Restoration of Right to Public Office, License, Etc.

American Law Reports ALR3dThe ALR databases are made current by the weekly addition of relevant new cases.

Pardon as restoring public office or license or eligibility therefor

Gary L. Hall, J.D.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Article OutlineIndexTable of Cases, Laws, and RulesResearch ReferencesARTICLE OUTLINE

I Prefatory Matters§ 1[a] Introduction—Scope§ 1[b] Introduction—Related matters§ 2[a] Summary and comment—Generally§ 2[b] Summary and comment—Practice pointers

II General considerationsA Public office

§ 3 Restoration; view that pardon does not restore public office§ 4 Eligibility; view that pardon removes punishment and moral guilt§ 5 View that pardon removes punishment but not moral guilt§ 6 View that pardon removes neither conviction nor moral guilt

B Licenses§ 7 To practice law; view that pardon merely opens door to restoration of li-

cense§ 8 Other licenses; view that pardon removes punishment but not moral guilt§ 9 View that pardon removes neither conviction nor moral guilt

III Effect of pardon on restoration of or eligibility for particular office or licenseA Public office

§ 10 Executive offices§ 11 Legislative offices§ 12 Judicial offices§ 13 Miscellaneous; policemen

B Licenses§ 14[a] To practice law—Held restored§ 14[b] To practice law—Held not restored§ 15 To practice medicine§ 16 Miscellaneous

Research ReferencesINDEX

Abortion disbarment following conviction of causing § 7moral qualifications of attorney as to being involved in § 14[b]

58 A.L.R.3d 1191 58 A.L.R.3d 1191 (Originally published in 1974)

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Armed robbery involving police officer §§5,13Assault, conviction of §§12,14[b]Attorney's license, pardon restoring §§7,14Ballot, candidate placing name on § 4Character, pardon as not restoring § 4Citizenship, pardon as restoring full rights of §§13,14[b]City alderman, disqualification of candidate for office of § 11Civil service employment §§4,13Client's money, attorney collecting § 14[b]Comment and summary § 2Confederacy, lawyer on side of § 14[b]Conspiracy conviction of attorney § 14[b]Conviction or moral guilt, pardon as removing §§6,9County commissioner §§3,11County judge, restoration of eligibility for office of § 12Dangerous weapon, policeman carrying §§5,13Disbarment, commission of crime by attorney §§7,14Driver's license, reissuance of §§9,16Effect of pardon on restoration of or eligibility for particular offices or licenses §§10-16Embezzlement by attorney § 14Embezzlement by public official §§4,6,10,12,14[a]Estate, attorney converting goods of § 14[b]Extortion conviction, disbarment of attorney for § 14[b]Forgery, attorney's conviction of § 14[b]Governor's office, ineligible for § 10Grand larceny, attorney convicted of § 14[b]Healing, art of §§3,9,15Impeachment proceedings by justice of peace § 12Innocence, pardon restoring § 4Intoxicating liquors attorney's reinstatement on condition of abstinence from § 14[b]illegal sale of § 16

Introduction § 1Judicial offices, effect of pardon on restoration of or eligibility for § 12Justice of peace, impeachment actions by § 12Larceny, conviction for §§4,6,10,12-14Law practice, licenses for §§7,14Legislative offices, effect of pardon on restoration of or eligibility for § 11Licenses, effect of pardon on restoration of or eligibility for §§7-9,14-16Liquor permit, eligibility to obtain §§8,16Loyalty oath, attorney taking § 14[b]Malicious stabbing, conviction of justice of peace in § 12Manslaughter, physician's license revoked because of conviction of §§3,15Medical license, restoration of §§3,9,15Moral guilt, pardon as removing §§4-6Moral turpitude, conviction involving §§3,14[b],16Murder attorney's intention at time of assault § 14[b]city policeman convicted of §§3,13



Participation in rebellion by attorney § 14[a]Penitentiary, probate and county judge confinement in § 12Physician's license to practice medicine §§3,9,15Policemen, effect of pardon on restoration or eligibility of § 13Postmaster, embezzlement conviction of § 6Practice pointers § 2[b]Prefatory matters §§1,2Probate judge, restoration or eligibility for office of § 12Professional misconduct of attorney § 7Public funds, embezzlement of §§4,6,10,12,14[a]Public highways, attorney's intoxication on § 14[b]Public office effect of pardon on restoration or eligibility of §§10-12general considerations as to §§3-6

Punishment, pardon as removing §§4,5Quo warranto proceeding as to county judge § 12Real estate broker's license §§9,16Related matters § 1[b]Salesman's license §§9,16Scope § 1[a]State representative, ineligibility of § 11Summary and comment § 2Taxicab license, renewal of §§9,16View that pardon merely opens door to restoration of license to practice law § 7Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules

Supreme Court

Ex parte Law (1866, DC Ga) F Cas No 8126 — 14[a]

