The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 11 | Issue 40 | Number 1 | Oct 01, 2013

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Selling Empire: American Propaganda and War in thePhilippines

Susan A. Brewer

And of all our race He has markedthe American people as his chosennation to f inal ly lead in theregeneration of the world. This isthe divine mission of America, andit holds for us all the profit, all theglory, all the happiness possible toman.

Senator Albert J. Beveridge, 1900

I thought it would be a great thingto give a whole lot of freedom tothe Filipinos, but I guess now it’sbetter to let them give i t tothemselves.

Mark Twain, 1900

At the turn of the twentieth century, Americansand Filipinos fought bitterly for control of thePhilippine Islands. The United States viewedthe Pacific islands as a stepping-stone to themarkets and natural resources of Asia. ThePhilippines, which had belonged to Spain forthree hundred years, wanted independence, notanother imperial ruler. For the Americans, theacquisition of a colony thousands of miles fromits shores required a break with their anti-imperial traditions. To justify such a break, theadministration of William McKinley proclaimedthat its policies benefited both Americans andFilipinos by advancing freedom, Christianbenevolence, and prosperity. Most of theCongress, the press, and the public rallied tothe flag, embracing the war as a patriotic

adventure and civilizing mission. Dissent,however, flourished among a minority calledanti-imperialists. Setting precedents for allwartime presidents who would follow, McKinleyenhanced the power of the chief executive tobuild a public consensus in support of anexpansionist foreign policy.1

This article explores McKinley’s use of wartimepropaganda extolling national progress andunity to aid his successful navigation of thetransition of the United States to great powerstatus. The president and his supporters didnot portray the United States as an imperialpower in the European manner. To win supportfor far-reaching changes in foreign policy,McKinley explained overseas expansion interms of American traditions and drew onfamiliar themes from the past. The last CivilWar veteran to serve as president, hecelebrated the coming together of the Northand South to fight a common enemy. Heportrayed American expansion in the Pacific asa continuation of manifest destiny. Hecompared the Filipinos to Native Americans,calling them savage warriors or “little brownbrothers.” Appealing to popular attitudes of thetimes, he encouraged Americans to fulfill theirmanly duty to spread Christian civilization. TheUnited States, he asserted, was a liberator, nota conqueror.2

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Hawaii, Cuba, and the Philippinescelebrate the Independence Day of theUnited States. July 1898. Charles L.Bartholomew, Minneapolis Journal.(Cartoons of the Spanish-American War byBart, Minneapolis: Journal Printing Co,1899).

To rally support for his policy, the McKinleyadminis trat ion mastered the la testcommunication technology to shape theportrayal of the war by the media of the day.McKinley was the first to have his inaugurationfilmed and to have a secretary who met dailywith the press, “for a kind of family talk,” asjournalist Ida Tarbell put it. Reporters wereprovided with a table and chairs in the outer-reception room of the Executive Mansionwhere they could chat with important visitorsand even the president if he approached themfirst. McKinley paid special attention to therepresentatives of the wire services, the newsagencies that sent syndicated stories bytelegraph to subscribing newspapers across thecountry. The president’s staff, which grew fromsix to eighty, monitored public opinion bystudying daily hundreds of newspapers fromaround the country. To make sure that

reporters accurately conveyed the president’sviews, his staff issued press releases, timingthe distribution so that reporters on deadlinefiled only the administration’s version of thestory. Through news management, theMcKinley administration disseminated warpropaganda based on facts, lies, ideas, patrioticsymbols, and emotional appeals.3

In contrast to the more rambunctiousexpansionists of the day, the genial McKinleyexuded calm and dignity. As noted by hiscontemporary, the British historian anddiplomat James Bryce, American leaders putconsiderable effort into leading opinion whileappearing to follow it. The president spokepublicly of America’s expanded influence in theCaribbean and the Pacific as though it hadhappened by chance or been willed by God. Hisactions, however, made the acquisition of anempire no accident. In addition, his publicposition of passivity made it difficult for criticsto challenge his policies until they were wellunder way. McKinley, observed the astuteHenry Adams, a grandson and great-grandsonof presidents, was “a marvelous manager ofmen.” While politicians, members of the press,and military men freely expressed theircriticisms of U.S. policy, the president and hisfellow expansionists took the country to warwith Spain, built a consensus for keeping thePhilippines, and maintained support for wagingwar against Filipinos who fought for theirindependence. In doing so, they constructed apersuasive version of U.S. policy in thePhilippines as a “divine mission” that not onlydisguised the realities of war and conquest, butalso would serve in years to come as anexample of America’s commitment to spreadingfreedom.4

Competition for Empire

The war between the Americans and theFilipinos was just one of many colonial warstaking place in the late 1800s and early 1900sas the world’s industrialized powers scrambled

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for dominance in Africa and Asia. Britaindoubled its imperial territory, France acquiredthree and a half million square miles includingIndochina, and Russia expanded east. Theaging Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Spanishempires struggled to hang on to what they had.Up-and-coming nations—Germany, Japan, andthe United States—sought to expand theirinfluence. Imperial powers clashed overfaraway frontiers and subdued native peopleswho resisted foreign rule. New technologiesoften made these fights one-sided. To fueleconomic expansion, businessmen and traderscompeted over investments, raw materials, andmarkets, backing railroad construction inChina, digging copper mines in Africa, andselling sewing machines to Pacific Islanders.Missionaries of many faiths crusaded for thesouls of the “heathen,” preaching ancientbeliefs as well as western attitudes aboutculture and consumer goods. Explorers racedto plant their flags. Claims of national gloryaccompanied many of these exploits, along withjustifications of spreading progress andstability. Such fierce competition for territory,economic gain, and souls often producedupheaval instead.5

His goal, McKinley told Governor RobertLaFollette of Wisconsin was to “attain U.S.supremacy in world markets.” The UnitedStates had settled its western frontier,wrapping up thirty years of conflict with theNative Americans. With their own continentalempire to manage, American expansionistsseemed more interested in ind irectimperialism---informal dominance througheconomic power---than direct imperialism,which entailed hands-on governance. Forinstance, U.S. companies already had madefortunes out of bananas and minerals fromLatin America. To further economic expansion,Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan of the U.S. Navyadvocated the construction of a canal throughCentral America, the buildup of a strong navyto protect trade routes, and the acquisition ofrefueling bases in the Caribbean and the

Pacific. Mahan’s ideas had powerful supportfrom McKinley, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), Assistant Secretary of the Navy TheodoreRoosevelt, and other expansionists, called“jingoes.” In particular, the United Stateswanted access to China with its millions ofpotential customers. So did Japan, Britain,Germany, Russia, and France. The imperialpowers threatened to divide up China as theyhad Africa. In January 1898, the U. S. Ministerto China warned Washington, “partition woulddestroy our markets.” Within months theUnited States would be a Pacific powerpracticing direct imperialism in the Philippinesto advance indirect imperialism in China.6

American expansionists of the white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant middle and upper classeswere confident that they could lead at homeand overseas. Citing Social Darwinism andscientific studies that demonstrated thesuperiority of the white race, they viewed whiteAmerican men to be dominant by virtue of theirevolved good character and civilized self-control. The men of decadent Spain, theythought, had gone soft. They considered non-white people to be no more than children,primitive and wild, in need of the guidance of abig brother or great white father. Women,viewed as weak and passive, also requiredprotection. Such attitudes reassured theseleaders of their natural supremacy at a timewhen mil l ions of Catholic and Jewishimmigrants arrived from Southern and EasternEurope, the women’s suffrage movementagitated for the vote, African Americanschallenged the “color l ine” drawn bysegregationists in the South, and workers andfarmers demanded radical reforms. Theseleading men preferred the status quo at home.War overseas provided an escape from “themenace and per i l s o f soc ia l i sm andagrarianism,” thought Henry Watterson, theeditor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, just “asEngland has escaped them, by a policy ofcolonialism and conquest.” In a nation at war,the leaders believed, everyone would know and

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accept their place in society whether at the topor the bottom. Freedom was only for “peoplecapable of self-restraint,” said TheodoreRoosevelt, who ironically was seen as a bit ofwild man himself.7

American expansionists drew on these beliefsand interests to justify war with Spain in thesummer of 1898 and the fighting in thePhilippines that followed. For most Americans,the conflict with Spain was about the liberationof Cuba. By 1896, Cuban rebels, who carriedout ruthless economic warfare by destroyingcane fields, sugar mills, and railroads, hadtaken charge of more than half the island. Toprevent civilians from supporting the rebels,Spanish authorities forced Cubans out of theirvillages into guarded “reconcentration camps,”where 100,000 died of disease and starvation.As Cubans and Spaniards fought on, Americaninvestors in Cuban railroads and sugarplantations lost millions. At his inauguration inMarch 1897, President McKinley referred tothe turbulence in Cuba and declared that theUnited States wanted “no wars of conquest.”What the United States did want in Cuba wasstability and economic access. McKinleyinformed Spain that it should put an end to therevo l t , i n s t i tu te re fo rms , s top thereconcentration policy, and respect the humanrights of the Cubans. Madrid proposed reformsthat satisfied no one. As the upheavalcontinued, McKinley stepped up the pressureby ordering the new battleship U.S.S. Maine toHavana to protect American lives and property.

