RETHINKING THE NUCLEAR WASTE PROGRAM: LESSONS FROM...

RETHINKING THE NUCLEAR WASTE PROGRAM: LESSONS FROM THE CRYSTALLINE REPOSITORY PROJECT

Robert J. Halstead, Meg Wise Radioactive Waste Review Board

Thomas J. Evans Geological and Natural History Survey

University of Wisconsin Extension State of Wisconsin

Madison, WI 53702

ABSTRACT

Based on a review of the U. S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Crystalline Repository Project, this paper recommends major changes in the federal nuclear waste program to restore state, Indian Tribe, and public confidence, in the event that a new geologic repository siting effort is needed. First, we recommend refinements in the site selection process, including the addition of new screening variables and a return to the original four-step screening process (national, regional, area, and location surveys leading up to site characterization). Most of the geotechnical field studies now planned for the site characterization phase should be moved forward to the location phase. This would reduce the likelihood of constructing an exploratory shaft facility, potentially costing one billion dollars or more, at a site technically unsuitable for repository development. Second, we recommend a new approach to socioeconomic impacts. The current approach fails to recognize that adverse economic impacts may begin to occur as early as the identification of candidate areas and ignores the fear of economic damages to families and individuals. Detailed economic compensation programs should be developed in consultation with states, tribes and local communities, early in the siting process, preferably prior to designation of candidate areas. Third, we recommend removal of the nuclear waste program from DOE. Because of the way it has conducted siting for both the first and second repositories, DOE has lost the confidence of potential repository host states and Indian Tribes. Many state officials and members of the public believe DOE's role in nuclear weapons production and in the promotion of civilian nuclear power create a serious conflict of interest regarding waste disposal. Most importantly, DOE's track record of environmental mismanagement at defense nuclear facilities undermines public confidence in the program. The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management should be removed from DOE and reconstituted as an independent executive agency.

THE CRYSTALLINE REPOSITORY PROJECT The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its

predecessor, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), identified granite formations in Maine, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and other states as potential repository sites during the mid-1970's. DOE deferred consideration of crystalline rock when it designated candidate sites for the first repository in 1981. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 directed DOE to nominate five candidate sites for a second repository by 1989. DOE assigned responsibilities for the second repository program to the Crystalline Repository Project Office in Chicago. Like other segments of the DOE nuclear waste program,, the Crystalline Repository Project (CRP) had a small staff and relied heavily upon contractors and subcontractors. DOE selected Battelle Memorial Institute of Columbus, Ohio as the prime contractor for the second repository site screening.

National Survey

In April 1983, DOE published a national survey (1) which recommended further study of crystalline rock formations in 17 states in three regions: The North Central

Region (Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin); the Northeastern Region (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont); in the Southeastern Region (Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia). This nation-to-region screening was based on a 1979 draft contractor report (2), which had been harshly criticized by state technical reviewers. State officials were led to believe that the report had been withdrawn from further use. In addition, state officials accused DOE of arbitrarily excluding from consideration crystalline rock formations in western states, and bedded salts and shales in the east, despite favorable preliminary reports on these formations (3).

Regional Survey The regional phase (region-to-area survey) began in

May 1983, when DOE issued draft regional environmental and geological characterization reports for state review. The states were highly critical of the draft reports, which were essentially summaries of available literature, and DOE revised and reissued the draft characterization reports in December 1984. The final regional characterization reports

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(4, 5, 6, 7,8,9) were substantially unproved as a result of state input. But state technical experts continued to warn DOE that the available data on geology and hydrology was extremely limited, and varied greatly in quality from region-to-region, from state-to-state, and between, various rock bodies within each state. DOE used these reports to identify 235 crystalline rock bodies for further evaluation.

As a result of the controversy over the regional characterization reports and state comments on the siting guidelines, DOE decided to develop a separate screening methodology, which would be used to narrow the 235 rock bodies down to 10-20 candidate areas, and/or potentially acceptable sites. DOE invited states, but not potentially affected Indian Tribes, to review drafts of the proposed screening methodology and participate b workshops with-DOE and its contractors. DOE adopted a number of state recommendations, but rejected many others, and the final screening methodology (10) published b April 1985 was very controversial.

The screening methodology was based on a computerized geographic information system which mapped the 235 crystallbe rock bodies b the 17 states upon a system of one-mile-square grid cells. The study regions covered about 500,000 grid cells. Each grid cell was evaluated accordbg to five disqualifying factors and 16 geologic and environmental screenbg variables derived from the DOE sitbg guidelines. Four additional screening variables derived from the DOE siting guidelines. Favorability scores were applied to each screenbg variable b each grid cell. A score of five represented most favorable conditions, one the least favorable. The aggregate favorability of each grid cell was determined by the arithmetic mean of scores for the variables.

Over the states' objections, DOE decided to weight screenbg variables, rather than workshops in late 1984 and early 1985. The first workshop consisted of representatives from DOE, federal agencies, and contractor firms. The second workshop consisted of states' representatives. Potentially affected Indian Tribes were not bvited to participate b the workshops.

The nine sets of variable weights, developed at the workshops, were applied b each of four phases. Durbg each phase, DOE made maps showing favorable areas for each of the nbe weight sets, and combbed these map sets to make four composite maps showing the aggregate favorability of each area. Finally, DOE formed prelimbary candidate areas by grouping grid cells which occurred most often b the nbe maps b each phase.

Draft Area Recommendation Report

In January 1986, DOE released its Draft Area Recommendation Report (DARR) (11,12, D). Using the maps generated from the screenbg methodology, DOE original

ly designated 22 preliminary candidate areas in seven states. One area b Maine was eliminated due to its proximity to the Canadian border and two areas b Wisconsin were combbed bto one, resulting in 20 preliminary candidate areas. DOE then designated 12 of the candidate areas in seven states as proposed potentially acceptable sites (PPASs). [See Table I.] The remaining eight preliminary candidate areas b four states were designated as backup sites in case any of the twelve PPASs were eliminated durbg area phase studies.

The CRP area recommendations were concentrated in the North Central Region (Minnesota and Wisconsin), b-cludbg four of twelve PPASs and sue of eight candidate areas, with a combined area of 2,912 square miles (64 percent of the total area of all PPASs and candidate areas). This region bcluded the largest PPAS, Wisconsin's Wolf River Batholith. With an area of 1,094 square miles (24 percent of the total), the Wolf River Batholith was almost 2 1/2 times as large as the next largest site. Minnesota had the greatest number of sites and areas - eight all together, and the greatest combbed area -1,647 square miles, of any state. The Northeast Region (Mabe and New Hampshire) had three PPASs with a combined area of 555 square miles (12 percent of the total). The Southeastern Region had five (PPASs) and two candidate areas with a combined area of 1,139 square miles (24 percent of the total).

The CRP area recommendations also included 375 square miles of Indian reservation lands owned by the Menombee, Stockbridgc-Munsee, and Winnebago tribes b Wisconsb; the Passamoquoddy and Penobscot Indian tribes b Mabe and the White Earth Chippewa band in Minnesota. The Wolf River Batholith PPAS also bcluded as much as 300 square miles of ceded treaty lands to which the 11 bands of the Lake Superior Chippewa tribe retain extensive fishbg, hunting and food gathering rights. The same Chippewa off-reservation treaty rights cover the Central Minnesota Granites PPAS and the Puritan Batholith candidate area b Wisconsin, totalling 568 square miles, and may also extend to another PPAS (NC-7) in Minnesota, with an area of 113 square miles. Indian reservation lands therefore comprise about eight percent of the total area designated by the CRP; ceded treaty lands represent another 18-20 percent. When other nearby Indian Reservations (including the Cherokee, Potowatomi, and Sioux) are included, at least 24 and possibly 27 Indian Tribes were potentially affected by the DARR designations.

