OriginalPaperUDC1:[37.104:378.1]Received December 22nd,2012

Aleksandar Dobrijević1, Predrag Krstić2

1 UniversityofBelgrade,FacultyofPhilosophy,ČikaLjubina18–20,RS–11000Belgrade 2 UniversityofBelgrade,InstituteforPhilosophyandSocialTheory,KraljiceNatalije45,RS–11000Belgrade 

adobrije@f.bg.ac.rs,prekrst66@gmail.com

Self-Education and University

AbstractIn an attempt to articulate the link between the “ideas” of university and self­education, the authors of this paper firstly set forth the classical understanding of education that precedes the conception of self­education. The second part deals with Nietzsche’s rigorous under­standing of self­education as the most consequent and most far­reaching intervention in the concept of education so far. The third part is exploring the example of Derrida’s wavering in regard to university activity and efficacity and signals the modern “antinomies” of legiti­mising its status. It is concluded that not only exterior challenges, but also the paradoxical tasks a university sets for itself, appertain to the very constitution of the university model which readily relied on the tradition of self­education, and that the relation between the vi­sions of university and self­education, is not devoid of intrinsic tensions, though it is often thought of these as mutually underpinning.

Key wordseducation,self-education,university,institutions,FriedrichNietzsche,JacquesDerrida

Self-educationisan“idea”.Thesameisthecasewithuniversity.1 But in their backgroundthereliesthethirdidea,whichupholdstheformertwoandhasahigherdegreeofgenerality.Thisiseducation,orthe“idea”ofeducation;thereforewestartwithit.Thenwepresenttheideaofself-educationandfinal-lydiscussantinomiesofthemodernuniversity.Intheconclusionwesuggest,regarding  the  relation among  these concepts  that have developed  into con-ceptions,notanswersbutratherguidelineswithinwhichcardinalandhencefertilecontemplationuponthe“destiny”ofuniversitymightbetakingplace.

Classic understandings of education

Accordingtoacrudebutnotentirelyincorrect,andatanyrateusabledivision,wecouldsaythatduringthecourseofhistorythenotionof“education”hasassumedthreekindsofcontents,orthreeconnotativeemphases.Onewouldessentially be the classical one,which dominated until theEnlightenment:educationwasinseparablyassociatedwiththemouldingofmatterandsoulthroughimitatingselectedexamples.Thenextunderstandingarosewiththeenlightenerswho in the eighteenth centurymade anunambiguous connec-tionbetweeneducationandthe“aim-orientedupbringing”.Itspurposewas

1

This  essay  is  a  significantly  extended  ver-sion  of  a  lecture  given  at  the  conference  of the Croatian Philosophical Society “The Idea 

oftheUniversity”,21st Days of Frane Petrić,Cres,23–26September2012.

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to achieve the final pedagogic product: the autonomous and engaged citizen –provideditisallowed,forthisoccasion,todetermineitinsuchterms,withall the reductions it entails.2 The third concept or the third idea of education hasappearedrecentlyandsuddenly.Of it, fornow, thismuchcanbesaid:both the element of imitation and the element of the final goal are lost on ac-countofsomethingelse,tobediscussedlateron.Wewillfirstexpatiateuponthetwo“non-modern”modelsofeducation,stilltreatingtheirdifferenceasdifferenceswithinthefamily,asiftheyhadasinglecommonaxis,threadorroot,whichwouldatthesametimedistinguishthemfromthethird“paradigm”.Youwillallowthat inthiscontext thecommondenominatorofthetwoclassicalvisionsofeducationmaybecalled“botani-cal”.Namely,thebotanicalmetaphorofcultivationdidnotleavethestageintheself-reflectionofeducationuntil,atbest,theNietzscheanindeterministicand antiessentialistic intervention in the fabric of understanding education as theprocessofassuminganalreadydeterminedshape–astheimplementation,incubationandfloweringofthegivenorimposedidea.Heseemstobethefirst to deviate from the pious presumption that things determined in advance arealreadyrootedinthehumanbeing,asakindofpossibilitythatshouldberealized,orthatthenorm,holdingusasfirmlyunderitswing,shouldpoursomething into him. Taking the autonomy and autotelicity of education into accountratherseriously,thatiseducationasself-legislativeself-purpose,hadtherefore towait the impressive asmuch as (due to abhorrence of uncon-trolledsubversion)subduedlineofrepresentingself-education,whichcouldalsosometimesturn,initspositivearticulation,intoanalibiforinefficacityor exhausting series of frivolous declarations.3

Forwhetheritisthequestionofdo-it-yourselfgardeningoroftheplannedhorticultureofwholeplantations,planting,transplanting,plantingout,hoe-ing,graftingandwateringremainthelandmarksofanypedagogicvision–aslong as there is one image of amorphy, but always rather specifically andfavourably“human”amorphywhichstillshould,foranyreason,beshapedbyanymeans.Namely, itusuallyhas to takea formregarding thisor that“designation”,4  regarding a better or golden past  (pre-Enlightenment  ideal) orthestakeinvestedinthefuturethatschoolswillhealallormostofsocialinjusticesandawkwardnessandbringtorealisation“promesse du bonheur”(Enlightenment credo).5 It seems that the ideal of universal education cannot evenbethoughtawayfromit.The Greek paideia has been connected to the idea of shaping or taking a shape bothetymologicallyandmeaningfully.Whether it is thequestionofapot,asculptureoraman,i.e.achild,itisalwaystheissueofits/his“consciousbuilding”,ofskill toshapesomething;it isalwaystheissueofreferringtowhatisbeingshapedartistically,towhatisartisticallyplastic,aswellastothenormativepicturethatfloatsbeforetheeyesoftheonewhoshapedit,“the‘idea’ or ‘typos’”.6 That image of ideational completeness of an object in the head of  the author/master as something desirable remains both constitutive anddecisive,whileeducationiscondemnedtoplannedandsystematicactiv-itythatisusedtoimpactthe“material”.Thefigureofsuchassumingofform,image,shape,aspectisinseparablymergedwiththepracticeofnormingandwiththetacticsofregulatedpreparingandforming.Such fate seems to have been sealed, as in the case ofmany otherGreekterms,withitstranslationintoLatin;παιδεία has become cultura or humani­tas.  Erudition  and  training  in  good  conduct  (eruditio et institutio in bonas artes),whichennoblestheproudRomancivilvirtus,replacesandassimilates

