Rethinking the Conflicts Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction

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Rethinking the Conflicts Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction Rethinking the Conflicts Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction

Jesse M. Cross

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679

Article

RethinkingtheConflictsRevolutioninPersonalJurisdiction

JesseM.Cross†

INTRODUCTIONEach legal fieldhas itsownwayofunderstandingboth itspast

and its present. In the field of Conflicts of Law, this understandingtakes the formof anoft-repeatedhistoricalnarrative—one that re-volvesaroundthecentraleventofthe“Conflictsrevolution.”1Priortothe1940s,thisnarrativeobserves,testsandstandardsinConflictsofLawsharedacommontheme:theywereanchoredintheideaof“sov-ereignty.”2Duringthisperiod,inotherwords,questionsinConflictsof

† Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. Yale LawSchool,J.D.2011;UniversityofCalifornia,Irvine,M.A.2006.Iparticularlywishtothankmycasebookcoauthors,BobFelix,RalphWhitten,andRichSeamon,aswellasthepar-ticipants of the Richmond Junior FacultyWorkshop and the South Carolina facultyworkshop,fortheirgenerousfeedback.Copyright©2020byJesseM.Cross. 1. Theterm“Conflictsrevolution”apparentlywascoinedbyAlbertEhrenzweigina1966article.SeeFriedrichK.Juenger,AThirdConflictsRestatement?,75IND.L.J.403,405n.21(2000)(citingAlbertA.Ehrenzweig,ACounter-RevolutioninConflictsofLaw?FromBealetoCavers,80HARV.L.REV.377(1966)).Thistermissometimesusedtodiscussonlythechoice-of-lawelementsofthislargerrevolutionbutothertimesisusedtocapturethejurisdictionalelementsaswell.CeliaWassersteinFassberg,Real-ismandRevolutioninConflictofLaws:InwithaBangandOutwithaWhimper,163U.PA.L.REV.1919,1921(2015). 2. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala,The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAML.REV. 2501,2517(2005)(“MuchlikeregulatorylawduringtheeraofAmericanBanana,legalspa-tialitywascentral toconsiderationsofconstitutional lawinthenineteenthcentury.Heretoo,decisions...[wereabout]thespatiallimitsofsovereignty.”);JohnT.Cross,The Conduct-Regulating Exception in Modern United States Choice-of-Law, 36CREIGHTONL.REV.425,443(2003)(“[N]otionsofexclusivesovereigntywerealinchpinoftheclassicalapproachtochoiceoflaw.”);IbrahimJ.Wani,BorrowingStatutes,Stat-utesofLimitationsandModernChoiceofLaw,57UMKCL.REV.681,682(1989)(“Un-derlyingtheconceptofvestingisthenotionofsovereignty.”);RobertWai,Transna-tionalLiftoffandJuridicalTouchdown:TheRegulatoryFunctionofPrivateInternationalLawinanEraofGlobalization,40COLUM.J.TRANSNAT’LL.209,241–42(2002)(“[T]ra-ditionalconflictoflawsemphasizedastronglyterritorialdefinitionofsovereignty.”);AustenL.Parrish,TheEffectsTest:Extraterritoriality’sFifthBusiness,61AND.L.REV.

680 MINNESOTALAWREVIEW [105:679

Lawwereviewedasquestionsaboutthebreadthofpowerthatapar-ticulartypeofentity,the“sovereign,”couldjustifiablypossess.3Basedon the answers to thesequestions, limits on legislative jurisdiction(i.e.,choiceoflaw)andpersonaljurisdictionweredeveloped.4Inprac-tice,thisapproachusuallylimitedstatestothegovernanceofpeopleand things existingwithin their territorial boundaries—a limit thatgrewoutoftheassumptionthatsovereignstates,bydefinition,wereentitieswhosepowerceasedattheirborders.5Bytheearlytwentiethcentury,thisapproachhadgeneratedtestsappliedbythecourtsfor:(1) personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment;6 (2)choiceoflawundertheDueProcessClause;7(3)choiceoflawunder

1455,1466(2008)(“IntheUnitedStates,theterritorialityprinciplereacheditszenithinthe1800s.”). 3. Thisviewhadsome traction inAmericasince theFounding,but itenteredAmericanConflictsthinkingwithparticularforcebeginningwiththepublicationofJo-sephStory’streatisein1834.JOSEPHSTORY,COMMENTARIESONTHECONFLICTOFLAWS22–23(MelvilleM.Bigelowed.,8thed.1883)(1834).OnStory’sfocusonsovereignty,see,for example, Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating InternationalComityasConflictofLaws,44U.C.DAVISL.REV.11,24(2010),statingthat“Story ...erectedhisconflictoflawssystemonsovereigntyandcomity”;andMatthiasLehmann,LiberatingtheIndividualfromBattlesBetweenStates:JustifyingPartyAutonomyinCon-flictofLaws,41VAND.J.TRANSNAT’LL.381,399(2008),statingthat“JosephStory...made‘sovereignty’ofthestateoveraterritorythepremiseofhisconflictstheory.”OnStory’sinfluence,see,forexample,ALANWATSON,JOSEPHSTORYANDTHECOMITYOFER-RORS:ACASESTUDYINCONFLICTOFLAWS2(1992),referencingStoryas“theprimearchi-tect of nineteenth-century American conflicts law”; and Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story’sCommentariesontheConflictofLaws–OneHundredYearsAfter,48HARV.L.REV.15,38(1934),notingthat“[i]ntheUnitedStatesandEngland,Storyisreveredtodayasthefatheroftheconflictoflaws.”ForthecasesthattranslatedStory’sconceptsintosover-eignty-basedconflictsrules,seeinfranotes6–10. 4. See,e.g.,STORY,supranote3,at21(“[I]twouldbewhollyincompatiblewiththeequalityandexclusivenessofthesovereigntyof[any]nation,that[other]nation[s]shouldbeat liberty to regulateeitherpersonsor thingsnotwithin itsown territo-ries.”). 5. Foradetailedanalysisofthisterritorialdefinitionofsovereignty,anditsin-tellectualhistory,seeinfraPartII.A.1. 6. SeePennoyerv.Neff,95U.S.714,722(1877)(“[N]otribunalestablishedby[astate]canextenditsprocessbeyond[its]territorysoastosubjecteitherpersonsorpropertytoitsdecisions.”).ForadiscussionofPennoyer,seeinfraPartII.A.1. 7. SeeHomeIns.Co.v.Dick,281U.S.397,407(1930)(“AStatemay,ofcourse,prohibitanddeclareinvalidthemakingofcertaincontractswithinitsborders,...[I]tmay prohibit performancewithin its borders, even of contracts validlymade else-where, if theyarerequiredtobeperformedwithintheStateandtheirperformancewouldviolateitslaws.”);N.Y.LifeIns.Co.v.Head,234U.S.149,155,162(1914)(“[A]StatemaynotconsistentlywiththedueprocessclauseoftheFourteenthAmendmentextenditsauthoritybeyonditslegitimatejurisdiction...[consequentlya]state,byalicense,may[not]acquiretherighttoexertanauthoritybeyonditsborders.”).

2020] RETHINKINGTHECONFLICTSREVOLUTION 681

theFullFaithandCreditClause;8(4)federalintenttolegislateextra-territorially;9and(5)statechoiceoflawselectionmethods.10

This approach toConflictsofLawwouldnot last,however. In-stead,intheperiodspanningfromthe1940sthroughthe1960s,theConflictsrevolutionwouldremakethefield.11AsRalphWhittenhas

8. SeeMod.WoodmenofAm.v.Mixer,267U.S.544,551(1924)(“[A]smarriagelookstodomicil,membership[inacorporation]...lookstoandmustbegovernedbythelawoftheStategrantingtheincorporation.”);AetnaLifeIns.Co.v.Dunken,266U.S.389,399(1924)(“TheTexasstatute[is] incapableofbeingconstitutionallyap-pliedto[theTennesseecontract]sincetheeffectofsuchapplicationwouldbetoregu-latebusinessoutsidetheStateofTexasandcontrolcontractsmadebycitizensofotherStatesindisregardoftheirlaws....”);Am.FireIns.Co.v.KingLumberCo.,250U.S.3,10(1919)(“[This]case [doesnot]presentanattemptof theFlorida lawto intrudeitself into the State of Pennsylvania and control transactions there .... There is nofoundation,therefore,forthecontentionthatfullfaithwasnotgiventoalawofPenn-sylvania....”);N.Y.LifeIns.Co.,234U.S.at161(“[I]twouldbeimpossibletopermitthestatutesofMissouritooperatebeyondthejurisdictionofthatStateandintheStateofNewYorkand ...destroyfreedomofcontractwithoutthrowingdowntheconstitu-tionalbarriers ....Theprinciple ... liesatthefoundationofthefullfaithandcreditclauseandthemanyrulingswhichhavegiveneffecttotheclause.”). 9. SeeAm.BananaCo.v.UnitedFruitCo.,213U.S.347,358(1909)(explainingthatasageneralrule,statutesareconstruedtoapplyonlywithintheterritoriallimitsinwhichitslawmakershavelegitimatepowerandthatwordswithuniversalscope,suchas“everycontractinrestraintoftrade,”shallbeinterpretedtomean“onlyeveryonesubjecttosuchlegislation”). 10. See,e.g.,Ala.GreatS.R.R.v.Carroll,11So.803,809(Ala.1892)(holdingthataplaintiff’srightsweredeterminedsolelybythelawsofMississippibecausethatwasthestatewheretheinjuryoccurred);seealsoRESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFCONFLICTSOFL.§1(1934)(endorsingthischoice-of-lawapproach). 11. Thestartingdateofthe“Conflictsrevolution”hasbeendebated.See,e.g.,Kath-erineFlorey,BigConflictsLittleConflicts47ARIZ.ST.L.REV.683,719(2015)(identify-ingtherevolutionas“[s]tartinginthe1920sand1930sandcontinuingthroughthemid-twentiethcentury”);SymeonC.Symeonides,TheChoice-of-LawRevolutionFiftyYearsAfterCurrie:AnEndandaBeginning,2015U.ILL.L.REV.1847,1870(identifying“the1960sasthedecadeofthechoice-of-lawrevolution”);MathiasReimann,Savigny’sTriumph?ChoiceofLawinContractsCasesattheCloseoftheTwentiethCentury,39VA.J.INT’LL.571,584(1999)(“Thisdevelopment,oftencalledthe‘Americanconflictsrev-olution,’beganinthe1950s,reacheditsclimaxinthe1960sand1970s,andpeteredoutinthe1980s.”).InpartbecausethisArticleadoptsabroaddefinitionofthe“Con-flicts revolution” that includes topics beyond state choice-of-law rules, a periodstretchingbacktothe1940sseemsappropriate.SeePac.Emp’s.Ins.Co.v.Indus.Acci-dentComm’n,306U.S.493,503(1939)(analyzingtowhatextenttheFullFaithandCreditClausecancompel“thequalificationordenialofrightsassertedunderthelawsofonestate,thatoftheforum,bythestatuteofanotherstate”);Int’lShoeCo.v.Wash-ington,326U.S.310,311(1945);UnitedStatesv.AluminumCo.ofAm.(Alcoa),148F.2d416,443(2dCir.1945)(questioningwhetherCongressintendedforalawtohaveanextraterritorialeffect).Foratimelineofstatesadoptingmodern(i.e.,post-revolu-tion)approachestochoiceoflaw,seeSYMEONC.SYMEONIDES,THEAMERICANCHOICE-OF-LAWREVOLUTION:PAST,PRESENTANDFUTURE37–50(2006).


putit,thismovementwas“successfulindestroyingthepremisesonwhichthe[preceding]systemofconflictoflawswasbased.”12WilliamTetleyhasdescribeditasaperiodinourlegalhistory“thecreativityanddynamismofwhichremainunequalledelsewhere.”13Itwasclearat thetime,and itremainscleartoday, thataprofoundchangewasoccurring in the field of Conflicts of Law in themid-twentieth cen-tury—achangethatwasfundamentallyalteringthetestsandstand-ardsusedbyAmericancourts.14

What,then,wasthenatureofthisprofoundchange?Accordingtotheconventionalview,thisConflictsrevolutionamountedtoarejec-tionofthesameideaacrosseachofitsmanydomains:theideathatConflicts tests should be grounded in a theory of sovereignty.15 Inplace of a sovereignty-based approach, this conventional view sug-gests,theConflictsrevolutionintroducedteststhatfocusedinsteadonpragmaticconcernssuchasconvenience,judicialflexibility,practical-ity,andlitigantfairness.16

12. RalphU.Whitten,CuringtheDeficienciesoftheConflictsRevolution:AProposalforNationalLegislationonChoiceofLaw,Jurisdiction,andJudgments,37WILLAMETTEL.REV.259,259(2001). 13. WilliamTetley,ACanadianLooksatAmericanConflictofLawTheoryandPrac-tice,EspeciallyintheLightoftheAmericanLegalandSocialSystems(CorrectiveVs.Dis-tributiveJustice),38COLUM.J.TRANSNAT’LL.299,299(1999). 14. Forcontemporaneousrealizationsoftherevolution’stransformativeimpact,see,forexample,Ehrenzweig,supranote1,at379,statingthat“[c]urrentconflictsdoc-trineisusuallyviewedasarevolutionagainstthe‘Establishment’ofthefirstRestate-mentofConflictofLaws”;HansW.Baade,Counter-RevolutionorAllianceforProgress?ReflectionsonReadingCavers,theChoice-of-LawProcess,46TEX.L.REV.141,144,147(1967),referringto“theCurrierevolution”andciting“BrainerdCurrie’sepochal1958study”;andFriedrichJuenger,ChoiceofLawinInterstateTorts,118U.PA.L.REV.202,202–03(1969),statingthat“[i]tseemsclearthatlexlociisnolongerthefederalchoiceoflawrule.Thisisaremarkabledevelopmentconsideringthattherulewasoncefol-lowedinword,ifnotindeed,byvirtuallyeverycourtintheUnitedStates....[Manycourts]haveembracedmodernconflicts thinkingcheerfully,andthe terms ...havebecomepartandparcelofthejudicialvocabulary.”(emphasisadded)(footnotesomit-ted). 15. SeeinfraPartI. 16. ManyscholarshavemadethisassertionabouttheConflictsrevolutiongener-ally.SeeRaustiala,supranote2,at25–48(“TheevolutionofAmericanlawhasbeenaprocessinwhichformalisticcategoriesbasedonspatiallocationandgeographicbor-derswererejectedinfavorofmoresupple,contextualconceptssuchas‘effects’and‘minimumcontacts.’” (footnoteomitted));HaroldP. Southerland,Sovereignty,ValueJudgments,andChoiceofLaw,38BRANDEISL.J.451,453(2000)(“Territorial theory,whichutterlydominated thinking inAmerican conflicts law forovera century,hasgivenwaypiecemealinthecourtstomethodsofanalysisthat[are]morecomplexandsensitive.”(footnoteomitted));GeorgeRutherglen,InternationalShoeandtheLegacyofLegalRealism,2001SUP.CT.REV.347(describingtherevolutionastriumphofade-structiverealist impulsethat lackedapositivevisionoragenda);DavidM.Kroeger,


This understanding of the Conflicts revolution is of enormousconsequencetoday.Mostofthetestsandstandardsthatthisrevolu-tion introduced are still, in some form, the tests employed by thecourts.17Thesetestsshownosignsofdisappearinganytimesoon.18

WelcometotheBigWorld:TheEmergingTortofthePublicPolicyExceptiontoEmploy-mentatWillandItsChaoticEncounterwithConflictofLaws,1989U.ILL.L.REV.795,795(“Afieldoflawoncesteepedintraditionalrulesandvestedrights,conflictoflawsisnowmetamorphosing fromarigidanalysis toahighly flexibleapproach.”).Somehavemadethispointspecificallyaboutchoiceoflawrules.SeeROBERTL.FELIX&RALPHU.WHITTEN,AMERICANCONFLICTSLAW:CASESANDMATERIALS8–9(2015)(describinganapproachthat“shiftedfromthevestedrightsapproachtoconflictsbaseduponaterri-torialtheoryoflaw,toanapproachbasedonthefunctioningofthejudicialprocess”);LEABRILMAYER,CONFLICTS OFLAWS:FOUNDATIONS ANDFUTUREDIRECTIONS1–4 (1991)(describingthepost-revolutiontestsaspragmaticteststhatrefusedanyinquiryintofirstprinciples,createdbyafigure(BrainerdCurrie)who“tookashiscornerstonetheabandonmentofmetaphysicalpremises”);Wani,supranote2(“Pragmatismreplacedtheformalismandconceptualismofthetraditionalapproachandthefocusofchoiceoflawanalysisshiftedfromterritorialsovereigntytotheexpectationsofthepartiesandthefairnessoftheresultsreached.”).Othershavemadethispointspecificallyaboutpersonaljurisdiction.Seeinfranotes42–45;seealsoLeffv.Berger,383F.Supp.441,443(D.Wyo.1974)(“[T]herigidityofPennoyerv.NeffhadevolvedtotheflexibilityoftheInternationalShoeprecepts.”).

Thisviewofthe“Conflictsrevolution”hassometimesresultedfromitsassociationwiththelegalrealistmovement.See,e.g.,Symeonides,supranote11,at1851(“...Cur-rieprojectedhislegalrealistconception....”);BRILMAYER,supra,at30–37(explainingthelegalrealists’critiquesoftheFirstRestatementofConflicts,suchasthatit“broughtaboutarbitraryresults”);PerryDane,VestedRights,“Vestedness,”andChoiceofLaw,96YALEL.J.1191,1193(1987)(“ThechoiceoflawrevolutionwassolidlygroundedinonethemewithinthelargermovementofAmericanLegalRealism.”);LAURAKALMAN,LEGALREALISMATYALE:1927-1960(1986).SeegenerallyWilliamC.PowersJr.,FormalismandNon-FormalisminChoiceofLawMethodology,52WASH.L.REV.27,27,52–57(1976)(analyzingtheshift fromformalismtonon-formalisminchoice-of-lawmethodologyfromthestandpointofatheoryof“judicialshiftsbetweenmajorlegalparadigms”). 17. See,e.g.,Brownev.P.A.M.Transp.,Inc.,No.5:16-CV-5366,2019WL333569,at*5(W.D.Ark.Jan.25,2019)(statingthattheapplicationofastatelawwillconformtotheDueProcessClauseandFullFaithandCreditClause,ifitis“neitherarbitrarynorfundamentallyunfair”(citingAllstateIns.Co.v.Hague,449U.S.302,308–10(1981)));FreestreamAircraft(Berm.)Ltd.v.AeroL.Grp.,905F.3d597,603(9thCir.2018)(“Astospecificjurisdiction,wegenerallyconductathree-partinquiry—commonlyreferredtoastheminimumcontactstest ....”);Licciexrel.Licciv.LebaneseCanadianBank,SAL,739F.3d45,48(2dCir.2013)(“ThecrucialNewYorkCourtofAppealsdecisionrelevanttothisproceeding...explicitlyestablishesaninterest-analysisapproach.”);Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Since JudgeLearnedHand’sleadingopinionin[Alcoa]...ithasbeengenerallyestablishedthattheso-called‘effectstest’limitstheShermanAct....”(citationomitted)). 18. The relevant elements of these tests have been retained, thus far, in earlydraftsoftheThirdRestatementofConflictofLaws.SeeRESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFCON-FLICTOFL.§1.02,cmt.b,at6(AM.L.INST.,PreliminaryDraftNo.1,Oct.1,2015)(ontheFullFaithandCreditClause);id.§5.05,cmt.c,at98(ontheDueProcessClause);id.atxiv(onstatechoice-of-lawselectionmethods).


When courts and scholars face a question about Conflicts of Law,therefore, they typically find an answer by applying a test thatemerged from the Conflicts revolution.19 Andwhen they are facedwithaquestionaboutthedeeperpurposesofsuchatest,theyusuallyanswerbyturningtothepragmaticvaluesthat,accordingtothetra-ditionalnarrativeoftheConflictsrevolution,thesetestsareassumedtoembody.20

As this Articlewill explain, however, this traditional narrativefundamentallymisunderstandstheConflictsrevolution.Properlyun-derstood,thisrevolutionwasacontinuationoftheCourt’straditionofrelyinguponsovereignty-basedtests,notarepudiationofthattradi-tion.Theunappreciated triumphof theConflicts revolution, rather,wastosubstituteonetheoryofsovereigntyforanother.21

What,then,wasthiscompetingtheoryofsovereignty?Accordingto this theory, thesovereignstate isnotdefined—as ithadbeen inearliercases—simplyasanentitypossessingexclusivepoweroveraterritory.22Rather,asovereignisunderstoodasanentitythat,bydef-inition,istaskedwithaspecificmission:namely,toprotectacommu-nity.23Underthisdefinition,sovereignpowerexistsinordertoaccom-plishaprotectivemission,anditlogicallyshouldreachonlysofarasis needed to accomplish that mission. In the following pages, this

19. Seesupranote17(listingrecentcasesthathaveappliedtestsfromthecon-flictsrevolution). 20. See,e.g.,Gillierv.ServiciosAgecom,LLC,No.17-Civ-23155,,2018WL324997,at*2n.3(S.D.Fla.Jan.8,2018)(“Thereasonforminimumcontactsisbecauseiten-suresfairnessandtheexpectationthat‘thedefendant’sconductandconnectionwiththeforumState[is]suchthatheshouldreasonablyanticipatebeinghaledintocourtthere.’” (quoting World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297(1980)));Zuckermanv.Metro.MuseumofArt,307F.Supp.3d304,320(S.D.N.Y.2018)(“UnderNewYorkconflictprinciples,‘[t]heNewYorkCourtofAppealshasexplicitlyheldthattheNewYorkinterestanalysisisnotrigid....’Interestanalysisisafactin-tensive‘flexibleapproach....’”(firstquotingAbuDhabiInv.Auth.v.Citigroup,Inc.,No.12Civ.283(GBD),2013WL789642,at*6(S.D.N.Y.Mar.4,2013);thenquotingFin.OnePub.Co.v.LehmanBros.SpecialFin.,414F.3d325,337(2dCir.2005)));Brink’sLtd.v.S.Afr.Airways,93F.3d1022,1030(2dCir.1996)(“NewYorkcourts,recogniz-ingthat‘[a]Statemaylacksufficientnexuswithacasesothatchoiceofitslawisarbi-traryorfundamentallyunfair,’abandoned[thepriorperiod’s]rigidrulesinfavorofamore flexible approach.” (quoting Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 70(1993)));InreSimonIILitig.,211F.R.D.86,167(E.D.N.Y.2002)(“Post-BabcockCourtofAppealscasesemphasizetheneedtobeflexibleinfollowinginterestanalysis.”). 21. SeeinfraPartII.B. 22. Seeinfranotes92–95andaccompanyingtext(discussingthesovereigntythe-sisinPennoyerandtheintellectualviewsbehindit). 23. SeeinfraPartII.B.


alternatetheorywillbereferredtoasthe“protectivesovereigntythe-sis.”24

Eventhosewhohavediscussedtheideaofcommunityprotectionin thecontextofConflictsofLaw, thisArticleargues,havenot fullyappreciated themeaning and import of this protective sovereigntythesis.Instead,thethesishasremainedentangledwithlingeringas-sumptionsfromtheterritorial ideaofsovereignty,andtherelation-shipthethesisrevealsbetweenthreekeyconcepts—community-pro-tectingmission,sovereignty,andtheConflictsrevolution—hasgoneoverlooked.AddressingtheseshortcomingsisessentialtounlockingthepotentialoftheConflictsrevolution,thisArticleargues.

