MALAWI SOCIAL ACTION FUND

Area 14, Red Cross House

Private Bag 352, Lilongwe 3, Malawi Tel: (265) 775 174/666/702 Fax: (265) 775 949

E-mail: masaf@masaf.org

SECOND BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENT OF THE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME (PWP)

FINAL REPORT

Prepared by: Peter M. Mvula, Evious K. Zgovu, Ephraim W. Chirwa and Esme Kadzamira

Wadonda Consult

P. O. Box 669, Zomba, Malawi Tel: (265) 827 933/839 296/823 869 Fax: (265) 523 021

NOVEMBER 2000

WACO

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TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables iv List of Figures vi List of Boxes vi Acknowledgements vii Abbreviations viii Executive Summary ix CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 The MASAF Public Works Program 2 1.3 Structure of the Report 4 CHAPTER 2: PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMS: LITERATURE REVIEW 5 2.1 Introduction 5 2.2 The Nature of Projects, Skill Requirements and Targeting 5 2.3 Determinants of Participation in Public Works Programs 7 2.4 Determination of the Wage Rate and Forms of Payment 7 2.5 Organisational Structure and Institutional Linkages 9 2.6 Impact of PWP on Beneficiary Communities 9 CHAPTER 3: TERMS OF REFERENCE AND METHODOLOGY 11 3.1 Introduction 11 3.2 Terms of Reference 11 3.2.1 Criteria for the Selection of Project Workers (B1) 11 3.2.2 Remuneration (B2) 11 3.2.3 Institutional Linkages (B3) 12 3.2.4 Work Roles, Assets and their Maintenance (B4) 12 3.2.5 Socio-Economic Impact of the PWP (B5) 12 3.3 Methodology of the Study 13 3.3.1 Study Project Districts and Sampling of Interviewees 13 3.3.2 Selection of Interviewees 13 3.3.3 Data Collection Techniques and Instruments 14 3.3.4 Data Processing and Analysis Techniques 14 3.3 Research Problems and Limitations of the Study 15 3.4 Summary 16 CHAPTER 4: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS 17 4.1 Introduction 17 4.2 Distribution of the Sample 17 4.3 Demographic, Economic and Household Characteristics 18 4.3.1 Sex and Age Distribution of the Respondents 18 4.3.2 Education Attainment of the Respondents 19 4.3.3 Respondents' Occupational Status 20 4.3.4 Marital Status of the Respondents 22 4.3.5 Sex of the Head of the Household 23 4.3.6 Age Distribution and Household Size 24 4.3.7 Housing Conditions 25 4.3.8 Energy and Water Sources 26

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4.3.9 Possession of Assets and Livestock 28 4.3.10 Sources of Income 29 4.3.11 Land Ownership and Food Production 30 4.3.12 Cropping Pattern and Use of Farm Inputs 33 4.4 Summary 35 CHAPTER 5: TARGETING AND SELECTION OF PROJECT WORKERS 36 5.1 Introduction 36 5.2 Targeting and Selection of Project Sites and Project Types 36 5.3 Criteria for Selecting Project Workers 38 5.4 Participation Rates 41 5.4.1 Extent of Participation by Gender 42 5.4.2 Reasons for Participation in the PWP 44 5.4.3 Reason for Non-Participation in the PWP 44 5.4.4 Reasons for Dropping Out 45 5.5 Summary 46 CHAPTER 6: REMUNERATION 48 6.1 Introduction 48 6.2 Duration and Mean Number of Hours Worked Per Day 48 6.3 MASAF PWP Earnings and Perceptions on Wage Levels 49 6.3.1 Total Earnings and Implied Employment Creation 49 6.3.2 Preferred Forms of Wages 50 6.3.3 Preferred Season of Engagement in MASAF PWP 52 6.3.4 Perceptions on Remuneration 53 6.3.4.1 Adequacy of Wages 53 6.3.4.2 Prevalence and Extent of Wage Payment Delays 55 6.4 Duration and Earnings in Alternative Employment among Non-beneficiaries 56 6.5 Summary 58 CHAPTER 7: INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE MASAF PWP 59 7.1 Introduction 59 7.2 Institutional Framework and Linkages for MASAF Projects 59 7.2.1 MASAF Management Unit and Zone Offices 59 7.2.1.1 Operational Framework 60 7.2.1.2 Linkages with DSS, Communities and Workers 60 7.2.1.3 Problems and Constraints 62 7.2.2 District Executive Committee Sub Set 62 7.2.2.1 Composition of the Committee 62 7.2.2.3 Institutional Capacity Constraints and Problems 64 7.2.3 Site Foremen, Contractors and Supervisors 65 7.2.4 Traditional Leaders and Members of Parliament 67 7.2.5 Project Committee and Workers Committee 68 7.3 Respondents' Knowledge of Alternative Safety Net Projects 70 7.4 Summary 72 CHAPTER 8: WORK ROLES, ASSETS AND THEIR MAINTENANCE 74 8.1 Introduction 74 8.2 Work Roles 74 8.3 Skills Requirements 76

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8.4 Asset Ownership and Maintenance 76 8.5 Summary 77 CHAPTER 9: SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MASAF PWP 78 9.1 Introduction 78 9.2 Impact of PWP on Household Livelihoods 78 9.2.1 Alternative Employment Opportunities prior to MASAF PWP 78 9.2.2 Utilisation of Wages Earned from MASAF PWP 80 9.2.3 Changes in the Quality of Life 80 9.2.4 Changes in the Main Sources of Income 83 9.2.5 Changes in Number of Meals 83 9.2.6 Changes in the Nutritional Status of Children 84 9.2.6.1 Overall Nutrition Status from the present Study 84 9.2.6.2 Nutritional Status of Children at Project Level 86 9.2.6.3 Comparative Analysis of Baseline and Present Study Anthropometry Measurements 88 9.2.6.4 Nutrition Status for Children in Beneficiary and Non-Beneficiary Households 89 9.3 Coping Mechanisms and Availability of Alternative Employment 91 9.3.1 Coping Mechanisms 92 9.3.2 Availability of Alternative Employment 93 9.4 People's Views on the Future of MASAF PWP 94 9.5 Summary 95 CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 96 10.1 Introduction 96 10.2 Conclusions 96 10.2.1 Targeting and Selection of Projects and Project Workers 96 10.2.2 Remuneration 97 10.2.3 Institutional Linkages 98 10.2.4 Work Roles, Assets and Maintenance 99 10.2.5 Socio-Economic Impact of the PWP 99 10.3 Recommendations 101 10.3.1 Targeting and Selection of Projects 101 10.3.2 Remuneration 101 10.3.3 Institutional Linkages 102 10.3.4 Work Roles, Assets and Maintenance 103 10.3.5 Work Roles, Assets and Maintenance 103 10.3.6 Monitoring and Evaluation 103 SELECTED REFERENCES 104 APPENDIX A LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS 107

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LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1 Number of PWP Projects under MASAF I by District and Type

of Activity 3 Table 4.1 Distribution of Questionnaire Responses by Status and Project Site (Number) 18 Table 4.2 Sex Distribution of Respondents by Beneficiary Status by Project Site 19 Table 4.3 Education Attainment of Respondents by Status and Project Site 20 Table 4.4 Occupation of Respondents by Status and Project Site 21 Table 4.5 Marital Status of Beneficiary Respondents by Project Site 22 Table 4.6 Marital Status of Non-Beneficiary Respondents by Project Site 23 Table 4.7 Sex of Head of Household by Status and Project Site 24 Table 4.8 Population Distribution by Sex 25 Table 4.9 Mean Household Size by Beneficiary Status and by Sex of Household Head 25 Table 4.10 Quality of Households' Main House 26 Table 4.11 Energy and Water Sources by Sex of Household Head by Status 27 Table 4.12 Ownership of Toilet by Sex of Household Head by Status 28 Table 4.13 Possession of Assets by Sex of Household Head by Status 28 Table 4.14 Possession of Livestock by Sex of Household Head by Status 29 Table 4.15 Major Source of Income by Sex of Household Head by Status 29 Table 4.16 Land Ownership and Food Production by Sex of Household Head by Status 31 Table 4.17 Proportion of Food Deficit Households by Sex of Household Head by Status 32 Table 4.18 Proportion of Households Using Alternative Food Sources by Sex of Household Head and Status 32 Table 4.19 Proportion of Households Having a Given Number of Meals by Sex of Household Head and Status 33 Table 4.20 Proportion of Households Who Grew a Certain Crop Sex of Household Head by Status 34 Table 4.21 Proportion of Households using Farm Inputs by Sex of Household Head and Status (percent) 34 Table 5.1 Percentage of Beneficiaries Indicating the Local Agent Responsible for the Selection of Workers by Gender 39 Table 5.2 Beneficiaries Perceptions on Criteria Used for Selecting Workers 40 Table 5.3 Number of Other Household Members who have participated in PWP 41 Table 5.4 Participation in MASAF PWP by Sex of Household Head 42 Table 5.5 Proportion of Female and Male Beneficiaries by Project Type and Gender 42 Table 5.6 Mean Ranking for the Preferred Type of Work by Gender 43 Table 5.7 Reasons for Participation in MASAF PWP by Sex of the Respondent and Sex of the Head of Household 44 Table 5.8 Reasons for Non-Participation in MASAF PWP by Non-Beneficiaries 45

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Table 6.1 Average Daily Number of Hours in MASAF PWP Activities 49 Table 6.2 Mean Earnings and Task Rates from MASAF PWP 50 Table 6.2 Percent of Beneficiaries Showing Preferred Mode of Payment by Month 51 Table 6.4 Distribution of Workers Showing Preferred Season of Employment on MASAF PWP 52 Table 6.5 Perceptions on Wages under MASAF Public Works Programme (Kwacha per day per MASAF task equivalent) 53 Table 6.6 Comparison of MASAF PWP Wage with Local Wages 54 Table 6.7 Prevalence and Extent of Delayed MASAF PWP Wages 55 Table 6.8 Mean Number of Hours worked per Day and Days worked per Month 56 Table 6.9 Mean Monthly Earnings from Alternative Employment Opportunities 57 Table 7.1 Districts by MASAF Zones 60 Table 7.2 Existence and Perceptions on the Effectiveness of the Project Committee (PC) 69 Table 7.3 Community Perceptions on Comparative Safety Net Programs 71 Table 8.1 Work Roles and Task Sizes under Various MASAF PWP Activities 75 Table 9.1 Participation in Alternative Employment Prior to MASAF PWP 79 Table 9.2 Types of Employment in which Workers Were Employed Prior to MASAF PWP 79 Table 9.3 Uses of Wages Earnings from MASAF PWP Employment 80 Table 9.4 Revealed Changes in Quality of Life 81 Table 9.5 Changes in Sources of Income between 1998 and 2000 83 Table 9.6 Proportion of Households Having a Given Number of Meals by Sex of Household Head and Status 84 Table 9.7 Distribution of Children by Anthropometric Z-Scores (All Sample Households) 85 Table 9.8 Distribution of Children by Anthropometric Z-Scores by Project Site (Height for Age Z-Scores) 86 Table 9.9 Distribution of Children by Anthropometric Z-Scores by Project Site (Weight for Age Z-Scores) 87 Table 9.10 Distribution of Children by Anthropometric Z-Scores by Project Site (Weight for Height Z-Scores) 88 Table 9.12 Distribution of Children by Anthropometric Z-Scores from Beneficiary Households covered in the 1998 and 2000 89 Table 9.13 Nutrition Status of Under-five Children in Beneficiary and Non-Beneficiary in New (non-baseline) Project Sites 90 Table 9.14 Means of Livelihood of Beneficiaries by Season and by Household Head Sex 92 Table 9.15 Employment Alternatives to Beneficiaries by Sex of Respondent 93 Table 9.16 Beneficiary and Non-beneficiary Perceptions on problems with PW 94

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LIST OF FIGURES Figure 6.1 Percent of Beneficiaries Showing Preferred Mode of Payment by Month 52

LIST OF BOXES Box 7.1 Positive Sentiments on the Performance of Foremen and Kapitawos 67 Box 7.2 Negative Sentiments on the Performance of the Foremen and Kapitawos 67 Box 9.1 Some of the Sentiments on Impact of Participation in MASAF PWP

Projects 82

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors of this report would like to sincerely thank everyone that participated in this evaluation and made it a success. First and foremost, we are highly idebted to the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries that participated by answering questions in the questionnaire and taking part in the focus group discussions, for without these people, this report would not have been a reality. To them, therefore, we say a big thank you. Another group of people that made the evaluation a success are the Research Assistants and their Supervisors. The team of supervisors comprised Innocent Ngwira, James Mwera and Ken Shawa. The team of Research Assistants comprised Vincent Gondwe, Ken Ndhlovu, Yotham Chawinga, Bessie Chirwa, Alice Dokowe, Lilian Chigona, Sheila Mahata, Patrick Msukwa, Alick Bwanali, Lumbani Nkhoma, Titus Nyirenda, Nzifeyi Nyekanyeka, Mary Funsani, Irenga Chalanda and Francis Saka. To all these fine young men and women we say thank you for their dedication to duty. The research teams were complemented by the services of some very careful drivers Mr. Mattaka, Mr. Saulos and Mr. Mdebwere. To them too we express our heartfelt gratitude. We also express our gratitude and vote of heartfelt appreciation to the staff of the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) at the Management Unit and the MASAF Zone Offices; and members of the District Teams in the districts that we visited. Last but not least, the authors would like to single out, acknowledge and applaud two individuals from Wadonda Consult for their significant contribution to the exercise. The two are Dr. Khwima Nthara and Ms. Mphatso Nyekanyeka.

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ABBREVIATIONS ADC Area Development Committee ADMARC Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation AEC Area Executive Committee DDC District Development Committee DEC District Executive Committee DRIMP District Road Improvement Programme DSS District Executive Committee Sub-Set EPA Extension Planning Area GTZ German Technical Corporation IEC Information, Education and Communication MASAF Malawi Social Action Fund MU Management Unit NGO Non-Governmental Organisation PMU Poverty Monitoring Unit VAM Vulnerability Assessment Mapping VDC Village Development Committee WVM World Vision Malawi

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction and Background Public Works Programs (PWP) as safety nets to vulnerable groups in society date back to the eighteenth century and have been implemented in both developed and developing countries to fulfil the dual development strategy of poverty alleviation and rural development. PWPs are popular in South Asia, but are becoming increasingly important in other developing countries. Within the SADC region, some of the countries that have implemented PWP include Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana and Malawi. The motives and design of public works programs vary across countries, but generally serve to provide relief to vulnerable groups in times of famine, deprivation and poverty in exchange for labour spent on creating infrastructure in the community. Many PWPs that focus on poverty alleviation use a wage rate that is less than the minimum wage as the self-targeting criteria. Institutionally, it is argued that proper decentralisation of the design and management of local infrastructure has far-reaching implications for the effectiveness of public works, particularly where projects are initiated at local village meetings. There is overwhelming evidence in the literature on the positive employment and income effects for the participants in developing countries. In Malawi, the national program of PWP has been implemented since 1995 first on a pilot basis and subsequently a substantive program started in 1996 under MASAF I financed by a loan from the World Bank. As at end of June the PWP under MASAF I has concentrated on construction of roads, although there is a gradual shift towards environmental related projects. Of 392 projects 86.2 percent (338) were on road construction, 9.7 percent (38) were afforestation, 2.8 percent (11) were on dam or water tank construction and 1.3 percent (5) were on river bank rehabilitation. This study was commissioned to assess the impact of the MASAF Public Works Programme on the livelihoods of beneficiaries and on community or rural development. Specifically, the study evaluated the criteria for selecting project workers, motives for participation, the levels and forms of remuneration, the institutional linkages, the work roles and ownership of assets and the socio-economic impact of the programme. The perceptions of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were central in the evaluation of various aspects of the programme. Methodology of the Study The study uses data collected from 16 project sites from 14 districts, eight of the project sites were covered in the baseline study. The eight projects in the baseline survey were Thabwa-Robeni road in Mulanje district, Ndunde-Simithi road in Chiradzulu, and Katema-Chileka in Mangochi, Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off road in Lilongwe, Ndunje-Bimphi road in Dowa, Lunjika via Chasenje School-M1 road in Mzimba, Bwengu-Katope in Mzuzu, and Kande-Chesamu in Nkhata Bay. The eight additional projects under MASAF I included in this study are Livunzu-Mpangowalimba road in Chikwawa, Ndunde Earth Dam in Chiradzulu, Pholombe River Bank Rehabilitation in Phalombe, Thumba Dam in Lilongwe, Buzi Hill Afforestation in Ntchisi, Lozi-Mwalawatongole road in Nkhotakota, Mbiriwizi Dam in Rumphi and

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Mwenelondo-Lake road in Karonga. The beneficiary assessment survey was conducted during the months of July and August 2000, using a semi-structured questionnaire, focus group discussions with beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups, key informants interviews with traditional leaders, project committees, skilled workers, district institutions and MASAF. In each project site the target was a total of 120 respondents to the questionnaire comprising 75 percent of participants or beneficiaries and 25 percent of non-participants or non-beneficiaries. The target number of respondents for the study was therefore 1,820 beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in MASAF-funded PWP projects. The actual sample covered in this study is 1,991 respondents of which 69.9 percent were beneficiaries and 30.1 percent were non-beneficiaries, and in each site two focus group discussions were conducted for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Most of the projects covered in this study were completed and the time gap between the survey period and completion date is substantial in some projects such that some intervening factors undoubtedly affect the impact analyses for the MASAF-funded Public Works Programme. The interpretation of results on the socio-economic characteristics and impact of the MASAF PWP should take into consideration the time factor. MAIN FINDINGS Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents The socio-economic characteristics of respondents in the sixteen project sites shows that the incidence of poverty is high, as is the case in many parts of Malawi. Although, the MASAF PWP mostly targeted vulnerable groups in the projects sites, among the non-beneficiaries there are respondents with similar or worse socio-economic characteristics than those of some beneficiaries. For instance, given that MASAF singles out female-headed households as one of the vulnerable groups, some non-beneficiaries that qualify with similar socio-economic characteristics as beneficiaries did not benefit from the safety net. The results are supported by the following observations: • The average number of years of schooling among respondents is 4 years, with 27.1

percent of beneficiaries and 22.0 percent of non-beneficiaries having primary education up to Standard 4. The proportion of respondents with secondary school education is 6.6 percent among beneficiaries and 10.3 percent among non-beneficiaries.

• Farming is the main occupation of respondents as reported by 81.4 percent and 75.5

percent of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, respectively. Engaging in small business activities is the second important occupation, represented by 8.4 percent of beneficiaries and 15.1 percent of non-beneficiaries.

• The sample of respondents mainly live in male-headed households. Overall, 82

percent of the respondents belong to male-headed households compared to 18 percent that belong to female-headed household. Among beneficiaries, 18.2 percent belong to female-headed households compared with 16.1 among non-beneficiaries.

• Housing conditions among respondents in the sample are generally poor for both

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beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, although such conditions are appear to be worse for beneficiaries.

• The main assets that respondents possess are a radio and a bicycle and more non-

beneficiaries own both assets than beneficiaries while more respondents belonging to male-headed households compared with female-headed households possess assets. The type of livestock owned by respondents is chicken with no significant differences with respect to head of household and whether beneficiary or non-beneficiary.

• Crop sales is the main source of income for many respondents, 71.1 percent among

beneficiaries and 66.9 percent among non-beneficiaries and 71.7 percent among male-headed households and 61.2 percent among female-headed households. More respondents from female-headed households (18.1 percent) than male-headed households (9.9 percent) consider small business as their main source of income.

• With respect to food security, most respondents own land but there are variations in

the land sizes among male-headed and female-headed households and among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Larger land sizes of more than 1.5 hectares are owned by male-headed households and non-beneficiaries. The mean land sizes for respondents from male-headed households is 1.56 hectares compared with 1.13 hectares among respondents from female-headed households, and 1.46 hectares among beneficiaries compared with 1.55 hectares among non-beneficiaries.

• Nearly, half of the respondents grow adequate food to last them to the next season,

but those that experience food deficits go without adequate food for an average of 4.7 months among beneficiaries and 4.6 months among non-beneficiaries, and these food deficit months generally occur between December and March.

Targeting and Selection of Project Sites and Workers The first stage in targeting involves the selection of EPAs by MASAF MU based VAM data. Due to the time lag between the collection of VAM data and implementation of projects, sometimes VAM data does not provide reliable information about vulnerability and district teams can provide justification for targeting different EPAs. The selection of the actual project site is the responsibility of the DSS. The selection of project type is also made at the district level, in principle with consultation with traditional leaders using Participatory Rural Appraisal methodologies. In practice, there were variations among the project sites, with some communities claiming that they were not consulted on the type of project while other reported that the projects were already requested by the communities even before being informed of MASAF funding. The project sites in the latter group had few implementation problems compared with the former. The project workers are recruited at the community level. The communities are responsible for identifying vulnerable households for targeting through project committee, traditional leaders or foremen. However, there was no prioritisation of vulnerable groups in the recruitment process and most communities used the ‘first come first served' basis, a process which alienated some qualified vulnerable households in favour of those who were relatively better off. The bases for selecting workers were not well known to those who participated, with 36.3 percent mentioning general poverty, 32.8 percent had no knowledge about the

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criteria used while 25.7 percent mentioned physical fitness, honesty, diligence and good behaviour. The low level of education in the communities, posed problems in the application of the targeting guidelines that were provided and lack of monitoring by the district teams in the selection process led to widespread inconsistencies in the selection process, and led to leakage of the benefits to the non-poor. There were no restrictions on the number of household members that could participate in the MASAF PWP, but generally 56.8 percent of beneficiaries were the only members of the household while 33.1 percent had two members of the household participating and 10.1 percent had more than three members of the household participating. Participation rates were a function of the wage rate, timely payment of wages to workers, nature of tasks and availability of alternative employment. Participation was high during periods of food shortages and low when household food security improves. Dropout rates were very low and men tended to dropout more than women. The main reason given for participation in the project was poverty among the beneficiaries while the non-beneficiaries the main reasons for not participating was that they were not selected and that they were not aware of the employment opportunity under MASAF-funded PWP activities. The communities held gender stereotyped views about what women can do which might have marginalised women participation in PWP projects, although in practice women were engaged in similar tasks as their male counterparts. Remuneration The mean number of hours in which workers complete the allocated task is 3.5 hours, implying that most workers were afforded extra time to use their labour in other activities. The gender differences in completion times for the tasks were not substantial, except in Lozi-Mwalawatonole and Thabwa-Robeni roads in which women took more than 4 hours to complete the task. Cash payment was the most preferred form of remuneration (82 percent of beneficiaries) compared to in-kind payment (18 percent) although the preference over the form of payment was seasonal. Cash was most preferred during the post-harvest period while in-kind payment was preferred during the food insecurity months (December - February) and in-kind payment was mainly preferred by female workers. This was evident from the questionnaire and focus group discussions. Most (42 percent) prefer to be engaged in MASAF funded PWP during the post-harvest period while 37 percent would prefer being engaged throughout the year. A higher proportion of female workers (44.9 percent) than male workers (35.5 percent) would prefer to work throughout the year. Most workers reported that the wage is not adequate. The average reservation wage (the wage below which they would offer labour services under normal (non-distress) circumstances) for beneficiaries is MK17.90 per task equivalent to the task in MASAF-funded public works projects, which is above the wage of MK15.80 which they were paid. The wage paid in MASAF-funded PWP projects is lower that the average local minimum wage of MK25.90 in similar activities and the preferred wage of MK31.10 among beneficiaries. In three cases, the local wage for comparable task is lower than what is paid in

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MASAF-funded PWP projects and in eight of the sixteen projects the reservation wage for beneficiaries is lower than the wage paid in MASAF-funded PWP projects. The reservation wage and the local wages are positively related to the wage beneficiaries would prefer to receive under MASAF-funded PWP projects. The preferred wage for beneficiaries ranges between MK17 and MK50 while non-beneficiaries would prefer wages between MK50 and MK150. Apart from concerns of low wages, there are substantial delays in wage payments. The proportion of workers that reported wage delays at project level ranges from 27 percent among workers at Ndunde-Simithi road to 75 percent in Mndunje-Bimphi road. The mean period of delays ranges from 10 days in the Thumba Dam project to 89 days in the Kande-Chesam road. Institutional Analysis The institutional linkages among the various institutions involved in the implementation of the MASAF PWP project cycle are in some cases weak. The collaborating institutions do not seem to have grasped the programme concept and operational framework of the MASAF Public Works Programme. The over-reliance of the project implementation on the district government departments and District Assemblies' physical and human resources, as the Malawi Government contribution, endangers the effective implementation of the projects. In most cases district government departments and District Assemblies face budgetary constraints and do not have adequate transport facilities for supervision and monitoring of project activities. In addition, the financial management capacity of the District Assemblies (formerly District Councils) is wanting and the inability of the district teams to manage the project resources endangered the efficiency in the management of projects. The linkage between the technical sector institutions at district level with the regional and central government is weakest. In some cases, technical sector supervisors are reluctant to commit themselves to MASAF-funded public works projects because they believe that the funded projects although within the scope of their work bring additional burden of the district resources. This is due partly to the ineffectiveness of the Memorandum of Understanding between MASAF and the sector Ministries, with the latter not taking into account MASAF funded activities in the financial provisions for the regional and district offices. The linkages between the DSS and the community in the implementation of projects are strong administratively and technically. In most project sites, beneficiaries and communities have commended the role played by the technical supervisors. Nonetheless, monitoring and supervision by other members of the DSS was grossly inadequate. At the community level, workers mostly interact with traditional leaders, the project committee, the technical supervisor and foremen, with different roles in the implementation of projects. The communities in most cases democratically elected the community-based project committee but fewer women were elected to the committees. The beneficiary perceptions on the performance of these institutions varied with respect to project sites. In most cases, the traditional leaders have provided a conducive environment for the implementation of the projects. The mixed feelings mostly relate to the performance of supervisors, the project committee and the gang leaders, particularly the poor public relations

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these institutional structures had with the communities. The knowledge of communities about alternative safety nets funded by other agencies is limited and revealed the inadequacy of information relating to available safety nets to help the poor in rural areas. The available alternative safety nets, only reported in two of the project sites, were better than MASAF PWP with respect to the ease of the tasks, the wage levels and the timeliness of wage payments and the duration over which the participants can derive income from the project. Comparatively, MASAF-funded PWP project activities were lighter, but the wage rates were lower, the duration of the employment shorter and had substantial delays in the payment of wages. Work Roles and Skills Requirements Most tasks are done by both men and women, although there is also a tendency to allocate lighter tasks to women and the weak. In general, most workers are happy with the work norms. There are no special skills requirements in carrying out the different work roles. On-job training meets the need to equip the workers with the required skills such that no one is excluded from participating in the PWP on grounds of not having the necessary skills. Ownership and Maintenance of Assets The study find that there is asymmetric information with regard to ownership and maintenance of assets. Most communities hold the view that MASAF-funded projects belong to MASAF, and hence must be maintained by MASAF itself, particularly in road projects. Furthermore, people expect to be paid for any maintenance work. But as far as MASAF is concerned, these assets belong to the communities themselves who are also supposed to maintain the localised assets (dams and forests) on a self-help basis. With regard to maintenance of roads, MASAF expects the district assemblies to be responsible, but this has proved difficult in practice. Impact of the Public Works Programme Overall, there is evidence that the MASAF-funded public works projects in the sixteen project sites in this evaluation have positive effects on the socio-economic status of households and the assets have enormous benefits to the community and rural economies. Nonetheless, in some of the indicators, the results may have been influenced by other intervening factors in a positive or negative way, and caution must be exercised in interpreting some impact results. That notwithstanding, the positive impact of the programme is reflected in the following indicators: • The public works activities created new wage employment for 39.9 percent

representing those that had not been employed 12 months prior to starting work in the MASAF-funded public works projects. Among male beneficiaries and female beneficiaries new wage employment was created for 29.1 percent and 55.5 percent, respectively.

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• Incomes from public works employment were mostly used for purchase basic necessities including food items (81.2 percent), household goods (58.8 percent), clothes, livestock and milling (29.9) and health expenses (22.5).

• Beneficiaries revealed that their participation in the MASAF-funded public works

projects significantly improved their socio-economic status as reported by 70.9 percent of beneficiaries - 77.4 percent among female beneficiaries and 65.1 percent among male beneficiaries. Beneficiaries best described the changes in the quality of life by the reporting that they ‘can afford basic necessities' (54.1 percent) or they are ‘better off now' (50.6 percent). These changes in the quality of life were supported by sentiments that emerged from focus group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

• The number of meals taken by the household per day during this evaluation is higher

compared with the findings in the baseline study. • The study finds evidence that the nutrition status of the children covered during the

present study was better than that for children covered during the baseline study. The more critical measures of nutrition (wasting and under-weightiness) showed fewer children were moderately and severely wasted and underweight. The gains in nutrition status, however, cannot be attributed to a single factor such as income from the safety net.

In the absence of MASAF-funded public works projects, most beneficiaries survive by income from crop sales, small businesses and ganyu in the neighbourhood. The relative importance of crop sales deminishes from the harvest season (81.8 percent) to the lean months (40.7 percent) while ganyu increases from the harvest season (34.5 percent) to the lean season (45.4 percent). Alternative employment opportunities could only have been available to 33.7 percent of the beneficiaries, but alternative employment could have been more available among male beneficiaries (21.2 percent) than female beneficiaries (12.5 percent). RECOMMENDATIONS The assessment of the operational framework and impact of the MASAF public works programme shows that the project is achieving its objective of assisting the vulnerable households and beneficiaries do associate changes in their socio-economic status to their participation in the MASAF public works programme. The sentiments from the beneficiaries and the wider community in the project sites reflect the importance of the MASAF PWP in reducing the severity of poverty and in community development. Nonetheless, some areas of improvement can be recommended: Targeting and Selection of Projects • There is need to develop and use more general indicators of poverty in identifying the

most poverty-stricken Extension Planning Areas (EPAs) in the districts. However, special recognition should be given to EPAs besieged by natural disasters as part of

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relief activities. District Assemblies using the national poverty indicators should be responsible for ranking EPAs by incidence of poverty in their districts.

• The selection of projects, once the poverty-stricken EPAs have been identified, should

be through the District Assembly structures. If the poverty-stricken EPAs do not have projects on the District Assembly approved list that qualify for funding under the MASAF PWP, the request for such projects from the community should be made through the District Assembly via the Area Development Committee and the Village Development Committee. This will ensure that adequate consultation between communities and their traditional leaders. The DEC or DSS should be involved in the identification of project sites and types only in emergency relief situations.

• The District Assembly should be assuming full ownership of the project activities

under MASAF funding. The IEC messages to the District Assembly members and technical supervisors and politicians should emphasise the fact that the MASAF Public Works Programme just provides funding to the District Assembly to implement public works projects initiated by the communities through the VDC and ADC.

• Recruitment of workers in public works projects should be done at community level

as is the case, but training provided to the foremen, the project committee and traditional leaders on the methods and guidelines for the identification of vulnerable households should be strengthened. In addition, given the low level of education in the target communities, members of the district team should be monitoring the recruitment of workers to ensure that the guidelines for selecting vulnerable households and workers are consistently followed by the community-based committees.

Remuneration • Cash as a preferred mode of payment among the beneficiaries should be maintained

as a mode of payment in MASAF-funded public works projects. • The Government minimum wage should be maintained as a guide for setting the wage

rate for the tasks only where it reflects the existing economic conditions in Malawi. In circumstances in which the official minimum wage remains constant and unrealistic, MASAF should be flexible in adjusting the wage rate for the safety net. The upward adjustment of the current wage for MASAF-funded public works projects should take into consideration the following alternatives:

o The increases in the general wage levels in the public sector, particularly the

category of unskilled employees. For instance, MASAF should increase the wage by the rate of increase in public sector wages for unskilled employees.

o The average reservation wage and the existing local minimum wages for the

rural areas from special sample surveys on rural labour market that MASAF should commission before the implementation of the projects. For example, based on this evaluation a wage rate of at least MK20 per task, which falls between the average reservation wage of MK17.90 and the average local minimum wage of MK25.90, is recommended.

xvii

• Although, a substantial proportion of beneficiaries would prefer to be engaged in

MASAF-funded public work projects, the implementation of projects should take into account the fact that in the rainy season, the poor need the time to work on their small gardens to produce whatever they can manage for subsistence.

Institutional Linkages • The capacity of collaborating institutions at the district and regional levels should be

strengthened, particularly in project and financial management. • The District Assemblies should ensure that they have adequate transport facilities for

the effective implementation, supervision and monitoring of development projects in the district.

• The collaboration of MASAF MU and the Ministries involved in the implementation

of the MASAF-funded public works projects should be strengthened. The Memorandum of Understanding with various Ministries should include the following:

o Ministries commitment of financial resources and transport facilities to the

regional and district offices. o Monthly reports on the projects from the technical supervisors should be sent

to the regional offices. o The Regional Officers for Ministries involved in the projects together with the

Zone Managers should hold quarterly meetings, to review project activities in the region based on the district reports from the technical supervisors. Quarterly regional reports based on the quarterly meetings should be submitted to Ministry Headquarters and MASAF MU.

o MASAF MU should have biannual review meetings with relevant Ministries based on quarterly reports compiled by the Regional Offices.

• The District Assemblies should improve the financial management of resources

relating to project funds, by ensuring that funds are used properly with adequate documentation to support expenditures.

• MASAF MU should continue the tranche system of disbursement of project funds as

one way of monitoring project expenditures. Work Roles and Skills Requirements • The District Assemblies and MASAF MU should develop IEC massages that promote

gender equality in the type of tasks and educate communities that women can perform same tasks as men in public works projects, including during the worker recruitment period.

xviii

Ownership of Assets and Maintenance There is a clear need for an IEC campaign on the issue of ownership and maintenance of assets created in MASAF-funded public works projects. In particular,

• Projects whose benefits are localised, the community should own the assets and the District Assembly should hand over the assets to the communities for maintain and management of the facilities. Such projects should be implemented only if the community agrees to maintain such assets.

• Projects whose benefits are not localised, such as roads, the District Assembly should

own the assets and should be responsible for maintenance of the assets preferably using the same public works concept.

Monitoring and Evaluation • Monitoring and evaluation should include monitoring of indicators of the socio-

economic impacts of the projects by administering a small questionnaire to a panel of selected beneficiaries before their first wage payments and thereafter on quarterly interval.

• MASAF MU should be evaluating the impact of MASAF Public Works Programme

on the socio-economic status of beneficiaries before or immediately after project completion in order to capture fully the effect of the interventions.