Garland, Ex parte, 71 U.S. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, 32 How. Pr. 241, 1866 WL 9477 (1866) — 3, 14[a]

Alabama

Reed v. State ex rel. Davis, 961 So. 2d 89 (Ala. 2006) — 3

Stephenson, In re, 243 Ala. 342, 10 So. 2d 1, 143 A.L.R. 166 (1942) — 3, 7, 14[b]

Arkansas

Atty. Gen., State ex rel. v. Irby, 190 Ark. 786, 81 S.W.2d 419 (1935) — 6, 12

Ridgeway v. Catlett, 238 Ark. 323, 379 S.W.2d 277 (1964) — 10

State v. Carson, 27 Ark. 469, 1872 WL 1044 (1872) — 12

California

Lavine, Re (1935) 2 Cal 2d 324, 41 P2d 161 — 7, 14[b]

O'Connell, In re, 64 Cal. App. 673, 222 P. 625 (1st Dist. 1923) — 14[b]



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Riccardi, In re, 64 Cal. App. 791, 222 P. 625 (1st Dist. 1923) — 14[b]

Wettlin v. State Bar of Cal., 24 Cal. 2d 862, 151 P.2d 255 (1944) — 7

Colorado

Browne, In re, 2 Colo. 553, 1875 WL 312 (1875) — 14[b]

Connecticut

Pharr v. Standing Committee on Recommendations to the Bar, New Haven County, 32 Conn. Supp.183, 346 A.2d 115 (Super. Ct. 1975) — 7, 14[a]

District of Columbia

Borders, In re, 797 A.2d 716 (D.C. 2002) — 7

Florida

Branch v. State, 120 Fla. 666, 163 So. 48 (1935) — 14[b]

Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, In re, 341 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1976) — 7

Randall v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 791 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist.2001) — 6

Sears, Petition of, 147 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1962) — 14[b]

Georgia

Hulgan v. Thornton, 205 Ga. 753, 55 S.E.2d 115 (1949) — 3, 11

Morris v. Hartsfield, 186 Ga. 171, 197 S.E. 251 (1938) — 3, 4, 13

Payne v. State, 52 Ga. App. 425, 183 S.E. 638 (1936) — 14[b]

Scott v. Leathers, 78 Ga. App. 661, 52 S.E.2d 40 (1949) — 3, 7, 14[b]

Illinois

Hildreth v. Heath, 1 Ill. App. 82, 1878 WL 10294 (1st Dist. 1878) — 11

People v. Rongetti, 395 Ill. 580, 70 N.E.2d 568 (1946) — 15

Indiana

Beck, Matter of, 264 Ind. 141, 342 N.E.2d 611 (1976) — 7, 14[b]

Patterson v. Dykes, 804 N.E.2d 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) — 3

Iowa

Slater v. Olson, 230 Iowa 1005, 299 N.W. 879 (1941) — 4, 13

Kentucky























Com. ex rel. Harris v. Porter, 257 Ky. 563, 78 S.W.2d 800 (1935) — 7, 14[b]

Louisiana

Cook v. Skipper, 749 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999) — 6

State v. Adams, 355 So. 2d 917 (La. 1978) — 8

State v. Gowland, 189 La. 80, 179 So. 41 (1938) — 14[b]

State v. Gowland, 174 La. 351, 140 So. 500 (1932) — 3, 7, 14[b]

Maryland

Meyerson, In re, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948) — 7, 14[b]

Massachusetts

Commissioner of Metropolitan District Commission v. Director of Civil Service, 348 Mass. 184,203 N.E.2d 95 (1964) — 5, 13

Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188 (1st Cir. 1970) (applying Massachusetts law) — 13

Minnesota

Lindquist, In re, 310 Minn. 558, 246 N.W.2d 35 (1976) — 14[a]

Mississippi

Crisler, Ex parte, 159 Miss. 247, 132 So. 103 (1931) — 7, 14[a]

Missouri

Damiano v. Burge, 481 S.W.2d 562, 58 A.L.R.3d 1183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) — 3, 8, 16

Guastello v. Department of Liquor Control, 536 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1976) — 8, 14[b]

Theodoro v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 527 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. 1975) — 16

New York

Baldi v. Gilchrist, 204 A.D. 425, 198 N.Y.S. 493 (1st Dep't 1923) — 9, 16

Finn, In re, 256 A.D. 288, 10 N.Y.S.2d 29 (2d Dep't 1939) — 7

Kaufmann, In re, 245 N.Y. 423, 157 N.E. 730 (1927) — 7, 14[b]

Oklahoma

Cloud, State ex rel. v. Election Bd. of State of Oklahoma, 1934 OK 481, 169 Okla. 363, 36 P.2d 20,94 A.L.R. 1007 (1934) — 3, 4, 11

Stone v. Oklahoma Real Estate Commission, 1962 OK 55, 369 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1962) — 9, 16

