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Small Arms andLight Weapons:

U.S. Policy

and Views

U.S. F O R E I G N P O L I CYU.S. F O R E I G N P O L I CY

A G E N D AVOLUME 6 AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE NUMBER 2

Small Arms andLight Weapons:

U.S. Policy

and Views

June 2001


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The uncontrolled proliferation of illicit small arms and lightweapons (SA/LW) in regions of the world suffering from

political instability and violent conflict has proven a majorobstacle to peace, economic development, and efforts to rebuild

war-torn societies. The United States is a global leader ofefforts to mitigate the illicit trafficking and destabilizingaccumulation of SA/LW through multilateral diplomacy and

bilateral assistance to countries in need. Specifically, the United States hasdirected its policies at building and enhancing enforcement and legal capacities,better controlling proliferation to areas of conflict, providing training on exportcontrol and customs practices, discouraging irresponsible and indiscriminateexports, strengthening sanctions against violators of embargoes, and enhancingstockpile security and destroying excess weapons. The U.S. approach focuses on

practical, effective measures to address the problem of illicit SA/LW trafficking in

conflict regions where it is most urgent, while acknowledging the legitimacy oflegal trade, manufacture, and ownership of arms.

As the international community completes preparations for the 2001 U.N.Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its

Aspects, this issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda examines the U.S. response to thechallenges posed by the uncontrolled proliferation of these weapons. Key U.S.officials outline U.S. initiatives for reducing and preventing the excessive anddestabilizing accumulation of the weapons that are contributing so greatly to thedevastation occurring in regions of conflict. A leading small arms analyst and

scholar give their views on U.S. SA/LW policy and comment on lessons learned sofar in the global pursuit of solutions to the problems that SA/LW cause.

Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr.

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U. S. F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

A G E N D A

Small Arms and Light Weapons: U.S. Policy and ViewsU. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 NUMBER 2 JUNE 2001


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U.S. F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

A G E N D AAn Electronic Journal of the

U.S. Department of State

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: U.S. POLICY AND VIEWS

CONTENTS

_ FOCUS

COMBATING THE SPREAD OF SMALL ARMS: THE U.S. APPROACH 5

By Ambassador Donald J. McConnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Operations,

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State

SMALL ARMS TRAFFICKING: CAN IT BE CONTROLLED? 8

By Herbert L. Calhoun, Deputy Division Chief, Office of Policy, Plans and Analysis,Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State

DESTROYING EXCESS SMALL ARMS: U.S. POLICY AND PROGRAMS 15

By C. Edward Peartree, Policy Officer, Office of Policy, Plans & Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S.Department of State

TRACING ILLEGAL SMALL ARMS: AN ATF PROGRAM 18

By Jacqueline K. Holmes, Program Manager, Firearms Programs Division, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,

U.S. Department of the Treasury

_ COMMENTARY

CURBING THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS: A PRACTICAL ROUTE 20

By Michael Klare, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies, Hampshire College

U.S. POLICY NEED NOT BE SILENT ON SMALL ARMS 23

By Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, Center for Defense Information

_ A GUIDE TO ADDITIONAL READING


ARTICLE ALERT 27

Abstracts of recent articles


BIBLIOGRAPHY 28

Spotlighting other views

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KEY INTERNET SITES 29

Internet links to resources on related issues

The Office of International Information Programs of the U.S. Department ofState provides products and services that explain U.S. policies, society, and values toforeign audiences. The Office publishes five electronic journals that examine majorissues facing the United States and the international community. The journals Economic Perspectives, Global Issues, Issues of Democracy, U.S. Foreign Policy

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Editor, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda

Political Security IIP/T/PSU.S. Department of State301 4th Street, S.W.Washington, D.C. 20547United States of America

E-mail: [email protected]

Please note that this issue of U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA can be locatedon the Office of International Information Programs International Home Page on theWorld Wide Web at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0601/ijpe/ijpe0601.htm.

Publisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Judith S. Siegel

Editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . James Hutcheson

Managing Editor . . . . . . . . . . Merle Kellerhals, Jr.

Associate Editor . . . . . . . . . Wayne Hall

Contributing Editors . . . . .Jennifer Clark

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Reference Specialists . . . . . Sam Anderson

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U. S. F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

A G E N D A

AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 NUMBER 2 JUNE 2001


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The proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons(SA/LW) in regions of the world suffering frompolitical instability and violent conflict has proven amajor obstacle to peace, economic development, andefforts to rebuild war-torn societies. In places likeSierra Leone, Kosovo, and Colombia, thousands ofinnocent civilians have been killed and tens ofthousands more displaced by ethnic and civil conflictsperpetuated in large part by easy access to illicit SA/LW.

The United States is a global leader in efforts to

mitigate the illicit trafficking and destabilizingaccumulation of SA/LW through multilateraldiplomacy and bilateral assistance to countries in need.Specifically, the United States has directed its policies atbuilding and enhancing enforcement and legalcapacities, controlling proliferation to areas of conflict,providing training on export controls and customspractices, discouraging irresponsible and indiscriminateexports, strengthening sanctions against violators ofembargoes, and enhancing stockpile security anddestroying excess weapons. The U.S. approach focuseson practical, effective measures to address the problemof illicit SA/LW trafficking in conflict regions where itis most urgent, while acknowledging the legitimacy oflegal trade, manufacture, and ownership of arms.

EXPORT AND IMPORT CONTROLS: Effective export andimport controls are the keystone of any successful effortto mitigate the problems of illicit trade in small armsand light weapons. In many developing countries, veryfew laws, if any, exist to regulate the import and export

of small arms and light weapons. In places where suchlaws and regulations do exist, enforcement is oftenweak. End-use certificates, the primary means ofensuring that weapons are delivered to intended users,are easy to forge and frequently can be bought for aprice in poor countries where corruption is rife.

All countries that manufacture, trade, or transitweapons, require a robust regime regulating the transferof arms. Regulations in the U.S. Arms Export ControlAct (AECA) govern commercial exports of all U.S.

defense articles and services as well as governmenttransfers through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)program. Under these regulations, U.S. governmentapproval is required for each transaction of defensearticles and services. The intended end-users arecarefully vetted to ensure that they do not violate any ofthe principles and norms in the 1995 U.S. ConventionalArms Transfer (CAT) policy. Under the CAT, allcommercial exports and non-commercial transfers aresubject to strict criteria including: U.S. and recipientcountry security needs; support for foreign policyinterests; risk of adverse impact on the recipient countryor region; human rights, terrorism, and proliferationrecord of the recipient and potential for misuse; andpotential for diversion or other unauthorized use.

Unauthorized re-transfers are a major source ofillicitly traded SA/LW. Arms re-transferred withoutnotification to the original exporter are frequently thenexus between legal and illegal trade. Certain countriesin Africa and Latin America, for example, have become

COMBATING THE SPREAD OF SMALL ARMS:THE U.S. APPROACHBy Ambassador Donald J. McConnell


Simple one size fits all solutions are ineffective in dealing with the complex, oftenregion-specific problems caused by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, saysAmbassador Donald J. McConnell, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department ofState. The best way to attack the problem, he says, is to identify and curb the sources andmethods of the illicit trade via robust export controls, law enforcement measures, and efforts toexpeditiously destroy excess stocks and safeguard legitimate government stocks from theft orillegal transfer.

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major conduits of arms to violent terrorist andinsurgent groups because of lax regulation overretransfers of legitimately traded arms. The UnitedStates is one of the very few countries in the world thatconditions all commercial sales and governmenttransfers of defense articles on rigorous end-usecertification, adequate security to prevent illegaldiversion, and the requirement for authorization forretransfer. U.S. law prohibits arms and munitionsexported from the United States from being re-transferred by the recipient without prior U.S.government approval. Suspected violations are subjectto end-use inquiries, which can result in criminalsanctions against the person or entities involved, andtermination of exports to a violating country. By lawall U.S. SA/LW are marked at the time of manufactureand import to assist in tracking illegal diversions.