AsthisArticlewillillustrate,thisthesishasacenturies-longhis-toryintheliteratureonsovereignty,animatingtheoristsfromThomasHobbes to Henry Hart.25 Moreover, it reentered American politicalthoughtwithrenewedforceduringtheNewDeal,therebyleavingitwell-positionedtoshapetheConflictsrevolutionthatwouldbegininthe1930sand1940s.26Andshapethisrevolutionitdid.IntheCon-flictsrevolution,weseearepeatedefforttotakethislongstandingthe-oryofsovereigntyandtranslateitintoaseriesofconcretetests—andourmoderntestsgaincoherenceandclarityoncethiscentraldevel-opmentisproperlyunderstood.27

Inwhatway, itmightbewondered,does theprotectivesover-eigntythesisgenerateteststhatdifferfromthoseofitspredecessor?BeforetheConflictsrevolution,asalreadynoted,theprevailingtheorydefinedthesovereignstateasaterritorialpower.28Consequently,itgeneratedConflicts tests that effectivelybeganwith an instruction:drawacirclearound the territoryof thestate.29Then, it instructedcourts:lookforactorsthatintrudeintothatcircle.30Thoseintrudingactors,itposited,weretheindividualswhocouldbejustifiablysubjecttostate legislativeor judicialauthority.31After theConflictsrevolu-tion,bycontrast,theprotectivesovereigntythesisissuedadifferentinstruction to courts. Because that thesis defined the state as the

24. SeeinfraPartII.B.2. 25. SeeinfraPartII.B. 26. Ontherolethisthesisplayedinthepoliticalrhetoricandconstitutionaldeci-sionsoftheNewDeal,seeinfraPartII.B.2.b. 27. SeeinfraPartIII. 28. SeeinfraPartII. 29. SeeinfraPartII.A.1(discussingsovereigntytheoryasitrelatestoPennoyerv.Neff). 30. SeeinfraPartII.A.1. 31. SeeinfraPartII.A.1.


protector of a community, the resulting tests beganwith anew in-struction:drawacirclearoundthestate’scommunity(or,aroundthesetofprotectionsdoledouttothatcommunity).32Next,itinstructedthesecourts:lookforactorsthatintrudeintothatcircle.33Theseac-tors,itsuggested,weretheindividualswhonowcouldbesubjecttostatelegislativeorjudicialauthority.34ThechallengesthatConflictsofLawhaswrestledwitheversincetheConflictsrevolutionhavebeen,ineffect,thechallengesofgivingsubstanceandmeaningtothispar-ticularapproachtostatepower.

To develop this understanding of Conflicts of Law, this ArticlespecificallychroniclesthecentralrolethattheprotectivesovereigntythesisplayedduringtheConflictsrevolutioninremakingoneofthemostimportanttestsinthefield:theFourteenthAmendmenttestforstatecourtpersonaljurisdiction.35Inthefamous1945caseofInter-nationalShoeCo.v.Washington,36theCourtcreatedanew“minimumcontacts”testforthispurpose—therebydiscardingthejurisdictionaltestitpreviouslyhadarticulatedinPennoyerv.Neff.37Insodoing,ittypicallyisassumedthatInternationalShoepivotedthisFourteenthAmendmenttestawayfromafocuson“sovereignty,”andcommitteditinsteadtoafocuson“fairness”or“convenience.”38Bycontrast,thisArticleshows,theCourtaccomplishedsomethingverydifferentinthe

32. See infraPart II.A.2 (discussing sovereignty theory as it relates to Interna-tionalShoev.Washington). 33. SeeinfraPartII.A.2. 34. SeeinfraPartII.A.2. 35. PriortoPennoyerv.Neff,95U.S.714(1877),theonlyconstitutionalmeansofchallenginganassertionofpersonaljurisdictionwastodosoindirectlybyinvitingthecourtofanotherstate,aftertheinitialtrial,torefuseundertheFullFaithandCreditClause to recognize the original judgment. See, e.g., Steven R. Greenberger, JusticeScalia’sDueProcessTraditionalismAppliedtoTerritorialJurisdiction:TheIllusionofAd-judicationWithout Judgment, 33 B.C. L.REV. 981, 1015–16 (1992) (discussing thismeansofindirectattack).SincePennoyer,however,theCourthasheldthatalitigantmaychallengetheconstitutionalityofanassertionofpersonaljurisdictiondirectlyintheoriginatingcourt.SeeInt’lShoeCo.v.Washington,326U.S.310,315(1945)(dis-cussingtheappellant’sdueprocesschallengetoastate’sexerciseofjurisdiction). 36. 326U.S.at310. 37. Thislabel(ofthe“minimumcontacts”test)wastakenfromtheCourt’sasser-tioninInternationalShoethat:“[D]ueprocessrequiresonlythatinordertosubjectadefendanttoajudgmentinpersonam,ifhebenotpresentwithintheterritoryoftheforum,hehavecertainminimumcontactswithitsuchthatthemaintenanceofthesuitdoesnotoffendtraditionalnotionsoffairplayandsubstantialjustice.”Int’lShoe,326U.S.at316(emphasisomitted)(quotingMillikenv.Meyer,311U.S.457,463(1940)). 38. Forsourcesrepeatingthisconventionalview,seeinfranotes65–68.


creationoftheminimumcontactstest:itinstalledtheprotectivesov-ereigntythesisatthecenterofpersonaljurisdiction.39

Onceweunderstandtheminimumcontactstestasre-orientingpersonaljurisdictionaroundtheprotectivesovereigntythesis,anum-ber of themost vexing problems in the field are diminished or re-solved.40Severalofthesewarrantcommentattheoutset.First,per-sonaljurisdictiondoctrineoftenhasbeenaccusedofdissolvingintoconfusionanddiscordinthepost-InternationalShoeera.41Itisadoc-trineunmoored,itisargued,fromanyconsistentlogicthatcanguidelower courts.42 However, recognition of the protective sovereigntythesisatthecenteroftheminimumcontactstestrevealsthat,beneaththe seemingchaos, theCourtessentiallyhasbeenengaged in threespecificdebatesabout the legacyof this thesis.Thesedebateshaveasked:

(1)Isittheentanglementofthedefendant,oroftheplaintiff,with

aprotectivesovereignthatisrelevanttojurisdiction?43(2)Whatlevelofentanglementwithaprotectivesovereignissuf-

ficienttowarrant jurisdiction?Ismereenjoymentof itsprotectionssufficient,ormustapartyactivelyseekoutthoseprotections?44

(3)Shouldaparty’srelationshiptoaprotectivesovereignbethe

solefactorinjurisdictionalanalysis,oroneofseveral?45

39. SeeinfraPartII.A.2. 40. See infraPart III (explaining the implications and benefits that comewithviewingtheminimumcontactstestasalignedaroundtheprotectivesovereigntythe-sis). 41. Forscholarsmakingthisassertion,seeinfranotes181–85. 42. SeeDouglasD.McFarland,DroptheShoe:ALawofPersonal Jurisdiction,68MO. L.REV. 753, 777 (2003) (“Since International Shoe created the minimum con-tacts/fairplaytestin1945forconstitutionalsupervisionofassertionsofstatecourtpersonaljurisdiction,theSupremeCourtandlowercourtshavelaboredtorefineandclarifythetest.Whileasmallminorityofcommentatorshavedeclaredtheseeffortsasuccess,thegreatmajorityofcommentatorshavebrandedtheseeffortsadismalfail-ure.”(footnoteomitted)). 43. SeeinfraPartIII.A.1. 44. SeeinfraPartIII.A.2. 45. SeeinfraPartIII.A.3.


Awarenessoftheseunderlyingdebates,andoftheirconnectiontotheprotectivesovereigntythesis,bringsstructuretoadoctrinethatmanyhaveassumedtobehopelesslyconfused.46

Second,personaljurisdictiondoctrinehasconsistentlybeensub-jected toaccusationsofconstitutional illegitimacy.47Once themini-mumcontactstestisunderstoodtobeanchoredinaprotectivesover-eignty thesis, however, it becomes clear that this test has greaterclaimstoconstitutionallegitimacythanpreviouslyassumed.

Third,thisnew,sovereignty-basedviewoftheminimumcontactstestprovidesgoodreasontorethinkthewidespreadjudicialpracticeofdeferringtoforumselectionclausesincontracts.48Afterall,totheextent thatpersonal jurisdiction ismeant toensure thata forum isconvenientforlitigants,itmakessensetooutsourcethatdetermina-tiontolitigantsthemselves.However,ifpersonaljurisdictionismeanttoensurethatastate,viewedasaprotectivesovereign,hasajustifia-ble reason toassert statepowerovera case, then itmakes far lesssenseforcourtstodefertoprivatepartiesinmakingthatdetermina-tion.

Fourth,therehasbeenconfusionsinceInternationalShoeabouttheextenttowhichterritorialboundariesremainrelevantinpersonaljurisdiction—andaboutwhether,iftheydo,itmeansthatolderideasaboutsovereigntysurvive inmodern-daydoctrine.49When Interna-tionalShoeisunderstoodasre-orientingpersonaljurisdictionaroundaprotectivesovereigntythesis,however,itbecomesclearthatterri-torialboundariesdoremainrelevant—butforanewreason.Underanearlier theory of sovereignty, these boundaries were importantsimplybecausetheywereviewedasprovidingtheinherentlimitsofsovereignpower.50Undertheprotectivesovereigntythesis,bycon-trast,theirrelevancestemsprimarilyfromanAmericanconstitutionaltraditionofusingsovereignboundariestodemarcatethecommunitythat the sovereignmustwork to protect.51 As this Article explains,bothlegalandexpressivebenefitswouldresultfromtheCourtexplic-itlyacknowledgingthat,beneathitscontinuedreferencestoterrito-rialboundaries,thisshiftinlogichasoccurred.

46. Forscholarsarguingthatthedoctrineishopelesslyconfused,seeinfranotes222–23andaccompanyingtext. 47. Forscholarswhoassertitsillegitimacy,seeinfranote166. 48. Foramorein-depthdiscussiononthistopic,seeinfraPartIII.C. 49. SeeinfraPartIII.G(analyzingthisconfusioningreaterdetailandencouragingtheSupremeCourttoprovideclarification). 50. SeeinfraPartII.B.1. 51. SeeinfraPartII.B.2.


Finally,personaljurisdiction—andConflictsofLawgenerally—has developed a lamentable reputation as an intimidating topic ofdauntingcomplexity.Whilesomeofthiscomplexitymaybeunavoid-able,muchofitissuesfromthefactthat,today,studentsandpracti-tionersareexpectedtointuitivelyknowcertainfactsaboutthesover-eignstate.What,forexample,arethe“benefitsandprotections”thatasovereignstateaffords?52Whatare the “interests” thata statepos-sesses?53Whatisthecommunitythatasovereignstateisassignedtoprotect?54 Too often, these questions remain buried in the Court’sopinions,wheretheiranswersarepresentedasnaturalassumptionsaboutthebehaviorofstates.55Bycontrast,onceweacknowledgethatideasofsovereigntyremainrelevantinmodernConflictsofLawanal-ysis,thesequalitiesofthesovereignstatecanbeacknowledged,dis-cussed,andrenderedaccessible.

Forallthesereasons,personaljurisdictiondoctrineisimprovedwhen the “sovereignty revolution” in InternationalShoe isproperlyunderstood.Atthesametime,thisargumentalsorevisesourunder-standingoftwoareasoflawthathaveevolvedalongsidetheCourt’sFourteenth Amendment doctrine: (1) federal personal jurisdictiondoctrineunder theFifthAmendment,and(2) theextraterritorialityprincipleundertheDormantCommerceClause.56TheCourthasbeenexplicitthatthesetestssharealogicwiththeminimumcontactstest—and,assuch,arevisedunderstandingof theminimumcontactstestshedsnewlightonthefunctionandutilityoftheseparalleldoctrines.

Innumerousways,therefore,aproperunderstandingofthesov-ereignty revolution in personal jurisdiction can transform our

52. Int’lShoeCo.v.Washington,326U.S.310,319(1945). 53. Pac.Emps.Ins.Co.v.Indus.AccidentCo.,306U.S.493,503(1938)(discussingonestate’sinterestinsafeguardingthecompensationofitsemployeeswhiletempo-rarilyabroadintheiremploymentandanotherstate’sinterestinprovidingphysicalsafetyandeconomicprotectionforemployeesinjuredwithinit). 54. Seeinfranote251(identifyingopinionspositing,alternately,thatthesover-eigncommunityconsistsofresidentsandofcitizens). 55. Foraprominentscholarvoicingthisfrustrationinthechoice-of-lawcontext,seeLeaBrilmayer,Governmental InterestAnalysis:AHouseWithoutFoundations,46OHIOST.L.J.459,467(1985),asking

[n]owwhere did this ‘of course’ come in?Why not say, ‘Why, thosewithwhosewelfareMassachusettsisconcerned,ofcourse—marriedwomenen-teringintocontractsinMassachusetts’?or‘marriedwomenwhosepropertyislocatedinMassachusetts’?oranyotherconnectingfactorthatmightbesin-gledout?Currielatersimplyreferredtothiscrucialpremiseashavingbeenshown. Through endless repetition and self-evident treatment, the rabbitwasplacedintothehatwithgreatfanfareandthenpulledtriumphantlyout.

56. SeeinfraPartsIII.D–E.


understandingof the law,bothwithinpersonal jurisdictionandbe-yondit.Insodoing,ithopefullybeginstoillustratethemanybenefitsthatcanaccruefromrecognizingthebroadersovereigntyrevolutioninConflictsofLaw.WithinthefieldofConflictsofLaw,this isoftenhowdoctrinalchangehascomeabout:fromBrainerdCurrietoRobertLeflar,scholarshavelookedbackonpriordecades’decisionsanddis-tilledtheconcernsthatcourtsactuallywereaddressing,asopposedtothosecourtssuperficiallyclaimedtoaddress.57Insodoing,theyclari-fiedthefield’strueconcernsandtherebyredirectedtheevolutionofitsdoctrinaltests.Takingtheseworksas its inspiration,thisArticleaspirestoasimilarmodeofanalysis.Itshowsthat,despitetheirsu-perficialrhetoric,courtsstillcareaboutsovereignty.Theyjusthappentocareaboutadifferentideaofsovereigntythanthatwhichprevailedacenturyago.

Thisargumentismadeinthreeparts.PartIbeginsbyrecountingtheconventionalunderstandingofInternationalShoeCo.v.Washing-ton,thepivotalcasethatbroughttheConflictsrevolutiontopersonaljurisdiction.PartIIillustratesthat,contrarytothisconventionalun-derstanding,thecentral innovationintheminimumcontactstestofInternationalShoewasthereplacementofonetheoryofsovereigntywithanother.PartIIIthenoutlinesthevariousimplicationsofthisre-visedunderstandingofmodernpersonal jurisdictiondoctrine,bothforpersonaljurisdictionandbeyond.

I.THETRADITIONALVIEWOFPERSONALJURISDICTIONTheIntroductiontothisArticletracedtheconventionalnarrative

that,amongcourtsandscholars,isusedtoexplaintheConflictsrevo-lutionofthemid-twentiethcentury.58Onedomaintowhichthiscon-ventionalnarrativeisapplied—adomainthatisthefocusofthisArti-cle—is personal jurisdiction. In this domain, the narrative is toldthroughthelensoftwolandmarkcases.ThefirstcaseisPennoyerv.

57. See,e.g.,RobertA.Leflar,ConflictsLaw:MoreonChoice-InfluencingConsider-ations,54CALIF.L.REV.1584,1585–86(1966)(claimingthata“tentativesummariza-tion” ofmajor choice-of-law influencingdecisions can replace themechanical rulesthatcourtshaveusedas“cover-ups”fortherealreasonsbehindtheirdecisions,whichwillbolsterthelegalcommunity’sunderstandingofchoice-of-lawopinions);RobertA.Leflar,Choice-InfluencingConsiderations in Conflicts Law, 41N.Y.U. L.REV. 267, 279(1966)(describingastudythatidentifiedninepolicyfactorsthathaveaffectedchoice-of-lawrulesandresults(citingElliotE.Cheatham&WillisL.M.Reese,ChoiceofAppli-cableLaw,81COLUM.L.REV.959(1952)));BRAINERDCURRIE,SELECTEDESSAYSONTHECONFLICTOFLAWS188–282(1963)(presentingextensivecasestudiesonchoice-of-lawdecisions). 58. Seesupranotes11–15andaccompanyingtext.


Neff.59Decidedin1878,theCourtinPennoyerasserted—forthefirsttime in its history—that the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment places limits upon the jurisdictional reach of statecourts.60 The limits that theCourt articulated, asmanyhavenoted,emergeddirectlyfromtheCourt’sdefinitionofthesovereignstate.61Consequently,Pennoyeristaken(quiteunderstandably)torepresentthefirstepochinConflictsofLaw—i.e.,theperiodinwhichConflictstestswereanchoredintheoriesofsovereignty.62

TheConflictsrevolutionwouldarrivetopersonaljurisdictionin1945,however,intheformofasecondlandmarkcase:InternationalShoeCo. v.Washington.63 In this case, theCourtdispensedwith thepersonaljurisdictiontestthatithadoutlinedinPennoyer,anditre-placeditwithanewtest—onetypicallyreferredtoasthe“minimumcontacts” test.64 Under this new test, it was permissible for statecourtstoassertjurisdictionoverdefendantswhohad“contacts,ties,orrelations”withthestate—eventhough,insomeinstances,thede-fendantmightnotbephysicallypresentwithinthestate.65

59. Pennoyerv.Neff,95U.S.714(1878). 60. Id.at733(“SincetheadoptionoftheFourteenAmendment...thevalidityof[state court] judgementsmay be directly questioned, and their enforcement in theStateresisted,onthegroundthatproceedingsinacourtof justicetodeterminethepersonalrightsandobligationofpartiesoverwhomthatcourthasnojurisdictiondonotconstitutedueprocessoflaw.”). 61. Seeid.at722(derivingajurisdictionalrulefromthepremisethat“everyStatepossessesexclusivejurisdictionandsovereigntyoverpersonsandpropertywithinitsterritory”);infraPartII(detailingtheCourt’slogicinPennoyer). 62. See, e.g., JohnN.Drobak,TheFederalismTheme inPersonal Jurisdiction,68IOWAL.REV.1015,1026(“Pennoyerv.Neffmarkedtheapogeeofthestatesovereigntytheoryofpersonaljurisdiction.”).DrobakarguesthatPennoyer,evenastheapexofthesovereigntyapproach,wasnonethelessmoreconcernedwithissuesoffairnesstode-fendantsthanhasgenerallybeenacknowledged. Id.;seealsoWendyCollinsPerdue,Sin,Scandal,andSubstantiveDueProcess:PersonalJurisdictionandPennoyerReconsid-ered,62WASH.L.REV.479,504(1987)(“[T]hefocusisnotonconcernsaboutfairnesstotheparticulardefendant,butinsteadisontheinherentlimitationsonthepowerofgovernments.”);AllanR.Stein,StylesofArgumentandInterstateFederalismintheLawofPersonalJurisdiction,65TEX.L.REV.689,690(1987)(“FromPennoyerv.NeffthroughInternationalShoeCo.v.Washington,dueprocess limitsonpersonal jurisdictionex-plicitly served as a device to allocate political authority between sovereigns. From1877 to1945, inappropriateassertionsof jurisdictionwereviewednotasmere in-fringementsonadefendant’s freedom,butasviolationsof thesovereigntyofotherstates.”). 63. Int’lShoeCo.v.Washington,326U.S.310(1945). 64. Id.at316. 65. Id.;seealsoid.at319.(“[D]ueprocessrequiresonlythatinordertosubjectadefendanttoajudgmentinpersonam,ifhebenotpresentwithintheterritoryoftheforum,hehavecertainminimumcontactswithit....”).


