Scott CaseStudySI BMS AESolutions (1)
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Transcript of Scott CaseStudySI BMS AESolutions (1)
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Standards
Certification
Education & Training
Publishing
Conferences & Exhibits
A Case Study: SAFETY
INSTRUMENTED BURNERMANAGEMENT SYSTEM
(SI-BMS)
Safety SymposiumHouston, TX
May 24, 2006
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Mike Scott, PE, CFSE
VP, Process Safety with AE Solutions Registered Professional Engineer in AK, SC,GA & IL Certified Functional Safety Expert (CFSE) Author / presenter of numerous technical papers on
process safety
ISA Instructor SI-BMS Webinar SI-FGS Webinar SI-BMS Class
ISA SP84 Committee Member BMS Subcommittee member FGS Subcommittee co-chair
ISA Safety Division BMS sub-committee chair
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Bud Adler
Director, Business Development with AE Solutions Active in process instrumentation field for over 40 years
Numerous sales, marketing and executive positions withinstrumentation vendors
Life Member of ISA
Member of ISA SP84 Safety Committee
Member of the BMS Subcommittee
Member of the FGS Subcommittee
Author of numerous technical papers related to processsafety
Frequent presenter at technical conferences and userseminars worldwide
Director-elect of ISA Safety Division
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Project Overview
Installation of two (2) new redundant Boilers Single Burner Boiler (NFPA 85)
Capable of firing natural gas, oil and / or wastegas
1365 PSIG steam at 310,000 lbs/hr
Client is fully S84 aware and hasimplemented numerous IEC61511 compliant
projectsComplex multiple entity project team
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Project Team Organization Chart
ChemicalManufacturer
Engineering
Firm
Boiler OEM
Burner OEM
SI-BMSConsultant
SIS Aware
SIS Aware
NON-SIS Aware
Semi-SIS Aware
NON-SIS Aware
Multiple sub-contractors
Various degrees of SIS
application knowledgeBoiler OEM had primary
PO for Boiler
Burner OEM and SI-BMScontracts were subs toBoiler OEM
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Construction Industry Institute
Front End Loading effort level directlyaffects the cost and schedule predictabilityof the project.
As the level of FEL tasks increase: The project cost performance from authorization decreases
by as much as 20% The variance between project schedule performance versus
authorization decreases by as much as 39% The plant design capacity attained and facility utilization
improved by as 15% The project scope changes after authorization tend to
decrease The likelihood that a project met or exceeded its financial
goals increased
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SIS FEL Package HAZARD Identification
Conduct HAZOP
Risk Assessment Perform LOPA Develop
SIF List SIS Design Basis Support Report
Safety Requirements Specification Develop
Lifecycle Cost Analysis Interlock List
Sequence of Operations
Conceptual Design Specification Redline P&IDs Develop
System Architecture Diagram
E-stop Philosophy SIS Logic Solver Specification Bill of Materials Approved Inst Vendor List / Procure Plan for SIS SIL Verification Report Control Panel Location Sketch Control Philosophy Specification
Summary Safety Report
Construction Estimate, TIC (+/- 20 %)
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Safety Lifecycle
Apply non-SIS ProtectionLayers to Prevent Identified
Hazards or Reduce Risks
Perform Process HazardsAnalysis & Risk Assessment
Define PHAInput /Output Requirements
Start
SIS Required?
ConceptualProcess Design
PerformSIS Detail Design
Develop Safety RequirementsSpecification
SIS Conceptual Design, &Verify Compliance With SRS
SIS Installation,Commissioning, and Pre-
Startup Acceptance Test
Define TargetSIL
SIS Startup,Operation, Maintenance,
Periodic Functional Testing
Pre-Startup Safety ReviewAssessment
EstablishOperating & Maintenance
Procedures
Modify orDecommission
SIS?