Laws and regulations are only as good as theirenforcement. While no enforcement mechanism isfoolproof, the United States employs end-use checks asan instrument for deterring and ensuring that U.S.exports are not illegally diverted to undesirable end-users. When a shipment is suspected of diversion orsome other violation, the State Department and U.S.Customs Service are able to conduct end-use inquiriesthrough a program known as Blue Lantern. TheU.S. Department of Defense (DOD) also has instituted

an end-use monitoring system for foreign military salesbased on the Blue Lantern program. Inquiries canrange from simple interviews conducted by U.S.Customs or State Department officers to physicalinspection of shipments. Hundreds of these end-usechecks are conducted worldwide each year. Knownviolations of U.S. export regulations have resulted indenial and suspension of licenses, criminal prosecution,and termination of all defense exports to certaincountries. Persons subject to prosecution under theITAR may face criminal penalties up to $1 million perviolation, imprisonment, or both.

REGULATION OF ARMS BROKERS: Unchecked roguebrokers operating with impunity due to a lack ofregulation are a major source of illicitly trafficked armsaround the world. Fewer than 20 countries in theworld have laws regulating arms brokers. The UnitedStates prides itself as having one of the mostcomprehensive regimes governing international armsbrokers in the world. A U.S. law approved in 1996. as

an amendment to the AECA, mandates that commercialbrokers engaged in the sale of U.S. defense articles mustregister with the State Departments Office of DefenseTrade Controls (DTC). Each transaction must also befully authorized and licensed by DTC. Jurisdictionextends not only over U.S. citizens and foreignnationals operating in the United States, but also overU.S. citizens abroad. Finally, brokers are required tosubmit annual reports enumerating and describing allapproved activities. The U.S. actively encourages othercountries to develop robust brokering laws andprocedures and has repeatedly called for internationaldiscussion on the development of model brokeringregulations that could serve as a global template fornational brokering laws.

ENFORCEMENT OF EMBARGOES: Although United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions imposelegally binding commitments on member states, toooften some members lack the political will or resourcesto ensure compliance with UNSC embargoes. TheUnited States strictly observes embargoes and imposescriminal penalties on U.S. companies that violate them.The United States urges all countries to imposecriminal sanctions on violators of UNSC embargoes, tosupport increased international cooperation, and toinvolve U.N. sanctions committees in efforts to identifyviolations and violators.

ATTACKING MEANS OF FINANCING:A great deal ofmedia attention has been focused on the problem ofconflict diamonds. Gems, timber, minerals, drugs,and other contraband, as well as diamonds, are barteredfor arms and are also a major precipitator of conflictbetween rival military organizations struggling forcontrol of lucrative concessions in some areas ofconflict such as in Western, Central, and SouthernAfrica. The United States strongly supported aDecember 2000 U.N. General Assembly resolutioncalling for a break in the link between diamonds andconflict and a July 2000 UNSC resolution calling onmember states to ban the import of diamonds fromSierra Leone unless exported under a certificationprocess approved by the U.N. Sanctions Committee.The United States has additionally supported sanctionsagainst Liberia and Angola relating to the trade inconflict diamonds. The United States is currentlyworking with the diamond industry, non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs), and governments through the

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so-called Kimberly Process to develop standards for aglobal certification process. Ending the export ofconflict diamonds and other contraband will greatlyaid efforts to cut off illegal sources of revenue that oftenfuel illicit trafficking in SA/LW.

ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: Lack of proper laws,regulations, training and resources greatly hinder manycountries efforts to curb illicit small arms and lightweapons trafficking. The United States worksbilaterally and multilaterally to offer technical andfinancial assistance in the areas of law enforcement,export control assistance, and stockpile managementand destruction of excess SA/LW. The United Statesfunds a variety of programs in Africa, including,notably, the African Baseline Survey on Small ArmsLegislation, Regulations, and Law Enforcement

Capacity for the United Nations African Institute forthe Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders(UNAFRI). The United States leads efforts to includenational reporting on SA/LW transfers in the WassenaarArrangement, a 33-country organization dedicated totransparency and responsibility in arms transfers.Export control assistance is offered to countries in needof developing laws, regulations and enforcementmechanisms; in particular, we have extensivecooperation programs with former members of theWarsaw Pact. In fiscal year 2001 (FY01), the United

States dedicated $2 million to global efforts to assistcountries in the destruction of excess small arms andlight weapons.

We believe that the approach outlined above holds thebest prospects for mitigating the harmful proliferationof SA/LW in the areas of the world where action ismost urgent. The United States does not support theproposals of some to totally ban civilian possession offirearms. Individuals in the United States and many

countries lawfully own and use hunting and sportingfirearms. The problem of SA/LW proliferation in areasof conflict and political instability is a qualitativelydifferent issue. Casting the net so wide as to ban allfirearms is counterproductive.

Similarly, the vast preponderance of SA/LW soldaround the world are licensed, fully legal transactions,mostly to governments for national defense and lawenforcement purposes. To tar all trade andmanufacturing of arms with the same brush as the illicittrade misses the point. Finally, the United Statesdisagrees with proposals to ban sales of SA/LW to non-state actors. Fundamentally, we oppose such a ban inprinciple because it fails to make the distinctionbetween responsible and irresponsible end-users only whether or not they have status as governments.

Terrorist groups, insurgents, and drug traffickersacquire arms primarily through illegal diversion, theftand smuggling rather than through legitimate transfers.Therefore, a ban to non-state actors is unlikely to workas intended. It is also important to note that such aban would preclude assistance to oppressed non-stategroups such as an ethnic minority faced with genocideby an oppressive government. Arms acquired throughillicit channels are best addressed by improvements inexport controls for both state and non-state end-users which we strongly advocate.

Ultimately, simple one size fits all solutions areineffective in dealing with the complex, often region-specific problems caused by the proliferation of smallarms and light weapons. Focused efforts to identifyand curb the sources and methods of the illicit trade viarobust export controls, law enforcement measures, andefforts to expeditiously destroy excess stocks andsafeguard legitimate government stocks from theft orillegal transfer are the best ways to attack the problem._

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Most arms control efforts since World War II havebeen devoted to nuclear and other weapons of massdestruction or to heavy conventional weapons. Sincethe United Nations Secretary-General issued asupplement to his 1995 Agenda for Peace on thesubject (January 1995), increasing attention has beengiven to the weapons that are actually producing thehorrors witnessed in Africa, the Balkans, and otherparts of the world. These weapons are small arms andlight weapons (SA/LW), such as landmines, assault

rifles (like the AK-47), and machine guns. This articlesurveys recent efforts to examine the issues and todevelop and establish appropriate and effectiveinternational controls over small arms and lightweapons. The issue of controlling anti-personnellandmines has followed a separate course and is notdealt with here.

WHAT ARE SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT

WEAPONS?

Broadly speaking, small arms and light weapons includea wide variety of lethal instruments, from handguns toman-portable air defense systems. While there is nouniversally accepted definition of small arms, the termis commonly viewed as encompassing man-portablefirearms and their ammunition primarily designed forindividual use by military forces as lethal weapons. Atypical list of small arms includes self-loading pistols,rifles and carbines, sub-machine-guns, assault rifles, andlight machine-guns. Not included in this list are

hunting rifles, civilian handguns, and weaponsconsidered as collectors items such as museum piecesand other weapons preserved for historical purposes.

Light weapons are usually heavier and larger than smallarms and designed to be employed by a small team orcrew of infantry personnel. They include some man-portable firearms and their ammunition, light artilleryguns and rockets, and guided missiles for use againstarmored vehicles, aircraft, or fortifications. A typical

list of light weapons could also include heavy machine-guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenadelaunchers, man-portable air defense systems (such asshoulder-fired anti-aircraft guns and missiles), anti-tankguns and recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank and rocketlauncher systems, and mortars of caliber below 100mm. Light weapons fall just below the seven categoriesof large weapons reported to the U.N. Register ofConventional Arms, and are thus an intermediarycategory between small arms and major weapons.

Compared to complex major weapon systems, smallarms and light weapons are more widely produced andavailable, relatively easy to conceal, and require littlemaintenance, logistic support, and training to operate.

WHY THE RECENT INCREASED INTEREST IN

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS?

Since the end of the Cold War, interest has turned tosmall arms and light weapons primarily as a result of

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS:CAN THEY BE CONTROLLED?