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1.1 Introduction Public works programmes (PWPs) have been important interventions in rural development in both developed and developing countries, in light of the failure of top-down development strategies and market reforms in redistributing growth and development. The motivation for such interventions centres on the provision of a safety net to vulnerable groups or the poor while at the same time embarking on rural development based on labour-resource in the rural areas. Subbarao (1997) argues that PWPs as safety nets, confer transfer and/or stabilisation of benefits to the poor, and using the poors’ labour to build infrastructure for development. The use of PWPs to foster rural development and as a poverty-alleviation strategy is evident in most developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and have been used as far back as the eighteenth century. (Ravallion, 1991b; World Bank, 1990). However, it is mainly during the 1960s and early 1970s that they started featuring as potentially powerful instruments, mostly in South Asia, that can be used to tackle mass unemployment and poverty and capital formation. On the sub-Saharan scene it was mainly after the economic crises and downturns during the 1980s, notwithstanding a considerable long period of sector reforms, that governments began to implement public works programmes to redress structural unemployment and poverty. In southern Africa public works initiatives have been implemented in Zimbabwe since the late 1980s, South Africa since early 1990s and mainly on water projects, and Botswana since 1992 and Malawi in 1995. Botswana has one of the most extensive public works programme operated at all times of the year, in response to protracted rural unemployment and structural poverty (Teklu and Asefa, 1997). The scale of the programme is drought-responsive, expanded when drought strikes and relaxed during years of moderate harvest collected by the rural poor. The public works programme in Botswana is presently used as a principal instrument to addressing the country’s structural poverty in the rural areas. In Malawi, Government attempts at a national scale public works programme first came into reality in July 1995 on a pilot basis, and later in July 1996 as a national intervention programme under the name Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF). MASAF was established as one of the poverty alleviation instruments designed to address community social needs within the context of a wider safety net programme including the agricultural ‘starter pack’ and food for work programmes. The state of deprivation in the country is evident. For instance, at the national scale, whereas population grew at an average rate of about 3.2 percent between 1988 and 1998 per capita income increased sluggishly at 0.8 percent. More specifically, food production has been on the decline since the mid 1970s, thus registering disappointing annual averages rates of 1.8, 1.2 and 1.1 percent during the periods, respectively, 1975-1984, 1985-1989 and 1990-1998 (World Bank, 1999). These statistics reveal significant and widening gaps between livelihoods and food requirements given the rapid population growth. Over the period 1990-1997 the World Bank (1999) reports (on the basis of the Malawi Social Indicators Survey (1995)) that 30 percent of under five children in Malawi were (moderate to severe) underweight, 7 percent were wasting and 48 percent were stunting. The MASAF Baseline Study conducted in 1998 found

2

underweight among 30.9 percent of the children, 4.4 percent (a significant difference) were wasting while 53.1 percent of the children covered in the study were stunting (Zgovu and Mvula, 1998). On the average nutrition conditions are worsening, and this is in line with poor growth performance in per capita incomes and food production. Conditions like the above, among others, do justify safety net interventions. The World Bank largely finances MASAF through credit made to the Malawi Government. The first phase of MASAF (MASAF I) that commenced in 1995 was financed through a government credit of US$ 56 million from the World Bank and a further credit of US$ 66 million in 1996 was obtained for the implementation of the second phase of MASAF (MASAF II). MASAF activities are today central to the government’s approaches to directly addressing three problems, namely, growing unemployment, declining income per capita, and under-investment in basic economic infrastructure. MASAF has three main operational sub-components. The first component is the Community Sub-Project (CSP) whose focus is direct financing of basic social infrastructure through participatory community development approaches. The activities under CSP include rehabilitation, extension and construction of social and economic infrastructure such as schools, health centres, markets, and bridges. The second component is the Public Works Programme (PWP), which is entirely a safety net or stabilisation scheme through which income are transferred to vulnerable households and individuals on the condition that they provide labour on economic and environmental infrastructure. The third is the Sponsored Sub Project (SSP) that targets disadvantaged and vulnerable groups through the sponsoring agencies already working with these groups. 1.2 The MASAF Public Works Programme The MASAF public works programme is a safety net in which MASAF funds labour-intensive public works to create employment as a cash transfer strategy. The activities under the PWP component include construction, rehabilitation and construction of economic infrastructure such as access roads, rainwater harvesting structures, afforestation and environmental assets. The public works programme not only provides a direct safety net in form of employment and cash income, it also enables communities invest in the creation and strengthening of basic economic infrastructure. The MASAF PWP targets the Extension Planning Areas (EPAs) that are poor and in food deficient based on the Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM). The EPAs for targeting are selected by MASAF MU. The selection of households and individuals to participate in the MASAF PWP entirely rests in the hands of the community. The project committee at community level identifies the vulnerable households and assist in the recruitment and management of workers. Ideally, at individual level, the MASAF PWP is self-targeting through the use of the minimum wage rate of MK15.80 per task. The MASAF PWP is implemented through the existing government administrative, technical and financial management structures at district level. These collaborating government institutions include District Assembly (as overseer of the programme and financial manager at district level) and line ministries including Ministry of Works and Roads, Ministry Water and Irrigation Development (for technical expertise) at both policy and implementation levels. The MASAF PWP activities have mainly concentrated on the rehabilitation and construction of rural access roads as is evident in Table 1. Out of 392 public works project, 86.2 percent are road rehabilitation and construction, 9.7 percent are afforestation projects, 2.8 percent are dams or water tanks and 1.3 percent are river bank rehabilitation.

3

Table 1.1 Number of PWP Projects under MASAF I by District and Type of Activity

Zone and District Roads Dams or (Tanks) Afforestation River Bank Rehabilitation

Mzuzu Zone Karonga Chitipa Rumphi Mzuzu Mzimba Nkhata Bay Likoma Total

15 10 12 11 11 14

2 75

- - 1 3 2 - - 6

- 1 6 1 1 - - 9

- - - - - - - -

Lilongwe Zone Kasungu Ntchisi Dowa Lilongwe Mchinji Salima Dedza Nkhotakota Total

12 12 11 16 10 12 10 12 95

- - - 1 - - 1 - 2

- 4 - 2 - - - - 6

- - - 1 - - - - 1

Liwonde Zone Mangochi Machinga Zomba Chiradzulu Phalombe Balaka Ntcheu Total

8

13 18 15 12

6 16 88

- -

(1) 1 - - - 2

5 1 1 2 4 1 -

14

- - - - 4 - - 4

Blantyre Zone Blantyre Thyolo Chikwawa Mwanza Nsanje Mulanje Total Grand Total

15

8 11 20 13 13 80

338

- - -

(1) - - 1

11

- - - 4 1 4 9

38

- - - - - - - 5

Notes: Figures are as of June 2000 Source: Direct Information from MASAF MU The second beneficiary evaluation of MASAF PWP in the 1998 revealed that although project sites were chosen on the basis of observed food insecurity situation, there was some evidence the site identification procedures were not followed at the district level (Zgovu, Mvula, Kunkwezu and Potani, 1998 (thereinafter ZMKP (1998))).1 The MASAF PWP was initially set at the daily rural minimum wage of MK7.50 per task and in 1995 the wage per task was increased to MK10.50, which was above the daily rural minimum wage. In 1999,

1 For instance, not all District Teams were conversant with the methodology for targeting vulnerable households at community level.

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the wage was set at MK15.80 per task and the daily minimum wage was MK15.90. These wages were believed to be slightly below the prevailing rural market wage rate and therefore would in principle self-target those who could not find alternative employment in the local (rural) labour markets at the market wage rate. In practice self-targeting was achieved in almost all projects and because of the drought during the 1997/98 growing season (and the year of the study) most households even those who under normal circumstances would not enlist themselves sought the safety net wage (ZMKP, 1998). With large household sizes against a background of escalating living costs, however, concerns that the wage rate was too low even for a rural wage rate were not uncommon. On the preference of form of wage payment the findings from the evaluation of MASAF PWP in 1998 showed that some beneficiaries had preference for food for work, and others preferred a rotation of cash wage and food wage.2 In 1998, Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) conducted a baseline study covering newly registered beneficiaries as a benchmark for beneficiary impact assessment (Zgovu and Mvula, 1998). The baseline study addressed issues including the socio-economic and nutrition status of both newly recruited beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in some randomly selected projects. Since the baseline was conducted, new projects have been launched, but the impact of the programme on the beneficiaries, communities and local economies had not been evaluated. This study reports the findings from a beneficiary assessment survey on the impact of the PWP component on communities based on a sample of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries from project sites covered in the baseline survey and those in new project sites. 1.3 Structure of the Report This report is organised into two parts with ten chapters. The first part presents the background to the MASAF public works programme, the theoretical justification of public works programme and their applicability in developing countries and the terms of reference and the methodology used in the study. The second part presents the findings of the study. The next chapter presents a literature review of the concept of the public works programmes. Chapter 3 outlines the terms of reference for the study and the methodology used in the assessment. Chapter 4 reports distribution of the sample and the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. Chapter 5 focuses on the analysis of the criteria for selection of projects and workers. Chapter 6 discusses the levels and forms of remuneration in MASAF funded public works programmes and wages that obtain in non-MASAF funded employment opportunities. Chapter 7 evaluates the institutional framework and linkages for the implementation of MASAF PWP projects and compares the MASAF PWP with other safety net programmes from the perspective of participants. Chapter 8 analyses work roles and the maintenance arrangements for the assets generated from MASAF PWP programmes. The evaluation of the socio-economic impact of the MASAF public works programme activities and beneficiary perceptions on MASAF PWP is reported in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 provides conclusions and recommendations.

2 These choices were reported to have been influenced by the then prevailing food scarcity on the local markets mainly during the lean months between November and March (ZMKP, 1998).

5

CHAPTER 2

PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES: LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Introduction The theoretical and empirical literature on public works programmes is vast and raises issues that relate to targeting, remuneration, institutional and administrative arrangements, appropriate technology, determinants of participation, and their impact on employment and poverty.3 The review of these issues and experiences of public works programmes in other countries, particularly in developing and African countries should help us in understanding aspects that are relevant to the programme in Malawi and the approach that can be adopted in the beneficiary assessment. The next section provides a background to public works programmes as an instrument of development and reviews the nature of projects, skill requirements and aspect of targeting. Section 2.3 reviews the motives for the community’s participation in public works programmes. Section 2.4 considers the determination of wages in the public works programmes and their effectiveness in reaching the target households. Section 2.5 focuses on the organisational and institutional structure for the management and implementation of public works programmes while Section 2.6 reviews the actual and potential impact of public works programmes. 2.2 The Nature of Projects, Skill Requirements and Targeting Public works programmes have been implemented in several countries with different motives and different design features. For instance, in the eighteenth century, in times of deprivation and poverty, households were provided with relief support on the condition that they provided labour. During the Great Depression of the 1920s-1930s public works programmes were also undertaken as a way to contain high levels of unemployment (Ravallion, 1991b; World Bank, 1990). In South Asia, public works programmes have been used as a means to containing famines in particular and poverty in general since the late nineteenth century. The region had one of the most-well known public works programme in the twentieth century, namely, the ‘Employment Guarantee Scheme’ (EGS) implemented in the Indian State of Maharashtra in the 1970s (Ravallion, 1991b). The success of EGS has provided the rationale for the current public works programmes in developing countries, with variations in design features to suit local conditions. Similarly, in sub-Saharan Africa, the public works programmes have aimed at providing relief (in cash wage or in-kind) to targeted disadvantaged groups of individual households in exchange for labour spent on creating and/or rehabilitating infrastructure within their locality. Public works programmes mainly focus on labour-intensive infrastructure development activities that play a vital role in the development process of a country such as transport and transport networks, water supply, soil conservation and environment. Gaude and Watzlawick (1992) note that infrastructure is one of the major areas of public sector investment in developing countries, with construction, rehabilitation and maintenance works accounting for 3 For example see among others Subbarao (1997), Teklu and Asefa (1999), Datt and Ravallion (1994), Gaude and Watzlawick (1992), Guha (1981), Mellor (1982), Holt (1983), Hossain and Asaduzzaman (1983), Imschoot (1992), Edmonds and Veen (1992), Clay (1986) and Ravallion (1991a, 1991b).

6

a significant share of gross domestic fixed investment. The nature of these infrastructural investments enables governments to create employment for unskilled labour in rural areas, which hitherto have limited market-based employment opportunities. The infrastructure created can have a direct productive role such as drainage, irrigation and environmental conservation while other investments play an economic role such as market development, roads and other transport network developments. Other infrastructure assets created are socially desirable such as schools, health facilities and water supply. Public works intervention can be classified into four main categories according to the way they address the objectives of employment and income generation to the participating individuals and the creation of economic and social capital (Clay, 1986). Firstly, we have relief works, which are primarily rapid responses to food insecurity under extra-ordinary food and income distress circumstances (Tschirley et al., 1996; Holt, 1983). Temporary employment is offered on local infrastructure creation or rehabilitation, in return the means of survival are provided to the participating temporarily vulnerable households. Second, there are income augmenting programmes, often implemented in response to seasonal fluctuations in incomes which primarily serve as safety nets for those whose income fall below subsistence levels. The incomes earned from the projects are intended to stabilise the welfare of the poor. Third, we have long-term employment generation programmes, designed to cater for employment needs among the unemployed, particularly those caught up in structural unemployment trap where alternative livelihoods are unavailable. Finally, we have low cost infrastructure programmes, which emphasise the creation of infrastructure rather than income augmentation. The targeting of public works programmes depend on the type of intervention and the relative emphasis in the objectives of the intervention. However, apart from the need to develop infrastructure in disadvantaged areas, the public works programmes tend to focus on income generation through employment as a poverty reduction strategy. Programmes that are designed around poverty alleviation tend to target the poor in disadvantaged communities. In countries where poverty is wide spread, it becomes difficult to adopt a specific targeting criteria for public works employment due to imperfect information about the poor available to implementers of the programmes.4 Many have, however, argued that the use of the wage rate that is not greater than the minimum wage for public works projects act as a self-targeting device that eliminates those that are not poor in the community by targeting those with low reservation wage rates (Ravallion, 1991a). Subbarao (1997) notes that while a low wage rate is likely to keep those that are not poor out of the programme, it may result in lower transfer earnings per (poor) participant. In countries with high inflation in which minimum wages are rarely adjusted, the use of minimum wages many not be socially acceptable and may lead to exploitation of the poor by the state.

4 The definition of the poor is a problem conceptually and in practice, and most countries rely on the World Bank per capita calorie consumption as a measure of poverty.

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2.3 Determinants of Participation in Public Works Programmes The decision whether to participate or not in public works programmes is modelled within the household or individual time allocation model based on the relative income that could be earned in a particular activity. The time allocation model postulate that an individual will allocate available time across several activities (wage labour, own farm work, other self-employed work, leisure, domestic work, public works and unemployment) to maximise utility which is a function of income and individual or household characteristics (Datt and Ravallion, 1994). Teklu and Asafe (1997) model the household or individual decision to work in the public works programme as a choice process that involves comparing income with the public works employment and without the public works employment. The individual decides to work on a public works project as long as the expected net income from the public works exceeds alternative income from other activities. Empirical works on the determinants of participation in public works projects in Botswana and Kenya indicate that the likelihood of participation increases with the number of adult members in the household and the age of the participant. However, participation decreases with wealth (livestock ownership), income transfers such as remittances and gifts, level of education, weakness of the participants and in villages with higher wages for unskilled labour (Teklu and Asefa, 1997). Their analysis also shows that the determinants of participation are gender-specific. For instance, females with more children in the household were less likely to participate in public works than males while those with more adults in the household were more likely to participate than males. Datt and Ravallion (1994) find similar results in public works employment in rural India. 2.4 Determination of the Wage Rate and Forms of Payment The principal benefit received by a worker from the public works is income earned from the labour services rendered. The determination of the wage rate in public works programmes is critical both for targeting and the benefits that the poor generate from their participation, but may also have wider implications on the local economy (Subbarao, 1997; Ravallion, 1991a). Generally, there are several alternative ways for the determination of wage rates in public works programmes. First, the minimum wage for unskilled labour is mostly used as a maximum wage that can be paid to those who choose to participate in public works employment. Second, others such as Subbarao (1997) advocate a wage rate that is no more than the prevailing market wage rate for unskilled labour. The issue of whether the minimum wage is higher or lower than the ruling wage rate remains an empirical question. Third, Basu (1987) advocates a wage rate that is consistent with the available budget, such that all those who are willing can be employed at that ‘budget’ wage rate. Fourth, the wage rate can be set at a higher level, which is considered socially acceptable, although this requires a very generous budget and generate less employment (Ravallion, 1991a). In any case, it is important to strike a balance between the objectives of self-targeting and ensuring that workers receive a meaningful transfer. Too low a wage keeps the overall participation rate low while at the same time ensuring a disproportionate number of poor workers than would be observed if the wage rate were higher. The foregoing naturally also begs the question of the level of the public works employment wage that confers economic empowerment to the poor and also minimises or avoids disrupting the local labour markets. The empirical evidence on the levels of wages in public works programmes varies across countries. Subbarao (1997) cites ten public works programmes in which four paid the

8

minimum wage, two having the minimum wage higher than the market wage, two paid less than the minimum wage (one with minimum wage greater than market wage), two paid less than the ruling market wage and one paid more than the ruling market wage. Miller (1992) reports similar variations in eleven countries. For example, in Uganda the public works wage rate was higher than the minimum wage which in turn was higher than the ruling wage rate while in Burkina Faso the public works wage rate was 29 percent of the minimum wage but 86 percent of the ruling market wage. The other design feature of public works employment programmes relates to the form and method of wage payment. Three main forms of payment are commonly used in public works: payment in cash wages, payment in-kind wage and a combination of cash and in-kind wages. Miller (1992) notes that cash payments allow for greater multiplier effects on local employment, particularly in agriculture. Moreover, cash payment gives exclusive freedom to the wage earner on the use of the income. Payments in kind are usually in form of food for work. Arguments in favour of payment in-kind revolve around their convenience of affording beneficiaries (most whom are chronical food deficit producers) rapid access to food and nutrition in times of dire food needs (Clay, 1986). An empirical case in point is the experience in Ethiopia where food rations proved an efficient intervention instrument during the famine (Holt, 1983). Dandekar and Sathe (1980) found that the food element of the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) was the most significant attraction. In terms of gender, Subbarao (1997) notes that wages in-kind or piece-wage payments may attract more women than men to work sites. Even critical in the preference of food payments to cash payments is the imminent access to nutritional gains among low income beneficiary groups (Mellor, 1980; Clay, 1986). Of course, nutrition studies have shown food availability in itself does not guarantee sustainable nutrition status (Mvula, 1991). The disadvantages of payment in-kind relate to the operational and transactional constraints from the point of view of logistical demands, and its direct and indirect effects on the local economy via the product and factor markets. For instance, in-kind wages require extensive outlays to defray costs of organisation for logistics, acquisition of foods (in most cases the foods are imported), transportation of bulky foods from the exporting or donor source into the recipient country and to the project site (mostly remotely located with limited accessibility during the rainy season), storage, fumigation and security considerations in-transit and at the project site, among other things.5 Sometimes, workers do not accept the type of food commodities being paid if the food does not conform to the dietary patterns (even as they change over time). For reason including inadequacies in storage and fumigation capacities and overstay Zgovu and Tsoka (1996) found discontent with the food commodities (weeviled and tasteless yellow-turned-brown maize rations) among beneficiary communities on the Chapananga Food for Work programme operated by the World Vision International/Malawi. Jackson (1982) demonstrate that when payments in-kind leak into the local produce market they pose disincentive effects to local agriculture to the extent that they tend to lower demand and therefore lower prices of locally grown (close) substitute crops. Such effects, however, are largely short term and 5 There are also transaction costs on the part of beneficiaries when the try to convert the commodity wage into cash income in order to acquire other commodities.

9

localised unless the programme is operated as long-term intervention and/or the programme’s size can readily have national impact (Clay, 1997). The methods of remuneration also vary, but three main bases for determining remuneration exist in the literature.6 First, remuneration is mainly based working hours per day - six or eight hours. Second, remuneration can be based daily tasks, in which the workers who complete the predetermined task early can leave but receive a daily wage. Third, workers can be paid according to piecework in which remuneration is based on output produced. However, whatever method of remuneration used what becomes critical in increasing participation and productivity is the promptness of payment (Miller, 1992). The untimely income disbursements potentially undermine the stabilisation property of the programme. Cases of delayed income disbursements (for one reason or another) to workers at some public works projects in Malawi are reported in ZMKM (1998). 2.5 Organisational Structure and Institutional Linkages The administrative structure and the number of institutions involved in the implementation of the public works programme vary from country to country. Gaude and Watzlawick (1992) argue that proper decentralisation of the design and management of local infrastructure works has far-reaching implications for the effectiveness of public works programmes. Imschoot (1992) observes that public works projects implemented in India, Madagascar and the Sudan are highly decentralised and encourage the active participation of the local authorities, technical departments and target groups, with the responsibility of the ministry (central government) being that of co-ordinating the activities of other technical services at decentralised levels. In Bangladesh, the management of the public works programme was mostly devolved around local government structures, responsible for identification of projects, preparation of proposals and project plans, and project approval and prioritisation, with projects mainly initiated at local village meetings (Hossain and Asaduzzaman, 1983). The role of collaborating institutions too is critical for the realisation of the intended safety net effect. Implementation of the public works programmes brings together a number of government (and sometimes non-government) agencies for their expertise in various aspects of the project activities. Inefficient and costly linkages adversely affect the share of programme resources that eventually filters down to workers (ZMKP, 1998). 2.6 Impact of PWP on Beneficiary Communities In line with the principal objectives of the public works programmes there are two direct effects on the participating households and communities. First, is the impact on incomes through the provision of employment to the poor households and individuals participating in the public works projects. It is for this reason that many countries have integrated public works programmes in their poverty alleviation strategies. The extent of the impact on poverty depends, however, on the wage rate, the timing of the programme (execution and disbursement of funds), the social benefit of the project and the costs associated with the forgone opportunities, inter alia, (Subbarao, 1997; Ravallion, 1991b; Datt and Ravallion, 1994).

6 See Miller (1992) for the relative merits of these alternative methods of remuneration.

10

The empirical evidence on the positive employment and net income effects on participants in public works programmes in developing countries is overwhelming. Datt and Ravallion (1994) find that the severity of poverty in the Employment Guarantee Scheme in India had fallen from 5 percent to 3.2 percent and that the foregone income resulting from workers participation in the programme were not substantial to outweigh the PWP earnings. Teklu and Asefa (1999), with respect to public works in Botswana and Kenya, also conclude that the access of the poor to public works employment appear to improve their net income and decrease poverty among the rural poor. Guha (1981) cites several examples of the positive impact of public works programmes on employment and incomes in South Asia. The second direct effect of public works programmes is the development of the physical infrastructure in rural areas by communities. These physical infrastructures include roads and transport networks, bridges, dam construction and irrigation facilities, soil conservation, water facilities and markets. The availability of these facilities uplifts the social status of the communities and promotes rural developments that is necessary for long-term and sustainable livelihoods. Nonetheless, the two direct impacts of the public works programmes generate indirect benefits and costs that have to be captured in the beneficiary assessment. Public works programmes can have multiplier employment effects in the local economy in the long run particularly where the incomes saved are invested in further productive activities (on farm or off farm activities). Some of the public works programmes may impart skills in form of management and organisation of work, skills in construction activities. The incomes derived from public works employment can also be used to buy food requirements thereby improving the nutritional status of children and adults in the participating households. Socially, the reduction in poverty improves social well being by limiting situations of helplessness and by stabilising the incomes of the poor. The development of infrastructure in rural areas may create conducive conditions for productive and economic activities. For example, the construction of a road that links the rural area to markets may encourage on farm production and agricultural based public works such as irrigation and soil conservation are likely to have positive impact on agricultural productivity.

11

CHAPTER 3

TERMS OF REFERENCE AND METHODOLOGY 3.1 Introduction This chapter outlines the terms of reference for the beneficiary assessment of the MASAF public works programme and the methodology used in the data collection and analysis. The next section begins with the outline of terms of reference for the study as provided by MASAF. Section 3.2 describes the methods of data collection, data collection instruments, and data analysis. Section 3.3 reports problems encountered in the study and limitations of the results. Section 3.4 provides a summary of the methodological framework. 3.2 Terms of Reference The main aim of the beneficiary assessment is to determine the impact of the public works programme on livelihoods and community/rural development. The specific Terms of Reference for the study are as follows: 3.2.1 Criteria for the Selection of Project Workers (B1) The beneficiary assessment will attempt to assess from the perspective of both workers and non-workers on:

a) The Criteria used for selecting workers b) Motive for their participation c) Motive for non participation for those selected d) Why some workers leave the project e) Perspective of those in the control groups in the baseline study f) Participation by gender of communities involved

3.2.2 Remuneration (B2) The beneficiary assessment will solicit workers views as to the level, form and use of remuneration gained through participation on the PWP.

a) What are workers getting paid? b) What is the workers' preference for type of remuneration (in cash, kind (for

example food), or a combination of cash and in kind) c) What is the workers' preference for type of remuneration by time of year (by rainy

season, post harvest, garden preparation time); and preference for type of work d) What is the desegregation of the information by sex and age of respondents e) What impact has working on the project made at household level f) To what use have the wages been put? g) What coping mechanisms will the household employ when the worker is no

longer deriving an income from the PWP? h) What other local employment alternatives exist and how accessible are they to the

needy households

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3.2.3 Institutional Linkages (B3) Given that the PWP is a targeted component, a critical role is played by a variety of institutions at national, regional and local level in the selection of the community, project and workers. The BA will evaluate the roles played by collaborating institutions and will also conduct a comparative analysis of other institutions involved in similar programmeming from the perspective of the workers:

a) How do workers perceive those representing other institutions with which they come into contact? (DSS members, Technical Assistants, contractors)

b) What are their views and perceptions on the way these institutions operate and the criteria they use, for example in the selection of a project and community area? (DSS, chiefs, MPs, extension workers and other facilitators)

c) Are workers aware of similar public works projects funded by other donors in their locality and region?

d) How would they compare the PWP to these projects? e) Consultant to come up with a comparative analysis of the existing safety nets

with particular, emphasis on public works. 3.2.4 Work Roles, Assets and their Maintenance (B4) The BA will assess how workers feel about the jobs they perform and whether they own the infrastructure created. The BA will also draw out gender aspects in the implementation of the PW programme:

a) Workers views of their working roles. Are some preferable to others, how are different jobs on the project allocated.

b) What are the constraints that prevent some members of the community from participating on the project?

c) What are communities' perceptions of their interaction with the implementers, contractors and supervisors?

d) What skills do workers need, what do they gain, how might they use them afterwards?

e) What impact will the asset built have on them (at individual, household and community level)?

f) Who will maintain the infrastructure once completed, if workers feel they might have a role, how would it be organised?

3.2.5 Socio-Economic Impact of the PWP (B5) The BA shall assess the socio-economic impact of the PWP on the beneficiary communities. This will draw mostly on the structure and findings of the Baseline Study done in 1998 and in addition to the information to be obtained from the field during the current study.

a) What are the views of the beneficiary and the non-beneficiary communities on the future of the MASAF PWP?

b) Utilisation of income by gender.

13

3.3 Methodology of the Study 3.3.1 Study Project Districts and Sampling of Interviewees Data was collected from 16 project sites from 14 districts. Eight of the project sites were covered in the baseline study. The eight projects in the baseline survey were Thabwa-Robeni road in Mulanje district, Ndunde-Simithi road in Chiradzulu, and Katema-Chileka in Mangochi, Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off road in Lilongwe, Ndunje-Bimphi road in Dowa Lunjika via Chasenje School-M1 road in Mzimba, Bwengu-Katope in Mzuzu, and Kande-Chesamu in Nkhata Bay. The eight additional projects under MASAF I included in this study are Livunzu-Mpangowalimba road in Chikwawa, Ndunde Earth Dam in Chiradzulu, Pholombe River Bank Rehabilitation in Phalombe, Thumba Dam in Lilongwe, Buzi Hill Afforestation in Ntchisi, Lozi-Mwalawatongole road in Nkhotakota, Mbiriwizi Dam in Rumphi and Mwenelondo-Lake road in Karonga. The selection of the additional study projects was purposive in order to include new areas of activities such as dams and afforestation or environmental projects. The beneficiary assessment survey was conducted during the months of July and August 2000. 3.3.2 Selection of Interviewees The study team solicited data from the same sample of households or individuals who were covered during the baseline study and new beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the additional project sites. This choice is necessary for impact assessment based on the ‘before and after’ situation analysis. Since non-beneficiary households and individuals were also interviewed during the baseline study they offer an additional benchmark for impact assessment based on ‘with and without’ situation analyses. Targeted programmes are likely to have externality effects of the project benefits. Spill-over effects cannot be entirely dismissed in so far as the beneficiaries dispose of their programme incomes within the local economies (thus boosting economic activity) and the created infrastructure tends to promote local economic activity (ZMKP, 1998). The method of selection of households and individuals from the project sites was as follows. First, for project sites in the baseline study, the enumeration teams identified beneficiaries that were captured in the baseline survey using names extracted from the baseline questionnaire responses. In situations where the required number of beneficiaries was not satisfied, the questionnaire was administered to replacement beneficiaries. The target number of non-beneficiaries was randomly selected from the non-participating households. Second, for new project sites (not covered in the baseline study) each project site was divided into two or three segments depending on the location or spread of the beneficiaries. Using the register of workers from the DSS, the required proportion of beneficiaries and non-participants was randomly selected for the administration of the questionnaire. In each project site the target was a total of 120 respondents to the questionnaire comprising 75 percent of participants or beneficiaries and 25 percent of non-participants or non-beneficiaries. The target number of respondents for the study was therefore 1,820 participants and non-participants in MASAF PWP projects. The actual sample covered in this study is 1,991 respondents of which 69.9 percent were beneficiaries and 30.1 percent were non-beneficiaries.

14

3.3.3 Data Collection Techniques and Instruments The study team used four main tools of data collection in addressing the terms of reference for the study. The first instrument was the open-end structured questionnaire administered to the sample beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the selected MASAF PWP project sites. The emphasis on the use of the structured questionnaire arises naturally to capture individual benefits and the relevance of individual characteristics in the analysis in determining participation in public works programmes. The questionnaire focused on both qualitative and quantitative responses on the design features of the projects, the impact on the economic and social status of the household and the nutritional status of children (conventionally approximated by anthropometric measurements of under-five children on issues of wasting, underweight and stunting). The second data collection instrument was a variant of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) through focus group discussions (FGDs) with the group of participants or beneficiaries on one hand and the group of non-participants or non-beneficiaries. FGDs were particularly useful in assessing the community’s perceptions on the selection of projects and the selection of those who participate in public works employment, the effectiveness of the various institutions that work with communities in the projects, and the socio-economic impact of the projects on the communities. The third data collection instrument was key informants’ semi-structured interviews at national, regional, district and community levels. The key informants included stakeholders, local contractors and supervisors, traditional leaders, project committee members, District Team officials, and MASAF officers at the Management Unit and Zone Offices. Key informant’s interviews enabled the study team to further identify institutional constraints and co-ordination problems, the degree and relative merits of involvement of various institutions, the adequacy of earnings and the overall impact of the PWP project activities. Finally, the study team reviewed available documents from MASAF particularly quarterly reports from MASAF MU and Zone Offices, the project implementation manual and other consultancy reports. The study team also accessed data from the baseline study that has mainly been used in this study to evaluate the impact of the projects on the livelihoods of the participants. 3.3.4 Data Processing and Analysis Techniques Data collected by means of a questionnaire were processed using primarily SPSS from which the study team derived basic descriptive statistics, frequencies and cross-tabulation. Data gathered through focus group discussions were compiled together, notes compared, and then interpreted and reported in table format or point form and graphical presentation. In the analysis of the impact of MASAF PWP on participants, the data of beneficiaries in the baseline study and the this study were matched as one way of determining changes that have taken place since 1998, when the baseline was conducted.

15

3.3 Research Problems and Limitations of the Study The data collection exercise was undoubtedly confronted with various kinds of problems and constraints. First, in some sites it was difficult to identify beneficiaries or participants in the MASAF PWP projects due to migration, deaths and targeting outside the project villages. For instance, in Nkhotakota, there was no project committee and local supervisors reported that some of the beneficiaries were tenants in villages far from the project villages and did not even associate the names. These problems meant that the target number of beneficiaries could not be achieved in some districts. Second, biases in the responses are possible. All but one project covered in the study were completed, and communities thought that the enumeration team was in the community to recruit workers. After explaining the purpose of the team, many were less interested in participating in focus group discussion and indeed in being interviewed. In some cases, the respondents could not critically examine the issues and responses. In some project sites covered in the baseline, for instance in Bwengu-Katope road, respondents had negative attitude towards the enumeration team arguing that they are wasting their time since they were already interviewed in 1998. Some respondents were hesitant to have their under-five children weighed or measured for anthropometry. One way of overcoming this problem in future is to conduct the beneficiary assessment before the projects are completed. Third, in baseline sites some of the non-beneficiaries that were captured in the baseline sites became beneficiaries overtime. This is likely to be the case because the baseline was conducted while the projects had just started and due to the fact that desertions and recruitment is quite high in these public works programmes. The focus in the identification of respondents that were covered in the baseline study was therefore on the beneficiaries in the baseline study. Fourth, at institutional level, some officers involved in the implementation of projects had either changed jobs and were not available at during the period of the fieldwork. This was particularly a problem with the District Assemblies in which most members of staff are new to the districts. The suspension of the financial autonomy by MASAF also created negative attitudes among members of the DSS, potentially biasing the results. The interpretation of the results must therefore take into account the aforementioned limitations. In addition, cautions should also be exercised in the interpretation of the results on the impact of the PWP programme on the economic and social well being of target households. Most projects evaluated in this study were completed long time ago, and in the interim period many changes in the economic environment have taken place. For instance, other policy interventions are likely to affect the socio-economic status of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries such as the agricultural ‘starter pack’, micro credit for small businesses, incomes from ganyu employment and income transfers. Similarly, the positive impact of the PWP projects may be undermined by the policy adjustments such as devaluation that contribute to inflation with consequent implications on the real value of earnings from public works. In some project sites, such as Buzi Hill Afforestation and Ndunde Earth Dam the projects ended abruptly and in some cases the bridges for roads are not yet constructed such as in Nkhata Bay. The communities in such cases could not appreciate the benefits of the projects.

16

Finally, the availability of other safety nets in areas close to the project sites was limited. This on one hand is positive in the sense that MASAF PWP target areas in which safety nets do not exist. On the other hand, with reference to the terms of reference, this has led the study team to generate less comparative data on alternative safety net programmes that the communities are aware of operating around their areas. Communities do not perceive programmes that are directly implemented by the government such as ‘starter pack’ as safety net programmes. 3.4 Summary The main objective of the beneficiary assessment study was to evaluate the impact of the MASAF public works programme and to solicit the perceptions of beneficiaries and other stakeholders on the implementation of the programme in selected project sites. Specifically, the assignment focused on targeting and selection of projects and workers, the level and forms of remuneration, the effectiveness of the institutional structure, the work roles and maintenance of assets and the socio-economic impact of the MASAF public works programme. In order to achieve these objectives, the methodological approach involved collection of data from the community and project sites based on questionnaire interviews and focus group discussions (using elements of Participatory Rural Appraisal), and interviews with key institutions and key informants. The survey covered sixteen project sites, eight of which were covered in the 1998 baseline survey commissioned by MASAF with the same beneficiaries identified in this study as much as possible. Surveys of this nature where matching of beneficiaries and in which projects were completed some years ago undoubtedly are confronted with problems of identification due to migration, deaths and changes in names. More importantly, the analysis of impact is made difficult in an economy where adverse economic conditions are likely to wipe out the individual benefits from public works, and in which the impact of other interventions become inseparable from the impact of public works. Nonetheless, with these limitations, the rest of the report presents the findings from the beneficiary. The next chapter presents the distribution of the sample respondents and their socio-economic characteristics.