Today, International Shoe is cited in cases,66 textbooks,67 trea-tises,68 and academic articles69 as the case thatmarked theCourt’s

66. See,e.g.,Metro.LifeIns.Co.v.Robertson-CecoCorp.,84F.3d560,577(2dCir.1996) (“The Supreme Court’s opinion in International Shoe ... made it clear thatwhetherdueprocessissatisfiedturnsexclusivelyonthefairnesstothedefendantinbeingmadetodefendasuitinaparticularforum.”);Jonnetv.DollarSav.BankofN.Y.,530F.2d1123,1135(3dCir.1976)(“Fairness,ofcourse,liesattheheartofInterna-tionalShoeandofcontemporarydueprocesslearning.”);Hutsonv.FehrBros.,584F.2d833,836(8thCir.1978)(referencingthe“InternationalShoe‘minimumcontacts’fair-nessdoctrine”);EnergyRsrvs.Grp.,Inc.v.SuperiorOilCo.,460F.Supp.483,506(D.Kan.1978)(referencing“thefundamentalfairnessanalysisofInternationalShoe”).ForSupremeCourtcases,seeinfranote70. 67. See, e.g., STEPHENC.YEAZELL,CIVILPROCEDURE 80 (8th ed. 2011) (“[Interna-tionalShoe]rearrang[ed]thelandscapeofpersonaljurisdiction;mostcontemporarydebateconcernsitsapplicationandinterpretation.”). 68. See,e.g.,1SPENCERWEBERWALLER&ANDREFIEBIG,ANTITRUSTANDAMERICANBUSINESSABROAD§6:3(4thed.2015)(discussingtheminimumcontactstestundertheheading:“§6:3.JurisdictionintheConstitutionalSense––FairnessStandardofInterna-tionalShoe”);RUSSELLJ.WEINTRAUB,COMMENTARYONTHECONFLICTOFLAWS§4.8,at118(3ded.1986)(claimingthatInternationalShoeestablisheda“jurisdictionalstandardoffairnesstothedefendant”);CHARLESALANWRIGHT&ARTHURR.MILLER,4AFEDERALPRACTICEANDPROCEDURE:CIVIL§1072 (4th ed.) (referencing “the International Shoestandardoffairness”). 69. SeeGeorgeRutherglen, InternationalShoeandtheLegacyofLegalRealism,2001SUP.CT.REV.347,360–61(“[AstrandinInternationalShoethathas]cometodom-inateacademicanalysisofitsconsequences...istheinvocationof‘traditionalnotionsoffairplayandsubstantialjustice’asthetestforjurisdictionundertheDueProcessClause....[Academicsconductingtheseanalysescontend]thatanyexaminationofthedefendant’scontactswiththeforumstatemustbesubordinatedtoanoverallinquiryinto the fairness of continuingthe litigation there.”); see also Friedrich K. Juenger,AmericanJurisdiction:AStoryofComparativeNeglect,65U.COLO.L.REV.1,9(1993)(“Chief Justice Stone ... proclaimed that henceforth it was possible to deduce theproper scope of jurisdiction from the Fourteenth Amendment’s basic ingredient of‘fairness.’”);Stein,supranote62,at690(arguingthatInternationalShoebegan“anero-sion of this political [i.e., sovereignty] element” and led to a doctrine that focuses“solelyontherelationshipbetweenthedefendantandtheforum,andthelegitimacyofthe forum’s assertionof jurisdictiondepends exclusivelyon fairness to thedefend-ant”);McFarland,supranote42,at794(referringto“thefairnesstestofInternationalShoe,[which]...hasbecomethefairness/conveniencetestoftoday”);TaylorSimpson-Wood,IntheAftermathofGoodyearDunlop:Oyez!Oyez!Oyez!ACallforaHybridAp-proachtoPersonalJurisdictioninInternationalProductsLiabilityControversies,64BAY-LORL.REV.113,149(2012)(“TheoriginaltestofInternationalShoewasoneoffair-ness....”); Jayci Noble, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: A Shift in theInternationalShoeAnalysisforUsersofE-CommerceandPeer-to-PeerWebsites,42S.ILL.U.L.J.521,524(2018)(referencing“thefairnessthattheInternationalShoeper-sonaljurisdictiontestemphasizesasacrucialpointintheanalysis”);MichaelVitiello,LimitingAccesstoU.S.Courts:TheSupremeCourt’sNewPersonalJurisdictionCaseLaw,21U.C.DAVISJ.INT’LL.&POL’Y209,215n.54(2015)(“Inthemid-twentiethcentury,InternationalShoeCo.v.Washingtonreformulatedthejurisdictionaltouchstonefromastate’spoweroverthosepresentwithinitsterritorytoananalysisof...fairnessor


shift toa jurisdictional test focusedupon issuesof “fairness”ratherthanissuesof“sovereignty.”TheSupremeCourthaslargelyacceptedthisconventionalaccount.70Accordingtothataccount,InternationalShoe rejected the idea that, inpersonal jurisdiction, theFourteenthAmendmentisdesignedtoenforcelimitationsthatareinherentintheideaofsovereignpower.Inplaceofasovereignty-basedjurisdictionaltest, the conventional account posits, International Shoe inserted anewtypeofjurisdictionaltest:onethatrequirescourtstofocusuponquestionsoffairnessorreasonablenesstodefendants,notquestionsofsovereignty.71

Inrecentyears,theCourthasadoptedthefamiliarvocabularyofthis account of International Shoe—i.e., the vocabulary of “sover-eignty”versus“fairness”—tocharacterizeitsongoingdisagreementsover personal jurisdiction. Here, several Justices (mainly from the

reasonableness....”);AustenL.Parrish,Sovereignty,NotDueProcess:PersonalJuris-dictionoverNonresidentAlienDefendants,41WAKEFORESTL.REV.1,13(2006)(“Ifter-ritorialsovereigntywasthegoverningparadigmforcasesbeforeInternationalShoe,dueprocessanditsfocusontheindividuallitigantwastheoneforthecasesthatfol-lowed.”).ButseeStein,supranote62,at698–700(arguingthatInternationalShoecon-tainedanefforttoextendPennoyer’sfocusuponWestphaliansovereignty);Raustiala,supranote2,at2516–17(describingInternationalShoeasacasethat“embracedasetofpragmatic,instrumental,andcontextualconsiderations”). 70. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980)(“TheclearfocusinInternationalShoewasonfairnessandreasonableness.”);Shafferv.Heitner,433U.S.186,188,211(1977)(referringtwicetothe“fairnessstandardofInternationalShoe”);HelicopterosNacionalesdeColom.,S.A.v.Hall,466U.S.408,427(1984)(Brennan,J.,dissenting)(“AtleastsinceInternationalShoeCo.v.Washington...theprincipalfocuswhendeterminingwhetheraforummayconstitutionallyassertju-risdictionoveranonresidentdefendanthasbeenonfairnessandreasonablenesstothedefendant.”);Rushv.Savchuk,444U.S.320,328(1980)(referringto“thefairnessstandardofInternationalShoe”);seealsoHansonv.Denckla,357U.S.235,251(1958)(describingInternationalShoeasmarkingthemove“fromtherigidruleofPennoyerv.Neff...to[a]flexiblestandard”). 71. Thisconventionalaccountalsopersistsintheimportantworkthathasbeendonetoforgeafieldofhorizontalfederalism.See,e.g.,HeatherK.Gerken,TheTaftLec-ture:LivingUnderSomeoneElse’sLaw,84U.CIN.L.REV.377,383(2016)(“Personaljurisdictionquestions, for example,were once cast in the vernacular of federalism,with its talk of territory and sovereigns. Now they are cast in terms of individualrights.”);HeatherK.Gerken&AriHoltzblatt,ThePoliticalSafeguardsofHorizontalFed-eralism,113MICH.L.REV.57,75–76(2014)(notingthat“theCourthasrecast[jurisdic-tion]inthelanguageofindividualrights”andassertingthat“mostcommentatorsthinkofthisdoctrinalshiftasproofoftheshortcomingsofthesovereigntymodel”);AllanErbsen,HorizontalFederalism,93MINN.L.REV.493,548(2008)(describingminimumcontactstestasprotecting“thelibertyinterest”withinasovereignty-versus-libertydi-vide);GillianE.Metzger,Congress,ArticleIV,andInterstateRelations,120HARV.L.REV.1468,1521–22(2007)(describing“theCourt’sswitch...toaminimumcontactsandfundamentalfairnessapproach”).


conservativewingoftheCourt)haveadvocatedformorerestrictivejurisdictionaltests—and,insodoing,theyhaveframedtheirapproachasareturnto“sovereignty”inpersonaljurisdiction.72Whileitisnotentirelyclear,itappearsthattheseJusticesoftenhaveinmind,bytheterm “sovereignty,” a territorial theory of state sovereignty akin tothatfoundincasesfromthepre-Shoeera.73TheJusticeswhocontinuetodefendamorerelaxedjurisdictionaltest,meanwhile,presentthem-selvesastheheirstothetraditionofInternationalShoe—whichtypi-callymeansdefendinganapproachtojurisdictionthatisgroundedin“fairness.”74 Textbooks and articles regularly adopt the Court’s de-scriptionofthisdisagreement,framingthedebateamongtheJusticesasadebateovertheroleof“fairness”versus“sovereignty”injurisdic-tion.75

Thisconceptualdebateover“sovereignty”and“fairness,”mean-while,hasbeenembarrassinglyunmooredfromthedoctrinesthattheCourtcontinuestoespouse.AsLouiseWeinbergalreadynotedseveral

72. J.McIntyreMach.,Ltd.v.Nicastro,564U.S.873,874(2011)(“Theprincipalinquiryincasesofthissortiswhetherthedefendant’sactivitiesmanifestanintentiontosubmittothepowerofasovereign.”);Bristol-MyersSquibbCo.v.SuperiorCt.,137S.Ct.1773,1780(2017)(notingtheideathatjurisdictionaltests“aremorethanaguar-anteeofimmunityfrominconvenientordistantlitigation.TheyareaconsequenceofterritoriallimitationsonthepoweroftherespectiveStates.”(quotingDenckla,357U.S.at251));seealsoCaseComment,LeadingCases:PersonalJurisdiction:Stream-of-Com-merce Doctrine: J. McIntyreMachinery, Ltd v. Nicastro, 125 HARV.L.REV. 311, 312(2011)(describingJusticeKennedy’spluralityopinionas“elevatingprinciplesofsov-ereigntyoverprinciplesoffairnessandreasonableness”andas“signal[ing]thereturnofsovereigntyasanimportantdueprocessrationale”).TheserecentcaseshavedrawnuponoccasionallanguageintheCourt’searlieropinionsassertingthevalueofsover-eigntyinjurisdiction,suchasDencklaandWorld-WideVolkswagen. 73. SeeDenckla,357U.S.at251(“TheyareaconsequenceofterritoriallimitationsonthepoweroftherespectiveStates.”);World-WideVolkswagen,444U.S.at293(de-scribing the Framers’ intention that the states retain “essential attributes of sover-eignty”);Bristol-MyersSquibb,137S.Ct.at1780(quotingverbatimthelanguagefromDencklaon“territoriallimitations”). 74. SeeNicastro,564U.S.at903(Ginsburg,J.,dissenting)(“Themodernapproachtojurisdictionovercorporationsandotherlegalentities,usheredinbyInternationalShoe,gaveprimeplacetoreasonandfairness.”);Bristol-MyersSquibb,137S.Ct.at1784(Sotomayor,J.,dissenting)(“AcoreconcerninthisCourt’spersonaljurisdictioncasesisfairness.”). 75. See,e.g.,RHONDAWASSERMAN,PROCEDURALDUEPROCESS:AREFERENCEGUIDETOTHEUNITEDSTATESCONSTITUTION224(2004)(speakingof“theCourt’songoingambiv-alenceabouttheroleofstatesovereignty...injurisdictionalanalysis”asopposedtotheroleof“thefairnessofjurisdiction”);HaroldL.Korn,TheDevelopmentofJudicialJurisdictionintheUnitedStates:PartI,65BROOK.L.REV.935,1000(1999)(describingtheCourt’s“prolongedequivocationaboutwhetherourlawofjudicialjurisdictionisnotmoreappropriatelydesigned toserve litigation fairness, than federalism-sover-eignty,considerations”).


decadesago:“Thetroubleis,aseventheCourtconcedes,thecasesdonotturnonthearticulatedpurposesofthejurisprudence.TheCourttalksaboutconvenience,fairness,reasonableness,andcomity,buttheCourthasdetachedthecasesfromthesemoorings....”76Thecontem-poraryCourtcontinuestodebatethemeritsof“sovereignty”versus“fairness”injurisdiction—yet,insodoing,itappearstobemechani-callyrepeatingvocabularyfromthetraditionalnarrativeofConflictsofLaw,notoutliningprinciplesthatbearanylogicalconnectiontoitsjurisdictionaltests.

ThisstateofaffairsledWeinbergtodespairthat,ultimately,mod-ern jurisdictionaltestssimply lackanyfoundationindeeperprinci-ples.77 AsWeinberg concluded: “Soquite obviouslywenowhave abodyofruleswithoutreasons.”78Fortunately,however,thisconclu-siondoesnotnecessarilyfollow.TheCourtmaybemarkedbyanem-barrassinginabilitytoexplainthefoundationalprinciplesthatunder-lie itspost-InternationalShoe jurisdictional tests—yet thisdoesnotmeanthat,beneaththesemoderntests,nofoundationalprinciplesex-ist.BeneaththeCourt’srecentrhetoricof“sovereignty”and“fairness,”afterall,thereappearstobeanunderlyingconsensusthatessentialelementsof theminimumcontacts test shouldbe retained.And, asPartIIwillexplain,theCourtinInternationalShoedidplaceacoher-ent, enduring principle at the core of the minimum contacts test:namely,acommitmenttoaprotectivesovereigntythesis.

II.THESOVEREIGNTYREVOLUTIONININTERNATIONALSHOEThisPartwillarguethat,contrarytoconventionalwisdom,Inter-

nationalShoeactuallycreatedajurisdictionaltestanchoredinathe-oryofsovereignty.Thisraises thequestion:whatdoes itmean,ex-actly,tosaythatajurisdictionaltestisanchoredin“sovereignty”?ThisArticleassumesthat,inorderforatestarticulatedbytheCourttobeconsideredasovereignty-basedtest,twoelementsshouldbepresent.First,theCourt’sopinionshouldcontainaclaimaboutthenatureofsovereignstates.Ideally,thisclaimalsoisgroundedinanestablished,longstandingtheoryofsovereignty.Inthefollowingpages,thistypeofclaimwillbereferredtoasa“sovereigntythesis.”Second,theopinionshouldderiveajurisdictionaltestfromitssovereigntythesis.Ifboththeseelementsarepresent,thenitseemsreasonabletosaythataju-risdictionaltestisasovereignty-basedtest.

76. LouiseWeinberg,ThePlaceofTrialandtheLawApplied:OverhaulingConsti-tutionalTheory,59U.COLO.L.REV.67,101–02(1988). 77. Id.at102. 78. Id.


With this standard in mind, the following pages compare theCourt’sopinionsinPennoyerv.NeffandInternationalShoeCo.v.Wash-ington.AsSectionAexplains,thesetwoopinionsweresimilarinthattheyeach:(1)articulatedasovereigntythesis;and(2)derivedajuris-dictional test from that thesis. As SectionB then shows, the sover-eigntythesisfoundineachopinionhasanequallyimpressiveintellec-tualpedigree.Thedifferencebetweenthesetwoopinionsisnotfound,therefore,intheextenttowhichtheywereabout“sovereignty.”Ra-ther,thecrucialdifferenceisfoundinthefactthattheCourtusedadifferentsovereigntythesisineachcase—onebasedonterritorialex-clusivityinPennoyer,andonebasedonaprotectivemissioninInter-nationalShoe.

A. SOVEREIGNTYINPENNOYERANDINTERNATIONALSHOE

1. Pennoyerv.NeffInordertounderstandthecommonuseofsovereigntythesesin

PennoyerandInternationalShoe,firstconsidertheCourt’sreasoninginPennoyerv.Neff.InPennoyer,theCourtbeganitsjurisdictionalrea-soningwithadeclarationthat:“[E]veryStatepossessesexclusiveju-risdictionandsovereigntyoverpersonsandpropertywithinitsterri-tory.”79OncetheCourthadarticulatedthisideaabout“everystate,”itthenproceededtoderiveajurisdictionaltestfromit.Toaccomplishthis, theCourt reliedon twoassumptions.First, theCourtassumedthatitstheoryofthestatelogicallyentailedalimitationonsovereignpower.Beginningwithitsthesisthatsovereignspossessterritorialex-clusivity,inotherwords,theCourtthenassumed—basedonthisthe-sis—thatsovereignpowermustbeentirelycoterminouswiththesov-ereign’sdomainofterritorialexclusivity.80AstheCourtput it:“Theotherprincipleofpubliclaw...followsfromtheonementioned;thatis,thatnoStatecanexercisedirectjurisdictionandauthorityoverper-sonsorpropertywithoutitsterritory.”81Thesovereignpowerofeachstate,theCourtconcluded,mustterminateatthestate’sborders.82

Having made this assumption about the limits of sovereignpower, the Court then added a second assumption: namely, that

79. Pennoyerv.Neff,95U.S.714,722(1878). 80. Seeid.at720(“TheauthorityofeverytribunalisnecessarilyrestrictedbytheterritoriallimitsoftheStateinwhichitisestablished.”). 81. Id.at722. 82. SeePerdue,supranote62,at502(“Thebasicpremiseofthe[Pennoyer]opin-ionisthattherearelimitationsonstatepowerthataresimplyinherentinthenatureofgovernment.”).


jurisdictionisanexerciseofsovereignpower.TheCourtassumed,inotherwords,thatifsovereigntyislimitedbytheprincipleofterritorialexclusivity,thensoispersonaljurisdiction.83Consequently,theCourtconcluded with a jurisdictional rule: a state court’s jurisdictionalreachmustterminateatthestate’sborders.

WhenweexaminetheCourt’sreasoninginPennoyer,therefore,wefindthattheCourtpurportedtoderiveajurisdictionalruleviathefollowingthree-steplogic:(1)Astateisanentitythatpossessesexclusivepoweroveraterritory.(2)Astatethereforehaspoweronlywithinitsterritory.(3)Onesuchpoweristheabilitytoassertjurisdiction—soastatehas

jurisdictiononlywithinitsterritory.AttherootofthisPennoyertest,therefore,isadescriptiveclaim

aboutthesovereignstate(premise1above).Inthissense,theopinionwasanchoredinasovereigntythesis.Beginningwiththatthesis,theCourtthenpurportedtoreasonitswaytoajurisdictionalrule.Whilethe Court’s reasoning certainly can be faulted (and the leap frompremise1topremise2isparticularlystriking),itnonethelessseemsreasonabletosay,basedonthisprofessedreasoning,thattheCourtinPennoyerofferedatestrootedinsovereignty.

2. InternationalShoeCo.v.WashingtonNext, consider theCourt’s reasoning in International Shoe.84 In

thatcase, theCourtwoulddevelopanewtest forpersonal jurisdic-tion—onecommonlyreferredtoasthe“minimumcontacts”test. Inthecrucialpassageofitsopinion,theCourtoutlinedthelogicofthistest,saying:

[T]otheextentthatacorporationexercisestheprivilegeofconductingactivitieswithinastate,itenjoysthebenefitsandprotectionofthelawsofthatstate.Theexerciseofthatprivilegemaygiverisetoobligations,and,sofarasthoseobligationsariseoutoforareconnectedwiththeactivitieswithinthestate,aprocedurewhichrequires thecorporation torespondtoasuitbroughttoenforcethemcan,inmostinstances,hardlybesaidtobeundue.85

83. Here,theCourtmadeanunexplainedpivotfromanabstractdiscussionaboutsovereign“power”toaconcreteruleregardinghowfara“tribunalestablishedby[suchastate]canextenditsprocess.”Pennoyer,95U.S.at722. 84. Int’lShoeCo.v.Washington,326U.S.310(1945). 85. Idat319.


Inthispassage,theCourtarrivesatits“minimumcontacts”testthroughathree-steplogic.Here,theCourtbegins(logically,althoughnot grammatically) with the idea that a state is an entity which,throughitslaws,provides“benefitsandprotection”toacommunity.86TheCourtthenassumesthat,whenapartyreceivesthosebenefitsandprotections, the state is entitled to impose corresponding “obliga-tions.”87Finally,theCourtassumesthattherequirementto“respondtoasuit”isonesuchobligation.88Inthisway,theCourtarrivesatajurisdictional test.Underthattest, ifanentityhasreceivedbenefits

86. Id. 87. Here,theCourtsuggeststhatanentitydrawinguponstatebenefitsandpro-tections can be conceptualized as entering into a reciprocal relationship with thatstate.Accordingtothisformulation,in-stateactivitycreates“ties”thatmutuallybindthecorporationandthestatetoeachother.Id.at320.Thisnotionof“ties”wasamet-aphoricalexpressionofatheoryofreciprocitythattheCourtalreadyhadarticulatedinMillikenv.Meyer,311U.S.457,463(1940),whereintheCourthadsaidthat:“Thestatewhichaccords[an individual]privilegesandaffordsprotectiontohimandhispropertybyvirtueofhisdomicilemayalsoexactreciprocalduties.”TheCourtinMil-likenadded: “‘Enjoymentof theprivilegesof residencewithin the state, and theat-tendantright to invoketheprotectionof its laws,are inseparable’ fromthevariousincidencesofstatecitizenship.Theresponsibilitiesofthatcitizenshipariseoutoftherelationshiptothestatewhichdomicilecreates.”Id.at463–64(citationomitted).Foran argument that Justice Douglas drew this reciprocity-as-fairness rationale fromprecedentsinvolvingsubstantivetaxquestions,seeKorn,supranote75,at997.JusticeStonealsohadusedasimilarlogicincasesregardingconscientiousobjectors.ForastudyofthesimilaritiesthatthereciprocitylogicofInternationalShoebearsto“justdeserts”theoriesintheliteratureonretribution,seeKevinC.McMunigal,Desert,Util-ity,andMinimumContacts:TowardaMixedTheoryofPersonalJurisdiction,108YALEL.J.189(1998). 88. Int’lShoe,325U.S.at319.ThisinterpretstheCourtassayingthatpersonaljurisdictionwasreasonableandcomportedwith“traditionalnotionsoffairplayandsubstantialjustice”ifthatassertionofjurisdictionwasgroundedinareciprocalrela-tionshipofthesortthattheCourtdescribed.ForotherscholarswhosimilarlyinterpretInternationalShoeasassertingthatthefairnessor“reasonableness”ofjurisdictionwasdeterminedbythepresenceorabsenceofminimumcontacts(ratherthanbeingasep-aratecriterionthathadtobemet),see,forexample,LindaSilberman,ReflectionsonBurnhamv.SuperiorCourt:TowardPresumptiveRulesofJurisdictionandImplicationsforChoiceofLaw,22RUTGERSL.J.569,576–83(1991);RobertC.Casad,JurisdictioninCivilActionsat theEndof theTwentiethCentury:ForumConveniensandForumNonConveniens,7TUL.J.INT’L&COMPAR.L.91,107–08(1999).

Whileversionsofthephrase“traditionalnotionsoffairplayandsubstantialjus-tice”previouslyhadbeenusedinMilliken,311U.S.457(1940),andalsoinMcDonaldv.Mabee,243U.S.90(1917),theywereusedtoadifferentend:todiscusstherequire-mentthatadefendantreceiveadequatenotice.Foradiscussionoftheevolutionofthisphrase,seeMcFarland,supranote42.McFarlandusesthisevolutiontoargue,inpart,thatInternationalShoebelongsonthefairnesssideofthefairness/sovereigntybinary;hecontendsthatJusticeStone,whenusingthisphrase,hadinmindthetraditionsofequityjurisprudence,wherethemostbasicprincipleisfairnessinanindividualcase.Id.at760.


andprotectionfromastate’slaws,thenanassertionofpersonaljuris-dictionbythestatecan“hardlybesaidtobeundue”—auseof“undue”thatismeanttoalludetothenotionthatdueprocess,inthatinstance,isnotviolated.89

Whenwe examine the Court’s reasoning in International Shoe,therefore,wefindthattheCourtderivedajurisdictionalruleviathefollowinglogic:

(1)Thestateisanentitythat,throughitslaws,affordsbenefitsand

protectionstosomecommunity.(2)Whenapartyreceivesthosebenefitsandprotections,itisfairfor

thestatetoimposereciprocalobligations.(3)Onesuchreciprocalobligationistheburdento“respondtoasuit”

(i.e.,submittojurisdiction).Attherootofthisjurisdictionaltest,therefore,isaninitialprem-

ise—onethat,onceagain,offersadescriptiveclaimaboutthesover-eignstate(premise1above).Inthisway,theCourtbeganwithasov-ereignty thesis. (It would repeat this description elsewhere in theopinion,moreover, underscoring its significance.90) Beginningwiththispremise,theCourtreasoneditswaytoajurisdictionalrule.Inthissense,InternationalShoe—nolessthanPennoyer—wasanopinionan-choredinatheoryofsovereignty.