Americans followed the story of the CubanRevolution in their many newspapers. NewYorkers alone could choose among eightmorning and seven evening papers. They couldread the Republican or Democratic papers fornews that shared their politics. Or they couldturn to the independent and, at three cents apaper, high-priced New York Times. For theless highbrow readers, there were thesensational “yellow journals.” To increasecirculation, publishers Joseph Pulitzer of the

New York World and St. Louis Post Dispatchand William Randolph Hearst of the New YorkJournal and San Francisco Examiner competedfor readers (and advertisers) with exposés,stunts, comics, sports coverage, women’sfeatures, and exciting accounts of foreignconflicts. They believed that war, especially theway they reported it, sold papers. Somehistories have blamed yellow journalism forstirring up such frenzy for war with Spain thatMcKinley was compelled to undertake one.Although McKinley’s actions do not supportthis view, the stories featured in the yellowpress did shape popular perceptions of theconflict. In contrast to the anti-war papers, withtheir accounts of complicated politicalproblems and atrocities committed by bothsides, the high circulation yellow press filledtheir pages with one-sided stories of Spain’scrimes of mutilation, rape, and murder.8

When the Maine blew up in Havana harbor onFebruary 15, 1898, Americans were stunned bythe loss of 266 sailors and outraged at thedestruction of their ship. The administrationasked for calm, appointed an expert board ofinquiry to investigate the explosion, andaccepted Madrid’s expressions of sympathy.Speaking at the University of Pennsylvania,McKinley said Washington would rely on Godfor guidance. Privately, he told Senator CharlesW. Fairbanks (R-IN) that the administrationwould “not be plunged into war until it is readyfor it.”9 The jingoes, meanwhile, were burstingwith anticipation for war. Luck was with themwhen the official inquiry, without consultingthe navy’s ordnance expert or chief engineer,concluded that an external explosion caused bya mine had destroyed the Maine, a verdict thatwas widely interpreted to mean that Spain wasculpable even though the report did not say so.In a later investigation, the U.S. Navydetermined that an internal explosion involvingthe fueling system most likely had destroyedthe ship. At the time, however, McKinley fedthe widespread impression of Spain’s guilt bysaying that anything that happened in Havana

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was ultimately its responsibility.

McKinley prepared for war by calling for amilitary buildup. Congress appropriated fiftymillion dollars, three-fifths of which went to theNavy. The rest went to the Army, whichassumed that only small forces would beneeded to take beaches and aid the Cubans andso used most of its appropriation on coastalfortifications. In late February, withoutpermission, the gung-ho Assistant SecretaryRoosevelt put naval units on alert. Although allattention was on the Caribbean, he did notignore Spain’s colony in the Philippines. Heordered George Dewey, the commander of theAsiatic Squadron, who had been busy searchingthe coast of China for the best site for anAmerican port, to proceed to Hong Kong andstand at the ready. Secretary of the Navy JohnLong and the president countermanded most ofRoosevelt’s orders, but not the one to Dewey.As for Spain, it had 150,000 troops in Cubaexhausted by fighting and disease, 20,000 inthe Philippines, and an antique navy. Wellaware that a single U.S. battleship could takeout one of their entire squadrons, Spanishofficers steeled themselves for what they hopedwould be an honorable defeat.10

As the Spanish government searched for acompromise solution, the European powersconsidered whether they should take sides.From the Vatican, the pope asked McKinley toavoid a war by accepting Spain’s promise of anarmistice with the rebels. Germany, which hadits eye on Spanish possessions in the Pacific,and France proposed mediation. McKinleypolitely rejected these offers. The Britishdecided to support the Americans by doingnothing. The president received reports thatAmerican business leaders had concluded awar might enhance opportunities for trade,investments, and profits. Congressional supportconsolidated after Senator Redfield Proctor (R-VT) returned from Cuba with a v iv iddescription of the suffering under Spanish rule.His colleague from Wyoming, Senator Francis

E. Warren, expressed growing indignation,“that we, a civilized people, an enlightenednation, a great republic, born in a revoltagainst tyranny, should permit such a state ofthings within less than a hundred miles of ourshore as that which exists in Cuba.”11

Once ready to wage war, McKinley explainedhis reasons to Congress on April 11, 1898. Bycustom, he did not deliver his message inperson, but sent it to be read out loud to thelegislators by clerks. The president definedU.S. aims as ending the war between Spain andCuba, establishing a stable government inCuba, and insuring peace and security for boththe citizens of Cuba and the United States.After calling for the use of force to achievethese purposes, the president mentioned inpassing that Spain had proclaimed asuspension of hostilities in Cuba. In otherwords, Spain had made one more majorconcession. He closed by asking Congress toconsider this development as it ponderedaction true to “our aspirations as a Christian,peace-loving people.” The Philippine Islandswere never mentioned.

As Congress prepared to declare war on Spain,the big debate was not over whether to go towar, but whether the United States shouldrecognize the revolutionary government inCuba. The debate illustrated the gap betweenthe public’s and the administration’sperceptions of what the war was about.McKinley’s aim was American access to astable Cuba, not Cuban independence. Ashistorian Louis Pérez has pointed out, theCuban rebels were on the verge of achievingindependence on their own. If they did, theymight decide to pursue freedom from foreigndomination not only by kicking out Spain, butalso the United States. McKinley persuaded thelawmakers no t to recogn i ze Cubanindependence. The United States and Spaindeclared war on each other at the end ofApril.12

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As much as he could, McKinley centralized warnews in the Executive Mansion. In the warroom, he installed twenty telegraph wires andfifteen phone wires with direct connections tothe executive departments and Congress. Fromthe Executive Mansion, it took a speedy twentyminutes for a message to reach armyheadquarters in Cuba. To protect the secrecy oftroop movements, McKinley ordered militarycensorship in Florida and in New York City,home of the wire services. The presscomplained, but complied. On May 17, theAssociated Press (AP) resolved “to loyallysustain the general government in the conductof the war” by avoiding publication of “anyinformation likely to give aid to the enemy orembarrass the government.”13

To expand the regular army, McKinley calledup 200,000 volunteers from National Guardunits; each state was given a quota based onpopulation. The commander-in-chief personallychose officers, considering party obligations,competence, and his theme of national unity.Most famously he gave commands to formerConfederates, General “Fightin’ Joe” Wheelerand Fitzhugh Lee, nephew of General Robert E.Lee who had surrendered to Union GeneralUlysses S. Grant in 1865. The troops’ lack ofpreparation was remarked upon by Kansasnewspaper editor William Allen White. “Theprincipal martial duty the National Guards hadto perform before they were mustered out,”noted White, “was to precede the fire companyand follow the Grand Army squad in theprocessions on Memorial Day and the Fourth ofJuly.” White was confident that Americancitizen soldiers, as clumsy as they were, soonwould be transformed into a disciplinedregiment, a “human engine of death.”14

On the first of May, George Dewey sailed hisfleet from Hong Kong to the Philippines andinto Manila Bay. He gave the order “You mayfire when ready, Gridley,” and oversaw theefficient destruction of Spain’s Pacific navalforce without losing a single American sailor.

Ships from the British, French, and Germannavies witnessed his triumph. As Dewey’s fleetattacked, a British naval band showed theirsupport by playing “The Star SpangledBanner,” a song whose lyrics had beencomposed by an American as the Britishbombarded Baltimore in the War of 1812. TheGermans, with their five warships in ManilaBay, proved more troublesome as time went on,making clear their interest in any availableislands. The British for their part muchpreferred the United States as a partner in thePacific to Germany. To control informationfrom his end, Dewey cut the transoceaniccable, which meant that news of his victory wastransmitted through Hong Kong and reachedthe United States on May 7. The dramaticreports of Joseph L. Stickney of the New YorkHerald, who blurred the line between reporterand participant by serving as Dewey’s aideduring the battle, Edward W. Harden of theNew York World and the Chicago Tribune, andJohn McCutcheon, cartoonist of the ChicagoRecord made Dewey a national hero. Quick tocapitalize on the victory, entrepreneurs slappedDewey’s picture or name on songs, dishes,shaving mugs, baby rattles, neckties, andchewing gum.15

McKinley adopted a public face of reluctanceand uncertainty about the Philippines while hemoved to take control. He remarked that “oldDewey” would have saved him a lot of trouble ifhe had sailed away once he defeated theSpanish fleet. Although certainly true,McKinley followed up Dewey’s victory bysending 20,000 troops under General WesleyMerritt to the islands. The president decided,“While we are conducting war and until itsconclusion, we must keep all we get. When thewar is over we must keep what we want.” Hetold committed expansionist Henry CabotLodge that he had doubts about keeping all ofthe islands, but “we are to keep Manila.” Thepresident continued, “If, however, as we go onit is made to appear desirable that we shouldretain all, then we will certainly do it.” Over the

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next several months, Senator Lodge and hisfellow jingoes dedicated themselves to make it“appear desirable.” As for American troops,they were shipped overseas on an open-endedmission with inadequate intelligence. Caughtby surprise, the War Department could provideMerritt’s staff with only an encyclopedia articleon the Philippines. Even so, Lt. Col. Edward C.Little of the 20th Kansas Volunteer InfantryRegiment, had a good idea of their objective.He told his men, “We go to the far away islandsof the Pacific to plant the Stars and Stripes onthe ramparts where long enough has waved thecruel and merciless banner of Spain.”16

On their way to the Philippines, U. S. forcesstopped to take the island of Guam fromSpanish officers who didn’t know they were atwar. At the same time, McKinley stepped upplans to acquire the Hawaiian Islands. Thepresident told his secretary, “We need Hawaiijust as much and a good deal more than we didCalifornia. It is manifest destiny.”17 Five yearsearlier, U.S. marines and warships hadprovided support for the overthrow of QueenLili’uokalani led by pro-American plantationowners. Urging annexation during the war withSpain, Senator Lodge made the case that if theUnited States didn’t take the islands nowsomeone else would, an argument that hewould use again regarding the Philippines.Congress made Hawaii a U.S. territory by jointresolution despite petitions of protest fromHawaiians. With the islands of Hawaii, Guam,and the Philippines, the United States wouldhave the refueling bases for naval andmerchant ships in the Pacific so desired byexpansionists. The U.S. defeat of Spanishforces in Cuba in mid-July enhanced U.S.dominance over the Caribbean.