Reactions to the DARR were negative in all seven states, stirring nearly unanimous opposition from state and tribal officials and a massive outpouring of public opposition. About 3,000 people attended the DOE briefing in naples, Maine; about 2,000 people attended briefings in Ashville, North Carolina, and in Wausau, Wisconsin; and about 1^00 people attended the briefing in Hennikcr, New

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Area Designation

Region State

Proposed Potentially Acceptal

North Central Wisconsin Minnesota Minnesota Minnesota

Northeastern Maine Maine New Hampshire

Southeastejn Virginia Virginia North Carolina North Carolina Georgia

Candidate Areas

North Central Wisconsin Minnesota Minnesota Minnesota Minnesota Minnesota

Southeastern Virginia Georgia

TABLEI

is for the Crystalline Reposi

Rock Body Def

>le Sites

Wolf River Batholith Undifferentiated Granites Undifferentiated Granites Archean Gneisses/ Central Minnesota Granites

Bottle Lake Complex Sebago Lake Batholith Cardigan Pluton

Lovingston Massif Virgilina Gneiss Rolesville Pluton Elk River Complex Woodland Gneiss Complex

Puritan Batholith Undifferentiated Granites Archean Gneisses Archean Gneisses Archean Gneisses Undifferentiated Granites

Fredericksburg Complex Lithonia Gneiss

tory Project

Area Ai -fqpation ('

NC-3 NC-6 NC-7

NC-10

NE-2 NE-4 NE-5

SE-2 SE-3 SE-4 SE-5 SE-7

NC-2 NC-9 NC-12 NC-13 NC-14 NC-A5

SE-1 SE-6

»ea Extent 5a. Miles)

1094 300 113

397

92 385 78

209 307 142 105 214

171 249 171 60 287 ' 70

64 67

Ref. 11.

Hampshire, and the hearing in Ashland, Wisconsin (14,15, 16,17). Between January and April, 1986, more than 18,000 people attended DOE briefings and hearings in 15 states. Altogether, DOE received about 60,000 comments on the DARR (18). Media coverage was extensive,-particularly by local and regional newspapers and local television stations. Of the ensuing political controversy, the American Nuclear Society's Washington representative observed: "Now [OCRWM Director Ben] Rusche's office has opened a new can of worms-the second repository selection process~and all hell has broken loose. Such a spectacle! Every politician east of the Mississippi River appears willing to throw himself/herself into the fire before allowing 'nuclear garbage' to be 'dumped' back here in God's country. Eastern governors are marching on Washington..." (19).

Deferral of the Second Repository Program On May 28,1986, DOE Secretary John S. Harrington

announced "I have decided to postpone indefinitely plans for any site-specific work related to a second repository. In January, the Department issued a draft Area Recommendation Report which proposed preliminary field work in the north central and eastern parts of the country. Other than cataloging the comments received by the Department, no further work is planned on this report. As a result of this

postponement, the areas identified in the report are no longer under active consideration. No other sites are under consideration" (20). Harrington stated that the deferral decision was based upon satisfactory progress in siting the first repository and a monitored retrievable storage facility, and also lower than anticipated projections of the amount of spent fuel requiring geologic disposal.

Many observers, however, speculated that the primary reason for the deferral was political pressure resulting from massive public opposition. These suspicions were confirmed as evidence related to the Department's decision, particularly a set of options papers prepared by CRP staff, became public b the following months (21, 22, 23). CPR staff recommended continuation of the program, coupled with a study of the need for a second repository. The major advantage of termination would be "(i]mmcdiate political relief from CRP states." But, CRP warned, "shortly thereafter the objections raised by the first repository states and utilities would more than offset the gain. " DOE headquarters decided to terminate the CRP despite these recommendations (24).

Secretary Harrington's May 28th announcement put the Crystalline Repository Project in limbo. The affected eastern states and Indian tribes welcomed the deferral, but

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' Halstead RETHINKING THE NUCLEAR WASTE PROGRAM

questioned what DOE meant by an indefinite postponement, and also questioned whether DOE had the authority to defer second repository siting. The States and tribes were also skeptical because DOE planned to expand its participation in foreign research on crystalline rock, especially construction of an exploratory shaft in Canada. State technical experts believed that much of the Canadian research could be directly transferable to sites in the United States. Meanwhile, first repository states sued DOE over the deferral, and Congressional critics used the deferral decision to successfully reduce DOE's FY 1987 budget request and to prohibit use of FY 1987 funds for exploratory shaft drilling at first repository candidate sites.

In January 1987, DOE issued a draft Mission Plan Amendment describing program changes necessary to accommodate the postponement of the second repository and a five-year delay in opening of the first repository. DOE acknowledged its lack of authority to suspend the second repository siting provisions of the NWPA, and stated its intention to restart work immediately if Congress did not agree to delay second repository siting until the mid-1990's. DOE adhered to this position in the final Mission Plan Amendment issued in June 1987: "... if the Congress takes affirmative action this fiscal year on the program proposed in this Mission Plan Amendment, the DOE would start in 1995 a national survey leading to the identification of regions, areas, and potential sites for the second repository. If affirmative Congressional action is not taken, the DOE will review the more than 60,000 comments received on the draft recommendation report issued in January 1986 and prepare a final area recommendation report that identified potentially acceptable sites for subsequent field work" (25).

Congress did not, however, adopt the Mission Plan Amendment and on October 1,1987, Secretary Harrington sent a letter to the Governors of the CRP states announcing resumption of-work on the Area Recommendation Report. The letter expressed support for pending legislation (S. 1668) which would prohibit site specific work on the second repository. "I am hopeful that Congress will act soon to resolve this issue; and once Congressional action is completed, I intend to revise our activities to conform to the directives from Congress... In the meantime, it is my obligation. . . to ensure that we obey existing law" (26).

The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987

Resumption of second repository work fueled efforts by eastern Senators and Representatives to eliminate the second repository provisions of the NWPA. The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, passed by Congress on December 21,1987, as a part of the budget reconciliation conference report (H. R. 3545), did just that. The new act eliminated the NWPA requirement that DOE select sites for the second repository, and prohibited DOE from

conducting "any site-specific activities with respect to a second repository unless Congress has specifically authorized and appropriated the funds for such activities." The act further directed DOE to report to the President and the Congress on the need for a second repository no sooner than January 1,2007. The new act required DOE to "phase out in an orderly manner" funding for research "to evaluate the suitability of crystalline rock as a potential repository host medium." Finally, DOE was required to consider additional potentially disqualifying factors in any future survey of crystalline rock: Seasonal increases in population; proximity to public drinking water supplies; and the impact on lands owned or placed in trust by the United States for Indian tribes (27).