Tennessee























State v. Parks, 122 Tenn. 230, 122 S.W. 977 (1909) — 3, 12

Texas

Ferguson v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 280, 28 S.W.2d 526 (1930) — 2[b]

Hankamer v. Templin, 143 Tex. 572, 187 S.W.2d 549 (1945) — 3, 7, 14[b]

Vermont

Harrington, Petition of, 134 Vt. 549, 367 A.2d 161 (1976) — 7, 14[a]

Virginia

Com. v. Fugate, 29 Va. 724, 1830 WL 1381 (1830) — 12

Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941) — 9, 16

Washington

State v. Hazzard, 139 Wash. 487, 247 P. 957, 47 A.L.R. 538 (1926) — 3, 9, 15

West Virginia

Hunter, Ex parte, 2 W. Va. 122, 1867 WL 1662 (1867) — 14[b]

Quarrier, Ex parte, 4 W. Va. 210, 1870 WL 2036 (1870) — 14[b]

I. Prefatory Matters

§ 1[a] Introduction—Scope

This annotation[1] collects the cases concerned with whether or not a pardon restores to the onepardoned a public office or license or eligibility for a public office or license. However, the annotation is notconcerned with cases discussing the application of executive clemency in one jurisdiction to a conviction ofcrime had in another jurisdiction, as affecting disqualifications in the former jurisdiction resulting from suchconviction.[2] It should also be noted that cases discussing a pardon as a defense in a disbarment proceedingare not treated herein.

Relevant statutes and court rules are considered herein only to the extent that they are reflected in thecases within the scope of the annotation. However, since it is quite possible that the effect of a pardon maybe controlled, at least in part, by statutes or court rules, the reader is advised to consult the latest relevantprovisions of his jurisdiction.

§ 1[b] Introduction—Related matters

Related Annotations are located under the Research Referencesheading of this Annotation.

§ 2[a] Summary and comment—Generally

Many constitutional or statutory provisions provide that a conviction of certain crimes renders the oneconvicted ineligible to hold public office.[3]












There is general agreement among the courts that the granting of a pardon to an offender will not restorehim to a public office which he has forfeited as a result of his conviction.[4] However, there does not appearto be such a well-settled rule concerning the effect of a pardon on the eligibility of the one pardoned to holdpublic office.[5]

Crucial to the determination whether a pardon will restore eligibility to hold a particular office is theview that the court takes as to the general effect of a pardon. Thus, some courts have taken the view that thepardon eliminates both the punishment resulting from the conviction and any moral guilt or blame whichmay have accompanied the commission of the crime.[6] Under this view, it would appear that a pardonwould restore eligibility for public office. On the other hand, it has been said that while the pardon removesthe punishment resulting from the conviction, it does not remove the moral guilt resulting from the commis-sion of the crime; under this view, if a disqualification to hold public office is based merely upon a convic-tion of a crime, the pardon restores the one pardoned to eligibility for the office, although he is not restoredto eligibility where character is a qualification for the office.[7] In considering the eligibility of a pardonedperson for public office, other courts have concluded that the pardon eliminates neither the fact of convictionnor the moral guilt accompanying the conviction.[8] Such a view would appear to lead to the conclusion thatthe pardon does not restore eligibility.

Many of the cases dealing with the effect of a pardon on the restoration of, or eligibility for, a licensehave involved licenses to practice law. These cases indicate a general view that a pardon does not automatic-ally result in the restoration of a license forfeited because of the commission of a crime, although the casesindicate that the pardon "opens the door" for the licensing authorities to consider the qualifications of theone pardoned.[9]

In those cases involving the restoration of, or eligibility for, licenses other than to practice law, thecourts have engaged in the same analytical process involved in those cases considering the effect of a pardonupon eligibility to hold public office. Thus, some courts have adopted the view that the pardon removes thelegal punishment resulting from conviction, but not the moral guilt or blame arising from the acts involvedin committing the crime.[10] Other courts have adopted the view that the pardon obliterates neither the actof conviction nor the accompanying moral guilt.[11]

The courts have considered whether a pardon resulted in the restoration of, or eligibility for, executiveoffices,[12] legislative offices, [13] and judicial offices,[14] as well as various other offices.[15] They havealso considered the effect of a pardon on the restoration of, or eligibility for, licenses to practice law[16] ormedicine,[17] in addition to various other licenses.[18] The results in these cases have depended on the ap-plicability of the foregoing principles, as well as the circumstances of the particular case.

§ 2[b] Summary and comment—Practice pointers

The attorney seeking to determine whether his client is eligible to seek public office or obtain a licenseas a result of a pardon should not assume, without some investigation, that the pardon is valid; in particular,counsel should concern himself with the question whether the officer of board which granted the pardon tocounsel's client had the authority to grant pardons.[19]

Of course, counsel must concern himself with the proper forum in which to raise the question of the ef-fect of a pardon on his client's status, [20] and, where local law dictates that the issue be raised before an ad-ministrative body, counsel will need to consider the extent to which the courts of his jurisdiction will reviewthe rulings of such a body.