SIS
Decommissioning
YesNo
(Based on ISA-S84)
Project Design Basis /Company Standards
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Initial Design P&ID NG & Bio Gas
Pilot Line
Main Gas Line
Flame
SensorIgniter
HV
103
HV
104
FO
SV
105
Natural Gas
SV
109
SV
108
Combustion
Chamber
FO
SV
110
FC FC
FCFC
BN
102
BS
102A
BS
102B
BS
102C
BS102C
Main
Flame
Main
Flame
Main
Flame
PilotFlame
PT101B PT101CPT101A PT106B PT106CPT106A
Bio Gas Line
HV
103
HV
104
FO
SV
105
FC FC
PT
107B
PT
107C
PT
107A
PT
111B
PT
111C
PT
111A
Bio Gas
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Initial Design P&ID - Oil
Main Oil Line
HV
203
HV
204
No.2 Oil
Combustion
Chamber
FC FC
PT
201B
PT
201C
PT
201A
Atom Steam Line
HV
304
FO
SV
305
FC
PT
301B
PT
301C
PT
301A
Steam
FT
309
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ID Fan
FD FanCombustion Air
PDT
401B
PDT
401C
PDT
401A
Initial Design P&ID - Air
Combustion
Chamber
FGR Air
FT
501B
FT
501C
FT
501A
CleanAir
PT
602A
PT
601B
PT
601C
STACK
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LT
801B
LT
801C
LT
801A
Initial Design P&ID - Steam
Steam Drum
PT
702A
PT
701B
PT
701C
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Economic & Safety Analysis
Calculate Benefit toCost Ratio
Calculate LifecycleCost
Perform SIL Calcs
(PFDavg and MTTFS)
SIS Conceptual DesignArchitecture Options
YesNo
YesNo
B/C > 1.0
LowestLCC?
Start
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Risk Analysis Results
Item ID No. Description Reqd SIL
1 I-001a High steam drum pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture A2 SIF-002a Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 23 SIF-003a Loss of combustion air flow causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 SIF-004a High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 25 SIF-005a Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 1
6SIF-006a Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causes Fuel Gas Trip. (1oo1) PT, (2oo3) BS Sensor Architecture
1
7 SIF-007a High pressure natural gas causes Fuel Gas Trip. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 18 I-005a Low pressure biogas causes Biogas Trip. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture A9 I-006a High pressure biogas causes Biogas Trip. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture A10 SIF-010a Flameout caused by low fuel oil pressure causes Fuel Oil Trip. (1oo1) PT, (2oo3) BS Sensor Architecture 111 SIF-011a Low atomizing steam pressure causes Fuel Oil Trip. (1oo2) Sensor Architecture 1
12SIF-012a Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior to introducing an ignition source into furnace during pilot light-off. (3
groups of 1oo1 Sensors) Overall XooX Architecture 113 SIF-013a Proof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) prior to initiating purge sequence. (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 114 I-007a Manual ESD Emergency Boiler Shutdown causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). N/A15 SIF-015a Flameout (all other causes) results in Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 216 I-008a Low Air to Fuel ratio results in a Master Fuel Trip (MFT) A
7
SIL 1; 4
SIL 2; 4 - SIL A; 1 - MPF
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Yes, a BMS is a SIS if:Risk Analysis determines
additional risk reduction isrequired and a Safety IntegrityLevel of 1 or greater isassigned to a BMS SafetyInstrumented Function
No, a BMS is not a SIS if:
Risk Analysis determines noadditional risk reduction is
required
Is a BMS a SIS?
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SIL Verification Results
SIF Description Func Test Reqd SIL Achvd SIL PFDavg RRF MTTFS (Years)2 Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip
(MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 5.86E-03 171 20.492a Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip
(MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 7.10E-03 141 18.78
3 Loss of combustion air flow (or differentialpressure) causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 5.83E-03 172 20.41
3a Loss of combustion air flow (or differentialpressure) causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 6.47E-03 155 18.01
4 High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 5.84E-03 171 20.52
4a High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 6.47E-03 155 20.3
5 Low instrument air pressure causes Master FuelTrip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 1 2 6.42E-03 156 18.09
5a Low instrument air pressure causes Master FuelTrip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 1 2 6.42E-03 156 18.09
6 Flameout caused by low pressure natural gascauses Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3)Sensor Architecture
24 1 2 5.83E-03 172 19.79
6a Flameout caused by low pressure natural gascauses Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1)Sensor Architecture 24 1 2 5.85E-03 171 17.74
7 High pressure natural gas causes Master FuelTrip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 24 1 2 5.84E-03 171 20.52
7a High pressure natural gas causes Master FuelTrip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 1 2 6.47E-03 155 20.3