In the Philippines, the big problem for the U. S.military was not Spain, but the army ofFilipinos headed by the twenty-seven year oldEmi l io Aguina ldo . Spanish co lon ia ladministrators had faced a growing nationalistmovement led in 1897 by Aguinaldo who

declared the Philippines independent, namedhimself president, and called for rebellion.When Spain began to use the same repressivetactics it used in Cuba, Aguinaldo accepted atruce, which included his exile to Hong Kong.He remained there until Dewey had himreturned to the Philippines to help theAmericans in their fight against Spain. In shortorder, Aguinaldo resurrected an army, tookcontrol of all of the islands with the exceptionof Manila, a few ports, and the areas inhabitedby Musl ims, i ssued a dec larat ion o findependence, and set up an elite-dominatedgovernment with a national assembly oflawyers, doctors, educators, and writers. ThenU. S. army troops arrived, carrying instructionsthat they were not to share authority in theislands with the Filipinos. General Thomas M.Anderson sent Aguinaldo a message: “GeneralAnderson wishes you to inform your people thatwe are here for their good and that they mustsupply us with labor and material at thecurrent market prices.”18

Recognizing the Filipino people as the realthreat, the American command worked out adeal with the Spaniards to stage a mock battleof Manila on August 13, 1898. They wouldshoot at each other and then Spain wouldsurrender before the Philippine Army ofLiberation could take part. As the Americansraised their flag over Manila, the outragedFilipinos cut off the city’s water supply.General Merritt was forced to negotiate andallow Filipinos access to their capital city.Merritt sailed for the Spanish-American peaceconference held in Paris, leaving General ElwellS. Otis, a graduate of Harvard Law School anda veteran of Gettysburg and the Indian wars, incommand. Relations between the Filipinos andthe Americans were both tense and friendly.Manila was an “odd place,” wrote volunteerWheeler Martin to his family in Idaho. “Theycant talk english nor we can’t understandthem,” but there lived “some of the prettyestwomen I ever saw in my life.” A number of U.S.soldiers, who referred to the Filipinos as

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“niggers” and “gugus,” expected deferencefrom the “natives.” Filipinos, who knewsomething about the tragic history of NativeAmericans and African Americans, expressedtheir belief that it might be better to diefighting than live under U.S. control.19

Uncle Sam, wearing the badge “World’sHumane Agent,” considers what to do withthe Philippines as Porto Rico and Cubal o o k o n , J u l y 1 8 9 8 , C h a r l e s L .Bartholomew, Minneapolis Journal.(Cartoons of the Spanish-American War byBart, Minneapolis: Journal PrintingCompany, 1899)

Its victory over Spain meant that the UnitedStates had become a world power. “Our army’sgreatest invasion of a foreign land wascompletely successful,” war correspondentRichard Harding Davis wryly concluded,“because the Lord looks after his own.” Othercommentators were from “the Lord helps thosewho help themselves” school of analysis.McClure’s Magazine ran an article replete withstatistics and charts showing that the United

States had become so strong it could prevail inwar against any combination of Europeannations. Blue and gray had fought together,celebrated McKinley. Theodore Roosevelttrumpeted the uniting in battle of the economicand social classes so divided by industrial strifebetween business and labor. The fashionmagazine Vogue wasn’t so sure that class unitywas a positive development. It expressed regretthat “our democracy” required gentlemen tomingle with the other classes in military units,fearing that “constant contact with the rougherelement … would affect a man’s character.”Spain, which had been so vilified in the weeksleading up to war, was now seen as gallant indefeat. The peoples of Cuba and the Philippineswho the Americans had pledged to liberatebegan to be portrayed by the administrationand the press as chi ld - l ike , v io lent ,incompetent, and untrustworthy. 2 0

Campaign to Keep the Philippines

As the peace talks with Spain began in the fallof 1898, McKinley announced that he wouldmake a speaking tour to “sound out” opinion onwhat to do with the Philippines. His realpurpose was to build support for keeping them.In fifty-seven appearances, McKinley linkedpatriotism with holding the islands. At trainstops, he frequently commented with pleasureon seeing children waving “the glorious oldbanner of the free.” He also sought approval tokeep troops in the Pacific, even though, asDemocratic leaders pointed out, the men hadenlisted to free Cuba. McKinley’s aides madesure that his appearances in mid-western townsreached a wide audience. They took along atrain carload of reporters from the wireservices, national magazines and big citynewspapers. The president’s staff distributedadvance copies of formal speeches along withnumerous bulletins complete with human-interest anecdotes, which frequently appearedword for word as news stories. Newspapereditors got the message and reported that itlooked like the United States would be keeping

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the Pacific islands.21

President McKinley greets the citizens ofAlliance, Ohio, from the rear platform ofhis train, 1900. (Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-102871)

McKinley struck two major themes, unity andprogress, as he spoke to cheering crowds inIowa. To the people of Clinton, he said, "Northand South have been united as never before.People who think alike in a country like oursmust act together." He suggested that wherewar and foreign policy were concerned politicsshould stop at the water's edge. At Denison, hesaid, “Partisanship has been hushed, and thevoice of patriotism alone is heard throughoutthe land.” In Chariton, he spoke of the peacefulacquisition of Hawaii in addition to the Spanishterritories. "And, my fellow-citizens, whereverour flag floats, wherever we raise that standardof liberty, it is always for the sake of humanityand the advancement of civil ization,”proclaimed McKinley. “Territory sometimescomes to us when we go to war for a holycause, and whenever it does the banner of

liberty will float over it and bring, I trust,blessings and benefits to all the people." AtHastings, the president was direct about therewards of war: "We have pretty mucheverything in this country to make it happy. Wehave good money, we have ample revenues, wehave unquestioned national credit; but we wantnew markets, and as trade follows the flag, itlooks very much as if we were going to havenew markets." To the people of Arcola, Illinois,the president spelled out what it meant to haveforeign markets: “When you cannot sell yourbroom-corn in our own country, you are glad tosend the surplus to some other country, and gettheir good money for your good broom-corn.”When McKinley returned to Washington, heremarked that “the people” seemed to expectthat the United States would keep all of thePhilippines.22

Pioneer Uncle Sam plows Civilization intothe Philippine Field behind Justice andHumanity without a Filipino in sight.S e p t e m b e r 1 8 9 8 . C h a r l e s L .Bartholomew, Minneapolis Journal.(Cartoons of the Spanish-American War byBart, Minneapolis: Journal PrintingCompany, 1899)

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The administration had wanted Manila as abase and decided early on to hold the island ofLuzon to protect the capital city. When theNavy argued that it would be better to have allof the islands, McKinley agreed. He acceptedGeneral F. V. Greene’s pro-expansion report onthe commercial opportunities of the islands.Numerous articles and books about “our newpossessions” outlined their potential forsupplying Americans with coffee, sugar, andmineral wealth. Washington instructed U.S.authorities in the Philippines not to promiseanything to “the natives” or to treat them aspartners, but to avoid an outright conflict. Fortheir part, Aguinaldo and his supporters,committed to the goal of independence, weredivided on how best to proceed, unsurewhether to ask for American protection of theirindependence or formal recognition. 23

“Uncle Sam to Little Aguinaldo -- See HereSonny, Whom Are You Going to ThrowThose Rocks At? September 1898. CharlesL. Bartholomew, Minneapolis Journal.(Cartoons of the Spanish-American War byBart, Minneapolis: Journal PrintingCompany, 1899)

McKinley organized the Peace Commission sothat expansionists would dominate thedelegation to Paris, carefully includingprominent Senators since the Senate wouldhave to ratify any treaty. During theirdeliberations, the commissioners were briefedby General Charles A. Whittier, who said that,based on his meetings with Aguinaldo, theFilipino leader would not be difficult tomanage. Furthermore, he reassured them as to“the ease with which good soldiers could bemade out of the natives, provided they were ledby white off icers.” 2 4 With Spain, thecommissioners negotiated a treaty which gavethe United States control of Cuba, Puerto Rico,Guam, and for twenty million dollars, thePhilippine Islands.