Since the general rule appears to be that a pardon does not restore a license to practice law, but merelyopens the door to an inquiry as to whether the attorney should be permitted to practice,[21] questions as to



the applicant-attorney's general qualifications ultimately will be considered, thus requiring the applicant andhis counsel to be prepared to demonstrate the good character of the applicant.[22]

II. General considerations

A. Public office

§ 3. Restoration; view that pardon does not restore public office

[Cumulative Supplement]In a number of cases, the courts have stated that a pardon granted to an offender does not restore him to

a previously held public office which he forfeited as a result of a conviction of a crime.USEx parte Garland (1867) 71 US 333, 18 L Ed 366

AlaRe Stephenson (1942) 243 Ala 342, 10 So 2d 1, 143 ALR 166

GaMorris v Hartsfield (1938) 186 Ga 171, 197 SE 251

Hulgan v Thornton (1949) 205 Ga 753, 55 SE2d 115

Scott v Leathers (1949) 78 Ga App 661, 52 SE2d 40La

Re Gowland (1932) 174 La 351, 140 So 500Mo

Damiano v Burge (1972, Mo App) 481 SW2d 562, 58 ALR3d 1183Okla

State ex rel. Cloud v Election Board of State (1934) 169 Okla 363, 36 P2d 20, 94 ALR 1007Tenn

State ex rel. Webb v Parks (1909) 122 Tenn 230, 122 SW 977Tex

Hankamer v Templin (1945) 143 Tex 572, 187 SW2d 549Wash

State v Hazzard (1926) 139 Wash 487, 247 P 957, 47 ALR 538

In Morris v Hartsfield (1938) 186 Ga 171, 197 SE 251, wherein a former city policeman who had beenconvicted of murder was subsequently granted a pardon by the governor of the state, the court recognizedthat a pardon could restore one to full rights of citizenship, including the right to hold public office, but thecourt indicated that a pardon does not operate to confer or restore a public office which was previously held,but which on account of a conviction and sentence was necessarily relinquished.

In Hulgan v Thornton (1949) 205 Ga 753, 55 SE2d 115, wherein a county commissioner who had beenconvicted in federal court of a crime involving moral turpitude was not permitted to continue in office, eventhough he had been pardoned by the President of the United States, the court recognized that where an officehas been forfeited by reason of the conviction of a crime, a subsequent pardon does not restore the party tothe office so forfeited.

Observing that a pardon releases punishment and blots out guilt, so that in the eye of the law an offenderis as innocent as if he had never committed an offense, in State ex rel. Cloud v Election Board of State(1934) 169 Okla 363, 36 P2d 20, 94 ALR 1007, the court recognized that even though a pardon can restore apardoned convict's eligibility to hold a public office, a pardon does not automatically restore offices for-feited in consequence of a conviction and judgment.

In State v Hazzard (1926) 139 Wash 487, 247 P 957, 47 ALR 538, wherein the court had said that a



















physician whose license had been revoked by the state medical board upon the strength of a conviction ofmanslaughter was not entitled to practice her profession after the governor of the state granted her an uncon-ditional pardon, the court recognized that a pardon does not restore offices forfeited in consequence of aconviction.

CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

Cases:

County commissioner's obtaining pardon, while in office, for his prior burglary conviction did not curehis ineligibility for public office, where commissioner had not been pardoned when elected and remainedunpardoned when he assumed office. Code 1975, § 36–2–1(a)(3). Reed v. State ex rel. Davis, 961 So. 2d 89(Ala. 2006).

County councilman–elect had prior felony conviction at time of his election that disqualified him fromholding office, even though councilman–elect obtained pardon nearly 10 months after election; subsequentpardon did not change councilman–elect's status as convicted felon at time of election, and retroactive ap-plication of pardon was contrary to public policy. West's A.I.C. 3–8–1–5(b). Patterson v. Dykes, 804 N.E.2d849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

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§ 4. Eligibility; view that pardon removes punishment and moral guilt

In the following case, in which the court considered whether one who had received a pardon thereby be-came eligible for public office, the court adopted the view that a pardon removes the punishment for thecrime committed, as well as the guilt resulting from the commission of that crime, thus making the offenderas innocent as if he had never committed the crime, and accordingly, eligible for office.

See Morris v Hartsfield (1938) 186 Ga 171, 197 SE 251, supra § 3, recognizing that a pardon restoresthe convicted person to general eligibility for public office.