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the ethnocentric and exclusive but also philosophically demanding άρετή of Greeks, equallybasedon“beingcivilised”. “Culture”nowpreserves,gen-eralises and simultaneously extends up to vulgar literalness the Greek verb plateio,which, in truth,did sophists andPlatohave inmind regarding thesettingofaprivateorastate-ownedfield,which,bycontrolledfeedingandwatchingovertheplants,wasshapingsouls.Andthethinghasbecomesimpleand remained almost self-intelligible until the present time. As agricultura is thecultivationofsoil,man’seducationiscultivationofthesoul,cultura animi. Accordingtotheagriculturalanalogy,nursingorcultivation–humanises.Pedagogic agriculturalism, seemingly paradoxically, uses the naturalisticdiscourse to legitimise the unnatural masterly anthropomachy and boundless educational optimism.There is no doubt that, just as a skilful farmerwillmanagetohandleandcultivateaplant“culture”inanyconditionsgivenbynature, a skilful educatorwillbeable to“ennoble”each individualhumannature.Favouringtheroleofeducator,inhisessayOn the Education of Chil­drenPlutarchsetsforthhiswell-known“pedagogictrinity”–nature(physis),thefoundationasamusttobeginwith,learning(mathesis),bothasteaching(didaskalia) and practising (askesis)and,eventually,ahabit–and thus in-

2

For  further  information  on  pre-modern  no-tions of education, see: Rudolf Vierhaus,“Bildung”, in: Otto Brunner,Werner Conze&  Reinhart  Koselleck (eds.),Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexicon zur po­litisch­sozialen Sprache in Deutschland Ge­schichtliche Grundbegriffe,Bd.1,KlettCotta,Stuttgart1972,pp.509–512;ReinhartKosel-leck,“OntheAnthropologicalandSemanticStructureofBildung”,in:ReinhartKoselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts,StanfordUniver-sityPress,Stanford2002,pp.170–207.

3

For details on the honourable part of this ar-ray–withinwhich thenamesofNietzsche,Dilthey, Gadamer, Lyotard, Foucault, De-leuze,etc.emerge,seeAleksandarDobrijević,“Izmeđuobrazovanjaisamoobrazovanja.OdBildungadoetikevrline”,Filozofija i društvo 29(1/2006),pp.119–127.Foranaccountonperils that may be posed at nation’s “mental-ity”byimmoderateaffirmationofself-educa-tion,seeHelmutPlessner, The Limits of Com­munity: A Critique of Social Radicalism,Hu-manityBooks,NewYork1999,pp.57–58.

4

HerewehaveinmindtheequivocalwordBe­stimmung. See Immanuel Kant, Pädagogik,KantsgesammeltenSchriften,Bd.IX,Walterde Gruyter & Co., Berlin 1963, p. 441; cf.Immanuel Kant, Anthropologie in pragma­tischer Hinsicht,KantsgesammeltenSchrif-ten,Bd.VII,WalterdeGruyter&Co.,Berlin1963,pp.119–121.

5

For the sakeofboth justice and instruction,weshouldsaythatthepointinquestionisex-clusively about popular reception of Enlight-

enment and “educational system”, and thatthe  leading  philosophers  of  the  Enlighten-mentwerenoticeablyeducatedelitists,aristo-cratsorexclusionistsand,certainly,scepticsabout  the possibility of mass Enlightenment ofpeople,trustingperhapsonlyintheeduca-tion“fromabove”, through thedespotswhohad already been enlightened. Cf. Paul Henri ThierryHolbach,The System of Nature,vol.II,TheEchoLibrary,Middlesex(UK)2006,pp. 115, 207; Jean Le Rond D’Alembert,Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot,UniversityofChicagoPress,Chi-cago1995,p.103;JulienO.DeLaMettrie,Man a Machine: And, Man a Plant, Hack-ettPub.Co., Indianapolis1994,p.27;PeterGay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (vol 1). The Rise of Modern Paganism,W.W. Norton and Co, NewYork 1966, p. 20;Immanuel Kant,  Der Streit der Fakultäten,KantsgesammeltenSchriften,Bd.VII,Wal-ter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin 1963, p. 92;Immanuel Kant,  “Beantwortung der Frage:Was ist Aufklärung?”, Kants gesammeltenSchriften,KleineSchriften,Bd.VIII,WalterdeGruyter&Co.,Berlin 1963, p. 40;T. J.Reed, “Talking to Tyrants: Dialogues withPowerineighteenth-centuryGermany”,His­torical Journal33(1990),pp.63–79;HarveyChisick, The Limits of Reform in the Enlight­enment. Attitudes toward the Education of the Lower Classes in Eighteenth­century France,Princeton University Press, Princeton 1981;Derek Beales, Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth­Century Europe, I.B.Taurus,London–NewYork2005,pp.21–23.

6

Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture,Volume I, Basil Blackwell,Oxford1946,p.xxiii.

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stalls,inthemostdirectandfar-reachingwayandforanyfuturepedagogy,thisagriculturalmetaphorcontainingorbeingreducedto,byitscharacter,theentireeducationalactivity.Humannatureissaidtobeactinginthesamewayasthenon-human.Justassuccessfulfarmingneeds,firstofall,goodsoil,thenaskilfulfarmerandeventuallygoodseeds,itisthesamewitheducation:thesoilishumannature,thefarmeristheeducatorandseedsarethelearningandtheregulationsbeingtransferredbyspokenwords.ItisnotcoincidentalthatPlutarch’s essay has been reprinted and quoted repeatedly since the Renais-sance.HisprinciplesandlimitersareindefatigablyrepeatedbytheWesterneduca-tionalengineering,whoseprojectionsinthisregardshowsurprisinglyslightdifferences.Being“instaurating”or“restoring“,reformingorrevolutionary,the prescriptivism of systematic planners of mass education has repeated the verysamehorticulturalDraftformillennia,addingonlysomenewpiquancy.Solicitous management of this or that politeia is in the possession of the vi-sionaryknowledgeoftheseedsof“humanity”andunmistakablyattendstothe unique educational and  life goals of  those  it guides:  to become a good manorevenamanatall–whichhasbeen,onceandforall,establishedtobeachievedthroughtheinstituteofcoerciveeducationinawell-organizedschool,inwhichallocatedvirtueswouldbetaught.7