17

CHAPTER 4

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

4.1 Introduction This chapter begins the presentation of the findings in the beneficiary assessment based on the data generated from the institutional and beneficiary surveys. The chapter concentrates on the distribution of the sample and the demographic, economic and the household characteristics of the communities covered in the study based on the methodology outlined in the previous chapter. The next section outlines the distribution of the sample of observation that is used for analysis in the study, paying particular attention on the extent of matching beneficiaries in the baseline study and this study. Section 4.3 presents the socio-economic characteristics of participants and non-participants in the MASAF public works projects and their household characteristics. Section 4.4 provides a summary. 4.2 Distribution of the Sample Following the methodology outlined in the previous chapter, the data for the findings in this study. Three approaches were used in the data collection exercise including the administration of the questionnaire to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, focus group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, and key informants interviews at institutional and community levels. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of questionnaire responses by project sites. The overall target of 120 respondents per project site was achieved in all the project sites, although the planned proportion of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries could not be achieved in most project sites. The only problem was to achieve the target proportions of beneficiary and non-beneficiaries in some of the project sites such as the Lozi-Mwalawatongole road, Buzi Hill Afforestation, Thabwa-Robeni and Ndunde Earth Dam in which the proportion of beneficiaries is less than 75 percent of the project site sample. The problem of identifying baseline respondents was particularly difficult in the case of non-beneficiaries, although others are captured as new beneficiaries in this study. In each project site we had two focus group discussions, one with a group of beneficiaries and the other separately with non-beneficiaries. Except in Lozi-Mwalawatongole, two beneficiary groups and one non-beneficiary group were interviewed, because in the former men and women could not freely discuss issues in one group. At community level in each project site three interviews were conducted with traditional leaders, the project committee or members and the kapitawos. At district level, interviews were conducted with the Chief Executive officers of District Assemblies, District Team or its members, the technical supervisors and MASAF district treasurers. The study team also interviewed the Director of the PWP Division and the Zone Managers and accounts assistants in the Zone Offices. The list of key informants is provided in Appendix A.

18

Table 4.1 Distribution of Questionnaire Responses by Status and Project Site (Number)

Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary Project Site Baseline New Total Baseline New Total Mwenelondo-Lake Road - 90 90 - 32 32 Mbiriwiza Dam - 90 90 - 30 30 Lunjika via Chasenga School-M1 Road * 71 24 95 5 26 31 Bwengu-Katope Road * 61 33 94 7 25 32 Kande-Mapale-Chesamu Road * 59 40 99 4 30 34 Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road - 49 49 - 72 72 Buzi Hill Afforestation - 86 86 - 36 36 Mndunje-Bimphi Road * 52 43 95 2 28 30 Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off Road * 55 36 91 0 32 32 Thumba Dam - 91 91 - 33 33 Livunzu-Mpangowalimba Road - 90 90 - 30 56 Thabwa-Robeni Road * 25 39 64 - 56 56 Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation - 90 90 - 30 30 Ndunde-Simithi Road * 40 50 90 - 30 30 Ndunde Earth Dam - 84 84 - 36 36 Katema-Chileka Road * 54 39 93 1 29 30

Notes: * Sites also covered in the baseline study. Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 (Field Notes). 4.3 Demographic, Economic and Household Characteristics 4.3.1 Sex and Age Distribution of the Respondents Table 4.2 shows the sex distribution of the respondents covered in the evaluation by participation status. Among the beneficiaries, 52.8 percent of the respondents were male and 47.2 percent were female. Since the sampling was random, the 47/53 split is an encouraging development since it shows that more women, who often are considered more vulnerable, are participating in the MASAF PWP. Among the non-beneficiaries, the ratio was 57.4 percent female and 42.6 percent male. Variations within project sites exist, with the Buzi Hills project afforestation in Ntchisi district having more (62.9 percent) female respondents while Kande-Chesamu road in Nkhata Bay district and Mndunje-Bimphi road in Dowa district registering the lowest women ratios of 11.2 percent and 11.8 percent, respectively. With respect to age, the women respondents among the beneficiaries had an average age of 38.3 years and the average age among the male beneficiaries was 38.7 years. Overall, most participants in the MASAF PWP in the sixteen projects visited were of middle age. Among the non-participants the average age among women was 34.6 years and among the men the average age was 36.5 years.

19

Table 4.2 Sex Distribution of Respondents by Beneficiary Status by Project Site

Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary Female Male Female Male

Project Site

N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent Mwenelondo - Lake Mbiriwizi Dam Lunjika - Chasenga - M1 Bwengu - Katope Kande - Chesamu Lozi - Mwalawatongole Buzi Hill Afforestation Mndunje - Bimphi Mbabzi - Nambuna TO Thumba Dam Livunzu - Mpangowalimba Thabwa - Robeni Phalombe River Bank Ndunde - Simithi Ndunde Dam Katema - Chileka Total

34 55 54 41 11

7 56 11 45 68 51 39 55 35 51 49

662

37.8 61.1 58.1 43.6 11.2 13.7 62.9 11.8 45.5 75.6 56.0 61.9 58.5 37.6 62.2 52.1

47.2

56 35 39 53 87 44 33 82 54 22 40 24 39 58 31 45

742

62.2 38.9 41.9 56.4 88.8 86.3 37.1 88.2 54.5 24.4 44.0 38.1 41.5 62.4 37.8 47.9

52.8

19 22 18 24 12 43 18 10 12 15 15 41 24 15 30 11

329

59.4 73.3 58.1 64.9 35.3 61.4 51.4 34.5 48.0 44.1 50.0 73.2 77.4 45.5 83.3 36.5

57.4

13 8

13 13 22 27 17 19 13 19 15 15

7 18

6 19

244

40.6 26.7 41.9 35.1 64.7 38.6 48.6 65.5 52.0 55.9 50.0 26.8 22.6 54.5 16.7 63.5

42.6

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 4.3.2 Education Attainment of the Respondents In terms of education (Table 4.3), a third (29.5 percent) of the respondents among the beneficiaries had had no formal education or had a mere adult literacy certificate. A further 27.1 percent of the respondents did between standard one and four. Another 36.8 percent did between standard five and eight. Only 6.6 percent of the beneficiaries had gone to secondary school or higher. As with sex distribution, there are wide variations between sites with the Lozi-Mwalawatongole site in Nkhotakota district registering the highest (58.3 percent) number of respondents without formal education and the Mwenelondo-Lake road site in Karonga, registering the highest (16.7 percent) of participants that had gone to secondary school and higher. Among the non-beneficiaries the proportions are slightly different with slightly more people having more years of schooling. Compared to the beneficiaries, there are more people (10.3 percent) with secondary or higher education than the 6.6 percent among the beneficiaries. Variations within sites are also evident, with the Lunjika-M1 site in Mzimba recording a larger proportion (25.8 percent) and the Mbabzi-Nambuna turn off road in Lilongwe in secondary or higher education. If one is to look at the attainment of education as a sign of vulnerability, then the programme was targeting the right persons since more beneficiaries had less or no formal education compared to the non-beneficiaries. This could also affect the performance of the programme since with the low education levels it may be hard for people to absorb the PWP concepts and guidelines.

20

Table 4.3 Education Attainment of Respondents by Status and Project Site

None or Adult Literacy Std 1 -4 Std 5- 8 Secondary and

Higher Project Site N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent BENEFICIARIES Mwenelondo - Lake Mbiriwizi Dam Lunjika - Chasenga - M1 Bwengu - Katope Kande - Chesamu Lozi - Mwalawatongole Buzi Hill Afforestation Mndunje - Bimphi Mbabzi - Nambuna TO Thumba Dam Livunzu - Mpangowalimba Thabwa - Robeni Phalombe River Bank Ndunde - Simithi Ndunde Dam Katema - Chileka Total

6

10 17 10 13 28 19 27 33 32 47 15 26 34 28 68

413

6.7

11.1 18.3 10.6 13.4 58.3 21.3 29.0 33.3 35.6 52.8 23.8 27.7 36.6 34.1 72.3

29.5

6

17 14 11 21 13 33 35 41 37 19 19 34 37 28 14

379

6.7

18.9 15.1 11.7 21.6 27.1 37.1 37.6 41.4 41.1 21.3 30.2 36.2 39.8 34.1 14.9

27.1

63 55 47 64 55

5 28 26 24 18 18 24 31 21 24 11

514

70.0 61.1 50.5 68.1 56.7 10.4 31.5 28.0 24.2 20.0 20.2 38.1 33.0 22.6 29.3 11.7

36.7

15

8 15

9 8 2 9 5 1 3 5 5 3 1 2 1

92

16.7

8.9 16.1

9.6 8.2 4.2

10.1 5.4 1.0 3.3 5.6 7.9 3.2 1.1 2.4 1.1

6.6

NON-BENEFICIARIES Mwenelondo - Lake Mbiriwizi Dam Lunjika - M1 Bwengu - Katope Kande - Chesamu Lozi - Mwalawatongole Buzi Hill Afforestation Mndunje - Bimphi Mbabzi - Nambuna TO Thumba Dam Livunzu - Mpangowalimba Thabwa - Robeni Phalombe River Bank Ndunde - Simithi Ndunde Dam Katema - Chileka Total

4 6 4 1 5

38 11

9 10

8 11

8 5 5

10 15

150

12.9 20.0 12.9

2.7 14.7 54.3 31.4 31.0 40.0 23.5 36.7 14.3 16.1 15.2 27.8 50.0

26.2

4 7 4 3 3 8 9 6 4

11 11

5 17 15 11

8

126

12.9 23.3 12.9

8.1 8.8

11.4 25.7 20.7 16.0 32.4 36.7 30.4 16.1 45.5 30.6 26.7

22.0

17 13 15 26 23 18 13 12 11 13

5 23 20

9 14

5

237

54.8 43.3 48.4 70.3 67.6 25.7 37.1 41.4 44.0 38.2 16.7 41.1 64.5 27.3 38.9 16.7

41.4

6 4 8 7 3 6 2 2 0 2 3 8 1 4 1 2

59

19.4 13.3 25.8 18.9

8.8 8.6 5.7 6.9

0 5.9

10.0 14.3

3.2 12.1

2.8 6.7

10.3

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 4.3.3 Respondents' Occupational Status Table 4.4 shows the distribution of the occupations of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Most (81.4 percent) of the beneficiaries take farming as their main occupation. The next largest occupation is running small businesses (8.4 percent), followed by ganyu (4.7 percent) and then salaried work (2.2 percent). The proportion of those in salaried work shows that after MASAF PWP some people had opportunities to find jobs.

21

Table 4.4 Occupation of Respondents by Status and Project Site

Business Farming Ganyu Salaried Work Project Site N % N % N % N % BENEFICIARIES Mwenelondo - Lake Mbiriwizi Dam Lunjika - M1 Bwengu - Katope Kande - Chesamu Lozi - Mwalawatongole Buzi Hill Afforestation Mndunje - Bimphi Mbabzi - Nambuna TO Thumba Dam Livunzu - Mpangowalimba Thabwa - Robeni Phalombe River Bank Ndunde - Simithi Ndunde Dam Katema - Chileka Total

25 10

5 11

3 8

14 1 7 4 7 2 3 7 4 6

117

27.8 11.2

5.4 11.7

3.1 15.7 15.7

1.1 7.1 4.4 7.8 3.2 3.2 7.8 4.9 6.5

8.4

40 75 73 81 86 36 66 87 83 85 81 51 83 68 67 74

1136

44.4 84.3 78.5 86.2 88.7 70.6 74.2 93.5 83.8 94.4 90.0 81.0 89.2 75.6 82.7 79.6

81.4

7 1 4 1 2 2 2 4 7 1 - 6 5 8 3 9

65

7.7 1.1 4.3 1.1 2.1 3.9 2.2 4.4 7.0 1.1

- 9.6 5.4 8.9 3.7

12.9

4.7

1 1 8 1 2 2 2 1 2 - 1 1 - 3 5 -

30

1.1 1.1 8.6 1.1 2.1 3.9 2.2 1.1 2.0

- 1.1 1.6

- 3.3 6.2

-

2.2 NON-BENEFICIARIES Mwenelondo - Lake Mbiriwizi Dam Lunjika – Chasenga - M1 Bwengu - Katope Kande - Chesamu Lozi - Mwalawatongole Buzi Hill Afforestation Mndunje - Bimphi Mbabzi - Nambuna TO Thumba Dam Livunzu - Mpangowalimba Thabwa - Robeni Phalombe River Bank Ndunde - Simithi Ndunde Dam Katema - Chileka Total

12

4 7 7 7

15 3 1 1 3 2

12 2 3 4 3

86

38.7 13.3 22.6 18.9 20.6 21.4

8.6 3.4 4.0 8.8 6.7

21.4 6.5 9.1

11.1 10.3

15.1

15 21 20 29 21 47 30 27 22 31 28 38 26 24 28 24

431

48.4 70.0 64.5 78.4 61.8 67.1 85.7 93.1 88.0 91.2 93.3 67.9 83.9 72.7 77.8 82.8

75.5

- 3 - - - 1 1 - 2 - - 3 - 3 2 -

15

-

10 - - -

1.4 2.9

- 8.0

- -

5.4 -

9.1 5.6

-

2.7

- - 1 1 5 - 1 - - - - 1 1 1 - 2

13

- -

3.2 2.7

14.7 -

2.9 - - - -

1.8 3.2 3.0

- 6.9

2.3

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Among the non-beneficiaries farming is still the largest occupation. The proportion though is slightly lower (75.5 percent) than among the beneficiaries. The proportion reporting small businesses among the non-beneficiaries (15.1 percent) is higher than among the beneficiaries (8.4 percent). Fewer non-beneficiaries (2.7 percent) than beneficiaries (4.7 percent) mentioned ganyu on the farm as their main occupation. During the baseline study the situation was the same in that slightly more persons were engaged in farming in beneficiary households (35.8 percent) than in non-beneficiary households (34.0 percent) and slightly more members of non-beneficiary households (5.4 percent) were engaged in petty trading than those from beneficiary households (3.0 percent). There has been a slight improvement in the rates but they are still on the lower side. These

22

small rates indicate that most members from both beneficiary and non-beneficiary households have very small wealth portfolios and/or little or no access to credit to operate even small petty trading. In terms of wage earning opportunities, it was found that there was no difference between beneficiary households (2.2 percent) than those from non-beneficiary households (2.3 percent) in having such opportunities. 4.3.4 Marital Status of the Respondents Table 4.5 show the marital status of the beneficiaries and reveals that among the beneficiaries 77.1 percent of the respondents were married, 8.0 percent were widowed, 8.0 percent were divorced, 1.6 percent were separated and 5.3 percent were single. At project level, the proportions of those widowed and divorced are higher and those of married lower in the project sites in the southern region compared with project sites in other regions. Table 4.5 Marital Status of Beneficiary Respondents by Project Site

Married Widowed Divorced Separated Single Project Site N % N % N % N % N %

Mwenelondo - Lake Mbiriwizi Dam Lunjika - M1 Bwengu - Katope Kande - Chesamu Lozi - Mwalawatongole Buzi Hill Afforestation Mndunje - Bimphi Mbabzi - Nambuna TO Thumba Dam Livunzu - Mpangowalimba Thabwa - Robeni Phalombe River Bank Ndunde - Simithi Ndunde Dam Katema - Chileka Total

64 70 77 80 83 45 67 79 82 72 67 42 61 68 54 67

1080

71.1 77.8 82.8 85.1 84.7 88.2 75.3 84.9 83.7 82.2 74.2 66.7 64.9 74.7 65.9 71.3

77.1

4 8 7 6 2 1 7 7 8 7 8 6 9 9

10 13

112

4.4 8.9 7.5 6.4 2.0 2.0 7.9 7.5 8.2 7.8 8.9 9.5 9.6 9.9

12.2 13.8

8.0

7 2 5 5 2 4 8 3 8 6 7 8

15 11 14

7

112

7.8 2.2 5.4 5.3 2.0 7.8 9.0 3.2 8.2 6.7 7.8

12.7 16.0 12.1 17.1

7.4

8.0

1 6 - 1 1 - 4 - - 1 4 2 - 1 - 1

22

1.1 6.7

- 1.1 1.0

- 4.5

- -

1.1 4.4 3.2

- 1.1

- 1.1

1.6

14 4 4 2

10 1 3 4 - 2 4 5 9 2 4 6

74

15.6 4.4 4.3 2.1

10.2 2.0 3.4 4.3

- 2.2 4.4 7.9 9.6 2.2 4.9 6.4

5.3

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Table 4.6 shows the marital status of non-beneficiary households by project sites. In contrast to the overall picture among beneficiary, 80.2 percent of the non-beneficiaries were married, 5.6 percent widowed, 7.9 percent divorced, 1.4 percent separated and 4.9 percent were single. However, the incidence of divorce is overall higher in project sites in southern region compared with project sites in the central and northern region. The aspect of vulnerability is revealed by the fact that more beneficiaries than non-beneficiaries were without a partner, which suggests that the programme targeted the vulnerable households.

23

Table 4.6 Marital Status of Non-Beneficiary Respondents by Project Site

Married Widowed Divorced Separated Single Project Site N % N % N % N % N %

Mwenelondo - Lake Mbiriwizi Dam Lunjika - M1 Bwengu - Katope Kande - Chesamu Lozi - Mwalawatongole Buzi Hill Afforestation Mndunje - Bimphi Mbabzi - Nambuna TO Thumba Dam Livunzu - Mpangowalimba Thabwa - Robeni Phalombe River Bank Ndunde - Simithi Ndunde Dam Katema - Chileka Total

24 26 27 30 29 58 32 25 21 32 25 34 20 24 25 27

459

77.4 86.7 87.1 81.1 85.3 82.9 91.4 86.2 84.0 94.1 83.3 60.7 64.5 72.7 69.4 90.0

80.2

4 3 - 1 2 4 - 1 2 - - 9 2 1 3 -

32

12.9 10.0

- 2.7 5.9 5.7

- 3.4 8.0

- -

16.1 6.5 3.0 8.3

-

5.6

3

1 4 1 6 1 2 1 1 1 6 5 6 5 2

45

9.7 -

3.2 10.8

2.9 8.6 2.9 6.9 4.0 2.9 3.3

10.7 16.1 18.2 13.9

6.7

7.9

- - 1 1 - - - - 1 - - 2 1 1 1 -

8

- -

3.2 2.7

- - - -

4.0 - -

3.6 3.2 3.0 2.8

-

1.4

- 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 - 1 4 5 3 1 2 1

28

- 3.3 6.5 2.7 5.9 2.9 5.7 3.4

- 2.9

13.3 8.9 9.7 3.0 5.6 3.3

4.9

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 4.3.5 Sex of the Head of the Household The results from the evaluation show that 18.2 percent of the households from which beneficiaries came from were female-headed and 81.8 percent were male-headed (Table 4.7). This is slightly different from the baseline study in which 83.3 percent were male-headed and 16.7 percent were female-headed households. In the case of non-beneficiary respondents, 16.1 percent of households are female-headed while 83.9 percent come from male-headed households. Despite the focus on female-headed households as target vulnerable groups, the proportion of female-headed households among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is not significant, and potentially some of the vulnerable households did not participate in the MASAF PWP. The difference in the headship of the household between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is not significant. Among beneficiaries the highest proportion of female-headed households is observed in the Ndunde Dam project in Chiradzulu (29.8 percent) due to the high incidence of unmarried respondents (34.1 percent) due to being widowed, divorced, separated and being single. The lowest proportion of female-headed households is observed in the Kande-Chesamu road project in Nkhata Bay (7.1 percent), with relatively low levels of being widowed, divorced and separated although the proportion of single respondents is relatively high. On the other hand, the incidence of female-headed households among non-beneficiaries is highest in the Phalombe River Bank rehabilitation project (29 percent) with a relatively high proportion of divorced respondents and lowest in the Buzi Hill Afforestation project in Ntchisi (2.9 percent) with the lowest level of divorced respondents.

24

Table 4.7 Sex of Head of Household by Status and Project Site

Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary Female Male Female Male

Project Site N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent Mwenelondo - Lake Mbiriwizi Dam Lunjika - M1 Bwengu - Katope Kande - Chesamu Lozi - Mwalawatongole Buzi Hill Afforestation Mndunje - Bimphi Mbabzi - Nambuna TO Thumba Dam Livunzu - Mpangowalimba Thabwa - Robeni Phalombe River Bank Ndunde - Simithi Ndunde Dam Katema - Chileka Total

16 19 14 10

7 4

17 7

12 16 27 15 28 15 26 23

256

17.8 21.1 15.1 10.6

7.1 7.8

19.1 7.5

12.1 17.8 29.7 23.8 29.8 16.1 31.7 24.5

18.2

74 71 79 84 91 47 72 86 87 74 64 48 66 78 56 71

1148

82.2 78.9 84.9 89.4 92.9 92.2 80.9 92.5 87.9 82.2 70.3 76.2 70.2 83.9 68.3 75.5

81.8

9 6 3 6 3

10 1 2 4 3 3

15 9 8 8 2

92

28.1 20.0

9.7 16.2

8.8 14.3

2.9 6.9

16.0 8.8

10.0 26.8 29.0 24.2 22.2

6.7

16.1

23 24 28 31 31 60 34 27 21 31 27 41 22 25 28 28

481

71.9 80.0 90.3 83.8 91.2 85.7 97.1 93.1 84.0 91.2 90.0 73.2 71.0 75.8 77.8 93.3

83.9

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 4.3.6 Age Distribution and Household Size Table 4.8 presents the age distribution of the households covered in the study. The table shows that a total of 9,869 individuals were reported to reside in the selected households and 48.7 percent were male while 51.3 percent were female. This is close to distributions in the 1998 Population and Housing Census in which 48.9 percent were male and 51.1 percent were female. Many are in the category of the economically active population, followed by the school going age. In the sample households, 14.5 percent of the people were between zero to four years of age, 30.3 percent were between five to fourteen years of age, 10.3 percent were between fifteen and seventeen years of age. Also 43.0 percent were between eighteen and sixty-four years and 1.8 percent were 65 years old or older. This gives a fairly large population of the economically active group compared to the economically inactive and translates into a dependency ratio of 0.86. This a slightly lower dependency ratio indicating that households participating in the MASAF PWP are not constrained in terms of labour availability. They have more people in the economically active group, and hence the participation of one or two people in the programme should not affect the households’ day to day activities very much. The sex ratio is 95 males per 100 females slightly lower than the sex ratio of 96 males in the 1998 Population and Housing Census.

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Table 4.8 Population Distribution by Sex

Male Female Total Age Category N Percent N Percent N Percent 0 - 4 years

5 - 14 years 15 - 17 years 18 - 64 years 65 + years

Total

714 1450 517

2036 86

4803

50.0 48.4 50.9 48.0 46.7

48.7

717 1543 499

2209 98

5066

50.0 51.6 49.1 52.0 53.3

51.3

1413 2993 1016 1245 184

9869

14.5 30.3 10.3 43.0

1.8

100.0 Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Table 4.9 gives the mean household size contrasted between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households and then between male headed and female headed households. Among the beneficiary households the mean household size is 5.01 compared to 4.86 among the non -beneficiaries. This confirms the findings of the baseline where it was observed that beneficiaries in all the districts except Dowa and Nkhata Bay had larger mean household sizes compared with non-beneficiary households. When sex of the household head is considered, the means are 5.07 and 4.48 among male and female headed households, respectively. Table 4.9 Mean Household Size by Beneficiary Status and by Sex of Household Head

Mean Standard Deviation N Beneficiary Status Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary Sex of Household Head Male Female

5.01 4.86

5.07 4.48

2.35 2.28

2.34 2.24

1398 569

1619 348

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 4.3.7 Housing Conditions Materials with which houses are made of are often times used as a proxy for economic status of households. Table 4.10 gives results of the housing conditions of the households covered in the evaluation. There appears to be very little difference at the distribution of the materials with which walls were made of when one looks at the male headed and female headed households. In both cases, less than a third of the households have main dwelling units made of burnt bricks. In general then, both male and female-headed households manifest signs of poverty as far as walls of dwelling units are concerned. The same applies to roofing material. Very few households have roofed their houses with iron sheets. Otherwise, the majority, more than 89 percent in both categories have roofed their main dwellings with grass. Windows too tell the same story. Close to a third of the households in both categories have windows covered with wood and another third have no windows in their houses. Only 10.1

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percent among the male-headed households and 12.7 percent among the female headed households have windows covered with glass. Almost all the floors (91.6 percent among the male-headed and 90.6 percent among the female-headed households) were made of mud. Table 4.10 Quality of Households’ Main House

Sex of Household Head Status Female Male Beneficiary Non - Beneficiary

House Feature

N = 348 N = 1629 N = 1404 N = 573 Walls Poles & Earth Compacted Earth Sun Dried Bricks Burnt Bricks

10.3 29.6 37.4 22.7

11.4 35.3 31.1 27.1

11.0 37.0 32.7 18.9

11.7 27.6 31.1 29.1

Roof Grass Tiles Iron Sheets Cement

89.1

0.3 10.3

0.3

89.6

1.3 8.7 0.1

92.2

0.9 6.5 0.1

83.1

1.7 15.2

0.0 Windows Wood Grass Glass No Window Other

24.5

6.3 10.1 38.6 20.5

25.6 13.7 12.7 26.0 22.0

26.4 13.1 10.1 28.6 21.8

22.9 10.6 17.5 27.4 21.5

Floor Cement Mud

6.9

91.6

8.5

90.6

5.9

93.1

13.8 85.2

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Differences do come up though when one looks at the beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. There are more (29.1 percent) non-beneficiaries having walls made of burnt bricks compared to 18.9 percent among the beneficiaries. The same applies to iron sheet roofing. Twice as many (15.2 percent) non-beneficiaries have roofs covered with iron sheets than beneficiaries (6.5 percent). The same applies to windows. Glass covering, which is often associated with status is more among the non-beneficiaries (17.5 percent) than among the beneficiaries (10.1 percent). Flooring follows the same trend with more (13.8 percent) of non-beneficiaries having floors of their main dwelling made of cement compared to 5.9 percent among the beneficiaries. The differences in housing conditions between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries reveal that the former are generally poor and confirms the earlier assertion that the people that participated in the MASAF PWP projects were by most standards are poor and vulnerable, although a substantial proportion of non-beneficiaries also have poor housing conditions. The high proportion of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries with poor quality of housing conditions illustrates the extent of poverty in Malawi. 4.3.8 Energy and Water Sources Table 4.11 shows the sources of cooking and lighting energy and water. In terms of sources of energy, there are very small differences between male headed and female headed households. The same applies to comparison between beneficiary and non-beneficiary

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households. The majority (in all cases) of respondents use collected firewood as their main cooking fuel and paraffin as the main fuel used for lighting. The same scenario appears in the sources of water for drinking. More than half the households in all the categories use water from boreholes. Table 4.11 Energy and Water Sources by Sex of Household Head by Status

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary

Energy Sources by Use and Water Sources N = 1625 N =347 N = 1402 N = 572 Cooking Collected Firewood Purchased Firewood Made Charcoal Purchased Charcoal Crop residues Other

90.8

7.0 0.2 0.1 1.8 0.1

87.0

9.0 0.3 0.3 2.6 0.3

90.8

6.9 0.3 0.1 2.0 0.0

88.8

8.6 0.2 0.2 1.7 0.5

Lighting Electricity Paraffin Candles Wood Fire Grass Other

1.2

92.0 0.2 1.6 3.2 1.8

0.9

88.8 0.0 3.2 4.6 0.0

0.9

91.5 0.0 2.0 3.4 2.5

1.7

91.3 0.7 1.6 3.5 1.2

Water Sources River Protected Well Unprotected Well Borehole Piped Supply

8.8 6.8

17.1 53.7 13.3

8.9 6.6

10.3 54.6 19.3

9.2 6.8

15.5 53.8 14.3

7.9 6.6

17.1 54.2 14.2

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Closely associated with the quality of the dwelling units, sources of fuel and water are the availability of toilet facilities. Table 4.12 gives results of the spread of toilet facilities among the male headed households and female headed households and then between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. Among the beneficiary and non-beneficiary households there is very little difference in that exactly the same proportion (83 percent) in both categories own a toilet. The situation though is different when one considers the male headed and female headed divide. In this case, more (30.2 percent) male-headed households do not own a latrine. In contrast, only about half (14.5 percent) among male headed households do not own a toilet. Female-headed households are thus at a disadvantage, and this also goes to show the extent of their vulnerability. This could suggest that women do not have enough resources to enable them dig and construct the latrines.

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Table 4.12 Ownership of Toilet by Sex of Household Head by Status

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary

Toilet Ownership

N = 1628 N = 348 N = 1404 N = 573 Yes No

85.7 14.5

69.8 30.2 83.0

17.0 82.5 17.5

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 4.3.9 Possession of Assets and Livestock Among the so many proxies of a household’s wealth are the possession of certain assets and livestock. Table 4.13 shows the proportions of households owning some specific assets. The most commonly owned assets in the sixteen sites visited were a radio and a bicycle. The comparison of male and female headed households reveal more male headed (40.2 percent) than female headed (19.5 percent) owned bicycles. The same applies to radios, more (56.9 percent) male-headed households than female-headed (31.9 percent) owned radios. The discrepancies between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households are there but the gap is not as wide. Slightly more (41.9 percent) non-beneficiaries than beneficiaries (34.5 percent) owned bicycles, and 56.5 percent non-beneficiaries owned radios compared to 50.1 percent. This trend is the same as reported by the baseline survey where radio possession was higher among male-headed and non-beneficiary households than among female headed households and beneficiary households. Table 4.13 Possession of Assets by Sex of Household Head by Status

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary

Asset

N = 1628 N = 348 N = 1404 N = 573 Bicycle Plough/Ridger Sewing Machine Ox-Cart Fishing Canoe/Boat Radio

40.2 4.2 4.8 3.1 2.1

56.9

19.5 0.9 2.9 2.0 1.1

31.9

34.5 3.2 3.9 2.1 1.7

50.1

41.9 4.5 5.8 4.9 2.6

58.5 Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Analysis of the ownership of livestock shows that the most commonly owned livestock are chickens, goats and pigs (Table 4.14). As with assets, there are differences in the proportions of households owning a particular livestock when female headed households are compared to male headed households. There are slightly more male-headed households owning any particular type of livestock than female headed households.

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Table 4.14 Possession of Livestock by Sex of Household Head by Status

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non - Beneficiary

Livestock

N = 1628 N = 438 N = 1404 N = 573 Cattle Sheep Goats Pigs Chicken Pigeons Ducks

9.4 1.9

29.1 12.8 60.1

9.3 7.9

4.9 0.6

22.1 6.9

70.7 5.5 6.6

8.1 1.5

28.6 11.6 69.4

8.3 8.3

9.8 2.1

26.4 12.2 67.4

9.6 6.1

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 When one compares the ownership of livestock between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, the proportions for all the animals are very close. In terms of small animals like goats, chickens and ducks, slightly more beneficiaries own these than non-beneficiaries. The reverse is true with respect to cattle, sheep and pigs. It is clear from the foregoing that there are differences in wealth between male-headed households and female-headed households, with male-headed households being better off than female-headed households. This is both in terms of asset ownership and livestock ownership. 4.3.10 Sources of Income The evaluation also sought to determine the first major source of income for the households to which the respondents belong and Table 4.15 gives the results. By far crop sales is most single predominant source of income of the households that took part in the evaluation. A little more than 10 percent of male headed households (71.7 percent) mentioned crop sales as their main source of income compared to 61.2 percent of female headed households. The situation between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is very close with 71.1 percent citing crop sales as their major source of income, compared to 66.9 percent among non-beneficiaries. Table 4.15 Major Source of Income by Sex of Household Head by Status

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary

Income Source

N = 1624 N = 348 N = 1402 N =571 Crop Sales Livestock Sales Fishing Small Business Income Transfers MASAF Wage Salaried Farm Employment Salaried Non-Farm Ganyu on Farm Other Ganyu Other

71.7 1.5 1.5 9.9 0.2 0.9 0.7 2.6 6.1 2.9 2.1

61.2 0.6 1.1

18.1 3.2 2.0 0.0 0.9 8.3 2.3 2.3

71.1 0.9 1.1 9.9 0.4 1.5 0.3 1.9 7.3 3.5 2.1

66.9 2.3 2.1

14.7 1.6 0.0 1.4 3.3 4.6 1.1 2.1

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000

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In order of magnitude the next major sources of income were operating small businesses and doing ganyu on farms. Twice as many female-headed households than male-headed households were involved in small businesses. Slightly more (8.3 percent) female-headed households than male-headed households (6.1 percent) were into ganyu on farms. As for the beneficiaries, less (9.9 percent) were involved in small business compared to 14.7 percent non-beneficiaries. When it comes to ganyu on farms, more beneficiaries (7.3 percent) were involved compared to 4.6 percent non-beneficiaries. Few people consider the MASAF wage as a major source of income. Less than one percent of male-headed households and only 2 percent of female-headed households considered it as a major source of income. Among the beneficiaries, only 1.5 percent considered the MASAF wage as a major source of income. During the baseline as well, the three main sources of income for most households were own crop sales followed by farm ganyu and then small business (petty trading). The order is slightly changed in that ganyu came before operating small businesses. Although a small proportion reported the MASAF wage as a major source of income, there is evidence that it is having some impact on the real poor. This can be deduced from the fact that it is more female-headed households that consider it so and that some of the beneficiaries categorise it as such. 4.3.11 Land Ownership and Food Production Land is another indicator of household wealth. The results from the sample of respondents in this study show that more than 95 percent of the households owned some piece of land (Table 4.16). Among the male-headed households, only 1.2 percent did not own land compared to 2.6 percent among the female-headed households. Among the beneficiaries, only 1.1 percent did not own land, compared to 2.3 percent among the non-beneficiaries. In terms of land holding sizes, the majority of the households owned between 0.5 hectares and 1.5 hectares. Among the female headed households though, more households (20.7 percent) owned less than 0.5 hectares. This is in comparison to 11.6 percent among the male-headed households. The reverse is true when ownership of more hectares is concerned. More (38.3 percent) male-headed households owned more than 1.5 hectares of land compared to 23.6 percent female headed households. These differences in land holding sizes between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households are not significant. However, there is a significant difference in the mean holding size between male-headed and female-headed households, suggesting gender bias in land ownership. Female-headed households are likely to have smaller pieces of land compared with male-headed households. Food production and food supply deficits at household levels also indicate the state of deprivation. Respondents were asked whether they produced adequate food to last them to the next season. The results show that among the male-headed households, 56.9 percent indicated that they had produced enough food from their land to last them to the next harvest (Table 4.16). The proportion among the female-headed households was lower (51.9 percent). When beneficiaries are compared to the non-beneficiaries, more of the later (61.7 percent) than the former (53.9 percent) had produced enough from their holdings to last them to the next harvest. This is a marked improvement from the baseline where only 31.7 percent among the male-headed households and 25.1 percent among the female headed households had produced enough that year to take them to the next harvest. All the same, female-headed households continue to show signs of vulnerability and the fact that beneficiaries seem to be at a disadvantage may also be a sign that the programme is reaching the right people.