And in an applicant's suit to review the action of the civil service commission in rejecting his applica-tion for a civil service position because he had been convicted of a felony, though subsequently pardoned,the court in Slater v Olson (1941) 230 Iowa 1005, 299 NW 879, acknowledged that a full pardon grantedafter a conviction contemplates a remission of guilt, and that it forgives an offender and relieves him fromthe results of his offense, not only relieving him from the punishment which the law inflicts for the crime,but also exempting him from additional penalties and legal consequences in the form of disqualifications ordisabilities based upon his conviction. While it indicated that a pardon does not of itself conclusively restorethe character of an offender, the court nevertheless recognized that although prohibited acts are not obliter-ated by a pardon, they are purged of their criminality. However, the court declined to approve the doctrinethat the effect of a full pardon is to make an offender a new man, and that in the eye of the law he would beas innocent as if he had never committed an offense, pointing out that broad implications could be attributedto such a statement.

In an action wherein a candidate for the office of state representative unsuccessfully sought to have hisname placed upon the ballot as the party nominee because of the alleged ineligibility of his opponent, whohad received more votes but had previously been adjudged guilty of embezzlement, the court in State ex rel.Cloud v Election Board of State (1934) 169 Okla 363, 36 P2d 20, 94 ALR 1007, stated that a full and uncon-ditional pardon after a conviction reaches both the punishment prescribed for an offense and the guilt of theoffender, so that the offense itself is obliterated in legal contemplation. Saying that a pardon deprives the tri-al court of any jurisdiction to enforce its judgment, and that it makes an offender a new man, the court ex-





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plained that when a pardon is full, it blots out the guilt, so that in the eye of the law an offender is as inno-cent as if he had never committed an offense. The court noted that a rightful exercise of the pardoning powerwould result in an encouragement to reform, and that a felon who has paid the price exacted by the law forhis transgression should be given the opportunity to prove by years of exemplary living that he has workedout a reformation of his own life, that he has removed the stain against his character, and that he is worthy oftrust.

§ 5. View that pardon removes punishment but not moral guilt

In the following case, the court adopted the view that a pardon removes all punishment resulting fromthe commission of a crime, but does not obliterate the guilt resulting from the acts committed; thus, accord-ing to the court, if a disqualification to hold a public office previously occupied by the offender is basedmerely upon the fact of conviction, the pardon restores the one pardoned to eligibility therefor, but if charac-ter is a necessary qualification for the office, the one pardoned is not eligible for that office.

In considering an applicant's fitness to be a police officer after he had been convicted of armed robberyand carrying a dangerous weapon and subsequently pardoned, the court in Commissioner of MetropolitanDist. Com. v Director of Civil Service (1964) 348 Mass 184, 203 NE2d 95, recognized that a pardon re-moves all legal punishment for an offense, and said that if a mere conviction involves certain disqualifica-tions which would not follow from the commission of a crime without a conviction, the pardon removessuch disqualifications. On the other hand, said the court, if character is a necessary qualification for an of-fice, and the commission of a crime would disqualify even though there were no criminal prosecution forsuch crime, the fact that a criminal has been pardoned should not make him any more eligible. Noting thatthe word "pardon" connotes guilt, the court explained that even if a pardon may remit all penal con-sequences of a criminal conviction, it cannot obliterate the acts which constituted a crime.

§ 6. View that pardon removes neither conviction nor moral guilt

[Cumulative Supplement]In the following case, the court adopted the view that a pardon does not obliterate the guilt arising from

the commission of the crime, nor does it remove the conviction itself, and thus the pardon does not renderthe one pardoned eligible to hold public office.

In State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v Irby (1935) 190 Ark 786, 81 SW2d 419, cert den Irby v Arkansas, 296 US616, 80 L Ed 437, 56 S Ct 136, wherein the court indicated that one who had been convicted of embezzle-ment of funds belonging to the United States while he was formerly serving as a postmaster was ineligible tohold the office of county judge, even though he had received a full pardon from the President of the UnitedStates, the court recognized that the issuance and acceptance, within itself, of a pardon irrevocably acknow-ledges a conviction of the crime pardoned, and said that as the very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or re-mission of penalty, a pardon implies guilt and it does not obliterate the fact of the commission of a crime,nor the conviction thereof. Acknowledging that the applicable constitutional disqualifying provision couldnot be considered as part of the punishment for the offense in the instant case, the court insisted that a par-don could not wash out a moral stain. The court pointed out that the holding of a public office is a politicalprivilege, and that it never becomes a right until the person claiming it shows that he is constitutionally eli-gible.


Cases:

Applicant, who received full pardon for conviction for falsely or fraudulently making a certificate as anotary public, was not entitled to certificate of eligibility to have his criminal history record expunged, as








pardon did not wipe out guilt or fact of conviction. West's F.S.A. § 943.0585. Randall v. Florida Departmentof Law Enforcement, 791 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2001).

Automatic pardon to which candidate was entitled after completion of sentence for his first offense didnot restore his right to hold public office; automatic pardon did not have same effect as a full pardon grantedby governor. LSA–Const. Art. 1, §§ 10(C), 20; LSA–Const. Art. 4, § 5(E)(1). Cook v. Skipper, 749 So. 2d 6(La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999), writ denied, 745 So. 2d 601 (La. 1999).