The change  that  remains determining even  for  the meaning attributed  to  it nowadays,however,beginswith theGermanunderstandingof“education”inthelateeighteenthcenturyandafterwards.Inanewperspective,itssensewas shifted or dislocated and deviated in at least one dimension from thepedagogic vision that the enlighteners had in mind. At the turn of the century Bildungbecame,firstofall,“self-cultivation”,“self-education”,“educationofoneself”(Selbstbildung, éducation de soi­même).8 This semantic  turning pointnowbringsthenotionclosetoanopen-endedprocessandtoakindofgrowthanddevelopment,not limited inadvanceand insofar indefinite(al-though,admittedly,notyettotallyunguidedinitsmaindirection),whetheritisthequestionofanindividual,apeopleor,later,nation.9 From that moment on, the understanding of education primarily as self-education dominated,atleastdeclaratively,perhapsuntilthelatest(Bologna)timesand–inspiteofvariouscontextualisations,as thecommondenominatorusedbyHerder,HumboldtandGoethe,ArnoldandMann–servedasthebasisfortheeduca-tionalphilosophyoftheuniversityinGermanyandintheWestaswell.Theperiodbetween1808and1810maybeconsideredastheCrucialAgeforitsestablishing,when themodelof theBerlinUniversitypropoundedbyWil-helm von Humboldt prevailed over the concepts Schleiermacher and Fichte hadof it.But like insomanyothermatters, itwasNietzschewhoderivedsuch  theoretical  consequences  from  this  understanding  of  (self-)education thatremainindispensableforthepresenttimes,evenifwedonotaccepthisconclusions.

Nietzsche’s vision of rigorous self-education

The essential precondition for such a  turning point  in  the understanding of education,however,wastorevealoneofits(too)intimateand(unforgivably)self-understandableconnectionswithphilosophy.Namely,philosophersusedto,mostlyintuitively,unbiddenlyandwithrathergenerousapproval,acceptthePlatonisticcouplementofphilosophyandeducationwhichDavidCooper,theoutstandingphilosopherofeducation,called“athesisofintimacy“:ac-cordingtoPlato,eachofthemsimplydoesnotgowithouttheother.10 None 

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butFriedrichNietzschedaredbringintoquestionthisconnection,predomi-nantandtakenforgrantedfromtheClassicalAntiquityonwards,butnotinordertorejectitresignedly,butinordertoradicaliseitexperimentally:phi-losophymayconsentonlytotheactofbecomingintimatewhoseefficacitywouldbemanifestedinakindofself-education.This,letusnameit,“thesisofradicalintimacy”containsin nuce the prominent Nietzschean anti-Platon-ism.Namely,whilethePlatonisticcouplementofphilosophyandeducation,forthesakeofitsownsuccess,demandsacertaintranscendentpledgeofthecouplement,andthereforeitcanberealisedonlybyastrenuousimitationoftheidealulteriormodel,theNietzscheanvisionseekssuchcouplementinthe“immanenceofautodidacticism”–whichisanothernameforhistheoryof“rigorousself-discipline”.11

InhisearlyworkNietzsche,indeed,hasnotyetgivenuptheideaofimita-tion,butthelatterhasahuman,notatranscendentface.12Moreover,mimeticeducationisnotagoalforitsownsake.Nietzschehaspreciselydefinedsuchkindofeducationas“liberation”(Bildung als Befreiung),andtheirbearersaseducators-liberators:“[Y]oureducatorscanbeonlyyourliberators.Andthatisthesecretofallculture:itdoesnotprovideartificiallimbs,waxnosesorspectacles–thatwhichcanprovidethesethingsis,rather,onlyshameduca-tion.Cultureis liberation, theremovalofall theweeds,rubbleandverminthatwanttoattackthetenderbudsoftheplant…”.13Consequently,evenNi-etzsche,hehimselfbeing”embedded”inthetraditionofpaideia and Bildung,doesnotwithstandtheuseofbotanicalmetaphors.Moreover,heforcesthem,in thesamewayheforces thebranchofphilosophical-educational thoughtthatshowsagreataffinitytowardsaristocratism.14

  7

Cf.Plato,Laws,644a–654b;Republic,564a,404d–412b, in: Complete Works, ed. JohnM. Cooper, Hackett Publishing Company,Indianapoli-Cambridge1997;Louis-AntoineLéondeSaint-Just,Fragments sur les institu­tions républicaines,Transcriptiond’uncahiermanuscritdéposéàlaBibliothèquenationale,Éditions10/18,collectionFaitetcause,Paris2003,pp.24–26.

  8

SeeWalter Horace Bruford,German Tradi­tion of Self­Cultivation. Bildung from Hum­boldt to Thomas Mann, CambridgeUniver-sityPress,London1975;ReinhartKoselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time,MITPress,Cambridge1985;R.Kosel-leck,“OntheAnthropologicalandSemanticStructureofBildung”,p.198.

9

For more details on these transitions, seeLouis Dumont. Homo aequalis II. L’idéologie allemande. France­Allemagne et retour,Gal-limard,Paris1991,pp.145,219;R.Vierhaus,“Bildung”,pp.511–516.

10

Cf.DavidCooper,“Filozofijakaoobrazovan-jeiobrazovanjekaofilozofija”,Zbornik Insti­tuta za pedagoška istraživanja30(1998),pp.275–277.Plato,indeed,expressesitratherinnegative  terms:  the enemy of  logos (misolo­gos)  is at  the same time  the uneducated one (amousos)(Plato,Republic411e).

11

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti­Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writ­ings,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge2005,p.119.

12

Nietzschebringsforwardthreeimagesofmenthat should be looked up to: the men of Rous-seau,Goethe andSchopenhauer.They “willno doubt long inspire mortals to a transfigura-tionoftheirownlives”(FriedrichNietzsche,Untimely Meditations,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge1997,p.150).

13

Ibid.,pp.129–130.