By Herbert L. Calhoun, Deputy Division Chief, Office of Policy

Plans and Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Since the end of the Cold War, interest has turned to small arms and light weapons primarily asa result of the dramatic increase in the number, duration, and destructiveness of intrastateconflicts, many of which called for costly U.N. peacekeeping missions, says Herbert L. Calhoun,Senior Foreign Affairs Specialist and Deputy Office Director, Bureau of Political-MilitaryAffairs, U.S. Department of State. The change in the international security landscape from afew episodic large-scale interstate wars to frequent small-scale intrastate conflicts has occurred ata time when international norms, export control regimes, and treaties to control or eliminateweapons of mass destruction are making substantial progress.

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the dramatic increase in the number, duration, anddestructiveness of intrastate conflicts, many of whichcalled for costly U.N. peacekeeping missions. Thechange in the international security landscape from afew episodic large-scale interstate wars to frequentsmall-scale intrastate conflicts has occurred at a timewhen international norms, export control regimes, andtreaties to control or eliminate weapons of massdestruction are making substantial progress. At thesame time, the proliferation and criminal misuse ofsmall arms and light weapons are posing increasingthreats to national and regional security.

These weapons have fueled dozens of intrastate andlocal conflicts around the globe killing, injuring,and displacing millions of people, primarily womenand children, from Albania to the Democratic Republic

of the Congo. They are todays real weapons of massdestruction. Patrick Brogan, in World Conflicts (TheScarecrow Press, 1998), reports that between 20 and 30million deaths have occurred in the 85 wars since 1945.The Institute for International Studies (ISS) of SouthAfrica reports that Africa alone has suffered 5,994,000fatalities in the last 50 years due mostly to small armsand light weapons. The U.S. Committee for Refugeescalculates that in 1997 there were more than 14 millionrefugees in foreign lands, and more than 19 millioninternal refugees, a number rivaling the mass

movement of peoples after World War II. In short, theregulation of small arms and light weapons, comparedto weapons of mass destruction, remains a relativelyunderdeveloped area.

Estimates of the number of small arms and lightweapons in circulation range from 100 to 500 million,with 50-80 million being AK-47 assault rifles. Anincreasing number of countries are becoming self-sufficient in the manufacturing of small arms andrelated ammunition either through indigenous orlicensed production. It has been reported that an AK-47 assault rifle can be purchased on the streets of somedeveloping countries for as little as $10 (U.S.), or inexchange for a chicken or a goat. In other countries,AK-47s can be rented by the hour by criminals solelyfor the purpose of carrying out a criminal act.International transfers are also a major source of smallarms and light weapons supply, through a host ofchannels, both legal and illegal.

The negative effects of the proliferation and illicittrafficking of small arms and light weapons have beenfar-reaching and diverse. Although most importantare the increased threats to international and regionalsecurity, these effects have also been felt indirectlythrough dramatic increases in peacekeeping costsresulting from the increased number and intensityof intrastate conflicts. Other negative aspects of theseweapons include their increased use by terrorists,the heightened threats to U.N. peacekeepers andhumanitarian relief workers, and the undermining ofthe implementation of peace agreements. The urgentneed to stem the proliferation and misuse of theseweapons, which has been urged by two U.N. Secretaries-General, has raised a number of humanitarian, lawenforcement, developmental, and security challengesfor the international community.

CULTURE AND THE CONTROL OF SMALL

ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

State sovereignty by definition includes the right tomonopolize the legitimate exercise of force. UnderArticle 51 of the United Nations Charter, states alsohave the right to use force in self-defense, or in defenseof their sovereignty. Small arms and light weapons usedto maintain domestic order and to defend a nationsborders represent the most visible and enduring

manifestation of these basic rights and thus will alwaysremain closely identified with issues of independenceand sovereignty. A logical extension of these rights isthat states also have the right to legally manufactureand otherwise acquire weapons necessary for self-defense.

Traditionally, it has been national rather thaninternational laws that prescribe the terms of possessionand use of small arms and light weapons by securityforces and private citizens. Hence, internationalattempts to control small arms and light weapons musttake into account these fundamental rights of states.Cultural norms, social values, and historical traditionsaffect domestic regulation of weapons. For example,learning to use a gun for self-defense, sportingpurposes, or military training is common in manycountries. The armed forces, police or militia in mostcountries are permitted to carry and use small arms inaccordance with domestic laws, and in some countriessuch as the United States, private citizens can do so as

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well. The right to own and bear arms can even beprovided in national legislation and nationalconstitutions, as is the case in the United States.Proposals to control small arms and light weapons musttake into account such differences in nationalorientation and the fact that states jealously guardagainst any encroachments from outside into theirdomestic policies.

THE CAUSES OF INSECURITY

While small arms and light weapons play a significantrole in exacerbating conflicts that exact enormoushuman and socioeconomic costs, the causes of suchconflicts lie in political, economic, ethnic, and religiousdifferences and disparities. These are often aggravatedby governance-related deficiencies, such as exclusionary

and repressive policies, and lack of, or weaknesses in,democratic institutions, respect for the rule of law, andhuman rights observance. Conditions of endemicinsecurity and weak national and interstate regulatoryand law enforcement structures, together with the factthat these weapons are cheap, widely available, easilyconcealed and transportable across porous borders, andrequire little maintenance and training, furthercompound the problems of widespread proliferation,illicit trafficking and possession, and criminal misuse.

SUPPLY AND DEMAND

Both supply-side and demand-side strategies arerequired if the SA/LW problem is to be surmounted.Uncontrolled weapons circulating into countries withfragile governments and histories of serious internalproblems only exacerbate the causes of conflict.Oversupply, with its many unintended consequences,obviously must be dealt with. At the same time, it is afact that the use of weapons is often only symptomaticof deeper societal ills, ills that produce the insecuritydriving the demand for weapons. Removing theinstruments without addressing the causes of insecuritywill simply generate a new demand for replacementweapons, leaving the sources of insecurity unaffected.Inevitably, these sources, such as underdevelopment,must be addressed if attempts at controlling weaponsare to be effective. The most promising approach tothe entire complex of problems associated with smallarms is one that balances supply-side and demand-sideefforts and integrates them with programs designed to

alleviate underdevelopment and other basic causes ofinsecurity.

LEGAL OR ILLEGAL TRANSFERS?

Legal and illegal transfers are often so closelyintertwined that it is difficult to establish a clear basisfor distinguishing them. Many weapons originating aslegal production or exports eventually fall into illegalcirculation. It is impossible to know with certaintywhat percentage of small arms and light weaponstransfers are legal or illegal, or when and how weaponsthat were originally transferred legally become illegal atsome point in their history.

The crisis in Somalia is a good case in point. The armsthat helped turn that crisis into near anarchy can be

traced directly to the flood of AK-47 assault riflesbrought back to Somalia by some 200,000 fleeing teen-age soldiers from the Ogaden War. The Somaliangovernment, for legitimate security purposes, acquiredthese weapons legally. Many weapons purchased legallyfor security needs in one conflict turn up being used forillicit purposes in another. They are often re-circulatedby sympathetic governments or ethnic sub-groups tothe army or rebel forces of another. Some weaponsrecovered in buy-back programs in El Salvador hadbeen used in Vietnam, Uganda, and Angola. One

of the most perplexing questions facing analysts andscholars is, How can international measures toregulate small arms and light weapons account for theambiguity between what is licit at one time and illicitat another?

THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY

The United Nations has remained at the forefront ofefforts to restrain the spread of small arms and lightweapons. Building on its earlier initiatives which calledfor action to combat illicit trade and the criminalmisuse of small arms and light weapons, the UnitedNations General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted anumber of resolutions over recent years calling for arange of actions at all levels.

Resolution 46/36 H of December 6, 1991 calledon states to curb illicit trafficking in arms by insuringbetter control over stocks and transfers, and by

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encouraging work at all levels to harmonize relevantlaws and procedures. This resolution contained a listof indicative measures to be implemented at the state,regional, and international level.

Resolution 50/70 B of December 12, 1995requested the Secretary-General to establish a panel ofgovernmental experts to prepare a report on the natureand causes of problems of small arms. The panel of 16nations was established and first convened on June 24,1996, and met again in July of 1997. In October1997, the panel issued a report that analyzed the natureand causes of small arms problems and provided anumber of recommendations for voluntary action bystates to address the problem.