While welcoming the apparent termination of the second repository program, the potentially affected states and tribes remain wary of the outcome. In Wisconsin, for example, past experience makes it difficult to place complete confidence in the Congressional termination. Wisconsin granite formations were first identified as potential repository sites by ERDA in 1976, only to be deferred by ERDA in 1977. DOE reopened consideration of Wisconsin in 1979, then deferred Wisconsin sites for the first repository in 1981. Reconsideration of Wisconsin sites resumed in 1983, following Congressional passage of the NWPA. This siting work was deferred by DOE in May 1986. In October 1987, DOE restarted siting, until the second repository program was again deferred by Congress in December of 1987.

Eastern states and tribes must now deal with new uncertainties. First, the new act makes no provisions for backup site work; if Yucca Mountain, Nevada is found unsuitable, DOE is to cease work and rep'ort to Congress. In that event, the result could be a new national siting survey for the first repository, unless Congress abandons the concept of geologic disposal. Some, if not all, of the sites identified in the DARR would probably be reconsidered. Second, even if Yucca Mountain is found to be licensable, the new act does not eliminate the 70,000 MTU limitation on first repository emplacements. A second repository will almost certainly be required for the anticipated inventories of spent fuel and high-level waste, currently projected at about 130,000 MTU by the third decade of the next century. Third, even if the 70,000 MTU cap on first repository emplacements is lifted, a second repository might still be required, since the capacity of a repository at Yucca Mountain may not exceed 90,000 MTU (28). Therefore, while the new act appears to take the CRP states and tribes "off the hook," considerable uncertainties remain for potentially affected states and tribes as well as for the national program.

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REVISE THE SITE SELECTION PROCESS In the event, that a new repository site search becomes

necessary, a critical factorin restoring state, tribe and public confidence will be improvements in the site selection process itself. Recommendations for changes are based on a detailed review of comments on the DARR by six of the seven states (29,30,31,32,33,34), comments by six of the affected Indian tribes (35,36,37,38), and transcripts of the four public hearings held by DOE on the DARR in Wisconsin in April 1986 (39,40,41,42,43).

DOE made a significantly greater effort to involve affected states in the second repository siting process than with the first repository. In turn, state participation in workshops, review and comment on documents, and provision of published and unpublished data to DOE consultants greatly improved the technical basis of the siting effort. DOE financial assistance grants to the 16 states totalled $7. 3 million, about ten percent of second repository program expenditures through September 30, 1986. By comparison, DOE grants to states represented about 2. 5 percent of first repository program expenditures during the same period (44).

However, DOE did not extend the same opportunities and financial support to affected Indian tribes. Tribes were not invited to participate in the development of the regional phase data base and screening methodology, and were thus denied the opportunity to influence critical program decisions. Tribes were not allowed to participate until the area phase planning workshop just six weeks prior to release of the DARR. DOE financial assistance to support review of the DARR by 24 Indian tribes totalled $716,000 (44), based on equal awards of $30,000 per tribe rather than upon a meaningful determination of each tribe's need.

If the federal nuclear waste program resumes siting, much of the CRP's work will be of potential value. However, many improvements in the process will be required. Some of the necessary changes should be relatively easy to accommodate - for example, providing adequate notice of document release dates and adequate time to complete the review and comment process. Other changes, such as third party conflict resolution of technical disputes, will probably have to be resolved on a state-by-state or tribe-by-tribe basis through binding written agreements with DOE. Review of the state and tribe comments on the DARR and citizen testimony at public hearings in Wisconsin indicate three major areas in which changes will be needed: The site selection criteria, the sequencing of siting study phases and the provision for geotechnical field studies prior to recommendation of PPASs.

Additional Siting Criteria

The nuclear waste program should adopt additional siting criteria based upon the requirements of the Nuclear

WastePoh'cyAmendmentsAct(NWPAA)ofl987,andalso based on the recommendations of the potentially affected states and tribes. The additional siting criteria should be incorporated at the region-to-area screening phase.

A new disqualifying factor based on seasonal fluctuation in population must be added to comply with the NWPAA. In the region-to-area screening, DOE did not address seasonal population fluctuations, although the current siting guidelines [Sec. 960.5-2-1] provide that a site could be disqualified if population density and distribution would prevent development of an approved emergency preparedness program, and a high seasonal population within projected site boundaries is a potentially adverse condition (45).

As a result, the DARR recommended candidate areas in which seasonal population fluctuations would probably complicate repository development. For example, the entire Puritan Batholith candidate area in Wisconsin is located in the Chequamegon National Forest, which receives about 712,000 recreation visitor and 127,000 hunting and fishing recreation visitor days of use per year (35). The western boundary of Puritan Batholith candidate area is near the route of the largest cross-country ski race in North America, which draws between 5,000 and 8,000 participants annually (34). Other examples including the Lake Sebago PPAS in Maine, where a 147 percent increase in population occurs during peak summer months (30); and the Elk River Complex PPAS in North Carolina, located within ten miles of the Great Smokey Mountains National Park, which was visited by over nine million people in 1985, making it the most visited national park in the United States (33).

A new disqualifying factor based on proximity to public water supplies must be added to comply with the NWPAA. DOE did not consider public water supph'es during the region-to-area screening, although the current siting guidelines [Sec. 960. 4-2-1, 960. 4-2-8-1 and 960. 5-2-6] provide for disqualification of sites based on proximity to water supplies and establish potentially adverse conditions (45). As a result, the DARR recommended candidate areas located in close proximity to major drinking water supplies. For example, the Lake Sebago PPAS in Maine includes portions of the watershed and water supply for more than 160,000 people, including the City of Portland (30). The Wolf River Batholith PPAS in Wisconsin includes a number of municipal groundwater supplies (34,42). The Central Minnesota Granites PPAS includes significant groundwater supph'es and is drained by tributaries to the Mississippi River, which provides drinking water for St. Paul Minneapolis, and St. Cloud (31). Proximity to water supplies might also disqualify portions of candidate areas and PPASs in Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina (29,32,33).

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A new disqualifying factor based on the impact of repository siting and characterization on Indian lands must be added to comply with the NWPAA. DOE did not consider Indian reservation lands and ceded territories during the region-to-area screening, although the current siting guidelines [Sea 960.4-2-8-2,960.5-2-2 and 960.5-2-6] for site ownership and socioeconomics virtually prohibit repository development on reservation lands and complicate siting on off-reservation treaty lands (45).

An act of Congress would be required to obtain title to any Indian reservation lands. The federal nuclear waste program probably lacks legal authority to enter Indian reservation lands for the purpose of conducting field studies. Moreover, even if the program could obtain title to Indian reservation lands, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to meet the reasonable mitigation requirement of the socioeconomics guideline. As the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin has argued, and the federal courts have agreed, Congress intended reservation lands "to be permanent homelands for the Indian people. They are not simply parcels of real estate, the appropriate of which can be compensated by monetary payments; rather they are central to the preservation of tribal cultures" (37).

A new screening variable for natural background radiation levels should be added at the region-to-area phase. The current siting guidelines [Sec. 960. 5-1,960.5-2-1 and 960. 5-2-9] impose qualifying conditions for preclosure radiological safety and a disqualifying condition regarding health and safety of repository workers. DOE originally proposed, then eliminated without adequate justification, consideration of natural background radiation in a draft of the screening methodology document. As a result, the DARR recommended PPASs in Maine, North Carolina and Wisconsin, where elevated background radiation levels could pose health risks to the repository workforce, complicate the monitoring of repository performance, and expose nearby resident populations to higher than acceptable dosages if minor releases of radioactivity from the repository were to be combined with the natural background levels (30,33,34).