Shortly after the president signed the treaty,but before it was submitted to the Senate forratification in late December 1898, he sentorders to General Otis in the Philippinesannouncing that “the mission of the UnitedStates is one of benevolent assimilation.”McKinley continued, “In the fulfillment of thishigh mission, supporting the temperateadministration of affairs for the greatest goodof the governed, there must be sedulouslymaintained the strong arm of authority, torepress disturbance and to overcome allobstacles to the bestowal of the blessings ofgood and stable government upon the people ofthe Philippine Islands under the free flag of theUnited States.” This elaborate messageexpressed the desired combination: a freeUnited States and a stable Philippines. The WarDepartment instructed Otis to “prosecute theoccupation” with tact and kindness, avoidingconfrontation with the insurgents by being“conciliatory but firm.” Aguinaldo, convincedthat the Senate would reject the treaty becauseit so grievously violated American principles,maintained a siege of Manila. His envoy FelipeAgoncillo traveled to Paris where both sides atthe peace talks ignored him. Agoncillo returnedto Washington to make the case that the“greatest Republic of America” should

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recognize the first Republic of Asia or therewould be conflict, but no official would seehim.25

As McKinley’s plan to take the Philippinesbecame clear, a number of Americans spokeout in opposition for a variety of reasons, someprincipled, some practical. Anti-imperialistsincluded former presidents, the DemocratGrover Cleveland and the Republican BenjaminHarrison, industrialist Andrew Carnegie, laborleaders Samuel Gompers and Eugene V. Debs,philosopher William James, and writer WilliamDean Howells. Satirists Mark Twain and PeterFinley Dunne mocked the high-soundingrhetoric of humanitarianism and morality,which they saw as a cover for racism andgreed. Dunne’s famous character, thebarkeeper Mr. Dooley, said it was a case ofhands across the sea and into someone’spocket. African American leaders Booker T.Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois believed thatthe Filipinos could govern themselves andcertainly would do a better job than the UnitedStates judging by its record with non-whitepeople at home. Other anti-imperialists werewhite supremacists who believed that anyeffort to prepare Filipinos for self-governmentwould fail. Women’s rights groups, still fightingfor the vote, sympathized with the Filipinoswho faced the prospect of being governedwithout their consent. Those with strategicconcerns pointed out that the United Statesalways had depended on the Pacific Ocean as abarrier, protecting it from attack. Acquisition ofhard-to-defend bases at Manila and PearlHarbor would make the United States morevulnerable.26

Despite the organization of the Anti-ImperialistLeague with its 30,000 members, the Senateratification of the peace treaty appeared likely.The economy was booming and the Republicansdid well in the off-year elections. Thepresident’s critics accused him of either beinga genial hack, the tool of bosses and capitalists,or a mastermind, craftily forging an empire by

trampling over the Constitution and Congress,a sure indication that they were demoralizedand did not know how to challenge him. Thepresident made another tour to promote hisPhilippines policy, this time through the South,where in Savannah he asked, “Can we leavethese people, who, by the fortunes of war andour own acts, are helpless and withoutgovernment, to chaos and anarchy, after wehave destroyed the only government they havehad?” He answered, “Having destroyed theirgovernment, it is the duty of the Americanpeople to provide for a better one.” Thepresident dismissed as unpatriotic anysuggestion that the American people wereincapable of creating a new government forothers. On February 6, 1899, the Senateratified the treaty with one vote to spare,dividing largely along party lines, which meantthat partisan politics may have had more to dowith the outcome than the outbreak of fightingin the Philippines the day before.27

War in the Philippines

“Insurgent dead just as they fell,” 5February 1899. (National Archives, III-AGA-3-22)

No one knows for sure who fired the first shot.The opening battle followed weeks during

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which both sides had engaged in provocations.Most accounts identify Americans from the 1st

Nebraska Regiment as the ones who openedfire when three or four Filipinos failed to haltas ordered. But the story that first reached theExecutive Mansion, courtesy of the New YorkSun, reported that the insurgents had attacked.McKinley never wavered from this version,later elaborating on it by claiming that theattacking insurgents had violated a flag oftruce and shot down U.S. soldiers while theytreated wounded Filipinos. How the Filipinoscame to be wounded went unexplained. Thepresident was confident that the United Stateswould easily and quickly pacify the islands.Reports of the first battle in which forty-fourAmericans and seven hundred Filipinos werekilled helped to inspire such confidence.Washington called the conflict an insurrection;the Philippine Republic considered it a fight forindependence.28

Between February and November 1899,Americans and Filipinos fought a conventionalwar with regular armies and set battles. TheAmerican forces maintained an average troopstrength of 40,000, the Filipinos between80,000 to 100,000 regulars. Military historianBrian McAllister Linn described the FilipinoArmy as intrepid and courageous with animpressive infantry, but suffering frominadequate training and lack of weapons andammunition. The Americans had greater skills,effective and powerful weapons, and a navythat shut down coastal and island traffic. Latein the year, Filipino forces turned to guerrillatactics designed to hit the Americans at theirweak points. U.S. troops occasionally sightedand pursued the enemy, only to come uponfarmers working hard in a field. PrivateFrederick Presher of New Jersey suspectedthey were “quick change artists,” but had noproof. Aguinaldo exercised less control over hisforces in the guerrilla phase, and the fightingcontinued after he was captured in 1901. TheFilipino strategy aimed to wear out theAmericans and make their occupation too

costly to continue.29

Emilio Aguinaldo (second seated man fromright) and other insurgent leaders.(National Archives, 391-PI-34).

To carry out benevolent assimilation, the U.S.Army pursued a “carrot and stick” policydeveloped during the Civil War and Indianwars. It rewarded cooperation with reformsand punished opposition with coercion,destruction of property, and death. GeneralOtis applied his significant administrative skillsto civic action programs. McKinley establisheda Philippines Commission to visit the islandsand determine what should be done to maintain“order, peace and the public welfare.” Thecommissioners reported that the Filipinos werenot ready for independence. McKinley set up asecond Commission, led by William HowardTaft, a fellow Republican from Ohio, to serve asthe U.S. governing authority. The U.S. civilianand military authorities attempted to wooFilipino elites with promises of opportunity andprivilege. General Arthur MacArthur orderedhis soldiers to establish “friendly relations withthe natives.”30 Otis, like McKinley, wasconfident of success because he mistakenlythought only a small percentage of Filipinosopposed American rule.

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At home, mil l ions of v iewers saw theadministration’s optimism about the warreflected in films. The new motion picturecompanies discovered that audiences wereeager to watch dramatic scenes of theirmilitary forces in victorious action. The films,each less than a minute long, served as a“visual newspaper and as propaganda,”according to film historian Charles Musser.Some films featured actual footage of troopsmarching and ships sailing. Others were fakedand called “reenactments.” For example, thebox-office hit Battle of Manila Bay was made ontop of a roof in New York City with cardboardships floating in a table turned upside-downand filled with water. Thomas Edison’scompany produced six reenactment films set inthe Philippines and shot in New Jersey. InAdvance of Kansas Volunteers at Caloocan,made in June 1899, white American soldierswave the flag as they triumphantly defeat theFilipinos played by African Americans. Suchfilms and others in which actors in blackfaceplayed Filipinos reinforced the perception thatthe war was about superior, white Americanssubduing a dark and inferior enemy. Theaterowners further enhanced the spectacle with thesound of gunfire or spreading smoke throughthe audience who would hiss at the enemy andcheer the raising of the American flag. Musserconcludes that, during the war, the movieshowmen “evoked powerful patrioticsentiments in their audiences, revealing thenew medium’s ideological and propagandisticforce.”31

Press reports from the Philippines indicatedthat victory might not be as imminent as thefilm reenactments or Otis’s official reportssuggested. The military placed few restrictionson war correspondents, who traveled, ate,camped, and sometimes joined in combatoperations with the troops. Reporters wrotethat Otis “never visited the lines” and refusedto heed the analysis of those at the front. In thepopular magazine Collier’s Weekly, FrederickPalmer noted, “General Otis does not impart

his plans to anybody either before or after theyhave failed.” One general told Palmer that hedisagreed with Otis on strategy: “I want to lickthe insurrectos first and reason with themafterward. He wants to reason with them andlick them at the same time.” In June 1899,correspondent John Bass, who reported forHarper’s Magazine, observed that the “wholepopulation of the islands sympathizes with theinsurgents” and that “the American outlook isblacker now than it has been since thebeginning of the war.”32 Reporters, who for themost part endorsed expansionist policies,c r i t i c i z e d w h a t t h e y s a w a s O t i s ’ sineffectiveness because they wanted the U.S.military to succeed.

Reporters also objected to what they saw asexcessive censorship. The Army controlled theone telegraph line out of Manila and reviewedall press reports. Otis assured Washington thathis censors allowed reporters to cable“established facts,” but not the “numerousbaseless rumors circulated here tending toexcite the outside world.” In the summer of1899, the censor blocked a story reporting thatGeneral Henry Lawton thought it would take atleast 75,000 troops to pacify the islands, a storythat reinforced the impression that all was notgoing as wel l as Ot is c la imed. Whencorrespondents objected, Otis threatened toexpel or court-marital anyone who sent aformal letter of complaint from Manila. Thefrustrated reporters transmitted theircomplaint to the United States via Hong Kongand charged that censors clamped down onnews not because it would harm operations butbecause it would upset people back home. Theyaccused Otis of attempting to make things lookbetter than they were by fixing casualtyreports, overrating military accomplishments,and underestimating the Filipinos’ commitmentto independence. The administration wasimplicated in these charges because it releasedOtis’s official reports, making it hard to tell, asthe Cleveland Plain Dealer pointed out,“whether Otis misled the administration or the

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administration misled the public on its own.”Even the expansionist press joined in thecriticism, except the McKinley loyalists whoargued that only the president could be in theposition to know what news of the war was safeto report. The president announced that hewould continue to support Otis’s censorshippolicies.33

Although soldiers and reporters tended tobelieve that Filipinos were inferior toAmericans, some learned to respect theiropponents’ tenacity. For example, ColonelFrederick Funston told a correspondent thatthe enemy was “an illiterate, semi-savagepeople, who are waging war, not againsttyranny, but against Anglo-Saxon order anddecency.” Palmer’s reporting, however, gavethe Filipinos credit for effective fighting. “Butthe island of Luzon is large,” he wrote, “and theLawton expedition, such is the excellence ofAguinaldo’s intelligence bureau, was not morethan fairly started before the Filipino armyappeared on the flank of MacArthur’s divisionopposite to where it was wanted and begantaking pot shots at the worn and cynicalMontana regiment.”34

“Our Boys entrenched against theFilipinos,”1900. (National Archives, 165-F5-16-13634)

William Oliver Trafton, a 22-year-old Texascowhand who enlisted for adventure, referredto the enemy as savages, wild varmints, andIndians. When he endured more hardship thanadventure, he developed some admiration forthe Filipinos. Before a battle Trafton talkedwith his friend:

He says, “Hell, they sure won’t killonly 40 of us.”