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Table 4.16 Land Ownership and Food Production by Sex of Household Head by Status

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary

N = 1608 N = 339 N = 1404 N = 573

Own Land? Yes No

98.8

1.2

97.4

2.6

98.9

1.1

97.7

2.3 Land Size Less than 0.5 Ha 0.5 - 1.0 Ha 1.01 - 1.5 Ha Greater than 1.5 Ha

11.6 31.0 19.1 38.3

20.7 36.8 19.0 23.6

12.7 31.9 20.4 35.0

14.5 32.5 15.9 37.2

Mean Land Size Mean Standard Deviation N

1.56 1.62 1628

1.13 0.86 348

1.46 1.43 1494

1.55 1.73 573

Adequate Food Growth? Yes No

56.9 43.1

51.9 48.1

53.9 46.1

61.7 38.3

Number of Food Deficit Months per year Mean Standard Deviation N

4.64 3.74 695

4.83 3.43 157

4.71 4.0

626

4.57 2.60 226

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 For those respondents that reported not producing enough to last them till the next harvest, most of them indicated that they run out of food for a mean period of just over four months. This is regardless of whether a household was female headed or male headed, beneficiary or non beneficiary. Again, this is a marked improvement from the results of the baseline where the mean number of months without food for male-headed households was 6.11 and female-headed households 6.52. Among the beneficiaries the mean was 6.33 months compared to the mean of 5.83 among the non-beneficiaries. Nonetheless, the improvement in household food security can also be attributed to a number of factors one of which could be the “starter pack” programme where in the past year government distributed free seeds to households. Hence, the improvement in the food situation can not only be associated with the public work programme. Among the respondents that indicated not producing enough, the months when they were food deficient varied by sex of household heads and status of respondents ( Table 4.17). Food deficits become more pronounced from November and they peak in January to March. Then they start going down. This is regardless of whether a household is male-headed or female-headed and whether a member of the household is a beneficiary of the MASAF Public Works Programme or not.

32

Female-headed households, compared to male-headed households, tend to own smaller land and are more food deficient. Thus singling out female-headed households as a special target group in the MASAF PWP is justified by the data in this study. The extent of vulnerability is also higher among beneficiaries than non-beneficiaries (although a significant number of non-beneficiaries are also vulnerable) indicating that the programme generally targeted the vulnerable households, but other vulnerable households did not benefit from the safety net. Table 4.17 Proportion of Food Deficit Households by Sex of Household Head by Status

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary

Month N = 503 N = 106 N = 451 N = 158 January February March April May June July August September October November December

70.4 81.7 73.0 42.1 22.5 10.5 10.3 13.1 18.3 29.4 39.4 54.3

72.6 80.2 71.7 38.7 24.5 15.1 17.9 22.6 29.2 35.8 42.5 58.5

69.4 80.3 73.2 41.5 22.8 10.0 10.9 14.4 19.5 24.8 39.5 54.8

74.7 84.8 71.5 41.8 22.8 15.2 13.9 15.8 22.2 36.7 41.1 55.7

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Those households that did not produce enough to get them through to the next harvest used a number of survival mechanisms. Table 4.18 shows that by far, regardless of which category they belonged to they bought food from the local market. There is very little difference between male (55.1 percent) and female (56.6 percent) headed households in terms of using this facility. Even between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the difference is small. Table 4.18 Proportion of Households Using Alternative Food Sources by Sex of

Household Head and Status

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary

Food Source N = 503 N = 106 N = 451 N = 158 ADMARC Local Market Food Transfers from Relations Food Transfers from Govt/NGO Ganyu Labour for Food Begging Credit from Money Lenders

50.5 55.1 10.1

1.6 47.5

4.8 2.8

44.3 56.6 17.9

1.9 52.8

3.8 2.8

48.1 55.0 12.2

2.0 50.3

4.7 2.7

53.2 56.3

9.5 0.6

43.0 4.4 3.2

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Some of these respondents supplemented whatever they harvested by purchasing from ADMARC. More male-headed households (50.5 percent) than female-headed households (44.3 percent) bought food from ADMARC. Using the beneficiary/non-beneficiary divide,

33

more non-beneficiaries (53.2 percent) than beneficiaries (48.1 percent) bought food from ADMARC. This could be a sign of lack of purchasing power among the female-headed households and among the beneficiary households. This again could show the extent of the vulnerability among the two categories. The next third largest means of supplementing food deficits was doing piecework (ganyu) for food. More female-headed (52.8 percent) than male-headed (47.5 percent) supplemented their food deficit that way. In the other category, more beneficiaries (50.3 percent) than non- beneficiaries (43.0 percent) engaged in ganyu to supplement their food supply. The results also show that female-headed households are vulnerable, and the best these people can do is to sell their labour so as to get food. Another indicator of well being or status of the household is the number of meals that household members have in day. Table 4.19 shows that during times of plenty, this is the period during and just after harvest, most households have two meals or more in a day. Less than one percent of the households had one meal in a day. During food deficit months though, more than 40 percent of the respondents had only one meal in day. The odds in this case are more against female-headed households (42.5 percent) compared to 41.7 percent from the male-headed households, and beneficiary households (43.5 percent) compared to 37.6 percent from non-beneficiaries. Table 4.19 Proportion of Households Having a Given Number of Meals by Sex of

Household Head and Status

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary

Number of Meals

N = 1421 N = 292 N = 1232 N = 482 During Times of Plenty (Harvest) One Two Three Four

0.4

38.9 58.4

2.3

0.3

40.8 57.5

1.4

0.4

39.9 57.7

2.0

0.2

37.5 59.8

2.5 During Food Deficit Months One Two Three

41.7 47.9 10.4

42.5 47.6

9.9

43.5 47.3

9.2

37.6 49.2 13.3

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000

4.3.12 Cropping Pattern and Use of Farm Inputs

Apart from the availability of land, issues of household food security hinge much on what people grow and the inputs they use. Table 4.20 shows that more than 95 percent of the households covered in the evaluation grew maize. There is virtually no difference between male-headed and female-headed households. In the case of beneficiary and non-beneficiary household there is only a two-percentage point difference with more beneficiaries growing maize than are the non-beneficiaries.

34

The next most grown crops are pulses, cassava and then tobacco. More than 50 percent of the households grew pulses. Among the female-headed households, 59.2 percent grew pulses compared to 50.8 percent among the male-headed households. Differences between beneficiary (52.6 percent) and non-beneficiary (53.4 percent) households are minor.

Tobacco, which is a high valued crop, was grown by 34.0 percent male headed households compared to 14.9 percent female headed households. Among the beneficiaries, only 30.3 percent grew tobacco. This compares with 33 percent among the non-beneficiaries. Thus, female-headed households are more into traditional food crops than the high valued cash crop. Table 4.20 Proportion of Households Who Grew a Certain Crop Sex of Household Head

by Status

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary

Crop N = 1563 N = 334 N = 1388 N = 560 Maize Cassava Vegetables Rice Tobacco Pulses Cotton

95.9 36.0 10.4

8.6 34.0 50.8

4.7

96.0 31.9 10.3

5.5 14.9 59.2

2.0

97.6 34.0 11.6

8.1 30.3 52.6

4.3

95.9 40.2

7.9 8.2

33.0 53.4

3.6 Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Table 4.21 shows the use of inputs by the sex of the head of the household and by beneficiary status. More (80.4 percent) male-headed households than female-headed (75.2 percent) applied fertiliser. The trend is the same among the beneficiaries (78.5 percent) and non- beneficiary household (82.0 percent). There is very little difference in the use of hybrid seed between beneficiaries (84.4 percent) and non-beneficiaries (85.3 percent). Table 4.21 Proportion of Households using Farm Inputs by Sex of Household Head and

Status (percent)

Sex of Household Head Status Male Female Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary

Farm Input

N = 1122 N = 203 N = 1164 N = 495 Fertilizer Kraal Manure Compost Manure Insecticides Local Seeds Hybrid Seeds

80.4 29.2 14.2

9.1 63.2 85.4

75.2 21.1 14.6

5.7 74.0 82.0

78.5 29.1 16.6

9.2 66.6 84.4

82.0 25.4

9.1 7.1

61.4 85.3

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000

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4.4 Summary The general conclusion from the above presentation is that several socio-economic indicators show that the state of state of deprivation and vulnerability among female headed-households and more so among beneficiary households is high. For instance, in terms of the level of education it is clear that female-headed households and beneficiary households had more respondents without formal education or with just adult literacy education. Furthermore, in terms of the materials used for dwelling units, dwellings of beneficiaries were made of cheaper and poor quality materials. The poverty among the beneficiaries also manifests itself in their occupation and their major sources of income. Most listed farming as their main occupation and crop sales as their first major source of income. Few people are in small-scale business that would increase their wealth portfolio. Even the possession of assets and livestock is in the favour of the non-beneficiaries and male-headed households. The aspect of vulnerability is further reflected in the marital status of the people participating in the MASAF PWP programme. More beneficiaries compared with non-beneficiaries are without a partner either due to being widowed, divorced, separated or simply single. The vulnerability of the beneficiaries and the female-headed households continues to manifest itself in the ownership of land and food production. A lot more beneficiaries and female-headed households own less than point five of hectare and more of them did not produce enough to take them to the next harvest. A notable development is the emergence of income from MASAF PWP as a first major source of income among few beneficiaries and among some female-headed households. This may point to the impact that the programme has on the real poor. Nonetheless, these various indicators also reveal that even among non-beneficiaries, there were some households with similar socio-economic characteristics as beneficiaries that qualified on the basis of vulnerability but did not participate in the MASAF PWP. This also suggests high demand for employment and supply of labour in public works programmes that cannot be met with available resources but effort should be made to prioritise vulnerable households.

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CHAPTER 5

TARGETING AND SELECTION OF PROJECT WORKERS

5.1 Introduction The socio-economic characteristics of respondents in the previous chapter set the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of targeting projects and vulnerable households in the MASAF PWP projects. The design of the criteria for targeting vulnerable areas and households in the programme design followed a top-bottom approach in which the targeted communities are not involved in the design process. This chapter provides an assessment of the criteria used for the selection of project sites, project types and project workers, and solicit views from the target communities (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) on the suitability and efficacy of the targeting criteria. The study team also sought the perceptions of the implementing agencies on the effectiveness and problems with the existing targeting criteria. The next section focuses on the criteria for targeting communities and selection of projects. Section 5.3 concentrates on the criteria for selection of workers in the communities. Section 5.4 analyses individual’s choice to participate in the public works programme, focusing on gender differences, motives for participation and non-participation and reasons for dropping out before the project completion. Section 5.5 provides a summary. 5.2 Targeting and Selection of Project Sites and Project Types The main objective of the MASAF PWP is to transfer cash income to vulnerable households by creating employment opportunities through labour intensive public works, in the process provide basic economic infrastructure to the communities. In order to achieve its objective of assisting the most needy, PWP projects are targeted at the Extension Planning Areas (EPA) and at the community and individual levels. The process of project selection begins with the identification of target areas - EPAs. MASAF MU uses data from the Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM) to identify vulnerable EPAs based on the extent of food insecurity. MASAF MU, in conjunction with the Poverty Monitoring Unit (PMU), is responsible for developing a suitable index and cut-off point of eligible EPAs based on VAM data (MASAF, 1999). Although target EPAs are chosen by MASAF MU, the District Executive Sub-Set (DSS) can justify targeting different EPAs if the EPAs selected by MASAF MU are less vulnerable. The flexibility in the choice of the target EPAs is allowed because the VAM does not always provide accurate and reliable information and the time lag between collection of the VAM data and implementation of the project makes it unreliable. For example, it has been reported that once, community leaders from Mulanje South challenged VAM’s classification of their area as not vulnerable. They argued that the VAM data had failed to identify food shortages in their area because of the presence of maize from neighbouring Mozambique in the local markets. According to information obtained from some of the DSS teams, there have also been instances of projects being assigned to EPAs that do not qualify. In such instances, projects have been assigned to other EPAs that did not qualify as vulnerable on the basis of VAM as long as the DSS provides reasonable justifications. Once the MASAF MU and the DSS have agreed on the target EPAs, the process for the selection of the project sites and the

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type of projects that are submitted to MASAF for funding consideration begins. The selection of project type such as road, dam or afforestation also rests with the district teams, with the communities taking a leading role. MASAF MU then requests the District Executive Committee Sub-Set (DSS) to submit project proposals for public works activities that can generate substantial employment for consideration for appraisal and funding. The process of identifying project sites and types for funding under MASAF work in two ways. First, the proposals for the target EPAs are identified from the list of projects that is approved by the District Development Committee (DDC) waiting for funding.7 These projects are community-driven (initiated by the communities) through the Village Development Committee (VDC) comprising all village headmen under one group village headman who is chair of the committee. Once a project has been identified, the VDC takes the project proposal to the Area Development Committee (ADC). The ADC is composed of all the group village headmen under the Traditional Authority who chairs the committee. Both the VDC and ADC consult the Area Executive Committee (AEC), a technical advisory body that comprise extension workers and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) operating in the area. The ADC submits the proposal to the DDC, which at the time of the study comprised all Traditional Authorities in the district, all Members of Parliament, district chairpersons of all political parties and other interest groups such as women. The DDC consults the District Executive Committee (DEC) composed of heads of different government departments at the district such as ministries of education, forestry, agriculture, health and works. The Director of Development and Planning chairs the DEC. Second, if no projects that qualify for public works are available on the approved DDC list of projects, the District Executive Committee Sub-Set (DSS) is responsible for the identification of projects in the target EPAs in consultation with the community leaders using participatory methods. The DSS is a sub-committee of the DEC chaired by the Director of Development and Planning. The identified project proposals are presented for approval to the DDC before they are sent to MASAF for funding consideration. Nonetheless, the projects identified by the DSS do not go through the normal process of VDC through to the ADC and the DDC, and hence tend to by-pass some of the district structures. In most of the districts visited it was mentioned that the choice of type of project to implement originated from the communities. The focus group discussions revealed that the identification of the projects is by the communities themselves, but this was more apparent in the project sites in the northern region. In all the five projects in the northern region the background to the project from the communities indicated that the projects were already submitted to the DDC through the VDC and ADC. This phenomenon was not equivocal in the project sites in the central and southern region. Moreover, in other districts it was felt that there was little consultation with the grassroots on the type of projects they wanted to have in their area. For instance, the beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and key informants in the communities in the Lozi-Mwalawatongole in Nkhotakota and Ndunde Earth Dam in Chiradzulu reported that they were not consulted on the type of project. On the other hand there is a limit to the extent that communities can freely select the type of activity they

7 Once the Councillors are elected and assume their duties, the DDC will become the District Assembly consisting of all the Councillors in the district, chaired by one of the Councillors with the Chief Executive and the Director of Development and Planning as ex-officio members of the District Assembly. At the time of the study the Chief Executive was chairperson and the Director of Development and Planning was secretary to the DDC.

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wanted in their area since PWP has its own menu of activities, although the process is flexible if other labour-intensive projects are identified for funding. Once MASAF MU accepts the proposals, whether projects from existing DDC list or those solicited by the DSS from the community leaders, the Zone Manager carries a desk appraisal followed by a field appraisal with the assistance of the DSS. The important aspects in the appraisal are the unskilled labour content potential and the results of the environmental impact assessment. Nonetheless, the process of consultation in the selection of projects that are directly solicited by the DSS is weak, and the DSS rarely use the Participatory Rural Appraisal methodologies. It is apparent that for projects that do not already exist on the DDC list, consultations with the communities is akin to consultation with traditional leaders, who in some cases may misrepresent the preferences of the communities. In contrast, for the projects that are presented to the DDC through the VDC and the ADC, communities are largely responsible for identification of project types using traditional structures, and projects closely reflect the preferences of communities. 5.3 Criteria for Selecting Project Workers The targeting criteria adopted by MASAF PWP is that of self targeting achieved through the setting of wages below the minimum wage rate. The assumption is that setting the wage below the minimum wage will not attract those already in employment or those that are better off. The use of the minimum wage in the public works programmes is common world-wide, but it can potentially exclude the very vulnerable particularly when opportunities are limited and recruitment is on ‘first come first served’ basis. MASAF MU, however, expects communities to identify vulnerable households to participate in public works projects. Originally, the targeting did not distinguish the vulnerable. Since MASAF II, female-headed households are singled out as a particular group that requires special consideration in the recruitment of workers (MASAF News, 2000). Both skilled and unskilled workers for the PWP projects are recruited at the community level by the site foreman who is assisted by the Project Committee and community leaders. The district teams and MASAF officials are involved in the selection of skilled workers such as foremen and contractors who are hired to construct structures like bridges and culverts. The selection of workers to participate in PWP projects is exclusively in the hands of the communities. The recruitment and management of workers rest with the site foreman who is assisted by the Project Committee and traditional leaders in identification of vulnerable groups. MASAF provides guidelines for selection of workers that require that identification of vulnerable households, then the household decides on which member to participate and if they PWP project require more people, the identified vulnerable households are considered in the second round before other households are considered for employment. Greater emphasis is placed on female-headed households in the communities. The study team, however, found that the demand for PWP employment is usually overwhelming forcing some communities to abandon these guidelines for selection. Nonetheless, although the DSS, the traditional leaders, project committees and communities are briefed on these guidelines, the low level of education limits the application of these guidelines in practice. The guidelines for the selection of vulnerable households are not well understood and require the strengthening of

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information and education. In most project sites covered in this study, communities use their own selection criteria that do not prioritise the vulnerable groups, and it was a common practice to recruit workers on ‘first come first served’ basis and on the basis of fitness. Table 5.1 shows the agencies responsible for selection of participants in the PWP by gender of beneficiaries. The most frequently cited agents responsible for the selection of project workers were local committees such as the project committee (58.8 percent of all beneficiaries) followed by supervisors and kapitawos, DSS/MASAF officials and traditional leaders. The category of the DSS/MASAF officials mostly refers to members of the DSS.8 The gender differences in the reported agency in the worker recruitment exercise are insignificant. Participants in the focus group discussions and interviews with key informants revealed the same agents responsible for selection. Although, MASAF encourages collaboration of the DSS with Non-Governmental Organisations, only one beneficiary reported the involvement of the NGO in the selection of workers. This isolated case though might reflect poor information about the institutions involved in the projects. Table 5.1 Percentage of Beneficiaries Indicating the Local Agent Responsible for the

Selection of Workers by Gender

Male Female Total Recruiting Agency N Percent N Percent N Percent

Local development/area committee 434 58.5 392 59.2 826 58.8 Traditional leaders 76 10.2 76 11.5 154 11.0 Member of Parliament 1 1.1 - - 1 0.1 Non-Governmental Organisation 1 1.1 - - 1 0.1 DSS/MASAF Officials 119 16.0 80 12.1 199 14.2 Supervisor and Kapitawos 161 21.7 147 22.2 308 21.9 Total Beneficiaries 742 662 1404

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Table 5.2 shows people’s perceptions on the criteria that were used to select participants in the area by gender. About half the participants mentioned poverty as the basis for selection of workers to participate in PWP projects, 51.5 percent of male and 76.0 percent of female beneficiaries. Though PWP projects target food insecure areas fewer than 10 percent of the beneficiaries identified food insecurity as the basis used for targeting workers. Over a third of the beneficiaries stated that they were not aware of any criteria that were used to select the project workers. This sentiment was also echoed in the focus group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. It was reported that local communities were never consulted about the selection criteria for workers nor given the opportunity to discuss how best they can identify vulnerable households. The ignorance about the selection criteria is also worrying, with 46.2 percent of male and 41.6 percent of female beneficiaries reporting that they did not know the criteria used for selecting workers.

8 Apparently, most beneficiaries could not distinguish the difference between MASAF officials from members of the DSS, and hence the reported involvement of MASAF officials may merely reflect that beneficiaries have poor information about the institutions involved at district level, given the low level of education for most beneficiaries.

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Table 5.2 Beneficiaries Perceptions on Criteria Used for Selecting Workers

Male Female Total Criteria N Percent N Percent N Percent General poverty 258 34.8 252 38.1 510 36.3 Landlessness 4 0.5 4 0.6 8 0.6 Food insecurity 31 4.2 46 6.9 77 5.5 Being known to those who select 34 4.6 20 3.0 54 3.8 No criteria to my knowledge 240 32.3 221 33.4 461 32.8 Other 236 31.8 125 18.9 361 25.7 Total Beneficiaries 742 662 1404

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 The ‘other’ criteria for the selection of workers in the PWP reported by 25.7 percent of beneficiaries include the possession of desirable social and physical attributes such as strength, honesty, diligent, maturity and well behaved. Age and physical mobility were also important attributes considered in the selection of workers for the project. In some communities the elderly were targeted for selection as vulnerable people whilst in other communities they were not and were seen to lack physical strength to undertake some of the tasks demanded by the job. Similarly in some sites school children were allowed to participate, specifically the Distance Education Centre students, whilst in other sites they were only allowed to participate during school holidays. The choice of workers on the basis of physical fitness was also common in the focus group discussions and from interviews with key informants. No special consideration was given to disadvantage groups such as female-headed households and the old, except in a few cases. The apparent emphasis of physical fitness has the potential of eliminating the needy in the target communities. The apparent heterogeneity and inconsistencies in the selection criteria reflect inadequate training offered to the foremen by the DSS. If the targets are vulnerable households, the question of how many members are employed is important. The positive aspect of having unrestricted recruitment is that the programme increases the income of the participating households if more than one member is employed. On the negative side unrestricted recruitment, potentially eliminate other households that are also vulnerable. However, no guidelines are provided on the number of household members that can be allowed to participate. Beneficiaries were asked to indicate whether they think that there are restrictions on the number of members that can participate per household. The data revealed that 74.8 percent of male beneficiaries and 73.6 percent of female beneficiaries said that there are no restrictions are imposed on the number of workers from each household that can participate in the PWP project. On the other hand, 25.2percent of male and 26.4 percent of female beneficiaries reported that there were restrictions. In the majority of the districts visited it was also indicated that such restrictions do not exist. The tendency is to allow one participant only per household. The data presented in Table 5.3 suggest that only one member per household was allowed in just over 56.8 percent of beneficiary in this study. More female beneficiaries (36.7 percent) indicated that one other household member was recruited in the PWP compared with the 30.0 percent among male beneficiaries. There is evidence, from focus group discussions, that some of the foremen and project committees did not competently handle the recruitment of workers.

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Table 5.3 Number of Other Household Members who have participated in PWP

Male Female Total Number of Household Members N Percent N Percent N Percent None 379 59.1 307 54.1 686 56.8 One 192 30.0 208 36.7 400 33.1 Two 50 7.8 46 8.1 96 7.9 Three 15 2.3 5 0.9 20 1.7 More than three 5 0.8 1 0.2 6 0.5

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 The inadequate clarity on the guidelines for selection of project workers and the absence of checks during recruitment could render the whole process open to abuse. The selection criteria used vary from community to community suggesting that the standard selection criteria and the choice of indicators for targeting participants is not used and the selection is open to the subjective discretion of the communities. The inadequacy in the use of targeting guidelines creates leakage of safety net to the non-poor. As Ravallion (1991) points out, experience with direct interventions suggests that some of the poor will simply not be reached, and leakage of benefits to the non-poor is unavoidable. Apart from the briefings that are given to the community leaders during project launch, the district team officials seem to play no significant role in the selection of project workers except for skilled workers. The district team does not monitor the selection process to ensure that the project targets the intended beneficiaries. The community at large is also not involved in determining or refining the selection criteria. 5.4 Participation Rates The participation rates were affected by several factors including timely payment of wages to workers, nature of the tasks, availability of alternative employment opportunities, labour constraints especially as related to agricultural production and food security. Key informants’ (supervisors, foremen) perceptions on participation revealed that participation is mainly influenced by food insecurity. Participation was said to be high during periods of chronic food shortages around December to March. This is not surprising since the project sites were chosen on the basis of their vulnerability to food shortages. Participation was low immediately after harvest when household food security improves and also in some cases during peak agricultural periods. Participation in the project was also characterised by irregular attendance and desertions. According to Table 5.4 nearly a quarter of the beneficiaries interviewed had either temporarily withdrawn from the project at one point in time or completely dropout. The reported reasons for dropping out, from focus group discussions, include sickness, drunkenness, low wages, and delays in payment of wages while some dropped out to look for food. The data suggest that most of those who dropout never return as indicated by the low incidence of returnees (those who temporarily de-registered). However, both males and females from female-headed households were more likely to re-register than those from male-headed households. Although the difference is small, the percentage of females who re-registered was higher than that of males. Dropping out was slightly higher amongst males than females.

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Table 5.4 Participation in MASAF PWP by Sex of Household Head

Sex of Household Head Male-headed Female-headed

Total Participation Status

Male Female Male Female Male Female Participated without de-registering 72.8 77.9 64.3 75.1 74.7 74.5 Temporary de-registered 3.9 5.6 14.3 6.2 4.5 5.2 Dropped out 23.3 16.5 21.4 20.3 20.8 20.3 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Number of Observations 713 411 14 237 1125 251

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 5.4.1 Extent of Participation By Gender One of the principal objectives of the PWP is to ensure that gender considerations are taken on board throughout the project cycle. To assess the gender balance of participants in the communities, a comparison is made between the participation rates of men and women in by project site and project type. None of the PWP projects being evaluated here had achieved gender parity in participation rates. Of the 16 projects sites evaluated in this study, about half (actually 7) had higher female participation rates whilst the rest had higher male participation rates. With respect to type of project, Table 5.5 shows that male beneficiaries were concentrated in road works whilst women were concentrated in afforestation, river bank rehabilitation and dam construction projects. Nonetheless, the 30 percent minimum requirement for female participation is satisfied in the sample of beneficiaries in the project sites covered in this study. Beneficiaries reported that there were misconceptions that road works were considered to be more strenuous and energy demanding than afforestation projects and therefore were deemed more suitable for men than for women. Given the apparent dominance of road works projects in PWP, there is a danger that women were being marginalised due to the gender stereotypes based on the nature of work involved in some activities. Table 5.5 Proportion of Female and Male Beneficiaries by Project Type and Gender

Male Female Total Type of Project N Percent N Percent N Percent

Road works 588 60.5 384 39.5 972 100.0 Dam construction 86 36.3 151 63.7 237 100.0 Afforestation 51 37.2 86 62.8 137 100.0 River bank rehabilitation 36 38.7 57 61.3 93 100.0

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Although the communities were of the view that most of the tasks involved in road works such as sloping, ditching, were not suitable for women and therefore were of the view that the majority of workers should be men, women preferences indicate to the contrary as shown in Table 5.6. Of the five types of projects that have been funded by MASAF under the public

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works programme, women on average ranked road works to be the most preferred type of project, followed by afforestation. The average rankings are however similar between female and male beneficiaries. It is possible that women’s choice was influenced by the fact that road works was the most common public works programme. In addition, the women who selected road works might be already participating in this programme and have either seen that the tasks are not too demanding as perceived or might be engaged in the less strenuous tasks such as land clearing. Table 5.6 Mean Ranking for the Preferred Type of Work by Gender

Sex of respondent Road works Dam

construction Water tank Afforestation River bank rehabilitation

Female Mean 2.19 2.90 3.49 2.48 3.59 N 647 648 645 647 644 Male Mean 1.98 2.95 3.53 2.69 3.59 N 736 732 732 730 729 Total Mean 2.08 2.92 3.51 2.59 3.59 N 1383 1380 1377 1377 1373

Note: The preferences over types of projects were ranked from most preferred (rank = 1) to least preferred

(rank=5). The mean figures are average ranks for each participant. Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 The reasons given for the gender differences in participation varied from site to site. The reason for low female participation mentioned during the focus group discussions and interviews with key informants was that there was a feeling amongst the community that the tasks were physically strenuous and therefore not suitable for women. As a result women were not encouraged to register. In one site, women were only called to register after the initial registration that initially targeted men, hence, only a few women could be employed. In another project site women were given peripheral roles such as fetching drinking water, carrying sand and clearing land, which need only a few women. Interestingly enough in project sites where a lot of men had quit women were asked to do the very same tasks. Women were also reported to be reluctant to come forward to register during recruitment phase because they were shy. Female beneficiaries in three of the sites in this study (all road works projects) reported that the message given during launching and recruitment was that the work was suitable for men. Despite this there were no special effort made to reach out to women and encourage them to apply. In exceptional cases, women were also marginalised in leadership and decision making positions. Few women were members of project committee or were appointed to ranks of gang leaders or kapitawos even in cases where women dominated participation. The major reason given was lack of education amongst the women. These misconceptions suggest the need to strengthen information and education about the work roles in PWP project activities. There were no indications from the study that the involvement of women in the projects affected their workloads negatively in any significant way. Since the project work was done in the morning only, women reported that they were able to schedule their work in the afternoons or evenings. In other instances it was reported that other members of the household such as older children assisted the women with their household chores. The

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women also benefited from the fact that in most of the sites the project allowed other household members to work on the project in place of the registered members when need arose. 5.4.2 Reasons for Participation in the PWP Beneficiaries were asked to state the most important reason for their participation in MASAF PWP. Their responses are presented in Table 5.7. The data shows that poverty is the principal reason for participation. This suggests that the programme is targeting the vulnerable as intended with 79 percent of beneficiaries indicating poverty as their main motivation for participating in public works projects. With respect to gender, 83.1 percent of female participants and 75.5 percent of male participants gave poverty as the reason for their participation. The next important reason for participation is earning of additional income followed by the desire to develop their area and better wages. Development of the area is the third important reason for participation, from only 8.2 percent of beneficiaries. Reasons included under the ‘other’ category comprise hunger, acquisition of skills and need for employment. The same reasons for participation were advanced during focus group interviews with beneficiaries. The need to have money to buy food was mentioned in over half the discussions with beneficiaries. In some sites (such as Rumphi) it was reported that the project was introduced during drought and prospects of hunger made people join the project. This was echoed in Karonga where it was stated that the project was introduced during a period of acute shortage of food and the wages offered by the project were seen as a way out. In other sites the need to have money to buy food was the given as the reason for participating. These results suggest that the MASAF PWP is largely targeting vulnerable food insecure EPAs. Table 5.7 Reasons for Participation in MASAF PWP by Sex of the Respondent and Sex

of the Head of Household.

Male Female Total Reason for participation N Percent N Percent N Percent

Poverty 554 75.5 539 83.1 1093 79.0 Development of our area 85 11.6 29 4.5 114 8.2 Better wages than alternative employment 1 0.1 5 0.8 6 0.4

Additional income earnings 85 11.6 63 9.7 148 10.7 Other 9 1.2 13 2.0 21 1.6 Total 734 649 1380

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 5.4.3 Reason for Non-Participation in the PWP Non-beneficiaries were asked to state the reasons why they did not participate in the PWP project. Of the 560 non-beneficiaries covered in the study only 16.3 percent belong to female-headed households. The reasons for non-participation by gender of respondent are shown in Table 5.8. The main reason given for non-participation is that they were not selected even though they had registered that they qualified and were willing to work. Only 3.0 percent of

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non-beneficiaries indicated that they did not participate because they were discouraged by the wage offered under MASAF PWP. However, it is apparent that relatively more men than women did not participate because of low wages. The case of being in alternative employment was a reason for not participating among 13.0 percent of male non-beneficiaries, but not so for female non-beneficiaries. The other reasons accounting for 44.8 percent of responses include sickness, missing the registration process, not being aware of the employment opportunity and old age. Overall, the results suggest that a greater proportion of non-beneficiaries would have participated given the offered minimum wage for public works. Table 5.8 Reasons for Non-Participation in MASAF PWP by Non-Beneficiaries

Male Female Total Reason for Non-participation N Percent N Percent N Percent

Registered but was not selected 77 32.4 80 24.8 157 28.0 Low wage rates 11 4.6 6 1.9 17 3.0 Was employed elsewhere 31 13.0 9 2.8 40 7.1 Busy on my farm 27 11.3 20 6.2 47 8.4 Busy running my business 19 8.0 11 3.4 30 5.4 Not interested in development work 3 1.3 15 4.7 18 3.2 Other 70 29.4 181 56.2 251 44.8 Total 238 100.0 322 100.0 560 100.0

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Among those who registered but did not get selected, 74 percent indicated that they failed to participate because they had registered their willingness to work late while 22.9 percent reported that the committee favoured other (28.6 percent of male and 17.5 percent of female non-beneficiaries). Only in 2.5 percent was the committee reported to disqualify individuals because they were better off in the community. In all project sites it was reported that many potential workers showed up during the registration exercise but were turned away. Registration was to a large extent on the basis of first come first served basis and ended once the target number was reached. If the low wage is an adequate instrument for self-targeting, the high level of applications from non-beneficiaries, the limited number of employment opportunities and the first come first served basis that committees use in the recruitment imply that the public works programme eliminates some of the vulnerable households. 5.4.4 Reasons for Dropout Apparently dropout rates were very low in all the project sites. What were more common were desertions of transient nature. The fact that only a small proportion of participants permanently dropout from the project is perhaps an indication of the extent of poverty in these communities and lack of alternative sources of income given the low wages offered by the project. The reasons that have been given for both temporal dropout include illness of self or other family members, late payment of project wages which force people to look for ‘ganyu’ particularly during the periods of acute food shortages and dodging strenuous and energy exerting tasks such as breaking rocks. Usually the workers return after the condition, which forced them to leave, has improved. In most of the project sites it was reported that re-employing these returnees is the prerogative of the supervisor or foreman. In the case of those who stopped working because of illnesses, attending funerals or delays in payment of wages, and re-registering is automatic as long as there is still a vacancy in the project.

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The reasons cited for permanent dropout are the similar to the reasons given for temporal withdraw but in addition and perhaps more important is the issue of wages. Low wages were frequently cited in all project sites as a major cause of desertions. People who dropped out because of low wages rarely returned to work. In some project sites like Chikwawa it was reported that late payments of wages led to people seeking alternatives sources of employment like ganyu particularly in January and February when food shortages became critical. In Mzuzu it was reported that most of the dropouts left immediately after harvesting since the main motive for participation was food and in addition alternatives sources of income become possible (through crop sales). In Nkhotakota and Lilongwe people left to work in their gardens during the growing season suggesting that the project did interfere with the seasonal workloads of some individuals. In road works it was also common to find people deserting when the distance to work from home increases as the course of the road moves further away. 5.5 Summary This chapter has evaluated the criteria for project selection and selection of workers. In order to achieve its objective of assisting vulnerable people, the PWP is targeted at EPA and household/individual levels. The main source of information used for targeting EPAs is VAM data, which is used to establish a cut-off point of eligible EPAs. However, where the VAM data does not reflect the situation, the process allows flexibility and the DSS can justify the targeting of EPAs based on different criteria. The selection of the actual project site is the responsibility of the district sub-set team. MASAF MU select the target EPAs based on the VAM data, but because of the unreliability of the VAM the DSS can justify targeting different EPAs. The selection of project type is also made at the district level. There were variations between the project sites whether the communities were consulted on the type of project or not. In all the project sites in the Northern region the projects had originated from the communities whilst in the southern and central regions, some communities felt that they was little consultation on what type of project to implement. In the former, most of the projects were originally on the DDC list of approved projects through the community traditional structures, the VDC and ADC. The project workers are recruited at the community level. The communities are responsible for identifying vulnerable households for targeting through project committee, traditional leaders or foremen. The low level of education in the communities, inadequate targeting guidelines and lack of monitoring of the selection process led to widespread inconsistencies in the selection process, and the leakage to the non-poor are possible. Participation was found to be affected by wage rate, timely payment of wages to workers, nature of tasks and availability of alternative employment. Participation was high during periods of food shortages and low when household food security improves. Dropout rates were very low and men tended to dropout more than women. There were some notable gender differences in participation by project type. Women were concentrated in afforestation, river rehabilitation and dam projects whilst men were concentrated in road works. The communities held gender stereotyped views about what women can do which might have marginalised women participation in PWP projects.