A new screening variable for transportation should be added at the region-to-area phase. DOE did not formally consider transportation, although the current siting guidelines [Sec. 960.5-2-7] establish qualifying conditions, favorable conditions and potentially adverse conditions for transportation (45). As a result, the DARR recommended candidate areas and PPASs without adequately documenting the availability of railroad and highway access. Analysis by the State of Maine found that seven of the candidate areas and PPASs were 20 miles or more from the nearest interstate highway, and three were 20 miles or more from the nearest mainline railroad (30).

Four-Step Site Narrowing Process If a new repository siting effort becomes necessary, the

nuclear waste program should return to the original four-step screening process outlined in DOE's 1980 generic environmental impact statement (46). Such a screening process would consist of a national survey (nation-to-region screening), a regional survey (region-to-area screening), an area survey (area-to-location screening), and a location survey (location-to-site screening). At the end of each step, the program's recommendations for further study should be formally presented in a draft written decision document to be reviewed by the affected states and tribes prior to finalization. The explicit goal of the four-step processes should be identification of the technically best available sites for characterization.

The nuclear waste program should reopen the national survey of potential sites conducted for the second repository program. DOE arbitrarily excluded crystalline rock formations in the western United States, and salt and shale formations in the eastern United States, in spite of DOE's own technical reports that these merited further study (47,48). Reopening the national survey would require reexamination of crystalline rock formations in the Rocky Mountains Region (Idaho, Wyoming, and Montana), in the Basin and Range Region (Nevada and Arizona), and in South Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas; bedded salt in the Salina Basin (Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania); and shale deposits in the Appalachian, Illinois, and Michigan basins.

The nuclear waste program should repeat the region-to-area survey, with a goal of designating about 20-30 candidate areas. The CRP regional database (amended in accordance with state and tribe comments) and the CRP screening methodology (with the additional recommended siting criteria) are adequate for this purpose, but the use of weighted variables should be abandoned, d The entire weighting process was unnecessary. At least 10 of the 12 most favorable preliminary candidate areas designated at PPASs in the DARR could have been selected from the equally-weighted composite maps. In addition, the equally weighted composite maps show at least 15 other potential candidate areas in six states which might be equal or better selections when compared with those designated in the DARR. Additionally, regions in other parts of the country and other potential host media in the East should be considered based on the reopening of the national survey.

The goal of the area phase should be the identification of 10-15 locations. The nuclear waste program should develop an extensive program for involvement of potentially affected states and tribes in the planning for the area phase of the siting process, especially the development of plans for geotechnical field studies, following the area characterization strategics recommended by the U. S.

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Geological Survey (49). To its credit, DOE appeared committed to extensive state and tribal involvement in planning for the area phase, prior to the deferral decision. The materials developed with state and tribe input at the area phase planning workshop in Denver in December 1985 will be useful in the event that a new siting effort is required.

The nuclear waste program should restore the location phase because it is a necessary and logical step in the site winnowing process. The goal should be identification of three to five sites for full characterization study. Even without the recommended shift of geotechnical studies from the site characterization of the location phase, extensive field work would be required during the location phase. States and tribes want the location phase restored so that the selection of locations will be based on a written decision document at the end of the area phase.

Location Phase Geotechnical Field Studies In the event that a new siting effort becomes necessary,

the nuclear waste program should shift virtually all of the site characterization work, short of construction of an exploratory shaft facility, forward to the location phase. This would improve the credibility of PAS designations, and prevent the commitment of large financial resources (up to a billion dollars) for characterization work at a site which might prove technically unsuitable. Also, location phase field work would provide preliminary data for repository engineering design and performance assessment, data which is not currently available (50,51), and would not otherwise be available until site characterization. A comprehensive geotechnical program is estimated to cost about 10 to 15 million dollars per location, based on a recent NRC technical report (52) and on information available to the Wisconsin Geological and Natural History Survey.

A comprehensive geologic mapping program should be carried out at each location. Geologic mapping would provide additional information necessary for determination of suitability, such as geomorphology, stratigraphy and lithology, tectonics, and surface hydrology. Geologic mapping is also a prerequisite for selecting borehole locations. For the first repository, DOE had planned to conduct mapping activities, including satellite and aerial photography, field observations, and trenching, during the site characterization phase. There is no reason why these mapping activities cannot be completed prior to a commitment to characterization. A comprehensive mappbg program at each location would require about six to twelve months.

A comprehensive geophysical survey program should be conducted at each location. Geophysical surveys can provide important additional information about subsurface geology without drilling boreholes. For first repository program, DOE proposed conducting geophysical surveys at each site during characterization, mcluding seismic reflec

tion and refraction, and gravity, electrical resistivity and magnetics surveys. There is no reason why these surveys cannot be completed prior to commitment to characterization. A comprehensive geophysical survey program at each location would require about 12 to 18 months, mcluding time for interpretation.

A limited program of deep exploratory drilling should be conducted at each location. After geologic mapping and in conjunction with the geophysical surveys, one large borehole (8 3/4" diameter to accommodate 51/2" diameter casing) should be drilled and cored to several hundred feet below repository depth at a proposed exploratory shaft site at each location. A limited number of additional boreholes should be constructed at or near the perimeters of each location, or in proximity to major hydrologjc boundaries within the location, in order to refine understanding of the geohydrologjc setting. For the first repository program, DOE proposed drilling deep boreholes at each site during characterization. There is no reason that this work cannot be done prior to characterization, although land acquisition and state permitting requirements will complicate drilling at most sites. Exploratory drilling during the location phase will provide important information about at-depth conditions, including rock characteristics, geohydrology, and geochemistry. Having this information available as the basis for narrowing locations down to candidate sites would add additional cost to the program, but would significantly improve the credibility of a recommendation to conduct full-scale site characterization (construction of an exploratory shaft and underground test chambers). A drilling program could be completed in about 18 to 36 months at each location, including time for extensive logging and laboratory analysis of rock and water samples.

ADDRESS SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS EARLY IN THE SITING PROCESS

One of the most important lessons from the CRP is that socioeconomic impacts should be addressed in detail, early in the repository siting processing. For more than a decade, studies of radioactive waste disposal have recognized that social and economic issues may be as important as geotechnical issues in repository site selection, social and economic concerns include so-called "special effects" resulting from perceived risks of nuclear waste transportation, handling, packaging, and geologic disposal. A report by the National Academy of Sciences suggested that adverse social effects such as community conflict might occur as early a "the site selection and planning stage" (53). State, tribe and public responses to the DARR indicate that adverse special socioeconomic impacts may begin to occur as soon as, or even before, candidate areas are formally designated.

CRP Deferral of Socioeconomic Impacts

DOE decided not to address socioeconomic impacts b the CRP region-to-area screening. DOE made this decision

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despite the siting guidelines requirement (Sec. 960. 5-2-6(a)] that in order to qualify a site for repository development, DOE must show that "any significant adverse social and/or economic impacts induced in communities and surrounding regions, by repository siting, construction, operation, closure, and decommissioning can be off-set by reasonable mitigation or compensation" as determined jointly among DOE and affected state and local jurisdictions and Indian tribes.