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B. Licenses

§ 7. To practice law; view that pardon merely opens door to restoration of license

[Cumulative Supplement]In the following cases, the courts held or recognized at least by implication that a pardon does not auto-

matically restore an attorney's license to practice law, but merely opens the door to an inquiry into whetherthe attorney possesses the standards of morality commensurate with the good character to be expected of amember of the bar.Fla

In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 341 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1976) (conditional pardon would not besufficient to lift objection to admission to bar)

In Re Stephenson (1942) 243 Ala 342, 10 So 2d 1, 143 ALR 166, the court said that since reinstatementto the bar will not automatically follow a pardon of a criminal conviction, a pardon does no more than openthe door to an inquiry that would otherwise be barred. The court recognized that a pardon reaches both thepunishment prescribed for an offense and the guilt of an offender, and that when a pardon is full it blots outthe guilt, so that in the eye of the law an offender is as innocent as if he had never committed an offense.However, recalling that good moral character is a prerequisite to admission to the bar, the court indicatedthat one should not be reinstated into the ranks of the legal profession, except upon overwhelming proof ofreform.

In Re Lavine (1935) 2 Cal 2d 324, 41 P2d 161, reh den (Cal) 42 P2d 311, wherein the court recognizedthat a disbarred attorney's application for reinstatement must be treated as an application for admission topractice, and not as an application to vacate the order of disbarment, the court said that while a pardon oblit-erates an offense to such an extent that for all legal purposes the one-time offender is to be relieved in thefuture from all of its results, it does not obliterate the act itself, but puts an offender in the same position asthough what he had done never was unlawful. Noting that a disbarred attorney who has been pardoned of anoffense cannot again practice without showing that he possesses the moral stamina essential to one qualifiedto be a member of the bar, the court pointed out that a pardon implies guilt and that it does not wash out amoral stain. The court went on to say that although a pardon relieves an offender of the penal consequencesof his act, it does not restore his character, and it cannot reinvest a person with those qualities which are ab-solutely essential for an attorney at law to possess.

See also Wettlin v State Bar of California (1944) 24 Cal 2d 862, 151 P2d 255, and Feinstein v State Barof California (1952) 39 Cal 2d 541, 248 P2d 3, in which the court made clear that a pardon of an attorneypreviously disbarred on account of his conviction of an offense does not of itself reinvest him with those es-sentials required of an attorney at law.

Attention is called to Scott v Leathers (1949) 78 Ga App 661, 52 SE2d 40, in which the court recog-nized that even though a disbarred attorney may not automatically be reinstated by an executive pardon of acrime which he has committed, a pardon would be one factor to be considered in its discretion, whilepassing upon whether an attorney should have his right to practice law restored to him. The court acknow-



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ledged that a pardon removes all blot and stain growing out of a previous conviction, and that it restores oneto full rights of citizenship.

In Re Gowland (1932) 174 La 351, 140 So 500, in which the court said that the governor's pardon of adisbarred attorney removed his disqualification for admission to the bar, the court recognized that a pardonreaches both the punishment prescribed for an offense and the guilt of the offender, and that when a pardonis full it blots out the guilt, so that in the eye of the law an offender is as innocent as if he had never commit-ted an offense. Noting that the attorney in the instant case did not contend that his pardon had the effect ofrestoring his license to practice, the court nevertheless acknowledged that he had re-established his good re-cord and reputation. However, pointing out that a disbarment proceeding is not a means of punishing an at-torney for misconduct or even a means of setting up an example to other attorneys, the court explained thatdisbarment proceedings are intended only for the betterment of the profession and for the protection of themembers of society who at times have to entrust their business and personal affairs to members of the pro-fession of law.

While examining the character of an attorney who had been disbarred following his conviction of caus-ing an abortion, but who later had received a pardon from the governor, the court in Re Meyerson (1948)190 Md 671, 59 A2d 489, declared that, since reinstatement will not follow automatically from a pardon,without more, there must be proof of innocence before a pardon will restore one to the fellowship of the bar.Indicating that even innocence of crime will not suffice to reinstate a disbarred attorney if he has failed tolive up to the appropriate standards of morality and honor, the court recited that a pardon does no more thanopen the door to an inquiry that would otherwise be barred.

In Re Kaufmann (1927) 245 NY 423, 157 NE 730, recognizing that reinstatement to the bar will not fol-low automatically from a pardon, without more, the court said that there must be convincing proof of inno-cence before a pardon will restore one to the fellowship of the bar, and that even innocence of crime will notsuffice if there has been a failure to live up to the appropriate standards of morality and honor. Acknow-ledging that rare instances may arise where one convicted, disbarred, and pardoned may be able to satisfythe court that his guilt has not been proven, or that he may be able to demonstrate his innocence, the courtsaid that a pardon may in some conditions be a warning, as significant as a judgment of reversal, that thelooms of the law have woven a fabric of injustice. Noting that courts do not forget that under the most cor-rect administration of the law, men will sometimes fall prey to the vindictiveness of accusers, the inaccuracyof testimony, and the fallibility of jurors, the court went on to say that a pardon does no more than open thedoor to an inquiry that would otherwise be barred. Indicating that the honor of the profession does not de-mand the sacrifice of the innocent, the court stated that an attorney seeking reinstatement has the burden ofsatisfying the court of his fitness to be restored to such an honorable fellowship.