Resolution 52/38 J of 1997, established a second

panel of 23 members, convened in 1998, to review theimplementation of the recommendations of the firstreport, to suggest further measures, and to examine thefeasibility of holding an international conference on theillicit trafficking of small arms in all its aspects.

Resolution 51/45 N of December 10, 1996 and52/38 G of December 9, 1997 were the first resolutionsdesigned to address the post-conflict aspects ofdisarmament. They stressed the importance andbenefits of instituting certain practical disarmament

measures during and after conflicts measures such ascollecting, controlling, and disposing of small arms andlight weapons, the demobilization and reintegration offormer combatants, and ways to restrain productionand illicit transfers.

Resolution 54/54V of December 15, 1999 calledfor an international conference on the illicit trade insmall arms and light weapons in all its aspects duringthe summer of 2001. The resolution specified that theconference should produce a global action program asits primary output. The conference was scheduled totake place July 9-20, 2001. The first PreparatoryCommittee (Prepcom) met February 28-March 3,2000; January 8-19, 2001; and March 20-30, 2001.The Prepcom decided on its key procedural issues andcompleted a second reading of its draft Program ofAction. Expectations are already high about theprospects for the conference, however, a number ofrelatively difficult issues remain to be resolved in thetext of the draft Program of Action.

United Nations action on small arms and light weaponsis not limited to the General Assembly. In a September1999 statement, the U.N. Security Council alsorecognized the growing problem. And there is interestat the highest levels of the United Nations as well. Asnoted in the introduction, the Secretary-General inJanuary 1995 sounded a clarion call to action in thesmall arms and light weapons area. In the supplementto An Agenda for Peace, he noted the considerableprogress made in dealing with weapons of massdestruction (WMD), and encouraged the internationalcommunity to turn its focus to the weapons that areactually killing people in the hundreds of thousandsand that are being used in the conflicts the UnitedNations is actually engaged in small arms and lightweapons. In response to the Secretary-Generalsappeal, a groundswell of initiatives developed and

continues to be pursued.

In November 1997, for example, the United States,Mexico and 26 other Western Hemisphere governmentssigned a convention negotiated through the Organizationof American States (OAS) against the illicit manufacturingof and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, and explosivematerials. The treaty requires states to strengthenborder controls, mark firearms, and share informationon weapons manufacturers, dealers, importers, andexporters.

In May 1998, the 15 members of the European Union(EU) entered into a political commitment on a code ofconduct governing arms transfers. The code establisheseight criteria for EU arms exports, which place restrictionson transfers to human rights violators, repressivegovernments, and on exports to areas of prolongedconflict. In December 1998, in an effort to combatdestabilizing accumulations of small arms, EUcountries also adopted a legally binding Joint Action onSmall Arms. The Joint Action is designed to help stemthe spread of small arms by supporting inventoryreductions, regional registers, exchanges of information,enhancing national controls, improving education andawareness, and providing incentives to warring factionsto surrender and destroy their arms.

In July 1998, 21 nations met in Oslo, Norway at thebehest of that government for the first internationalgovernment-level conference on small arms. Theattendees agreed that the complexity of small arms

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problems requires multi-faceted actions and pursuitalong a variety of parallel tracks. The Oslo consensuswas embodied in a final document, Elements of aCommon Understanding, which called for globalsupport of 11 existing international initiatives. InDecember 1999 a second Norway-hosted conferencewas held in Oslo. A geographically varied mix of 18countries attended. The objective of that conferencewas to take stock of ongoing developments and toengage in in-depth discussions on arms brokering.The outcome of this second conference was anotherElements of a Common Understanding, whichidentified areas for further study and outlined anumber of possible measures for addressing problemsof arms brokering.

At the August-September 1998 Summit of Non-aligned

Nations in Durban, South Africa, the heads of stateexpressed concern over the illicit transfer and circulationof small arms and their proliferation as constituting aserious threat to national and regional security of manynon-aligned nations. They urged summit attendees totake steps to deal effectively with problems of smallarms through administrative and legislative means, andcalled upon producers and nations with the largestarsenals to reduce significantly the production andtrade in conventional weapons.

Following-up on the momentum created at the firstOslo conference, the government of Belgium hosted anOctober 1998 first-of-a-kind conference on SustainableDisarmament for Sustainable Development.Approximately 90 countries plus a large number ofnon-governmental organizations (NGOs) wererepresented in Brussels. The conference eschewed theidea that disarmament and development could betreated successfully in isolation from each other andcalled for nations to adopt an integrated approach. TheBrussels conference issued a Call for Action outlining,in comprehensive detail, activities that the internationalcommunity should consider in addressing the problemsof small arms and development.

In October 1998, the 16 member states of theEconomic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), led by the President of the Republic ofMali, Alpha Oumar Konare, declared a three-yearrenewable moratorium on the production, import andexport of light weapons in the West African region.

This was the culmination of almost 5 years of intensiveefforts on the part of the government of Mali, theU.N., and other governments, both in the region andbeyond, to establish the first-ever moratorium onconventional arms. An organizational mechanismwas established to implement and administer themoratorium, as a number of nations consider how bestto contribute to its success. The ECOWAS Moratoriumis up for renewal October 31, 2001.

In addition to inter-governmental actions, NGOs havealso played an important role in raising the consciousnessof the international community, in carrying the burdenof academic research, and in building effective datacollections. They have also helped galvanize the actionof governments in support of small arms and lightweapon efforts. NGOs have also sponsored key

conferences and seminars and participated in mostgovernment-sponsored conferences. Their constantencouragement of better cooperation betweengovernments, civil society, and NGOs ensures thatprogress in the small arms field will be steady andcumulative.

THE U.S. RESPONSE

In his keynote address to the 50th UNGA in October1995, President Clinton acknowledged the need to

focus more attention on the problem of small arms andon related problems of drug trafficking, smuggling, andincreases in terrorism. The U.S. approach to smallarms proliferation has been to address, in a balanced way,both demand-side issues, or underlying causes, andsupply-side issues, such as illicit trafficking. In an effortto stem illicit flows as well as better regulate legal flows,the United States uses the full range of its policy tools atall levels. U.S. demand-side efforts include initiativesby the U.S. Agency for International Development(USAID) to promote the establishment of democraticinstitutions and practices, continued emphasis on respectfor human rights, adoption of an integrated responseto complex transnational crises, implementation ofa number of practical post-conflict disarmament anddevelopment measures, and support for establishingand enhancing regulatory and law enforcementcapacities in threatened and war-torn societies.

On the supply side, the United States seeks to globalizebest practices, including: encouraging global adoption

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of model regulations on commercial arms transfers;imposition of controls on arms brokering and re-exporttransactions; supporting the effective implementationof the recently completed Vienna Firearms Protocol(March, 2, 2001) based on the OAS model; providingassistance for stockpile security and weapons destruction;and promoting the early conclusion of an internationalagreement to restrict man-portable air defense systems.In the fall of 1998, the United States launched a seriesof important policy initiatives directed primarily at thenexus of arms flows and conflict in Africa.

Owing to the commitment demonstrated by its actions,the United States is recognized as a leader in efforts tocontrol small arms and light weapons. As a suppliernation, the United States has taken seriously itsresponsibility to maintain the highest standards of

transparency, export controls, restraint in armstransfers, and regulation of brokering activities. TheUnited States has established partnerships with like-minded states to address a range of small arms and lightweapons issues that include weapons destruction,coordinating assistance to affected states, supportingregional initiatives, and strengthening enforcement ofU.N. Security Council embargoes.

At the special September 1999 U.N. Security CouncilMinisterial Meeting on Africa, the United States

initiated a number of concrete measures which over thelast two years it has implemented. These include:

commitments to full and timely disclosure of allarms shipments being transferred into regions or zonesof conflict in Africa;

international support for a voluntary moratoriumon arms sales that could fuel inter-connected conflicts;

meetings of governments and international andnon-governmental organizations to exchangeinformation on regional arms transfers;

increased aid for capacity-building in Africa tomonitor and interdict arms flows and strengthensanctions enforcement;

adoption of national legislation to criminalizeviolations of mandatory arms embargoes and othersanctions regimes; and

support for effective implementation of the FirearmsProtocol and the multilateral agreement restricting theexport of man-portable defense systems.

