twice in the hospital for the ailments earlier mentioned. He, therefore, had until 1964-1965 within which to file his claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. And even if we counted the ten-year period from the date of his hospitalization for hemorrhoidectomy on May 15 to 29, 1972, the claim filed only in January 18, 1983 is obviously beyond the prescriptive period. Moreover, hemorrhoidectomy has never been mentioned as the basis of his claim. The petitioner, therefore, failed to seasonably raise his claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, assuming its applicability.Furthermore, the fact that the petitioner continued working until he compulsorily retired on December 10, 1983 militates against his right to disability compensation. In the case ofCorales v. Employees Compensation Commission(supra), we held:It must be noted that We disallowed petitioner's claim for disability compensation because of the undisputed fact that petitioner, despite his disabling illness of PTB medically speaking was able to physically pursue his line of work the very day he reached the compulsory age of retirement 65; and therefore cannot be awarded disability benefits under Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, which observes the wage loss factor as basis of the granting of disability benefits for it commands that " ... No compensation shall be allowed for thefirst three calendar days of incapacityresulting from an injury except the benefits provided for in the preceding section; but if the incapacity extends beyond that period, compensation shall be allowed from the first day of such incapacity. ... ." (Section 14, Act 3428, as amended). Consequently, We ruled that, despite OUR finding that petitioner's illness and disability was work-connected, he is not entitled to disability benefits because his illness and/or medical disability did not result in any wage loss or diminution of earnings as it is undisputed from the records that he not only continued to receive the same rate of salary (P3223.58 per annum) he was receiving in 1965 when he was initially found afflicted with PTB but also thereafter enjoyed increases of salaries and at the time of his compulsory retirement in 1975, his rate was P5095.20 per annum; although he did not receive any promotion in rank or position. from 1965 to the year of his retirement. ... (at p. 555).WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-48488 April 25, 1980GLORIA D. MENEZ,petitioner,vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION & CULTURE),respondents.Gloria D. Menez in her own behalf.Manuel M. Lazaro for respondents.MAKASIAR,J.:Petition for review oncertiorarifrom the decisionen bancdated March 1, 1978 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0462, affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim of petitioner for benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (now Title II the New Labor Code) and dismissing said claim.The records disclose that petitioner Gloria D. Menez was employed by the Department (now Ministry) of Education & Culture as a school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila near a dirty creek.On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System (p. 1, ECC rec.).On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. In denying aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus resolved:Upon evaluation based on general accepted medical authorities, your ailments are found to be the least causally related to your duties and conditions of work. We believe that our ailments are principally traceable to factors which are definitely not work-connected. Moreover, the evidences you have, submitted have not shown that the said ailments directly resulted from your occupation as Teacher IV of Raja Soliman High School, Manila (Letter-Resolution, p. 4, ECC Case No. 0462).On November 24, 1976, petitioner filed a letter-request for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial of her claim, which request was denied by the GSIS in its letter-resolution of November 28, 1976 therein reiterating that on the basis of the evidence on record, it appears that petitioner has not established that her employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailments (p. 6, ECC rec.).On March 7, 1977, petitioner again requested for reconsideration of the second denial of said claim, still alleging that her ailments arose out of and in the course of employment (p. 11, ECC rec.).On March 11, 1977, respondent GSIS reaffirmed its stand on the case and elevated the entire records thereof to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review (p. 12, ECC rec.).On March 1, 1978, respondent Commission issued a decision en banc thus stating:... Despite assertions to the contrary by herein appellant, this Commission fully agrees with the respondent system that appellant's employment has nothing to do with the development of her disabling illnesses. Appellant's ailments are not listed as occupational diseases for the employment she was engaged in as to merit compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended (p. 13, rec.).On July 7, 1978, petitioner filed this petition seeking a review of aforesaid decision of respondent Commission (p. 2, rec.).Petitioner claims she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected (p. 2, rec.).She specifically alleged that ... said sickness and/or disabilities arose out of or in the course of employment and is aggravated by the condition and nature of the work in school, that appellant belonged to the afternoon and night shifts as shown by her time record, Annex D, subjecting her to varying climatic (sic) temperature at noon and night time; and that the place of work, Raja Soliman High School, is surrounded by the Divisoria market at the north, Sta. Helena Bridge and Creek which is heavily polluted; in the Northeast, is the presence of many squatter houses too, and in the south gasoline stations, bakery, Textile market as stated before and a fact. That as a teacher of social studies handling 250 students more or less a day, she is subjected to infections from students who have flu, colds and other respiratory infections which aggravated her ailments (p. 3, rec.).Petitioner now maintains that her ailments arose in the course of employment and were aggravated by the condition and nature of her work. Specifically, she asserts that "pneumonitis or baby pneumonia which has become chronic that led to bronchiectasis which is irreversible and permanent in nature is compensable under No. 21 of compensable diseases (Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977) as conditions were present as attested to by doctor's affidavits and certifications."Respondents Commission and System contend that petitioner's ailments of rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not among the occupational diseases listed as compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; and, that respondent Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the form of accepted medical findings thus making said decision final and conclusive on the matter (p. 33 & 68, rec.).Article 167 (1) of the new Labor Code provides that (1) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. ...Rule 111, Section 1 (b) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation thus provides: (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions.Rule III, Section 1 (c) of said Rules states:(c) Only inqiury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.The aforequoted provisions clearly establish that for an illness to be compensable, it must either be:1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease; or2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.An occupational disease is one "which results from the nature of the employment, and by nature ismeant conditions to which all employees of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural incidentof a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation ahazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general" (Goldberg vs. 954 Mancy Corp., 12 N. E. 2d 311; Emphasis supplied).To be occupational, the disease must be one "due wholly to causes and conditions which arenormal and constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation;that is, those things which science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. Every worker in every plant of the same industry is alike constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular occupational disease" (Seattle Can Co. vs. Dept. of Labor, 265, p. 741; Emphasis supplied).An occupational disease is one which develops as a result of hazards peculiar to certain occupations, due to toxic substances (as in the organic solvents industry), radiation (as in television repairmen), repeated mechanical injury, emotional strain, etc. (Schmidts Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine, p. 561).From the foregoing definitions of occupational diseases or ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis can be considered as such occupational diseases. All public high school teachers, like herein petitioner, admittedly the most underpaid but overworked employees of the government, are subject to emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers especially young boys, and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or non- academic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high school in which she teaches is situated in a tough area - Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers is further accentuated by poor diet for they can ill-afford nutritious food.In her work, petitioner also has to contend with the natural elements, like the inclement weather heavy rains, typhoons as well as dust and disease-ridden surroundings peculiar to an insanitary slum area.These unwholesome conditions are "normal and consistently present in" or are the "hazards peculiar to" the occupation of a public high school teacher. It is therefore evident that rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are the "natural incidents" of petitioner's occupation as such public high school teacher.But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases, there is ample proof that petitioner contracted such ailments by reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher due to her exposure to the adverse working conditions above-mentioned.Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after being drenched and the consequent "chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected." Undoubtedly, petitioner's ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor Code since under Rule 111, Section 1 (c) of its Implementing Rules, "only sickness or injury which occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules."It must be borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of the Raja Soliman High School which is located in the heart of Binondo District. She was constantly exposed to the heavily polluted air and congestion (squatter's area) characteristic of the area. She was not only exposed to the elements - varying degrees of temperature throughout the day and night - but also had to withstand long hours of standing while performing her teaching job. Likewise, she had to regularly negotiate long trips from her home in Project 2, Quirino District, Quezon City (her residence) to said high school in Binondo, scampering from one ride to another, rain or shine, and sweating in the process.Furthermore, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that our country is in a typhoon belt and that yearly we experience torrential rains and storms. Needless to say, in her daily rides from Quezon City to Binondo and back, she had to go through the ordeal of perspiring and getting wet from downpours or heavy rains, thus making her susceptible to contracting her ailments. Moreover, petitioner was always in contact with 250 students who might have been carriers of contagious respiratory diseases like flu and colds and who were themselves inadequately nourished, residing as they do in a depressed and congested area. And adding to the unhygienic working atmosphere was her malnutrition or undernourishment. More often than not, a teacher who has no other source of income takes to aside from the poor man's staple diet of tuyo, daing and rice legumes like mongo, vegetables and fruits with edible seeds which contain much uric and.Acute arthritis is inflammation of a joint marked by pain, swelling, heat and redness; the result of rheumatism or gout (p. 56, The Simplified Medical Dictionary for Lawyers). Gout is a disease characterized by painful inflammation of the joints,in excessive amount of uric acid in the blood Poor man's gout is caused by hard work, poor food and exposure (p. 268, supra). It may thus be seen that uric acid eventually causes arthritis, aside from excessive mental and physical stresses to which teachers are subject of reason of their duties.Consequently, this Court finds petitioner to have substantially shown that the risk of contracting her ailments had been increased by unfavorable working conditions.InDimaano vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission(78 SCRA 510 [1977]), WE ruled that illnesses of rheumatic arthritis with sub-acute exacerbation and hypertension of therein petitioner, who was herself a teacher, as service-connected, after WE considered her working conditions and nature of employment which are substantially the same as those of herein petitioner.Significantly, also, the Employees' Compensation Commission, in its Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432, respectively dated March 16, 1977 and July 20, 1977, adopted a more realistic construction of the provisions of the New Labor Code by including in the list of compensable ailments and diseases, cardiovascular disease which comprehends myocardial infarction, pneumonitis and bronchial asthma (Sepulveda vs. WCC, et al., L-46290, Aug. 25,1978).Furthermore, it must be stressed that "the approval of petitioner's application for retirement is a clear indication that she was physically incapacitated to render efficient service (Sudario vs. Republic, L-44088, Oct. 6, 1977; Dimaano vs. WCC, et al., supra). Petitioner was allowed to retire under the disability retirement plan on August 31, 1975 at the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory retirement age of 65. Under Memorandum Circular No. 133 issued by the retirement shall be recommended for approval only when "the employee applicant is below 65 years of age and is physically incapacitated to render further efficient service." Obviously, petitioner thus retired by reason of her ailments.Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions that "Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teachers's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja vs. Republic, et al.. L-43317, December 29, 1978).WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE IS HEREBY ORDERED1) TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND [P 6,000.00] PESOS AS DISABILITY INCOME BENEFITS; AND2) TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS.SO ORDERED.Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro concur.Teehankee (Chairman), concurs in the result.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-47294 April 8, 1987HILARIA DABATIAN,petitioner,vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (General Services Department, Cagayan de Oro City),respondent.Mando Z. Tagarda and Longino G. Tagarda for petitioner.Nicasio S. Palaganas and Jose G. de Vera for respondent ECC.GANCAYCO,J.:A petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated June 27, 1977 in ECC Case No. 0217 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying the claim for death benefits of Hilaria Dabatian, widow of the late Sigfredo A. Dabatian, was filed on September 26, 1977. However, for failure to file the necessary docket fees, this Court denied the petition in a Resolution dated September 30, 1977.A Motion for Reconsideration together with a motion to litigate as pauper was filed by the petitioner and this Court, in a Resolution dated November 11, 1977, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file simultaneous memoranda, The Employees' Compensation Commission, which was not formally impleaded as respondent in the petition, filed its memorandum and so did respondent GSIS. Petitioner failed to file her memorandum. The case was submitted for decision on August 30, 1978.The undisputed factual background as found by the ECC which should have been made the proper respondent in this case, is as follows:At the time of his death Sigfredo A. Dabatian was employed as Garbage Truck Driver in the General Services Department of the City Government of Cagayan de Oro City. As Garbage Truck Driver, he was assigned mostly in the night shift. In fact, at the time of his death, his time of duty started from 10:00 o'clock at night to 6:00 o'clock in the morning the next day. It was gathered from the evidence on record that the deceased was a heavy coffee drinker which was his way of warding off sleepiness.Prior to his death, he was observed by his co-employees to have been getting paler and weaker while at work until the time he collapsed and became unconscious while on his tour duty and was brought to his residence by his companions. Despite hospitalization, he died two weeks later on July 3, 1976.A claim for income benefits under the Employee's Compensation Program was filed by the widow, the herein appellant. The Government Service Insurance System decided against the compensability of the claim on the ground that decedent's ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is not definitely accepted as an occupational disease, as listed under the present law on compensation. Neither was there a showing that the same was directly caused by his employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions attendant to the deceased's employment.1The case was the elevated to the ECC which ruled that:... Peptic ulcer, the deceased's main ailment, is a sharp circumscribed loss of tissue resulting from the digestive action of acid gastric juice. Aggravating factors are ingestion of alcohol, coffee, tea and cola drinks. Cigarette smoking has also been documented to be a definite cause of delayed healing of peptic ulcer. Some drugs also contribute to its occurrence. Another factor in the production of peptic ulcer is the hereditary predisposition which seems to play a major role in the occurrence of peptic ulcer. Intractable bleeding is a complication of peptic ulcer. Death will ensue due to irreversible shock as a result of a bleeding peptic ulcer. (Principles of Internal Medicine by Harrison).Upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, the deceased's ailment was found not to be in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of work. His ailment was principally traceable to factors which were definitely not work-connected, specifically, his inherent predisposition to drinking coffee heavily which could have aggravated his contraction of the disease resulting to his death. However, aggravation of an illness is not a ground for compensation under the present compensation law.2On these considerations, the ECC found no sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the GSIS denying petitioner's claim. Hence, this petitioner certiorari.The sole issue which the Court must determine is whether or not under the premises the death of Sigfredo A. Dabatian is compensable.The petition obviously addresses itself to the presumption of compensability and the principle of aggravation which were sufficient grounds for entitlement under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In fact, all the cases cited by the petitioner were decided under the old compensation law.The records show that petitioner died on July 3, 1976 when the old compensation law had already been abrogated. No competent evidence whatsoever was submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment was contracted prior to January 1, 1975 in order to bring it under the protective mantle of the old compensation law.3There are no medical findings, affidavits, reports or any other evidence that deceased suffered from pain or any discomfort prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code. No allegation was even made to this effect. True it is, that strict rules on evidence do not apply in cases such as this and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of labor. However, We cannot over-extend the limits of such rules. Justice and fair play dictate otherwise. The new law on compensation should be applied to this case.The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 as amended, abolished the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of employment, the reason being "to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability ... "4It was found, and rightly so, that the old law, the Workmen's Compensation Act, destroyed the parity or balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to workmen's compensation. The balance was tilted unduly in favor of the workmen since it was possible to stretch the work-related nature of an ailment beyond seemingly rational its.5Thus, under the present law,6in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have resulted from either a) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or b) any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission, then petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature of her husband's work increased the risk of contracting the disease.Aside from the undisputed fact that the deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of warding off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by petitioner to bolster the theory that her husband's work increased the risk of contracting the ailment.Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of an illness is no longer a ground for compensation under the present law.This Court takes notice of the fact that the conditions in this case are not peculiar to the work mentioned herein. Many, if not most, employees are equally exposed to similar conditions but have not been victims of peptic ulcer.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. No costs.SO ORDERED.Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTBaguio City