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The main reason given for participation in the project is poverty. This suggests that PWP is largely targeting vulnerable people. The main reason for non-participation was that they were not selected implying that some of the vulnerable households are eliminated because of the limited employment opportunities offered by PWP.

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CHAPTER 6

REMUNERATION 6.1 Introduction This chapter report results of the beneficiary and non-beneficiary assessments on wage levels, form and preferences. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate worker’s preferences over the type of remuneration from public works programmes, their preferred form of wages by season and compare the wage levels that participants and non-participants received in alternative employment available in the communities. In the public works projects MASAF uses the government minimum wage as the guide when setting the safety net wage for workers in targeted Extension Planning Areas (EPAs). That is, the safety net wage (e.g. K15.80 per day at the time of the study) is set slightly below the government minimum wage (set at K15.90 per day at the time of the study). MASAF PWP workers were asked to state the number of hours they worked per day, the form and level of wages and perceptions on remuneration. The participants’ perceptions on remuneration related to the preferred form of wages during different seasons of the year (such as rainy season, post-harvest and garden preparation time), the wage level and the incidence of delayed wage payments. Another important season-related issue that was raised with beneficiaries was the time or season of the year when they would most prefer to be engaged on MASAF PWP. The study team also sought information from non-participants on the wages from the alternative employment in the local economy. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section of the chapter presents the findings on the duration of employment in MASAF funded public works programmes. Section 6.3 focuses on earnings from employment opportunities under MASAF PWP and the perceptions of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on remuneration. Section 6.4 presents findings from non-beneficiaries on duration worked and earnings from alternative (non-MASAF public works) employment opportunities. Lastly, section 6.5 provides a summary of the findings on remuneration. 6.2 Duration and Mean Number of Hours Worked Per Day MASAF PWP stipulates that workers should work for four hours in a day. In practice the overall mean number of hours was 3.5 (see Table 6.1). Variations in the number of hours worked at different project sites abound. For instance, workers on the Thabwa-Robeni road in Mulanje district worked for the highest average of 4.14 hours while those in Buzi-Hill Afforestation project in Ntchisi worked for the lowest average of 2.67 hours. At gender level the overall mean for both male and female was 3.5 hours. For some projects, e.g. Thabwa-Robeni road and Lozi-Mwalawatongole road women worked for longer mean duration of 4.30 and 4.00 hours, respectively, compared to males’ mean duration of 3.88 and 3.77 hours, respectively. The fact that individuals worked for relatively small number of hours seen above means that they were afforded relatively more time to use their labour in other activities.

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Table 6.1 Average Daily Number of Hours in MASAF PWP Activities

Sex of Respondent Project Site Female Male

All Respondents

Overall 3.50 3.51 3.51 Mwenelondo-Lake Road 3.09 2.96 3.01 Mbiriwizi Dam 3.67 3.38 3.56 Lunjika via Chasenga School-M1 Road 3.59 3.46 3.54 Bwengu-Katope Road 3.78 3.86 3.82 Kande-Mapale-Chesamu Road 3.30 3.43 3.41 Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road 4.00 3.77 3.81 Buzi Hill Afforestation 2.59 2.81 2.67 Mndunje-Bimphi Road 3.45 3.58 3.57 Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off Road 3.53 3.70 3.62 Thumba Dam 3.54 3.50 3.53 Livunzu-Mpangowalimba Road 3.83 3.77 3.81 Thabwa-Robeni Road 4.30 3.88 4.14 Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation 3.26 3.71 3.43 Ndunde-Simithi Road 3.17 3.60 3.44 Ndunde Earth Dam 3.50 3.65 3.55 Katema-Chileka Road 3.89 3.54 3.72

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment, 2000 6.3 MASAF PWP Earnings and Perceptions on Wage Levels 6.3.1 Total Earnings and Implied Employment Creation The average total earnings that individual MASAF PWP workers reportedly received from the various project sites as at the time of the study are reported in Table 6.2. The overall mean for both male and female workers for all study project sites was about MK1,810.00. Given the daily wage rate (task wage) of MK15.80 it implies that MASAF PWP accorded each worker an estimated 114 employment days of an average of 3.5 hours each. At gender level an average male worker received about MK2,028.00, which exceeded the amount of MK1,568.00 received by an average female worker. In terms of employment days created, this translates into 128 for male workers and 99 for female workers. However, it is important to remember that these are not the actual average days worked. At project level the highest mean earnings per worker was MK3,629.00 received by workers on Kande-Mapale-Chesamu Road project in Nkhata-Bay district while the lowest was MK871.00 earned by workers on the Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road project in Nkhotakota district. It is not apparent why there were such variations. But it is also worth noting that the total earnings earned by individual workers varied directly with the actual number of days worked. Similarly, total earnings received at project level differed reflecting the actual number of tasks performed by workers throughout the project.

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Table 6.2 Mean Earnings and Task Rates from MASAF PWP

Female Workers Male Workers All Workers Project Site

Earnings (Kwacha)

Task Rates*

Earnings (Kwacha)

Task Rates*

Earnings (Kwacha)

Task Rates*

Overall 1,568.00 99 2,028.00 79 1,810.00 114 Mwenelondo-Lake Road 1,347.00 85 1,770.00 112 1,606.00 102 Mbiriwizi Dam 2,102.00 133 2,161.00 137 2,125.00 134 Lunjika via Chasenga Sch-M1 Road 2,755.00 174 2,409.00 152 2,614.00 165 Bwengu-Katope Road 1,579.00 100 2,155.00 136 1,896.00 120 Kande-Mapale-Chesamu Road 1,628.00 103 3,867.00 245 3,629.00 230 Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road 802.00 51 882.00 56 871.00 55 Buzi Hill Afforestation 1,274.00 81 1,589.00 101 1,391.00 88 Mndunje-Bimphi Road 1,506.00 95 2,196.00 139 2,111.00 134 Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off Road 1,105.00 70 1,004.00 64 1,049.00 66 Thumba Dam 848.00 54 1,192.00 75 931.00 59 Livunzu-Mpangowalimba Road 1,685.00 107 2,294.00 145 1,947.00 123 Thabwa-Robeni Road 1,523.00 96 1,444.00 91 1,494.00 95 Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation 2,137.00 135 2,184.00 138 2,155.00 136 Ndunde-Simithi Road 1,242.00 79 1,493.00 94 1,399.00 89 Ndunde Earth Dam 1,573.00 100 1,472.00 93 1,538.00 97 Katema-Chileka Road 1,041.00 66 1,120.00 71 1,078.00 68

Note: * Task Rates = earnings divided by the task wage rate of K15.80. Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000. 6.3.2 Preferred Forms of Wages It was reported that MASAF PWP wages were paid in cash. The workers were asked to state whether they preferred cash or in-kind payment. The majority (82 percent) was in favour of cash payment. The remainder, 18 percent were in favour of in-kind form of payment. When further asked to indicate the form of payment (i.e. whether cash and in-kind) they would most prefer to be used during different seasons of the year the most popular form of payment during all the seasons was still cash among both male and female workers. The results on the latter are depicted in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.1. We note that while cash was preferred to in-kind, there were seasonal variations in its popularity; cash was most preferred during the post-harvest months from around March (preferred by more than 80 percent of the workers) until the late garden preparation month of November. For the period from December to February (also known to be the period when most households’ food insecurity is critical) preference for cash falls somewhat while that for in-kind payment rises. Thus the preference for in-kind payments varies inversely with the level of food availability, being more preferred during food deficit periods. This suggests that during a critical food deficit time (or in a typical food deficit area) in-kind payments would be preferred to cash payments. Gender differences in the preferred form of wages abound with proportionately more female workers than male workers preferring in-kind payments for all months. Focus group discussions with participants and non-participants also revealed that women had higher preference for in-kind payments particularly maize while men were mostly in favour of cash payments. This is highly correlated with the finding on the utilisation of income from public works projects in which proportionately more women compared with men use income to purchase food.

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Table 6.3 Percentages of Beneficiaries Showing Preferred Mode of Payment By Month

Female Respondents Male Respondents Month N Cash In-kind Total % N Cash In-kind Total %

January 632 64.4 35.6 100.0 714 74.6 25.4 100.0 February 636 63.9 36.1 100.0 716 74.9 25.1 100.0 March 628 69.3 30.7 100.0 710 80.5 19.5 100.0 April 605 75.8 24.2 100.0 694 85.9 14.1 100.0 May 594 78.1 21.9 100.0 680 87.8 12.2 100.0 June 590 77.5 22.5 100.0 672 87.8 12.2 100.0 July 590 77.4 22.6 100.0 676 87.5 12.5 100.0 August 594 76.7 23.3 100.0 677 86.6 13.4 100.0 September 593 75.5 24.5 100.0 682 86.3 13.7 100.0 October 594 75.0 25.0 100.0 681 85.1 14.9 100.0 November 602 72.2 27.8 100.0 693 82.7 17.3 100.0 December 617 69.4 30.6 100.0 708 80.6 19.4 100.0

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000. Figure 6.1 Percentage of Beneficiaries Showing Preferred Mode of Payment by Month

74.6

74.9 80.5

85.9

87.8

87.8

87.5

86.6

86.3

85.1

82.7

80.6

64.4

63.9

69.3 75.8

78.1

77.5

77.4

76.7

75.5

75.0

72.2

69.4

35.6

36.1

30.7

24.2

21.9

22.5

22.6

23.3

24.5

25.0

27.8

30.6

25.4

25.1

19.5

14.1

12.2

12.2

12.5

13.4

13.7

14.9

17.3

19.4

0.010.020.030.040.050.060.070.080.090.0

Percent

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

In-kind (Male)

In-kind (Female)

Cash (Female)

Cash (Male)

In-kind (Male) In-kind (Female) Cash (Female) Cash (Male)

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6.3.3 Preferred Season of Engagement in MASAF PWP MASAF PWP workers were asked to state the season during which they would most prefer to be employed on MASAF PWP. The responses given in Table 6.4 show that on the overall basis (last two columns) the majority (43 percent) of the workers preferred the post-harvest period (April-July), 11 percent preferred the rainy season (December-March), 9 percent preferred the garden preparation time (August-November). The above were a total of 63 percent of the workers who preferred seasonal employment. The remainder, 37 percent wanted MASAF PWP to employ them throughout the year. Table 6.4 Distribution of Workers by Preferred Seasons of Employment on MASAF

PWP

Sex of Household Head Female Male

Overall Season N Percent N Percent N Percent Garden Preparation (August-November) 26 10.5 90 8.0 116 8.5 Rainy Season (December-March) 23 9.3 132 11.8 155 11.3 Post-harvest (April-July) 87 35.2 500 44.6 587 42.9 Throughout the year 111 44.9 398 35.5 509 37.2 Total 247 100.0 1,120 100.0 1,367 100.0

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment, 2000. From above the proportions of workers who preferred being employed on MASAF PWP throughout the year were substantial particularly among workers who lived in female-headed households. Such households were probably some of the typically resource-poor ones with very few (if any) appreciable alternative means of livelihood. The data also show that between 20 percent of both female and male-headed households preferred to be employed in MASAF PWP activities even during seasons of garden preparation and rainy season. Such were probably households who underwent seasonal fluctuations in food security, being food insecure during the preferred season but food secure during the post-harvest months of April-July. By analogous reasoning, those that preferred to be employed during the post-harvest period of April-July (approximately an overall 43 percent of the respondents) can be described as not experiencing seasonal food shortages. That is, they were food secure (from alternative sources) during the gardening season and would rather supply labour in MASAF PWP afterwards. A specific finding worth further attention is that only 11.3 percent of the workers preferred being engaged during December-March the period considered by MASAF MU to be ideal for intervention. During the period in question most poor households are generally food insecure (see findings from this study and others) hence the felt appropriateness to intensify the safety net during December-March. The main reason for not preferring the period in question was said to be that they preferred devoting most of their time to working in their gardens to produce whatever little food they could manage and be assured of some food produce. Their point was strengthened by occurrences of long safety net wage delays (and project suspensions in some places) which had created feelings of uncertainty. Thus while the period in question is admittedly one characterised by household food insecurity individuals and communities still wanted to maximise own food production and supplement it with MASAF PWP wages after the growing season.

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6.3.4 Perceptions on Remuneration 6.3.4.1 Adequacy of Wages The wage rate that MASAF uses in the public works programs is one of the contentious issues among participants, non-participants and key informants interviewed during the study. One of the principles of MASAF with respect to public works is to provide employment to the poor as a safety net around the government minimum wage. In 1998, the wage rates for gang leaders (kapitawos) and casual labour were MK14.50 and MK10.50 per day, respectively. The wage rates were increased by 50 percent for kapitawos to MK21.75 per day and by 50.4 percent for casual labourers since 1999. Discussions with all the stakeholders in the project sites covered in the study support the view that the current minimum wage is grossly inadequate given the changing economic conditions in Malawi. Table 6.5 presents perceptions from the communities on wage levels. Most existing wages from alternative employment on similar work that require unskilled labour for an equivalent MASAF PWP task were higher than the MASAF PWP wage of MK15.80, with the exception of Buzi Hill Afforestation, Thumba Dam and Thabwa-Robeni road. In Thabwa-Robeni road project, beneficiaries were of the view that the local wage rates was exploitative but the MASAF wage was better and were also developmental. The local existing wage is highest at MK37.00 in the Mwenelondo-Lake road in Karonga. Table 6.5 Perceptions on Wages under MASAF Public Works Programme (Kwacha per

day per MASAF task equivalent)

Reservation wages Preferred wages Project Site

Local Minimum

wages Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary Beneficiary Non-

Beneficiary Mwenelondo-Lake Road 37.00 15.00 35.00 20.00 58.00 Mbiriwizi Dam 35.00 20.00 50.00 27.00 70.00 Lunjika via Chasenga School-M1 25.00 25.00 35.00 50.00 70.00 Bwengu-Katope Road 17.00 15.00 20.00 38.00 38.00 Kande-Mapale-Chesamu Road 20.00 18.00 25.00 20.00 40.00 Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road 30.00 20.00 30.00 35.00 35.00 Buzi Hill Afforestation 15.00 10.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 Mndunje-Bimphi Road 30.00 15.00 20.00 30.00 30.00 Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off Road 30.00 15.00 23.00 30.00 50.00 Thumba Dam 10.00 10.00 15.00 17.00 50.00 Livunzu-Mpangowalimba Road 30.00 15.00 58.00 30.00 116.00 Thabwa-Robeni Road 10.00 15.00 20.00 38.00 38.00 Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation 25.00 27.00 38.00 38.00 38.00 Ndunde-Smith Road 20.00 33.00 35.00 35.00 38.00 Ndunde Earth Dam 23.00 21.00 50.00 30.00 150.00 Katema-Chileka Road 27.00 22.00 25.00 30.00 50.00 Average 25.90 17.90 31.80 31.10 56.3

Notes: The wage data is based on information from focus group discussions and key informants’ interviews in

the community. The monthly wages are computed on the basis of a four-hour task equivalent and where respondents indicated monthly wages; the monthly wage was divided by 26 days to obtain the daily wage.

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000

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The effectiveness of the safety net wage in targeting the poor can be evaluated by comparing the safety net wage to the reservation wage (the wage below which they are unwilling to offer their labour services). If people are willing to work for less than their reservation wage then it can be said that such people are indeed without reliable alternative sources of livelihood. On average the local minimum wage in the sixteen project sites is MK25.90 per task compared with the wage rate of MK15.80 per task in MASAF-funded public works projects. The average reservation wage among beneficiaries is MK17.90 per task less than the local minimum wage and the reservation wage for non-beneficiaries of MK31.80 but more than the wage in MASAF-funded projects. However, there are variations in the project sites, with eight of the sixteen project sites covered in the study, beneficiaries reporting the reservation wage above the wage in MASAF-funded public works project. Interestingly, the reservation wages for beneficiaries are lower than those revealed by non-beneficiaries, reflecting the vulnerability of the former. Also, an analysis can be made with regard to whether the MASAF wage has a distortionary effect on the local labour markets or not. It is true that when converted to a full day’s wage, the MASAF wage of K15.80 (which is for 4 hours) is actually twice (K31.60) the statutory minimum wage of K19.90. Thus, it would be tempting to conclude that the MASAF wage is hence, likely to be distortionary. However, there is a very important factor that must be brought into the equation before a conclusion can be made. There is trite knowledge that the statutory minimum wage in Malawi has always been far much lower that the actual average wage in the labour market. This is because the statutory minimum wage has not only been very low, but also because upward adjustments have been very much infrequent.9 Indeed, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, this study found that on average, the actual local minimum wage in the sixteen project sites was K25.90 for the same time per day as under MASAF-PWP, that is, for 4 hours a day. This amounts to K51.90 for the same time per day, which is more than 3 times the statutory minimum wage. In other words, the MASAF wage of K31.60 per 8-hour day, though twice the minimum wage, is much lower than the actual local minimum wage. Therefore it can be concluded that the MASAF-PWP wage is still far from distorting the local labour market. With respect to preferred wage rate, it is apparent that both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries would prefer higher wages than currently offered under the MASAF-funded public works projects. The average preferred wage for beneficiaries is MK31.10 per task above the average local minimum wage and their reservation wage, but below that preferred by non-beneficiaries (MK56.30 per task). The lowest preferred daily wage rate was stated by workers on the Thumba Dam project (MK17.00) and highest among workers on the Lunjika-M1 road project (MK50.00). These wage preferences show that the current daily safety net wage of MK15.80 per task is low compared with the average local minimum wage and the reservation wage for beneficiaries. Most arguments on the communities’ demand for higher wages were based on the real value of the wage rate. This was seen from the fact that they often complained about the falling purchasing power of their wages. The perceptions on wages from the focus group discussions and key informants’ interviews are supported by the data from the individual questionnaire. Table 6.6 shows that 78.5 percent against 21.5 percent of respondents indicated that wages under MASAF PWP are less than what is offered by local private employers. Similarly, a larger proportion (95.5 percent) noted that wages offered by other institutions are higher than the wages under MASAF PWP.

9 For example, the current statutory minimum wage of K15.90 has been at this level since October 1998.

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Table 6.6 Comparison of MASAF PWP Wage with Local Wages

Is the MASAF PWP wage greater than Wages offered by Local Private Employers? Wages offered by Other Institutions?

Response

N Percent N Percent No 1,551 78.5 1,888 95.5 Yes 426 21.5 89 4.5

Total 1,977 100.0 1,977 100.0 Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment, 2000. With the high inflation witnessed in the past years, the static nature of the wages means that the real returns to labour are far below what can be considered as an effective safety net wage. While it is plausible to use the minimum wage to guide the determination of the safety net wage the inflexibility in the adjustment of the minimum wage in an economy that is subjected to high commodity price inflation renders the safety net wage ineffective in raising the beneficiaries’ welfare. The poor individuals and households thus barely benefit from the constant safety net wage. 6.3.4.2 Prevalence and Extent of Wage Payment Delays MASAF PWP workers also expressed concern on the delays of payment of their dues. The prevalence of payment delays and the maximum and mean number of days of delayed payment are shown in Table 6.7. Slightly more than half of the workers stated that their wages were delayed at some point in time during the project life. The largest proportion of workers reporting delays in wage payments was 75 percent among workers on the Mndunje-Bimphi road in Dowa district while the smallest proportion of 27 percent among workers on the Ndunde-Simithi road project. With respect to the length of payment delay (in number of days) the overall average number of days of delayed wage payment was 45 days and the (reported individual case of) maximum or longest delay was 366 days. The mean number of days of delayed wage payments for individual projects varied substantially, with the lowest mean of 10 days on Thumba Dam project and the highest of 89 days on the Kande-Mapale-Chesamu road project.

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Table 6.7 Prevalence and Extent of Delayed MASAF PWP Wages

Workers Who Stated there were Payment Delays

Period of Delay (Days) Project Site

N Percent Maximum* Mean Overall 1,092 55.3 366 45 Mwenelondo-Lake Road 66 54.5 28 12 Mbiriwizi Dam 65 54.2 100 45 Lunjika via Chasenga School-M1 Road 80 64.5 150 73 Bwengu-Katope Road 78 59.5 90 20 Kande-Mapale-Chesamu Road 94 71.2 150 89 Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road 39 32.5 200 25 Buzi Hill Afforestation 83 66.9 90 48 Mndunje-Bimphi Road 92 75.4 366 34 Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off Road 88 71.0 120 47 Thumba Dam 41 33.1 70 10 Livunzu-Mpangowalimba Road 88 72.7 180 81 Thabwa-Robeni Road 50 42.0 90 43 Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation 83 66.4 180 66 Ndunde-Simithi Road 34 27.0 60 15 Ndunde Earth Dam 43 36.4 90 12 Katema-Chileka Road 68 54.8 90 16

Note: * The ‘maximum’ and ‘minimum’ values were individual cases not necessarily the ‘group’ or

‘project site’ values. Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Overall, the modal number of days of wage delays was 197 days reported by 18 percent of those that had indicated that they had experienced wage delays. The maximum number of days of wage delays is 366 reported by one beneficiary in the Mndunje-Bimphi road.10 In general, the prevalence of delayed wage payments was high and the duration rather too long a in a truly ‘safety net’ intervention. One of the main reasons for delayed wage payments to beneficiaries included project suspensions (e.g. the case of projects in Dowa, Nkhatabay, Nkhotakota to mention a few) and the inability of the DSS to properly account for the financial resources for the project. 6.4 Duration and Earnings in Alternative Employment among Non-beneficiaries The level of wage earnings in the ‘local economy’ or neighbourhood of MASAF PWP activities in comparison with the MASAF PWP earnings is determined by the earnings of non-participants in the project sites covered in the study. Non-beneficiaries sampled in the study were asked whether they were employed elsewhere, and if so, what was the number of hours worked per day, number of workdays per month and total monthly earnings. Table 6.8 shows the findings on the number of hours worked per day and number of days worked per month. 10 This was stated by one respondent on the Mndunje-Bimphi road project. This may be the case of a worker involved in a wage dispute e.g. a situation where an individual who claimed to have worked but his/her services terminated before getting paid.

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Table 6.8 Mean Number of Hours worked per Day and Days worked per Month

No. of Hours worked per Day No. of Days worked per Month Sex of respondent Sex of Respondent

Project site Female Male

Overall Female Male

Overall

Mwenelondo-Lake Road - 7.50 7.50 - 29 29 Mbiriwizi Dam 4.67 7.00 5.25 18 30 21 Lunjika via Chasenga -M1 Road - 8.00 8.00 26 26 26 Bwengu-Katope Road 3.67 6.00 4.60 16 30 23 Kande-Mapale-Chesamu Road 4.50 8.67 7.00 16 24 21 Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road 2.00 4.00 3.00 7 14 11 Buzi Hill Afforestation 5.00 - 5.00 30 - 30 Mndunje-Bimphi Road 4.00 - 4.00 20 26 24 Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off Road 8.00 7.00 7.20 30 24 25 Thumba Dam 4.00 6.00 5.00 21 14 18 Livunzu-Mpangowalimba Road - 4.00 4.00 - 20 20 Thabwa-Robeni Road 6.00 9.00 7.29 21 18 20 Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation 5.00 - 5.00 25 - 25 Ndunde Earth Dam - 10.00 10.00 - 26 26 Katema-Chileka Road - 7.00 7.00 - 23 23 Overall 4.79 7.20 6.16 20 24 22 Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000. A total of 662 non-beneficiaries (31 percent female and 69 percent male) of the 1,104 non-beneficiaries held alternative employment opportunities. On the average, both male and female non-beneficiaries who were engaged in other employment worked for 6 hours per day; male non-beneficiaries had longer work days of 7 hours while female non-beneficiaries had about 5 hours. In both cases individuals worked longer duration than MASAF PWP workers who had an average of 3.5 hours per day. The longest days of work (8 hours) among female non-beneficiaries obtained around Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off road project while among male non-beneficiaries the longest was 10 hours around Ndunde Earth Dam project. With respect to the total monthly earnings that non-participants made from the various employment opportunities, it was found that on average female non-beneficiaries earned smaller amounts of money (about K938.00) than male non-beneficiaries who earned MK1,440.00 per month (see Table 6.9). The overall average was MK1,225.00. All earnings except those among female non-beneficiaries around Lozi-Mwalawatongole road project were greater than the monthly earnings from an average full-time MASAF PWP beneficiary who would earn MK347.60 in 22 workdays. On hourly equivalence, alternative employment in the area translates into a wage rate of MK9.04 per hour compared with MK4.51 per hour in MASAF-funded public works projects. The evidence that the local wages are much higher than the wage paid in MASAF-funded projects further supports beneficiary observation that the minimum local wage for similar work was higher than the wage earned in MASAF-funded projects. Thus on the average non-beneficiaries who had other employment opportunities and beneficiaries that participated in local employment were better off compared with those that participated in the MASAF-funded public works projects. It must be added, though, that it is not all non-beneficiaries who had employment opportunities after all there were some who applied for MASAF PWP but did not succeed in getting employed.

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Table 6.9 Mean Monthly Earnings from Alternative Employment Opportunities

Sex of Respondent Project site Female (Kwacha) Male(Kwacha) Overall (Kwacha)Mwenelondo-Lake Road - 761.00 761.00Mbiriwizi Dam 1,033.00 3,600.00 1,675.00Lunjika via Chasenga School-M1 Road 3,120.00 - 3,120.00Bwengu-Katope Road 2,250.00 2,635.00 2,507.00Kande-Mapale-Chesamu Road 520.00 1,327.00 1,025.00Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road 160.00 3,000.00 1,580.00Buzi Hill Afforestation 500.00 - 500.00Mndunje-Bimphi Road 400.00 1,200.00 800.00Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off Road 1,000.00 543.00 634.00Thumba Dam 840.00 1,780.00 1,310.00Livunzu-Mpangowalimba Road - 1,850.00 1,850.00Thabwa-Robeni Road 691.00 1,048.00 825.00Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation 533.00 - 533.00Katema-Chileka Road - 757.00 757.00Overall 938.00 1,440.00 1,225.00 Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000. Interestingly, the wage rates obtaining in alternative employment opportunities for non-beneficiaries are somewhat close to those found in the rural labour market study. For instance, Zgovu (2000) finds that employees received an overall monthly wage rate of MK1,228.00 in contract employment, MK1,220.00 in salaried employment, and MK1,100.00 in temporary employment or ganyu. 6.5 Summary The major findings reported in this chapter can be summarised as follows. The total earnings and total number of days generated from the activities were generally low to meet their food and livelihood needs. Cash was the most preferred form of wages for all seasons and for both male and female workers. There were indications that preference for in-kind payments was inversely related with household food availability, that is, preference for in-kind payments increased while that for cash fell somewhat for the November-February period when most poor households tend to experience food shortages. With respect to the season when workers would most prefer to be engaged in MASAF PWP half of the workers favoured the post-harvest period but about 40 percent stated that they would prefer being engaged throughout the year. The latter can be said to be some of the most vulnerable workers that the safety net reached. The study finds that the incidence of delays in wage payments was high and the duration rather too long for a ‘safety net’ intervention. The delays were partly due to project suspensions and in failure of the district teams to properly account project funds that are advanced in tranches for project implementation. Delays in wage payments weakened the purchasing power of the earnings due to high inflation in Malawi, and diminished the significance of the safety net. The wage paid in MASAF-funded public works projects is much lower compared with the wage rates from comparable employment in the communities and the wages earned by non-

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beneficiaries in alternative employment. Non-beneficiaries in alternative employment worked longer workdays of 6 hours than those on MASAF-funded public works projects who worked for an average of 3.5 hours. The average wage rate in alternative employment translates into MK9.04 per hour compared to the average hourly wage MK4.51 in the MASAF public works projects. The wage in MASAF-funded public works projects is also lower than the average reservation wage rate for beneficiaries and the average local minimum employment, and beneficiaries would prefer a wage in MASAF-funded projects double the current wage. MASAF MU contended, however, that the MASAF PWP wage were static for the simple reason that the wage rate being used (K15.80) was already almost equal to the Government minimum wage of K15.90. Raising the MASAF PWP wage would certainly amount to a safety net wage higher than the government minimum wage. This would contradict the principle of setting a safety net wage below the minimum wage and would potentially attract individuals from existing alternative sources of employment. This contention is well intended in so far as the design of safety net interventions is concerned, but it is also important to ensure that the safety net wage does not fall below the reservation wage of the poor to minimise labour exploitation.

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CHAPTER 7

INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE MASAF PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

7.1 Introduction This chapter reports the findings on the role of various institutions that are involved in the implementation of MASAF PWP. MASAF PWP operational strategy is to provide a safety net to the poor households in the targeted areas through infrastructural projects that are collaboratively implemented by various institutions at national, regional, district and community levels. Specifically, this chapter identifies the various institutions and evaluates their roles in the project cycle for the public works projects, assesses the institutional linkages and their effectiveness in the implementation of projects and analyses the community’s perceptions on the performance of various institutions in the project cycle. In addition, the MASAF PWP programme is compared with existing safety net programmes in the catchment areas of the MASAF project sites based on the assessment of communities. 7.2 Institutional Framework and Linkages for MASAF Projects 7.2.1 MASAF Management Unit and Zone Offices The overall management of MASAF activities is vested in the Management Unit (MU) headed by the Executive Director assisted by five divisional heads. The public works programme falls under the Public Works Programme Division headed by the Director of PWP who reports directly to the Executive Director. The Deputy Director of PWP assists the Director of PWP at the management unit. Some of the responsibilities of the PWP Division at MU are co-ordination of annual targeting of EPAs, preparation of annual budgets and mobilisation of resources for public works, linking with desk officers in sector ministries, supervision of zone operations and monitoring and evaluation of zone activities. The PWP Division is also responsible for policy formulation for the management and implementation of PWP for approval by the Board based on the experiences in the field activities. The operations of MASAF in general and the PWP Divisions in particular have evolved over time since the successful implementation of the pilot phase. There is evidence that that MASAF approach has been a learning process, in which the management of the project continues to be refined through the field experiences and consultations with various stakeholders. For instance, the payment of wages to the community in-kind that was partly used in the pilot projects was phased out in the main phase due to the logistical problems with collaborating institutions. In addition, there has been expansion in the outreach network for the PWP Division through additional officers in zone offices. Initially, MASAF did not provide maintenance for government vehicles at district level used in the implementation of the PWP projects. However, in the main phase MASAF can contribute a maximum of two-thirds towards the cost of maintaining vehicles. However, in practice MASAF has had to bear the total cost of maintenance of district vehicles used in the implementation of PWP projects. Nonetheless, other issues such as the basis for targeting, the gender representation requirements, the use of the minimum wage and the community management of the projects remain the same. As observed above, the issues of targeting and the level of wages remain

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controversial issues in the design of the programme from the perspective of participants and communities. The latter has been exacerbated by the inability of the Government to adjust minimum wages regularly in light of changing economic conditions such as the high cost of living. 7.2.1.1 Operational Framework The MASAF zone offices are the outreach network of the PWP Division and consists of four Zone offices managed by Zone Managers (Project Officers). Table 7.1 shows the distribution of districts in the four zones. The Administrative Assistant and Zone Accounts Assistant who are also responsible for the Community Sub Project assist the Zone Manager for the Public Works Programme. The role of the Zone office include the provision of financial management support to the District Executive Committee Sub-Set (DSS), management of resources at the zone level, facilitating dissemination of information with respect to the public works programme. The zone office also facilitates project development and implementation at district level, liaise and co-ordinate with sectoral ministries at regional level, monitoring and evaluation of project activities. Table 7.1 Districts by MASAF Zones MASAF Zone Districts Mzuzu Lilongwe Liwonde Blantyre

Karonga, Chitipa, Rumphi, Nkhata Bay, Mzimba, Likoma Kasungu, Lilongwe, Mchinji, Salima, Nkhotakota, Dowa, Ntchisi, Dedza Ntcheu, Machinga, Mangochi, Zomba, Chiradzulu, Phalombe, Balaka Blantyre, Mwanza, Thyolo, Mulanje, Chikwawa, Nsanje

Source: MASAF (1999). 7.2.1.2 Linkages with DSS, Communities and Workers The operational concept of MASAF is to collaborate with various government departments, non-governmental organisations and community institutions. The successful implementation of the project activities therefore depends on the level of understanding of the project concept among various stakeholders. At the national level the PWP Division establishes Memorandum of Understanding between MASAF and various ministries involved in the implementation of projects at district level. At district level, the Zone Office collaborates with District Assemblies and the district team on the implementation of approved project activities. In turn, the district team collaborates with traditional leaders and communities in the implementation of the project, and the involvement of MASAF at community level is remote by design. Although, public works projects fall under the jurisdiction of line ministries MASAF provides support for transport (fuel expenses) and subsistence allowance to the ministry staff on duty on MASAF funded projects, and contributes to the cost of vehicle maintenance. Interviews with the DSS and Zone Officers revealed that in most respects the linkages are satisfactory but it is apparent that some DSS members do not fully understand the operational and collaborative concept of MASAF. This in part is due to the fact that most officers in the District Assemblies are new. The District Assemblies and the line ministries do not assume full ownership of the project activities in their districts and in a few cases there are

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misconceptions that additional activities funded by from MASAF bring additional work not budgeted for in the central government financial provisions. This reflects the weakness in the effectiveness of the Memorandum of Understanding between MASAF and the relevant parent ministry. The problem here is that although the parent ministry agrees to the collaborative concept, the capacity of the ministries at district level does not reflect the increased workload in supervision and implementation of district projects. The parent ministry does not take into account these additional activities in the financial provisions for the districts. The ineffectiveness of the Memorandum of Understanding is also reflected in the lack of supervision of the projects by the regional offices of the line Ministries. In some cases the sectoral technical supervisors were not willing to take additional responsibilities. In the Ndunde Earth Dam in Chiradzulu district, it was difficult to have full co-operation of the technical supervisor in the Water Department for the implementation of the project. The other contentious issue between MASAF and the DSS is the argument that the tranche system of payments contributes to the inefficient implementation of projects at district level. This is because the tranche system requires proper accounting for the financial resources before additional resources are disbursed – a requirement which many DSS fail to satisfy. The justification process is one way of monitoring the financial management of MASAF funds. However, the limited number of justification officers at MASAF MU (only one at the time the projects in the study were being implemented) for the whole programme and the lack of adequate training and inadequate capacity for District Assembly treasurers handling PWP accounts affect the operational efficiency of the project. The delays in the financial provisions have also been exacerbated by the temporary decision of the inclusion of the Zone Manager as a signatory to the district accounts. This has effectively transferred financial management from the District Assemblies to the Zone Offices. The interaction of MASAF officials and the communities in which projects are implemented is minimal and visits to the sites are once every three months. This is reflected in the analysis of the institutions that the beneficiaries interact with in the implementation of projects. Participants in the Thumba Dam in Lilongwe and Ndunde-Simithi road in Chiradzulu noted that they had no direct relationship with MASAF officials. In the Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation project, MASAF officials were not listed as having close links with the communities. This was the case in many projects, and participants and key informants could not distinguish the difference between members of the DSS and MASAF officials, and this reflects the inadequacy of information on the various institutions interacting with the communities. In the Buzi Hill Afforestation project in Ntchisi district, key informants expressed concern that MASAF officials did not visit the project area during the course of implementation and believed that the sector technical supervisor deliberately kept them away from the project. It was argued that the technical supervisors did not want communities to voice their concerns directly to MASAF. Nonetheless, this prominent absence of MASAF officials at community level is in line with the design of the public works programme in which MASAF acts as a financier, with the implementation of the project being the responsibility of the district team and the communities. Extension of the involvement of the MASAF officials to the implementation level in the communities will undoubtedly involve extra resources (human and physical) that will entail additional resources and costs. However, the limited involvement of MASAF at the community level may be desirable to ensure that project activities are implemented according to the MASAF guidelines and principles. The concerns that have been raised on

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targeting of participants in the project about favouritism and corrupt practices in the recruitment and payment of workers could be minimised with the presence of MASAF. 7.2.1.3 Problems and Constraints One of the problems that the study team identified is the poor relations and lack of understanding on project concepts between the District Assemblies and the Zone Offices. In most cases, the District Offices feel that their autonomy in the decision-making process is undermined and affected by the lengthy financial procedures and the direct interference of the Zone Offices. This is particularly evident in the Lilongwe zone in which MASAF MU suspended several projects due to failure of the DSS to account for the financial resources, but the declining commitment of the District Assemblies was also reported in the other three zones (see also MASAF, 2000). However, the District Assemblies reported that some times there is undue influence from the Zone Managers in the decision making process of the DSS. For example, the hiring of independent supervisor and contractors directly by MASAF eliminates their involvement in the selection process for supervisors that will work closely with them. There is also unwillingness of the DSS to commit their own sectoral resources to MASAF funded project activities. Nonetheless, the study team observed that District Assemblies and government departments operate under heavy financial and budgetary constraints. For instance, members of the DSS in Mangochi reported that the implementation and supervision of MASAF funded public works programmes relied on one vehicle that was used in many competing programmes. The human resource capacity of the MASAF PWP Division is extremely over stretched for the effective implementation of projects at district level. While at the MU level the office of the Director and Deputy Director adequately handle project issues, the Zone Offices do not have adequate human resource capacity to handle the many project activities in the districts they serve. This inadequate capacity in the PWP division at the Zone level adversely affects the operational efficiency of project activities and has been one source of the administrative problems between the Zone Offices and the DSS, which have implications for project performance at the community level. The additional responsibilities given to Zone Offices to handle project accounts for all the districts, are likely affect their time for the implementation and supervision of projects. 7.2.2 District Executive Committee Sub Set 7.2.2.1 Composition of the Committee The District Executive Committee Sub Set (DSS) is a technical sub committee of the District Executive Committee (DEC) which is a technical advisory body to the District Development Committee. The DEC is a multi-sectoral institution at the district level responsible for the technical evaluation of development projects proposed by the communities and/or Village or Area or Community Development Committees. The DSS comprises the Director of Planning and Development (formerly District Development Officer), Director of Finance in the District Assembly (formerly Clerk of Council) and the Sector Technical Supervisor, while the District Community Development Officer serves as a co-opted member on ad hoc basis. The DSS reports to the Chief Executive of the District Assembly, who is also a signatory of the projects’ bank accounts.