These initiatives complemented and reinforced anumber of existing U.S. initiatives directed at endingviolence in Africa. For instance, in 1994, the U.S.government enacted the African Conflict ResolutionAct, which requires U.S. agencies to report to Congressannually on their efforts to improve conflict resolutioncapabilities in Africa. At the March 1999 U.S.-AfricaMinisterial called Partnership for the 21st Century,the United States reaffirmed support for the AfricanCrisis Response initiative (ACRI). Since 1993 the U.S.has contributed $8 million (U.S.) to support the ACRI.

The United States led a number of actions directed at

ending and preventing the recurrence of genocide inRwanda, including: meeting with other heads of statesat the Entebbe Summit in March of 1998; sponsoringthe U.N. resolution that reactivated the U.N. ArmsFlow Commission to identify and stop illegal armstrafficking to former Rwanda army and militia forces;and lending U.S. support to the U.N. Secretary-Generals April 1998 Report to the Security Council onThe Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of DurablePeace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Earlyin 2000, the United States began work with the

U.N.s African Institute for the Prevention of Crimeand Treatment of Offenders (UNAFRI) to survey theregulations, laws, and capacities of African nations.Work on that project continues. The United Statescontinues its efforts to extend political, technical, andmaterial support to the efforts of Mali and its neighborsto implement the moratorium on the import, export,and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa.

Also, the United States participates in a wide range ofinternational meetings, conferences and workshopsincluding the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts onSmall Arms, whose 1997 and 1999 reports made anumber of recommendations that the U.S. hasendorsed. The United States also participates in theU.N. Disarmament Commissions discussions ofPractical Disarmament.

In addition to U.N.-sponsored meetings, the UnitedStates sent senior-level delegations to the Oslo andBrussels conferences and played a prominent role in

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OVERVIEW

The principal source of destabilizing accumulations ofsmall arms and light weapons (SA/LW) in many regionsof the world is not new production but re-circulatedstocks of surplus military weapons. Cold War stocks inthe countries of Eastern Europe and the former SovietUnion, often poorly secured and susceptible to theft orillegal transfer, have been a source of arms for regionalcriminal organizations and violent terrorist groups.Ex-Warsaw Pact militaries eager to upgrade to NATO

standards have dumped large numbers of infantry rifles,machine guns, and light weapons such as rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) onto the globalmarket. Sales of surplus arms, often to undesirableend-users such as insurgent groups or warringgovernments under international embargo, have provena ready source of revenue for cash-poor developingcountries.

In Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, smallarms used in one regional conflict frequently turn upin another regional conflict. Arms collected in theaftermath of a peace settlement, if not quickly securedand expeditiously destroyed, will often be dispersedinto the community, exacerbating instability andviolent crime, or fuelling new conflicts. Arms used bythe Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)in El Salvador and by the Contras and Sandanistas inNicaragua during the 1980s have been recently tracedto the civil war in Colombia. Sometimes, themigration of arms spans oceans and continents: U.S.

origin M-16 assault rifles captured in Vietnam after thefall of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) have turned updecades later in Central America.

While robust export controls and enforcement arecritical elements in the effort to curb illicit traffickingin SA/LW, the simplest and most reliable way toprevent proliferation of illicit arms is through properstockpile management and expeditious destruction ofexcess. Taking up this global problem, the StateDepartment, working with the Department of Defense,

has dedicated funding and expertise to assistingcountries in improving stockpile management practicesand destroying excess SA/LW.

HISTORY OF U.S. EFFORTS

Until recently, U.S. destruction of excess small armshad been largely an ad hoc effort. Recognizing thatreducing collected stocks of arms in a post-conflictenvironment is critical to alleviating violence andimproving stability, U.S. military forces, sometimesworking with multinational partners, have frequentlyundertaken the destruction of arms seized or otherwisecollected in military or peacekeeping operations. TheUnited States destroyed tens of thousands of small armsand light weapons in Iraq and Kuwait during and afterthe Gulf War. In Haiti in 1994 and 1995, the U.S.10th Mountain Division destroyed 18,621 small armsand light weapons. In Panama, coincident withOperation Just Cause in 1990-91, U.S. forces destroyed77,553 small arms and light weapons. The NATO-led

DESTROYING EXCESS SMALL ARMS:U.S. POLICY AND PROGRAMS

By C. Edward Peartree, Policy Officer, Office of Policy, Plans and Analysis


While robust export controls and enforcement are critical elements in the effort to curbillicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), the simplest and most reliable way toprevent proliferation of illicit arms is through proper stockpile management and expeditiousdestruction of excess, says C. Edward Peartree, Policy Officer, Office of Policy, Plans & Analysis,Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Taking up this globalproblem, the State Department, working with the Department of Defense, has dedicated fundingand expertise to assisting countries in improving stockpile management practices and destroyingexcess SA/LW.

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Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the NATO-led Kosovo security force (KFOR) in Kosovo havedestroyed thousands of weapons. In Liberia, betweenJuly and October 1999, the U.S. sent experts andcontributed $300,000 through the U.N. Trust Fundon Liberia to destroy almost 19,000 small arms andlight weapons and more than 3 million rounds ofammunition.

As U.S. engagement on global small arms efforts grewduring the late 1990s, interest in concrete measures tomitigate their harmful effects turned to the issue ofeliminating re-circulating and surplus stocks in areasof concern. At an October 15, 1999 summit meeting,the United States and Norway agreed to create a JointWorking Group to assist at-risk countries in thedestruction of excess SA/LW. Shortly thereafter, on

November 18, 1999, the Stability Pact for SoutheasternEurope endorsed a declaration of 10 regional states todestroy seized and surplus weapons. To support thiscommitment, the U.S. and Norway offered to sendtechnical assessment teams to member countries toassist destruction efforts. In May 2000, U.S. andNorwegian experts visited Albania on the firstassessment visit to be undertaken since the conceptionof their joint efforts.

THE PILOT PROJECT: ALBANIA

Albania offers an excellent case study in the problemscaused by excessive, poorly managed stocks of weaponsin an unstable political environment. During theMarch 1997 political crisis caused by severe economicinstability and the collapse of the government, over500,000 small arms and light weapons and many tonsof ammunition were looted from government arsenalsaround the country. The proliferation of stolenmilitary small arms in Albania led to soaring violentcrime and dramatic increases in arms smuggling intoneighboring countries such as Macedonia andYugoslavia. Some estimates indicate that over 50percent of the stolen Albanian arms ultimately endedup in Kosovo; in any event, the sudden influx of armsto ethnic Albanian separatists helped to ignite armedconflict in that region a conflict that led to directU.S. and NATO intervention.

Beginning in May 1998, the Albanian governmentbolstered efforts to collect weapons circulating in the

civilian population, both through new legislation andincreased law enforcement measures. This effort wasassisted in 1999 by the initiation of a United NationsDevelopment Program (UNDP) Weapons inExchange for Development program (originallytargeted at the Albanian district of Gramsh, laterextended to Elbasan and Dirba). Under the UNDPprogram, a limited number of collected weapons weredestroyed, though the focus of the program remainedon collection of illegal arms. Efforts to eliminatecollected and surplus stocks of Albanian arms began inearnest on September 7, 2000, when U.S. AssistantSecretary of State Eric Newsom, joined by representativesof the Norwegian and German Embassies in Albania,signed a memorandum with Albanian Minister ofDefense Ilir Gjoni. According to the memorandum,130,000-plus weapons collected from the civilian

population since the 1997 crisis were to be expeditiouslydestroyed along with surplus military stocks. TheAlbanian project was praised within the Stability Pactand the Organization for Security and Cooperationin Europe (OSCE) as an important security andconfidence building measure for the Balkan region. Asof May 2001, over 50,000 SA/LW have been eliminatedin Albania with U.S., German and Norwegianassistance, and the project continues successfully.

EXPANDING EFFORTS

The Albania initiative stimulated interest in the Balkanregion and internationally in the importance ofreducing stockpiles of surplus arms. A U.S.-Norwegianteam conducted a successful joint assessment visit toMacedonia and Bulgaria in October 2000. Thecommitment of the U.S. government also grew withthe release of $2 million in first-time dedicated fundsin the Fiscal Year 2001 foreign operations budgetfor global small arms destruction. Regional andinternational organizations addressing the SA/LWproliferation problem began to recognize the importanceof SA/LW stockpile management and destruction ofexcess. The landmark OSCE Document on SmallArms and Light Weapons, adopted by 55 countries onNovember 24, 2000 contains an entire section onstockpile management and destruction of arms. TheUnited States and the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) signed a joint declaration onSA/LW measures in December 2000, which includescommitments to destruction of excess and illicit arms.