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 80157. February 6, 1990.]

AMALIA NARAZO,Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Provincial Governors Office, Negros Occidental),Respondents.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.

D E C I S I O N

PADILLA,J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) dated 19 May 1987, 1 denying petitioners claim for compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended, for the death of her husband, Geronimo Narazo.

Geronimo Narazo was employed for thirty eight (38) years as Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor, Province of Negros Occidental. His duties included preparation of the budget of the Province, financial reports and review or examination of the budget of some provincial and municipal offices.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

On 14 May 1984, Narazo died at the age of fifty seven (57). His medical records show that he was confined three (3) times at the Doa Corazon L. Montelibano Hospital in Bacolod City, for urinary retention, abdominal pain and anemia. He was thereafter diagnosed to be suffering from "obstructive nepropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy", commonly known as "Uremia."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner, as the widow of the deceased, filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefits for the death of her husband, under the Employees Compensation Law (PD 626, as amended). However, said claim was denied on the ground that the cause of death of Narazo is not listed as an occupational disease, and that there is no showing that the position and duties of the deceased as Budget Examiner had increased the risk of contracting "Uremia." 2 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said decision, claiming that although the cause of her husbands death is not considered as an occupational disease, nevertheless, his job as Budget Examiner which required long hours of sedentary work, coupled with stress and pressure, caused him many times to delay urination, which eventually led to the development of his ailments. The GSIS denied said motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS on the ground that the ailments of the deceased could not be attributed to employment factors and as impressed by medical experts, benign prostatic hypertrophy is quite common among men over fifty (50) years of age, regardless of occupation, while uremia is a complication of obstructive nephtropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy; 3 hence, this petition.