B. INTELLECTUALHISTORYOFTHESOVEREIGNTYTHESESINPENNOYERANDINTERNATIONALSHOE

ThesovereigntythesesfoundinPennoyerandInternationalShoealsobothdrewondeepintellectualtraditionsinthesovereigntyliter-ature.ThisSectionillustratesthispoint,showingtheconnectioneachcase’s sovereignty thesis bears to longstanding theories of sover-eignty.

89. Int’l Shoe,326U.S.at319.Thisphrasing is reminiscentof theCourt’s laterrhetoric in Brown v. Board of Education, 347U.S. 483, 495 (1954),where its pro-nouncementthat“separateeducationalfacilitiesareinherentlyunequal”wasmeanttoallude,inthenegative,totheFourteenthAmendmentconceptofequalprotection. 90. Int’lShoe,326U.S.at319.


1. Pennoyerv.NeffFirst,considerthesovereigntythesisfoundinPennoyer.Thatthe-

sis,itwillberecalled,providedthat:“[E]veryStatepossessesexclu-sivejurisdictionandsovereigntyoverpersonsandpropertywithinitsterritory.”91WhentheCourtofferedthisthesis,itplainlydrewuponalongintellectualtradition.Thereisalongstandingtheorythatassoci-atessovereigntywithtwotraits:territorialityandexclusivity.StephenKrasner,theinternationalrelationsscholar,hasdescribedthistradi-tionasonemarkedbyacommitmentto“aninstitutionalarrangementfororganizingpoliticallifethatisbasedontwoprinciples:territorial-ityandtheexclusionofexternalactorsfromdomesticauthoritystruc-tures.”92Underthistheory,“sovereignty”refersprimarilytothegov-ernment’s ability to retain amonopoly as the only legitimate stateactorwithinagiventerritory.93Earlythinkerswhoespousedthisthe-ory,suchasEmerdeVattelandChristianWolff,viewedthisterritorialmonopolyasacorerighttowhichstateswereentitled—arightakinto the natural rights that Enlightenment thinkers believed rational

91. Pennoyerv.Neff,95U.S.714,722(1878).FortheargumentthatthistheoryofsovereigntywasalreadybeingregularlyemployedinfederalcommonlawrelatingtotheFullFaithandCreditClausepriortoPennoyer,seeRogerH.Trangsrud,TheFed-eralCommonLawofPersonalJurisdiction,57GEO.WASH.L.REV.849,870–76(1989). 92. STEPHEND.KRASNER,SOVEREIGNTY:ORGANIZEDHYPOCRISY20(1999). 93. Overthepasttwodecades,itisworthnoting,federalismscholarshiphaspro-ductivelycastasidethisvisionofexclusivesovereignstodocumentthecomplexover-lapping institutionalarrangements thatdefinemoderngovernanceand jurisdiction,and toexamine thebenefitsanddownsidesof sucharrangements.See, e.g.,Gerken,supranote71(documentingstate-to-statelegalspilloversandtheirrelationshiptode-mocracyvalues);Gerken&Holtzblatt,supranote71(discussingtheaffirmativecaseforstate-to-statelegalspillovers);RobertB.Ahdieh,ForeignAffairs,InternationalLaw,andtheNewFederalism:LessonsfromCoordination,73MO.L.REV.1185,1245(2008)(documentinggovernmentaloverlapandcoordinationwhichillustratethat“thepara-digmofdual federalismembeddedwithin theWestphalianstate isno longerappo-site”);JudithResnik,ForeignasDomesticAffairs:RethinkingHorizontalFederalismandForeignAffairsPreemptioninLightofTranslocalInternationalism,57EMORYL.J.31,33(2007)(documenting“translocal”arrangementsthatdefy“exclusivesovereigntism”models);PaulSchiffBerman,GlobalLegalPluralism,80S.CAL.L.REV.1155(2007)(dis-cussingthecomplexitiesoflawinaworldwhereasingleactoractorissubjecttomul-tiplelegalorquasi-legalregimes);RobertB.Ahdieh,FromFederalismtoIntersystemicGovernance:TheChangingNatureofModernJurisdiction,57EMORYL.J.1(2007)(ex-ploringtheevolvingnatureofmodernjurisdiction);seealsoRobertM.Cover,TheUsesofJurisdictionalRedundancy:Interest,Ideology,andInnovation,22WM.&MARYL.REV.639(1981)(discussing“jurisdictionalredundancy”);RobertM.Cover&T.AlexanderAleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035(1977) (discussing the overlapping constitutional requirements between state andfederalcourtsincriminalcases).


individualstopossess.94Modern-dayadherentstothistraditionhavetendedtoleavethisnaturalrightsheritagebehind,buttheyhavecon-tinuedtoassert thatself-determinationandautonomyfor territori-ally-definedcommunitiesarefundamentalvaluesthatareworthpur-suing.95 Surveying this tradition, Krasner concludes: “The rule[requiredbythistheory] istheexclusionofexternalactors ... fromtheterritoryofastate.”96

Thisdefinitionofthesovereignstate—referredtointhefollow-ingpagesasthe“Westphaliansovereigntythesis”—alsohasalonghis-toryinAmericanthought.AsGaryBornhasobserved,ThomasJeffer-sonemployeditinhiscorrespondences,97andChiefJusticeMarshallinvokeditinearlyopinionssuchasSchoonerExchangev.McFaddon.98AndthetheorywouldgainuniqueforceinthefieldofConflictsofLaw

94. SeeEMMERICHDEVATTEL,THELAWOFNATIONS;ORTHEPRINCIPLESOFTHELAWOFNATURE,APPLIEDTOTHECONDUCTANDAFFAIRSOFNATIONSANDSOVEREIGNS137(JosephChittyed.,P.HNicklin&T.Johnson1835)(1758)(“But,thoughanationbeobligedtopromote,asfarasliesinitspower,theperfectionofothers,itisnotentitledforciblytoobtrudethesegoodofficesonthem.Suchanattemptwouldbeaviolationoftheirnat-uralliberty.Inordertocompelanyonetoreceiveakindness,wemusthaveanauthor-ityoverhim;butnationsareabsolutelyfreeandindependent(Prelim.§4).”);ANNVANWYNENTHOMAS&A.J.THOMAS, JR.,NON INTERVENTION:THELAWAND ITS IMPORT INTHEAMERICAS5(1956)(“Tointerfereinthegovernmentofanother,inwhateverwayin-deedthatmaybedoneisopposedtothenaturallibertyofnations,byvirtueofwhichoneisaltogetherindependentofthewillofothernationsinitsaction.”(quotingCHRIS-TIANWOLFF, JUSGENTIUMMETHODOSCIENTIFICAPERTRACTATUMch. 1§256 (1764 ed.)(1934));seealsoKRASNER,supranote92,at14(“Vattelreasonedfromthelogicofthestateofnature.Ifmenwereequalinthestateofnature,thenstateswerealsofreeandequalandlivinginastateofnature.ForVattelasmallrepublicwasnolessasovereignstatethanwasapowerfulkingdom.”).

ForKrasner,thistraditiondatesbacktothewritingsofVattel—notnecessarilytothePeaceofWestphaliaitself,eventhoughthistheoryofsovereigntyiscommonlyas-sociatedwith thePeace ofWestphalia.SeeKRASNER, supranote92, at 20–21 (“ThenormofnoninterventionininternalaffairshadvirtuallynothingtodowiththePeaceofWestphalia,whichwassignedin1648.Itwasnotclearlyarticulateduntiltheendoftheeighteenthcentury....Vattelarguedthatnostatehadtherighttointerveneintheinternalaffairsofotherstates.”). 95. See,e.g.,U.N.CHARTERart.2,¶4(“AllMembersshallrefrainintheirinterna-tionalrelationsfromthethreatoruseofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpolit-icalindependenceofanystate....”). 96. KRASNER,supranote92,at4. 97. Letter fromMr. Jefferson toMr.Morris (Aug.16,1793), inAMERICANSTATEPAPERS167,169(WalterLowrie&MatthewSt.ClaireClarkeeds.,1833),asquotedinGaryB.Born,AReappraisaloftheExtraterritorialReachofU.S.Law,24LAW&POL’YINT’LBUS.1,11(1992)(“Everynationhas,ofnaturalright,entirelyandexclusively,allthejurisdictionwhichmayberightfullyexercisedintheterritoryitoccupies.”). 98. SchoonerExch.v.McFaddon,11U.S.(7Cranch)116,136(1812)(assertingthat,withinagiventerritory,sovereignpowerwas“necessarilyexclusiveandabso-lute”).


withthepublicationofJosephStory’sinfluentialCommentariesontheConflictofLawsin1834.99BorrowingfromEuropeantheoristssuchasUlrichHuber,StorytooktheWestphaliantheoryofsovereigntyandtransformeditintoacenterpieceofhistheoryofConflictsofLaw.100DuepartlytotheenormousinfluenceofStory’streatise,thistheorywoulddominatethefieldofConflictsofLawinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies.101

ThistheoryofsovereigntyclearlyshapedtheCourt’sopinioninPennoyer. JusticeFieldfamouslycitedJosephStory’streatisefortheideabehindtheopinion’ssovereigntythesis—anexplicitacknowledg-ment that the Court was drawing upon the intellectual history ofWestphaliansovereignty.102AsKalRaustialahasobserved:“OneneedonlyreadJusticeStephenJohnsonField’sopinioninPennoyerv.NefftoseetheconnectionbetweenWestphalianterritorialsovereigntyasunderstoodininternationallawandtheprevailingjurisdictionalprin-ciplesofnineteenth-centuryAmericanlaw.”103

2. InternationalShoeCo.v.WashingtonForcenturies,analternatetheoryofsovereigntyhascompeted

withtheWestphaliansovereigntythesisinvokedinPennoyer.Accord-ingtothiscompetingtheory, thesovereignstate isanentity that istaskedwithaspecificmission:itmustprotectacommunity.Itspow-ers,ratherthanbeingaxiomatic,growoutofthiscoremission.InthisArticle,thisideaisreferredtoasthe“protectivesovereigntythesis.”

Asthefollowingpagesillustrate,thisprotectivesovereigntythe-sisenjoysanintellectualpedigreenolessimpressivethanthatofitsWestphaliancounterpart.Tothisend,Subsection(a)brieflytracesthe

99. STORY,supranote2. 100. See,e.g.,WATSON,supranote3,at1–27(detailingHuber’sinfluenceonStory);JamesWeinstein,TheDutchInfluenceontheConceptionofJudicialJurisdictionin19thCenturyAmerica,38AM.J.COMPAR.L.73(1990);Childress,supranote3(explainingthatStory“adopt[ed]Huber’sconflictsdoctrine”andnotingthat“Huber’stheorywasbased...onstatesovereignty”).AsHaroldKornhasnoted,HuberactuallyadvancedatheoryofpersonaljurisdictionthatwasmoreflexiblethanthatfoundinStory’streatise(andlaterimportedintoPennoyer);StoryhadaddedthisrigidapplicationofHuber’sprinciplestotheareaofpersonaljurisdiction,withhisonlycitationinsupportofthisapplicationcomingfromadistrictcourtopinionthatStoryhimselfhadauthored.SeeKorn,supranote75,at977–82. 101. See,e.g.,MathiasReimann,ANewRestatement—FortheInternationalAge,75IND.L.J.575,577(2000)(describingStory’streatiseas“thefoundationoftheconflictsdisciplineinthiscountry”);Childress,supranote3,at23(describingStory’stheoryas“seminal”). 102. Pennoyerv.Neff,95U.S.714,722–23(1878). 103. Raustiala,supranote2,at2509.


appearanceofthisprotectivesovereigntythesisinthefollowingintel-lectualmovements:(i)Enlightenment-erasocialcontracttheory;(ii)nineteenth-centurynationalist theory inEurope;and(iii) legalpro-cess theory.Then,Subsection (b)documents the resurgenceof thisprotectivesovereigntythesisintheNewDeal,therebyhighlightingitssalience at themomentwhen the Courtwas deciding InternationalShoe.

a. ThesisinSovereigntyScholarship

i. SocialContractTheoristsIn order todevelop a theoryof the sovereign state, Enlighten-

ment-erasocialcontracttheoristsregularlyengagedinathoughtex-perimentthatimaginedbacktoa“stateofnature”—i.e.,toatimepe-riodthatprecededtheexistenceofsovereignstates.104Throughthisthought experiment, social contract theorists posed the question:whatincentivesmightinduceindividualslivinginastateofnaturetocreate—and thensubmit themselves to—asovereignentity?105Theanswer, these theorists typically suggested,was that the sovereignmustoffertoperformsomeprotectivefunctionforthecommunity.106It was only through the offering of some such protections, it wasthought,thatrationalindividualswouldbeinducedtowillinglysacri-ficetheirliberty.AsHobbesputit,thefactorthatleadsindividualstoaccept“theintroductionofthatrestraint[ofsovereignty]uponthem-selves...istheforesightoftheirownpreservation.”107Putdifferently,thesovereignstatemustoffertoprovideprotectionandpreservationtoindividuals;otherwise,itcannotjustifyitsownexistence.

AsimilarlineofthoughtcanbefoundinRousseau’swritings.108However,theideamayhavebeenmostarticulatelyexpressedbyJohnLocke,whowroteinhisTwoTreatisesofGovernmentthat:

104. SeeJOHNLOCKE,TWOTREATISESOFGOVERNMENT189(1821). 105. See, e.g., THOMASHOBBES,LEVIATHAN, OR, THEMATTER,FORM, ANDPOWEROFACOMMON-WEALTHECCLESIASTICALANDCIVIL87(A.R.Wallered.,1904)(1651)(reflectingonwhatwouldinduceanindividual“tolaydownthisrighttoallthings;andbecon-tentedwithsomuchlibertyagainstothermen,ashewouldallowothermenagainsthimselfe”);LOCKE,supranote104,at189(“Tounderstandpoliticalpowerright,andderiveitfromitsoriginal,wemustconsider,whatstateallmenarenaturallyin....”);JEAN-JACQUESROUSSEAU,THESOCIALCONTRACT5(ErnestRhysed.1920)(1762)(“Manisbornfree;andeverywhereheisinchains....Whatcanmake[thischange]legitimate?ThatquestionIthinkIcananswer.”). 106. Seeinfranotes107–09andaccompanyingtext. 107. HOBBES,supranote105,at115. 108. SeeROUSSEAU,supranote105,at14(“Isupposementohavereachedthepointatwhichtheobstaclesinthewayoftheirpreservationinthestateofnatureshowtheir


Ifmaninthestateofnaturebesofree...whywillhepartwithhisfree-dom?...Towhichitisobvioustoanswer,thatthoughinthestateofnaturehehathsucharight,yet...theenjoymentofthepropertyhehasinthisstateisveryunsafe,veryunsecure.Thismakeshimwilling to ... join insocietywithothers,whoarealreadyunited,orhaveamindtounite,forthemutualpreservationoftheirlives,libertiesandestates,whichIcallbythegeneralname,property.109Through this “state of nature” thought experiment, social con-

tract theorists concluded that theessentialqualityof the sovereignstate—thequalitythatbringsit intoexistence—isitspromisetoaf-fordprotectionstoavulnerablecommunity.

ThissocialcontracttheoryfamouslywouldbeincorporatedintoAmericanpoliticalcultureviatheDeclarationofIndependence.There,theFoundersembracedtheprotectivesovereigntythesisofLockeandothers,and theyarguedthat italso impliedan importantcorollary:namely,thatapoliticalcommunityalwaysretainstheright“toalterortoabolish”itssovereigngovernmentwhensuchgovernmentceasestoprotecttheirsafetyandhappiness.110 Inthissense, theFoundersviewed a sovereign’s right to continued existence to be dependentuponitsability,anditswillingness,toaffordbasicprotectionstoasov-ereigncommunity.111AsthehistorianMarkHulliungputit:

powerofresistancetobegreaterthantheresourcesatthedisposalofeachindividualforhismaintenanceinthatstate.Thatprimitiveconditioncansubsistnolonger....”). 109. LOCKE,supranote105104,at294–96(emphasisomitted). 110. TheDeclarationstates:

Weholdthesetruthstobeself-evident,thatallmenarecreatedequal,thatthey are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, thatamongtheseareLife,LibertyandthepursuitofHappiness.—Thattosecuretheserights,GovernmentsareinstitutedamongMen,derivingtheirjustpow-ersfromtheconsentofthegoverned,—ThatwheneveranyFormofGovern-mentbecomesdestructiveoftheseends,itistheRightofthePeopletoalteror toabolish it,and to institutenewGovernment, laying its foundationonsuchprinciplesandorganizingitspowersinsuchform,astothemshallseemmostlikelytoeffecttheirSafetyandHappiness.

THEDECLARATIONOFINDEPENDENCEpara.2(U.S.1776). 111. ThisideaalsoappearedintheMassachusettsconstitutiondraftedbyJohnAd-ams(andstillinforcetoday),whichprovidedinthepreamblethat:

Theendoftheinstitution,maintenance,andadministrationofgovernmentistosecuretheexistenceof thebody-politic, toprotect it;andto furnishtheindividualswhocomposeitwiththepowerofenjoying,insafetyandtran-quility,theirnaturalrightsandtheblessingsoflife;andwheneverthesegreatobjectsarenotobtained,thepeoplehavearighttoalterthegovernment....

SeeDAVIDMCCULLOUGH,JOHNADAMS221(2001).Adamsalsoconnectedthisideaofpro-tective government to an ideaof reciprocal obligations, providing inArticleX that:“Eachindividualofthesocietyhasarighttobeprotectedbyitintheenjoymentofhislife,libertyandproperty,accordingtostandinglaws.Heisobliged,consequently,tocontributehisshare to theexpenseof thisprotection ....”MASS.CONST. art.X.Ona


Thepreambleof theDeclarationof Independence ... enshrined a full-blownversionofLocke’stheory.Ratherthantakinggovernmentforgranted,ashadtheEnglishin1689,Jefferson’stextsawitassomethingwilledintobeingbythesovereignpeopletoprotecttheirinalienablenaturalrights.Intheeventthatthegovernmentfailstodischargeitsduty,thepeople...mayremovetheirrulersandchangethepoliticalsystem.Whatthepeoplegiveth,theymay taketh away. The contract is ongoing, not signed once and for-ever.112

ii. Nineteenth-CenturyNationalistsTheprotectivesovereigntythesisalsoappearedinanintellectual

movement in private international law that spread across Italy,France,andBelgium(and,toalesserextent,GermanyandSpain)inthenineteenthcentury.113Referringtotheparticipantsofthismove-ment as the supporters of a “doctrine of nationality,” Joseph Bealegave insight into theprominenceof these scholars inhis landmarkwork,ATreatiseontheConflictofLaws.114There,hepresentedthesescholarsasofferingoneoftwo“modernsystemsofthought”thatri-valedhisownvestedrightssystem.115

Oneof thesenationalist theorists,FraçoisLaurent,usefullyde-scribedthedifferencebetweentheprotectivesovereigntythesisandtheWestphaliansovereigntythesis.AsLaurentputit:

The realists [who adopt a Westphalian theory] think that sovereignpowershouldembraceallpersonsandthingswhicharewithintheterritoryorwhichmakeupthecountry.That is the feudalsystemwhichconfoundssovereigntywithproperty.TheItalianpublicistssay,asIdo,thatsovereigntyisamissionratherthanapower.Ithasforitsobjectthedefenseandpreserva-tionofsocietyanditshouldbeinvestedwithsuchpowersaswouldpermitittofulfillitsmission.116AsLaurentobservesinthispassage,theWestphaliansovereignty

thesispresentsthesovereignstateasanentitythat—bydefinition—has a certain type of power (viz., exclusive power over a fixed

similarideaofreciprocityinInternationalShoe,seesupranotes89–90andaccompa-nyingtext.SeealsoTHEFEDERALISTNO.43(JamesMadison)(“Thefirstquestionisan-sweredatoncebyrecurringtotheabsolutenecessityofthecase;tothegreatprincipleofself-preservation;tothetranscendentlawofnatureandofnature’sGod,whichde-claresthatthesafetyandhappinessofsocietyaretheobjectsatwhichallpoliticalin-stitutionsaim,andtowhichallsuchinstitutionsmustbesacrificed.”). 112. MARKHULLIUNG,THESOCIALCONTRACTINAMERICA:FROMTHEREVOLUTIONTOTHEPRESENTAGE145(2007). 113. See1JOSEPHHENRYBEALE,ATREATISEONTHECONFLICTOFLAWSORPRIVATEIN-TERNATIONALLAW71(1916). 114. Id.at62. 115. Id. 116. FRANÇOISLAURENT,DIRITTOCIVILEINTERNAZIONALE632–36(1885)(It.),quotedinBEALE,supranote113,at71–72(emphasisadded).


territory).Bycontrast,Laurentandothersviewedthesovereignstateasanentitytaskedwithacertainmission:namely,topreserveorpro-tectaparticularsociety.117ForLaurent,therefore,coercivepowerwasnotanaxiomatictraitofthesovereignstate.118Rather,itwasthelog-icaloutgrowthofthesovereign’sfoundationalmission.119Sovereignpower,inotherwords,existsinordertoaccomplishaprotectivemis-sion—andshouldreachonlyso faras isneeded toaccomplish thatmission.