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As illegal trafficking in small arms increases, bothnationally and internationally, countries throughout the

world are utilizing the services of a U.S. governmentprogram, the only one of its kind, that traces the historyof recovered crime guns sourced from the United States.

The National Tracing Center (NTC) is part of theBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), whichhas as one of its missions the responsibility to provideinformation to law enforcement on firearms used incriminal activity. ATF developed its International Trafficin Arms Program to combat the illegal movement ofU.S.-sourced firearms in international traffic and reduce

the number of weapons that are illegally traffickedworldwide from the United States. These firearms aremany times used to commit acts of internationalterrorism, to subvert restrictions imposed by othernations on their residents, and to further organized crimeand narcotics-related activities. The NTC provides animportant first step by handling gun trace information,which can result in investigative leads. Through itsregulatory and enforcement authorities derived from theGun Control Act, ATF seeks to neutralize the illicitmovement of firearms and to deny their access tointernational narcotics dealers, terrorists, and criminals.

ATFs National Tracing Center traces the history ofrecovered crime guns for federal, state, local, andinternational enforcement agencies. Application of thistracing history is indispensable for law enforcementwhen researching the nexus or movement of U.S.-source firearms. The NTC stores informationconcerning the multiple sale of firearms, suspect guns,stolen firearms, and firearms with obliterated or partial

serial numbers; and it is the only repository for allrecords of Federal firearms licensees who have

discontinued business. Foreign agencies, like their U.S.law enforcement counterparts, use this information todetermine criminal violations, recognize patterns andtrends, prove ownership, and identify source areas.

During 2000 and to date in 2001, the National TracingCenter processed more than 200,000 firearm tracerequests including more than 19,000 from foreigncountries. Of the requests where U.S. origin wasdetermined, close to 8,000 of these were successfullytraced to the retail level. The top international

requestors were Colombia, Mexico, Canada, Germany,Jamaica, Japan, and Brazil.

The firearms trace process is initiated upon receipt of atrace request form. International trace requests arecurrently received directly from foreign law enforcementagencies via telephone, fax or through electronictransmission from the offices of ATF Country Attachs,currently located in Colombia, Mexico, and Canada.Firearms information is reviewed for technical accuracyand coded for data entry into the Firearms TracingSystem database. Based on particular informationreceived from the firearms manufacturer, the wholesalerand retailer are then contacted to determine theidentity of the individual purchaser of the firearm.This information is forwarded to the trace requestor inthe form of a Firearms Trace Summary. A routine tracerequest is usually processed in 11 days whereas urgenttrace requests (based on crimes that involve murder,kidnapping, terrorist acts, etc., or the apprehension orholding of a suspect) are completed within 24 hours.

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TRACING ILLEGAL SMALL ARMS: AN ATF PROGRAMBy Jacqueline K. Holmes, Program Manager, Firearms Programs Division,Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Department of the Treasury

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) developed its International Traffic in ArmsProgram to combat the illegal movement of U.S.-sourced firearms in international traffic andreduce the number of weapons that are illegally trafficked worldwide from the United States, saysJacqueline K. Holmes, Program Manager, Firearms Programs Division. These firearms aremany times used to commit acts of international terrorism, to subvert restrictions imposed by othernations on their residents, and to further organized crime and narcotics-related activities.


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The NTC approach is equally proactive when a firearmis recovered in a foreign country and traced to a U.S.citizen. A referral is forwarded to the appropriate ATFfield division as a possible investigative lead to furtherassist the foreign law enforcement requestor.

The NTC has developed various programs designed toprovide proactive assistance to the investigator withfirearms tracing. For instance, one category of firearmon which NTC has focused is the suspect gun thathas not yet been recovered by law enforcement but isbelieved to have been trafficked or involved in criminalactivity. Conditions that may cause firearms to besuspect include connections with Federal FirearmsLicensee (FFL) or interstate thefts, the purchase of largequantities of firearms by a single individual, or dealerswith improperly kept records. The NTC enters firearm

information into the Suspect Gun database at therequest of an ATF office. These guns are not traced butare queried against all trace requests initiated by theNTC for possible matches.

Of particular interest is Access 2000, a computerizedlink between the NTC and firearms manufacturers andwholesalers. This nexus allows NTC instant access to thecomputerized records in order to complete traces moreefficiently. ATF is continuing this working partnershipwith the firearms industry in order to facilitate the

tracing of crime guns by use of a standardized automatedsystem. Instant access allows NTC employees to querythe disposition of an individual serial number, thusspeeding up the trace process and reducing the trace-related cost to industry. Of course, 24-hour access allowsNTC employees to query the history of firearms asnecessary for urgent trace requests.

The Crime Gun Analysis Branch (CGAB) of the NationalTracing Center works closely with the Tracing Branch byanalyzing the data from crime gun traces, multiple sales,and firearm thefts. Analysis of firearms traces identifiescrime gun patterns that may not be apparent frominformation in a single trace. Collaboration with respectto sharing of international firearm trace information willhelp identify firearms trafficking trends and patterns in particular, international patterns that can help lawenforcement agencies target enforcement action to helpreduce international firearms trafficking and violentgun crime.

The CGAB provides support to law enforcement agenciesby conducting analyses of firearms recovered andsubmitted in a particular geographic location in orderto identify most commonly recovered firearms, crimesassociated with the firearms, possessor information,source locations (States or individual dealers where thefirearm was sold), and to determine the time-to-crime(the time from which the firearm was sold to anindividual to the time that it was recovered by lawenforcement). These analyses identify sources of crimegun problems and provide investigative leads onindividuals who may be involved in international firearmstrafficking. The types of detailed crime gun analysesdepicted rely upon comprehensive tracing of recoveredfirearms and are most effective when completeinformation about the firearm, possessor, and recovery issupplied. ATF analytical support has been provided to

many agencies and has been proven effective in puttinginternational firearm traffickers behind bars, therebyhelping to reduce gun crime and violence.

Through its International Programs Branch, ATF alsoeducates law enforcement and other officials in foreigncountries about its firearms tracing and investigativecapabilities and participates in multinational workinggroups to stem the flow of international firearms trafficking.

The Bureau also hosts an International Firearm Serial

Number Restoration class. Participants are provided witha serial number restoration kit and are taught thefundamentals of restoration. Another activity is theclassroom instruction for international forensic expertsgiven by personnel from the ATF Forensic SciencesLaboratory. This instruction program includes a class inthe tracing of crime guns with obliterated serial numbers.

ATFs commitment to support law enforcementcontinues to expand and has become a global effort. ATFrecognizes that its jurisdiction is limited in many of thesecases; however, bolstering foreign law enforcement is acontinuing enterprise for ATF. The Bureaus ability totrace firearms for foreign law enforcement is just anothermeans by which ATF can work with the worldwide lawenforcement community. In this capacity, ATF aids itsforeign counterparts in developing investigative leads tohelp combat the illegal movement of firearms ininternational traffic and to prevent illicitly-traffickedfirearms from being used in criminal acts of violence. _

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The uncontrolled trade in small arms and lightweapons is a significant and growing problem to whichinternational policymakers are devoting unprecedentedattention this year. At first glance, the illicit trade insmall arms might appear relatively insignificant whencompared to such dangers as the proliferation ofchemical and nuclear weapons, which is, of course, animportant cause for international concern. But thespread and misuse of small arms and light weapons isalso a significant problem, and one that truly deserves

the high degree of attention it will receive at the UnitedNations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Armsand Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, to be held July 9-20 in New York. To fully appreciate why this is so, it isfirst necessary to consider some of the changes thathave taken place in the nature of armed conflict sincethe end of the Cold War.

For most of the 20th century, the practice of warfaretypically entailed a series of armed encounters betweenthe organized military forces of established states,usually for the purpose of territorial conquest or otherclearly defined strategic objectives. The belligerents onboth sides employed the full weight of their respectiveforces until one or the other conceded defeat. But theconflicts of the current era bear little resemblance tothis model: most take place within the borders of asingle state, and most entail attacks by paramilitary andirregular forces on unarmed civilians for the purposeof pillage, intimidation, and/or ethnic slaughter.Conflicts often persist for a long period of time and

rarely entail a decisive, all-out battle between thevarious parties.