14

“You need to have been born for any higher world; to say it more clearly, you need tohave been bred for it” (FriedrichNietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a Phi­losophy of the Future,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge2002,p. 108).This isnotonly  the  question  of  the  aristocratic  nature of  Nietzsche’s  educational  thought. Accord-ing to Cooper, aristocratism permeates andeven  organises  Nietzsche’s  entire  philoso-phy(DavidCooper, Authenticity and Learn­ing. Nietzsche’s Educational Philosophy,Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1983, p.110).  It  is  rather  interesting  that Nietzsche’s aristocratism is the most prominent precisely 

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“Liberation”inquestionshouldbeunderstoodasautotelicpractice,literallyas“self-liberation”.Forthekeyroleortaskofthe“educator-liberator”istoliberate thewishfor“self-overcoming”(Selbstüberwindung)  in  the  learner. Hencethenotionofself-overcoming,asonethepillarsofNietzsche’sphi-losophy,andthenotionofself-liberation,maybeequated.Thispairofho-mogeneousnotionsshould,ofcourse,beaccompaniedbythenotionof“self-education”.Therefore,Bildungasliberation,astheprocessofliberation,isofan almost exclusively instrumental value: it necessarily represents the means for Bildungasself-cultivationofselfhood,forSelbstbildung.Inotherwords,self-overcoming becomes a metaphor for self-education.15

Self-overcoming is, undoubtedly, an obsessive subject for Nietzsche. Hiswholeworktestifiestothisfascination,tosuchanextentthatonlyinit,andnowhereelse,doesherecognisehisown“humanity”.16 In a letter sent to Paul Rée,Nietzschecomplains(or,perhaps,boasts)thatErwinRhodecallshima“deceiverofself-overcoming”.17AtafewplacesNietzscherevealshisbig-gestambition,laterevenbeingrevivedascompletelyachieved–toacquiretheproudtitleof“educator”:“Iknownohighergoalthantobecome,insomeway,an‘educator’inthenoblestsenseoneday…Toplant,builtandcreate!Itwouldmean‘toeducateoneself’,woulditnot?“18 Recurring to the third essay of his Untimely Meditations,heconfidentlyclaimsthat“Schopenhaueraseducator”doesnotcomeout,but ratherhiscounterpoint, “Nietzscheaseducator”.19

HerewecanobserveakindofturningpointinNietzsche’sthought:namely,hissuddenabandonmentofthe“educatorasliberator”conceptioninfavourof the pedagogy of self-overcoming or autodidacticism as the only conception worthmentioning.Itseemsasif“educationasliberation”(mimetics)unex-pectedly lost the status of necessary means or preparation for a unique goal – self-overcoming. Nietzsche even goes as far as to argue that “there are no educators”(inthesenseof“liberators”):“Asathinkeroneshouldspeakonlyofself-education”.20Byallappearances,Nietzschebegantocomprehendau-todidacticismasakindofeducationthat“keepsmeasureinitself”.21WedaresaythatthischangeinNietzsche’sthoughtwasconditionedbyhisemphasis-ingtheimportanceofthe“biographical”in“educatorasliberator”.Namely,before theybecame respecteddidactswe should lookup to, educators-lib-eratorshadtoworkveryhardonthemselves,i.e.theythemselveshadtobe-comeautodidactsfirst.Inordertomakethisintuitionconvincing,Nietzscheendeavouredtoreinforceorverifyitbyanautobiographicalelement,asiftheautobiographicalwereworthmentioningonlyasautodidactic:“An educator educates! But first he has to educate himself!AndIwriteforthatreason”.22 Inthisregard,atonepointhegiveshimselfuptodreamingoforfantasisingabouta“’schoolofeducators’(wheretheyeducatethemselves)”.23Whatwasvalid for self-overcoming – as a kind of Nietzsche’s self-confirming “human-ity”–shouldnowalsobevalidforself-educationasaregulatingeducationaltask,beitjustintheformofmerepossibility:“[S]elf-determinationandself-educationcould, in thefreestandmostfar-sightedspirits,onedaybecomeuniversaldeterminationwithregardtoallfuturehumanity”.24

Association is inevitable, and thequestionposes itself:howdoes, if at all,Nietzsche’s Übermenschfitintothisstory?Shouldnotthisfigure,howeverobscureitis,beabearerofthe“futurehumanity”,evenoftheentirefuture“culture”? In aword, is theÜbermensch  an  adequate  replacement  first  for the“educatorasliberator”,andthenforthe“educatorasautodidact”?Orishe both at the same time? Nietzsche himself does not provide an unequivocal answer,andthis,surely,givesrisetovariousinterpretations.Accordingtoan

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influentialreading,Übermensch cannot be separated from the conception of self-overcoming.25Amanwhohasovercomehimselfisherebeinginterpretedas a realisation of Übermensch,assomeonewhomanagestoovercometheunfavourableconditionsstandinginthewayofrealisinghisownuniqueindi-viduality.Havinginmind,then,whathasbeensaidsofar,thefigureofÜber­mensch completelymatchesthefigureofthe“educator”initsbroadestsense,so that it can even be taken as a metaphor for the education process itself.26

AsupportforthisviewmayindeedbefoundinNietzsche’sZarathustra. None ofhis otherwritings contains so strongly impregnateddeonticdemands: aman is something that must and at the same time should be overcome.27How-ever, this particular normative tone indicates the dimension ofNietzsche’sintentionwhich could easily be neglected.Namely, for the first time self-

atpointswhereheusesbotanicalmetaphors:“Buttheessentialfeatureofagood,healthyaristocracy  is  that  it  does  not  feel  that  it  is a function (whether of the kingdom or ofthe  community)  but  instead  feels  itself  to be  the  meaning  and  highest  justification  (of the kingdom or community), – and, conse-quently,thatitacceptsingoodconsciencethesacrificeofcountlesspeoplewhohavetobepusheddownandshrunkintoincompletehu-manbeings,intoslaves,intotools,allfor the sake of the aristocracy. Its fundamental belief mustalwaysbe thatsocietycannot exist  for thesakeofsociety,butonlyasthesubstruc-tureandframeworkforraisinganexceptionaltype of being up  to  its higher duty  and  to  a higher  state  of  being. In the sameway, thesun-seeking, Javanese climbing plant calledthe sipo matadorwillwrapitsarmsaroundanoak tree so often and for such a long time that finally,highabovetheoak,althoughstillsup-portedbyit,theplantwillbeabletounfolditshighestcrownoffoliageandshowitshappi-nessinthefull,clearlight.”(F.Nietzsche, Be­yond Good and Evil,p.259).AndweshallputasideNietzsche’s “fundamental flaw”, sincesipo matadordoesnotgrowinJavaatall,butin  the Amazonian  rainforests  and  since  it  is not a climbing plant but a monstrous liana.

15

See Peter Fitzsimons, Nietzsche, Ethics and Education. An Account of Difference, SensePublishers,Rotterdam-Taipei2007,p.161.