The states urged consideration of socioeconomic impacts in the region-to-area screening. DOE, however, paid little attention to socioeconomics in the regional environmental characterization reports. In the screening methodology, DOE maintained that socioeconomic issues should be deferred to the area phase of siting, and specifically refused to consider impacts on agriculture, tourism, and off-reservation treaty rights. Not until the area characterization workshop in mid-December 1985, did CRP staff and consultants begin to discuss with states and tribes how these issues might be addressed. The DARR issued in January 1986, contained no discussion of socioeconomic issues associated with the specific candidate areas and PPASs.

DARR and Special Socioeconomic Impacts

The states of Maine, Minnesota and Wisconsin urged consideration of special socioeconomic impacts because of those states' heavy economic dependence upon tourism/recreation and agriculture, industries which are especially vulnerable to adverse public opinion and negative media presentations. Indian tribes in Minnesota and Wisconsin sought consideration of off-reservation socioeconomic and cultural resources.

Wisconsin concerns about potential adverse impacts on agriculture were borne out by the DARR recommendation of the Wolf River Batholith PPAS. The Wolf River Batholith PPAS covered portions of seven counties in one of the richest farming areas in Wisconsin, including two of the top 20 milk producing counties in the United States, Marathon and Shawano. In 1985, the seven counties contained 9,500 farms, more than 1.9 million acres of farmland, and earned $590 million in total farm cash receipts, about $370 million for dairy products alone. In addition to local impacts, Wisconsin feared that repository development might harm the state-wide agricultural economy, particularly the dairy industry. In 1985, Wisconsin farm cash receipts for all commodities exceeded $5 billion, and the state ranked eighth nationally b agricultural production. Wisconsin leads the nation in production of milk, butter, cheese, milk cows, hay, and corn for silage (54,55).

Minnesota also faced potential adverse impacts on agriculture, since agriculture is a major economic activity in and around all eight of its designated candidate areas and PPASs (31). Portions of Stearns County, the seventh ranked

milk producing county nationally in 1985, were included in one candidate area, and the county is also adjacent to the Central Minnesota Granites PPAS. In 1985, Minnesota was the number four state nationally in milk production, and the fifth ranking state in total farm cash receipts (54,55).

Wisconsin concerns about potential adverse impacts on tourism were borne out with the DARR recommendation of the Puritan Batholith candidate area. The Puritan Batholith candidate area is located near the geographic center of a ten-county region in northwestern Wisconsin where tourism is the most important industry. Almost half a million tourists vacationed in the ten-county area during the summer of 1985, and nonresidents owned more than 29,000 recreational housing units in the area (39). About 140 hotels and resorts, and 17 private campgrounds and trailer parks, are located within 30 miles of the candidate area. In addition to concern about the local economy, Wisconsin also feared potential harm to the statewide tourism and recreation industry, which has annual gross receipts of about $4 billion (34).

Potential adverse impacts on tourism were also at issue in Maine, particularly in and around the Sebago Lake PPAS. The State of Maine estimates that travel and tourism sales around Sebago Lake amount to about $58 million per' year. Tourism and travel expenditures bring about $1.2 billion dollars to the state economy annually (30).

Chippewa Indian concerns about the loss of socioeconomic and cultural resources located on off-reservation treaty lands were borne out by the DARR site designations in Minnesota and Wisconsin. These resources include religious sites, plants and plant products, fish, and wild game. In the Chippewa woridview, these resources and the land itself have a spiritual value which transcends economics, with significant implications for mitigation. "Mitigation may be an appropriate response to economic damages, and perhaps in some cases, to minor environmental damages, but there is no way DOE proposes, or the tribes can imagine, that cultural damages can be mitigated. Tribal homelands cannot be relocated; tribal cultural dependence on the relationship to the natural world cannot be replaced. Mitigation can therefore not be used as a substitute for screening proposed candidate areas for potential destruction of culturally significant Indian lands" (35).

Speakers at the DOE hearings in Wisconsin presented evidence that adverse socioeconomic impacts may already be occurring as a result of the DARR area and site designations. The following are representative examples of what local residents told DOE:

The mere fact that western Shawano County has been named as a study site places our investment and marketing opportunities related to agriculture. . . in serious jeopardy. If the DOE does not believe that agriculture

908


re included id l/acent to thej innesota wajj tion,andthe[ '4,55).

• impacts on | mendation j 'e Puritan j apniccen-isin where iaif a mil. "ring the U3 29,000 *0 hotels •r parks, 'a addi->'n also 'ecrea-out$4

issue Lake rism per

•bil.

of :r-s-is d i

would suffer, I cite for you the example of cheesemaking plants in Wisconsb which refused to take process steam from solid waste mdneration plants, because they didn't want their products to be associated with garbage in the public's mind. How much worse is the inevitable public perception of local agriculture's association with high-level nuclear waste" (42)?

"I submit to you that the very fact that this area is under consideration could destroy our tourism economy. Certainly the possibility of the selection of our area for the nuclear dump will keep me from making a further investment in our resort [located three miles from the candidate area boundary] and that may mean no additional jobs to the area" (39).

The tourists when it was first announced that Northern Wisconsb would be a site for a nuclear waste repository started to shy away. Some people who were gobg to buy properties cancelled those orders. Some people that lived here or have property here told realtors to sell it. Some people run scared naturally but nonetheless they are starting to make these moves and we depend on these people for our livelihood..." (40).

"I am personally responsible for the annually updated assessments of over one-quarter of a billion dollars worth of privately owned property b this area... While declining property values are the rule b Wisconsb this year, the largest declines b areas I work are b the east* ern part of the Town of Round Lake, adjacent to your proposed site. Have you started to rub our area already" (40)?

Recommendations for Addressing Socioeconomic Impacts

In the event that a new repository siting effort becomes necessary, the federal nuclear waste program should address socioeconomic impacts early on. First, the program must acknowledge the potential for significant adverse socioeconomic impacts on agriculture, tourism, and Indian cultural resources. As a matter of policy, socioeconomic issues and geotechnical issues must be considered of equal importance b selection of a repository site. As a matter of policy, the program must make a firm commitment to provide massive economic compensation to affected states and tribes, local governments, and affected businesses and bdividuals.

Second, the area-to-region screening should direct siting away from areas in which potential adverse socioeconomic and cultural impacts may defy reasonable mitigation efforts. Exclusionary screening will be more difficult for tourism, because of the limited availability and b -consistent quality of data, than for agriculture and ceded Indian lands. Regardbg agriculture, the states and the U. S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service

have data on prime agricultural lands, which could be used for screening (31). State and federal data on agricultural land use and production by county, could also be used for screening. Screening to avoid Indian sodoeconomic and cultural resources should not be difficult, since boundaries of the ceded territories have been legally established b Wisconsb, Michigan and Minnesota, the states b which off-reservation treaty rights are most extensive (35).

Third, the nuclear waste program should develop detailed economic compensation plans prior to the final recommendation of areas. These plans should be developed jobtly with state, tribe, and local officials, and the affected public. These plans must develop specific compensation mechanisms for agriculture, tourism, Indian socioeconomic •and cultural resources, and affected bdividuals. The need to address potential adverse economic impacts on individuals and families cannot be over-emphasized. Both the federal nuclear waste program and the potential repository host states have paid too little attention to this problem. Many families living in or adjacent to a candidate area perceive that a repository will directly threaten their property rights and property values, their individual livelihoods, and economic base of their community. Both equity and practicality demand that the federal nuclear waste program guarantee that residents of a potential repository site have the option to relocate without economic loss, as well as the option to remab b the affected area without economic loss.