For these nineteenth-century scholars, the protective sover-eigntythesisalsogeneratedacorrespondingviewofthelaw.Inthewordsofonesuchtheorist,AndréWeiss,thelawwassimply“thefor-mulated expression” of sovereignty.120 Since these scholars viewedsovereignsasprotectorsofasovereigncommunity,andalsoviewedthe lawasamechanismbywhichsovereignsrealize theiressentialcharacter,theyinevitablyviewedthelawasprotectiveincharacter.Weiss,forexample,arguedthatthe“truefunction”ofthelawwasto“protect the citizen” and “to provide for the interests of those forwhomitismade,thatis,fortheinterestsofcitizensofthestatewhichhasgivenitforce.”121Weissadded:“Whenalawdealswithaprivateinterest,italwayshastheobjectofutilitytotheperson.”122AntoinePilletsimilarlypositedthat:“Onecannotdenythattheessentialfea-tureoflawisitssocialobject,”andheexplainedthatakeysocialobjectwas“toprotecttheprivateinterestsofindividuals,[inorderto]placetheindividualinthepositionmostfavorableforhisdevelopmentandpreservation.”123Summarizingthisview,Bealeobservedthat,intheworkofthesenationalistscholars,therewasaconsistentemphasisonthefactthata“sovereign...wishestothrow...theprotectionofhispersonallaw”aroundthesubjectsofthatsovereignstate.124Forthesetheorists,aprotectivevisionofthelawemergeddirectlyfromanun-derlying theory about the sovereign state. The law was a vehicle

117. Seeid. 118. Seeid. 119. Seeid. 120. ANDRÉWEISS,TRAITÉTHÉORIQUE ETPRATIQUE DEDROIT INTERNATIONALPRIVÉ(1892)(Fr.),quotedinBEALE,supranote113,at68. 121. WEISS, supranote 120, quoted inBEALE, supra note 113, at 68.Weiss alsothinksthroughhowthesegoalscollidewiththeterritorialgoalsofstates. 122. WEISS,supranote120,quotedinBEALE,supranote113,at70. 123. ANTOINEPILLET,PRINCIPESDEDROITINTERNATIONALPRIVÉ(1903)(Fr.),quotedinBEALE,supranote113,at82–83. 124. BEALE,supranote113,at67.Inofferingthisdescription,Bealealsowasnotingthatthesenationalistthinkerscanbeviewedasacontinuationofearlierstatutistthe-orists.


throughwhichthesovereignexpressedandrealizeditsessentialchar-acter—andthatcharacterwasmoldedbyamissiontoprotectapar-ticularcommunity.

Thisnationalist school, it shouldbenoted,paired its theoryofsovereigntywithaparticular(andparticularlytroubling)definitionofthesovereigncommunity.For thesenationalist thinkers, the sover-eign communitywas anaturally forming collectivity—one thathadbeenshapedintoaunifiedculturebyitsgeography, itshistory,andperhapsevenitsracialorethnicunderpinnings.125InthevocabularyoflegalscholarRichardT.Ford,thesethinkerspositedtheexistenceofan“organicjurisdiction”forthestate;theysuggestedthatthesov-ereigncommunitycouldbeviewedas“thenaturaloutgrowthofcir-cumstances, conditions and principles that, morally, preexist thestate.”126Elaborating,Fordnotesthat:“Theideologicalfoundationofnation-states isprimarilythatoforganicism;nationsarethoughttorepresent‘apeople’whoarebothdistinctiveandrelativelyhomoge-neous.”127Thenineteenth-centurynationalistsmadeuseofthisanti-quated ideological foundation.Tothesetheorists, thenationalcom-munitywasnotmerelyacollectionofrationalindividuals;itwasanorganic,quasi-racialentity.128Itwasaverydifferentvisionofthesov-ereigncommunitythanthatwhichsocialcontracttheoristshadem-braced—afactwhichillustratesthediversityofthoughtthathasex-isted among those who share a commitment to the protectivesovereigntythesis.

Thesenationalisttheoriststhereforedifferedfromthesocialcon-tracttheoristsinimportantways,includingintheirdefinitionofthe

125. SeeLAURENT,supranote116,at632–36,quotedinBEALE,supranote113,at71–72(“[Nationallaws]domorethansticktoourbones,theycirculateinourveinswithourblood,forwereceiveournationalitywiththebloodwhichourparentstrans-mittous....”);P.S.Mancini,DeL’utilitédeRendreObligatoirespourTouslesEtats,SouslaFormed’unoudePlusieursTraitesInternationaux,UnCertainNombredeRèglesGé-néralesduDroitInternationalPrivepourAssurerlaDécisionUniformedesConflitsEntrelesDifférentesLégislationsCivilesetCriminelles,1J.DUDROITINT’LPRIVÉ221 (1874)(Fr.),quotedinBEALE,supranote113,at69–70(“Climate,temperature,geographicalsituation,whethermountainousormaritime,thenatureandfertilityofthesoil,differ-enceofneedsandofcustoms,determinewitheverypeople,almostwithoutexception,theirlegalsystem.Theydetermineinagreaterorlessdegreetheprecocityofphysicalandmoraldevelopment,[and]theorganizationoffamilyrelations....Fortheserea-sonsthestatusandcapacityofpersonsintheprivatelawofthedifferentnationsmustdifferinaccordancewiththisdifferenceinconditions.”). 126. RichardT.Ford,Law’sTerritory(AHistoryofJurisdiction),97MICH.L.REV.843,859(1999). 127. Id. 128. Id.at872.


sovereigncommunity.Theyagreedwithsocialcontracttheory,how-ever,onthebasicqualitythatmarksthestateasasovereign:itsfoun-dationalmissiontoprotectacommunity.129

iii. LegalProcessTheoryAsSubsection(b)willexplainbelow,theNewDealusheredina

resurgenceoftheprotectivesovereigntythesisintheUnitedStates,inbothpolitical rhetoric andconstitutionaldoctrine.Beforeexploringthatresurgenceindetail,however,itisworthnotingavariantoftheprotectivesovereigntythesisadoptedbyaschoolofthoughtoftenas-sociatedwiththeNewDeal: legalprocesstheory.130Thisschooldif-feredwithbothsocialcontracttheoryandthenineteenth-centuryna-tionalistsinitsdefinitionofthesovereigncommunity—yetitsharedtheirbasiccommitmenttotheprotectivesovereigntythesis.

This scholarly movement is perhaps best encapsulated in theworkofHenryHartandAlbertSacks.Intheirdefiningwork,TheLegalProcess,131HartandSacksoutlinedaconceptofthesovereigncommu-nitythatdistilledanideaincirculationintheacademythroughouttheNew Deal.132 This definition of the sovereign community, whilegroundedinahumanistviewof the individual,nonethelessempha-sizedpeople’sfundamentalinterdependenceinwaysthatsocialcon-tracttheorydidnot.133AccordingtoHartandSacks,a“communityofinterest” naturally grows out of people’s unavoidable

129. Seesupranotes104–05andaccompanyingtext. 130. OntheassociationoflegalprocesstheorywiththeNewDeal,seeWilliamN.Eskridge,Jr.&PhilipP.Frickey,TheMakingoftheLegalProcess,107HARV.L.REV.2031,2042(1994)statingthat,“TheHartandSacksmaterialspositatheoryofsocietyin-spiredbytheNewDeal....“. 131. SeeHenryHart,Jr.&AlbertSacks,TheLegalProcess:BasicProblemsintheMaking and Application of Law (1958) (unpublishedmanuscript), inTHECANONOFAMERICANLEGALTHOUGHT243,255(DavidKennedy&WilliamW.Fishereds.,1958). 132. TheLegalProcesswouldnotappearinprintuntilaftertheCourt’sdecisioninInternational Shoe.Nonetheless, contemporary scholarshaveviewed thatworknotonly as representativeof thematerial thatHart hadbeen teaching atHarvardLawSchoolsincethelate1930s,butmorebroadlyastheculminationofprevailingtrendsinAmericanlegalthoughtinthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury.See,e.g.,Eskridge&Frickey,supranote130,at2034(“[I]twasHenryHartwhocompletedtheprojectofsynthesizingthethreepre-WorldWarIIconcepts intoasystematicwayofteachingandthinkingaboutlegislation(specifically)andpubliclaw(moregenerally).”). 133. SeeHart&Sacks,supranote131,at255(“Hereentersthemostfundamentalof theconditionsofhumansociety. In thesatisfactionofall theirwants,peoplearecontinuouslyandinescapablydependentupononeanother.”);seealsoCASEMATERIALSONLEGISLATION599(WilliamEskridge,Jr.etal.eds.,1995)(“HartandSackspositedaNewDeal-inspiredtheoryofsocietydifferentfromtraditionalliberal(socialcontract)theory.”).


interdependence.134Thiscausesasovereigncommunitytotakeshape,as “people form themselves into groups for the protection and ad-vancementoftheircommoninterests.”135

Thesovereignstate,HartandSacksadded,isthevehiclebywhichthissovereigncommunityrealizesitsdesireforthesecommonpro-tections.Thesovereignstate’spurpose,inotherwords,istoprovidethecommunitywith the “protectionandadvancementof [its] com-moninterests.”136Elaborating,theyexplained:

Thechallenge[ofprotectingthecommunity’scommoninterests]isonlypartlymetbythemanykindsofspecialgroupswhichpeopleform—suchasthefamilyinsimplesocieties,orclubs,churches,laborunions,businessas-sociations,andthelikeincomplexsocieties.Thereis,inaddition,aninvaria-blyfeltneedforanoverriding,generalpurposegrouptoprotectandfurthertheoverriding,basic interestswhichthemembersofacommunityhaveincommonandwhichmustbeprotectedandfurtherediftheyaretosurviveandtoprosperandiftheirvariousspecial-purposegroupsaretobeabletoexistandtofunction.137Thesovereignstate,HartandSacksposited,istheinstitutionthat

individualscreateinordertoanswerthisneed.138Aswiththenine-teenth-centurynationalists,moreover,thisviewofthesovereignstatealsoledtheseauthorstoaprotectivevisionofthelaw.AsHartandSacksputit:“Law...isadoingofsomething,apurposiveactivity,acontinuousstrivingtosolvethebasicproblemsofsocialliving.”139

HartandSacksthereforebrokewithbothsocialcontracttheoryandthenineteenth-centurynationalistsintheirdefinitionofthesov-ereigncommunity.Yettheyretainedtheideathatsovereignsareen-titiesthat,bydefinition,mobilizealawmakingapparatusinordertoaffordprotectionstoaparticularcommunity.

b. ThesisintheNewDealTheprotectivesovereigntythesis(anditscorrespondinglypro-

tectivevisionofthelaw)alsohaveappearedrepeatedlyinAmericanconstitutionaldiscourse.OneexamplefromtheFoundingera,theDec-larationofIndependence,alreadywasdiscussedabove.140Anotherex-ampleisfoundintheFourteenthAmendment,wheretheEqualPro-tectionClauseprovides that: “NoState shall ... deny toanyperson

134. Hart&Sacks,supranote131,at256. 135. Id. 136. Id. 137. Id. 138. Id. 139. DavidKennedy,IntroductiontoTHECANONOFAMERICANLEGALTHOUGHT,supranote131,at245. 140. Seesupranotes110–12andaccompanyingtext.


withinitsjurisdictiontheequalprotectionofthelaws.”141Here,statelawsarenotpresentedsimplyascoercive impositions; rather, theyareviewedas fundamentallyprotective innature.142EarlydraftsoftheClausetiedthislegalvisiondirectlytotheprotectivesovereigntythesisfoundintheDeclarationofIndependence,cross-referencingthetriumvirateof rights that,whenadequatelyprotected,were said tojustifytheongoingpowerofsovereigngovernment.143SenatorJacobHowardechoed thisprotectivevisionwhenhe introduced the finalversionoftheAmendment,asheobservedthat:“Itprotectstheblackmaninhisfundamentalrightsasacitizenwiththesameshieldwhichitthrowsoverthewhiteman.”144Thisvisionofthelaw,wherethele-galregimeispresentedasa“shield”designedtoaffordprotection,an-ticipatedthelanguageofnineteenth-centurynationalistssuchasAn-toinePillet,whowouldremarkthat:“Allprotectionisarmor,whichdoesnotfulfillitsofficeunlessitiswithoutflaw.”145Despiteholdingvery different visions of the sovereign community, these thinkerssharedaprotectivevisionofthelaw—onethatappearsrooted,ineachinstance,inaprotectivesovereigntythesis.

TheprotectivesovereigntythesiswouldgainparticularforceinAmerica,moreover—in both political rhetoric and legal doctrine—during the NewDeal. Time and again, Rooseveltwould invoke thelogicof social contract theory—including itsprotective sovereigntythesis—inordertojustifytheNewDealagenda.146Toaccomplishthis,RooseveltrepeatedlysuggestedthatthemodernAmericaneconomycreated,ineffect,anewstateofnature.147Heregularlyofferedade-pictionofthenationaleconomyinwhichtheideaofaninherentlybe-nevolentmarketplacecollapsed to revealaverydifferenteconomicreality—onedominatedbychaos,withselfisheconomicactorswhowereworkingtonogreaterend.148 In theabsenceofabelief in theinherent benevolence of economic forces, Roosevelt explained, theeconomyappeareddominatedsimplyby“thelonewolf,theunethical

141. U.S.CONST.amend.XIV,§1. 142. Inafuturearticle,IwillexaminemoredeeplytheinteractionoftheEqualPro-tectionClausewithConflictofLaws. 143. The first draft of theAmendment provided that: “The Congress shall havepowertomakealllawswhichshallbenecessaryandpropertosecure...toallpersonsintheseveralStatesequalprotectionintherightsoflife,liberty,andproperty.”CONG.GLOBE,39thCong.,1stSess.1033–34(1866). 144. Id.at2766. 145. PILLET,supranote123,quotedinBEALE,supranote113,at84. 146. Seeinfranotes149–55andaccompanyingtext. 147. Seeinfranotes149–55andaccompanyingtext. 148. Seeinfranotes149–55andaccompanyingtext.


competitor,therecklesspromoter,theIshmaelorInsullwhosehandisagainsteveryman’s,[who]declinestojoininachievinganendrec-ognizedasbeingforthepublicwelfare,andthreatenstodrag[indus-try]backtoastateofanarchy.”149AccordingtoRoosevelt,theGreatDepressionhadshownmoderneconomicforcestobechaotic,unco-ordinated,andamoral—forcesakintothosefoundinthestateofna-tureimaginedbythesocialcontracttheorists.

149. FranklinD.Roosevelt,AddressBeforetheCommonwealthClubofSanFran-cisco(Sept.23,1932)[hereinafterCommonwealthClubAddress],inFRANKLINDELANOROOSEVELT:GREATSPEECHES26(JohnGraftoned.,1999)[hereinafterSPEECHES];seealsoid.at21(describingthecollapseof“thedreamofaneconomicmachine”);id.at22–23(assertingthat“ourindustrialcombinationshadbecomegreatuncontrolledandirre-sponsibleunitsofpowerwithin thestate”markedby “irresponsibilityandgreed”);FranklinD.Roosevelt,FirstInauguralAddress(Mar.4,1933)[hereinafterFirstInau-gural],inSPEECHES,supra,at28,30(assertingthattheseeconomicactors“knowonlytherulesofagenerationofself-seekers,”appearedmerelytobeengagedin“themadchaseofevanescentprofits,”andseemed“[unableto]applysocialvaluesmorenoblethanmeremonetaryprofit”);FranklinD.Roosevelt,AssessingtheNewDealandMa-nipulating the Currency (Oct. 22, 1933), inFDR’SFIRESIDECHATS115–16 (RusselD.Buhite&DavidW.Levyeds.,1992)[hereinafterCHATS](evokingthe“CleansingoftheTemple,”aGospelepisodeinwhichJesusexpelsthemoney-changersfromthetemple,to emphasize the unregulated American scene of economic actors who possessed“someselfishinterest,someprivateaxetogrind”anddeclaringthatthegovernmentwas“constructingtheedificeofrecovery—thetemplewhich,whencompleted,willnolongerbeatempleofmoney-changersorofbeggars,butratheratemplededicatedtoandmaintainedforagreatersocialjustice,agreaterwelfareforAmerica—thehabita-tionofasoundeconomiclife”);FirstInaugural,supra,at66(“Practicesoftheunscru-pulousmoneychangersstandindictedinthecourtofpublicopinion,rejectedbytheheartsandmindsofmen....Themoneychangershavefledfromtheirhighseatsinthetempleofourcivilization.Wemaynowrestorethattempletotheancienttruths.Themeasureoftherestorationliesintheextenttowhichweapplysocialvaluesmoreno-blethanmeremonetaryprofit.”);FranklinD.Roosevelt,AnsweringtheCritics(June28,1934)[hereinafterCriticsSpeech],inCHATS,supra,at47(describingthemoderneconomyas“characterizedbyamadchaseforunearnedrichesandanunwillingnessofleadersinalmosteverywalkoflifetolookbeyondtheirownschemesandspecula-tions”);FranklinD.Roosevelt,GovernmentandModernCapitalism(Sept.30,1934)[hereinafterGovernmentSpeech],inCHATS,supra,at54(referringto“theoldchaos”ofthelaissez-faireeconomy);FranklinD.Roosevelt,DefendingtheWPAandPressingforSocialSecurity(Apr.28,1935)[hereinafterDefendingWPASpeech],inCHATS,su-pra,at65(depictinganeconomicworldasoneinwhich“individualself-interestandgroupselfishnesswereparamountinpublicthinking”);id.(describingaworldpopu-latedbyindividualsandinstitutionsincapableof“consideringthewholeratherthanamerepartrelatingtoonesectionortoonecrop,ortooneindustry,ortooneindividualprivate occupation”); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Praising the First Hundred Days andBoostingtheNRA(July24,1933)[hereinafterHundredDaysSpeech],inCHATS,supra,at28,33(“[W]ithoutunitedactionafewselfishmenineachcompetitivegroupwillpaystarvationwagesandinsistonlonghoursofwork.Othersinthatgroupmusteitherfollowsuitorcloseupshop.Wehaveseentheresultofactionofthatkindinthecon-tinuingdescentintotheeconomichellofthepastfouryears.”).


Theinstitutionthatwasdesignedtoremedysuchastateofna-ture,Rooseveltalsoexplained,wasthesovereignstate.Tothisend,Rooseveltrepeatedlyassertedthatgovernment,atitscore,wasapur-posiveinstitutioncreatedtoservethecommunity.Asheputitinonefiresidechat,thecreationofthesovereignstatewasanendeavorthat,“likethebuildingofaship,”wasaimedat“thecreationofausefulin-strumentforman.”150ForRoosevelt,theoriginofthestate,anditson-goingclaimtolegitimacy,wasboundupinitsneedtofulfillapurposeonbehalfofacommunity.151TouseRoosevelt’swords,itwastheideathat:“[G]overnment...existstoserveindividualmenandwomen.”152

That overriding institutional purpose,Roosevelt added,was toprovideprotectionstoacommunity—tofurnishthecommunitywith“protection against the vicissitudes ofmodern life,” as he put it.153Rooseveltrepeatedlyturnedtothisideathatgovernment,aboveall,existedtoensurethatthepublicwasaffordedthebasic“protections”necessaryinorderforthemtoconducttheirprivateliveswithsome

150. DefendingWPASpeech,supranote149,at64–65. 151. See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance Speech (June 27, 1936), inSPEECHES,supranote147,at47,49(arguingthat,inthefaceofmoderneconomiccon-ditions, “theAmerican citizen could appeal only to theorganizedpowerof govern-ment”);HundredDaysSpeech,supranote149,at33(“Thereisnothingcomplicatedaboutitandthereisnothingparticularlynewintheprinciple.Itgoesbacktothebasicideaofsocietyandof thenation itself thatpeopleacting inagroupcanaccomplishthingswhichnoindividualactingalonecouldevenhopetobringabout.”);FranklinD.Roosevelt,TheFourFreedomsSpeech(Jan.6,1941),inMYFELLOWAMERICANS109,110(MichaelWaldmaned.,2010)[hereinafterFourFreedoms](“[The]innerandabidingstrengthofour[politicalsystem]isdependentuponthedegreetowhich[it]fulfill[s]theseexpectations[heldbythecommunitythatitserves].”);DefendingWPASpeech,supranote149,at72(describingtheNewDealasmarkedby“renewedfaithinthevastpossibilitiesofhumanbeingsto improvetheirmaterialandspiritualstatusthroughtheinstrumentalityofthedemocraticformofgovernment”);GovernmentSpeech,su-pranote149,at55(“[I]nmanydirections,theinterventionofthatorganizedcontrolwhichwecallgovernmentseemsnecessarytoproducethesameresultofjusticeandrightconductwhichobtainedthroughtheattritionofindividualsbeforethenewcon-ditionsarose.” (quotingElihuRoot));DefendingWPASpeech,supranote149,at72(“[I]tismorethantherecoveryofthematerialbasisofourindividuallives.Itistherecovery of confidence in our democratic processes, our republican institutions....Fearisvanishingandconfidenceisgrowingoneveryside,renewedfaithinthevastpossibilitiesofhumanbeingsto improvetheirmaterialandspiritualstatusthroughtheinstrumentalityofthedemocraticformofgovernment.”);CommonwealthClubAd-dress,supranote149,at19(“[A]factorthattendedtolimitthepowerofthosewhoruled,wastheriseoftheethicalconceptionthattherulerborearesponsibilityforthewelfareofhissubjects.”). 152. CommonwealthClubAddress,supranote149,at19. 153. CriticsSpeech,supranote149,at50.


measureofsafetyandsecurity.154 Inthisregard,theNewDealcon-tainedaforcefulassertionthattheprotectivesovereigntythesiscap-turedtheoriginandessenceofsovereignty.

ForRoosevelt,thissovereigntythesisentailedacommitmenttoprotectasovereigncommunitythatwasnotdefinedalongracialorethniclines.AsRooseveltputitinhisFourFreedomsspeech:“[O]urnationalpolicy in internalaffairshasbeenbaseduponadecentre-spectfortherightsandthedignityofallourfellowmenwithinourgates.”155 In this definition of the sovereign community, territorialboundariesreturnedtorelevance—butnotbecause,as inWestpha-liantheory,theymarkedthelogicalboundsofsovereignpower.Ra-ther,theseboundarieswererelevantbecausetheyprovidedanegali-tarian way to define the sovereign community that the state,understoodviatheprotectivesovereigntythesis,mustworktopro-tect.