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The DSS is responsible for the selection of the projects from the DEC list, identification and selection of projects not listed by DEC in consultation with communities, local leaders, extension workers and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The DSS also facilitates the election of the project committee, prepares proposals for selected projects, submits project proposals to MASAF for approval and funding, implements projects in the district and supports the Foremen and Project Committees on project management. The members of the DSS are collectively and individually accountable. This collective and individual accountability is reflected in their responsibilities that include supervision, monitoring and evaluation of projects, preparation of monthly financial and progress reports, and financial and physical progress reports for justification. b) Linkages with Communities and Workers The DSS is central to the implementation of the MASAF PWP projects in the communities, and members of DSS frequently visited the project sites and held meetings with the village project committees. Focus group discussions and key informants’ interviews revealed that the level of interaction between members of DSS and the communities was high, although this varied from project to project. In most cases, the linkages were strong between the members of the DSS and the Village Project Committee. For instance in the Mwenelondo-Lake road in Karonga, both participants and non-participants the members of DSS met the village committee twice or three times per month particularly the visits by the supervisor from the Ministry of Works (DRIMP) and the treasury. However, the main problem the participants faced with the district team was the delay in the payment of wages, such that at one point they workers resorted into a strike as a way of enforcing the timely payment of wages. However, in the Lozi-Mwalawatongole road in Nkhotakota district and the Ndunde Earth Dam in Chiradzulu, the DSS did not set up community-based committees for the implementations of projects and did not consult the community and traditional leaders prior to the implementation of the projects. In both project sites participants and key informants reported that the recruitment procedures were not consistent and employment was unevenly distributed among the target villages. For instance, in Nkhotakota most of the workers came from the Lozi, the village where the project started and very few needy households were employed in the village where the project ended. In the Ndunde dam project in Chiradzulu, the community argued that the lack of consultation and non-existence of the project committee implied that the project implementation was not satisfactory. The participants believe that the decision by the District Assembly to use a ‘tractor’ (bowmac) in the construction of the dam deprived their opportunity to increase the number of employment in the project site. The perceptions of the participants and key informants on the quality of sectoral technical supervisors in most projects were favourable. Most project committees and key informant commended the technical capability of the technical supervisors. However, the participants in the Buzi Hill afforestation project in Ntchisi district noted that the forestry officials were lazy and used to mix up records on absenteeism and cut wages without justifications. Overall, the technical and administrative linkage of the DSS with the Village Committees, the traditional leaders, the participants and the communities has been instrumental in the successful implementation of projects. In most project areas both participants and non-

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participants attribute the successful completion of the project to the constant supervision of the DSS members particularly the sectoral technical supervisor, and the good working relationship between the district team and the project committees. 7.2.2.3 Institutional Capacity Constraints and Problems The interviews and discussions with the district teams, the MASAF zone officials and key informants revealed that several capacity constraints exist in the project cycle and in the implementation of projects. These capacity constraints are both administrative and technical in nature. First, there was poor co-ordination of the district team due to separation of District Administration and District Council. However, this should be a minor problem with the consequent decentralisation that has brought about District Assemblies, particularly after the election of Councillors. Second, the sectoral ministries at district level poorly understand the MASAF project concept. Furthermore, the linkage between the MASAF-funded projects supervised by sectoral technicians, and regional and Ministry headquarters is weak. There is a misconception that MASAF funded projects bring additional responsibilities and require additional resources that are not covered by the financial provisions from the parent ministries. The central government financial allocation to district and regional offices does not take into account the additional resource requirements of the Ministry in MASAF funded project activities, although MASAF provides for supervisory obligations in form of justifiable allowances. There is lack of commitment at the district level and this problem is also related to the question of ownership of the assets after project completion, as it is not clear whether the sectoral ministries are responsible for ensuring that assets are properly maintained, particularly in road projects. This is different in the case of afforestation and dam projects in which the MASAF funded projects complements an elaborate existing institutional framework established by the Ministry of Forestry and Natural Resources in the communities such as the Village Forestry and Natural Resource Management Committee. Thirdly, there was poor financial management in the District Assemblies before the decentralisation process. In some cases, the poor financial management of MASAF project funds has been exacerbated by the implementation of the local government reforms. During the process of decentralisation, staff turnover in the district teams was high affecting the implementation and financial management of project activities. The poor financial management in the District Assemblies was also due to inadequate training of accounts clerks or treasures responsible for MASAF PWP accounts on MASAF financial procedures. Fourthly, the PWP concept is heavily dependent on the human and physical resource capacity of the District Assemblies and the line ministries as part of Government of Malawi contribution to the projects. While the human resource constraints are less severe, most district teams are constrained in the number of motor vehicles available for use in MASAF funded public works projects. Although, MASAF provides support for transport expenses, most of the district assemblies and sectoral ministries do not have adequate running vehicles. The problem of availability of transport facilities as a constraint in the supervision, monitoring and evaluation of public works projects was reported by all the district teams whose projects are covered in this study.

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7.2.3 Site Foremen, Contractors and Supervisors The site foremen are under the direct supervision of the Sector Technical Supervisors and are responsible for the technical implementation of the project including the recruitment of labour and management of the project. In some cases, where the sectoral technical expertise for a specific activity does not at the district level or where the sectoral ministries do not have adequate capacity, such services are contracted. Both the foremen and the contractors are required to be technically qualified to implement the planned activities. In all the projects included in this study, the use of contractors to perform specific tasks has been seldom. There are a few exceptions. Two contractors were used in the Mbiriwizi dam to build the spillway for the dam. The district team, the project committee and participants in project all reported that the work of the first contractor was sub-standard due to inadequate capacity for dam construction and the spillway collapsed but the spillway constructed by the second is strong. In the Lunjika-Chisenga-M1 road the contractors were used in the construction of bridges but started their work after the community had already finished the construction of the road. In the Kande-Chesamu road a contractor was hired to construct three culverts and bridges along this road but did not do the work due to lack of funds. The district team has hired another contractor but work had not yet started at the time of this survey, and the bridges are made of temporary local material (logs). Contractors were also used in the maintenance of the Mbabvi-Nambuma TO road. However, the performance of the contractor was not satisfactory, with participants and key informants reporting that road width was narrowed and that wages for workers were not yet paid at the time of the study for work done five months ago. In the Thabwa-Robeni road in Mulanje, respondents reported that the contractors that were supposed to construct bridges have not yet started their work. The two contractors used in the Katema-Chileka road in Mangochi completed the tasks successfully. The day to day implementation of the project is vested in the site foreman who is assisted by kapitawos and gang leaders. The assessment of participants and non-participants in the projects is that most of the foremen used in the projects were qualified for the type of work and their performance in the execution of their duties was good. Box 7.1 presents some of the positive sentiments from the participants on the relative performance of foremen and kapitawos in the implementation of the projects.

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Box 7.1 Positive Sentiments on the Performance of Foremen and Kapitawos “The foreman was very conversant with road works, interacted well with workers and the community and was thus able to produce quality work at the end of the day.” (Beneficiaries in the Mwenelondo-Lake Road project in Karonga). “The official from the Water Department assisted the committee at each stage of the construction. He came to the project site daily from Rumphi Boma. He really was a dedicated person in as far as dam work was concerned. In construction of the dam, two contractors were hired. One had a bowmac roller for compaction of the dumped soil on the embankment ridge. The other one was employed to construct the spillway. The two contractors were able to work with people smoothly. There were no problems in as far as their involvement on dam work was concerned.” (Beneficiaries in Mbiriwizi Dam project in Rumphi). “Even our road foreman and his kapitawos were people who were very understanding. Whenever a person has not done his/her work properly, they could come and assist him/her or tell him/her on how best that part could be done. The foreman was staying at Ekwendeni, but everyday he used to commute between Ekwendeni and Bwengu and used to come to the site before anyone else.” (Beneficiaries of Bwengu-Katope Road in Mzuzu). “The Agricultural Field Assistant was available everyday and also did some of the work and offered technical guidance to the workers”. (Beneficiaries in the Thumba Dam project in Lilongwe). “The foreman and the kapitawos had adequate knowledge of project activities and organised work well. The recruitment of workers was also fair.” (Beneficiaries in the Livunzu-Mpangowalimba road project in Chikwawa). “The foreman had good organisational and technical skills. The kapitawos had good leadership skills and also knew their work because all had experience in road construction under the DRIMP”. (Beneficiaries in the Thabwa-Robeni road project in Mulanje). “The Forestry Assistant knew his work well and we were happy with the way he recruited workers in the project and he was very much interested in the project as well as the community. This was reflected in his frequent visits, his ability to solve problems relating to the project and in monitoring the progress of the project”. (Beneficiaries in the Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation project in Phalombe).

In some projects, the foremen and the kapitawos were reported to have poor public relations with the communities as is evident from some of the negative sentiments that emerged from the focus group discussions with participants as presented in Box 7.2 below.

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Box 7.2 Negative Sentiments on the Performance of the Foremen and Kapitawos “The foreman acted as if he was not a partner to this development. He could work more closely with officials of MASAF than with the area committee or supervisors.” (Beneficiaries of Kande-Mapale-Chesamu road project in Nkhata Bay). “There was a committee but we do not know the members, we just heard that the foreman formed one in the village where the project started from (Lozi). Although, the foreman knew his job he had favouritism in the recruitment of workers and wanted bribes. Kapitawos were ignorant of their job, their public relations were poor and were not concerned with the quality of work and gave tough time to workers.” (Beneficiaries of the Lozi-Mwalawatongole project in Nkhotakota). “The Chairman and his committee were not on their own bad, but the forestry officials were giving them too much pressure and they ended up treating people unfairly. As for the forestry officials (foreman), these people were lazy, did not know their job and were only receiving too much money and used to mix up records (did not know who was absent, for how many days and they cut wages anyhow).” (Beneficiaries in the Buzi Hill Afforestation project in Ntchisi). “The DRIMP officials (foreman) were useless and were not coming to work and most of the work was going wrong because of poor guidance. The kapitawos were also incompetent and would not properly record the days that workers were absent or present. Some people that were present and working throughout would receive low pay because of inaccurate records.” (Beneficiaries in the Mndunje-Bimphi Road project in Dowa). “We doubt if the foreman had enough knowledge of dam construction since he had failed to finish the dam at Ndunde. He was a very bad work organiser and his leadership was bad. His type of leadership showed that he was not interested in the project and hated the community because he shouted at everybody. However, he was good at choosing people for the right jobs and was able to monitor the progress of the work but failed to resolve the project workers problems and the problems of the project on itself.” (Beneficiaries in the Ndunde Earth Dam in Chiradzulu).

7.2.4 Traditional Leaders and Members of Parliament The traditional leaders are the main instruments of entry of the DSS in the proposed project area. The initial entry of the DSS in the targeted EPA prior to the implementation of the public works programme is through the Traditional Authority. Identification of projects by the DSS is done in consultation with the Traditional Authority and community leaders. It is the Traditional Authority who organises a meeting of village headmen of the targeted villages and brief then on the proposed MASAF PWP project. Once the project is approved, the Traditional Authority and village headmen organises a community meeting (of all concerned villages) at which a project committee or committees are elected for the management of the project at community level. The traditional leaders and the community are briefed by the Zone Officer at the District launch on their role and the roles of various institutions in the implementation of the project. The role of the traditional leaders is to mobilise workers and to verify whether the workers recruited by the foreman and the project committee are their subjects. In addition, traditional leaders also assume the role of resolving the conflicts that may arise in the working relations. Overall, information from participants and key informants revealed that in most projects the process of entry of the DSS into the EPA involved consultations with the traditional leaders. In most cases, the projects were already presented by the Traditional Authority at the District Development Committee meeting. In some projects the traditional leaders also assisted the

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project committees in the actual recruitment of workers and in the monitoring of project activities and conflict resolution. In all the projects covered in this study, participants, non-participants and key informants consider traditional leaders as one of the various institutions that have been instrumental in the success of the MASAF PWP projects. All the projects in the Mzuzu zone in the study were projects that were already presented by the communities to the DDC through their traditional authority and the implementation under the sponsorship of MASAF did not bypass these traditional institutions. The link between the district teams and the traditional institutional structure was strong in most of the projects evaluated in this study. In most cases, the communities through their Traditional Authority requested most of the projects and suggest that the communities were involved in the identification of projects. However, the only exceptions are in the Lozi-Mwalawatongole road in Nkhotakota and the Ndunde Earth Dam in Chiradzulu, the process of entry into the target areas did not involve all the traditional leaders. In Nkhotakota, the village heads interviewed and participants reported that they were informed at political meeting, addressed by a newly elected Member of Parliament, that some work will be carried out on the road. The next thing the community heard was that the DRIMP official was recruiting workers without consultation with the village heads. The community had no role in the recruitment of workers in the Lozi-Mwalawatongole road project. The village heads interviewed also expressed ignorance about the existence of a project committee and the maintenance arrangements for the road. The interviews from participants, non-participants and traditional leaders suggests that the Lozi-Mwalawatongole road project was politically initiated and the principles of entry of the DSS in the target EPA were obviously compromised in this project. Similarly, participants and non-participants in the Ndunde Earth Dam project in Chiradzulu also reported that they did not elect the committee and the project was being run from the District Assembly and the link between the DSS and the community was weak. Key informants’ interviews confirmed that the technical supervisor from the district was harsh and did not provide the most conducive environment for development work. The level of political intervention in the project cycle from the perspective of participants, non-participants and key informants has been limited and has generally not interfered with the implementation of the projects. Members of Parliament as institutions involved in the project were only mentioned in the Mbabvi-Nambuma TO road, the Lozi-Mwalawatongole road and in the Katema-Chileka road. Nonetheless, it is only in the Lozi-Mwalawatongole road that the political intervention led to the compromise of the community institutions in the management and implementation of the project. This limited level of political intervention or involvement outside the district structures and its complete elimination is desirable for the successful implementation of government programmes that are supposed to be devoid of political affiliation. 7.2.5 Project Committee and Workers Committee The Project Committee is the community-based implementing institution of funded MASAF PWP project activities. The Project Committees are elected directly by the communities in the villages that participate in the project. The Project Committee is responsible for the identification of vulnerable households and assist in the recruitment of workers, labour management and certification of labour attendance. In addition, Workers Committees are elected among the workers for each localised work area and assist in day to day management

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of project implementation.11 MASAF officials and members of the DSS brief members of the Project Committee together with the Traditional Authority on the implementation and management of the project at the project launch. Table 7.2 shows perceptions of participants and non-participants in MASAF PWP projects on the performance of the project committees. In all the project sites covered in this study, except the Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road in Nkhotakota and the Ndunde Earth Dam in Chiradzulu, the participants and key informants reported that the communities elected the project committee prior to the implementation of the project. The project committees had ten members. In project sites where committees were elected participants and key informants confirmed that the committees are responsible for recruiting workers and are the custodian of tools and implements used in the projects. Table 7.2 Existence and Perceptions on the Effectiveness of the Project Committee (PC)

Project Site

PC elected by

community?

Average frequency of

meeting

PC working relation with participants

Performance in project implementation

1. Mwenelondo-Lake road Yes 2 or 3 times per month Very Good

Very Good, constant supervision and contacts

with chiefs

2. Mbiriwiza Dam Yes Twice per months Very Good Very Good, liaison with

chiefs

3. Lunjika-Chisenje-M1 Road Yes Twice per months Very Good Very Good

4. Bwengu-Katope Road Yes Regular Very Good Very Good and constant supervision

5. Kande-Mapale-Chesamu Rd Yes, 3 Committees Regular Very Good Very Good and constant

supervision

6. Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road No Committee - - -

7. Buzi Hill Afforestation Yes Regular Good but poor

public relations

Satisfactory and regular meeting

8. Mndunje-Bimphi Road Yes Regular Good Satisfactory

9. Mbabvi-Nambuma TO Road Yes Regular Good but poor

public relations

Very Good

10. Thumba Dam Yes Regular Very Good Very Good 11. Livunzu-Mpangowalimba Rd Yes Regular Very Good Satisfactory 12. Thabwa-Robeni Road Yes Regular Very Good Very Good 13. Phalombe River Bank Rehab Yes Regular Very Good Very Good 14. Ndunde-Simithi Road Yes Regular Very Good Very Good 15. Ndunde Earth Dam No _ _ Project not completed

16. Katema-Chileka Road Yes Regular Good but poor

public relations

Satisfactory

Source: Beneficiary Assessment Survey 2000

11 Members of the Project Committee are sometimes drawn from non-participants and may not be on the project sites to monitor activities on daily basis.

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Nonetheless, there were variations in the performance of the project committees. In the Mwenelondo-Lake road in Karonga district participants in the public works project reported that the members of the committee were chosen on the basis of hard work and their ability to co-ordinate and organise activities. The performance of the project committee was high, both participants and non-participants attributed the successful completion of the project to the good working relation between the foreman and the project committee. Participants in the Mbiriwizi dam in Rumphi reported that the project committee and the traditional leaders usually met twice per month. Nonetheless, there were concerns that the committee members started abusing their authority and the participants suggested the rotation of members of the committee. While the rotation of members of the committee may be optimal for long-term projects, it may not be the best way of restoring the effectiveness of the committee members in short-term projects. Similarly, the participants in the Lunjika-Chisenje-M1 road and Bwengu-Katope road were satisfied with the working relationship that existed among the project committee, the traditional leaders and the district team. In the Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation the communities had already started the project under self-help concept through the Village Natural Resource Management Committees in the Ministry of Forestry and Natural Resources. The participants and non-participants were satisfied with the performance of the committee. Of the project activities covered in this study, two stand out as having no committees for the implementation of the PWP projects. First, in Nkhotakota (Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road) all those interviewed reported that the communities were not involved in the project activities. Although, participants mentioned the existence of a committee but they did not know the members of the project committee. The committee was also not known to the traditional leaders in the project area and reported lack of consultation by the district team on the project activities. The discussions with both participants and non-participants revealed that the project was politically motivated, with the informants attaching the introduction of the project to their Member of Parliament. Second, in the Ndunde Earth Dam project in Chiradzulu district, the communities claimed that the District Assembly did not consult them on the project. In addition, no project committee was elected to run the project at the community level. Although in principal the MASAF project implementation manual provides for workers committee where need arises to facilitate the daily operations of the project, this was not reported as one of the institutions involved in the implementation of the project. Given that the role of the workers committee derives from delegated activities of the project committee, in most project sites the project committee was strong and its linkage with the other local institutions was also strong, making the existence of the workers committee unjustifiable and unnecessary. 7.3 Respondents’ Knowledge of Alternative Safety Net Projects The knowledge of respondents on alternative safety net programmes in their areas is very limited. The limited knowledge reflects that safety net programmes in Malawi have not been extensively used, although the incidence of poverty is quite high. The responses from the participants and non-participants were confirmed from interviews with the members of DSS and traditional leaders that indicated that MASAF PWP was the only safety net programme the communities were aware of in the project sites covered in this study. Alternative safety net programmes were only reported by participants and non-participants in Livunzu-

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Mpangowalimba road in Chikwawa, Thabwa-Robeni road in Mulanje. Table 7.3 shows the differences and similarities of safety net programmes available in the catchment areas in which MASAF projects were implemented. In the Livunzu-Mpangowalimba road project the participants knew the World Vision Malawi (WVM) project involving the construction of a new school at Mpingasa area some five kilometres away from the MASAF project site. The objectives of WVM in constructing a new primary school at Mpingasa are to enable children learn near their homes since they had to travel long distance to school and to alleviate people’s poverty around Mpingasa area. The main target individuals were men and they had no criteria but employed whoever wanted to work. Although some women were employed, men were preferred to women, while MASAF encouraged the participation of women. The number employed at Mpingasa was higher than that at the MASAF project. Compared to work funded by MASAF, respondents reported that the type of work at Mpingasa was tough because it involved a lot of digging. The main tasks at the WVM project were digging the foundation, clearing the bush, loading and unloading bricks/quarry stones into trucks, mixing cement with sand for building purposes and breaking stones. Participants in the MASAF project were of the view that MASAF tasks were easier and better off. Moreover, at the WVM project, they had long working hours every day, more days a week, more months a year compared to MASAF project. In both the MASAF and WVM project workers were paid in money wages, but WVM workers were earning higher wages than in the MASAF project and there was no gender differentiation of wages for the same positions. Payment of wages at the WVM was monthly and timely compared to the delays in the MASAF projects. In both cases, some workers were retrenched due to less work as the project was nearing completion. Table 7.3 Community Perceptions on Comparative Safety Net Programmes

Indicators MASAF WVM GTZ 1 Nature of project Road School block Road

2 Targeting of workers Poor but physically fit

Those willing to work

Poor and willing to work

3 Gender considerations Yes Biased towards men Yes 4 Level of difficulty of tasks Light Heavy Light 5 Days of work per week 5 6 6 6 Basis of work Task Time Task 7 Form of wages Cash Cash In-kind

8 Monthly wages K216 More than MASAF 50 kg bag of maize (higher than MASAF)

9 Delays in wage payments Yes No No 10 Duration of employment Short Longer Longer 11 Maintenance of assets Not clear Community Community

Source: Beneficiary Assessment Survey 2000 In the Thabwa-Robeni road in Mulanje district participants and non-participants in the MASAF project cited the GTZ food for work road construction project. The respondents reported that the GTZ and MASAF project activities were similar in their simplicity. The participants and non-participants noted that everybody in GTZ project area was free to take part whilst in MASAF only those that were physically fit were employed. However, the MASAF project employed more people compared to the GTZ project. MASAF project had

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many women while in the GTZ project the distribution of women and men was nearly equal. The tasks were under the GTZ project were slashing, digging, cutting down trees, and removing stones and tree stumps, carrying sand and stones and levelling the road. The respondents reported that these tasks were the same as those in the MASAF project and were task measurement were similar. MASAF had five days a week while GTZ had six days. The payment of wages in the GTZ project was in-kind in form of maize while MASAF gave cash. Participants were of the view that the GTZ project remuneration of a 50-kilogram bag of maize per month per individual was better than the cash payment of MK216 per month in the MASAF project. There was no difference in payment between male and female participants if they were in the same position in MASAF and GTZ projects. However, unlike in the MASAF project there were no delays of wage payment in the GTZ project. With regard to maintenance arrangements in the GTZ project, the chiefs agreed that their subjects would clear the road once every year. Discussions with some members of the DSS and other key informants in Mulanje also revealed that other safety net schemes in the district have performed better than MASAF funded public works because they do not rely on other institutions for the implementation and monitoring of project activities. The GTZ project is also better than MASAF because it employs its own workforce who are fully equipped and without transport problems. In addition, people feel the likelihood of ghost workers is higher in the MASAF PWP projects than in the projects implemented by other agencies. It was also indicated that wage payments in the GTZ programme are not delayed because all the maize needed for a particular period is available well in advance of payment dates. The foregoing suggest that the difference that are negative to the MASAF PWP projects relate to the real value of the wage rates and the time value of money affected by the delays in wage payments. The delays in wage payments have serious implications in Malawi inflation is high and increasing, hence diminishing the purchasing power of an already small wage. While many participants are in favour of payments of wages in cash as it offers freedom of choice, the long delays in wage payments makes communities favour in-kind payments to money wages. 7.4 Summary This chapter has reviewed the institutional framework for the implementation of the MASAF PWP. The implementation of the project relies on the capacity of the collaborating institutions at the district level. The institutions, in addition to MASAF, that are actively involved in the implementation of the programme include the District Assembly, technical sectoral supervisors, the traditional leaders and contractors. It has been observed that the involvement of MASAF in the implementation of the projects at the community level is limited by design and leaves the process to the district teams and the communities. The link between MASAF and the community is minimal as the former only interacts with the community mostly during the project launch and during project monitoring visits once every three months. The relationship with the MASAF zone offices and the district teams is generally conducive, save the capacity and budgetary constraints of the District Assembly and government district offices. Poor financial management of project resources at district level has in most cases affected the implementation of projects. At the community level, workers interact with traditional leaders, the project committee, the technical supervisor and foremen, with different roles in the implementation of projects. The

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beneficiary perceptions on the performance of these institutions vary with respect to project sites. In most cases, the traditional leaders have provided a conducive environment. The mixed feelings mostly relate to the performance of supervisors, the project committee and the crew leaders. The knowledge of communities about alternative safety nets is limited. Alternative safety nets were only reported in two of the project sites covered in the study. Nonetheless, these known alternative safety nets were perceived to be better than MASAF PWP with respect to the wage levels and the timeliness of wage payments and the duration over which the participants can derive income from the project. This points to the need for more information on the alternative safety nets that can be at the disposal of vulnerable households in Malawi.

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CHAPTER 8

WORK ROLES, ASSETS AND THEIR MAINTENANCE 8.1 Introduction This chapter presents workers perceptions on the various roles they play in different activities, the question of ownership of assets and the maintenance of the assets that the projects bring to the communities. The gender dimension of the role of workers is important in public works because there may be a misconception that particular activities are suitable for only male members of the target group. The next section reports the perceptions of beneficiaries on their work roles in various project activities. Section 8.3 focuses on the skills requirements for various activities. Section 8.4 addresses the question of ownership and maintenance of assets. Finally, section 8.5 provides a summary. 8.2 Work Roles The nature and size of work roles and tasks have an important bearing on time spent doing the work, activity completion rates and most important, the level of participation in energy demanding works. Also critical for level of participation is the manner in which different work roles and tasks are assigned to different workers. Nonetheless, several factors and not just work roles and tasks affect the level of participation. Table 8.1 shows the nature and assignment of work roles by gender. Most work roles were reportedly done by both male and female workers. In almost all projects, there was a general tendency to allocate what they considered >lighter= tasks to women and the elderly or the frail, and people did not have problems with such >positive= discrimination. Indeed, from the focus group discussions, workers said that although they would have preferred certain tasks to others, they were quite happy to accept the foremen and supervisors’ decisions. The only exception in this regard was in Nkhotakota (Lozi-Mwalawatongole Road Project) where the majority of workers felt that the foreman was clearly favouring some workers.

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Table 8.1 Work Roles and Task Sizes under Various MASAF PWP Activities

Type of Project

Work Role or Task

Assignee (By Gender)

Road construction / rehabilitation

Felling trees Stumping Slashing Clearing Digging Ditching Levelling Sloping Cumbering

Male workers Male workers Both male and female Both male and female Both male and female Both male and female Both male and female Both male and female Both male and female

Earth-dam construction

Felling trees Stumping Slashing Clearing Digging Quarrying / Stone breaking Sand/soil removal Planting trees/grass

Mostly male workers Mostly male workers Both male and female Mostly female Both male and female Both male and female Female Both male and female

Afforestation

Fetching seeds Seed selection Clearing Holing Soil filling Fencing Fire-breaks

Both male and female Both male and female Mostly female Mostly male workers Mostly female Both male and female Both male and female

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000. A third principle employed in most projects was rotation of tasks, although, surprisingly, its absence in other projects seemed not to have had any adverse impact on worker morale. For example, workers in the Katema-Chileka Road Project in Mangochi said they were happy despite there having been no rotation of roles. In the Mbabzi-Nambuma Road Project in Lilongwe, workers said that they would have preferred rotation of tasks, but at the same time understood the fact that perfect rotation was going to be difficult in the light of gender and stamina considerations in the allocation of tasks. With respect to the time it took individuals to complete given daily work roles it was reported that it took different individuals different times to complete given tasks. Actual work duration ranged from 1 hour to 6 hours (mean was about 3.5 hours) depending on the nature of tasks and the strength of the worker compared to the recommended daily work duration of 4 hours for any given role/task. Generally, workers felt that the tasks were manageable. Workers on the Mwenelondo-Lake road project expressed the desire that task sizes should be smaller than they were at the time of the study. The reason though was not because the tasks were heavy or unmanageable rather they believed that smaller tasks would make the project last longer and hence they would benefit over a longer period of time than otherwise.

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8.3 Skills Requirements Workers in almost all projects stated that they did not need to have any special skills in order to perform the different roles listed in Table 8.1 above. Instead, on-the-job training for certain tasks, such as sloping in road construction, stumping in both, road and dam construction, and seed selection or fence building in the case of afforestation projects always sufficed. Apart from that, all that was required in certain tasks, such as digging and ditching was physical fitness. But even in such instances, people were not constrained from participating, since, in view of findings presented in the preceding section, there were gender and stamina considerations in the allocation of tasks. Further, in the event of illness, workers were allowed to ask someone to work on their behalf. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that special skills requirement was not a constraint to participation in the MASAF PWP programmes. It is however worth noting that from the focus group discussions, most workers professed having learnt some new skills through participation in these projects. In this regard, some said that this was going to improve their chances of finding employment in the future. 8.4 Ownership and Maintenance In principle, the projects funded by MASAF under the Public Works Programme belong to the communities. However, the issue of ownership, and hence, maintenance of assets under MASAF projects, still remains problematic. This is regardless of the fact that the second MASAF PWP evaluation study (ZMKP, 1998) had discussed the nature of the problem. The communities do not have this sense of ownership, particularly in road construction and rehabilitation projects in which free-ridding behaviour is high. According to MASAF MU the community is responsible for the maintenance of dam and afforestation projects while District Assemblies are responsible for the maintenance of road projects. Most people, however, in the sampled projects were not even aware of any maintenance arrangements. People’s attitudes were that any project that was funded by MASAF was not theirs, and hence, had to be maintained by MASAF itself. In particular, the popular view was that MASAF needed to occasionally come with cash-for-work maintenance projects. The majority of the workers contended that they could not work without being paid. Thus, it seems very little has been done either by MASAF or the DSS to sensitise communities about their responsibility and the various roles of the institutions involved in the implementation of the projects. From the foregoing, it can be clearly seen that an urgent need exists to pay greater attention to the design of a workable scheme for the maintenance of assets built under the MASAF PW programmes. Otherwise, the impact of these assets will just be transient like their associated cash transfers. In addition, there should be no separation of ownership and maintenance of projects like in road projects. Project activities whose benefits are not localised such as roads should be owned and maintained by the District Assembly or the Government department and MASAF should fund such projects on condition that those that are soliciting funding for such activities assume the full ownership and maintenance of the assets.

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8.5 Summary The study has found that in general, there were no serious complaints from workers about the work norms. Both men and women did most of the tasks but the majority was agreeable to the allocation of lighter tasks to women and the weak. It has also been found that there was no requirement of special skills upon workers in the carrying out of the different work roles. Except on grounds of stamina, every worker was capable of participating in any task. Most workers acquired new skills from the project activities, and felt that these newly acquired skills would be useful in the future, in that it would improve their chances of finding employment. The study has established that the issue of ownership and maintenance remains unresolved, from the point of view of district teams and the communities. Most people still regard the PWP projects as belonging to MASAF even after they have been handed over to the respective communities. This is inevitable since as a sponsoring agency MASAF is associated with the projects from the political platforms to the implementing agencies. Communities further expressed ignorance of any maintenance arrangements, and this calls for the need to strengthen the information aspect of the programme, right from politicians to the communities.