See also Application of E (1879, NY) 65 How Pr 171, in which the court indicated that since a pardoncannot reinstate an attorney's right to practice law, an inquiry should be made into his possible innocence;and Re Finn (1939) 256 App Div 288, 10 NYS2d 29, wherein the court said that an attorney seeking rein-statement has the burden of satisfying the court of his innocence, before a pardon will restore him to mem-bership at the bar.

The court in Hankamer v Templin (1945) 143 Tex 572, 187 SW2d 549, recognizing that a pardon can-not reinstate a disbarred attorney to his former office, said that a pardon does not reinvest an attorney withthe good character which is a requirement of admission to the bar. While it acknowledged that a pardon is anact of clemency, the court explained that a pardon does no more than open a door that would otherwise beclosed to a disbarred attorney seeking reinstatement.

In the following case, the court appeared to treat the pardon as restoring the attorney's right to practicelaw.

In Ex parte Crisler (1931) 159 Miss 247, 132 So 103, wherein the court indicated that a full pardon ofthe governor discharged all consequences of an attorney's order of disbarment made under a statute as a partof the punishment for a crime which he had committed, the court asserted that a full pardon absolves a partyfrom all the legal consequences of his crime and conviction, direct and collateral. Making clear that it was











not confronted with a statutory proceeding to disbar an attorney on account of professional misconduct in-volved in a transaction which culminated in a conviction and pardon, the court went on to say that a pardonreaches both the punishment prescribed for an offense and the guilt of the offender, and that it blots out theguilt, so that in the eye of the law an offender is as innocent as if he had never committed an offense. Statingthat when a pardon is granted after a conviction, it makes the convict a new man and gives him a new creditand capacity, the court explained that a pardon rehabilitates a person in all his rights as a citizen, and thatafter the granting of a pardon any officer of the state should be denied the right to impute a conviction to anoffender.

On the other hand, the opinion in the following case, in which the court held that a pardon did not rein-vest the attorney with the right to practice law, gives no indication that the pardon even opened the door to aconsideration of the attorney's eligibility.

In considering the possible reinstatement of a disbarred attorney who had been pardoned of the felonyconviction which was the cause of the revocation of his license to practice, the court in Commonwealth exrel. Harris v Porter (1935) 257 Ky 563, 78 SW2d 800, indicated that a pardon cannot rehabilitate a disbarredattorney in the trust and confidence of the proper judicial authorities. The court asserted that while a pardonrelieves an attorney of the penal consequences of his act, it cannot restore his character and it does not rein-vest him with those qualities which are absolutely essential for an attorney at law to possess.


Cases:

See Pharr v. Standing Committee on Recommendations to the Bar, New Haven County, 32 Conn. Supp.183, 346 A.2d 115 (Super. Ct. 1975), § 14[a].

A full and unconditional presidential pardon after attorney's disbarment for federal convictions for con-spiracy, obstruction of justice, and unlawful travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit bribery, didnot entitle attorney to automatic reinstatement to practice law without regard to whether he had establishedfitness to practice; attorney was required to file appropriate application for reinstatement with Board on Pro-fessional Responsibility. D.C. Code 2001, § 11–2503(a); Bar Rule XI, § 16(d). In re Borders, 797 A.2d 716(D.C. 2002).

See Matter of Beck, 264 Ind. 141, 342 N.E.2d 611 (1976), § 14[b].See Petition of Harrington, 134 Vt. 549, 367 A.2d 161 (1976), § 14[a].

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§ 8. Other licenses; view that pardon removes punishment but not moral guilt

[Cumulative Supplement]In the following case, in which the court considered the effect of a pardon on the pardoned individual's

eligibility for a liquor license, the court approved the view that a pardon obliterates all punishment arisingfrom the conviction, but not the guilt arising from the acts underlying the conviction.

In Damiano v Burge (1972, Mo App) 481 SW2d 562, 58 ALR3d 1183, wherein the court held that apardon re-established plaintiff's eligibility for a liquor license, the court recited that since a pardon removesall legal punishment for an offense, if a conviction involves certain disqualifications which would not followfrom the commission of a crime without a conviction, the pardon removes such disqualifications. However,the court indicated that if character is a necessary qualification and the commission of a crime would dis-qualify even though there were no criminal prosecution for the crime, the fact that a criminal had beenpardoned would not make him any more eligible.







http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=WLIN1.0&vr=2.0&DB=1000869&DocName=DCCODES11-2503&FindType=L







Cases:

Automatic pardon granted to first offenders by constitution upon completion of sentence restores priv-ileges as well as rights, such as privilege of holding liquor license. State v Adams (1978, La) 355 So 2d 917.

