Eight Conflicts Cyber Conflicts

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SESSION ID: Eig ht Cyber Con fli cts Whi ch Changed Cyberspace STR-F01 Jason Healey Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative  Atlantic Council @Jason_Healey

Transcript of Eight Conflicts Cyber Conflicts

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SESSION ID:

Eight Cyber Conflicts Which ChangedCyberspace

STR-F01

Jason Healey

Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative Atlantic Council

@Jason_Healey

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Cyber Truisms

Cyber conflict is moving incredib

quickly.

Change is the only constant…

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From Army Cyber Command Update,

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Cyber TruismsFew if any contemporary computer security controls

have prevented a [red team] from easily accessing any

information sought.

The market does not work well enough to raise the secu

of computer systems at a rate fast enough to match the

apparent growth in threats to systems.

Espionage over networks can be cost-efficient, offer

nearly immediate results, and target specific locations …

insulated from risks of internationally embarrassingincidents

The almost obsessive persistence of serious

penetrators is astonishing.

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Cyber Truisms

1979

1988

1991

1988

Few if any contemporary computer security controls

have prevented a [red team] from easily accessing any

information sought.

The market does not work well enough to raise the secu

of computer systems at a rate fast enough to match the

apparent growth in threats to systems.

Espionage over networks can be cost-efficient, offer

nearly immediate results, and target specific locations …

insulated from risks of internationally embarrassingincidents

The almost obsessive persistence of serious

penetrators is astonishing.

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Eight Cyber Conflicts

1. Cuckoo’s Egg (1986) – only DoJ paid attention

2. Morris Worm (1988) – Led to first CERT

3. ELIGIBLE RECEIVER and SOLAR SUNRISE (1997, 1998) – JTF-CN

4. MOONLIGHT MAZE (2000+) – Cooperation and coordination

5. Chinese Espionage (2000s) -- Led to billions spent through CNCI

6. Estonia and Georgia (2007, 2008) – Global attention, NATO focus

7. BUCKSHOT YANKEE (2008) – US Cyber Command

8. Stuxnet (2009) – Global attention, possible counterattack on US banks

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WHAT HAPPENED IN 1986?

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Cuckoo’s Egg: ~1986

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Morris Worm: 1988

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ELIGIBLE RECEIVERand SOLAR SUNRISE

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MOONLIGHT MAZE: late 1990s, early 2000

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Chinese Espionage: 2000s- Today

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Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008)

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BUCKSHOT YANKEE

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St t d US I C t C fli t

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Stuxnet and US-Iran Covert Conflict:mid-2000s to today

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Eight Cyber Conflicts

1. Cuckoo’s Egg (1986) – only DoJ paid attention

2. Morris Worm (1988) – Led to first CERT

3. ELIGIBLE RECEIVER and SOLAR SUNRISE (1997, 1998) – JTF-CN

4. MOONLIGHT MAZE (2000+) – Cooperation and coordination

5. Chinese Espionage (2000s) -- Led to billions spent through CNCI

6. Estonia and Georgia (2007, 2008) – Global attention, NATO focus

7. BUCKSHOT YANKEE (2008) – US Cyber Command

8. Stuxnet (2009) – Global attention, possible counterattack on US banks

T L l Fi di

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There is a history and we must learn from it!

Dynamics are relatively stable despite change…

Top-Level FindingsFrom Cyber as National Security History

T L l Fi di

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There is a history and we must learn from it!

Comparison to fighter pilots

The real impacts of cyber conflicts have been cooverestimated

Cyber Pearl Harbor, no deaths yet! (we think)

Top-Level FindingsFrom Cyber as National Security History

Top Le el Findings

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There is a history and we must learn from it!

The real impacts of cyber conflicts have been consistently overestimated

Cyber is more familiar than it seems

The more strategically significant a cyber conflict is, the m

is to conflicts on the land, in the air, and on the sea—with o

exception

With implications for Speed of Response

 Attribution

Warning

Deterrence

Top-Level FindingsFrom Cyber as National Security History

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There is a history anfrom it!

The real impacts of c

have been consisten

Cyber is more famili

The more strategica

cyber conflict is, the

conflicts on the land

the sea—with one c

QUESTIONS?

@Jaso

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