ThisreturntoaprotectivesovereigntythesisledRoosevelttothekeyconclusionoftheNewDealconstitutionalproject:namely,thatitwas necessary to remove constitutional constraints that preventedAmericangovernmentsfromactingasprotectivesovereigns.Inpar-ticular, itwas assumednecessary to remove constitutional impedi-mentsthatpreventedprotectivesovereignsfromprotectingthecom-munity from the harshest consequences of modern economicforces.156

AstheSupremeCourteventuallygavesanctiontotheNewDeal,it translated these Rooseveltian premises into a constitutional

154. SeeDefendingWPASpeech,supranote149,at72(outliningtheneedtopro-vide“wiseprovisionsfortheprotectionoftheweakagainstthestrong”);FranklinD.Roosevelt,APreelectionAppealtoFarmersandLaborers,inCHATS,supranote149,at73,81(“Theydeservepracticalprotectionintheopportunitytousetheir laboratareturnadequatetosupportthematadecentandconstantlyrisingstandardofliving,and to accumulate amargin of security against the inevitable vicissitudes of life.”);FranklinD.Roosevelt,ANationalServiceLawandanEconomicBillofRights,inCHATS,supranote149,at282,292(addressing“[t]herighttoadequateprotectionfromtheeconomicfearsofoldageandsicknessandaccidentandunemployment”);AcceptanceSpeech,supranote151,at50(“ThebraveandclearplatformadoptedbythisConven-tion,towhichIheartilysubscribe,setsforththatGovernmentinamoderncivilizationhascertaininescapableobligationstoitscitizens,amongwhichareprotectionofthefamilyandthehome....”);seealsoGovernmentSpeech,supranote149,at55(“[P]ri-vateenterpriseintimessuchasthesecannotbeleftwithout...reasonablesafeguardslestitdestroynotonlyitselfbutalsoourprocessesofcivilization.”). 155. FourFreedoms,supranote151,at110. 156. ForadiscussionoftheconstitutionaldimensionsofRoosevelt’spoliciesdur-ingthistimeperiod,see, forexample,2BRUCEACKERMAN,WETHEPEOPLE:TRANSFOR-MATIONS125–47(1998);andMilaSohoni,NoticeandtheNewDeal,62DUKEL.J.1169(2013).


jurisprudence.NocasebetterillustratesthisthanWestCoastHotelCo.v.Parrish.157InWestCoastHotel,theCourtreevaluatedthelimitationsthattheDueProcessClauseoftheFourteenthAmendmenthadplaced,throughtheCourt’s jurisprudenceona “freedomofcontract,”uponstate regulation of contractual relations in the economic market-place.158 As Bruce Ackerman has observed, the Court’s “switch intime”inWestCoastHotelwastheJustices’“signalthattheycouldbetrustedtocodifytheNewDealrevolutionwithoutthefurtherneedforformalinstruction.”159

InWestCoastHotel,theCourtopenlyacknowledgedthechaoticeconomic reality cited repeatedly by Roosevelt. Here, the Courtpointedtoward“theeconomicconditionswhichhavesupervened”160inAmericaduringtheGreatDepression,anditstatedthat:“Wemaytakejudicialnoticeoftheunparalleleddemandsforreliefwhicharoseduringtherecentperiodofdepressionandstillcontinuetoanalarm-ingextentdespitethedegreeofeconomicrecoverywhichhasbeenachieved.”161Moreover,theCourtendorsedthechangedviewoftheeconomythatresultedfromtheseeconomicforces;itdescribed“un-conscionable employers,” and it spoke of the “abusewhich springsfromtheirselfishdisregardofthepublic interest.”162 Inthisregard,theCourtaligneditselfwithRoosevelt’sclaimsthattheGreatDepres-sionmarked a turning point afterwhich economic forceswere re-vealedtobenasty,chaoticforcesofthesortthatsovereignswerede-signedtoregulate.

Inresponsetotheseeconomicrealities,theCourtinWestCoastHotelthenfollowedRoosevelt’sembraceofaprotectivesovereigntythesis.FortheCourt,thissovereigntythesiswascrystallizedinasin-gle term: “protection.”163 Time and again, the Court described theoverridingneed for sovereign states tobe capableof promulgatingandenforcingregulationsthatwouldoffer“protection”tovulnerableindividualsintheeconomicmarketplace.164TheCourtbeganitsopin-ion,forexample,byrepeatingtherelevantstatute’sdeclarationthat:“ThewelfareoftheStateofWashingtondemandsthatwomenandmi-norsbeprotectedfromconditionsof laborwhichhaveapernicious

157. W.CoastHotelCo.v.Parrish,300U.S.379(1937). 158. Id.at391. 159. ACKERMAN,supranote156,at315(emphasisomitted). 160. W.CoastHotel,300U.S.at390. 161. Id.at399. 162. Id.at399–400. 163. Id.at391. 164. Id.at393–95,398–99.


effectontheirhealthandmorals.”165Inenactingthestatute,theCourtsaid, the stateofWashingtonwassimply “carryingout itspolicyofprotection.”166

Thesepoliciesof“protection,”theCourtsuggested,areatthecoreofastate’ssovereignpower.Consequently,ratherthan labelingthestatepoweratissuea“policepower”—thetermtypicallyusedtode-scribesuchregulationsforhealthandmorals—theCourtinsteadre-ferred throughout the opinion to the “protective power” of thestate.167Insodoing,theCourtconnectedthispolicepowertoanun-derlying,NewDealvisionofitspurpose—namely,thepurposeofen-ablingthegovernmenttoaffordprotectionstoacommunity.Viewedassuch,theCourtexplained,theseregulationsnotonlyareimposeduponthecommunity; theyalsoare imposed“in the interestsof thecommunity.”168Thisisavisionofasovereignentitywhosepowersaremoldedbythepurposethatithasbeenassigned—here,thepurposeofprotectingacommunity.

Notsurprisingly,therefore,theCourtinWestCoastHotelalsoem-bracedRoosevelt’swillingnesstoidentify—andtoremove—constitu-tionalconstraintsthatpreventedsovereignsfrompursuingtheirpro-tective agenda. Announcing that “freedom of contract” no longerwouldoperateasabarriertostatelegislation,theCourtexplainedthemannerinwhichtheDueProcessClausewouldoperateintheabsenceofthisconstraint,saying:

[T]helibertysafeguarded[bytheFourteenthAmendment]islibertyinasocial organizationwhich requires the protection of law against the evilswhichmenacethehealth,safety,moralsandwelfareofthepeople.LibertyundertheConstitutionisthusnecessarilysubjecttotherestraintsofduepro-cess, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and isadoptedintheinterestsofthecommunityisdueprocess.169Noticethat,inthispassage,theCourtoutlinedanoverridingfunc-

tionthatgovernmentsareassumedtoserve:namely,the“require[d]”functionofproviding “theprotectionof lawagainst theevilswhichmenacethehealth,safety,moralsandwelfareofthepeople.”170Goingforward,theCourtexplained,thecontoursofpermissiblestatepowerundertheDueProcessClausewouldbeshapedbytheoverridingneed

165. Id.at386. 166. Id.at399. 167. Id.at390(referringto“theexerciseoftheprotectivepoweroftheState”);id.at396(describingthestate’s“broadprotectivepower”);id.at400(referringto“theState’sprotectivepower”). 168. Id.at391. 169. Id. 170. Id.


for states to perform this protective function. Here, the Court ex-plainedthat:“[R]egulationwhichisreasonableinrelationtoitssub-jectandisadoptedintheinterestsofthecommunityisdueprocess.”171Intheabsenceoftheoldconstitutionalconstraint,inotherwords,theonlylimitationuponstatelegislativeactivitywouldbethelimitationinherentintheveryideaoftheprotectivesovereigntythesis.Sover-eignlegislativeactivitywasjustifiable,theCourtsaid—andwascon-stitutionalunder theDueProcessClause—to theextent that itper-formedthisfunctionofprotectingandadvancingthe“interestsofthecommunity.”172 Under this interpretation, the term “liberty”meant,simply,freedomfromgovernmentalactionthatisdisconnectedfromthegovernment’smissionasaprotectivesovereign.173Inthismanner,theCourtnotonlyemployedaprotectivesovereigntythesisinWestCoastHotel;italsoassertedthattheDueProcessClauseoperatedtoensurethatstateswereempoweredtoactintheircapacityasprotec-tivesovereigns,andthattheywerepreventedfromactingbeyondthatessentialcapacity.

WestCoastHotelwasnottheonlyNewDealopinioninwhichtheCourtreassertedtheprotectivesovereigntythesis.Atthesametime,theCourtalsowascementingthisthesisinotherdomainswithinCon-flictofLaws.Thesedevelopmentswillbeexploredinafuturearticle,andsotheywillnotbediscussedindetailhere.Still,itisworthnotingthat Justice Stone—the author of International Shoe—would writeseveralsuchopinions,particularlywithrespecttotheapplicationofthe Full Faith and Credit Clause to state choice-of-law determina-tions.174There,Stonewoulddevelopaconstitutionaltestwhich,withrespectto“theconstitutionalauthorityof[a]statetolegislateforthebodilysafetyandeconomicprotectionofemployeesinjuredwithinit,”wouldemphasizethat:“Fewmatterscouldbedeemedmoreappropri-ately the concern of the state ... or more completely within itspower.”175

c. ThesisinInternationalShoeBythetimeofInternationalShoe,therefore,theprotectivesover-

eigntythesiswasinescapable.Usedbysocialcontracttheorists,ithad

171. Id.(emphasisadded). 172. Id. 173. Id. 174. SeePac.Emps.Ins.Co.v.Indus.AccidentComm’n,306U.S.493,503(1939);AlaskaPackersAss’nv.Indus.AccidentComm’n,294U.S.532,543(1935);BradfordElec.LightCo.v.Clapper,286U.S.145,163–64(1932)(Stone,J.,concurring). 175. Pac.Emps.,306U.S.at503.


shaped American political thought since the Founding.176 Used bynineteenth-century nationalists, it had featured prominently in theShoeera’sleadingtreatiseonConflictofLaws.177UsedinthecraftingoftheEqualProtectionClause,itsrhetorichadinfuseddebatesovertheconstitutionalamendmentatissueinShoe.UsedtoarticulateanddefendtheNewDealproject,ithadreclaimedacentralroleinAmeri-canpoliticalthoughtduringtheperiodwhenShoewouldbedecided.Used bymembers of the legal process school, it had gained wide-spreadacceptanceamongtheCourt’sacademicpeers.178UsedinWestCoastHotel, it had infused the Court’s own rethinking of sovereignpowerinthewakeoftheNewDeal’spoliticaltriumph.

Thesevariousschoolsof thoughtdiffered in theirvisionof thesovereigncommunity—positing,forexample,thatthepropercommu-nitywasaseriesofatomistic,rationalindividuals(socialcontractthe-orists),anethnically-definedorganiccommunity(nineteenth-centurynationalists),oraninterdependent,purpose-drivencommunity(legalprocesstheorists).Yettheyallconvergedonacommonidea:namely,thatthesovereignstateisanentitytaskedwithafoundationalmissionto protect a sovereign community.Moreover, they tended to agreethat:(1)sovereignspursuethisprotectivemissionthroughtheirlaws;and(2)whensovereignactionisundertakeninpursuitofthisprotec-tivemission—andonlywhenitissoundertaken—thatactionislegit-imateandjustifiable.InInternationalShoe,theCourttooktheseideasaboutsovereignty,anditplacedthematthecenterofanewtestforpersonaljurisdiction.

Throughtheforegoinganalysis, it ispossibletoreachaproperunderstandingofthemannerinwhichtheCourt’srulinginInterna-tionalShoedeviatedfromitspriorrulinginPennoyerv.Neff.Ontheonehand,theCourt’sopinioninInternationalShoe—nolessthanitsopinion inPennoyer—grounded its jurisdictional test ina theoryofsovereignty.Afterall,theCourt’sopinionineachcasecontainedasov-ereigntythesis,andeachderivedajurisdictionaltestfromthatsover-eigntythesis.179Ontheotherhand,theCourt’spivotinInternationalShoe toanalternatetheoryofsovereigntywasasignificant innova-tion.180

176. SeesupraPartI.B.2.a.i. 177. SeesupraPartI.B.2.a.ii. 178. SeesupraPartII.B.2.a.iii. 179. SeesupraPartII.A.1(outliningPennoyer’sjurisdictionaltest);supraPartII.A.2(outliningShoe’sjurisdictionaltest). 180. SeesupraPartII.B.2.


AsthislandmarkcaseofInternationalShoehasbeenreducedtoameresymbolforfairness-basedapproachestojurisdiction,inotherwords,animportantdimensionofthecasehasbeenlost.InternationalShoe,ithasbeenforgotten,wasanopinioncenteredaroundtheverytopicthat itnowismadetostandagainst:statesovereignty.181Thecasetooktherevolutionarystepofadvancingitsowntheoryofstatesovereigntyintothefieldofpersonaljurisdiction—aprotectivesover-eigntythesisthatwasalientoPennoyer,butthatwasresurgentduringtheNewDeal, and thatwas reminiscent of contemporary opinionssuchasWestCoastHotel.InInternationalShoe,theCourtplacedthistheory at the center ofmodern jurisdictional analysis—and that iswhereitremains,inmodifiedform,today.

III.IMPLICATIONSPartIIarguedthatcourtsandscholarshavefundamentallymis-

understoodthe“minimumcontacts”testinpersonaljurisdiction.Ra-therthanrepudiatingsovereignty-basedapproachestopersonal ju-risdiction, itargued,theminimumcontactstestactuallyre-orientedpersonaljurisdictionaroundanalternatetheoryofsovereignty.Thisalternatetheoryofsovereignty,whichPartIIlabeledasthe“protec-tivesovereigntythesis,”definesthesovereignstateasanentitythatistaskedwithaspecificmission:namely,toprovideasetoffundamentalprotectionstoasovereigncommunity.

ThisPartexplorestheimplicationsandbenefitsofunderstandingthe minimum contacts test as oriented around a protective sover-eignty thesis. As the following pages explain, this corrected under-standingoftheminimumcontactstestholdsthepotentialtoalleviatenumerousproblemsinthemoderndoctrineofstatecourtpersonalju-risdiction—problems that have proved particularly vexing in the

181. Relatedly, community-based approaches to jurisdiction now are regularlymadetostandagainsttheminimumcontactstestandsovereignty-basedapproaches.See,e.g.,PaulSchiffBerman,TheGlobalizationof Jurisdiction,151U.PA.L.REV.311,321–22(2002)(arguingthat“acontacts-basedapproachmustnowyieldtoaconcep-tion of jurisdiction based on community definition”); id. at 424 (using community-based theory to “open space for the articulation of norms that challenge sovereignpower”);LeaBrilmayer,Liberalism,Community, andStateBorders, 41DUKEL.J.1,3(1991) (arguing that “general jurisdiction seems to reflect communitarian assump-tionswhereasspecificjurisdictionseemstoreflectliberalones”);ROBERTM.COVER,TheFolktalesofJustice:TalesofJurisdiction,inNARRATIVE,VIOLENCE,ANDTHELAW:THEES-SAYSOFROBERTCOVER173(MarthaMinowetal.eds.,1992)(identifyingaspirationtojurisdictiondevoidofsovereignty);RobertM.Cover,Foreword:NomosandNarrative,97HARV.L.REV.4,52(1983)(dismissingsovereigntytheoriesasobfuscatingtoolsin-vokedtoavoidtheindefensibilityofthestate’scoerciveroleoverothercommunities’laws).


decadessinceInternationalShoewasfirstdecided.Theseincludeitsabilityto:(1)clarifyaconfuseddoctrine;(2)bolstertheconstitutionallegitimacyofthedoctrine;(3)castnewdoubtonthelegitimacyoffo-rumselectionclauses;and(4)revealtheassumptionsembeddedinthedoctrinethat,whenleftunspoken,oftenleavestudentsandlaw-yersoverwhelmed.

Additionally,thiscorrectedunderstandingoftheminimumcon-tacts test also has implications that extend beyond the FourteenthAmendment.Asthefollowingpagesexplain,itshedsnewlighton:(1)theFifthAmendmenttestforfederalpersonaljurisdiction;and(2)theextraterritoriality test that the Court employs under the DormantCommerceClause.

Finally,thisrevisedunderstandingoftheminimumcontactstestholdsthepromiseofdispellinglingeringconfusionabouttherolethatterritorial boundaries play inmodern Conflict-of-Laws analysis. Asthefollowingpagesexplain,therewouldbebothlegalandpracticalbenefitsiftheCourtweretoexplicitlyembracetheprotectivesover-eigntythesisandprovidenewclarityonthisparticulartopic.Eachoftheseimplicationsisconsideredbelow.

A. CLARIFYINGACONFUSEDDOCTRINEPersonaljurisdictiondoctrineoftenhasbeenaccusedofdissolv-

ingintoconfusionanddiscordinthepost-InternationalShoeera.Ithasbecomeadoctrineunmoored,itisargued,fromanyconsistentlogicthatcanguidelowercourts.Inthewordsofsomeleadingscholarsinthefield:

“[Post-Shoedoctrine] isabodyof lawwhosepurpose isuncer-tain,whoserulesandstandardsseemincapableofclarification,andwhoseconnectiontotheConstitutioncannoteasilybedivined.”182

“[Itis]anunsatisfactorybodyoflawthatisextremelydifficultforjurisdictionscholarstoorganize,synthesize,andcomprehend.”183

“Over100yearsafterissuingPennoyertheSupremeCourtisstilllaboring to articulate a coherent doctrine of personal jurisdictionwithintheframeworkestablishedbythatopinion.”184

“Ambiguityandincoherencehaveplaguedtheminimumcontactstest....”185

182. JayConison,WhatDoesDueProcessHavetoDowithJurisdiction?,46RUTGERSL.REV.1071,1076(1994). 183. WilliamM.Richman,UnderstandingPersonalJurisdiction,25ARIZ.ST.L.J.599,600(1993). 184. Perdue,supranote62,at479. 185. McMunigal,supranote87,at189.


“[J]urisdictionintheUnitedStatesisamess.”186Fortheirpart,theJusticesthemselvesseemequallyconfusedby

thedoctrine.TheCourt’srecentopinionsonpersonaljurisdictionreg-ularly splinter intopluralities, failing tounite theCourtbehindanysingleviewoftheminimumcontactstest.187Moreover,asPartIex-plained,theCourt’sopinionsconsistentlyfailtoidentify,muchlessde-fend,anyprinciplesthatbeararationalconnectiontotheirproposedjurisdictionaltests.188Instead,theCourtconductsdebatesaboutgen-eralprinciplesof“fairness”and“sovereignty,”whileofferingjurisdic-tionalteststhatsupportneither.189Theresult,itseems,isadoctrineadrift.

Astheforgoingpageshaveshown,however,theCourtdidplaceacoherentprincipleatthecoreoftheminimumcontactstestinInter-national Shoe.Once thisprinciple is recognized, theCourt’smyriadcasesinthepost-Shoeerasuddenlyacquiresomestructureandcoher-ence.Specifically,recognitionoftheprotectivesovereigntythesisatthe center of the minimum contacts test reveals that, beneath theseemingchaos,theCourtessentiallyhasbeenengagedinthreespe-cificdebatesaboutthelegacyofthisthesis.Thesedebateshaveasked:

(1)Isittheentanglementofthedefendant,oroftheplaintiff,with

aprotectivesovereignthatisrelevanttojurisdiction?(2)Whatlevelofentanglementwithaprotectivesovereignissuf-

ficientforjurisdiction?Ismereenjoymentofitsprotectionssufficient,ormustapartyactivelyseekoutthoseprotections?

(3)Shouldaparty’srelationshiptoaprotectivesovereignbethe

solefactorinjurisdictionalanalysis,oroneofseveral?Subsections1through3traceeachofthesethreedebatesinthe

Court’scaselaw.Astheyillustrate,oncepersonaljurisdictiondoctrineisseenthroughthelensoftheCourt’sturntoaprotectivesovereigntythesis, itbecomesapparent that theCourt’sdoctrine isnot chaotic.

186. PatrickJ.Borchers,JurisdictionalPragmatism:InternationalShoe’sHalf-Bur-iedLegacy,28U.C.DAVISL.REV.561,564(1995);seealsoJuenger,supranote1,at403(describingthecurrentapproachesas“gibberish”). 187. See,e.g.,J.McIntyreMach.,Ltd.v.Nicastro,564U.S.873,877–80(2011);Burn-hamv.SuperiorCt.,495U.S.604,619(1990);AsahiMetalIndus.Co.v.SuperiorCt.,480U.S.102(1987). 188. Seesupranote75andaccompanyingtext. 189. Seesupranote75andaccompanyingtext.


Rather, it is an evolving discussion—occurring on several fronts—abouttheroleofthisprotectivesovereigntythesisinpersonaljuris-diction.

1. PlaintifforDefendant?InInternationalShoe,theCourtpositedthatitwastheentangle-

mentof thedefendant,nottheplaintiff,withaprotectivesovereignthatwasrelevant.190Inapairofopinions,however,JusticeBlackchal-lengedthisdefendant-focusedapproach.191WhileagreeingwiththeShoe Court that states should be viewed as protective sovereigns,Blackexpressedabeliefthatastate’s“powertoprotect”thecommu-nitymustincludeanabilityto“open[the]doors”ofitscourtstothatcommunity,asheputitinhisInternationalShoeconcurrence.192Tohismind,eachstatepossessesa“righttoaffordjudicialprotectiontoits citizens”193 and has a “manifest interest in providing effectivemeansofredressforitsresidents,”194asheputitinseparateopinions.Thisprotectiveinterest,hebelieved,aloneshouldjustifyanassertionofjurisdiction—and,consequently,suchassertionsshouldnotneces-sarilybeconditioneduponadefendant’sreceiptofstatebenefits.195Inotherwords,iftheplaintiffwaspartofthesovereigncommunitythat the statehadan interest inprotecting, JusticeBlack suggestedthatshouldbesufficient to justifyanassertionofpersonal jurisdic-tion—regardless of the defendant’s entanglement with the protec-tionsandbenefitsaffordedbythestate.ThiswasanideathatJusticeBlackbegantodevelopinhisconcurrenceinInternationalShoe,andthathefullyembracedinhisopinionfortheCourtinMcGeev.Interna-tionalLifeInsuranceCo.

Today,McGeeinparticularlivesoninaveryconfusedstateintheCourt’sjurisprudence.Selectivelycitingdictathatbearsnoconnection

190. Int’lShoeCo.v.Washington,326U.S.310,316(1945). 191. Id.at323(Black,J.,concurring)(“TheCourt...hasengagedinanunnecessarydiscussioninthecourseofwhichithasannouncedvagueConstitutionalcriteriaap-pliedforthefirsttimetotheissuebeforeus.”);McGeev.Int’lLifeIns.Co.,355U.S.220(1957). 192. Int’lShoe,326U.S.at323–24(Black,J.,concurring). 193. Id.at324–25(“Ibelieve that theFederalConstitution leaves toeachState,withoutany‘ifs’or‘buts’apowertotaxandtoopenthedoorsofitscourtsforitsciti-zenstosuecorporationswhoseagentsdobusinessinthoseStates.BelievingthattheConstitutiongavetheStatesthatpower,IthinkitajudicialdeprivationtoconditionitsexerciseuponthisCourt’snotionof‘fairplay,’howeverappealingthattermmaybe.”). 194. McGee,355U.S.at224. 195. JusticeBlack’sShoeconcurrenceismoreequivocalonthis,emphasizingthatthecorporation’sagentsstillmustdobusinessinthosestates.Int’lShoe,326U.S.at323(Black,J.,concurring).


toJusticeBlack’sunderlyingproposal,theCourtnowcitesMcGee insupport of plaintiff-focused tests,196 defendant-focused tests,197 andconvenience-focusedteststhatdiscardentirelythefocusonaprotec-tive sovereign.198 In one case,Burger King v. Rudzewicz, the Courtsomehow cited McGee in support of all three competing ap-proaches.199Nowonder commentators find chaos and confusion inthisareaoflaw.