I says, “You told me that we couldwhip the whole thing in twoweeks.”

He says, “Haven’t we licked themevery time that we have had afight?”

I says, “Yes, but the damn foolswon’t stay whipped.”35

L ike many Amer i cans , T ra f ton hadunderestimated the Filipinos’ determination toresist.

The Debate over Empire

The resistance of the Filipinos to U.S. ruler e q u i r e d s o m e a d j u s t m e n t i n t h eadministration’s presentation of its policy.McKinley still portrayed the American cause ashumanitarian, expressing his sorrow thatcertain “foolish” Filipinos had failed torecognize the benefits of American generosity.A year after the sinking of the Maine, McKinleystood in the Mechanics’ Hall in Boston, thecapital of the anti-imperialist movement, beforeportraits of Washington, Lincoln, and himselflabeled “Liberators,” to explain to an audienceof almost six thousand that the United Statessought to emancipate the Philippines.“No

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imperial designs lurk in the American mind,” heasserted. Dismissing controversy, McKinleysaid it was not “a good time for the liberator tosubmit important questions concerning libertyand government to the liberated while they areengaged in shooting down their rescuers.”Ironically, the news that the Filipinos werefighting for their independence was used tojustify the argument that they weren’t ready forit. With exasperation, the anti-imperialistNation commented, “McKinley is one of therare public speakers who are able to talkhumbug in such a way as to make their averagehearers think it excellent sense, and exactlytheir idea.”36

As opposition to the war grew at home,McKinley linked support for the troops withsupport for his policies. The president spoke atthe August homecoming of the TenthPennsylvania Regiment in Pittsburgh. Heexpressed his confidence in General Otis, hispraise for the troops who served their country“in its extremity,” and his disdain for criticswho said the soldiers should be brought home.He argued that without U.S. soldiers, thePhilippines would be in chaos and sufferingunder the rule of “one man, and not with theconsent of the governed.” Here he somehowimplied that the Filipinos themselves preventedthe establishment of “the consent of thegoverned,” but in the same speech he statedthat the goal was the creation of a governmentthere under the “undisputed sovereignty” ofthe United States. The most dramatic momentof the ceremony came when McKinley slowlyread a list of the regiments engaged in thePhilippines: “First California, First Colorado,First Idaho, Fifty-first Iowa, Twentieth Kansas,Thirteenth Minnesota, First Montana, FirstNebraska, First North Dakota, Second Oregon,Tenth Pennsylvania, First South Dakota, FirstTennessee, Utah Artillery ….” As he did, thesoldiers of Pennsylvania roared theirappreciation for each regiment. By celebratingunity with a roll call of the states, thepresident, with the help of cheering soldiers,

could drown out dissent.37

President McKinley reviews the statemilitia in Los Angeles, 1901. (Library ofCongress, LC-USZ62-122820).

McKinley and his fellow expansionists linkednational glory to power and economic interests.Just before he left on another autumn tour topromote his policies, the president privatelytold his secretary, George Cortelyou, “one ofthe best things we ever did was to insist upontaking the Philippines and not a coaling stationor an island, for if we had done the latter wewould have been the laughing stock of theworld. And so it has come to pass that in a fewshort months we have become a world power.”The president, who tended to be less specificabout American power in public, left the moreassertive statements to his supporters. InCollier’s Weekly, Lodge made the persuasivecase that if left alone, the Philippines would bevulnerable to takeover by some Europeanpower not bothered by issues of self -government. He described the islands as rich innatural resources and a large potential market

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“as the wants of the [Filipinos] expand in thesunshine of prosperity, freedom andcivilization.” Moreover, the islands providedaccess to even greater markets in China. “Willthe American people reject this opportunity?”Lodge asked. “Will they throw away all thistrade, and all this wealth?” He didn’t think so.38

The expansionists mustered racial argumentsto justify U.S. policies. Senator Albert J.Beveridge told the Senate that race was morepowerful than the Constitution. “God has notbeen preparing the English-speaking andTeutonic peoples for a thousand years fornothing but vain and idle self-contemplationand self-admiration. No!” he declared. “He hasmade us the master organizers of the world toestablish system where chaos reigns.”39

Without U.S. control, Lodge predicted “bloodyanarchy” among the eight million people ofmany different races and tribes speaking fiftyor sixty languages and dialects on the 1,725islands of the Philippines. He denouncedAguinaldo as “an irresponsible ChineseMestizo” (Aguinaldo’s maternal grandfatherwas Chinese) and a “self-seeking dictator of theordinary half-breed type” leading one portion ofa tribe in rebellion. Theodore Rooseveltcompared the Filipino insurgency to the Indianwars when he accepted the Republican vice-presidential nomination in 1900; the parallels,he declared, were so “exact” that self-government to the Philippines “would be likegranting self-government to an Apachereservation under some local chief.” Warcorrespondent John Bass shared some of theracial views of the expansionists, but was lessconfident that the use of force in thePhilippines would succeed. Writing in Harper’sMagazine about the Moros or Muslims of theislands of Sulu and Mindinao, he predicted thatthese people, like the Native Americans, wouldsuccumb eventually to the superior race. In themeantime, although their “land of promise”could flourish with tobacco and coffeeplantations, it was best to leave the Moros withtheir wives and their Koran alone, concluded

Bass. If they were forced to change, hecorrectly predicted, they would fight.40

Much was made of manly duty. In Madison,Wisconsin, McKinley announced that, since thearmy and navy had “brought us” newterritories, Americans must meet theirresponsibilities “with manly courage, respondin a manly fashion to manly duty, and do whatin the sight of God and man is just and right.”Theodore Roosevelt, advocate of the strenuouslife, insisted that military service toughenedAmerican manhood, which too much civilizationtended to undermine. American men, inparticular, had an obligation to set an example.“The eyes of the world are upon us,” declaredPhilippines Commissioner Dean C. Worcester,recalling Puritan founder John Winthrop in aspeech before prominent Chicagoans. QuotingRudyard Kipling’s new poem, “The White Man’sBurden,” Worcester called for Americans totake up their imperial responsibilities over their“new-caught, sullen peoples, half-devil and half-child.”41

As later recalled by a minister, McKinley’s mostquoted explanation for his Philippines policywas oddly personal. Speaking to a delegation ofMethodists in 1899, he insisted that he had notwanted the Philippines and “when they came tous, as a gift from the gods, I did not know whatto do with them.” He described praying on hisknees for guidance when it came to him that itwould be “cowardly and dishonorable” to givethe islands back to Spain, “bad business” togive them to commercial rivals Germany andFrance, and impossible to leave them to“anarchy and misrule” under unfit Filipinos.“There was nothing left for us to do,” heconcluded, “but to take them all, and toeducate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilizeand Christianize them.” In this account ofdivine guidance, McKinley neglected tomention that many Filipinos were RomanCatholic or that the Philippines had a universityolder than Harvard. This explanation,nevertheless, summed up the key principled,

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pragmatic, and prejudiced justifications of thepresident’s imperial policy.42

Anti-imperialists also cited principles andnational self-interest to argue against U.S.policy in the Philippines. To state the opposingposition, Collier’s Weekly invited RepublicanGeorge F. Hoar, the respected senior Senatorof Massachusetts and Lodge’s counterpart. Thedebate, Hoar argued, was between republicand empire, between liberty and slavery,between the Declaration of Independence andimperialism. Standing by its traditionalprinciples, the United States had become “thestrongest, freest, richest nation on the face ofthe earth.” Americans would deny their ownheritage, he asserted, if instead of dealing withthe people of the Philippines as Christians whodesired independence, they treated them as“primitives to be subdued so that their landmight be used as a stepping-stone to the tradeof China.” Other anti-imperialists used satire tocontrast U.S. policy with Christian values.William Lloyd Garrison, Jr., the son of the notedabolitionist, rewrote a popular hymn.

Then onward, Christian soldier!Through field of crimson gore,

Behold the trade advantagesbeyond the open door!

The prof i t s on our ledgersoutweigh the heathen loss;

Set thou the glorious stars andstripes above the ancient cross!