REMOVE THE NUCLEAR WASTE PROGRAM FROM DOE

If a new repository siting effort should become necessary, it will be easier to restore confidence b the siting process than to restore confidence b the federal nuclear waste program. DOE could improve the siting process and address socioeconomic issues under existing statutory authorities, but these steps alone would not be sufficient to restore state, tribe, and public confidence. Nor would expanded state, tribe and public bvolvement, nor adoption of innovative conflict resolution proposals, be suffirient to restore confidence. Nothbg shorts of removal from DOE is likely to succeed in rehabilitating the nuclear waste program's credibility.

Loss of State, Tribe and Public Confidence Several recent studies document the loss of confidence

b DOE's waste program, and have suggested remedies. The U. S. General Accountbg Office (GAO) report on institutional relations under the NWPA concluded "States and tribes have little confidence b DOE, and have placed little credibility b the program. Furthermore, because of the on-gobg problems they have had with DOE and its predecessors, they have grown to mistrust DOE and do not believe DOE when it says it can manage all of the technical problem assodated with a repository." The GAO recommended

909


improving state and tribe involvement to "enhance the overall credibility of the program," including expanded state and tribe access to DOE technical group meetings, employing independent advisory groups during site characterization, and negotiation of phased consultation and cooperation agreements (56).

D. Bella, C. D. Mosher, and S. N. Calvo, participants in the GAO study, explore the issue of trust relative to the nuclear waste program, and recommend a dispute resolution process designed to overcome the lack of trust between DOE and the states and tribes, in two recent articles. They propose a two-step process, beginning with informal discussions among DOE, states, tribes, and outside technical experts, arranged by an independent facilitator in an attempt to reach consensus. Disputes which were not resolved by information discussion would go to nonbinding mediation with an independent negotiator or possibly a group like the National Academy of Sciences (57,58).

M. E. Kraft, B. B. Cleary, and J. Schaefer, in a paper based on a detailed review of Wisconsin's experience with the nuclear waste program, confirm the findings of the GAO report. Their study includes a detailed content analysis of the testimony given by 238 persons at four DOE hearings in Wisconsin. "In summary, the data from the Wisconsin hearings clearly support the GAO (1987) conclusion on DOE's lack of public credibility. There was overwhelming opposition to a site in Wisconsin, but a significant number of people either mistrusted DOE or viewed it as lacking technical competency." If the siting process resumes in Wisconsin, they recommend that DOE "significantly improve and expand upon its efforts at public involvement" (59).

State and Tribe Concerns

Proposals to reform DOE's nuclear waste program overlook a critical concern of state and tribe officials, that is the fact that the program is run by DOE. State and tribe officials do not generally make a distinction between the Department of Energy and the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM). Under federal law, it is the Secretary of DOE who makes the important decisions about the waste program, not the Director of OCRWM. Negative attitudes toward DOE in general reinforce state and tribe skepticism about OCRWM's handling of the nuclear waste program.

State and tribe officials are disturbed about the increasing militarization of DOE. When Congress passed the NWPA, DOE was a civilian agency involved in a broad range of energy activities. In the fiscal year 1981, civilian energy and general science programs accounted for 62 percent of DOE's budget, and atomic defense programs accounted for 38 percent. For fiscal year 1988, military programs made up 65 percent of DOE's budget request (60, 61). State officials understand that budget decisions set

agency priorities, and are not comfortable having the civilian nuclear waste program managed by an agency which started out as a Department of Energy with a nuclear weapons program, but appears to have become a Department of Nuclear Weapons with an energy program.

State and tribe officials are also concerned about institutional linkages between the civilian nuclear waste program and the defense programs within DOE. OCRWM's top leadership has been drawn primarily from individuals with backgrounds in the DOE military programs, particularly persons with ties to the Savannah River Plant and the Hanford Reservation. Moreover, the civilian program is heavily dependent upon contractors who are also involved in DOE's military programs. State and tribe concerns were compounded by the President's decision in 1985, based on the recommendation of the Secretary of DOE, that defense wastes be disposed of in the same repository or repositories with civilian waste, the so-called "co-mingling" decision (62).

States involved in the CRP questioned DOE's co-mingling proposal in comments on the draft report. The State of Minnesota feared that national security needs might result in pressure on the NRC during the licensing process, and that as a result "technical adequacy and public health and safety may be emphasized less than schedule goals and defense needs if wastes are co-mingled." The State of North Carolina commented: "If DOE emphasizes defense needs and schedule goals over technical adequacy and public health and safety, then federal credibility and state participation will once again be jeopardized. This situation must be avoided." Wisconsin challenged "the underlying assumption that na

tional security considerations, particularly those regarding disclosure of classified information, are compatible with the degree of public information disclosure that will be required for NRC licensing. " States also feared that co-mingling would undermine public credibility and acceptance of a repository, possibly resulting in significant delays in the availability of a repository for civilian waste, concerns shared by utility industry commentors, including the Atomic Industrial Forum, the Edison Electric Institute, Florida Power and Light, and Middle South Services (64).

State officials' greatest concern, however, is DOE's record of environmental mismanagement at its existing defense facilities. More than a dozen recent reports by the U. S. General Accounting Office have documented DOE's dismal track record. GAO found a pervasive pattern of "contaminated groundwater and soil with high levels of both radioactive and hazardous substances" and failure to comply with environmental laws at DOE facilities (64,65). Concern about DOE facilities was fueled by the April 1986 Chernobyl accident b the Soviet Union. Moreover, national and regional news media have given enormous coverage

910


to problems at DOE facilities during 1986 and 1986, including major articles in the Ngw York Times, the Washington post, Science, and an award-winning series of investigative reports in the Milwaukee Journal. State officials find it difficult to ignore editorial headlines such as "The Bomb Makers' Complacency" (66) and "Deadly Peril of Nuclear Neglect" (67).

Tribal officials, at least from the Wisconsin and Minnesota tribes, tend to have even less confidence in DOE than state government officials. In part this is due to CRP's failure to involve the tribes. Tribal officials are also more skeptical of federal authority, given their past experience with treaty rights. Moreover, tribal leaders in Wisconsin and Minnesota share the Yakima tribe's concerns about off-reservation treaty rights and DOE's environmental management record at Hanford. At a DOE hearing in Wisconsin, Hillary J. Waukau, an official of the Menominee Indian Tribe, referred DOE representatives to a local newspaper account about Hanford: "It says here, Hanford had nuclear leaks. Did you people read that? I suggest that you do... If you can't make this one work, how the hell you figure to come on Menominee land and make us guinea pigs! We don't want that to happen here" (41).

Public Concerns The public in Wisconsin has also lost confidence in

DOE. The Kraft study found: "One of GAO's major criticisms of DOE's implementation of the NWPA is that the agency lacks public credibility. This conclusion is supported by data from the Wisconsin hearings. Sixty-six percent of those testifying thought that the agency lacked credibility or cannot be trusted. Ten other agencies, organized interests and other groups (e. g. , Congress, the nuclear industry and scientists) were similarly assessed. Only government, in general, is listed as non-credible or non-trustworthy by more than ten percent of the citizenry (thirty-seven percent). Similarly, DOE is much more likely to be seen as lacking technical competence. Thirty-nine (39) percent of those testifying doubted its technical expertise compared to 11 percent who had that attitude for the nuclear industry, the next highest ranked category" (59).

