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Smart Grid Security Challenges

Ahmad Alqasim

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Agenda

Problem Statement Power system vs. smart grid Background Information Focus Point Privacy Attack Privacy Attack Countermeasures Jamming attack Jamming Attack Countermeasures Conclusion Discussion Time

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Problem Statement

Analyze smart grid security challenges Focus on:

Privacy attack: Aims to illegally reach to the customer’s load profile (CLP)

Jamming attack: Aims to cause a denial of service to the wireless system in home area network (HAN)

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Traditional System vs. Smart Grid

Traditional Power system One-way Interaction Unable to meet the new

energy demand Customers only have a

physical access to their electrical devices

Depends on complex distribution scheme and manual switching

Smart Grid System Two-way Dialogue More Efficient, Reliable,

Secure and Greener Allow customers to

manage electricity usage and bill over the web

Automatically rerouting and restoring power delivery

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IT Systems and Power Systems Integration

IT SystemsPower

Systems

Smart Grid System

Integration

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IT Systems and Power Systems Integration

IT Systems Power Systems

Smart Grid

Operating Systems

WAN

TCP/IP

ICCP/DNP3

EMS

SCADA

SCADA

EMSWAN

Operating Systems

TCP/IP

ICCP/DNP3

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Conceptual Model

Market Operations Service Provider

Customer Distribution Transmission Bulk Generator

Electrical Flow

Secure Communication Flow

Domain

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Focus Point

HAN

Distribution Service Provider

Smart Meter

Jamming Attack

Privacy Attack

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Home Area Network (HAN)

ZigBee Wireless

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Privacy Attack

Customer’s Load Profile (CLP) stored in the smart meter

Represent the reading figures by different appliances during different periods of time

The service provider use the CLP to calculate the electricity price

A behavioral information about customer can be extracted from the CLP

For example: waking up or sleeping time The motivation to use these information can be:

spying, burglary or business benefits

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Privacy Attack

Wake up time – 8:00 am Evening Activities– 7 pm-10 pm

Reference : [Molina-Markham et al., 2010]

Customer’s Load Profile Graph

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Privacy Countermeasures

Trusted Third Party (TTP) High Frequency Encryption De-Pseudonymization Non-Intrusive load Levelling (NILL)

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Trusted Third Party (TTP)

The TTP Will not access to the smart meter. Rather, it will receive the reading figures and send them to the service provider

Smart Meter

Service Provider

Trusted Third Party (TTP)

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High Frequency Encryption

The service provider can access to the LF in order to calculate the electrical bill

Customer’s Load Profile

High Frequency

(HF)

Low Frequency (LF)

Unencrypted LF

Encrypted HF

Service Provider

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De-Pseudonymization

Customer Information

DB1Load Profile

DB2Personal Profile

Aims to store customer personal information and load information in two different databases

Address, name and phone

television, electrical consumption

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Non-Intrusive load Levelling (NILL)

Aims to mask the actual load profile without affecting the actual data

Actual CLPMask CLP

Masked CLP

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Actual CLP

Masked CLP

Final Load

Profile

Battery

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Jamming Attack

Performed against ZigBee wireless in HAN Hacker usually aims to prevent the smart

meter from communicating with different appliances

In smart grid, the priority for availability, then integrity and confidentiality

Jamming attack affects the availability of data

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Jamming Techniques and Types

Techniques Spot Jamming Sweep Jamming Barrage Jamming Deceptive Jamming

Types Constant Jammer Deceptive Jammer Random Jammer Reactive Jammer

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pseudorandom Sequence

Pseudorandom sequence is a key that only known by the sender and receiver

And aims to hide the SFD

Start of Delimiter Frame (SFD)

pseudorandom Sequence

Packet

Mask the SFD

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Frequency Hopping

Smart Meter

The packet jumps between different frequencies. So, the jammer does not know exactly which frequency to jam

WashingMachine

Wormhole-based Anti-jamming

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Jammed Area

The wire cable is used in case the wireless range is jammed

Node 2

Node 2Wireless Range

Wire Cable

Node 1

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Conclusions

Smart grid provide more reliable, efficient and greener energy than power system

Privacy attack aims to develop a behavioral pattern about customers in order to perform a future action

Jamming attack aims to affect the availability of data and wireless communication in HAN

Current security tools are not completely suitable for smart grid. So, new tools have to be developed

And, the cost of security system has to be justified to fit with the business requirement

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Discussion Time

Questions and Answers