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CHAPTER 9

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MASAF PWP 9.1 Introduction The chapter reports the results of the analysis of the impact of the MASAF public works programme. In some cases baseline data collected in 1998 is used to assess the observed changes in the performance indicators. However, in the context of the safety net programme in Malawi, it is rather difficult to link households’ participation in the safety net with observed levels and changes based on the baseline data. First, the communities have been exposed to some important ‘shocks’ or ‘interventions’ such as the government’s “Starter Pack” programme from which households (including those covered in the safety net) have reportedly benefited from increased food production. Secondly, the evaluation comes almost two years after the households involved in the baseline ceased working and receiving wages from the (short-term) safety net intervention. There are more reasons than can be accommodated here which warrant a very cautious approach when making inferences about the safety net’s impact on the socio-economic status of households. The interpretation of the results should therefore take these issues into consideration. The next section evaluates the impact of the MASAF PWP on household livelihoods focusing on provision of employment and wage income, utilisation of wages, changes in socio-economic status, changes in number of meals and the nutritional status of children. Section 9.3 focuses on survival strategies for beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. Section 9.4 provides a summary. 9.2 Impact of PWP on Household Livelihoods 9.2.1 Alternative Employment Opportunities prior to MASAF PWP Workers were asked to state whether or not they held alternative employment opportunities prior to participating in MASAF PWP. The responses to this question are reported in Table 9.1. On overall basis 60.1 percent of the workers had alternative employment 12 months prior to starting work on MASAF PWP while the remainder 39.9 percent did not offer their labour services prior to the PWP project. Variations at project level abound with the lowest proportion of workers who had such employment opportunities being 29.1 percent of the workers at Mbiriwiza Dam project, and the highest was 87.2 percent of the workers at Ndunde Earth Dam. It can also be observed that most beneficiaries in the central and southern region projects had been engaged in paid employment before compared with the project sites in the northern region. This implies that the MASAF public works projects have generated new employment for nearly 40 percent of the sample beneficiaries. With respect to the distribution of workers by gender, the results show that proportionately more male workers (71.0 percent) than female workers (45 percent) in almost all the projects were employed prior to being employed on MASAF PWP projects. Alternatively, more female workers did not have access to employment 12 months prior to participating in MASAF PWP.

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Table 9.1 Participation in Alternative Employment Prior to MASAF PWP

Proportion responding ‘Yes’ to whether they were employed in other activities before working on MASAF PWP Sex of Household

Male Female Total Type of Employment

N Percent N Percent N Percent Mwenelondo-Lake Road 21 38.9 6 18.2 27 31.0 Mbiriwizi Dam 15 45.5 8 17.4 23 29.1 Lunjika -M1 Road 21 65.6 9 20.0 30 39.0 Bwengu-Katope Road 31 77.5 13 50.0 44 66.7 Kande-Mapale-Chesamu 53 64.6 2 20.0 55 59.8 Lozi-Mwalawatongole 31 72.1 - - 31 62.0 Buzi Hill Afforestation 26 86.7 13 46.4 39 67.2 Mndunje-Bimphi Road 63 75.9 3 27.3 66 70.2 Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off 40 90.9 23 69.7 63 81.8 Thumba Dam 11 78.6 34 73.9 45 75.0 Livunzu-Mpangowalimba 31 86.1 20 69.0 51 78.5 Thabwa-Robeni Road 16 69.6 22 57.9 38 62.3 Phalombe River Bank 17 60.7 11 45.8 28 53.8 Ndunde-Simithi Road 34 65.4 11 35.5 45 54.2 Ndunde Earth Dam 23 100.0 11 68.8 34 87.2 Katema-Chileka Road 29 85.3 20 54.1 49 69.0 Total 458 70.9 204 44.5 668 60.1

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000. The types of employment in which workers were engaged are reported in Table 9.2. On overall basis, salaried employment and piecework or ganyu were the commonest types of employment (with proportions of 47.6 and 42.1 percent, respectively) in which workers were engaged prior to working on MASAF PWP. Ganyu was particularly more popular among female workers than among male workers (68 percent of female workers participated in ganyu compared with only 31 percent of male workers) whereas salaried employment was more popular among male workers than female workers. Thus fewer female workers had access to longer-term employment compared to male workers. Table 9.2 Types of Employment in which Workers Were Employed Prior to MASAF

PWP

Male Female Total Type of Employment N Percent N Percent N Percent

Salaried employment 260 57.4 52 25.6 312 47.6 Piecework or ganyu 138 30.5 138 68.0 276 42.1 Tenancy 30 6.6 9 4.4 39 5.9 Other 25 5.5 4 2.0 29 4.4 Overall 453 100.0 203 100.0 656 100.0

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000

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9.2.2 Utilisation of Wages Earned from MASAF PWP Individuals and households who worked on MASAF PWP spent their earnings on a wide range of needs including the ones shown in Table 9.3. Food was the expenditure item cited by the highest proportion (81.2 percent) of the valid cases (respondents) at the overall level. The second and third commonest expenditure items were, respectively, households goods cited by 58.8 percent of the respondents and medicinal drugs (from village shops) cited by 22.5 percent of the households. The pattern at level of sex of the respondents was similar to that found at the overall level. That is, food was the commonest items on which wages from MASAF PWP were spent among both male and female beneficiaries. The second and third commonest expenditure items were household goods and medicinal drugs. The popularity of spending on food confirms the fact that most of the households do not produce adequate food crops for consumption. Table 9.3 Uses of Wages Earnings from MASAF PWP Employment

Sex of Respondent Male (N=386) Female (N=242)

Total (N=628) Items

N Percent N Percent N Percent Food items 300 77.7 210 86.8 510 81.2 Household goods 238 61.7 131 54.1 369 58.8 School fees/education 38 9.8 35 14.5 73 11.6 Medicinal drugs from village shops 81 21.0 60 24.8 141 22.5 Invested in petty trading 24 6.2 21 8.7 45 7.2 Paying hired or ganyu workers 15 3.9 17 7.0 32 5.1 Farm inputs 38 9.8 17 7.0 55 8.8 Transport 48 12.4 25 10.3 73 11.6 Savings 4 1.0 - - 4 0.6 Other (e.g. clothes, livestock (chicken), milling) 115 29.8 73 30.2 188 29.9

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 The data also reveal the impact the wages earned from MASAF PWP had on the beneficiaries’ expenditures. That is, the wages gave them command over the good and services listed above and others not individually stated. More interesting are those cases where the wages were ploughed into further income generating activities (e.g. petty trading) and transferred to other people in form of ganyu wages besides spending on food. 9.2.3 Changes in the Quality of Life The beneficiaries were asked whether their participation in the MASAF PWP project had improved their economic status or livelihoods. This question directly addressed the impact of beneficiary participation on MASAF PWP and isolated the effects of other intervening economic conditions. Table 9.4 shows the proportion of beneficiaries who revealed that their economic status had improved and the best way beneficiaries described the impact of the project at individual and household level. The data shows that 70.9 percent of beneficiaries felt that their participation in the MASAF PWP projects improved their economic status. Economic status improved relatively more among female beneficiaries (77.4 percent) than among male beneficiaries (65.1 percent). Some beneficiaries were more specific as reflected

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in the ‘others’ category, which include descriptions such as purchase of clothes, payment of school fees, reduction in poverty and having adequate money. The best feeling of the impact of their participation is that they can afford basic necessities with MASAF wages a result that tallies with the observation on the utilisation of wages. Table 9.4 Revealed Changes in Quality of Life

Sex of Respondent Male Female

Total Changes in Quality Life

N Percent N Percent N Percent Improved Status Yes No

412 221

65.1 34.9

435 127

77.4 22.6

847 348

70.9 29.1

Best Description (Yes responses) Better off now 217 52.7 212 48.7 429 50.6 Can afford basic necessities 210 51.0 248 57.0 458 54.1 Can save some money now 3 0.7 7 1.6 10 1.2 Own a small business now 28 6.8 30 6.9 58 6.8 Own more assets now 61 14.8 44 10.1 101 12.4 Others 66 16.0 61 14.0 127 15.0

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 The positive effects of the MASAF PWP projects were further confirmed during focus group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The sentiments from both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were in favour of the positive impact of the projects at the individual, household and community levels. They noted that there were many positive developments that were made possible by the wages received from the projects as well as the infrastructure created. In places where projects were incomplete people expressed feelings of indifference. For instance, communities with incomplete road projects did not appreciate the project work but those with completed road projects appreciated citing improved accessibility of some places. The cost to the individuals and communities whose gardens (among other things) were used up by sections of the project was felt to be insignificant relative to the gains made from the employment and assets. There were mixed feelings about the effect of the wages on the local market parameters such as commodity prices and level of economic activity (demand and supply of commodities). In some cases demand for commodities was said to have increased to the benefit of grocery and shop owners but in others this was not the case. The precise views and expressions gathered from the communities are reported in Box 9.1.

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Box 9.1 Some of the Sentiments on Impact of Participation in MASAF PWP Projects “Although the wage was little (reportedly K200 per month) and delayed, the money greatly helped us to buy food (e.g. fish which we could not afford before) and other things. We bought shopped from the nearest trading centres at Thabwa, Chitakale, Chinakanaka and Mulanje Mission. Prices of commodities did not go up because of the MASAF wages but it was time they had to go up. Supply of goods and services did not change as a result of MASAF wages.” (Beneficiaries on the Thabwa-Robeni Road) “Those who received MASAF wages mostly spent them on food, clothes, soap and salt. Some workers also bought commodities and household items (in some cases paying by instalment) which they could not afford before. A few others built and renovated their houses. MASAF wages helped some people in their household budgets while others not. Some mismanaged their money by spending on beer leaving their households suffering. Demand for goods in the local markets went up because of MASAF wages.” (Non-Beneficiaries on the Thabwa-Robeni Road). “MASAF wages were spent on food, clothes, milling, loans and other household needs. With the money from MASAF, we were able to live better lives and could afford to buy certain things that would not be possible without MASAF money. The trees will help in future because the trees reduce or control destruction of property and lives from floods. Trees will bring rains, river banks look beautiful now and at the same time, tree leaves add fertility to the soil after decaying, (trees have been planted in peoples gardens, those very close to the river. Some people even have vegetable gardens on the banks of the river). ” (Beneficiaries on the Phalombe River Bank Rehabilitation project). “The construction of the road had eased communication problems which used to exist. For example, people had a lot of problems doing business, with the road it became easy for them to carry out their businesses.” (Non-beneficiaries on the Lunjika via Chasenga-M1 road) “The MASAF wages had a very big positive impact in our everyday lives because we were able to buy some of the things we wanted despite the fact that the wages received were low. Those people who ran local businesses like groceries used to benefit quite a lot from the wages of MASAF because most project workers people bought most of their domestic needs from their groceries.” They added that: “even though the road passed through some peoples’ gardens the owners did suffer a great loss compared to what had been gained [at community level].” (Beneficiaries on the Bwengu-Katope road project) “MASAF wages helped some people to buy fertiliser which enabled them to have increased food crop harvest.” (Non--Beneficiaries on the Bwengu-Katope road project) “The dam had been very helpful because water [for vegetable gardening] ceased to be a problem. Before the dam was constructed people drew water from wells but these would dry up and thus nursery beds would not be watered. People were also happy that government put in some fish in the dam. This will solve problems in getting relish. However, in the process of constructing the dam people lost some sugarcanes and vegetables gardens which were close to the dam site.” (Non-beneficiaries around the Thumba Dam project) “The dam had no economic impact on the people because it was not yet finished. The purpose of rehabilitating the dam by MASAF had not produced any fruits.” (Non-beneficiaries from Ndunde Earth Dam project)

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9.2.4 Changes in the Main Sources of Income It has been observed above that MASAF wages have been used for a variety of households’ needs, some of which investment aspects such as purchase of farm inputs and start-up capital for small businesses. The presumption here is that the utilisation of wage earnings from MASAF PWP in investment in other activities might change their reliance on unstable sources of income, although other factors may also account for such changes. Table 9.5 present changes in major sources of income between 1998 and 2000, using the same beneficiaries covered in the baseline survey. Crop sales were still major sources of income for beneficiaries in both 1998 and 2000, but the proportion of beneficiaries that reported crop sales as a major income source increased from 59.7 percent to 75.4 percent. Assuming that beneficiaries mainly sell surplus food, it arguable that their food consumption might also have increased during the period, which is confirmed by the increase in the number of meals below. Table 9.5 Changes in Sources of Income between 1998 and 2000

1998 2000 Sources of Income Male

(N=198) Female

(N=123) Total

(N=321) Male (N=230)

Female (N=161)

Total (N=391)

Crop Sales 64.4 51.2 59.7 78.3 71.4 75.4 Livestock Sales 2.5 1.6 2.2 0.9 - 0.5 Small Business 10.1 9.8 10.0 5.7 6.8 6.1 Income Transfers 0.5 4.1 1.9 - - - MASAF Wage - - - 0.9 8.1 3.8 Salaried Farm Employment 1.0 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.6 0.5 Salaried Non-Farm Employment 5.1 7.3 5.9 0.9 - 0.5 Ganyu on Farm 11.6 18.7 14.3 7.0 6.2 6.6 Other Ganyu 3.0 4.9 3.7 3.9 5.6 4.6 Other 1.5 0.8 1.2 2.2 1.2 1.8

Source: Baseline Data (Zgovu and Mvula, 1998) and MASAF PWP Beneficiary

Assessment 2000 What is also prominent is the diminishing importance of ganyu on farm from 14.3 percent in 1998 to 6.6 percent in 2000 and proportionately more women than men have reduced their reliance of ganyu on farm since 1998. However, more beneficiaries relied on other ganyu in this study compared to the baseline study. Potentially, the experience gained under PWP may be responsible for this shift as individual’s search for ganyu activities widen to non-traditional activities. The MASAF PWP employment opportunity became a major source of income for 3.8 percent, particularly among women. Also noticeable is the decline in the proportion of beneficiaries whose main source of income is operating small business enterprises from 10 percent to 6.1 percent 9.2.5 Changes in Number of Meals Table 9.6 shows the number of meals taken by the beneficiaries in the baseline survey and this survey. Although the changes in the number of meals may also be influenced by other programmes such as ‘starter pack’, the data shows that overall the frequency of food consumption increased between 1998 and 2000. For instance, during the food surplus

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months the proportion of beneficiaries having meals three times per day increased from 14.4 percent in 1998 to 60.0 percent in 2000. Similarly, the proportion of beneficiaries having three meals per day during the food deficit months has increased while the proportion of those having one meal has fallen substantially. Table 9.6 Proportion of Households Having a Given Number of Meals by Sex of

Household Head and Status

1998 2000 Number of Meals Male

(N=194) Female

(N=122) Total

(N=316) Male (N=214)

Female (N=146)

Total (N=364)

During Food Surplus Months One Two Three Four

7.6

77.3 15.2

-

10.7 76.2 13.1

-

8.8

76.9 14.4

-

-

38.8 58.0

3.2

-

34.2 63.0

2.7

-

37.0 60.0

3.0 During Food Deficit Months One Two Three Four

50.5 40.7

8.2 0.5

60.7 37.7

1.6 -

54.4 39.6

5.7 0.3

44.0 46.8

9.2 -

38.4 47.3 14.4

-

41.8 47.0 11.3

- Source: Baseline Data (Zgovu and Mvula, 1998) and MASAF PWP Beneficiary

Assessment 2000 9.2.6 Changes in the Nutritional Status of Children Anthropometry measurements were taken on under-five children of both beneficiary and non-beneficiary interviewees in both new sites and those sites covered during the baseline study. The purpose of collecting these data was to assess the nutritional status of the children and then the results to infer on the nutritional status of the rest of the community members. Changes in the nutritional status of children covered in the baseline would indicate either improvement or otherwise. However, caution must be exercised in the interpretation of the findings since there are many reasons that positively or negatively affect the nutritional status including safety net interventions where the wages earned from such an intervention are spent on food and other nutrition-enhancing items. 9.2.6.1 Overall Nutrition Status of Under-Five Children Table 9.7 shows the level of nutrition for under-five children from beneficiary and non-beneficiary households covered in this study. The results indicate that 44.6 percent of the children had the normal height for their age, slightly more than one in every five children (23.2 percent) was moderately stunted and about one in every three (32.2 percent) was severely stunted. Aggregate stunting rate was therefore 55.4 percent (being the sum of moderate and severe stunting). The baseline study conducted in 1998 found the respective proportions (for both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) of normal height-for-age, moderate stunting and severe stunting of 46.9, 25.6 and 27.5 percent, and the aggregated stunting rate was 53.1 percent (See Table 63 in the Baseline Report or Tables 9.8 and 9.9 below). The Malawi Social Indicators Survey

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(MSIS) (1995) found a national stunting rate of 48.3 percent. The above clearly show that stunting has worsened somewhat over time. Table 9.7 Distribution of Children by Anthropometric Z-Scores (All Sample

Households)

Stunting (Height-for-Age)

Under-weight (Weight-for-Age)

Wasting (Weight-for-Height) Z-Score*

N Percent N Percent N Percent $ -2.00 Z Score 532 44.6 894 74.9 1,140 95.5 <-2.00 Z Score 277 23.2 207 17.3 35 2.9 < -3.00 Z Score 385 32.2 93 7.8 19 1.6 Total 1,194 100.0 1,194 100.0 1,194 100.0

* Interpretation: Z Score $ -2.00 is Normal status; Z Score < -2.00 is Moderate status; Z Score < -3.00 is Acute or Severe (poor) status.

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 What is also equally important though is that stunting is less sensitive to short-term bouts of food insecurity but more sensitive to prolonged food insecurity and poor food in-take. Short-term fluctuations in food availability and in-take have more immediate impact on body weight, among other things. Thus, some factors in addition to food insecurity facing the households could have been at play, which account for the observed differences. With respect to under-weightiness, the study found 74.9 children had the normal weight for their age, 17.3 percent were moderately under-weight and 7.8 percent were severely under-weight. Aggregate under-weightiness was therefore 25.1 percent. The baseline found the respective proportions (for both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) of normal, moderate and severe under-weight of 69.1, 21.4 and 9.0 percent, and the aggregate under-weight was 30.4. The MSIS aggregate under-weight rate was 29.9 percent. Aggregate under-weightiness is shown to have fallen considerably from 30.4 percent of the children covered in the baseline to 25.1 percent of the children covered in the present study. This is not surprising since body weight is sensitive to food availability and its in-take and at the time of the study, which was presumably high higher partly due to the good harvest at that time. With respect to the children’s measurements of weight-for-height (also known as a measure of ‘wasting’) it was found that 95.5 percent of the children had the normal weight-height proportion, 2.9 percent were moderately wasting and 1.6 percent were severely wasting (the case of acute malnutrition). Aggregate wasting was therefore 4.5 percent. The baseline findings (for the total sample of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) on wasting were as follows: 95.6 percent children with normal weight-for-height, 2.9 percent children were moderately wasting, 1.5 percent were severely wasting, and aggregate wasting was 4.4 percent. The Malawi Social Indicators Survey (MSIS, 1995) found the aggregate incidence of wasting among 7 percent of children. This means that wasting among children covered in the present study was slightly worse off than those covered in the baseline study but the incidence in the present study is considerably lower than that found among children covered in the MSIS (1995) study.

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9.2.6.2 Nutrition Status of Under-five Children at Project Level Tables 9.8 through to 9.10 show the distribution of nutritional status of children by project site. Some of the findings showing outstanding (farthest away from the sample average) moderate and severe incidences of stunting, under-weight and wasting have been highlighted in bold in all the three tables showing the above indicators. For instance, five projects had higher than average (overall) proportions of children with moderate stunting and seven projects (Mwenelondo-Lake road in Karonga, Lozi-Mwalawatongole road in Nkhotakota, Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn Off road in Lilongwe, Livunzu-Mpangowalimba in Chikwawa, Ndunde-Smith road and Ndunde Earth Dam in Chiradzulu and Katema-Chileka in Blantyre districts) had proportions of children with higher than the overall proportion of 32.2 percent of children who were severely stunted. The projects in Chiradzulu had the highest proportions (one in every two children) of severe stunting. Arguably all projects with higher than the sample average proportions of stunting (so too other indicators presented below) deserved the safety net if at the wages could translate into increased food in-take. Table 9.8 Distribution of Children by Anthropometric Z-Scores by Project Site (Height

for Age Z-Scores)

> = -2 Z-Scores Normal

< - 2 Z-Scores Moderate

< - 3 Z-Scores Severe/Acute Total

Project Name N Percent N Percent N Percent N PercentMwenelondo-Lake road 43 46.2 16 17.2 34 36.6 93 100.0 Mbiriwizi Dam 48 46.6 27 26.2 28 27.2 103 100.0 Lunjika via Chasenga-M1 36 61.0 14 23.7 9 15.3 59 100.0 Bwengu-Katope road 50 48.1 26 25.0 28 26.9 104 100.0 Kande-Mapale-Chesamu road 28 51.9 17 31.5 9 16.7 54 100.0 Lozi-Mwalawatongole road 33 33.7 28 28.6 37 37.8 98 100.0 Buzi Hill Afforestation 68 53.5 30 23.6 29 22.8 127 100.0 Mndunje-Bimphi road 37 43.0 21 24.4 28 32.6 86 100.0 Mbabzi-Nambuma T/Off 37 41.6 20 22.5 32 36.0 89 100.0 Thumba Dam 30 45.5 15 22.7 21 31.8 66 100.0 Livunzu-Mpangowalimba 21 46.7 7 15.6 17 37.8 45 100.0 Thabwa-Robeni road 16 42.1 9 23.7 13 34.2 38 100.0 Phalombe River Bank Rehab. 32 50.8 11 17.5 20 31.7 63 100.0 Ndunde-Simithi road 13 43.3 2 6.7 15 50.0 30 100.0 Ndunde-Earth Dam 13 22.4 13 22.4 32 55.2 58 100.0 Katema-Chileka road 27 33.3 21 25.9 33 40.7 81 100.0 Overall 532 44.6 277 23.2 385 32.2 1194 100.0

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 With respect to weight-for-age the projects that had considerably greater than the sample average proportion (17.3 percent) of moderately under-weight children were Mndunje-Bimphi road (29.1 percent), Lozi-Mwalawatongole road (25.5 percent), Phalombe River Rehabilitation (22.2 percent) and Thumba Dam (21.2). With respect to severe under-weightiness eight projects (as highlighted) had greater than the sample proportion of 7.8 percent, the greatest proportion being 18.4 percent found among children at Thabwa-Robeni MASAF PWP road.

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Table 9.9 Distribution of Children By Anthropometric Z-Scores by Project Site (Weight for Age Z-Scores)

> = -2 Z-Scores

Normal < - 2 Z-Scores

Moderate < - 3 Z-Scores Severe/Acute Total

Project Name N Percent N Percent N Percent N PercentMwenelondo-Lake road 64 68.8 18 19.4 11 11.8 93 100.0 Mbiriwizi Dam 86 83.5 14 13.6 3 2.9 103 100.0 Lunjika via Chasenga-M1 54 91.5 4 6.8 1 1.7 59 100.0 Bwengu-Katope road 86 82.7 15 14.4 3 2.9 104 100.0 Kande-Mapale-Chesamu road 44 81.5 7 13.0 3 5.6 54 100.0 Lozi-Mwalawatongole road 62 63.3 25 25.5 11 11.2 98 100.0 Buzi Hill Afforestation 99 78.0 16 12.6 12 9.4 127 100.0 Mndunje-Bimphi road 59 68.6 25 29.1 2 2.3 86 100.0 Mbabzi-Nambuma T/Off 63 70.8 17 19.1 9 10.1 89 100.0 Thumba Dam 47 71.2 14 21.2 5 7.6 66 100.0 Livunzu-Mpangowalimba 38 84.4 6 13.3 1 2.2 45 100.0 Thabwa-Robeni road 26 68.4 5 13.2 7 18.4 38 100.0 Phalombe River Bank Rehab. 48 76.2 14 22.2 1 1.6 63 100.0 Ndunde-Simithi road 21 70.0 5 16.7 4 13.3 30 100.0 Ndunde-Earth Dam 40 69.0 8 13.8 10 17.2 58 100.0 Katema-Chileka road 57 70.4 14 17.3 10 12.3 81 100.0 Overall 894 74.9 207 17.3 93 7.8 1194 100.0

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 Wasting (both moderate and severe) at project level was most prevalent among children around Thabwa-Robeni road whose aggregate (sum of moderate and severe) wasting was 18.4 percent. Other project areas with exceptionally high proportions of wasting children were Phalombe River Rehabilitation (aggregate wasting of 9.5 percent), Ndunde Earth Dam (8.6 percent), Ndunde Smith road (6.7 percent) and Kande-Mapale-Chesamu road (5.6 percent). Some projects (where the are dashes, ‘-’) did not have any severely wasting children. In addition, given the small number of children in other projects, the focus is on the general results. On the whole some project sites had well above the sample average percentages of children (and thus households) with poor nutrition status. Such projects can be said to have been some of the right most deserving targets for the safety net. In the majority of the project sites the proportions of children in the moderate and severe categories were about the sample averages which themselves are worrying incidences of the problem poor nutrition status. Thus it appears that the ‘safety net’ initiative reached out to some of the households who deserved it.

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Table 9.10 Distribution of Children by Anthropometric Z-Scores by Project Site (Weight for Height Z-Scores)

> = -2 Z-Scores

Normal < - 2 Z-Scores

Moderate < - 3 Z-Scores Severe/Acute Total

Project Name N Percent N Percent N Percent N PercentMwenelondo-Lake road 90 96.8 2 2.2 1 1.1 93 100.0 Mbiriwizi Dam 100 97.1 3 2.9 - - 103 100.0 Lunjika via Chasenga-M1 58 98.3 1 1.7 - - 59 100.0 Bwengu-Katope road 103 99.0 1 1.0 - - 104 100.0 Kande-Mapale-Chesamu road 51 94.4 2 3.7 1 1.9 54 100.0 Lozi-Mwalawatongole road 94 95.9 3 3.1 1 1.0 98 100.0 Buzi Hill Afforestation 120 94.5 4 3.1 3 2.4 127 100.0 Mndunje-Bimphi road 84 97.7 1 1.2 1 1.2 86 100.0 Mbabzi-Nambuma T/Off 85 95.5 3 3.4 1 1.1 89 100.0 Thumba Dam 64 97.0 2 3.0 - - 66 100.0 Livunzu-Mpangowalimba 44 97.8 - - 1 2.2 45 100.0 Thabwa-Robeni road 31 81.6 4 10.5 3 7.9 38 100.0 Phalombe River Bank Rehab. 57 90.5 5 7.9 1 1.6 63 100.0 Ndunde-Simithi road 28 93.3 - - 2 6.7 30 100.0 Ndunde-Earth Dam 53 91.4 2 3.4 3 5.2 58 100.0 Katema-Chileka road 78 96.3 2 2.5 1 1.2 81 100.0 Overall 1140 95.5 35 2.9 19 1.6 1194 100.0

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 9.2.6.3 Comparative Analysis of Baseline and Present Study Anthropometry Measurements Anthropometry data collected on children from the households covered in the baseline (1998) and also in the present (2000) study are reported in Table 9.11. Of the 524 children covered during the baseline (see Table 63 of the Zgovu and Mvula (1998b)) only 244 were traced and involved in the 2000 study. As noted in chapter 3 above, it was difficult to trace all the beneficiaries covered in the baseline. Although, 417 baseline beneficiaries with 248 under-five children were matched, the same individuals had only 144 under-five children. Given that it is two years since the baseline, some of the under-five, those who were three or more years were excluded in the athropometric measurements. The present study found that the proportion of the children had the ‘normal’ height-for-age score fell from 50 percent found during the baseline to 41.4 percent in 2000. The proportion of ‘severely’ stunting children rose (to 31.6 percent) in the 2000 compared to 1998 when the proportion was 25 percent.

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Table 9.12 Distribution of Children by Anthropometric Z-Scores from Beneficiary Households covered in the 1998 and 2000

Stunting

(Height-for-Age) Under-weight

(Weight-for-Age) Wasting

(Weight-for-Height) Z-Score* N Percent N Percent N Percent

Baseline (1998) $ -2.00 Z Score 72 50.0 99 68.8 135 93.8 <-2.00 Z Score 36 25.0 33 22.9 8 5.6 < -3.00 Z Score 36 25.0 12 8.3 1 0.7 Total 144 100.0 144 100.0 144 100.0 Evaluation (2000) $ -2.00 Z Score 101 41.4 190 77.9 236 96.7 <-2.00 Z Score 66 27.0 41 16.8 6 2.5 < -3.00 Z Score 77 31.6 13 5.3 2 0.8 Total 244 100.0 244 100.0 248 100.0

Source: Baseline Data (Zgovu and Mvula, 1998) and MASAF PWP Beneficiary

Assessment 2000 With respect to under-weightiness it can be seen that more children in the year 2000 (77.9 percent) than there were in 1998 (68.8 percent) had the ‘normal’ weight for their age. The above are significant gains in nutrition status among the children and their households. In fact the percentage of ‘severely under-weight’ children fell from 8.3 percent during the baseline study to 5.3 percent during the present study. Significant gains were also made in respect of children’s weight-for-height. During the baseline 93.8 percent of the children had the ‘normal’ weight-for height Z-score but during the present study the proportion of children with the ‘normal’ weight-for height Z-score was higher at 96.7 percent. This implies that fewer children were wasted during the 2000 study than those found during the 1998 study. Overall, it is clear that the children’s nutrition position was better during the 2000 study than it was during the baseline study in 1998. As stated at the outset it is not a straightforward to attribute the above gains in nutrition to a single factor (e.g. wages from MASAF PWP). In the case of the wages from MASAF PWP such a link is made more difficult, by the fact that not only were wages small (compared to the cost of a basket of basic commodities), delayed in some cases. In addition, the period during which people benefit from the project has generally been short and in nearly all cases by the time this follow-up was being undertaken households had long been off the ‘safety net’ programme. What complicates the issue further are the gains observed in indicators that are sensitive to mostly current food intake situations. Credit to the wages from MASAF PWP, however, cannot be absolutely ruled out. 9.2.6.4 Nutrition Status for Children in Beneficiary and Non-Beneficiary Households The nutrition status of children in the ‘new’ projects (those not covered during the baseline study) is presented in Table 9.13. Based on the height-for-age indicator it can be seen that in overall terms the proportion of children of normal height-for-age ($ -2 Z-score) was slightly higher in non-beneficiary households (45.5 percent) than those in the beneficiary households (43.3 percent). Alternatively, the aggregate proportion of (moderate (<-2 Z-score) plus

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severe (<-3 Z-score)) stunted children was higher among beneficiary households (56.7 percent) than those in non-beneficiary households (54.5 percent). Table 9.13 Nutrition Status of Under-five Children in Beneficiary and Non-Beneficiary in

New (non-baseline) Project Sites

HEIGHT-FOR-AGE Non-Beneficiary Beneficiary

Sex of household head Sex of household head Female Male Overall Female Male Overall

N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent

$ -2.00 Z Score 12 38.7 88 46.6 100 45.5 28 41.8 159 43.6 187 43.3 <-2.00 Z Score 8 25.8 49 25.9 57 25.9 14 20.9 76 20.8 90 20.8 < -3.00 Z Score 11 35.5 52 27.5 63 28.6 25 37.3 130 35.6 155 35.9

Total 31 100.0 189 100.0 220 100.0 67 100.0 365 100.0 432 100.0 WEIGHT-FOR-AGE

$ -2.00 Z Score 26 83.9 143 75.7 169 76.8 49 73.1 265 72.6 314 72.7 <-2.00 Z Score 5 16.1 29 15.3 34 15.5 13 19.4 68 18.6 81 18.8 < -3.00 Z Score - - 17 9.0 17 7.7 5 7.5 32 8.8 37 8.6

Total 31 100.0 189 100.0 220 100.0 67 100.0 365 100.0 432 100.0 WEIGHT-FOR-HEIGHT

$ -2.00 Z Score 30 96.8 175 92.6 205 93.2 63 94.0 353 96.7 416 96.3 <-2.00 Z Score 1 3.2 7 3.7 8 3.6 3 4.5 10 2.7 13 3.0 < -3.00 Z Score - - 7 3.7 7 3.2 1 1.5 2 0.5 3 0.7

Total 31 100.0 189 100.0 220 100.0 67 100.0 365 100.0 432 100.0 Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment 2000 The results on the analysis of the nutrition status of children at the level of sex of household head in both beneficiary and non-beneficiary households are also shown in Table 9.13. Among non-beneficiary households it can be seen that the aggregate (moderate plus severe) proportion of stunted children was higher in children from female-headed households (61.3 percent) than those from male-headed households (53.4 percent). Among the beneficiary households it was also the case that female-headed households had a higher aggregate proportion of children (58.2 percent) who were stunted than male-headed households, whose aggregate proportion of stunted children was 56.4 percent. On this basis female-headed households were more safety-net-deserving than male-headed households. When compared with the overall proportion of stunting (in Table 9.7) and with earlier studies, however, both male and female-headed households in both the beneficiary and non-beneficiary households at the ‘new’ project sites had worse off proportions of aggregate stunting and were indeed some of the deserving areas deserving safety net interventions. With respect to the weight-for-age indicator 76.8 percent of the children in non-beneficiary households (in the ‘new’ project sites) and 72.7 percent in the beneficiary households had the normal weight-for-age ($ -2 Z-score). The aggregate (moderate plus severe) incidences of under-weightiness were therefore worse- off among children in beneficiary households (27.4 percent) than among children in non-beneficiary households (24.3 percent). These aggregates, however, were better off than those obtained among the children covered in the baseline study whose aggregate was 30.9 percent. In terms of incidences of under-weightiness among children at the level of sex of the household head (within the beneficiary

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and non-beneficiary households) it can be seen that for non-beneficiary households slightly more children in female-headed households (16.1 percent) than in male-headed households (15.3 percent) were moderately under-weight but no child among the female-headed households was severely under-weight while 9.0 percent of the children in male-headed non-beneficiary households were severely under-weight. A similar pattern was observed between female-headed and male-headed beneficiary households. That is, 19.4 percent of the children in female-headed households were moderately under-weight compared to 18.6 percent of children in male-headed households but more children in male-headed households (8.8 percent) were severely under-weight than those in female-headed households whose proportion was 7.5 percent. With respect to the weight-for-height indicator beneficiary households (in the ‘new’ project sites) had a higher proportion (96.3 percent) than non-beneficiary households’ 93.2 percent of children who had normal weight-for-height measurements. It follows that in terms of aggregate proportions of wasting there were more children in non-beneficiary households (in fact 6.8 percent) who were wasting than in the beneficiary households (3.7 percent). More specifically, the proportion of 3.2 percent of severe wasting (<-3 Z-score) children among non-beneficiary households was considerably higher than the mean proportions (1.6 percent) of the overall sample used in this study, the baseline study finding (1.5 percent), among others. Indicators of weight-for-height at the level of sex of the households’ head show that male-headed non-beneficiary households had worse off aggregate proportions of wasting of 7.4 percent of children than their counterparts (female-headed non-beneficiary households) who had an aggregate percentage of 3.2 percent. In fact, there were no severely wasting children among the latter. Indicators of wasting among children in female-headed beneficiary households were worse off (4.5 percent moderately wasting and 1.5 percent severely wasting) than those of children in male-headed beneficiary households (2.7 percent moderately wasting and 0.5 percent severely wasting). 9.3 Coping Mechanisms and Availability of Alternative Employment The MASAF PWP is designed to provide a safety net to the vulnerable households. On this principle the programme achieves to transfer incomes to the poor, as a short-term measure, in exchange of labour services on development work. The question however, remains whether the cash transfers bail the vulnerable household members from their poverty trap and how best they cope once the projects are completed in the area. The study analysed the means of livelihood of beneficiaries of MASAF PWP. Since all the projects sampled, except one, were completed at the time of the study, the results should help us understand the coping mechanisms that beneficiary households employ when they are no longer deriving income from the public works programme. The study also focused on the availability of alternative sources of employment for needy households. Since the MASAF PWP is a cash transfer scheme implemented through paid employment projects, it was essential to investigate this issue because, among other things, the findings should provide some insights into the extent to which the MASAF PWP complementing alternative sources of employment.