16

“Myhumanityisaconstantself-overcoming”(Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti­Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writ­ings,p.83).Andfurther:“Mywritingsspeakonly of my overcomings” (Friedrich Ni-etzsche, Human, All Too Human, Cambridge UniversityPress,Cambridge1996,p.209).

17

FriedrichNietzsche, Izabrana pisma,Prosveta,Beograd1996,p.139.InalettersenttoFranzOverbeck there is an additional confirmation of this “deceiving”: “[I] strain all threadsofmyself-overcoming”(ibid.,p.144).

18

Ibid.,pp.47–48.

19

F. Nietzsche, The Anti­Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings,p.115.

20

F.Nietzsche,Human, All Too Human, p.374.

21

PredragKrstić,“Filozofskaobrazovanostkaodisfunkcijadruštva”,Theoria51(1/2008),p.106.

22

“Erzieher erziehn! Aber die ersten müssen sich selbsterziehn! Und für diese schreibeich” (Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Einzel­bänden, vol. 8, Giorgio Colli & MazzinoMontinari (eds.), Deutscher TaschenbuchVerlag,München-Berlin-NewYork1980,pp. 47(2[25])).

23

F.Nietzsche,Izabrana pisma,p.66.

24

F.Nietzsche,Human, All Too Human,p.268.

25

Cf. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche. Philoso­pher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th edition,Princeton University Press, Princeton–NewJersey1974,p.309.

26

SeePeterFitzsimons,“Nietzsche’sÜbermen­schasaMetaphorforEducation”,Paideusis: Journal of the Canadian Philosophy of Edu­cation Society16(1/2007),p.13.

27

Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zar­athustra. A Book for All and None, Cam-bridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge2006,pp.5,18,25,41.

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overcomingseemsheretobecomprehendedasameans,andnotasanendinitselfanymore.Inotherwords,theconceptionofself-overcomingandtheconception of Übermensch cannot be equated. A man should and must over-comehimselfonlyinthedirectionofwhatis“higher”thanaman,whateveritis,i.e.towardssomethingnolongerbeingaman.Therefore“educator”can-not be the same as Übermensch.Atbest,heisnothingbutapreparationforsomethingthathasnotyetcomeintoexistenceandforwhatitisnotknownifiteverwill.Suchreadinggivestherighttothoseinterpretationsthatrecognisea“negativepedagogy” inZarathustra, teachingwithoutamoral,a teacherwithoutstudentsandwithoutinclinationtohavethem.28

If ÜbermenschisthefinalwordofNietzsche’s“teleology”,wecanthereforeconcludethatherenounces,inaway,hisearlierdraftsofaphilosophyofself-educationorrather,heovercomesthemsuccessively:self-educationgradual-ly and almost imperceptibly transforms from a sublime goal into a means for somefurther,possiblyunattainablegoal.Ontheotherhand,ifÜbermensch doesnothaveanyonetolookuptobuthimself,heisanautodidactpar excel­lence.Nevertheless,asynopticviewonNietzsche’soeuvrerevealshisper-sistent critique (clearly adduced in the earlywritingOn the Future of our Educational Institutions)ofasyetpredominantviewofeducation/cultureasafunctionofsocialusefulness(creating“educationalphilistines”asreplace-ablecogsinacreakysocialmechanism),whichisalwaystothedetrimentoftheindependentstatusofcultureasregardsthewellbeingofthestate.Autodi-dacticismwould,inthatsense,denotenotjustaprotestagainsttherelentlessutilitarisationoftheuniversityapparatus,butarecommendationoraguide-line for anti-banalisation of the very idea of education.

Derrida and the aporias of the university

The autodidactic moment of self-education and its real or imaginary sanctu-aryintheBerlinuniversitymodel,inthefaceofthechallengesofitscorrup-tioninthetwentiethcentury,willbeusedmoreorlessopenlyasareferencepoint by  thinkers  so different  from each other as  Jaspers and Habermas or Derrida.Inonecase,itwasinconjunctionwithcomprehensivenationifica-tion,withthebrandingone’sproductiononthebasisofgeographicalorigin;then,itwassufficienttoinsistonthe“realityofthefreespirit”,onthemedi-aevaltransnationaltraditionandonthestate’sobligationtorespectit,atthesametimefundingthefreespiritwithoutaskingwhyandwhatfor,asakindof inalienable and guaranteed right.29Inanothercase,thereferencewillbeusedasagainstthethreatoflosingone’sownresearchsubstanceandyieldingtoperhapsevenmoreperfidiouspowersandtyrants.For,thecontemporarycrisisoftheuniversity,thatis,ofitsphilosophyofeducation,atfirstglanceperhapsagainparadoxically,ismostly(ante)datedbacktothe1970s.Itwasinthisperiodthatitwasobservedthattheuniversityinevitablyfollowstheverylogicofgrowingtransnationalisation,whichintheenderodespreciselythenation-stateuponwhichitsmodelhadbeendesigned.30Or,toputitinmoretheoreticalterms:itbecamequestionableifitsidea–withitsinevitablefun-damentalfigure,thefigureof“constitutionofselfhoodthroughenquiringintonon-selfhood”,“formingtheselfhoodthroughthetemptationofotherness”31 – may still rest on the philosophy of classical German idealism?32

Jacques Derrida’s musings on these issues seem to be both pertinent and in-spiring.Inspring1999andon30June2000inAthensandattheUniversity of Frankfurt respectively, he gave lectures devoted to the “unconditional”characteroftheuniversityanditsfuture.Byuniversity“withoutconditions”Derrida means the modern European university – built more or less according 

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to theBerlinnineteenth-centurymodel–whichhasbeenonthestagefortwocenturiesalreadyandwhichisrecognisedwithinframesof“whatiscalledac-ademicfreedom,anunconditional freedomtoquestionandtoassert,oreven,goingstillfurther,therighttosaypubliclyallthatisrequiredbyresearching,knowing,andthinkingthetruth”.33So,initeverythingisexposedtouncon-ditionalendeavoursofathoughtunboundeddisciplinarily,philosophically,orscientifically,whichisnotevenreducibletocritique.“Thereis,inprinciple,nolimit,intheuniversity,inthecritical–or,Iprefertosay,deconstructive–examinationofeverypresupposition,everynorm,everyaxiomatics…”34 InDerrida’swork,however,theunconditionalityoftheuniversityseemstobelessfactualthannormative.Theuniversity,itissaid,isyettobecometheultimate site of critical – and more than critical – resistance to any dogmatic and unjust appropriation.Thephrase“morethancritical”testifiestothenewchallengesandacertainawarenessthattheuniversityitselfisnotinnocent,isevennotnecessarilyavictimasregardsthecrisisofitsownidea,legitimationandstatus.Morethancritical,Derridaexplains,means“deconstructive”,means“therighttodecon-struction as an unconditional right to ask critical questions not only about the historyoftheconceptofaman,butaboutthehistoryoftheverynotionofcri-tique,abouttheformandtheauthorityofthequestion,abouttheinterrogativeformofthought”.35 It is for this excess that Derrida seems to care the most; for anextremelyconsistentimplementation,forapplyingtheprincipletohimself,fornotstopping,fornotsettling,orsedimentingeveninresistance.36 In other 

28

Cf. P. Krstić, “Filozofska obrazovanost kaodisfunkcijadruštva”,p.107andEliyahuRose-now, “What Is Free Education? The Educa-tional Significance of Nietzsche’sThought”,Educational Theory 23 (4/1973), pp. 354–370.