The New York Evening Post justified suchopposition, saying, “Anti-Imperialism is onlya n o t h e r n a m e f o r o l d - f a s h i o n e dAmericanism.” 4 3

For imperialists and anti-imperialists interestedin expanding American trade in the Pacific, thedebate centered on the question whether the

Filipinos on their own were capable ofproviding the Americans with the economicopportunities they wanted. In his AnnualMessage, now called the State of the Unionaddress, President McKinley told the nationthat the Filipinos “are a race quick to learn,”but “should be helped … to a more scientificknowledge of the production of coffee, indiarubber, and tropical products, for which thereis demand in the United States.” The anti-imperialist Senator George Turner ofWashington acknowledged the vast interests inAsia, but pointed out that if Manila became agreat trading port, it would be at the expenseof American ports on the Pacific coast. “It willprofit principally a motley population offoreigners, for whom we care nothing,” Turnerconcluded. He suggested that, by letting theFilipinos govern themselves, the United Statescould then make commercial treaties with theislands without the burdens of governing. EvenSenator Hoar desired access to the Pacific; hesimply objected to the means by which theUnited States was obtaining it. So did theeditors of Harper’s Weekly, who felt that theUnited States had made a mistake in thePhilippines. Echoing the president, however,they concluded that once the country was atwar, everyone must pull together to supportthe troops.44

Also fueling anti-imperialist anger was theperception that the administration had abusedits power and deceived the public. SenatorHoar believed that the American people hadbeen misled when they were told that theFilipinos were “barbarous and savage” and hadmade “an unprovoked attack … upon our flag.”Referring to “McKinley’s War,” anti -imperialists charged the president with wagingwar by military authority, not a congressionaldeclaration. Mark Twain thought that theAmerican people and the Filipinos were being“sold a bill of goods,” featuring two differentbrands of civilization. “For home consumption,”he thought, the “blessings of civilization”---justice, gentleness, Christianity, law and order,

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temperance, liberty, equality, education---wereprettily and attractively displayed. For exportto “the heathen market,” in contrast,“civilization” meant blood, tears, destruction,and loss of freedom. The war, he felt, betrayedthe Filipinos and the “clean young men” sent tofight them. Twain tried to imagine what theFilipinos thought: “There must be twoAmericas: one that sets the captive free, andone that takes a once-captive’s new freedomaway from him, and picks a quarrel with himwith nothing to found it on; then kills him to gethis land.” He said he wished he could see howthe United States was going to get out of whathad become “a mess, a quagmire.”45

The debate over the war became morepoliticized in the 1900 presidential election.The Democratic candidate William JenningsBryan called for Congress to consider grantingindependence to the Philippines. Anti-imperialist and philosopher William Jameshoped that if the Filipinos held out longenough, Americans would come to their sensesand reject “imperialism and the idol of anational destiny, based on marital excitementand mere ‘bigness.’” The administration andthe military condemned the anti-imperialistsfor, as they saw it, encouraging the Filipinos toresist by denouncing U.S. policies. Taft thoughtwith justification that the insurgents wouldfight on in hope of a Democratic victory inNovember.46 Bryan centered much of hiscampaign on the Philippine issue, declaring it abetrayal of principles and a violation of thesacred mission of America. McKinley spoke ofjobs and economic growth. Roosevelt, with hisescort of armed cowboys, campaigned forvirile, nationalistic Republicanism. At hissecond inauguration in March 1901, McKinleybegan his speech talking about currency andended with the Philippines. “We are not wagingwar against the inhabitants of the PhilippineIslands. A portion of them are making waragainst the United States,” he declared. “By farthe greater part of the inhabitants recognizeAmerican sovereignty and welcome it as a

guaranty of order and of security for life,property, liberty, freedom of conscience, andthe pursuit of happiness.”47

This cartoon in the May 12, 1900 issueof Judge showed Bryan with an axe andMcKinley with the flag. The caption reads“Take Your Choice---Do you want a manwho, having raised the stars and stripes inour new possessions, will maintain themwith dignity; or a man who will cut down“Old Glory” and make us the laughingstock of the world?” Victor Gillam, artist.(Library of Congress, LC-USZC4-5391)

After McKinley’s re-election, U.S. forcesescalated the repression. In May 1900, Otis hadbeen succeeded by MacArthur who rejected“benevolent assimilation” and with it the belief

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that most Filipinos really wanted Americanrule. In December, MacArthur ordered U.S.forces to wage war against the civilianpopulation in hostile areas. The Americansemployed torture, executed prisoners, rapedwomen, looted villages, and destroyed the ruraleconomy. The most effective way to punish aguerrilla fighter, explained General Robert P.Hughes, was to attack his women and children.Funston tricked Aguinaldo into surrender bypretending to be a prisoner of disguisedFilipino scouts, entering the leader’s camp, andtaking him captive. Aguinaldo called for theend of resistance; several of his generalssurrendered and many guerrillas went home.Where the fighting continued, both sidescarried out atrocities. In Batangas province in1901 and 1902, the Amer icans usedreconcentration camps that had caused suchoutrage when Spain used them in Cuba. Anestimated 200,000 Filipinos died from diseaseand starvation. The punitive policies succeededin breaking the resistance. Colonel ArthurMurray, who had opposed brutal actions thatwould make enemies out of civilians assumedto be friendly, concluded that if he had it to doover, he would have had done “a little morekilling and considerably more burning.”48

The conciliation side of U. S. policy was theresponsibility of Taft, who was confident of theability of the United States to bring justice andorder to the islands. He believed that once lawsgoverning land, mining, banking, andtransportation were in place and schools,roads, and hospitals were built, enterprise andprosperity would follow. Yet, he was dogged byproblems everywhere. The Filipinos wereignorant and superstitious, he reported. “Weshall have to do the best we can with them.”Taft’s deeper frustrations were reserved for hisfellow Americans. He condemned the U.S.military officers who treated the Filipinos withcruelty and prejudice, because such behaviorinspired more recruits for the insurgents. ToSecretary of War Elihu Root, Taft complainedabout the behavior of U. S. civilians. “You know

we have the rag tag and bob tail of Americans,who are not only vicious but stupid,” wroteTaft. “They are most anxious to have Congressgive an opportunity to open this country anddevelop it, but instead of facilitating a conditionof peace and good feeling between theAmericans and the Filipinos, they areconstantly stirring up trouble.” Taft, who wastrying to win over the Filipino upper class,despaired when a visiting congressmanannounced at a press interview in Manila thatthe Filipinos were “nothing but savages, livinga savage life and utterly incapable of selfgovernment and without the slightestknowledge of what independence is.” The sameattitudes about Filipino inferiority thatexpansionists had expressed to justify thet a k e o v e r n o w i n t e r f e r e d w i t h t h eadministration’s efforts to carry it out.49

Taft also had to respond to Washington’sconcerns about news reports that describedManila as a den of sin, drunkenness, andprostitution. In contrast to the administration’sclaims that its purpose was to bring Christianuplift to the Philippines, the occupation of theislands instead seemed to have corrupted themorals of U.S. troops. Taft blamed the negativepress for upsetting the people at home, but hadto admit the characterization was valid. Hedefensively noted that Manila at least was moresober than American cities of its size. Thearmy, alarmed by the spread of venerealdisease, established a system for examiningprostitutes and confining the diseased tohospitals. As historian Kristin Hoganson hasnoted, such news prompted anti-imperialists tochallenge the administration’s portrayal of itspolicy as a civilizing mission. Critics declaredthat instead of enhancing masculine nobility,imperialism led to degeneracy or “goingnative.”50

At home, McKinley concentrated on spreadingthe word of progress. In his last speech given inSeptember at the 1901 Pan-AmericanExposition in Buffalo, New York, the president

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praised the fair for recording “the world’sadvancement.” Extolling industrial growth,c o m m e r c i a l a d v a n t a g e , a n d n e wcommunications technology, he declared,“Isolation is no longer possible or desirable.”For the instruction and entertainment ofmillions of fair-goers, the fair directorsconstructed a Filipino Village--their idealizedversion of the Philippines--alongside Mexican,Hawaiian, Cuban, Eskimo, and Japanesevillages. To enter the eleven-acre FilipinoVillage, fair-goers passed U.S. soldiers onparade at the gates. Once inside they saw onehundred Filipinos at work and play, thatchedhuts, water buffalo pulling carts, a Catholicchurch, and a theater where a Filipino bandplayed “The Star-Spangled Banner.” Theorganizers included representatives of themore “primitive tribes” having decided againstputting Aguinaldo on display. The exposition’sartificial global order was shattered when LeonCzolgosz, an anarchist and the son of Polishimmigrants, shot the president. After McKinleydied eight days later, anarchists and socialistswere arrested around the country, demandsescalated for immigration restriction, and thepr ice of souvenirs at the expos i t ionskyrocketed. 5 1

Peaceful Filipinos display economicproductivity in the Philippine Village at the

Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, NewYork, September 1901. Frances BenjaminJohnston, photographer. (Library ofCongress, Lot 2967 (G) Box 1)