By contrast, once the key innovation of International Shoe isproperlyunderstood,JusticeBlack’sdisputewiththemajorityinIn-ternationalShoeproperlycomesintofocus.Ontheonehand,hisun-derlyingagreementwith themajoritybecomesevident;he concursthatstatesshouldbeviewedasprotectivesovereigns,andheagreesthat a jurisdictional test should emerge from this theory of sover-eignty.Ontheotherhand,hispointofcontentionalsobecomesclear:hebelievesthattheentanglementofaplaintiff,notadefendant,withaprotectivesovereignshouldprovidetherootofjurisdictionalanaly-sis.

Byandlarge,itshouldbenoted,theCourthassettledthisunder-lyingdisagreement(despiteitsfailuretoacknowledgeit).Today,theCourtconsistentlyfocusesonwhetherthedefendant,nottheplaintiff,issufficientlyentangledwiththeprotectivesovereign.200Nonetheless,it isworthnotingthat JusticeBlack’sapproachappearsparticularlylogicaloncetheminimumcontactstestisunderstoodasanefforttoimplementaprotectivesovereigntythesis.Theretroactivenatureofcivilcasesmeansthat,intheparadigmaticcivilcase,itistheplaintiffwhoisseekingthereliefthroughthelaw’sprotectivepower,notthedefendant.Inthisway,aprotectivesovereigntythesisdoesseemtogenerateanaturalfocusontheplaintiff.

Asthishopefullyillustrates,explicitrecognitionoftheprotectivesovereigntythesishasseveralimportantbenefits.First,itclarifiestherealargumentsthatareoccurringbetweentheJustices—therebyre-movingoddandinaccurateinterpretationsofpriorcaselawfromju-risdictionaldiscussions.Second,itmaycreatenewunderstandingsof

196. See,e.g.,BurgerKingCorp.v.Rudzewicz,471U.S.462,483n.25(1985). 197. See,e.g.,AsahiMetalIndus.Co.v.SuperiorCt.,480U.S.102,109(1987). 198. See,e.g.,Burnhamv.SuperiorCt.,495U.S.604,638(1990)(Brennan,J.,con-curring);BurgerKing,471U.S.at484. 199. BurgerKing,471U.S.at475(citingMcGeeinsupportofthedefendant-focusedpurposefulavailmenttest);id.at484(citingMcGeefortheinconveniencerationale);id.at483n.25(citingMcGeeforitsplaintiff-focusedapproach). 200. See,e.g.,Waldenv.Fiore,571U.S.277,284(2014)(“Wehaveconsistentlyre-jected attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry bydemonstratingcontactsbetweentheplaintiff(orthirdparties)andtheforumState.”).


whichpositionswithintheseargumentsaremoreintuitiveorcompel-ling.

2. ReceiptorAvailment?Even if oneaccepts theCourt’sdefendant-focusedapproach to

theminimumcontactstest,thatonlygivesrisetoanotherquestion:whatlevelofentanglementbyadefendantwithaprotectivesovereignissufficient towarrant jurisdiction? In InternationalShoe, itwillberecalled, theCourtassertedthatmereenjoymentof thebenefitsaf-fordedbyaprotectivesovereigncouldjustifyanexerciseofjurisdic-tion.Adefendantdidnotneedtoseekoutastate’sbenefits,orintendtoreceivethosebenefits,inordertobesubjecttojurisdiction.201Re-latedly, theCourtmade clear in International Shoe that its jurisdic-tionaltestwasnotgroundedatheoryof impliedconsent.202 Itstestrequired no purposeful action directed toward the forum, in otherwords, partly because its test was not based on the notion that,throughpurposefulaction,oneexpressesaconstructiveconsentthatisnecessarytoanexerciseofjurisdiction.

TheCourtchallengedthiselementoftheminimumcontactstest,however,inHansonv.Denckla.203Ratherthaninquiringintowhetherthedefendant“enjoysthebenefitsandprotectionofthelawsofthatstate[,]” as it had in International Shoe, the Court inDenckla askedwhetherthedefendanthadtakenpurposefulactioninpursuitofthosebenefits.204AstheCourtputit:“[I]tisessentialineachcasethattherebesomeactbywhichthedefendantpurposefullyavailsitselfoftheprivilegeofconductingactivitieswithintheforumState,thusinvokingthebenefitsandprotectionsofitslaws.”205Inthisway,the“purpose-fulavailment”standardfromDencklaproposedthat,notwithstandingtheCourt’sapproachinInternationalShoe,onlyapartythatprovidedimpliedconsenttoreceivethebenefitsandprotectionofaprotectivesovereignshouldbesubjecttojurisdiction.

ThedebateprovokedbythiselementofDencklacontinuestodi-vide the Court. It was on full display, for example, in J. McIntyre

201. Int’lShoeCo.v.Washington,326U.S.310,319(1945). 202. Seeid.at318(“True,someofthedecisionsholdingthecorporationamenabletosuithavebeensupportedbyresorttothelegalfictionthatithasgivenitsconsenttoserviceandsuit,consentbeingimpliedfromitspresenceinthestatethroughtheactsofitsauthorizedagents.Butmorerealisticallyitmaybesaidthatthoseauthorizedactswereofsuchanatureastojustifythefiction.”(citationsomitted)). 203. 357U.S.235(1958). 204. Id.at253. 205. Id.


Machinery,Ltd.v.Nicastro.206Adoptingthepurposefulavailmentap-proach, JusticeKennedycitedDencklawhileendorsingtheproposi-tionsthat:(1)jurisdictionisproperonlywhenthedefendantpurpose-fullyseeksthestate’sbenefits;207and(2)thelegitimacyofjurisdictionisgrounded ina theoryof impliedconsent.208This led JusticeGins-burg,inherdissentingopinion,toretort:

[I]nInternationalShoeitself,anddecisionsthereafter,theCourthasmadeplainthatlegalfictions,notably“presence”and“impliedconsent,”shouldbediscarded,fortheyconcealtheactualbasesonwhichjurisdictionrests.... [T]heplurality’snotionthatconsentistheanimatingconceptdrawsnosupportfromcontrollingdecisionsofthisCourt.Quitethecontrary,theCourthasexplained,aforumcanexercisejurisdictionwhenitscontactswiththecontroversyaresufficient;invocationofafictitiousconsent,theCourthasre-peatedlysaid,isunnecessaryandunhelpful.209Onceitisunderstoodthattheminimumcontactstestanchored

jurisdictionalanalysis inaprotectivesovereignty thesis, therootofthisdebateover“impliedconsent”becomesmoreapparent.Onefa-mousiterationoftheprotectivesovereigntythesis—thatofferedbythesocialcontracttheorists—waspaired,byseveralofitsexponents,withatheoryofimpliedconsent.210Byadvocatingforanimpliedcon-sentstandard,therefore, JusticeKennedyandothersseemtobeac-ceptingtheuseofaprotectivesovereigntythesis—and,atthesametime,tobeadvocatingforaparticulariterationofthisthesis.Namely,theyseemtoendorsethereplacementofaNewDealiterationwithanearlierEnlightenment-eraversion.

This context, it should be noted, brings much more clarity toNicastro than the Justices themselvesmanage tobring. JusticeKen-nedyandJusticeGinsburgdidnotunderstandthemselvestobedisa-greeingoverthecorrectiterationof,orproperimplementationof,anagreed-uponprotectivesovereigntythesis.Instead,bothviewedtheirdisputeasadebateoverwhethertoanchorjurisdictionin“fairness”

206. J.McIntyreMach.,Ltd.v.Nicastro,564U.S.873(2011). 207. Id.at877(“Asageneralrule,theexerciseofjudicialpowerisnotlawfulunlessthedefendant‘purposefullyavailsitselfoftheprivilegeofconductingactivitieswithinthe forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” (quotingDenckla,357U.S.at253)). 208. Id.at881(“Eachoftheseexamples[ofwherejurisdictionisproper]revealscircumstances,oracourseofconduct,fromwhichitispropertoinferanintentiontobenefitfromandthusanintentiontosubmittothelawsoftheforumState.”). 209. Id.at900–01(Ginsburg,J.,dissenting)(footnoteomitted)(citationsomitted). 210. SeeHOBBES,supranote105,at113(treatingsubmissiontoaconquerorasim-pliedconsent);LOCKE,supranote105,at119(statingthatthe“verybeingofanyonewithin the territories”ofa sovereignconstitutes impliedconsent to thesovereign’srule).


or“sovereignty.”211Itwasanoddcharacterizationoftheirdispute—and one that likely has its roots in the 1980 case ofWorld-WideVolkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.212 In Volkswagen, the Court did notmakeanysignificantchangestotheprevailingiterationofthemini-mumcontactstest—yettheCourtjustifiedthistest,inlanguagethatwouldbecomeconsequential,byreferencingtwo“functions”thatthetestostensiblyperformed.213AstheCourtputit:

Theconceptofminimumcontacts...canbeseentoperformtworelated,butdistinguishable,functions.Itprotectsthedefendantagainsttheburdensoflitigatinginadistantorinconvenientforum.AnditactstoensurethattheStatesthroughtheircourts,donotreachoutbeyondthelimitsimposedonthembytheirstatusascoequalsovereignsinafederalsystem.214Importantly, when the Court referred to “sovereigns” in

Volkswagen, it apparently was attempting a return (in rhetoric, atleast)toaWestphaliansovereigntythesis.Here,theCourtturnednottothevisionofsovereigntysanctionedinInternationalShoe,butra-ther to “theoriginalschemeof theConstitutionand theFourteenthAmendment”astheCourtunderstoodthem.215Inthesesources,theCourtfoundasystemofinterstatefederalismthatemphasizedtheex-clusivityofstatepower—adefiningtraitofWestphaliansovereignty,notofprotectivesovereignty.216

InVolkswagen,therefore,theCourtprovidedaglossofthemini-mumcontactstest—onethathasdonegreatharmtotheCourt’son-goingdebateoverthistest.IthasconvincedtheJusticesthat,atthecoreoftheirdisagreement,adebatemustexistaboutwhichsideoftheVolkswagen logic they support. Consequently, Justice Ginsburgclaimedtodefendafairness-basedtest,whileJusticeKennedyclaimedtodefenda testrooted insovereignty.217 Insodoing, these Justices

211. SeeNicastro,564U.S.at882(“Theprincipal inquiry incasesof thissort iswhetherthedefendant’sactivitiesmanifestanintentiontosubmittothepowerofasovereign.”);id.at903(Ginsburg,J.,dissenting)(“Themodernapproachtojurisdictionovercorporationsandotherlegalentities,usheredinbyInternationalShoe,gaveprimeplacetoreasonandfairness.”). 212. World-WideVolkswagenCorp.v.Woodson,444U.S.286(1980). 213. Id.at291–92.InVolkswagen,theCourtreiteratedthepurposefulavailmenttestithadpreviouslyarticulatedinDenckla,anditdevelopedastream-of-commercetheorythatinstructedcourtsontheapplicationofthispurposefulavailmenttestinthecontextofconsumerproductscases.Id.at297–98. 214. Id.at291–92. 215. Id.at293. 216. Seeid.(“ThesovereigntyofeachState,inturn,impliedalimitationonthesov-ereigntyofallofitssisterStates—alimitationexpressorimplicitinboththeoriginalschemeoftheConstitutionandtheFourteenthAmendment.”). 217. CompareJ.McIntyreMach.,Ltd.v.Nicastro,564U.S.873,884(2011)(plural-ityopinion),withid.at903(Ginsburg,J.,dissenting).


obscured the genuine root of their disagreement—a disagreementthatissignificantlynarrowerthantheirVolkswagen-inspiredrhetoricsuggests.Thisdisputeasks:Whichspecificiterationoftheprotectivesovereigntythesisismostcompelling?And,relatedly:Whatformofentanglementwiththebenefitsofaprotectivesovereignwarrantsacorresponding assertion of jurisdiction?These aremanageable, de-batablequestions—butonlywhencourtsandscholarsknowtoaskthem.

3. SovereigntyAloneorMulti-FactorReasonableness?Inadditiontoinauguratingamisguidedsovereignty-versus-fair-

nessdebate,theCourt’sopinioninVolkswagenalsobroughtamoresubstantial innovation into personal jurisdiction analysis.Here, theCourtintroducedthenotionthat,inthepursuitof“reasonableness[,]”courtsmight conduct an all-things-considered test that, indecidingwhethertoexercisejurisdiction,wouldbalancetheinterestsofallthepartiesandentities involvedinthe litigation.218Describingthisbal-ancing-of-interestsapproach,theCourtsaid:

Implicitinthisemphasisonreasonablenessistheunderstandingthattheburdenonthedefendant,whilealwaysaprimaryconcern,willinanappro-priatecasebeconsideredinlightofotherrelevantfactors,includingthefo-rumState’sinterestinadjudicatingthedispute;theplaintiff’sinterestinob-taining convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest is notadequatelyprotectedbytheplaintiff’spowertochoosetheforum,theinter-state judicialsystem’s interest inobtainingthemostefficientresolutionofcontroversies;andthesharedinterestoftheseveralStatesinfurtheringfun-damentalsubstantivesocialpolicies.219Underthisanalysis,thesovereignstateismerelyoneofseveral

entitieswithintereststhatoughttobeconsidered.Whilethisbalanc-ing-of-interestsapproachrecognizesthestateasaprotectivesover-eign,inotherwords,itrejectstheideathatthissovereignisspecifi-callyoruniquelyrelevanttothedevelopmentofaconstitutionaltestforpersonaljurisdiction.

In two subsequent opinions, the Courtwould incorporate this“reasonableness”testintoitsjurisdictionaltest.First,inBurgerKingCorp.v.Rudzewicz,theCourtsuggestedthatpassageofthis“reasona-bleness”testcouldjustifyanassertionofjurisdictionevenintheab-senceofashowingofpurposefulavailment.220Then, inAsahiMetalIndustryCo.v.SuperiorCourt,theCourtsuggestedthatafailureofthis“reasonableness”testcouldthwartanexerciseofjurisdiction,evenif

218. Volkswagen,444U.S.at292. 219. Id.(citationsomitted). 220. BurgerKingCorp.v.Rudzewicz,471U.S.462,467–68(1985).


there was a showing of purposeful availment.221 In each case, theCourtstillrequiredapurposefulavailmentanalysis—butitsuggestedthatthisavailmentcheck,whichwasgroundedinanindividual’sen-tanglementwithaprotectivesovereign,wouldbeconsideredalong-sideotherpragmaticfactorsthatborenoconnectiontothestate’sroleasaprotectivesovereign.222

In a sense that has gone unappreciated, therefore, this line ofcasespresentsachallengetothelegacyofInternationalShoe—achal-lengethatismoreprofoundthanthatseeninotherpost-Shoecases.Priorcaseshadbegunwithanacceptanceofthefundamentalinnova-tionattheheartofInternationalShoe:namely,thatajurisdictionaltestshouldbeanchoredinaprotectivesovereigntythesis.Bycontrast,thecasesculminatinginAsahi—whileretainingtheideathatastate’ssta-tusasaprotectivesovereignremainsrelevanttojurisdictionalanaly-sis—nonethelessproposedatestthatisnotsolelyderivedfromthatstatus.

B. CONSTITUTIONALITYThe Court’s Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction doc-

trinehasconsistentlybeensubjectedtoaccusationsofconstitutionalillegitimacy.Formostcommentators,thislegitimacyproblemhasitsoriginsinPennoyerv.Neff.223Inthewordsofonescholar,theCourtwasguiltyinPennoyerof“engrafting,withoutjustification,thesover-eignty-based international law approach to territorial jurisdictionintothedueprocessclauseofthefourteenthamendment.”224Thisun-justifiedactof linkingstatecourtpersonal jurisdiction to theFour-teenth Amendment has caused problems for the legitimacy of anyFourteenthAmendmenttestforstatecourtjurisdictionthattheCourthasarticulatedinthewakeofPennoyer.HowcananyparticularFour-teenthAmendmenttestbeconstitutionallylegitimate,afterall,iftheveryassociationofpersonaljurisdictionwiththeFourteenthAmend-mentwasanunjustifiedjudicialinnovation?

221. SeeAsahiMetalIndus.Co.v.SuperiorCt.,480U.S.102,104(1987). 222. Seeid.at113;BurgerKing,471U.S.at461–62. 223. SeeDrobak,supranote38,at1019–24;MartinH.Redish,DueProcess,Feder-alism,andPersonalJurisdiction:ATheoreticalEvaluation,75NW.U.L.REV.1112,1120–26(1981);RalphU.Whitten,TheConstitutionalLimitationsonState-CourtJurisdiction:AHistorical-InterpretativeReexaminationoftheFullFaithandCreditandDueProcessClauses(Part2),14CREIGHTONL.REV.735,804–08(1981). 224. TerryS.Kogan,ANeo-FederalistTaleofPersonalJurisdiction,63S.CAL.L.REV.257,298(1990).


OnceInternationalShoeisunderstoodasgroundingpersonalju-risdiction in a protective sovereignty thesis, however, the Court’spost-Shoejurisprudencegainsnewclaimstolegitimacy.Consider,forexample,ananalysisunderBruceAckerman’stheoryofconstitutionallegitimacy.AccordingtoAckerman,onecanobserveadistinctivepo-litical practice that has occurredoccasionally throughoutAmericanhistory—a practice that Ackerman labels “higher lawmaking.”225Whenconducting“higherlawmaking,”thecitizenryengagesinapro-tracted dialoguewith its representatives—a dialogue about funda-mentalconstitutionalvalues.226ThisextendeddialogueemergesfromAmerica’sconstitutionaldesign;inparticular,theseparationofpow-ersenshrinedintheConstitution(andthestaggeredelectionsthatre-sult)createstheneedforreformerstorepeatedlyprevailattheballotboxinordertoimplementtheirconstitutionalvisioninallofthesep-aratebranchesofthefederalgovernment.227Whenreformideasper-severethroughthisperiodofprotracteddialogueandenter intoallthreebranches,Ackermanasserts,theyhaveachievedauniquelevelofdeep,sustainedpublicapproval—onethattheFounderssoughttoprotectviathedistinctivecategoryof“constitutionallaw.”228Assuch,Ackermanconcludes, theachievementsofsuchreformerscan—andshould—beviewedaslegitimatepartsoftheconstitutionalcanon.229

One suchmoment of higher lawmaking,Ackerman asserts, oc-curredintheNewDeal.230UnderAckerman’stheory,therefore,con-stitutionalreformsthatwereintegraltotheNewDealprojectshouldbe viewed as constitutionally legitimate. This raises the question:whatreformswereintegraltotheNewDeal?AsPartIIexplained,onevitalelementoftheNewDealconstitutionalprojectwasaforcefulre-assertionofaprotectivesovereigntythesis—andaconcomitantcom-mitmenttoremovingconstitutionalconstraintsthat impededstates

225. ACKERMAN,supranote156,at3–7. 226. Seeid.at187(“Forme,‘thePeople’is...thenameofanextendedprocessofinteractionbetweenpoliticalelitesandordinarycitizens....Ifthehigherlawmakingsystemoperatessuccessfully,itwillchannelthisactivecitizenshipengagementintoastructured dialogue between political elites and ordinary Americans—first givingcompetingelitesthechancetoelaboratealternativeconstitutionalmeanings;thenin-vitingcitizenstoshareinthedebate....anddecisionsofpoliticalelitesduringthenextperiod,whicharethensubjectedtocitizendebateanddecisionatthenextelection;andsoforth.”). 227. Id.at187–88. 228. Id. 229. Id. 230. Id.at279–311.AckermanidentifiesfourmomentsinAmericanhistorythatmeetthestandardsofhigherlawmaking:(1)theFounding,(2)Reconstruction,(3)theNewDeal,andthe(4)CivilRightsmovement.Seegenerallyid.


fromactingasprotectivesovereigns,particularlyvis-à-visnewlyas-cendantcorporateeconomicforces.231WhenInternationalShoeisin-terpretedasre-orientingpersonaljurisdictiondoctrinearoundapro-tectivesovereigntythesis,therefore—andasremovingconstitutionalbarriers that prevented states fromacting as protective sovereignswithrespecttothenewly-prevalentphenomenonofinterstatecorpo-ratebusiness—thecasesuddenlyappearstobeacoherentpartofthisNewDealconstitutionalproject.Consequently,italsoappearslegiti-mateunderAckerman’stheoryofconstitutionallegitimacy.

Not all jurisdictional tests promulgated under the FourteenthAmendment,itshouldbenoted,benefitfromthisclaimtolegitimacy.Rather,onlythosejurisdictionalteststhatcaptureandretainthekeyinnovationofInternationalShoe—viz.,itsderivationofajurisdictionaltestfromaprotectivesovereigntythesis—receivethisbenefit.232TothosewhofindAckerman’stheorycompelling,thisprovidesfurthershape and structure to the Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine.Namely,itsuggeststhattheCourt’soriginaliterationoftheminimumcontactstest isconstitutionallydefensible,butthatearlierconstitu-tional tests (e.g., thePennoyer territorial test) and some later tests(e.g.,theAsahiall-things-consideredtest)arenot.233

C. FORUMSELECTIONCLAUSESToday, courts regularlyuphold forumselection clauses in con-

tracts,solongastheselectedforumisreasonable.234Courtswillapplythisruleevenwhenthechosenforumcouldnot,independentoftheforum-selectionclause,constitutionallyexercisepersonaljurisdictionover the parties.235 This approachmakes sense, perhaps,when the

231. SeesupraPartII.B.2. 232. SeediscussionsupraPartII.A.2. 233. SeediscussionsupraPartII.A.1. 234. Federalcourtsgenerallytakethisapproach.See,e.g.,Bremenv.ZapataOff-ShoreCo.,407U.S.1,18–19(1972).Severalstatesalsofollowthefederalstandard.See,e.g., Smith,Valentino&Smith, Inc.v.SuperiorCt.,551P.2d1206,1209(Cal.1976).SeveralalsofollowtheSecondRestatementapproach,whichprovidesthataforum-selectionclausewillbeenforcedunlessitisunreasonable.RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONFLICTOFL.§80cmt.c(AM.L.INST.1988);see,e.g.,St.PaulFireandMarinev.Court-neyEnters.,270F.3d621(8thCir.2001).Somestatestatutesdirectcourtstoenforceforumselectionclauses, incertain instances,even if thepartieshavenoconnectionwhatsoevertotheforumstate.See,e.g.,N.Y.GEN.OBLIG.LAW§5-1402(McKinney2020)(requiringNewYorkcourtstoacceptpersonaljurisdictionifacontractisworthatleast$1millionandthepartiesselectNewYorklawtogovernthecontract). 235. See,e.g.,HemlockSemiconductorPte.Ltd.v.JinglongIndus.,51N.Y.S.3d818,825–26(Sup.Ct.2017)(holdingthat,despitelackingNewYorkcontacts,applicationofforumselectionclausedidnotviolatedueprocess,asappliedtolong-termsupply


minimumcontactstestisunderstoodaspreventinginconvenientliti-gation.Afterall,thecontractingpartiesoughttohaveabettersensethanthecourtsofwhatdoes—anddoesnot—constituteaninconven-ientforumforthem.