29

SeeKarlJaspers,The Idea of the University,Beacon Press, Boston 1959; Karl Jaspers,“PhilosophicalAutobiography”,in:PaulArt-hur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, Tudor Publishing Company, NewYork1957,pp.35,45–53.

30

Forthiskindofreconstruction,seeBillRead-ings,The University in Ruins,HarvardUni-versityPress,Cambridge(MA)1996.

31

Antoine Berman, L’Épreuve de l’étranger. Culture et tradition dans l’Allemagne ro­mantique,Gallimard,Paris1984,pp.68,75;Craig Ireland, Subaltern Appeal to Experi­ence. Self­Identity, Late Modernity, and the Politics of Immediacy, McGill-Queen’s Uni-versityPress,Montreal2004,p.63.

32

JürgenHabermas, “The Idea of theUniver-sity. Learning Processes”, Belgrade Circle Journal1–2/1998(SpecialIssue:InDefenceof theUniversity), pp.29–38; cf. ImmanuelKant, FriedrichWilhelm Joseph von Schel-

ling,FriedrichNietzsche, Ideja univerziteta,BrankoDespot(ed.),Globus,Zagreb1991.

33

JacquesDerrida, “TheFutureof theProfes-sion or the University Without Condition(Thanks to the ‘Humanities,’ What could take place Tomorrow)”, in: Tom Cohen(ed.),Jacques Derrida and The Humanities. A Critical Reader, Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge 2001, p. 24; cf. JacquesDerrida, “Unconditionality or Sovereignty.TheUniversity at the Frontiers of Europe”,Oxford Literary Review31(2/2009),pp.120;see also, Jacques Derrida, “Les pupilles del’Université.  Le  principe  de  raison  et  l’idee de l’Université”, Belgrade Circle Journal 1–2/1998 (Special Issue: In Defence of theUniversity),pp.17–28.

34

J. Derrida, “Unconditionality or Sovereign-ty”,p.123.

35

J.Derrida,“TheFutureof theProfessionortheUniversityWithoutCondition”,p.26.

36

Whichmayalso,asweknowfromKoselleckat least (cf. Reinhart Koselleck,Critique and Crisis. Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society, MIT Press, Cambridge(MA) 1988), provide mental comfort andmoral conveniences.

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words,forwhatcanbereadasawarningthattheuniversity,insofarasitispossible,shouldnotbedoingwhatithasdone,perhapsinevitably,fromthebeginning:recyclethelogicofdominationor,tousehereDerrida’stermforthesameprocessofdetrimentalsubjectivisation,“sovereignty”.Itseemsthatthe deconstructive dismantling is the only one to guarantee the university’s righttospecificandhonour(able)edexistence,justasonlycriticalandmorethancriticalquestioning–questioningalsoone’sowncriticalquestioningsasnon-questionedaxiomatics, questioning the traditional figureof theoreticalcriticismandpasswordofcontemplationastheauthorityofthequestionform,questioningthoughtas“questioning”–enablesandestablishesasaprinciplewhatispossibleonlyinperformance,inaperformativemanner,bycreatingevents: the university’s right to deconstruction and unconditional resistance.Derrida believes that such unconditional resistance enables the opposing of a “universaluniversity”toallexternalpowers,includingthosemostexpansiveinmodernity:powersofthe(nation)state,the(corporate)economyandthe(mass)media,aswellasthepowersofideology,faithandculturethatarestillingoodhealth.However, that impossibleunconditionalityofuniversity, itsabstractandhyperbolicinvincibility,isalsorecognisedasitsweaknessandvulnerability.Itisalsopowerlessatthesametime,withoutitsownpowersbeforequotidianones–“[b]ecauseitisastrangertopower,becauseitishet-erogeneoustotheprincipleofpower”.Itis,therefore,“withoutcondition”,both in thesense that it is“unconditional”and in thesenseof“powerless-ness”,“lackofdefence”.Beingabsolutelyindependent,itisalso“anexposed,tenderedcitadel,tobetaken,oftendestinedtocapitulatewithoutcondition,tosurrenderunconditionally”.37Consequently,beingfacedwithmoderntech-no-scientific seductions andenticements, theuniversityneedsnotonly theresistanceprinciple, but also the strength of resistance– andof defection:“deconstruction (and I am not at all embarrassed to say so and even to claim) has its privileged place in the university and in the Humanities as the place of irredentist resistanceoreven,analogically,asasortofprincipleofcivildisobedience,evenofdissidenceinthenameofasuperiorlawandajusticeofthought”.38Inthenameoffreedom,namely,theunconditionalthoughtoftheuniversityshouldquestiontheprincipleofpowerastheprincipleofsover-eigntyand–findingitsspaceoffreedom–remainitselfwithoutpower:“Itisanunconditionalitywithoutsovereignty,whichistosayatbottomafreedomwithoutpower.Butwithoutpowerdoesnotmean‘withoutforce’”.39

Derrida’s“principleofresistanceanddissidence”outlinesaperspectiveontheuniversitythatendeavourstoreconcilewithoutcasualtiesandlossofproduc-tivetensions,oratanyratetobringtoawareness,theparadoxicalalternativeofitsownpositioning,whichweaspiredtoillustrateinthispaper:“without power but without weakness. Without power but not without force, be it a cer­tain force of weakness”.40Like“justice”and“messiahship”in(later)Derridawork–moreprecisely,“messiahshipwithoutmessianism”,“waitingwithoutexpectation”,whichisthe“universalstructureofexperience”,the“universalstructureofrelationtoanevent”41 – the university could thus become a re-valuedandreshaped“institution”atwhich,butnotwithinwhich,theworkofdeconstructionceasesandwhichmakestheroomfor(practical)opportunities.InspiredbyLevinas’sstrengthofthepowerless,thisdeteleologisedmessiah-shipnowaccepts,bypromotingotherness,thatthefutureisalwaysunexpect-ed,unforeseeableandunprogrammed,andbypromotingjusticeitpositsthefutureintothepresenttimeandimposesresponsibilitytoactwithoutdelay.42