The Wisconsin hearings raise doubts that DOE's credibility with the public can be restored. Concern about DOE's environmental record paralleled those of state and tribal officials. A representative statement was: "Why should Wisconsin, or any state, be the federal government's guinea pig for an untested technology in the hands of the DOE with their disgraceful record of environmental protection at their own facilities? Can the DOE guarantee that their nuclear garbage dump will not leak durmg the time that the waste remains hazardous-a quarter to a half million years? Of course not. No one can guarantee an un-proven technology, and certainly not the DOE. The DOE can't guarantee the containment of toxic chemicals nor low-

or high-level nuclear waste for a quarter of a century, not to mention a quarter of a million years" (42). Overall, ten percent of the citizens who testified at the DOE hearings in Wisconsin not only challenged DOE's track record of environmental management, but accurately identified a specific DOE facility at which environmental problems had occurred.

Many of the speakers also felt that a direct conflict of interest exists between DOE's mission to produce nuclear weapons, which makes DOE a major producer of nuclear waste, and DOE's mission to promote civilian nuclear power, and its role as manager of the nuclear waste program. Despite warnings from the hearing facilitators that comments about the production of nuclear waste would have no impact on DOE's siting decisions, 108 of the 238 speakers, about 45 percent, discussed the production of nuclear waste from weapons activities and nuclear power plants, and many speakers stated that for them, this was the single most important issue in dealing with nuclear waste management.

Remove the Federal Nuclea r Waste Program from DOE

In the event that a new repository siting effort becomes necessary, the single most important step in rehabilitating the federal nuclear waste program will be to take it out of DOE. The idea of a separate, independent agency to manage the waste program has been around for more than a decade (68). Three years ago, the Advisory Panel on Alternative Means-of Financing Managing (AMFM) Radioactive Waste Facilities recommended turning the program over to a federally

charted corporation (69). The AMFM panel recommendation was based primarily on management considerations. The most compelling reason for taking the program out of DOE, however, is the loss of state, tribe, and public confidence.

There are a number of ways to take the civilian radioactive waste management program out of the Department of Energy. We believe the most feasible action would be to make the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management an independent executive agency patterned after the Environmental Protection Agency. The Director should be appointed by the President with confirmation by the Senate. The new agency's site selection and program activities would be reviewed by the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board created by the NWPAA. Technical disputes between the nuclear waste program and potential host states and tribes should be submitted to consensus seeking discussion forums, and if not resolved, submitted to a mediation process as recommended by Bella, et al. The recommendations of Kraft et al. for expanded public participation programs should also be adopted.

911


CONCLUSIONS We have reviewed both siting and non-siting issues, and

the basis of state, tribe and public opposition to the CRP recommendation of candidate areas and sites for a second nuclear waste repository. We have focused upon the technical aspects of the site selection process because this is a key element in the overall success of the nuclear waste management program. If the siting process is defective, state and public opposition is certain, and the prospects for delay or defeat of the program are great. But, even if the siting process is technically correct, and socioeconomic issues are appropriately addressed, state and tribe officials and the public are still likely to oppose the nuclear waste program as long as it is associated with DOE. Even if the safety of geologic disposal is demonstrated and local impacts are mitigated, there may still be substantial public opposition to siting because of ideological opposition to nuclear power and weapons. Removing the program from DOE will not end the program's problems, but removal is a necessary prerequisite for solving those problems, in the event that a new repository siting effort becomes necessary.

REFERENCES 1. BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE, OFFICE OF

CRYSTALLINE REPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT, "A National Survey of Crystalline Rocks and Recommendations of Regions to be Explored for High-Level Radioactive Waste Repositories: Technical Report," OCRD-1, (April 1983).

2. DAMES AND MOORE, "Crystalline Intrusives in the United States and Regional Geologic Characteristics Important for Storage of Radioactive Waste," ONWI-50, (December 1979).

3. STATE OF MINNESOTA, "Review of the U. S. Department of Energy's National Survey of Crystalline Rocks," (April 1986).

4. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "Southeastern Regional Environmental Characterization Report: Vol. I," DOE/CH-3(l), (August 1985).

5. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "Northeastern Regional Environmental Characterization Report: Vol. I," DOE/CH-4(l), (August 1985).

6. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "North Central Regional Environmental Characterization Report: Vol. I," DOE/CH-5(l), (August 1985).

' 7. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "Southeastern Regional Geologic Characterization Report: Vol. I," DOE/CH-6(l), (August 1985).

8. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "Northeastern

Regional Geologic Characterization Report: Vol. I," DOE/CH-7(l), (August 1985).

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11. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project: Overview," DOE/CH-15(0), (January 1986).

12. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project: Vol. I," DOE/CH-15(l), (January 1986).

13. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project: Vol. 2 Plates," DOE/CH-15(2), (January 1986).

14. D. BEHM, "A-Waste Foes Say They'll Fight to the Death," Milwaukee Journal. January 30,1986, Page 1.

15. J. MILNE, "Angry Crowd Assails Federal Nuclear Waste Study of Site in N. H. ," The Boston Globe, February 12,1986, Page 24.

16. "Seven States Balk at Nuclear Dump," The Journal of Commerce, March 6,1986, Page 9A.

17. P. MALLER, "Dump Foes Out in Force in Ashland," Milwaukee Sentinel, April 10,1984, Page 1.

18. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, "Quarterly Report on DOE's Nuclear Waste Program as of June 30,1986," GAO/RCED-86-206FS, (August 1986).

19. J. GRAHAM, "Window on Washington: Waste 'dumps'...," Nuclear News, June 1986.

20. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Statement by John S. Harrington, Secretary of Energy, Nuclear Waste Repository," (May 28,1986).

21. C. PETERSON, "Politics Affected Atom Dump Choice." The Washington Post. August 1,1986, Page 1A.

22. E. MARSHALL, "Nuclear Waste Program Faces Political Burial," Science, Vol. 233, (August 22,1986), Pages 835-836.

23. L. J. CARTER, "Nuclear Imperatives and the Public Trust: Dealing with Radioactive Waste," Washington, D. C. Resources for the Future, (1987), Pages 408-414.

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24. M. WISE, "Analysis of Crystalline Repository Project Options Papers," Prepared for Wisconsin Radioactive Waste Review Bdard, (October 1986).

• 25. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "OCRWM Mission Plan Amendment," DOE/RW-0128, (June 1987).

26. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, "Policy Reader-October 1987," (October 1987).

27. Congressional Record, Vol. 133, No. 205 - Part III, (December 21,1987), p. H12169.

28. T. J. EVANS and R. J. HALSTEAD, "How Many G eologic Repositories will be Needed?" Waste Management - '87, (1987).

29. STATE OF GEORGIA, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, "Georgia's Response to Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project," (April 16,1986).

30. STATE OF MAINE, TASK FORCE ON HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE, "State of Maine Comments on U. S. Department of Energy CRP Draft Area Recommendation Report," (April 1986).

31. STATE OF MINNESOTA, GOVERNOR'S NUCLEAR WASTE COUNCIL, "Comments on the U. S. Department of Energy Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project Report," (June 1986).

32. STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, OFFICE OFSTATE PLANNING, "Initial Response to the Department of Energy Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project," (April 1986).

33. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, "North Carolina Comments on United States Department of Energy Draft Area Recommendation Report," (April 15,1986).

34. STATE OF WISCONSIN, RADIOACTIVE WASTE REVIEW BOARD, "Wisconsin's Comments on U. S. Department of Energy's Draft Area Recommendation Report," (July 1986).

35. GREAT LAKES INDIAN FISH AND WILDLIFE COMMISSION, "Comment on Behalf of the Bay Mills Indian Community, Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians," (April 1986).

36. LAC DU FLAMBEAU BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA INDIANS, "Comments on the Draft Area Recommendations Report," (April 15,1986).

37. MENOMINEE TRIBES OF WISCONSIN, "Preliminary Comments on the Department of Energy's Proposal to Designate the Menominee Reservation as a Potentially Acceptable Site for a Nuclear Waste Repository," (April 18,1986).

38. WHITE EARTH RESERVATION TRIBAL COUNCIL, "Comments on the DOE Nuclear Repository Siting Process," (April 1986).

39. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Transcript of Proceedings: DOE Hearing on the Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project, Ashland, Wisconsin, Session I," (April 9,1986).

40. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "Transcript of Proceedings: DOE Hearing on the Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project, Ashland, Wisconsin, Session II," (April 9,1986).

41. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Transcript of Proceedings: DOE Hearing on the Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project, Keshena, Wisconsin," (March 22,1986).

42. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Transcript of Proceedings: DOE Hearing on the Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project, Waupaca, Wisconsin," (April 8,1986).

43. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Transcript of Proceedings: DOE Hearing on the Draft Area Recommendation Report for the Crystalline Repository Project, White Lake, Wisconsin," (March 19,1986).

44. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, "Annual Report to Congress,"

DOE/RW-0144, (April 1987).

45. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "10 CFR Part 960: General Guidelines for the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear Waste Repositories; Final Siting Guidelines," Federal Register, Vol. 49, No. 236, (December 6,1984).

46. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "Final Environmental Impact Statement: Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste, Volume I," DOE/EIS-0046F, (October 1980).

47. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "Statement of Position in the Matter of Proposed Rulemaking on the Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste (Waste Confidence Rulemaking)," DOE/NE-0007, (April 15,1980).

913


48. OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORIES, "Regional Geological Assessment of the Devonian-Mis-sissippian Shale Sequence of the Appalachian, Illinois, and Michigan Basins Relative to Potential Storage/Disposal of Radioactive Wastes," ORNL-5703, (January 1983).

49.TRASK.N. J.,E. H. ROSEBOOM.R. D. WATTS, and M. S. BEDINGER, "Exploration of Crystalline Rocks for Nuclear Waste Repositories: Some Strategies for Area Characterization," Open-File Report 86-379, Prepared by U. S. Department of Interior, Geological Survey in Cooperation with U. S. Department of Energy (1986).

50. BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE, OFFICE OF CRYSTALLINE REPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT, "Design Analysis for a Repository in Crystalline Rock," BMI-OCRD-20, (March 1985).

51. EWA, INC. , "Critical Review and Assessment of 'Design Analysis for a Repository in Crystalline Rock," (BMI-OCRD-20, March 1985, Prepared for State of Minnesota), (October 1985).

52. ERTEC WESTER, INC. , "Information Needs for ' Characterization of High-Level Waste Repository Sites in Six Geologic Media," NUREG/CR-2663, (May 1985).

53. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, "Social and Economic Aspects of Radioactive Waste Disposal: Considerations for Institutional Management," Washington, D. C. : National Academy Press (1984).

54. STATE OF WISCONSIN, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, "1987 Wisconsin Agricultural Statistics," (August 1987).

55. STATE OF WISCONSIN, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, "1987 Wisconsin Dairy Facts," (August 1987).

56. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, "Nuclear Waste: Institutional Relations Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1988," GAO/RCED-87-14, (February 1987).

57.BELLA, D. A.,C. D. MOSHER.andS. N. CALVO, Technology and Trust: Nuclear Waste Controversy," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering. Volume 114, No. 1, (January 1988).

58.BELLA,D. A.,C. D. MOSHER,andS. N. CALVO, "Establishing Trust: Nuclear Waste Disposal," Journal

of Professional Issues in Engineering, Volume 114, No. 1, (January 1988).

59. KRAFT, M. E.,B. B. CLARY, and J. SCHAEFER, "Politics, Planning and Technological Risks: State and Citizens Participation in Nuclear Waste Management," Paper Delivered at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3-6, 1987.

60. BEHM, D. , "Energy Giving Way to Weapons: Department's Priorities Change Sharply Under Reagan," The Milwaukee Journal, August 3,1986, Page 1A.4A.

61. GORDON, M. R., "Most Energy Funds for Military Uses," The New York Times, January 13,1987, Page 10.

62. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "An Evaluation of Commercial Repository Capacity for the Disposal of Defense High-Level Waste," DOE/DP-0020-1, (June 1985).

63. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, "An Evaluation of Commercial Repository Capacity for the Disposal of Defense High-Level Waste: Responses to Comments," DOE/DP-0027, (December 1985).

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65. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, "Environmental, Safety, and Health Oversight of the Department of Energy's Operations," Statement of Keith O. Fultz, before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research, and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, GAO/T-RCED-87-12, (March 25,1987).

66. The New York Times, December 27,1986, .

67. The Milwaukee Journal, September 7,1986, Page 16.

68. "Waste Authority Proposed; Duties Specified," Nuclear News (December 1977), Pages 81-82.

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914

WASTE MANAGEMENT '88

Waste Processing, Transportation, Storage and Disposal Technical Programs and Public Education

Volume II

Low-Level Waste

Proceedings of the Symposium on Waste Management

at Tucson, Arizona February 28-March 3,1988

Sponsored by Fuel Cycle and Waste Management

Division of American Nuclear Society

Radwaste Systems Committee of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers

Electric Power Research Institute The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

and The University of Arizona

College of Engineering and Mines

Roy G. Post Editor

Morton E. Wacks

Technical Program Chairman

Donna McComb Paula Messer

Proceedings Coordinators

Program Advisory Committee

M.E. Wacks (Chrmn.) R.Trefry (Adm. Asst.) A. Register (Sec.) H. Babad A.V. Bankley L.E Borduin S.S. Borys DA. Brodnick S. Brown R.E. Browning A. Clement R. Coley P. Colombo T. Conway J. D'Ambrosia A.S. Dam

R. Doyle J. Gervers M. Ginniff P. Gray W.T. Gregory E. Helminski T.P.Hillmer R.Jim C. Jupiter M. Kaczmarsky H. Kuribayashi J.R. LaRiviere H. Lowenberg J. McCray E. McDaniel J. McElroy

B.Nair E. McDaniel N. Norman L.C. Oyen R. Papp S J.S. Parry A. Perge A.M. Piatt R. Post R.M. Propst L. Ramspott J. Randall M. Raudenbush L. Rutland T.Smith J.P. Staehr

J. Strahl J. Stucker G. Subbaraman E.C. Tarnuzzer J.E. Testa D.Uhl L. Ulland R. Voit R. Walton R. Weincr G.D. Weyman R. Williams D.Wood H.R. Yoshimura

RETHINKING THE NUCLEAR WASTE PROGRAM: LESSONS FROM...

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