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SIL Verification Results
SIF Description Func Test Reqd SILAchvd
SILPFDavg RRF MTTFS (Years)
10Flameout caused by low fuel oil pressure
causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(2oo3) Sensor Architecture
24 1 2 5.83E-03 172 19.79
10aFlameout caused by low pressure natural
gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture
24 1 2 5.85E-03 171 17.74
11Low atomizing steam supply (low flow)
causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture
24 1 1 3.66E-02 27 14.48
11a
Low atomizing steam supply (low flow)
causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 1 1 3.66E-02 27 14.48
12Proof of gun in position signal is
required prior to startup of fuel oilfiring. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
24 1 1 3.09E-02 32 48.01
12aProof of gun in position signal is
required prior to startup of fuel oilfiring. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
24 1 1 3.09E-02 32 48.01
13
Safe purge conditions must be satisfiedprior to introducing an ignitionsource into furnace during pilot
light-off. (2oo3) Sensor Architecture
24 1 1 3.10E-02 32 1501.7
13a
Safe purge conditions must be satisfiedprior to introducing an ignitionsource into furnace during pilotlight-off. (2oo2) Sensor Architecture
24 1 1 3.15E-02 32 146.06
15
Proof of no flame in firebox (by flamescanner) prior to initiating purgesequence. (2oo3) SensorArchitecture
24 1 1 8.58E-06 116508 14.5
15a
Proof of no flame in firebox (by flamescanner) prior to initiating purge
sequence. (1oo1) SensorArchitecture
24 1 1 2.30E-04 4345 28.54
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Economic & Safety Analysis
Calculate Benefit toCost Ratio
Calculate LifecycleCost
Perform SIL Calcs
(PFDavg and MTTFS)
SIS Conceptual DesignArchitecture Options
YesNo
YesNo
B/C > 1.0
LowestLCC?
Start
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Benefit-to-Cost-Ratio
B-C Ratio = FNo-SIS x EVNo-SIS - FSIS x EVSISCostSIS + CostNT
B-C Ratio = Ratio of benefits to cost
FNo-SIS = Frequency of the unwanted event without a SIS
FSIS = Frequency of the unwanted event with a SIS
EVNo-SIS = Total expected value of loss of the event without a SISEVSIS = Total expected value of loss of the event with a SIS
CostSIS = Total lifecycle cost of the SIS (Annualized)
CostNT = Cost incurred due to nuisance trips (Annualized)
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B-C Ratio 2oo3 Architectures
Nuisance Trip
Rate (Yrs) B-C Ratio
SIF-002 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.86E-03 0.00032556 20.49 3,660$ 10.59
SIF-003 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.00546448 5.83E-03 0.00003186 20.41 3,675$ 1.04
SIF-004 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.84E-03 0.00032444 20.52 3,655$ 10.60
SIF-005 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 6.42E-03 0.00035667 18.09 4,146$ 10.40
SIF-006 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.83E-03 0.00032389 19.79 3,790$ 10.54
SIF-007 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.84E-03 0.00032444 20.52 3,655$ 10.60
SIF-010 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.83E-03 0.00032389 19.79 3,790$ 10.54
SIF-011 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 3.66E-02 0.00203333 14.48 5,180$ 9.71
SIF-012 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.00546448 3.09E-02 0.00016885 48.01 1,562$ 1.10
SIF-013 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 3.10E-02 0.00172222 1,501.70 50$ 11.94
SIF-015 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 8.58E-06 0.00000048 14.50 5,172$ 10.08
FNo-SIS
(1/Yrs) PFDAvgCostNT
($/Yr)
FSIS
(1/Yrs)EVNo-SIS EVSIS
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B-C Ratio 1oo1 Architectures
Nuisance Trip
Rate (Yrs) B-C Ratio
SIF-002a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 7.10E-03 0.00039444 18.78 3,994$ 13.28
SIF-003a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.00546448 6.47E-03 0.00003536 18.01 4,164$ 1.30
SIF-004a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 6.47E-03 0.00035944 20.30 3,695$ 13.48SIF-005a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 6.42E-03 0.00035667 18.09 4,146$ 13.19
SIF-006a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.85E-03 0.00032500 17.74 4,228$ 13.15
SIF-007a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 6.47E-03 0.00035944 20.30 3,695$ 13.48
SIF-010a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.85E-03 0.00032500 17.74 4,228$ 13.15
SIF-011a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 3.66E-02 0.00203333 14.48 5,180$ 12.21
SIF-012a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.00546448 3.09E-02 0.00016885 48.01 1,562$ 1.44
SIF-013a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 3.15E-02 0.00175000 146.06 513$ 15.48
SIF-015a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 2.30E-04 0.00001278 28.54 2,628$ 14.29
FNo-SIS
(1/Yrs) PFDAv gCostNT
($/Yr)
FSIS
(1/Yrs)EVNo-SIS EVSIS
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Economic & Safety Analysis
Calculate Benefit toCost Ratio
Calculate LifecycleCost
Perform SIL Calcs
(PFDavg and MTTFS)
SIS Conceptual DesignArchitecture Options
YesNo
YesNo
B/C > 1.0
LowestLCC?