Petitioner avers that the nature, length of time, and circumstances of the occupation of the deceased were not considered in determining whether the work of the said deceased had increased the risks of contracting the ailments which caused his death. The work of the deceased, which required long sedentary work under pressure, aggravated the risk of contracting the disease leading to his hospital confinement and death. 4

In controversion, the ECC argues that petitioner failed to show proof that the disease which caused the death of her husband is work-connected; and that no credence could be given to petitioners claim that her husbands delayed urination gave rise to the development of his ailments, for lack of medical bases. All that petitioner has shown, according to the ECC, are mere aggravation, and not work-connection causes. 5

Rule III, section 1, paragraph 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, defines a "compensable sickness" as any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. 6 The ECC is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. 7

Thus, a sickness or death caused by said sickness is compensable if the same is listed as an occupational disease. If it is not so listed, compensation may still be recovered if the illness was aggravated by employment. However, it is incumbent upon the claimant to show proof that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions.

The death of petitioners husband was caused by "Uremia due to obstructive nephropathy and benign prostatic hypertrophy," which is admittedly not among those listed as occupational diseases. 8 As per finding of the ECC, "Uremia is a toxic clinical condition characterized by restlessness, muscular twitchings, mental disturbance, nausea, and vomiting associated with renal insufficiency brought about by the retention in blood of nitrogeneous urinary waste products." One of its causes is the obstruction in the flow of urinary waste products. 9

Under the circumstances, the burden of proof was upon petitioner to show that the conditions under which her deceased husband was then working had increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death.cralawnad

To establish compensability under the increased risk theory, the claimant must show proof of reasonable work-connection, not necessarily direct causal relation. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as will support a decision, or clear and convincing evidence. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable. To require proof of actual causes or factors which lead to an ailment would not be consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee in favor of the workers. 10 Although strict roles of evidence are not applicable, yet the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. 11

The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in the Office of the Governor dealt with the detailed preparation of the budget, financial reports and review and/or examination of the budget of other provincial and municipal offices. Full concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in the budget and/or financial reports were necessary, such that the deceased had to sit for hours, and more often that not, delay and even forego urination in order not to interrupt the flow of concentration. In addition, tension and pressure must have aggravated the situation. In the case of Ceniza v. ECC, 12 the Court held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . . It may be added that teachers have a tendency to sit for hours on end, and to put off or postpone emptying their bladders when it interferes with their teaching hours or preparation of lesson plans. From human experience, prolonged sitting down and putting off urination result in stagnation of the urine. This encourages the growth of bacteria in the urine, and affects the delicate balance between bacterial multiplication rates and the host defense mechanisms. Delayed excretion may permit the retention and survival of micro-organisms which multiply rapidly, and infect the urinary tract. These are predisposing factors to pyelonephritis and uremia. Thus, while We may concede that these illnesses are not directly caused by the nature of the duties of a teacher, the risk of contracting the same is certainly aggravated by their working habits necessitated by demands of job efficiency."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the foregoing circumstances, we are persuaded to hold that the cause of death of petitioners husband is work-connected, i.e. the risk of contracting the illness was aggravated by the nature of the work, so much so that petitioner is entitled to receive compensation benefits for the death of her husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Employees Compensation Commission denying petitioners claim for benefits under PD 626, as amended, arising from the death of her husband, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

SOORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado,JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTBaguio CityFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-45910 April 28, 1980ELIGIO P. MIRASOL,Petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Department of Education and Culture),Respondents.chanrobles virtual law libraryFERNANDEZ,J.:This is a petition to review the decision of the Employee's Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0134 entitled "Eligio Mirasol, Claimant, versus, Government Service Insurance System (Department of Education and Culture), Respondent" affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for compensation of Eligio P. Mirasol on the ground that the claimant's ailments, hypertension and rheumatic infection in both knees, are not occupational diseases arising from his employment.1chanrobles virtual law libraryThe petitioner, Eligio P. Mirasol, while in good health, was appointed as classroom teacher on August 1, 1945 in the public school in Libmanan, Camarines Sur. In 1960, he was appointed as District Food Production Coordinator and Attendant Teacher in the same school. He became a District Revolution Coordinator and Attendant Teacher in 1972. In 1974, the petition was given additional assignment as District Vocational Coordinator. The district was composed of forty eight (48) central barrio schools, eighteen (18) of which were in the mountains which could be reached only on foot. Eight (8) schools were 30 kilometers and the nearest was 10 kilometers from the petitioner's headquarters in the town proper of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. It was the petitioner's duty to visit monthly all the district schools. On August 25, 1973, he experienced for the first time symptoms of malignant hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis. The ailments of the petitioner persisted. He was under continuous medical treatment until he retired on February 28, 1976 after having been in the government service for thirty one (31) years, more or less. His retirement was brought about by ailments diagnosed as high blood pressure and rheumatoid arthritis, both knees.2chanrobles virtual law libraryThe petitioner applied for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in 1976. In a letter dated March 8, 1976, the Senior Assistant General Manager, Domingo N. Garcia, of the GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the ailments of hypertension and rheumatic infection, both knees, are not occupational diseases and that the working conditions of the petitioner's employment could not have directly caused such ailments.3chanrobles virtual law libraryThe motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the Senior Assistant General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System in a letter dated May 17, 1976.4chanrobles virtual law libraryThe petitioner appealed to the Employee's Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIt is a fact that part of the duties of the petitioner was to make monthly visits to various schools which are not accessible by road. To reach these mountainous schools, the petitioner had to hike through muddy ricefields and climb slippery mountains during sunny and rainy days. During these monthly visits, the petitioner fell down many times because of the slippery paths in the ricefields and trails in the mountains. The ailments of hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis, both knees, must have been caused by the exposure to the elements of the petitioner and his falling down many times while hiking in muddy ricefields and on slippery mountain trails under all kinds of weather conditions on his way to the barrio schools not accessible by road.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThere is sufficient substantial evidence of record to show that the ailments of the petitioner were caused by the duties of his employment and that the risk of contracting said ailments was increased by the working conditions. He is entitled to permanent total disability compensation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe record also discloses that the petitioner received medical treatment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWHEREFORE, the decision of the Employee's Compensation Commission sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered:1) To pay the petitioner the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as disability benefit;chanrobles virtual law library2) To reimburse the petitioner the medical expenses he incurred, supported by proper receipts; andchanrobles virtual law library3) To pay the petitioner the amount of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) as attorney's fees.SO ORDERED.Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989ZAIDA G. RARO,petitioner,vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences),respondents.GUTIERREZ,JR., J.:Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees' compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles of 94 presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees' compensation decisions.The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of "proof of increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable because the law says so.The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost.A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.The following issues are raised in this petition:1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. (p. 17, Rollo)The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes the difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namel Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic and blood forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills.17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic workers.(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines "sickness" as follows:ART. 167.Definition of Terms. As used in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise: (1) Sicknessmeans any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is by working conditions. For this purpose, the Co on is empowered to determine and approve occupational and work- related illnesses that may be considered compensable sable based on hazards of employment. (PD 1368, May 1, 1978).Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines who are entitled. It provides:SECTION 1. (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease under Annex A of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions. (Emphasis supplied)The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove apositive thing the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed .InNavalta v. Government Service Insurance System(G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes; people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease .To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision of the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and the present scheme.On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988).Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.InSarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra),we affirmed the validity of the new law by explaining the present system as follows:We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari.The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights.The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving anegativeproposition that the diseasewas not causedby employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove apositiveproposition, that the risk of contracting the isincreasedby working conditions.The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the said fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law.We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need toshow a greater concern for the trust fundto winch the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching implications.We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court to accomplish.For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the decisions inPanotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission[128 SCRA 473 (1984)];Mercado v. Employees' Compensation Commission[127 SCRA 664 (1984)];Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation Commission[156 SCRA 21 (1987)];Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission[155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from those stated above.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public respondents is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Fernan , C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 94167 January 21, 1991MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. AND SKIPPERS MARITIME CO., LTD.,petitioners,vs.HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION) AND CECILIA SENTINA,respondents.Victorino Alba for petitioners.Rodolfo B. Dizon for private respondent.