Thisperspectivedoesnotseemworse–onlylesscomfortableandmorepre-carious–thanthephantasmintowhichtheuniversityhasbeencaught.How-

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ever,itseemsthatamoreserioustroublearisesfromthefactthatitsobligationof,afterall,alwayspotentiallyself-devouringdeconstructioncannotbepre-scribed,somewhatlikethecivildisobediencereferredtobyDerrida,aswellastherighttorebellionintheConstitution.Thisperspective,however,clearlysignals that no agreeable support in the eternal enemy outside can be found anymore,thattheproblemisinside,andthatthealternativewithinwhichuni-versity is stretched can easily be both his place of birth and of death.In these terms here it seems more interesting to question the very agreement betweentheunderstandingofself-educationandtheideaofuniversity.Coulduniversityhaveeverbeenarefugeofnon-directiveeducation?Howhas,orhowcouldhave,aninstitutionso,afterall,self-understandablystandardisingandratherhierarchising,inadditioninevitablyimbricatedinthepowerrela-tionspreciselybyvirtueofthatKnowledgethroughtheproductionofwhichitclaimstobeeschewingthem,43survived,perhapsafterthecompulsorygen-eralandfunctionalorpreparatorysecondaryeducation,asanoasisofresist-ance?Andwhatcouldthelegitimationofself-educationbebasedupon,ifatall,insuchaninstitution?Inotherwordsandratherpointedly:coulditindeed,thereoranywhere,beestablished?Itcouldeasilyturnoutthattheuniversity,perhapsalreadyinits“idea”andcertainlyintheimplementationthereof,issubsumedunderthemoregeneralparadoxofall“institutionsoffreedom”thatturnfromguardsintotheirowngravediggers. It is also the paradox of righteous brotherhood by subjugation thatinevitablybringsforthhomogenisationbeforetheconquerors,uniform-ingthemselvesevenaftertheliberation:firstwithinboundariesoftheproto-colofitsownoccurrencesandtheninincreasinglywiderscopeitpractisesthe sameor,which is evenworse,much subtler rule againstwhich itwasostensiblyrisingagainst–as,forinstance,capitalismwithits,i.e.university’s“discourseofexpertise”.44Afterall,itmayturnoutthatwhatBlocharguesfor Christianity is also valid for the university – that the most valuable things 

37

J.Derrida,“TheFutureof theProfessionortheUniversityWithoutCondition”,p.27–28.

38

Ibid.,p.29.

39

J.Derrida,“UnconditionalityorSovereignty”,p.129.

40

Ibid.,p.130.

41

JacquesDerrida,“Marx&Sons”,in:MichaelSprinker(ed.),Ghostly Demarcations. A Sym­posium on Jacques Derrida’s “Specters of Marx”,Verso,London–NewYork1999,pp.242,248–253.

42

J.Derrida,“Marx&Sons”,p.229.

43

Foucault is here, naturally, an inevitable as-sociation and imperishable witness. See, ofcourse,MichelFoucault,Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977,Panteon,NewYork1980.

44

More(neo)psychoanalytically,(post)structura-listandpoliticallyspeaking,“universitydis-course”,thatis“biopoliticsdiscourse”asthe“discourseofexpertise”movedtothesideoforwastakenoverbythecapitalistic“masterdiscourse” (Jacques Lacan, L’envers de la psychanalyse,1969–1970,Seuil,Paris1998;Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics,Palgrave Macmillan, London 2008): beingseemingly more “humane” and “liberal”, itactually still organises and manages the lives of individuals and society in a more perfidi-ous manner. Emerging as a true victor in the struggle against the “brutal capitalism” ofradically directed “1968”, the “postmoderncapitalism”, according to this interpretation,becomesabletouseitsownlogicinordertoabsorbitsdeepestoppositesand,moreover,toplacethemasitsownproducts.Thusitusesthe  autonomy  of  institutionalised  theoretical universityknowledgeandtransformsitwith-inthe“societyofknowledge”intocapitalorproduction capacity.

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in it are the heretics. Renegades of the modern university almost at the very momentofitsestablishment,whoareatthesametime,probablynotbyacci-dent,doyensofcontemporaryphilosophy(Marx,KierkegaardandNietzschebeforeall),autodidactswhoseinspirationalheresiestheuniversityhasman-aged,justasanyotherindustryandinprogressivelyshortertime,toabsorbinto its registers and to concatenatewithin its apparatus, could testify thattheuniversity–fortunately,necessarily,resentfullyandcontrarytoitsownefforts–engenderssuchgiftstoo.Ontheotherhand,withoutitsorthodoxy,theywould,mostlikely,neverhaveappeared.