Start
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Lifecycle Cost Analysis
Lifecycle CostsProcurement Costs DescriptionSystem Design Engineering costs associated with Front End Loading and
Detailed Design
Purchase Cost of Equipment including Factory Acceptance Testingand Shipping
Installation Construction costs associated with SIS
Start-up Commissioning, PSAT and Initial Functional Testing of SIS
Operating Costs DescriptionEngineering Changes Engineering costs associated with maintenance
Consumption Power, spare parts, instrument air, etc.Maintenance Inspection, Functional Testing
Cost of MTTFS DescriptionLost Production Cost of lost production
Asset Loss Cost of lost equipment
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LCC Analysis Results
SIF Description Life Cycle CostEstimate$75K
Delta LifeCycle Cost$75K
Life Cycle
CostEstimate
$6K
Delta LifeCycle Cost$6K
2 Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(2oo3) Sensor Architecture $207,455$17,156
$92,174$27,650
2a Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture $190,299 $64,524
3 Loss of combustion air flow (or differential pressure)causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) SensorArchitecture $207,946
$11,802$92,213
$27,2223a Loss of combustion air flow (or differential pressure)causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor
Architecture $196,144 $64,991
4 High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(2oo3) Sensor Architecture $207,272
$27,208$92,159
$28,4544a High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture $180,064 $63,7055 Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture $211,237
$15,724$80,665
$15,7245a Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture $195,513 $64,9416 Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causesMaster Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture $211,886
$13,573$92,529
$27,3646a Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causesMaster Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture $198,313 $65,1657 High pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(2oo3) Sensor Architecture $207,272
$27,208$92,159
$28,4547a High pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture $180,064 $63,705
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LCC Analysis Results
SIF DescriptionLife Cycle Cost
Estimate$75K
Delta Life
Cycle Cost$75K
Life Cycle Cost
Estimate$6K
Delta Life
Cycle Cost$6K
10Flameout caused by low fuel oil pressure causesMaster Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture
$211,886
$13,573
$92,529
$27,364
10aFlameout caused by low pressure natural gas causesMaster Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture
$198,313 $65,165
11Low atomizing steam supply (low flow) causes MasterFuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture $246,614
$15,724
$83,495
$15,724
11a Low atomizing steam supply (low flow) causes MasterFuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture $230,890 $67,771
12Proof of gun in position signal is required prior to
startup of fuel oil firing. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture$122,793
$15,724
$73,589
$15,724
12aProof of gun in position signal is required prior to
startup of fuel oil firing. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture$107,069 $57,865
13
Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior tointroducing an ignition source into furnace duringpilot light-off. (2oo3 FT, 2oo3 PDT, 1oo1 ZSC) Sensor
Architecture
$83,860
$12,693
$82,287
$27,294
13a
Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior tointroducing an ignition source into furnace duringpilot light-off. (1oo1 FT, 1oo1 ZSC) SensorArchitecture
$71,167 $54,993
15Proof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) priorto initiating purge sequence. (2oo3) SensorArchitecture
$259,209
$115,658
$96,314
$35,530
15aProof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) priorto initiating purge sequence. (1oo1) SensorArchitecture
$143,551 $60,784
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Final Results
SIF Description Life CycleCostEstimate
$75KDeltaLifeCycleCost$75K
Life CycleCost
Estimate$6K
DeltaLifeCycleCost$6K
Option 1 2oo3 Architecture $4,354,860
$572,086
$1,940,226
$553,008
Option 1A 1oo1 Architecture $3,782,774 $1,387,218
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Conclusion
Complex project team with multi-layeredcontractual arrangement
Implementation of a SIS FEL saved projectteam cost and schedule
Implementation of Safety Lifecycle reducedRisk associated with BMS
Implementation of Economic Analysis
coupled with Safety Availability requirementsresulted in over $500K in savings
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Make your money
work for you!
28
Conclus ion
Proper Implementation of theSafety Lifecycle Can ReduceCost of Ownership!
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Applied Engineering Solutions, Inc.
Thank You! Are There Any
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