GANCAYCO,J.:The employer is exempted from liability for burial expenses for a seaman who commits suicide. How about in a case of one who ran amuck or who in a state of intoxication provoked a fight as a result of which he was killed? Is the employer similarly exempt from liability? This is the issue in this case.Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI) for and in behalf of co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to work aboard the M/V Harmony I for a period of one year. He reported for duty aboard said vessel on July 13, 1987.On January 16, 1988 at about 3 p.m., while the vessel was docked alongside Drapetona Pier, Piraeus, Greece, Sentina arrived aboard the ship from shore leave visibly drunk. He went to the messhall and took a fire axe and challenged those eating therein. He was pacified by his shipmates who led him to his cabin. However, later he went out of his cabin and proceeded to the messhall. He became violent. He smashed and threw a cup towards the head of an oiler Emmanuel Ero, who was then eating. Ero touched his head and noticed blood. This infuriated Ero which led to a fight between the two. After the shipmates broke the fight, Sentina was taken to the hospital where he passed away on January 17, 1988.1Ero was arrested by the Greek authorities and was jailed in Piraeus.On October 26, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for payment of death benefits, burial expenses, unpaid salaries on board and overtime pay with damages docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 88-10-896. After submission of the answer and position papers of the parties a decision was rendered by the POEA on July 11, 1989, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to pay complainant Cecilia S. Sentina the sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P230,000.00) representing the deceased's death benefit and burial compensation, the sum of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS (US$350.00) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing unpaid shipboard pay and fixed overtime pay plus ten percent (10%) of the total judgment award by way of and as attorney's fees.All other claims are ordered dismissedSO ORDERED.2A motion for reconsideration and/or appeal was filed by petitioners which the respondent First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) disposed of in a resolution dated March 31, 1990 dismissing the appeal and affirming the appealed decision.3A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was denied by said public respondent in a resolution dated June 29, 1990.Hence, the herein petition forcertiorariwherein the following grounds are invoked:The Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding that "The payment of Death Compensation Benefit only requires that the seaman dies during the term of the conract, and no other."That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding that even if the subject seaman's death resulted from the fight he himself created, such nonetheless does not constitute a "deliberate or wilfull act on his own life."That the Hon. NLRC, gravely abused its discretion in holding, that the death of the late 4/Engr Romulo Sentina is compensable.4The petition is impressed with merit.Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the POEA Standard Format for Filipino seamen employed in ocean going vessels states that No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a deliberate or willful act on his own life by the seaman,provided howeverthat the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seamen.The same provision of the standard format also provides In case of death of the seaman during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount ofx x x x x x x x xb. P210,000.00 for other officers including radio operators and master electrician. (Memo Circular No. 5 effective March 1, 1986)In interpreting the aforequoted provision in its decision, the POEA held that payment of death compensation benefits only requires that the seaman should die during the term of the contract and no other. It further held that the saving provision relied upon by petitioners refers only to suicide where the seaman deliberately and intentionally took his own life.5Public respondent in affirming the said POEA decision made the following disquisitionIt is not difficult for us to understand the intent of the aforequoted "Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the POEA Standard Format" that to avoid death compensation, two conditions must be met:a) the subject death much have resulted "from adeliberate or willful act on his own lifeby the seaman;" andb) such death "directly attributable to the seaman" must have been proven by the "employerThus, even ifarguendo,the appellants may successfully prove that the subject seaman's death resulted from the fight he himself created, such, nonetheless does not constitute a "deliberate or willful act on his own life." On this ground alone, the instant appeal would already fail.6The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not automatically give rise to compensation.1wphi1The circumstances which led to the death as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer and seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations to the liability to pay death benefits.When the death of the seaman resulted from adeliberate or willful act on his own life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman,such death is not compensable. No doubt a case of suicide is covered by this provision.By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck, or committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman, the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. First he challenged everyone to a fight with an axe. Thereafter, he returned to the messhall picked up and broke a cup and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus provoked, the oiler fought back The death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his unlawful aggression and thus is not compensable.Even under Article 172 of the Labor Code, the compensation for workers covered by the Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund are subject to the limitations on liability.Art. 172. Limitations of liability. The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for the compensation to the employee or his dependents except when the disability or death was occasioned by the employee's intoxication, willful intent to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence, or otherwise provided under this Title.Private respondent pointed out that petitioner MSSI endorsed the claim for compensation of private respondents. Said petitioner admits this fact but asserts that it was not favorably acted upon by its principal, petitioner Skippers Maritime Co., Inc. because of the circumstances that led to the death of Sentina.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the POEA dated July 11, 1989 and the resolutions of public respondent dated May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990 affirming the same are hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 115497 September 16, 1996INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., FIRCROFT SHIPPING CORPORATION and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC.,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and CONSTANCIA PINEDA,respondents.PANGANIBAN,J.:Are the local crewing or manning agent and its foreign principal (the shipowner) liable for the death of a Filipino seaman-employee who, after having been discharged, was killed in transit while being repatriated home?The instant petition1seeks the reversal and/or modification of the Resolution2dated March 30, 1994 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission3dismissing the appeals of petitioners and affirming the decision dated November 16, 19924of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Administrator Felicisimo C. Joson, which orderedthat.5WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, respondents are hereby jointly and severally held liable to pay the complainant the following amounts:1. P130,000.00 as death compensation benefits.2. P18,000.00 as burial expenses.The FactsThe proceedings below originated as a claim for death compensation benefits filed by Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased son, seaman Jeremias Pineda, against Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation and the Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. The following facts were found by the POEA Administrator:6As can be gathered from the records of the case, it was alleged that deceased seaman, Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as Oiler on board the vessels, "MV Amazonia", owned and operated by its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation for a period of nine (9) months with additional three (3) months upon mutual consent of both parties with a monthly basic salary of US$276.00 plus fixed overtime rate of US$83.00 and a leave pay of 2 1/2 days per month; that on October 2, 1989, he met his death when he was shot by a Thai Policeman in Bangkok, Thailand; that considering that the deceased seaman was suffering from mental disorders aggravated by threats on his life by his fellow seamen, the Ship