Theodore Roosevelt’s administration defendedthe ongoing conflict in the Philippines and theextreme methods used to fight it. Underpressure from Senator Hoar, the Senateinvestigated the conduct of the war in April andMay 1902. News stories of the reconcentrationprogram and torture practices had appeared inthe press. Anti-imperialists bypassed militarycensorship in the Philippines by publishing eye-witness accounts of atrocities reported byreturning soldiers. Chaired by Senator Lodge,the hearings led to light fines for a few officersand a court martial for General Jacob H. Smith,who had ordered his troops to kill every personover ten years old on the island of Samar,which ended in a reprimand. Lodge said that heregretted the atrocities but blamed Americanbehavior on Filipino culture. “I think they havegrown out of the conditions of warfare, of thewar waged by the Filipinos themselves, asemicivilized people, with all the tendenciesand characteristics of Asiatics, with the Asiaticindifference to life, with the Asiatic treacheryand the Asiatic cruelty, all tinctured andincreased by three hundred years of subjectionto Spain,” he explained. Roosevelt dismissedreports of U.S. atrocities, calling the Americantroops’ behavior at the massacre of the Sioux atWounded Knee worse. Moreover, he denouncedthe army’s critics “who walk delicately and livein the soft places of the earth” for dishonoringthe “strong men who with blood and sweat”suffered and died “to bring the light ofcivilization into the world’s dark places.”52

A Century of Selling Empire

On July 4, 1902, President Roosevelt declaredthe war in the Philippines over. The editors ofthe Washington Post noted that, between thetwo of them, Presidents McKinley andRoosevelt had tried to pronounce the war over

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six times already. The Philippine Commissiondefined any continuing Filipino insurgence as“banditry.”53 Forty-two hundred Americans haddied along with hundreds of thousands ofFilipinos. The fighting between Filipinos andAmericans continued until 1910 and against theMoros on Mindinao until 1935. Six years later,in December 1941, the Japanese attacked thePhilippines and defeated U.S. forces led byGeneral Arthur MacArthur’s son, GeneralDouglas MacArthur, who vowed to return andliberate the islands. Aguinaldo, his father’s oldadversary, sided with the Japanese. After WorldWar II, the United States granted thePhilippines independence on July 4, 1946, butkept major naval and air bases on the islandsuntil the early 1990s. Aguinaldo, ever thesurvivor, marched in the first PhilippineIndependence Day parade waving therevolutionary flag he first had raised in 1898.

President McKinley had announced a newglobal role for the United States when heacquired the Philippines. The United States ranits colony in the interests of powerfulAmericans, specifically those with influence inWashington. “Any connection between theseinterests and those of the Filipino people atlarge—or, for that matter, of the Americanpeople at large—was basically coincidental,”concluded historian H. W. Brands. The UnitedStates had become a Pacific power, but thecosts of running a colony exceeded the profits.The experience of the Americans in thePhilippines reinforced their preference foreconomic expansion in Asia without directimperialism. McKinley nevertheless did nothesitate to assert U.S. interests. For instance,in 1900, the president dispatched 5000American troops from the Philippines to Chinato join the other imperial powers who werededicated to putting down the Chinesegovernment-backed rebellion against foreigninfluence known as the Boxer Rebellion. Byordering U.S. forces to fight overseas against arecognized government without congressionalapproval, McKinley had created a new

presidential power. And he had proven SenatorLodge to be right. The acquisition of thePhilippines meant no other power could “shutthe gates of China” on the United States andthat included China.54

Uncle Sam spreads his coat tails to coverthe Philippines, Hawaii, Cuba, and PuertoRico, December 1898, Charles. L.Bartholomew, Minneapolis Journal.(Cartoons of the Spanish-American War byBart, Minneapolis: Journal PrintingCompany, 1899)

McKinley, who, according to Root, “always hadhis way,” claimed to follow the will of thepeople as he shaped opinion. 55 He establishedthe White House as the producer of news, andthrough the emerging mass media, deliveredhis messages which balanced principles andinterests with something for almost everyone:gung-ho expansionists, do-gooders andmissionaries, businessmen, and flag-wavingaudiences at train stations across the country.He presented the United States and himself asservants of a higher power, fulfilling anextended version of Manifest Destiny. He

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declared that “trade follows the flag” and theflag must be honored wherever it waved.Although he spoke of the benefits of newmarkets and enhanced prestige, McKinleyassured Americans that this policy was notmainly one of self-interest. It was a “divinemission” in which Americans took on theresponsibility of guiding and protectingFilipinos. Popular films, cartoons, and fairexhibits reinforced the official messages thatsuch a mission meant profit and glory. At thesame time, such assertions of America’s moraland material superiority were challenged by adrawn-out war, heavy loss of life, and reports ofatrocities. Critics expressed concern that warfor empire could damage the republic. And theargument made by anti-imperialists--thatAmericans should not just preach theirdemocratic traditions overseas but actuallypractice them--would survive.

With gusto, President Theodore Rooseveltassociated American expansion with theprogress of civilization. It was the task of the“masterful race,” announced Roosevelt in 1901,to make the Filipinos “fit for self-government”or leave them “to fal l into a welter ofmurderous anarchy.” In his Annual Message of1902, he asserted that, as civilization hadexpanded in the last century, warfare haddiminished between civilized powers. “Warswith uncivilized powers,” Roosevelt explained,“are largely mere matters of internationalpolice duty, essential for the welfare of theworld.”56 It would be the job of his successorsto define who was civilized and who was not.

To justify interventions elsewhere, futurepresidents would recall McKinley’s attractiveversion of U.S. involvement in the Philippines.In 1950, President Harry Truman used thePhilippine example to defend U.S. interventionin the Korean War. “We helped the Philippinesbecome independent,” he announced in a radioaddress, “and we have supported the nationalaspirations to independence of other Asiancountries.” The United States, Truman

explained, stood for freedom againstcommunist imperialism. That was why, heannounced following the outbreak of war inKorea, he had ordered the expansion of U.S.commitments to the Chinese nationalists onTaiwan, to the French rulers of Vietnam, and tothe American-sponsored government of thePhilippines, which received U.S. military andCIA advisors along with economic aid to assistit in putting down the radical nationalist Hukmovement. Notably, Truman presented thesethree nationalist struggles in Asia as Cold Warconflicts. Such a portrayal required littleexplanation of what was actually happening inthese countries and it positioned the UnitedStates as their protector in a global struggledefined by Truman as a battle between freedomand totalitarianism.57

“A new totalitarian threat has risen againstcivilization,” announced President George W.Bush in a speech before the PhilippineCongress in October 2003. “America is proud ofits part in the great story of the Filipinopeople,” declared the president. “Together oursoldiers liberated the Philippines from colonialrule.” As he rallied support for U.S. leadershipin the global war on terror, Bush asserted thatthe Middle East, like Asia, could becomedemocratic as illustrated by the Republic of thePhilippines six decades ago. Not only didPresident Bush gloss over the inconvenientfacts of the past, but he also put a positive faceon the present. Uneasy about instability in thePhilippines, Bush announced a joint American-Filipino five-year plan to “modernize andreform” the Phil ippine mil itary. U.S.policymakers were worried about Abu Sayyaf, aterror group thought to have links to Al Qaedaand Islamic extremism. A few thousand U.S.marines were already in the southernPhilippines assisting local forces in fighting anIslamic separatist movement with roots goingback to the resistance against the Americans acentury before.58

McKinley’s portrayal of American rule in the

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Phi l ipp ines as the “advancement o fcivilization,” and “a guaranty of order and ofsecurity for life, property, liberty, freedom ofconscience, and the pursuit of happiness” heldits appeal. His successors also wouldmanipulate media coverage, present war as ahumanitarian mission, and call for support ofthe troops when the “natives” resisted andcriticism on the home front grew louder. Thepropaganda designed to build support forAmerica’s first land war in Asia created anillusion of the United States as a benevolentliberator that lives on.

Susan A. Brewer is a professor of history atthe University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Sheis the author of Why America Fights: Patriotismand War Propaganda from the Philippines toI r a q(http://amzn.com/0199753962/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) (New York: Oxford University Press,2009) and To Win the Peace: Br i t ishPropaganda in the United States during WorldW a r I I(http://amzn.com/0801433673/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1997).

Recommended citation: Susan A. Brewer,"Selling Empire: American Propaganda andWar in the Philippines," The Asia-PacificJournal, Vol. 11, Issue 40, No. 1, October 7,2013.

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Notes

1 This article first appeared as Chapter 1, “TheDivine Mission”: War in the Philippines,” inWhy America Fights: Patriotism and WarPropaganda from the Philippines to Iraq (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2009), 14-45 andis reprinted in revised form here with thepermission of Oxford University Press.

2 “He is evidently going to make unity---a re-united country---the central thought.” Diary ofGeorge B. Cortelyou, 9 December 1898, Box52, George B. Cortelyou Papers, Library ofCongress , Wash ington , DC; AndersStephanson, Manifest Destiny: AmericanExpansion and the Empire of Right (New York;Hill and Wang, 1996), 66-111; Matthew FryeJacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United StatesEncounters Foreign Peoples at Home andAbroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hill & Wang,2000), 221-65; For an excellent historiographyon the United States as empire see Paul A.Kramer, “Power and Connection: ImperialHistories of the United States in the World,”

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American Historical Review 116 (December2011): 1348-1391.

3 Ida Tarbell, “President McKinley in WarTimes,” McClure’s Magazine, July 1898,209-24; Stephen Ponder, “The President MakesNews: William McKinley and the FirstPresidential Press Corps, 1897-1901,”Presidential Studies Quarterly 24 (Fall 1994):823-37; For an outstanding collection ofpolitical cartoons see Abe Ignacio, Enrique dela Cruz, Jorge Emmanuel, Helen Toribio, TheForbidden Book: The Philippine-American Warin Political Cartoons (San Francisco: T’boliPublishing, 2004).

4 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth,vol. 2, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1899),252-54; Henry Adams, The Education of HenryAdams (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), 374.