Conclusion

Built roughly at the same time, the idea of themodern university and theidea of self-education have advanced in an apparently harmonious coalition. Sprung from the ideaof resistance, resistance toanything thatunderminestheirself-sufficiencyandsublimeautotelicity, theybuilt theirautonomybyrelying perhaps only on non-mimetic, non-instrumental and unforeseeableidealof“totalpersonality”.TheBerlinUniversitymodelproclaimedit,andthe protagonists of self-education found a fulcrum in it – but also a point of resistance at the same time.Self-educationhas,infact,adualconnotation.Ononehand,itsgoalisthesameasthatofthemodernuniversity:educationitselfisavirtue,andtheedu-catedman,neverdefinableinadvance,isitsimage.Ontheotherhand,self-educationpointstotheautodidacticismaswell,notsomuchtothegoal,buttothemethodthatisanecessarycountermovetoeducationalinstitutions,totheneed for a critical reminder of the danger of any educational establishment. In thefirstsense,self-educationanduniversityadvancetogetherharmoniously:theresistanceagainstthethirdparty–national,ideological,religious,marketormediainterventionsinresearchprogramsandknowledge–formsthepointof their communality or even unity. Only the strategies may differ: organized oppositionwiththeriskoflookingliketheopponentoraproudretreatdevoidofopportunitiesforcorruption,butforinfluencetoo.In theothersense,whenunderstoodasautodidacticism,self-educationanduniversitydiverge,perhapstothedetrimentofboth,sincetheirrelationshiptransforms into amoreor less staticopposition.Theuniversity, as aplaceof  protection  and  channelling  idiosyncratic  intellectual  exploits  in  front  of thethreatofsomenon-academicforcethatwouldliketofunctionalizethem,turns from its logical chassis into a trammelling cage that disables them. In adialecticalco-directednessoffreethoughtanditsinstitutionalization,out-wardlyfreeuniversityinevitablyestablishesrulesofthegamethatdenyitsinnerfreedom,imposestandardsandurgestotheenlightenedapostasy–ofthose“freethinkers”whoare,eventhoughonlyinanegativeposture,inevi-tably referred to it.Inotherwords,self-educationanduniversity,giventhecommongoal–theeducated individual – and the common enemy – placing education in the serv-iceofnon-researchpurposes–advancedinparallel,bothhistoricallyandide-ologically.Moreover,theystilladvance–totheextentthat(ispossiblethat)theuniversityremainsaplaceof loose,nondoctrinaireandnon-narcissisticfellowship.However, the separation comes into playwhen (and inasmuchasitisthecase)universitybecomesaplaceofnotonlyinstrumentalised,butalsohierarchisedknowledgethatrepeatsand/orregeneratesformsofdomina-tionagainstwhichitmighthaverisenbefore.

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Thequestion iswhether theuniversitycanexistasanheir to the idealsofself-education and whether it can tolerate or even encourage recalcitrantandrebelliousautodidactsintheirmidstimmediately,andnotonlyaftertheeventsasitstillsometimesthinksitdoes,orisitsentencedtotheindustri-alizationthatisnotdictatedbyexternalinstancesalone,butalsobyitsowninstitutionalstructure?Inotherwords–andthereforeDerrida’sarticulationof intrinsically antinomical situatedness of university is significant – is it pos-siblethattheuniversitydoesnotfollowthepatternsofpowerandnotbeingpowerlessitself?Evenifbeingimpossible,itiscertainlyanoblemission.Ortheconstantstruggleofpowerrelationsandtheeconomywithinitscurrentcontexts,whichtheuniversityshouldnotonlytestify,butalsothinkand,loyaltoitsidealeveninitsownquestioning,practice.

Aleksandar Dobrijević, Predrag Krstić

Samoobrazovanje i univerzitet

SažetakU nastojanju da artikuliraju vezu između »ideja« univerziteta i samoobrazovanja, autori ovog članka, kao svojevrsnu predigru, u prvom dijelu izlažu ona klasična razumijevanja obrazova­nja koja prethode koncepciji samoobrazovanja. U drugome dijelu diskutira se Nietzscheovo rigorozno shvaćanje samoobrazovanja kao najkonzekventnija i najdalekosežnija intervencija u dotadašnji koncept obrazovanja. Treći dio na primjeru Derridaovih kolebanja u pogledu dje­latnosti i djelotvornosti univerziteta signalizira suvremene »antinomije« legitimacije njegovog statusa. Zaključuje se da ne samo izvanjski izazovi nego i paradoksalni zadaci koje sebi postav­lja spadaju u samu konstituciju onog modela univerziteta koji je rado sebe oslanjao na tradiciju samoobrazovanja, a da odnos između vizija univerziteta i samoobrazovanja, za koje se mislilo da se uzajamno podupiru, nije lišen intrinzičnih tenzija.

Ključne riječiobrazovanje,samoobrazovanje,univerzitet,institucije,FriedrichNietzsche,JacquesDerrida

Aleksandar Dobrijević, Predrag Krstić

Selbstbildung und Universität

ZusammenfassungSich bemühend, die Verbindung zwischen der Idee der Universität und der der Selbstbildung zu artikulieren, darstellen die Verfasser dieses Textes im ersten Teil, als ein eigenartigen Vor­spiel, die dem Konzept der Selbstbildung vorangehenden klassischen Bildungsverständnisse. Im zweiten Teil wird die strenge Bildungsauffassung Nietzsches als die konsequenteste und weitrei­chendste Intervention in den bisherigen Bildungskonzept diskutiert. Im dritten Teil des Textes werden die gegenwärtigen “Antinomien” diskutiert, die im Zusammenhang mit der Legitimie­rung der Lage der Universität entstanden sind, und zwar auf dem Beispiel der Schwankungen Derridas in Bezug auf die Wirkung und die Wirksamkeit der Universität. Es wird gefolgert, dass nicht nur externe Herausforderungen, sondern auch paradoxe Aufgaben, die die Universität sich selbst stellt, in die Verfassung selbst desjenigen Universitätsmodells gehören, das sich gern auf die Tradition der Selbstbildung anlehnt, und dass das Verhältnis zwischen der Universi­tät­ und Selbstbildungsvorstellungen, die als sich gegenseitig stützend angesehen waren, der intrinsischen Spannungen nicht entbehren kann.

SchlüsselwörterBildung,Selbstbildung,Universität,Institutionen,FriedrichNietzsche,JacquesDerrida

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L’éducation par soi-même et l’université

RésuméSe proposant d’articuler un lien entre l’« idée » d’université et celle d’éducation par soi­même, les auteurs de cet article, sous forme d’une mise en train générique, exposent dans la première partie les acceptions classiques du terme éducation antérieures à la conception de l’éducation par soi­même. Dans la deuxième partie, il est question de la manière rigoureuse de Nietzsche de comprendre l’éducation par soi­même comme l’intervention la plus conséquente et la plus por­teuse dans le concept d’éducation ayant cours jusqu’alors. La troisième partie signale, partant de l’exemple des hésitations de Derrida au sujet de l’activité et de l’efficacité de l’université, des « antinomies » modernes touchant à la légitimité de son statut. La conclusion formule que non seulement des défis extérieurs mais également des tâches paradoxales qu’elle s’impose font partie de la constitution même du modèle d’université qui s’appuyait volontiers sur la tradition de l’éducation par soi­même, tandis que la relation entre la vision d’université et celle d’édu­cation par soi­même dont on pensait qu’elles s’étayaient mutuellement, n’est pas exempte de tensions intrinsèques.

Mots-cléséducation,éducationparsoi-même,université,institutions,FriedrichNietzsche,JacquesDerrida