Bycontrast,whentheminimumcontactstestisunderstoodasachecktoensurethatpartieshavebecomeadequatelyentangledwithaprotectivesovereign,itislessobviousthatpartiesshouldhavethecapacitytooverridethosedeterminations.Afterall,aparty’sdesiretoavoidaparticularforumdoesnotalterthefactthatthepartymayhavereceivedbenefitsfromthestate—benefitsthatthestatemaybelievewarranttheimpositionofreciprocalobligations.Similarly,evenifpar-tiesshareadesiretoselectaforum,itispossiblethatneitherpartybelongstothesovereigncommunitythattheforumseekstoprotect—raisingquestionsaboutthecapacityinwhichthestateactswhende-cidingtoresolvetheirlegaldispute.Ifthepointofpersonaljurisdic-tion is to empower states to act as protective sovereigns, in otherwords—andtoprohibitthemfromactingoutsidethissovereignca-pacity—thenthereislittlejustificationforoutsourcingajurisdictionaldeterminationtoprivateparties,andtheconventionalapproachtofo-rumselectionclauseswouldseemmisguided.

D. FIFTHAMENDMENTPERSONALJURISDICTIONCourtstypicallyhaveheldthat,intheFifthAmendmentcontext,

federalcourtsaresubjecttothesameminimumcontactstestforju-risdictional limitations that the Fourteenth Amendment imposesupon states.236 That said, the Supreme Court recently raised somequestion about this inBristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court.237

agreementbetweenSingaporemanufacturerandChinesebuyer);AmeritasInv.Corp.v.McKinney,694N.W.2d191,199(Neb.2005)(holdingthat“avalidandenforceablechoiceofforumclauseinacontractissufficientinitselftowaivetherequirementofminimumcontactsandtosubmitanonresidenttothejurisdictionoftheforumstate”);St.PaulFire&Marine,270F.3dat623–24;MenorahIns.Co.v.INXReinsuranceCorp.,72F.3d218,222(1stCir.1995);Chanv.Soc’yExpeditions,Inc.,39F.3d1398,1406(9thCir.1994);HellerFin.,Inc.v.MidwheyPowderCo.,883F.2d1286,1290–91(7thCir.1989);EliLilly&Co.v.HomeIns.Co.,794F.2d710,717–20(D.C.Cir.1986);Jacob-senConstr.Co.v.TetonBuilders,106P.3d719,723–26(Utah2005). 236. See,e.g.,Livnatv.PalestinianAuth.,851F.3d45,54(D.C.Cir.2017)(“Nocourthas ever held that the Fifth Amendment permits personal jurisdictionwithout thesame ‘minimumcontacts’with theUnitedStatesas theFourteenthAmendment re-quireswithrespecttoStates.Tothecontrary,boththeSupremeCourtandthiscourthaveappliedFourteenthAmendmentpersonal-jurisdictionstandardsinFifthAmend-mentcases.”). 237. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780, 1783–84(2017)(“[S]inceourdecisionconcernsthedueprocesslimitsontheexerciseofspecific


Moreover,inBristol-Myers,theCourtalsosuggestedthatthecurrentminimumcontactstestisanchoredinatheoryoffederalism—athe-orythatplainlywouldnotextendtothefederalgovernmentundertheFifthAmendment.238Thishasintroducedsomeuncertaintyabouttheassumptionthattheminimumcontactstestappliestothefederalgov-ernmentundertheFifthAmendment,aswellastostatesundertheFourteenthAmendment.239

TheideaofferedinthisArticle—viz.,thattheminimumcontactstest reorients jurisdictional analysis around a theory of protectivesovereignty—offersseveral lessons for thisFifthAmendment issue.First, to theextent that theFifthAmendmentstandarddoes indeedmirrortheminimumcontactstest,thisArticle’snewunderstandingofthisminimumcontactstestprovidesaconcomitantreconceptualiza-tionoftheFifthAmendmentstandard.ThiswouldimportintoFifthAmendmentjurisprudencemanyofthebenefitsalreadymentionedinthe context of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the FifthAmendmenttestpresumablyalsowouldbenefitfromtheaforemen-tionedargumentsforincreasedconstitutionallegitimacy—since,afterall,theNewDealconstitutionalprojectwasmorecentrallyfocusedonexpandingandreconceptualizingfederalpower.

Meanwhile, this Article’s new understanding of the minimumcontactstestalsorebutsthesuggestion,mentionedinVolkswagenandreiteratedinBristol-Myers,thattheminimumcontactstestwasalim-itedefforttorethinktheroleofstatesinafederalsystem(ratherthananeffort toexaminethebroaderrootsofsovereignpower).240Thisrebuttalisofconsequence,astheBristol-Myersapproachsuggeststhatthe logic of the minimum contacts test in inapplicable to federalcourts.Bycontrast,seeingtheminimumcontactstestasarethinkingof sovereignty principles generally, as opposed to a rethinking ofstate-specificprinciples,vindicatesandsupportstheextensionofthistesttofederalcourts.Assuch,itrevealsthatthecontinuedalignmentofFifthandFourteenthAmendmentjurisdictionaltestsisafarmorelogicalpaththantheCourtsuggestsinBristol-Myers.

jurisdictionbyaState,weleaveopenthequestionwhethertheFifthAmendmentim-poses the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federalcourt.”). 238. Id.at1781(explainingthetestasaninstancewhere“theDueProcessClause[is]actingasaninstrumentofinterstatefederalism”(quotingWorld-WideVolkswagenv.Woodsen,444U.S.286,294(1980));seealsoBristol-Myers,137S.Ct.at1788(So-tomayor,J.,dissenting)(“Themajority’sanimatingconcern,intheend,appearstobefederalism.”). 239. SeeBristol-Myers,137S.Ct.at1784. 240. Seeid.at1785(quotingVolkswagen,444U.S.at294).


E. THEDORMANTCOMMERCECLAUSEThe foregoing analysis of the minimum contacts test also has

ramificationsforourunderstandingoftheCommerceClause.Thisisbecause,inordertosurviveaDormantCommerceClausechallenge,theCourthasdirectedthatastatelawmust,interalia,respectanex-traterritorialityprinciple.241Accordingtothisprinciple,astatemaynotenactlegislationthathastheeffectofregulatingcommerceoccur-ringwholly outside its borders.242 This extraterritoriality principlehasbeencomparedtothelimitsonstatecourtpersonaljurisdiction,sincebothpreventstatesfromexertingpowerovercommercialactorsthatdidnot,intheirrelevantbusinesstransactions,havemeaningfulcontactwiththestate.243AsJusticeWhiteremarked:“ThelimitsonaState’s power to enact substantive legislation [under the DormantCommerceClause]aresimilartothelimitsonthejurisdictionofstatecourts.”244

The Court has been careful to note that, while similar, theDormantCommerceClauselimitsarenotidenticaltothepersonalju-risdiction limits.245 Indeed,astheCourtmovedawayfromtherigidterritorialruleforjurisdictioninthepost-Shoeera,theDormantCom-merceClause testhas retaineda lingering focuson territoriality.246Thatsaid,theCourthasshownsomerecentinterestinbringingthesetests back into alignment. In South Dakota v. Wayfair, the Courtbroughtthe“substantialnexus”rule,whichservesananalogousanti-extraterritoriality function in the application of the Dormant Com-merce Clause to tax-related statutes, into close alignmentwith thecontemporary personal jurisdiction test, for example.247 Moreover,theCourtjustifieditsnewtestinWayfairwithlogicplainlyborrowedfrom its post-Shoe jurisdiction cases, with the Court asserting:“[T]hereisnothingunfairaboutrequiringcompaniesthatavailthem-selvesoftheStates’benefitstobearanequalshareoftheburdenoftaxcollection.”248

Inthecomingyears,theCourtpresumablywillmakefurtherde-cisionsabouttheextenttowhichthisDormantCommerceClausetest

241. See,e.g.,Healyv.BeerInst.,491U.S.324,336(1989). 242. See,e.g.,id.(holdingthatastatecannotpreventdistributorsfromraisingout-of-statepricesaftersubmittingtheirmonthlypricestotheregulatingstate). 243. SeeEdgarv.MITECorp.,457U.S.624,643(1982). 244. Id. 245. SeeHealy,491U.S.at336n.13. 246. See,e.g.,id.at326&n.1. 247. SeeSouthDakotav.WayfairInc.,138S.Ct.2080(2018). 248. Id.at2096.


shouldbebroughtintoalignmentwiththeminimumcontactstest,asopposedtocontinuingitscommitmenttoaPennoyer-styleterritorial-ityprinciple.Asitdoes,theCourtshouldhavefullawarenessofthelogic,andthebenefits,ofthemodernminimumcontactstest.Tothisend,theCourtwoulddowelltorecognizethattheminimumcontactstestanchorspersonaljurisdictioninaprotectivesovereigntythesis—andtoconsiderwhetherthisvisionofstates,asopposedtothemorerigid territorial vision,wouldbetter serve theendof fosteringeco-nomicunityandcooperationthroughtheDormantCommerceClause.

F. DEMYSTIFYINGCONFLICTSAsSectionAmentioned,personaljurisdictionhasareputationas

beingconfused.Generally, thisareaof law—alongwiththebroaderfieldofConflictsofLaw—alsohasareputationofbeingconfusing.Stu-dentsandlawyersregularlyviewitasanintimidatingtopic,assumingthatitisprohibitivelydauntingtotheuninitiated.Thisreputationislamentable;itsteersthoughtfulstudentsandpractitionersawayfromengaginginanimportantfieldoftheoryandpractice.Fortunately,thisreputationalsoislargelyavoidable.ConflictsofLawisnotaninher-entlydifficultlegaltopic.Rather,itisrendereddifficultwhenstudentsandpractitionersareexpectedtoproduce,oncommand,ideasthatarepresentedascommonsense—butthatactuallyarelearned,notintui-tive.

This ispreciselywhathappensacrossseveraldomains inCon-flictsofLaw.Ideasaboutsovereignstates,andabouttheirpowers,arepresentedasintuitive,obviously-sharedideas.249Inreality,however,they are contested and contestable assumptions250—ones that be-comemanageableoncetheyareacknowledged.Tothisend,acknowl-edgmentoftheroleplayedbytheprotectivesovereigntythesiscanhelpdemystifythisareaoflaw,asitbringstotheforequestionsthat,fortoolong,haveremainedimplicit.What,forexample,aretherele-vant“benefitsandprotection”thatastateaffords?251Whatarethe“in-terests”thatstateslegitimatelypursuethroughtheirlaws?Whobe-longstothesovereigncommunitythatthe“benefitsandprotection”aredesignedtoprotect?252

249. SeediscussionsupraPartII. 250. SeediscussionsupraPartII. 251. Forexample,doesthisincludethebenefitofseekingredressincourts,asJus-ticeBlackrepeatedlysuggested?See,e.g.,Int’lShoeCorp.v.Washington,326U.S.310,324(1945)(Black, J., concurring).Or is it referringsolely tooutside-the-courtroombenefits,suchasprotectionagainstharmsfromnegligentactors? 252. For example, is it the state’s citizens, as JusticeBlack assumed in hisShoe


These questions rise to the surface once the protective sover-eigntythesisisacknowledged.Absentthatacknowledgment,theytoooftenremainburiedintheCourt’sopinions,presentedasnaturalas-sumptionsaboutthebehaviorofstates.Infact,theyareanythingbutthat—theyaredebatableideasthatcuttotherootofourself-under-standingasapoliticalcommunity,andtheywarrantdemystificationandexplicitdiscussion.

G. THEROLEOFTERRITORYUnder the regime of Pennoyer v. Neff, the role that territorial

boundariesplayed inpersonal jurisdictionanalysiswasclear.Here,stateboundarieswereseenasdemarcating the inherent limitsofastate’ssovereignpower.253Consequently,theseterritorialboundarieswereviewedascrucialtoanassessmentofastate’sclaimtojurisdic-tion,sincejurisdictionwasseenassimplyonemanifestationofstatesovereignpower.

Bycontrast,theroleofterritorialboundariesafterInternationalShoe is lessobvious.254On theonehand, theCourt in International

concurrence,seeid.,orisitstateresidents,asBlackpositedinMcGee,seeMcGeev.Int’lLifeIns.Co.,355U.S.220,223(1957)? 253. Pennoyerv.Neff,95U.S.714,722(1878)(“[E]veryStatepossessesexclusivejurisdictionandsovereigntyoverpersonsandpropertywithinitsterritory.”). 254. Forillustration,considerthefollowingfromLeaBrilmayer:

Asovereign(orquasi-sovereign,inthecaseofastate)hasarecognizedinterestinregulatingconductwithinitsborders.Itreflectsthestate’sobliga-tiontoprotectitscitizensandtheirinterestswithinthestate.Thesefactorscometogethertosupportthemostrecognizableformofpersonaljurisdictionexercisedbystates: jurisdictionoverconductofthosewithinitsterritorialboundaries.Theyalsoformthecoreofthejustificationforastate’sexerciseofpoweroverthosewhoactoutsideof itsboundaries,butwhoseconductaffectspeoplepresentorresidingthere.

LeaBrilmayer,AGeneralLookatSpecificJurisdiction:TowardsaUnifiedTheoryof“Aris-ingOutof”or“Relatedto”JurisdictionWheretheDefendant’sForumConductContrib-utedtothePlaintiff’sClaims,42YALEJ.INT’LL.ONLINE1,14(2017).Here,Brilmayerinsightfullynotesthestate’sprotectiveroleanditsrelevancetojurisdiction.However,sheassumesthatthisroleextendsonlyto“citizensandtheirinterestswithinthestate.”Id.Why?Whydoesthestate’sprotectivemissionnecessarilyendatitsborders?Then,shepositsthatthisprotectionrolejustifiesjurisdictionoverall“conductwithinitsbor-ders,”includingactivityinjurioussolelytononcitizens.Id.Whywouldthesovereign’smission,asdefinedbyBrilmayer,licensejurisdictioncompletelywithinstateborders?TheanswerappearstobeWestphalian:Brilmayeraddsthatforeigners“aresubjecttojurisdictioninsuchcasesonlywhereterritorialsovereigntyinterestsareatstake.”Id.TheintroductionofterritorialityateachstageoftheanalysisthusseemstoproduceatangleofprotectiveandWestphalianideasofsovereignty—onethatgeneratesconfu-sionandthatartificiallyinhibitsthepossibilitiesinherentinthepivottoaprotectivesovereigntythesis.


Shoeplainlyturnedawayfromtheterritorialdefinitionofthesover-eignstatethat,previously,ithadembracedinPennoyer.Ontheotherhand,theCourtsuggestedinShoethatadefendant’sphysicalpresencewithinstatebordersremainedafactofconsequencetojurisdictionalanalysis.255 As a result, there has been a fair amount of confusionabouttheextenttowhichterritorialboundariesremainrelevantun-der theminimum contacts test—and about whether, to the extenttheseboundariesdoremainrelevant,itshowsthattheWestphaliansovereignty thesis survives into modern-day jurisdictional doc-trine.256

WhenInternationalShoeisunderstoodasre-orientingpersonaljurisdictionaroundaprotectivesovereigntythesis,however,thiscon-fusioncanbedispelled.According to thisunderstanding, territorialboundariesdoremainrelevanttothejurisdictionalinquiry—buttheirrelevancederivesfromanewsource.Nolongeraretheseboundariesimportantsimplybecausetheyareviewedasprovidingtheinherentlimitsofsovereignpower.Rather,theyarerelevantbecausethereisanAmericanconstitutionaltradition—realizedundertheFourteenthAmendment—ofusingsovereignboundariestodemarcateanddefinethesovereigncommunitythat,underaprotectivesovereigntythesis,thesovereignmustworktoprotect.

ItwouldbeextremelybeneficialfortheCourttoclarifythisrolethatterritorialboundariesnowperforminjurisdictionalanalysis.Le-gally,ofcourse,itwouldhavethebenefitofremovinglingeringconfu-sion in personal jurisdiction doctrine. At the same time, this

255. SeeInt’lShoe,326U.S.at319(suggestingthatafactorofcontinuedrelevancewas “the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activitieswithinastate”). 256. CompareParrish,supranote69(“IfterritorialsovereigntywasthegoverningparadigmforcasesbeforeInternationalShoe,dueprocessanditsfocusontheindivid-uallitigantwastheoneforthecasesthatfollowed.”),andRexR.Perschbacher,Fore-word,28U.C.DAVISL.REV.513,513(1995)(“Atthetime,andforatleastthenextthirtyyears,the ‘minimumcontacts’doctrineannouncedinInternationalShoeseemedtherightvehicletoreplacetherigidandoutdatedterritorialpowertheoryofInternationalShoe’sdiscreditedantecedent,Pennoyerv.Neff.”),withBernadetteBollasGenetin,TheSupremeCourt’sNewApproachtoPersonalJurisdiction,68SMUL.REV.107,121(2015)(“InternationalShoe,however,presentstwofaces—oneforward-lookingface,basedonlanguagethatspeaksintermsofreasonablenessorfairnessoftheforumbasedonthelitigationatissue,andasecond,backward-lookingfacethatprivilegesPennoyer’spremisethatstateterritorialauthoritymustberespected.”),andMartinH.Redish&EricJ.Beste,PersonalJurisdictionandtheGlobalResolutionofMassTortLitigation:De-finingtheConstitutionalBoundaries,28U.C.DAVISL.REV.917(1995)(arguingthatIn-ternationalShoesupportsterritorialjurisdiction),andStein,supranote62,at698–99(arguingthatInternationalShoecontainedanefforttoextendPennoyer’sfocusuponWestphaliansovereignty).


clarificationalsowouldservevaluableexpressivebenefitsinthecur-rentpoliticalmoment.InAmerica,territory-baseddefinitionsofthesovereign community have been embraced for a specific reason:namely, because they operate as an antidote to race- or ethnicity-based theories of community. As the architects of the Civil WarAmendmentssoughttoleavebehindahistoryofracially-definedsov-ereigncommunities(atboththefederalandstatelevels),theyturnedtoterritoryasprovidinganalternative,race-neutralmeansofdemar-catingthecommunitythatsovereignsmustworktoprotect—andtoprotect equally.257 Through the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore,territorialboundarieswereweaponizedasenginesofracialandeth-nicequalityinAmerica.258

InAmericanpoliticalcultureoverthepastfewyears,therehasbeen an insidious resurgence of rhetoric positing that territorialboundariesshouldservepreciselytheoppositefunction.Undertheseaccounts,boundariesareuseful insteadbecause theymightdemar-cateandpreserveanethnicallyhomogeneouscommunity.FromPres-identTrump’s calls tobuildawall along theAmericanborderwithMexico,259tochantsof“bloodandsoil”inCharlottesville,260therehasbeenadisturbingreturninAmericanpublicdiscoursetotheideathatterritorialboundariesandattachmentscan,should,ordoprotecteth-nichomogeneity.Inlightofthetroublingrecentsurgeinpublicrhet-oricthathaspromotedandrelieduponthisconception,therewouldbesignificantexpressivevalueinaCourtopinionthatfirmlyarticu-latedthecontraryvision:avisionofAmericawheresovereignbound-ariesareemployedpreciselybecause,underaprotectivesovereigntythesis,theyprovideanequality-orientedmethodofdefiningthecom-munity that the statemustwork to protect. In the aforementioned

257. Forjustafewexamplesofthispre-CivilWarhistory,see,forexample,ARTI-CLESOFCONFEDERATIONof1781,art.IVwhichstatesthatonly“thefreeinhabitantsofeachoftheseStates”areentitledtotheprivilegesandimmunitiesoftheotherstates(andwithadditionalexceptions);andDredScottv.Sandford,60U.S.(19How.)393(1857)(construingtheterm“citizen”asexcludingemancipatedslaves),supersededbyconstitutionalamendment,U.S.CONST.amend.XIV.SeealsoDONALDG.NIEMAN,TOSETTHELAW INMOTION:THEFREEDMEN’SBUREAUANDTHELEGALRIGHTSOFBLACKS, 1865–1868,at77–102(1979)(onthe“BlackCodes”oftheimmediatepost-CivilWarperiod). 258. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 380–95(2005). 259. SeePeterBaker,TrumpDeclaresaNationalEmergency,andProvokesaCon-stitutionalClash,N.Y.TIMES(Feb.15,2019),https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html[https://perma.cc/5SEB-45PB]. 260. See Meg Wagner, “Blood and Soil”: Protesters Chant Nazi Slogan in Char-lottesville, CNN (Aug. 12, 2017, 7:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottesville-unite-the-right-rally/index.html[https://perma.cc/7FAH-GGMJ].


wordsofFranklinRoosevelt,itwouldaffordtheCourtanopportunityto reassert that: “[O]ur national policy in internal affairs has beenbaseduponadecentrespectfortherightsandthedignityofallourfellowmenwithinourgates.”261

Inafuturearticle,Iplantoexplorethispointingreaterdetail.Fornow,however,itmaysufficetonotethatareturntoShoe’stheoryofsovereigntywouldprovidetheCourtwithanopportunitytoreassertthisfundamentalAmericanvisionofthesovereigncommunity—andtodosoatatimewhenthatvisioncouldusebolsteringinourpublicdiscourse.

CONCLUSIONConflictsofLawisafieldthat,asmuchasanyfieldinthelaw,has

beenshapedbyawidespreadunderstandingofasingle,centralevent.Accordingtothatunderstanding,theConflictsrevolutionpivotedthefieldawayfromjurisdictionalandchoice-of-lawtestsanchoredinanytheoryofsovereignty,andinsteadembracedmorepragmatictestsfo-cusedonflexibility,fairness,andconvenience.Itistimetorecognize,however,thatthisinterpretationisfundamentallyincorrect.TheCon-flictsrevolutionplainlywasacontinuationoftheCourt’straditionofrelyinguponsovereignty-basedtests,notarepudiationofthattradi-tion.TheunappreciatedtriumphoftheConflictsrevolution,inreality,wastoanchorAmericanConflictsofLawinanalternatetheoryofsov-ereignty.ThisArticlehassetouttoexplainthisalternatetheory—re-ferredtoastheprotectivesovereigntythesis—andtochronicleitsap-pearancein(andimplicationsfor)personaljurisdictiondoctrine.Insodoing,ithopefullyhasbeguntoillustratethemanybenefitsthatcanaccruefromacorrectedunderstandingoftheConflictsrevolution—anunderstanding that recognizes itskey innovationof re-orientingthefieldaroundaprotectivesovereigntythesis.

261. FourFreedoms,supranote151.

Rethinking the Conflicts Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction

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