5 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of theGreat Powers: Economic Change and MilitaryConflict from 1500-2000 (New York: RandomHouse, 1987), 150.

6 Walter LaFeber, The American Search forOpportunity, 1865-1913 (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1993), 133, 138.

7 Robert Hannigan, The New World Power:American Foreign Pol icy, 1898-1917(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,2002), 1-16; Thomas Schoonover, Uncle Sam’sWar of 1898 and the Origins of Globalization(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,2003), 98.

8 Robert Hilderbrand, Power and the People:Executive Management of Public Opinion inForeign Affairs, 1897-1921 (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1981),17-28.

9 Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 167-68.

10 Allan R. Millett and Peter Malowski, For the

Common Defense: A Military History of theUnited States of America (New York: FreePress, 1994), 287-88.

11 LaFeber, American Search, 142-43; Lewis L.Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1980),77.

12 Louis A. Pérez, Jr., The War of 1898: TheUnited States and Cuba in History andHistoriography (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1998), 10-12.

13 Hilderbrand, Power and the People, 32.

14 William Allen White, “When Johnny WentMarching Out,” McClure’s Magazine, June1898, 198-205.

15 Leech, Days of McKinley, 209.

16 Leech, Days of McKinley, 238; Gould,Presidency of William McKinley, 101.

17 Gould, Presidency of William McKinley, 50.

18 Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (1931;reprinted, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1989), 334.

19 Paul A. Kramer, “Race-Making and ColonialViolence in the U.S. Empire: The PhilippineWar as Race War,” Diplomatic History 30 (April2006): 190; Paul A. Kramer, The Blood ofGovernment: Race, Empire, the United Statesand the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 2006), 102-5.

20 John Seelye, War Games: Richard HardingDavis and the New Imperialism (Amherst:University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 275;F. W. Hewes, “The Fighting Strength of theUnited States,” McClure’s Magazine, July 1898,280-87; Edna Woolman Chase and Ilka Chase,Always in Vogue (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,1954), 47.

21 Hilderbrand, Power and the People, 36, 41.

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22 William McKinley, Speeches and Addresses ofWilliam McKinley: From March 1, 1897 to May30, 1900 (New York: Doubleday & McClure Co.,1900), 85, 97, 109, 113-14, 124.

23 Gould, Presidency of William McKinley, 132,139; George B. Waldron, “The CommercialPromise of Cuba, Porto Rico, and thePhilippines,” McClure’s Magazine, September1898, 481-84.

24 H. Wayne Morgan, ed., Making Peace withSpain: The Diary of Whitelaw Reid, September-December 1898 (Austin: University of TexasPress, 1965), 215.

25 McKinley to Secretary of War, transmitted toGeneral Otis, 21 December 1898; AdjutantGeneral to Otis, 21 December 1898; Alger toOtis, 30 December 1898, Box 70, CortelyouPapers; H. W. Brand, Bound to Empire: TheUnited States and the Philippines (New York:Oxford University Press, 1992), 48.

26 Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire:The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1985); Roger J.Bresnahan, In Time of Hesitation: AmericanAnti-Imperialists and the Philippine-AmericanWar (Quezon City, Philippines: New Day, 1981).

27 Leech, Days of McKinley, 353; McKinley,“Speech at Banquet of Board of Trade andAssociated Citizens,” Savannah, 17 December1898, in Speeches, 174.

28 Diary, 5 February 1899, Box 52, CortelyouPapers; McKinley, “Address Before the TenthPennsylvania Regiment,” Pittsburgh, 28 August1899, in Speeches, 215.

29 Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War,1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press ofKansas, 2000), 34, 325; Glenn Anthony May, APast Recovered (Quezon City, Philippines: NewDay, 1987), 133.

30 Kramer, Blood of Government, 112-13.

31 Charles Musser, The Emergence of Cinema:The American Screen to 1907 (New York:Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1990), 225-61;Advance of Kansas Volunteers at Caloocan(Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 1899), (here(http://memory.loc.gov)); Nick Deocampo,“Imperialist Fiction: The Filipino in theImperialist Imagery,” in The Philippine-American War and the Aftermath of an ImperialDream, 1899-1999, ed. Angel Velasco Shaw andLuis H. Francis (New York: New YorkUniversity Press, 2002), 224-36; Amy Kaplan,The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S.Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 2002), 146-60.

32 Linn, Philippine War, 132-36; FrederickPalmer, “The Campaign in Luzon,” Collier’sWeekly, 4 November 1899, 3.

33 Otis to Adjutant General, 17 January 1899,Box 71, Cortelyou Papers; Linn, Philippine War,135, 325; Hilderbrand, Power and the People,49.

34 Brands, Bound to Empire, 58; Palmer,“Campaign in Luzon,” 3.

35 William Oliver Trafton, We Thought We CouldWhip Them in Two Weeks, ed. William HenryScott (Quezon City, Philippines: New Day,1990), 65-66.

36 McKinley, “Speech at Dinner of the HomeMarket Club,” Boston, 16 February 1899, inSpeeches, 185-93; Nation, 23 February 1899,140.

37 McKinley, “Address Before the TenthPennsylvania Regiment,” in Speeches, 211-17.

38 Diary, 17 September 1899, Box 52, CortelyouPapers; Henry Cabot Lodge, “Shall We Retainthe Philippines?” Collier’s Weekly, 10 February1900, 4.

39 “Albert J. Beveridge’s Salute to Imperialism,”in Major Problems in American Foreign

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Relations, vol. 1, 4 th ed., ed. Thomas G.Paterson and Dennis Merrill (Lexington, MA:D.C. Heath, 1995), 425.

40 Lodge, “Shall We Retain,” 3; Walter L.Williams, “American Imperialism and theIndians,” in Indians in American History: AnIntroduction, ed. Frederick E. Hoxie and PeterIverson (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1998),244; John F. Bass, “Jolo and the Moros,”Harper’s Weekly, 18 November 1899, 1159.

41 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for AmericanManhood: How Gender Politics Provoked theSpanish-American and Philippine-AmericanWars (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1998), 152-53; McKinley, “Speech at Madison,Wisconsin,” 16 October 1899, in Speeches,318; Dean C. Worcester, “Some Aspects of thePhilippine Question,” 15 November 1899,Hamilton Club of Chicago, Serial Publications.No. 13.

42 William McKinley, “William McKinley’sImperial Gospel,” 1899, in Major Problems, ed.Paterson and Merrill, 424.

43 George B. Hoar, “Shall We Retain thePhilippines?” Collier’s Weekly, 3 February1900, 2-3; Alan McPherson, “Americanismagainst American Empire,” in Americanism:New Perspectives on the History of an Ideal,ed. Michael Kazin and Joseph A. McCartin(Chapel Hill: University of North CarolinaPress, 2006), 176.

44 William McKinley, “Annual Message,” 5D e c e m b e r 1 8 9 9 , ( h e r e(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu)); Speech ofHon. George Turner, U.S. Senate, 22-23January 1900, Washington DC; Editorial, “TheCountry and Its War,” Harper’s Weekly, 3 June1899, 540.

45 Hoar, “Shall We Retain,” 3; “Anti-ImperialistLeague Pamphlets,” Box 7, Moorfield StoreyPapers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC;Mark Twain, “To the Person Sitting in

Darkness,” February 1901, in Mark Twain’sWeapons of Satire: Anti-Imperialist Writings onthe Philippine-American War, ed. Jim Zwick(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,1992), 22-39.

46 William Howard Taft to Elihu Root, 11 August1900, Series 21, Reel 640, William Howard TaftPapers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC;Kramer, Blood of Government, 133.

47 McPherson, “Americanism,” 175; WilliamMcKinley, “Second Inaugural Address,” 4M a r c h 1 9 0 1 , ( h e r e(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu)).

48 Linn, Philippine War, 221.

49 Taft to Root, 14 July 1900, Series 21, Reel640, Taft Papers; Taft to Root, 14 October1901, Container 164, Elihu Root Papers,Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

50 Root to Taft, 15 January 1901, Taft to Root,17 January 1901, Root to Taft, 21 January 1901,and Root to McKinley, 24 January 1901, Series21, Reel 640, Taft Papers; Hoganson, Fightingfor American Manhood, 180, 191.

51 “Extracts from President McKinley’s LastSpeech,” 5 September 1901, Joseph Tumulty toWoodrow Wilson, 20 September 1919,Container 50, Joseph Tumulty Papers, Libraryof Congress, Washington, DC; Robert W.Rydell, All the World’s a Fair: Visions of Empireat American International Expositions,1876-1916 (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1984), 126-53.

52 Kramer, Blood of Government, 145-56;Roosevelt to the Secretary of War, 18 February1902, Container 162, Root Papers.

53 Kramer, Blood of Government, 155.

54 Brands, Bound to Empire, 79; LaFeber,American Search, 177.

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55 Leech, Days of McKinley, 384.

56 Theodore Roosevelt, “Annual Message,” 3December 1901 and “Annual Message,” 2D e c e m b e r 1 9 0 2 , ( h e r e(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu)).

57 “President Truman’s Address,” 1 September1950, Box 46, George M. Elsey Papers, Harry

S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

58 George. W. Bush, “Remarks by the Presidentto the Philippine Congress,” 18 October 2003,(here (http://www.georgewbushlibrary.gov));David E. Sanger, “Bush Cites Philippines asModel in Rebuilding Iraq,” New York Times, 19October 2003.