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9.3.1 Adaptive Strategies and Coping Mechanisms The beneficiaries were asked to indicate the alternative means of livelihood that are usually used by season. The year was divided into three periods: harvest time (April-July), slack period (August-November), and lean months (December-March). Table 9.14 presents results for beneficiaries categorised by sex of household head. It can be seen that there are three sources of livelihoods that a good proportion of households had recourse to: crop sales, ganyu in the neighbourhood, and small businesses. During harvest time, 81.8 percent of the beneficiaries listed crop sales as a major source of livelihood. The percentage declines as months go by with 70.3 percent saying that this was a source of livelihood during the slack period, and 40.7 percent reporting that this was a source of livelihood during the lean months. Thus, fewer and fewer households rely on crop sales as they move away from the harvest period. Table 9.14 Means of Livelihood of Beneficiaries by Season and by Household Head

Sex

Harvest Time (April - July) Slack Period

(August-November) Lean Months (December -March) Means of Livelihood

MH FH Total MH FH Total MH FH Total Crop sales 84.4 71.1 81.8 71.8 63.7 70.3 41.4 36.7 40.7 Livestock sales 9.5 7.0 9.0 12.2 9.0 11.6 15.5 13.3 15.1 Fishing 3.6 1.2 3.1 3.8 2.0 3.5 3.0 2.0 2.8 Small Business 34.8 41.0 36.0 38.1 40.6 38.5 34.5 41.0 35.7 Salary (pay roll) 7.7 3.9 7.0 7.4 3.5 6.7 6.7 2.7 6.0 Emigrate for Ganyu 2.0 1.2 1.9 4.0 2.0 3.6 3.7 2.3 3.4 Ganyu in the neighbourhood 33.6 38.7 34.5 40.5 48.0 41.9 44.9 47.7 45.4 Letting out property 1.3 0.4 1.1 1.6 - 1.3 1.5 0.8 1.4 Credit 0.9 1.2 0.9 4.9 2.0 4.3 5.6 2.3 5.0 Begging from relations 1.2 2.3 3.8 3.1 3.9 4.3 5.7 5.1 5.0

Notes: MH stands for male-headed households and FH stands for female-headed households. Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment, 2000 The importance of ganyu in the neighbourhood as a source of livelihood increases as households move away from the harvest time. Focus group discussions with beneficiaries revealed that ganyu activities included farm activities (clearing, digging and making ridges), brick making and building. The trend is that while less than half the beneficiary households (34.5 percent) reported it as a source of livelihood during harvest time, the proportion increased to 41.9 percent during the slack period, up to 45.4 percent during the lean months of December to March. In addition, the reliance on ganyu as a livelihood strategy increases as reliance on crop sales decrease. The other major source of livelihood is the running of small-scale businesses. The main business activities that were reported in focus group discussions were selling pancakes, vegetables, sugarcane, fish, and pottery and light beer. The proportions here range from 36.0 percent in the April to July period, to 38.5 percent in the August to November period, and 35.7 percent in the December to March period. With small businesses therefore, the variations are not very big across the seasons.

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The sale of livestock is another source of livelihood that increases with seasons. While as only 9.0 percent of households mentioned livestock sales in the April to July period, 11.6 percent mentioned it in the August to September period and 15.1 percent in the December to March period. Other sources of livelihoods that much fewer households have recourse to include: fishing, salaried employment, emigrating for ganyu, letting out property, credit and begging from relations. With respect to sex of the household head, it can be seen that with regard to the three most common coping mechanisms, during all periods, crop sales still remains the most prevalent. However, the proportion of male headed households coping through this mechanism surpasses that of female headed households. On the other hand, the percentage of female headed households coping through small businesses and ganyu in the neighbourhood is greater than male headed households. 9.3.2 Availability of Alternative Employment The availability of alternative employment opportunities in the communities could indicate the substitutability of MASAF employment after the completion of projects. Beneficiaries were asked to indicate alternative sources of employment that could have been available to them, had they not participated in the PWP. Of the total of 1404 beneficiaries, only 34.8 percent could have searched alternative employment if they were not employed in the PWP project. Searching for alternative employment was higher among male beneficiaries (41.6 percent) than among female beneficiaries (27.0 percent). Table 9.15 shows the availability of alternative employment by type of employment and sex of respondent. Overall, 33.7 percent of beneficiaries could have found alternative employment if they were not employed in the public works programme. Table 9.15 Employment Alternatives to Beneficiaries by Sex of Respondent

Sex of Respondent Male (N=742) Female (N=662)

Total (N=1404) Type of Employment

N Percent N Percent N Salaried employment 78 5.6 25 1.8 103 7.3 Piecework or ganyu 204 14.5 142 10.1 346 24.6 Tenancy 17 1.2 4 0.3 21 1.5 Other 19 1.4 15 1.1 34 2.4 Overall 298 21.2 175 12.5 473 33.7

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment, 2000

The findings show that less than half (33.7 percent) indicated that they could have been engaged in alternative employment had they not participated in the MASAF PWP. In addition, piecework or ganyu, is by far the most common type of alternative employment. Of the total sampled beneficiaries, 24.6 percent indicated piecework or ganyu as their likely alternative. This amounts to more than half (73.2 percent) of the respondents who said they could have found alternative employment. The next likely alternative source of employment was salaried employment (7.3 percent), followed by other sources (2.4 percent) 12 and tenancy (1.5 percent). It is also worth noting that the proportion of female 12 When asked to specify “other” sources of employment, some respondents indicated contract

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participants (12.5 percent) who could have found alternative employment was much less than that of men (21.2 percent). 9.4 People’s Views on the Future of MASAF PWP The study team also solicited views from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and interviews with key informants on suggestions for improving the effectiveness of the public works programme. In general, both beneficiary as well as non-beneficiary communities would like to see MASAF continuing to fund projects. Both communities feel these projects do make a significant difference in people’s lives, either directly to beneficiary households or indirectly through positive externalities to non-beneficiary households and the community at large. However, people had a number of views and suggestions about the actual delivery of the MASAF PWP in the future. Table 9.16 presents perceptions from the communities on the current problems with the MASAF PWP. It is apparent that despite the revealed positive impact of the PWP on the socio-economic status, the concerns over low wages and timeliness of wage payments are overwhelming. The low wages and late disbursement of wages under MASAF PWP were reported as problems by 69.5 percent and 52.5 percent of the sample respondents, respectively. Table 9.16 Beneficiary and Non-beneficiary Perceptions on problems with PWP

Sex of Respondent Male Female

Total Problems

N Percent N Percent N Percent Unfair targeting/employment procedures 40 5.4 29 4.4 69 4.9 Low wages 536 72.2 440 66.5 976 69.5 Late disbursement of wages 408 55.0 329 49.7 737 52.5 Lack of consultation on project selection 11 1.5 3 0.5 14 1.0 Poor timing of the PWP project (season) 17 2.3 10 1.5 27 1.9 It is temporal in nature 94 12.7 60 9.1 154 11.0

Source: MASAF PWP Beneficiary Assessment, 2000 First, most people would like to see the MASAF PWP not only as a safety net programme, but also one that can help them graduate from poverty. It is in this light that came such calls as increased wages, or alternatively, a reduction in daily task sizes so that projects can last much longer. Secondly, efforts should be made to ensure that more people should be allowed to work. In most cases very needy households could not benefit simply because the required number of workers was small. Thirdly, people advised that in the future, MASAF should ensure that there are no delays in wage payments. Fourthly, people in Chikwawa, Mulanje, Nkhata-Bay, and Chiradzulu (Ndunde Earth Dam Project) were of the view that MASAF’s assets will not have the intended impact on the community if projects are not properly complete in Chikwawa, Mulanje, Nkhata-bay, bridges had not been constructed on MASAF roads. Lastly, in some

employment while the majority indicated self-employment. Since this question was about paid employment, it is therefore worth noting that the 2.4 percent is overstating the availability of “other” forms of paid employment.

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project sites such as Mbabzi-Nambuma Turn-Off Road and Ndunde Earth Dam, people advised MASAF to make sure that in the future, only kind-hearted Kapitawos and foremen with good public relations should be engaged. 9.5 Summary This chapter has reported results from the beneficiary assessment on the socio-economic impact of the MASAF-funded public works projects, adaptive strategies and perceptions on the project. Overall, the views from beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and key informants reveal many positive effect of the programme on the socio-economic status or livelihoods of the households participating in MASAF funded public works projects. The findings also show that for most beneficiaries, MASAF-funded public works projects generated new paid employment, particularly among female beneficiaries. Beneficiaries spent most of their wages on food items and household goods and associate the improvement in the quality of life to their participation in the MASAF PWP project activities. The results also show that, when compared with baseline study, the number of meals taken by households have increased, sources of income changed and there is a general improvement in the nutrition status of children. However, since some projects were completed some time ago, other intervening factors may have influenced these results in a positive or negative way. The most important survival strategies that households use in the absence of employment in MASAF-funded public works projects are sale of crop sales, ganyu in the neighbourhood and operation of small businesses. However, the importance of these alternative strategies tend to be seasonal with crop sales being more important in the harvest time while ganyu becomes more important in the lean season. The frequently cited concerns in the MASAF-funded public works projects relate to the level of wages and delays in the payment of wages. More than a third of the beneficiaries reported low wages as the main problem and half reported the problem of delayed payment of wages. These combined, as we have observed earlier, and given the changing economic conditions in Malawi diminish the purchasing power of the earnings from the safety net. Nonetheless, beneficiaries would like MASAF continue funding projects, but the concept of a safety net should be transformed to a programme that provides medium term employment to enable them pull out of poverty.

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CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10.1 Introduction The main purpose of this evaluation was to assess the impact of the MASAF public works programme on the beneficiary households and the community. Specifically, the study aimed at addressing five major areas. First, to assess the efficacy of the criteria for selecting beneficiaries and project sites including the motives for participation. Second, to solicit the perceptions of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on the levels of remuneration and forms of wage payments. Third, to examine the institutional links that exist among various collaborating institutions in the project cycle for the implementation of the public works programme. Fourth, to assess the work roles, the beneficiary valuation of assets and maintenance of assets after project completion. Fifth, to assess the socio-economic impact of the public works programme focusing on livelihoods, utilisation of wages and development in the target areas. Methodologically, the study covered sixteen project sites, eight of which were covered in the baseline survey carried out in 1998. In this evaluation, eleven of the project sites were road construction projects, three were dam construction or rehabilitation projects, one was afforestation project and the last one was a river bank rehabilitation project. 10.2 Conclusions Overall, the MASAF PWP project is a safety net programme in which individuals provide labour services in public works in exchange for money wage while at the same time fostering development at community level. The activities have generally concentrated in road construction or rehabilitation, although the number of projects in environmental oriented activities is increasing. The general approach in the implementation empowers local institutions and community institutional structures to implement the projects, while MASAF assumes the role of a sponsoring agent for these projects, although there are misconception at various levels that these projects belong to MASAF. The main findings of the study include the following: 10.2.1 Targeting and Selection of Projects and Project Workers The socio-economic characteristics of beneficiary and non-beneficiary respondents point to the fact that in most of the project sites covered in this study the households were vulnerable. The programme probably went to the people that needed it most and the fact that more women were participating in the sixteen project sites is an indication that one of the most vulnerable groups is being adequately addressed by the project. Nonetheless, some households that have similar characteristics of vulnerability did not benefit from the safety net in the sixteen project sites.

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The study finds that MASAF PMU uses the Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM) data to target vulnerable EPAs, although in some districts the DSS have justified targeting different EPAs based on their own assessment of the level poverty and accessibility to the road network in the areas. This flexibility is well recognised by both MASAF and the DSS due to the fact that in many respects the VAM data is out of date by the time the projects are implemented and its increased reliance as a targeting criteria may lead to helping communities that are better off. The selection of the project type is entirely done at district level by the district team in consultation with the community leaders. The study finds that in many projects the communities are not involved in the selection of projects for the Public Works Programme. Greater involvement of the communities is evident in project sites in which the communities already requested the projects from the District Development Committee through the VDC and ADC. In cases where the projects do not originate from these district development structures, Participatory Rural Appraisal methodologies for the identification of proposed projects from the communities are not used by the DSS. The responsibility for selecting workers lies with the foreman and the community-based project committee assisted by the traditional leaders. The project committee and the traditional leaders are expected to identify vulnerable groups, but the study finds that recruitment of workers was on the ‘first come first served’ basis using the minimum wage as a self-targeting instrument. This practice might have eliminated some of the most vulnerable individuals, evident in the socio-economic characteristics of some non-beneficiary households. Some important determinants of participation were wage rate, the timeliness of wage payments, the nature of tasks and availability of alternative employment. The study also finds that participation increases during the periods of food shortages, but dropout rates are very low in the projects. The main reason given for participation is poverty suggesting that the MASAF PWP is mostly targeting vulnerable groups. The supply of labour in the communities for public work is high but the limited employment opportunities available in the projects implies that only a few willing vulnerable individuals participate. 10.2.2 Remuneration The study finds that on average workers were on average engaged for less than four hours to complete the allocated task, but the total earnings and total number of days generated from the activities were generally low to meet their food and livelihood needs. Nonetheless, the fact that beneficiaries spend less labour time in public works projects accords then extra time to undertake other social and economic activities. In all project sites, the workers were paid the recommended wage of K15.80 per task for MASAF-funded public works projects. This wage was lower than the prevailing local wages for similar activities (such as clearing and digging in farms) for equivalent tasks and below the beneficiaries’ reservation wage under normal circumstances. The average minimum local wage in the sixteen project sites was MK25.90 and the average reservation wage for beneficiaries is MK17.90, hence adjusting the wage rate for MASAF-funded public works projects above the reservation wage but below the local wage is desirable. This can be a justified adjustment in circumstances where the minimum wage does not reflect the existing economic conditions.

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Cash was the most preferred form of wages for all seasons and for both male and female workers. The study finds no evidence that wages were differentiated according to gender. There were indications that preference for in-kind payments was inversely related with household food availability, that is, preference for in-kind payments increased while that for cash fell somewhat for the November-February period when most poor households tend experience food shortages. Half of the workers would prefer to be engaged in MASAF-funded public works projects in the post-harvest period but about 40 percent stated that they would prefer being engaged throughout the year. Alternative employment from the perspective of non-beneficiaries in the project sites is moderately available, but gender differences exist. About 60 percent of the non-beneficiaries were in alternative employment, with only 31 percent being women compared with 69 percent being male. In comparison with those engaged in MASAF-funded public works projects, non-beneficiaries in alternative employment worked longer hours per day to complete their task compared with MASAF-funded projects. However, the computed hourly wage revealed that non-beneficiaries in alternative employment earned twice as much per hour than those employed in the MASAF-funded public works projects. Such wage differentials justifies the case for the vulnerable groups to demand higher wages if they were to be employed in MASAF-funded public works projects. 10.2.3 Institutional Linkages The study finds that the institutional linkages among the various institutions involved in the implementation of the MASAF PWP project cycle are weak and collaborating institutions do not seem to have grasped the programme concept and operational framework of the public works programme. The study observes that while the link and interaction between MASAF and the district teams in many respects is generally conducive, the over-reliance of the project implementation on the district government departments and District Assemblies’ physical and human resources endangers the effective implementation of the projects. In most cases district government departments and District Assemblies face budgetary constraints and do not have adequate transport facilities for supervision and monitoring of project activities. In addition, the financial management capacity of the District Assemblies (formerly District Councils) is wanting and the inability of the district teams to manage the project resources endangered the effectiveness of the programme. The linkage between the technical sector institutions at district level with the regional and central government is weakest. In some cases, technical sector supervisors are reluctant to commit themselves to MASAF-funded public works projects because they believe that the funded projects although within the scope of their work bring additional burden of the district resources. The study observed that this is due to the ineffectiveness of the Memorandum of Understanding between MASAF and the sector Ministries, with the latter not taking into account MASAF funded activities in the financial provisions for the regional and district offices. The results of the institutional analysis suggest that the linkages between the DSS and the community in the implementation of projects are strong administratively and technically. In most project sites, beneficiaries and communities have commended the role played by the technical supervisors. Nonetheless, monitoring and supervision by other members of the DSS was grossly inadequate.

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At the community level, workers mostly interact with traditional leaders, the project committee, the technical supervisor and foremen, with different roles in the implementation of projects. The communities in most cases democratically elected the community-based project committee but fewer women were elected to the committees. The beneficiary perceptions on the performance of these institutions vary with respect to project sites. In most cases, the traditional leaders have provided a conducive environment for the implementation of the projects. The mixed feelings mostly relate to the performance of supervisors, the project committee and the gang leaders. The knowledge of communities about alternative safety nets funded by other agencies is limited and revealed the inadequacy of information relating to available safety nets to help the poor in rural areas. The study finds that the available alternative safety nets, only reported in two of the project sites, were better than MASAF PWP with respect to the wage levels and the timeliness of wage payments and the duration over which the participants can derive income from the project. 10.2.4 Work Roles, Assets and Maintenance The study finds that in general, there were no serious complaints from workers about the work norms. While both, men and women did most tasks the majority were agreeable to the allocation of lighter tasks to women and the weak. Similarly, there were no serious concerns expressed regarding task sizes. The workers were happy with the rotation of tasks that was practised in most projects. It is also evident that there were no requirements for special skills in the carrying out of the different work roles. Thus, except on grounds of stamina, every worker was capable of participating in any task. On-job training met the need for whatever skills were needed to perform a particular task. And in this case, the study finds that most workers professed having learnt some new skills, and felt that these newly acquired skills would be useful in the future, in that it would improve their chances of finding employment. The study has also found that the issue of ownership and maintenance is unclear in most project sites covered in this evaluation. In particular, the view of most respondents is that MASAF funded projects, regardless of the project type, belong to MASAF. As such, their expectation is that MASAF will be coming occasionally to carry out maintenance work, paying them in the process for their labour “contribution.” On the other hand, according to MASAF, all the assets that it funded belong to the communities themselves. Further, MASAF expects that the maintenance of localised assets (dams, forests) is the responsibility of the communities themselves, while that of roads is the domain of District Assemblies. The separation of ownership from maintenance in the road projects creates uncertainty over the responsibility of the communities and District Assemblies. 10.2.5 Socio-Economic Impact of the Public Works Programme The study finds overwhelming evidence of the positive impact of the participation of households in the MASAF public works programme on their socio-economic status. Most beneficiaries use the wage earning from MASAF PWP employment for purchase of food, household assets, but also invest in other productive activities such as agriculture and small business enterprises. MASAF PWP provided the only wage employment for most of the

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female beneficiaries in the project areas. The communities associate their improvement in the quality of life with their participation in the MASAF public works programme. There is scope for income from the safety net to have considerable impact on the nutrition status of the children and hence that of the rest of the household members. Nonetheless, caution must be exercised in interpreting these results due to the impact of intervening factors as there was rather a long gap between the time the baseline was undertaken and the time the follow-up study took place. In addition, the income from the safety net intervention stood some chances of its impact being undermined by being too short-lived and the continued decline in the real purchasing power of its wages. After completion of the MASAF PWP, an overwhelming majority of people tends to survive on crop sales at all times of the year. However, a sizeable proportion also does fall back on piecework employment (ganyu) within the neighbourhood, and small-scale business activities. Very small proportions of people resort to livestock sales, salaried employment, letting out property, credit, and begging from relatives as survival strategies. The study findings have also shown that the importance of these coping mechanisms varies by seasons. As the months become leaner on the agricultural calendar, fewer people depend on crop sales, while proportions increase, of people depending on piece work employment in the neighbourhood, small-scale business activities, livestock sales, credit, and begging from relatives. Piecework (ganyu) is by far the most common type of alternative employment in the project sites covered in this study. Salaried employment comes second, followed by other types of employment such as tenancy and contract. Less than half of the beneficiaries indicated that these alternative sources of employment could have been available had they not participated in the MASAF PWP. In terms of accessibility, the proportion of females who indicated that these types of employment could have been available to them is lower than that of males. Since females are generally poorer than males, the above mentioned alternative sources of employment are less accessible to the needy. The low wages and the late disbursement of wages in many respects were the main concerns of both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, and would like the project to improve in these areas. In addition, communities would wish MASAF to provide such employment on a sustainable medium term basis for the wage earnings to pull them out of poverty and hence the demand that MASAF should go back to the project sites for maintenance work of the assets.

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10.3 Recommendations The assessment of the operational framework and impact of the MASAF public works programme shows that the project is achieving its objective of assisting the vulnerable households and beneficiaries do associate changes in their socio-economic status to their participation in the MASAF public works programme. The sentiments from the beneficiaries and the wider community in the project sites reflect the importance of the MASAF PWP in reducing the severity of poverty and in community development. Nonetheless, some areas of improvement can be recommended: 10.3.1 Targeting and Selection of Projects • There is need to develop and use more general indicators of poverty in identifying the

most poverty-stricken Extension Planning Areas (EPAs) in the districts. However, special recognition should be given to EPAs besieged by natural disasters as part of relief activities. District Assemblies using the national poverty indicators should be responsible for ranking EPAs by incidence of poverty in their districts.

• The selection of projects, once the poverty-stricken EPAs have been identified, should be

through the District Assembly structures. If the poverty-stricken EPAs do not have projects on the District Assembly approved list that qualify for funding under the MASAF PWP, the request for such projects from the community should be made through the District Assembly via the Area Development Committee and the Village Development Committee. This will ensure adequate consultation between communities and their traditional leaders. The DEC or DSS should be involved in the identification of project sites and types only in emergency relief situations.

• The District Assembly should be assuming full ownership of the project activities under

MASAF funding. The IEC messages to the District Assembly members and technical supervisors and politicians should emphasise the fact that the MASAF Public Works Programme just provides funding to the District Assembly to implement public works projects initiated by the communities through the VDC and ADC.

• Recruitment of workers in public works projects should be done at community level as is

the case, but training provided to the foremen, the project committee and traditional leaders on the methods and guidelines for the identification of vulnerable households should be strengthened. In addition, given the low level of education in the target communities, members of the district team should be monitoring the recruitment of workers to ensure that the guidelines for selecting vulnerable households and workers are consistently followed by the community-based committees.

10.3.2 Remuneration • Cash as a preferred mode of payment among the beneficiaries should be maintained as a

mode of payment in MASAF-funded public works projects. • The Government minimum wage should be maintained as a guide for setting the wage

rate for the tasks only where it reflects the existing economic conditions in Malawi. In circumstances in which the official minimum wage remains constant and unrealistic, MASAF should be flexible in adjusting the wage rate for the safety net. The upward

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adjustment of the current wage for MASAF-funded public works projects should take into consideration the following alternatives: • The increases in the general wage levels in the public sector, particularly the category

of unskilled employees. For instance, MASAF should increase the wage by the rate of increase in public sector wages for unskilled employees.

• The average reservation wage and the existing local minimum wages for the rural areas from special sample surveys on rural labour market that MASAF should commission before the implementation of the projects. For example, based on this evaluation a wage rate of at least MK20 per task, which falls between the average reservation wage of MK17.90 and the average local minimum wage of MK25.90, is recommended.

• Although, a substantial proportion of beneficiaries would prefer to be engaged in

MASAF-funded public work projects, the implementation of projects should take into account the fact that in the rainy season, the poor need the time to work on their small gardens to produce whatever they can manage for subsistence.

10.3.3 Institutional Linkages • The capacity of collaborating institutions at the district and regional levels should be

strengthened, particularly in project and financial management. • The District Assemblies should ensure that they have adequate transport facilities for the

effective implementation, supervision and monitoring of development projects in the district.

• The collaboration of MASAF MU and the Ministries involved in the implementation of

the MASAF-funded public works projects should be strengthened. The Memorandum of Understanding with various Ministries should include the following: • Ministries commitment of financial resources and transport facilities to the regional

and district offices. • Monthly reports on the projects from the technical supervisors should be sent to the

regional offices. • The Regional Officers for Ministries involved in the projects together with the Zone

Managers should hold quarterly meetings, to review project activities in the region based on the district reports from the technical supervisors. Quarterly regional reports based on the quarterly meetings should be submitted to Ministry Headquarters and MASAF MU.

• MASAF MU should have biannual review meetings with relevant Ministries based on quarterly reports compiled by the Regional Offices.

• The District Assemblies should improve the financial management of resources relating

to project funds, by ensuring that funds are used properly with adequate documentation to support expenditures.

• MASAF MU should continue the tranche system of disbursement of project funds as one

way of monitoring project expenditures.

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10.3.4 Work Roles and Skills Requirements • The District Assemblies and MASAF MU should develop IEC massages that promote

gender equality in the type of tasks and educate communities that women can perform same tasks as men in public works projects, including during the worker recruitment period.

10.3.5 Ownership of Assets and Maintenance There is a clear need for an IEC campaign on the issue of ownership and maintenance of assets created in MASAF-funded public works projects. In particular,

• Projects whose benefits are localised, the community should own the assets and the District Assembly should hand over the assets to the communities for maintain and management of the facilities. Such projects should be implemented only if the community agrees to maintain such assets.

• Projects whose benefits are not localised, such as roads, the District Assembly should own the assets and should be responsible for maintenance of the assets preferably using the same public works concept.

10.3.6 Monitoring and Evaluation • Monitoring and evaluation should include monitoring of indicators of the socio-economic

impact of the projects by administering a small questionnaire to a panel of selected beneficiaries before their first wage payments and thereafter on quarterly intervals.

• MASAF MU should be evaluating the impact of MASAF Public Works Programme on

the socio-economic status of beneficiaries before or immediately after project completion in order to capture fully the effect of the interventions.

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Clay, E. J. (1986) Rural Public Works and Food-for-Work: A Survey, World Development,

14 (10/11), 1237-1252 Chirwa, E. and Milner, J. (1997) Impact Assessment of Food Security and Nutrition

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Chirwa, E., Mvula, P., Namata, L. and Zgovu, E. (1996) Review of Credit Operations

under Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) Project and Other Programmes, Report prepareed for Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Social Policy Section, Lilongwe: Wadonda Consult (Zomba)

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Guha, S. (1981) Income Redistribution through Labour-Intensive Rural Public Works: Some

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2000, Lilongwe: MASAF Management Unit (PWP Division) MASAF News (2000) PWP Corner, Volume 3, No. 2, July Mellor, J. W. (1980) Food Aid and Nutrition, American Journal of Agricultural

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APPENDIX A

LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS Karonga District Mr. T.E.C. Mwale Chief Executive, Karonga District Assembly Mr. B.J. Khonje Director of Finance, Karonga District Assembly Mr. A. Mkandawire DRIMP Supervisor, Karonga Mr. Bota Acting Director of Planning and Development, Karonga Mr. Chiphwanya Karonga District Assembly Clerk Senior Chief Kyungu Karonga Mr. Paul Maseke Nduna of Chief Kyungu Mr. S.Y. Kalambo Secretary, Village Committee, Mwenilonde-Lake Road Mr. S. Mwanju Committee member, Mwenilonde-Lake Road Mr. H.W. Munthali Committee member, Mwenilonde-Lake Road Mr. J. Gondwe Committee member, Mwenilonde-Lake Road Mr. B.J. Phiri Committee member, Mwenilonde-Lake Road Rumphi District Mr. L.M. Phiri Supervisor - DRIMP, Rumphi Mr. Jere Water Department, Rumphi Mr. Kalua Irrigation Officers - MOAI, Rumphi Mrs. Chithumba District Forest Office, Rumphi Mr. Mabuwira Group Village Headman, Rumphi Mr. H.K. Gondwe Chairman Village Commiittee, Mbiriwizi Mrs. E. Msiska Secretary, Village Commiittee, Mbiriwizi Mr. M. Luhanga Treasurer, Village Commiittee, Mbiriwizi Mr. S. Mzumara Committee members, Mbiriwizi Mr. L. Nyondo Committee members, Mbiriwizi Mr. J. Gondwe Committee members, Mbiriwizi Mr. B.J. Phiri Committee members, Mbiriwizi Mzimba District Mr. Mbewe Chief Executive, Mzimba District Assembly Mr. Katsitsi Director of Planning and Development, Mzimba Mr. Kumwenda Supervisor, DRIMP, Mzimba Mr. O.G. Mkamanga Works Supervisor, Mzimba Mr. Brian Munyenyembe Group Village Headman, Lunjika Road Mr. Mphande Group Village Headman, Lunjika Road Mr. T. Chirwa Group Village Headman, Lunjika Road Mr. Kandomo Banda Group Village Headman, Lunjika Road Mr. B. Nyirongo Group Village Headman, Lunjika Road Mr. M. Mkandawire Village Headman, Lunjika Road Mr. K. Kabeza Village Headman, Lunjika Road Mr. Chidothi Former Mzuzu District Commissioner Mr. W.H.K. Phiri DRIMP Supervisor, Ekwendeni Mr. Mzumura Director of Finance, Mzuzu City Assembly Mr. P.M. Nyirenda Clerk, Mzuzu City Assembly

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Nkhata Bay District Mr. M. Chimphepo Chief Executive, Nkhata Bay District Assembly Mr. C. Kalemba Director of Planning and Development, District Assembly Mr. A.C. Munthali DRIMP Supervisor, Nkhata Bay Mr. Zungeni Clerk of Council, Nkhata Bay Mr. Safali Village Headman, Nkhata Bay Mr. Lekaleka Village Headman, Nkhata Bay Mr. Dembanthuli Village Headman No. 9, Nkhata Bay Mr. Chakokomera Village Headman, Nkhata Bay Nkhotakota District Mrs. F. Mdokwe Chief Executive, Nkhotakota District Assembly Mr. Bulumuti Group Village Headman,Lozi-Mwalawatongole road,

Nkhotakota Mr. Stambuli Chirwa Village Headman, Lozi-Mwalawatongole road, Nkhotakota Mdazikhumba Abiti Amadi Village Head-Woman, Lozi-Mwalawatongole road, Nkhotakota Mr. Tongole Group Village Headman, Lozi-Mwalawatongole road,

Nkhotakota Ntchisi District Mr. R. C. Z. Hara Chief Executive, Ntchisi District Assembly Mr. A. N. Mtema Assistant District Forestry Officer, Ntchisi Mr. B. L. Nguluwe Road Supervisor, Ntchisi Mr. Stephano Msungwi Village Headman, Buzi Hill Afforestation Project, Ntchisi Mr. Jossam Lumbe Group Village Headman, Buzi Hill Afforestation Project,

Ntchisi Mr. Lobian Shumba Chairman - Project Committee, Buzi Hill Afforestation Project,

Ntchisi Dowa District Mr. Kayira Road Supervisor, Dowa Mr. Rabson B. Kachulu Group Village Headman, Mdunje-Bimphi Road, Dowa Mr. Nelson Bayiton Mayani Chairman Project Committee, Mdunje-Bimphi Road Dowa Mr. Robson Bololo Kachulu Group Village Headman, Kachulu Dowa Mr. Bennet Mtalimanja Village Headman Kachigubu, Mndunje-Bimphi Road Dowa Lilongwe District Mr. Moyo Chief Executive, Lilongwe District Assembly Mr. Chataika Senior Roads Supervisor, Lilongwe DRIMP office Mr. Mdzinja Dziko Mdzinja Village, T/A Kabudula, Mbadzi-Nambuma TO road Mr. Nelson B. Mayani Chair, Project Committee Mbadzi-Nambuma TO road Mr. Bennet Mtalimanja Village Headman Kachigubu, Mbadzi-Nambuma TO road Mr. Dayiza Sandilasi, Mbadzi-Nambuma TO road Mr. Kumbuyo Chiwala Village Headman, Thumba Dam, Lilongwe Mr. Leonard Chisunzi Group Village Headman, Thumba Dam, Lilongwe Mr. Henderson Makamo Chairman, Project Committee, Thumba Dam, Lilongwe Mr. Bonongwe Group Village Headman, Mbadzi-Nambuma TO Road,

Lilongwe

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Chikwawa District Mr. A.O. Ndhlovu Director of Planning and Development, District Assembly Mr. Uzaliwe Officer In-charge, DRIMP, Chikwawa Mr. Banda Director of Administration, Chikwawa District Assembly Mulanje District Mr. C. Kumwembe Director of Planning and Development, District Assembly Mr. Mazengera Director of Finance, Mulanje District Assembly Mr. Kholomana Roads Supervisor, Mulanje Chief Njema Village Headman, Thambwa-Robeni Road, Mulanje Austin Ng’oma Committee Member, Thambwa-Robeni Road, Mulanje George Chikumbu Supervisor, Thambwa-Robeni Road, Mulanje Chiradzulu District Chief Sitima Village Headman, Ndunde Earth Dam, Chiladzulu Anne Kimu Committee Clerk, Ndunde Earth Dam, Chiladzulu Charles Mwasama Supervisor (Kapitawo), Ndunde Earth Dam, Chiladzulu Mr. Moyo Chief Executive, Chiladzulu District Assembly Chief Mphepo Village Headman, Ndunde-Smith Road, Chiladzulu John Mwabasa Kapitawo, Ndunde-Smith Road, Chiladzulu Elex Mphepo Committee Member, Ndunde-Smith Road, Chiladzulu Ms Khama Mkonde Accounts Clerk, MASAF, Chiladzulu Phalombe District Mrs Kamwendo Chief Executive, Phalombe District Assembly Mr. Chunga Forestry Department, Phalombe Ms Kalini Misili MASAF PWP Treasurer, Phalombe District Assembly Ms Flora Macheso MASAF PWP Treasurer, Phalombe District Assembly Mr. John Losamu Chairperson, Phalombe River Bank Afforestation, Phalombe Chief Mthumpwa Group Village Headman/Village Headman, Phalombe River

Bank Afforestation Project, Phalombe Davie Chalera Kapitawo, Phalombe River Bank Afforestation Project,

Phalombe Mangochi District Mr. Pangani Chief Executive, Mangochi District Assembly Mr.Ngulube Director of Planning, Mangochi District Assembly Mr. Donda Supervisor - DRIMP, Mangochi District Assembly Mr. Kaponolangeni Mangochi District Assembly Mr. Mponya Mangochi District Assembly Mr. Lipondo Adamu Village Headman, Katema-Chileka Road, Mangochi MASAF Mrs. I. Manjolo Director of Public Works Programme, MASAF PMU Mr. Jeremani MASAF PWP Zone Manager, Mzuzu Mr. G. Manda MASAF PWP Zone Manager, Lilongwe Mr. Gonani MASAF PWP Zone Manager, Liwonde Mr. Nkhoma MASAF PWP Zone Manager, Blantyre Mr Hope Majawa MASAF Zone Accounts Assistant, Liwonde