Captain should not have allowed him to travel alone.In its Answer/Position Paper, respondent agency averred that deceased seaman signed a contract of employment as Oiler for a period of nine (9) months with additional three (3) months upon mutual consent of both parties with a monthly salary of US$276.00, fixed overtime rate of US$83.00; that on December 21, 1988, deceased seaman jointed the vessels MV Amazonia and proceeded to discharge his duties as Oiler; that on September 28, 1989, he finished his contract and was discharged from the port of Dubai for repatriation to Manila; that his flight schedule from Dubai to the Philippines necessitated a stopover at Bangkok, Thailand, and during said stopover he disembarked on his own free will and failed to join the connecting flight to Hongkong with final destination to Manila; that on October 5, 1990, it received a fax transmission from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the effect that Jeremias Pineda was shot by a Thai Officer on duty on October 2, 1989 at around 4:00 P.M.; that the police report submitted to the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok confirmed that it was Pineda who "approached and tried to stab the police sergeant with a knife and that therefore he was forced to pull out his gun and shot Pineda"; that they are not liable to pay any death/burial benefits pursuant to the provisions of Par. 6, Section C. Part II, POEA Standard Format of Employment which state(s) that "no compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, (in)capacity, disability or death resulting from a willful (sic) act on his own life by the seaman"; that the deceased seaman died due to his own willful (sic) act in attacking a policeman in Bangkok who shot him in self-defense.After the parties presented their respective evidence, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision holding petitioners liable for death compensation benefits and burial expenses.Petitioners appealed the POEA decision to the public respondent. In a Decision dated March 30, 1994, public respondent upheld the POEA.Thus, this recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action forcertiorariper Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.The IssuesThe petitioners made the following "assignment of errors":Respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that herein petitioners are liable for death compensation benefits despite the fact that there is no direct evidence proving that Pineda was mentally sick at the time of repatriation.Respondent NLRC committed a serious error of law in not upholding the provisions of Par. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA standard format Contract of Employment.Respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion infinding for compensability of Pineda's death when respondents (should read "petitioners") have proven that his death was not work-connected.The principal issue in this case is whether the petitioners can be held liable for the death of seaman Jeremias Pineda.The petitioners challenge the factual bases of the NLRC Decision, and argue that there was "no evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, that the deceased Pineda, at the time of his repatriation was not in full control of his mental faculties", and that "there (was) no showing that seaman Pineda acted strangely when he disembarked from the vessel" in Dubai where he was discharge, and from which point he flew to Bangkok without any untoward incident during the entire trip. They thus insist that they were under no obligation to have Pineda accompanied home when he was discharged at the end of the contract term of nine months, that they were in no position to control the deceased's movements and behavior after he was repatriated and therefore should not be held answerable for the deceased's own voluntary acts, and that the deceased could have, while in Bangkok, ingested some drugs or other mindaltering substance resulting in his aggressive behavior and untimely demise.The Court's RulingProcedural and Substantive DefectsAt the outset, we note that the petition suffers from serious procedural defects that warrant its being dismissed outright. Petitioners acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for reconsideration with the public respondent before bringing the instant petition to this Court. This constitutes a fatal infirmity.. . . The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is thatcertiorariwill lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of public respondent. In the instant case, the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by the law was a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision, based on palpable or patent errors, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the questioned decision.7(T)he filing of such a motion is intended to afford public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent Commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. . . .8. . . And for failure to avail of the correct remedy expressly provided by law, petitioner has permitted the subject Resolution to be come final and executory after the lapse of the ten day period within which to file such motion for reconsideration.9But even if the aforesaid procedural defect were to be overlooked, the instant petition nevertheless suffers from serious substantive flaws. The petition assails the Resolution of the respondent Commission as lackingfactualand legal bases to support the same. A petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie only in cases where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction is clearly shown to have been committed by the respondent Commission, and this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions or resolutions of the respondent NLRC does not include a correction of its evaluation of the evidence.10Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the respondent NLRC, if supported by substantial evidence, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless the petitioner is able to clearly demonstrate that respondent Commission had arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or had misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly appreciated.11First Issue: No Direct Evidence of Mental State?At any rate, even disregarding for the nonce the substantive as well as procedural defects discussed above, a judicious review of the records of this case turns up no indication whatsoever that the respondent Commission committed any grave abuse or acted beyond or without jurisdiction. On the contrary, the petitioners contention that the assailed Resolution has no factual and legal bases is belied by the adoption with approval by the public respondent of the findings of the POEA Administrator, which recites at length the reasons for holding that the deceased Pineda was mentally sick prior to his death and concomitantly, was no longer in full control of his mental faculties.First, a word about the evidence supporting the findings of the POEA Administrator. We have held that claims of overseas workers against their foreign employers should not be subjected to the rules of evidence and procedure that courts usually apply to other complainants who have more facility in obtaining the required evidence to prove their demands.12Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA), a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence,i.e., that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.13In this instance, seaman Pineda, who was discharged in Dubai, a foreign land, could not reasonably be expected to immediately resort to and avail of psychiatric examination, assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that time, not to mention the fact that when he disembarked in Dubai, he was already discharged and without employment his contract having already run its full term and he had already been put on a plane bound for the Philippines. This explains the lack or absence of direct evidence showing his mental state.The circumstances prior to and surrounding his death, however, provide substantial evidence of the existence of such mental defect or disorder. Such mental disorder became evident when he failed to join his connecting flight to Hongkong, having during said stopover wandered out of the Bangkok airport's immigration area on his own. We can perceive no sane and sufficient reason for a Pinoy overseas contract worker or seaman to want to while away his time in a foreign land, when he is presumably unfamiliar with its native tongue, with nothing to do and no source of income, and after having been absent from kith and kin, heart and home for almost an entire year. Nor can we find any plausible reason for him to be wielding a knife and scaring away passersby, and even taking a stab at an armed policeman, unless he is no longer in full possession of his sanity. To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient in themselves to produce a firm conviction that the deceased seaman in this case was no longer in full control of his senses when he left his work. To reiterate, in this case, no more than substantial evidence is required.Second Issue:Employer Exempted from Liability?It is petitioner's contention that "Pineda's death caused by his own willful act of attacking a Thai policeman and getting shot at in self-defense is not compensable", inasmuch as Par. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA's Standard Format Contract of Employment for Seaman states that:No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability ordeathresulting from a (deliberate or) willful act on his own life by the seaman(,)provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seaman. (Emphasis supplied).Moreover, petitioners contend that this Court already held in the case ofMabuhay Shipping Services, Inc.vs.NLRC and Cecilia Sentina14that the employer is not liable for the willful act of an employee on his own life. Further, Article 172 of the Labor Code provides for a limitation on the liability of the State Insurance Fund when the "disability or death was occasioned by the employee's intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence . . . . ".Petitioners are in error. This Court agrees with the POEA Administrator that seaman Pineda was no longer acting sanely when he attacked the Thai policeman. The report of the Philippine Embassy in Thailand dated October 9, 1990 depicting the deceased's strange behavior shortly before he was shot dead, after having wandered around Bangkok for four days, clearly shows that the man was not in full control of his own self:15(CAD) IN REPLY TO TELEX SENT TO EMBASSY BY ADM. SARMIENTO/DELA ROSA OF OWWA/DOLE RE CAUSE OF DEATH OF DECEASED SEAMAN JEREMIAS PINEDA, KINDLY ADVICE HIS OFFICE THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED BANGKOK 1515H ON BOARD XC903 ON A STOP OVER FLIGHT FROM DUBAI ON HIS WAY TO HONGKONG PROCEEDING TO MANILA. UNFORTUNATELY PINEDA FAILED TO TAKE THE SAME FLIGHT OUT AT 1630H, CHECKED OUT OF IMMIGRATION, WENT OUT OF AIRPORT AND WANDERED OUT AND FEW DAYS LATER MET HIS UNTIMELY DEMISE. PLS. REFER TO OURAD DATED 5 OCT 89 QUOTING FULL TEXT OF POLICE REPORT ADDRESSED TO THIS EMBASSY RECOUNTING INCIDENT LEADING TO FATAL SHOOTING OF PINEDA. KINDLY FURNISH OWWA/DOLE FULL TEXT OF SAID REPORT FOR THEIR INFO.PER REPORT RECEIVED FROM AIRPORT PERSONNEL PINEDA WAS ACTING STRANGELY, REFUSED TO BOARD HIS SCHEDULED FLIGHT AND DISAPPEARED FROM AIRPORT.POLICE REPORT ALSO CONFIRMED HIS STRANGE BEHAVIOR LEADING TO HIS ARREST, THEN RUNNING AMOK AND CAUSING TROUBLE TO PASSERS AND ATTEMPT TO STAB THE DUTY POLICEMAN WHO TRIED TO PACIFY HIM.PINEDA SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN SUFFERING FROM SOME MENTAL DISORDER AS CAN BE GLEANED FROM HIS PERSONAL LETTERS DISCOVERED AMONG HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS.HE COMPLAINED OF SUFFERING FROM SEVERE HEAD PAINS AND EVEN REPORTED TO CAPTAIN OF A SHIP ABOUT THREATS ON HIS LIFE BY FELLOW SEAMAN WHICH INVARIABLY LEAD (sic) TO HIS BEING REPATRIATED HOME WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED HIS DISPOSITION.SUGGEST DOLE CONTACT CAPTAIN OF M/V AMAZSON (sic) AND ASCERTAIN AS TO WHY PINEDA HAVE (sic) TO DISEMBARK AND SUBSEQUENTLY REPATRIATED.IF PINEDA WAS ALREADY SUFFERING FROM MENTAL DISORDER AS FEARED, HE SHOULD HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO TRAVEL HOME ALONE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A PHYSICIAN. (emphasis supplied)The POEA Administrator ruled, and this Court agrees, that since Pineda attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his mental faculties, the aforequoted provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment exemption the employer from liability should not apply in the instant case. Firstly, the fact that the deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of his reason, and that thereby, his will must have been impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the policeman can in no wise be characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his part. Secondly, and apart from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased's mental condition, petitioners "should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed said seaman to travel home alone",16and their failure to do so rendered them liable for the death of Pineda. Indeed, "the obligations and liabilities of the (herein petitioners) do not end upon the expiration of the contracted period as (petitioners are) duty bound to repatriate the seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate the contract of employment."17The instant case should be distinguished from the case ofMabuhay, where the deceased, Romulo Sentina, had been in a state of intoxication, then ran amuck and inflicted injury upon another person, so that the latter in his own defense fought back and in the process killed Sentina. Previous to said incident, there was no proof of mental disorder on the part of Sentina. The cause of Sentina's death is categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. But seaman Pineda was not similarly situated.Incidentally, petitioners conjecture that the deceased could have been on drugs when he assaulted the policeman. If this had been the case, the Thai police and the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok would most certainly have made mention thereof in their respective reports. But they did not do so.Third Issue:Was Death Work-Related?Petitioners further argue that the cause of Pineda's death "is not one of the occupational diseases listed by law", and that in the case ofDe Jesu vs.Employee's Compensation Commission,18this Court held that ". . . for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of the Rules (the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation) with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."19Petitioner's reliance onDe Jesusis misplaced, as the death and burial benefits being claimed in this case are not payable by the Employee's Compensation Commission and chargeable against the State Insurance Fund. These claims arose from the responsibility of the foreign employer together with the local agency for the safety of the employee during his repatriation and until his arrival in this country,i.e., the point of hire. Through the termination of the employment contract was duly effected in Dubai, still, the responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted. Section 4, Rule VIII of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment clearly provides for the duration of the mandatory personal accident and life insurance covering accident death, dismemberment and disability of overseas workers:Sec. 4. Duration of Insurance Coverage. The minimum coverage shall take effect upon payment of the premium and shall be extended worldwide, on and off the job, for the duration of the worker's contractplus sixty (60) calendar days after termination of the contract of employment; provided that in no case shall the duration of the insurance coverage be less than one year. (Emphasis supplied)The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their usefulness.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is herebyDISMISSEDand the Decision assailed in this petition isAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 73441 September 4, 1987NAESS SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ZENAIDA R. DUBLIN,respondents.Rhodora Banaga Javier for respondent.NARVASA,J.:The decisive issue in this special civil action of certiorari is whether or not the POEA and the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adjudging that under a contract of employment of a crewman of an ocean-going vessel providing as "compensation for, (the crewman's) loss of life" for the payment of "CASH BENEFITS" to his "immediate next of kin," said crew-man's death by suicide is compensable.On the night of September 3, 1983, while the vessel M/V DYVI PACIFIC was plying the seas enroute from Santos, Brazil to Port Said, Egypt, Pablo Dublin the vessel's chief steward, fatally stabbed the second cook, Rodolfo Fernandez, during a quarrel, then ran to the deck from which he jumped or fell overboard. An alarm was immediately raised, and the vessel turned to comb the surrounding area for Dublin. After some time his floating body was briefly sighted, but it disappeared from view even as preparations to retrieve it were being made, and was never seen again although the search went on through the night and was called off only at 6:00 o'clock the next morning.1There is no dispute that Dublin had been hired by NAESS Shipping, Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter called NAESS) to serve aboard the M/V DYVI PACIFIC under an employment contract which incorporated as part thereof the Special Agreement between the International Workers Federation (ITF) and NAESS Shipping (Holland) B.V. of Amsterdam, the mother company of NAESS (Philippines). Said Agreement bound NAESS to pay cash benefits for loss of life the of workers enrolled therein, pursuant to the following provisions.Article 8For the purpose of this Special Agreement the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the ITF-Affiliated Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP-PTGWO) and Naess Shipping Philippines, Inc., dated April 16, 1983 in respect of all Philippine seafarers has been approved by the ITF,Paragraph 17-CASH BENEFITSCompensation for Loss of Life:i) to immediate next of kin-US$24,844.00ii) to each dependent child under the age of 18 US$7,118.002For the death of Dublin his widow Zenaida, by whom he h