The distinctive challenges posed by the changingnature of armed conflict were first addressed in 1995by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary-General ofthe United Nations. I wish to concentrate on whatmight be called micro-disarmament, he told theU.N. Security Council. By this, he explained, I meanpractical disarmament in the context of the conflicts

the United Nations is actually dealing with, and of theweapons, most of them light weapons, that are actuallykilling people in the hundreds of thousands. Effortsto curb the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons, heinsisted, must be followed by parallel progress inconventional arms, particularly with respect to lightweapons.

These comments have since been amplified andelaborated upon by many other prominent figures,including senior U.S. officials. But in these few words,Boutros-Ghali highlighted the principal cause ofinternational concern over the uncontrolled spread ofsmall arms: the fact that these weapons are actuallykilling people in the hundreds of thousands in thewars the United Nations (and many individual states)are actually dealing with.

The wars that Boutros-Ghali was referring to are almostall internal conflicts predominantly ethnic disputesor political battles over the control of the state or the

CURBING THE ILLICIT TRADE IN SMALL ARMS:A PRACTICAL ROUTE

By Michael T. Klare,

Professor of Peace and World Security Studies, Hampshire College

The uncontrolled trade in small arms and light weapons is a significant and growing problemto which international policymakers are devoting unprecedented attention this year, saysMichael T. Klare, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies, Hampshire College. Klare believesthat the delegates to this years U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and LightWeapons in All Its Aspects bear a heavy responsibility in trying to lay the foundation for a newinternational regime aimed at curbing the flow of arms to areas of conflict and preventing theirre-use after wars have ended. Such measures while only part of a larger effort to reduce thelevel of global violence and bloodshed can make a significant contribution to world peaceand stability.

_ C O M M E N T A R Y

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ethnic composition of particular regions or territories.Two aspects of these conflicts deserve particularmention: first, most of the victims have been civilians many of them women, children, or the elderly and second, most of the deaths and injuries have beenproduced by small arms and light weapons.

These two phenomena are natural expressions of thechanging nature of violent conflict. Although everyrecent war has a distinctive history and trajectory, allexhibit some characteristics in common. In almostevery case, ambitious and unscrupulous demagogueshave sought to gain or retain power by creatingsectarian armies composed of their ethnic or religiouskinfolk. Once established, these bands are typicallyemployed to silence opposition forces, to intimidate thelocal population, or to drive off members of other

ethnic groups. More often than not, they are also usedto generate income and other benefits for thedemagogues and their loyal henchmen.

Given the nature of such conflict, it is not surprisingthat attacks on unarmed civilians are a routineoccurrence. Although seemingly random and senselessto outside observers, violence of this sort almost alwayshas a purpose: to exact tribute from the population, toobtain fresh military recruits (often young boys andteenagers who are enticed or coerced into combat), to

destroy peoples faith in the ability of the establishedgovernment or a rival armed militia to protect them, todrive members of particular ethnic groups from theirancestral lands, or to exact revenge for prior acts ofresistance. Whatever the case, it is the innocent anddefenseless who suffer the most from these attacks.

The same set of conditions that leads to frequentattacks on civilians also leads to the pervasive use ofsmall arms and light weapons. Most of the combatantsin these conflicts are non-professional soldiers withlittle (if any) military training, and so must rely onsimple, easy-to-use combat systems like theubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle and its various copiesand modifications. In most cases, moreover, the forcesinvolved lack the funds to acquire major weaponssystems, which are considerably more expensive thansmall arms. (A second-hand AK-47, for instance, canbe acquired for $100 or less in many areas, while eventhe cheapest second-hand tank sells for $100,000 ormore.) Small arms and light weapons can also be

carried from battle to battle by an individual soldier a distinct advantage for forces that operate in remoteand undeveloped areas with few if any roads.

The nature of the combatants in these conflicts alsoproduces a reliance on illicit sources of weaponry. Inalmost every case, one or more of the warring parties isa militia or insurgent group that is excluded by lawfrom access to the legitimate arms market. Even someof the government forces involved may be dependenton black-market sources, because the regime inquestion has been subjected to an international armsembargo for its failure to abide by human rightsaccords or U.N. Security Council resolutions.Whatever the case, the parties to these conflicts mustturn to black-market dealers for access to fresh suppliesof arms and ammunition.

These factors have given considerable impetus to thedevelopment of a robust, globe-spanning trade inblack-market weaponry. Typically, the arms involved inthis trade are obtained through theft or subterfuge fromthe large stockpiles of military equipment left over fromthe Cold War period, much of which is still in fullyoperational condition. These arms are then carried byship or plane via circuitous routes to areas of conflictaround the world. Although it is impossible to put aprecise dollar value on the magnitude of this trade,

estimates of $2-3 billion ($2,000 million to $3,000million) per year are not considered excessive.

To pay for all of these black-market weapons, thebelligerents involved often engage in illicit economicactivities of one sort or another kidnapping,extortion, drug trafficking, prostitution, diamond andivory smuggling, illegal logging, and so on. Theseendeavors often add to the trauma of war, by imposingfurther injuries and costs on innocent civilians, bysabotaging legitimate economic activities and, in somecases, by contributing to environmental degradation.To make matters worse, the people who engage in theseillicit activities often acquire considerable personalwealth, and so perceive no reason to bring the fightingto a close. This, indeed, is one of the main reasons forthe failure of U.N. peacekeeping operations in suchcountries as Angola, the Congo, and Sierra Leone.

Clearly, efforts to end these and other ongoing conflicts and to prevent additional wars of this sort from

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breaking out in the future will require strong andunstinting support from the international community.A whole range of initiatives will be needed to addressthe dynamics of armed conflict and its many destructiveconsequences. The various parties to these disputes willhave to be persuaded to resolve their differences throughpeaceful negotiations, warring factions will have to bedisarmed and demobilized, and the survivors of war willhave to be provided with the wherewithal to rebuildtheir shattered lives. To prevent the re-ignition ofcombat, moreover, ex-combatants will have to be assistedin making the transition from military to civilian life.

Curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weaponsis only one part of this larger effort. Experiencesuggests, however, that it is a very crucial part. This isso because arms are the critical ingredient that can turn

a simmering ethnic dispute into a full-scale war, or thatenable a brutal warlord to dominate a particular regionfor years or even decades at a time. When a war isterminated, moreover, the widespread availability ofsurplus arms can turn a fragile peace into a condition ofpersistent lawlessness and banditry.

Focusing on the illicit trade in small arms is alsoattractive because curbing this flow is something thatthe international community can do in a timely,practical manner. Other steps persuading long-time

belligerents to sit down at the bargaining table,rebuilding war-shattered economies, integrating ex-combatants into civil society, and so on are long,complicated processes that must be specially tailored toeach individual situation. But adopting commonguidelines on the export and import of arms and closingloopholes in existing arms regulations is something thatcan be pursued at the international level and producean immediate, worldwide effect.

The establishment of new international controls onsmall arms trafficking will not fully block the flow ofarms to areas of conflict or bring all wars to a close.There will always be some traffickers who will seek toelude governmental controls in the pursuit of fabulouswealth. But an effective system of controls could resultin a significant reduction in the flow of arms, making itmore attractive for warring parties to agree to a cease-fire and the initiation of peace negotiations. Similarly,efforts to collect and destroy surplus weapons after the

successful conclusion of peace talks would reduce therisk of a fresh round of fighting or the retransfer ofarms to belligerents in other conflicts.

Many of the specific measures that could be incorporatedinto an international control regime of this sort havealready been embraced and implemented at the localand regional levels. These include: provisions for themarking of weapons and the adoption of uniform systemsof export/import documentation (as provided for bythe Inter-American Convention Against the IllicitManufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials);close cooperation between the police and customsofficials of affected countries in suppressing cross-border arms-smuggling activities (as envisioned by theSouthern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation

Organization); and the provision of training andtechnical assistance in modern investigative techniquesby the developed nations of the North to the developingcountries of the South (as called for in the EuropeanUnions Program for Preventing and Combating IllicitTrafficking in Conventional Arms).

All of these strategies, and various others, will beconsidered by delegates to the July 2001 conference inNew York City. At this point, it is still too early topredict which of these measures will win the support of

the assembled delegates, but it is likely that someamong them will be incorporated into the Program ofAction that is expected to be adopted at the conclusionof the conference. The conference will also set the stagefor further action in this area, such as strengthenedefforts at the regional and sub-regional level.

The delegates to the Conference on the Illicit Trade inSmall Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects bear aheavy responsibility: to lay the foundation for a newinternational regime aimed at curbing the flow of armsto areas of conflict and preventing their re-use afterwars have ended. Such measures while only part ofa larger effort to reduce the level of global violence andbloodshed can make a significant contribution toworld peace and stability. _

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.


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Small arms are a class of weapons responsible for themajority of todays conflict casualties, and an estimated

500,000 deaths and thousands more injuries each year.The spread and misuse of small arms cause, prolong,and exacerbate humanitarian crises around the world.In the last few years, a growing international consensushas emerged that steps must be taken to avoid a worldawash in small arms. These weapons are often tradedillegally through the same murky channels used bydrug cartels, terrorists, and organized crime. Worldgovernments have recognized the importance of reiningin this trade.

A United Nations (U.N.) conference on the issue ofsmall arms in July 2001, intended to focus oncoordinated international action to deal with the illicittrade in small arms and light weapons, has become thefirst international effort in what has until now largelybeen a national and regionally-based undertaking. TheU.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms andLight Weapons in All Its Aspects underscores the effortto rein in the small arms trade at the international level,and perhaps slow the escalating death toll caused by it.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) arebecoming increasingly frustrated as governments losesight of the underlying objective to eliminate thehuman suffering caused by the illicit small arms trade.The small arms issue, at the U.N. conference andbeyond, requires coordinated international, regional,national, and local action and leadership to eliminatethe weapons devastating impact, including cooperationand coordination between governments and NGOs.Governments should look to multilateralize best

practices and develop standards and norms to countersmall arms proliferation and misuse.

U.S. leadership on small arms issues is vital now morethan ever. In the U.S. political sphere, however, smallarms trafficking has not been a high priority. Often,policymakers are loathe to get involved in the issue ofsmall arms proliferation because they regard it as anattempt to introduce domestic gun control, or theythink the issue is too controversial. Others believe thatthere are other, more important issues to deal with.

The concern of NGOs and activists is that silence on

illicit small arms proliferation might mean the issue willreceive little or no attention from key policy officials inthe near future and will not be placed higher on thepolitical agenda. U.S. inaction on small armstrafficking would be a tragic mistake, not only for themillions of people affected by small arms around theworld, but for the credibility and standing of theUnited States among its allies which would bedamaged by not standing up to stop this scourge.Small arms have become a genuine threat to U.S.national security interests because their proliferationperpetuates violent conflict and creates new cycles ofviolence and crime. Moreover, the uncontrolledproliferation of small arms puts U.S. troops andpeacekeepers at risk when excess weapons destabilizeregions of conflict, or when weapons caches are notremoved from post-conflict situations. Small arms alsodiminish U.S. business opportunities and raise costs,hinder the ability of humanitarian and relieforganizations to conduct their efforts, and weaken thepossibilities for sustainable development.

U.S. POLICY NEED NOT BE SILENT ON SMALL ARMSBy Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, Center for Defense Information

and chair, U.S. Small Arms Working Group (SAWG)

The spread and misuse of small arms cause, prolong, and exacerbate humanitarian crisesaround the world. In the last few years, a growing international consensus has emerged that stepsmust be taken to avoid a world awash in small arms, says Rachel Stohl, a senior analyst at theCenter for Defense Information, and chair of the U.S. Small Arms Working Group. She urgesgovernments to look to multilateralize best practices and develop standards and norms to countersmall arms proliferation and misuse.

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To counter the dangers of small arms proliferation,policies on legal sales in conjunction with internationalcooperation to reduce illicit trafficking must be developed.One aspect cannot be addressed without the other, asthe line between the illicit and legal trade is oftenmurky or deliberately blurred. Many illegal weapons incirculation were at some point legally transferred bygovernments or with government approval. Thegrowing use of, and reliance on, international privatetraffickers also clouds the issue (in some cases these arelegal sales, in others, not). Legal government sales intheir own right warrant international attention, as theymay also lead to human rights abuses, serve to prolongconflicts, or be used for unintended purposes.

Policy options on small arms are abundant and can beimplemented with relatively little cost while achieving

large and tangible results. The Clinton administrationintroduced several measures to control small armsproliferation that have not been implemented. Many ofthese should be embraced by the Bush administration todemonstrate a strong U.S. commitment to the smallarms issue.

First, the United States should lead a moratorium onarms sales to all regions of conflict especiallyongoing conflicts and work with other states toadopt similar moratoria. In many countries and

regions, there are enough small arms in circulation toarm the worlds worst conflicts several times over. Newstocks need not enter the supply chain.

Second, a criterion outlined in the European Union(EU) Code of Conduct and the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)Document on Small Arms should be rigorously appliedto international small arms exports. Both the EU andOSCE criteria emphasize the exporting states duty toprevent arms sales that would contribute to humanrights violations and other acts of repression, exacerbateregional tensions, provoke or prolong conflicts, be athigh risk of diversion into the illicit market, orotherwise threaten international peace and security.Such a policy is in line with a prior State Departmentpledge to honor strict criteria when licensing smallarms exports. Further, administration officials shouldpromote the congressionally mandated InternationalCode of Conduct in ongoing multilateral negotiationsto ensure that other countries respect strict exporting

criteria. Governments have an obligation to make sureweapons are not used to violate rights and commitabuses.

Third, the United States as well as other exportingnations should set an example by adopting a policy ofexport restraint that is designed to prevent diversionand dangerous weapons buildups, based on the existingU.S. policy to audit, and if necessary, cut off exportsto a state if arms export license applications exceed thenormal, reasonable, domestic needs of a given importingcountry or show other abnormalities. Excess smallarms should not be introduced to vulnerable areas ormade available on the open market. Developingcountries should be encouraged to spend scarce resourceson strengthening their infrastructures, not expandingmilitary strength. Even though excess defense articles

are often provided at a reduced cost, many countrieswould be better served with institutional support.

Fourth, the State Department should ask for, andCongress should grant, continued and increasedfunding for small arms destruction programs andcontinued cooperation on weapons destruction andstockpile management, in order to help destroy surplusweapons that would otherwise cascade to regions ofconflict. Programs are currently under way in EasternEurope and cooperation is ongoing with the South

African Development Community. Currently, theState Department receives $2 million for theseprograms. This is not enough. The State Departmentshould ask for and receive additional funds for theseprograms and look to expand them to other regions.The collection and destruction of surplus weaponsfacilitates post-conflict reconstruction and lessens thelikelihood of a country returning to war. In the end,the minimal costs associated with such programs areless than the costs associated with conflict andprolonged post-conflict reconstruction efforts thatwould inevitably develop from excessive anddestabilizing accumulations of small arms.

Fifth, the State Department should develop aninformation-sharing mechanism on United Nationsarms embargoes, either within the United Nations or inregional fora. The United States should also improveimplementation and enforcement of the U.S. armsbrokering law, a 1996 amendment to the Arms ExportControl Act (AECA), passed on July 21, 1996, and

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encourage other countries to enact similar restrictions.In the past, the United States has been critical of thelack of adherence to U.N. arms embargoes and hasrecommended increased cooperation in the internationalcommunity on enforcing compliance. Monitoring andregulating the trade in small arms and prosecutingviolators of national and international arms controllaws would make implementing arms embargoes less ofa challenge than it is today.

Sixth, the State Department should advocate immediateSenate ratification of the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS) convention on small arms trafficking.The United States signed, in November 1997, the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturingof and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosivesand Other Related Materials, which is intended to

increase controls over and traceability of small arms asthey move across borders. Given that the United Stateshas already implemented the majority of measuresoutlined in the convention, ratification will serve as anexample to the rest of the hemisphere. An effectiveregime to control the illicit trafficking of small armscould be duplicated in other regions and lead tomeaningful international control of the i

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