See Guastello v Deptment of Liquor Control (Mo) 536 SW2d 21, § 16.

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§ 9. View that pardon removes neither conviction nor moral guilt

In the following cases, in which the courts considered the effect of a pardon upon the restoration of a li-cense or eligibility therefor, it was held or recognized that the pardon did not obliterate the guilt of the per-son pardoned, or the fact of conviction.

In Baldi v Gilchrist (1923) 204 App Div 425, 198 NYS 493, in which the holder of an expired taxicablicense had applied for a renewal of the license, but was refused such renewal in accordance with an admin-istrative rule of the license commissioner for the reason that he had been convicted of a felony, the court re-cognized that an executive act of clemency cannot obliterate the fact of a conviction. The court explainedthat a pardon does not proceed upon the theory of innocence, but rather it implies guilt.

Where an application for an examination required of persons seeking a real-estate broker's or salesman'slicense was denied on the ground that the applicant had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude,the court in Stone v Oklahoma Real Estate Com. (1962, Okla) 369 P2d 642, recognized that a pardon re-stores rights of citizenship and removes penalties and legal disabilities, but emphasized that a pardon doesnot substitute a good reputation for a bad reputation. Explaining that the granting of a pardon carries with itan implication of guilt, the court declared that a pardon obliterates neither the facts of the commission of acrime nor the conviction thereof. Asserting that a pardon cannot wash out a moral stain, the court pointedout that a pardon involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. Acknowledging that it had been said that a fullpardon would make an offender a new man and blot out his guilt, so that in the eye of the law he would beas innocent as if he had never committed an offense, the court observed that such a general statement hadnot been widely accepted or approved.

And in Prichard v Battle (1941) 178 Va 455, 17 SE2d 393, in which the court indicated that the revoca-tion of a driver's license and the conditions required for reissuance of such license were not penalties or pun-ishment for a motorist's conviction of leaving the scene of an accident, and therefore such revocation andconditions were unaffected by the pardon of the governor which had been granted to the motorist, the courtstated that while a pardon can relieve a motorist from a punishment or penalty which the state might exact ofhim for an offense, it cannot erase the fact of a conviction. The court explained that a pardon cannot changethe fact that by reason of an act committed, a motorist should be put in a class of persons regarded by thestate as unfit to drive automobiles on its highways unless additional provision for the safety of others can bemade. The court also pointed out that the purpose of the revocation of a driver's license is to remove fromthe highways an operator who is a potential danger to other users of automobiles.

Without indicating the effect of a pardon on the conviction of the person pardoned, the court in the fol-lowing case, in considering whether a pardoned individual was entitled to have her medical license restored,observed that a pardon did not obliterate the guilt associated with the crime committed.

In State v Hazzard (1926) 139 Wash 487, 247 P 957, 47 ALR 538, wherein the court indicated that anunconditional pardon did not restore a license to practice the art of healing to one whose license has been re-voked because of a conviction of a crime, the court said that a pardon can relieve one from the disability offines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but that it cannot erase a stain of bad character which has









been definitely fixed. The court explained that the very act of forgiveness implies the commission of awrong.

III. Effect of pardon on restoration of or eligibility for particular office or license

A. Public office

§ 10. Executive offices

In the circumstances presented in the following case, the court held that one who had been convicted ofa crime and later pardoned was ineligible to hold the office of governor.

In a political candidate's suit for a writ of mandamus to compel a state party chairman and secretary toperform the ministerial duty of certifying his name for inclusion on the ballot as a candidate for the office ofgovernor in the upcoming party primary, the court in Ridgeway v Catlett (1964) 238 Ark 323, 379 SW2d277, held that the candidate was ineligible to hold a public office, since he had been convicted of the crimeof embezzling public funds and the state constitution clearly provided that no person convicted of embezzle-ment of public money should be capable of holding any office of trust or profit in the state. Rejecting thecandidate's argument that the constitutional provision was inapplicable to him because he had received apardon from the acting chief executive of the state, purporting to restore all civil and political rights whichhe had lost as a result of the conviction, the court asserted that under the plain language of the constitutionalprovision it was the fact of conviction that disqualified a person from holding public office. The court de-clared that it could find no intimation that the pardoning power conferred on the governor by the constitutionwas intended to permit such an act of clemency to supersede the clear mandate of the provision disqualify-ing the candidate. However, holding that the party chairman and secretary did not have the judicial authorityto determine that a candidate was ineligible to hold public office, and to refuse to place his name upon theballot for that reason, the court directed that the writ of mandamus should be issued.

§ 11. Legislative offices

Under the circumstances presented in the following case, the court held that one who had been con-victed of a crime and later pardoned was ineligible to hold the office of county commissioner.

The court in Hulgan v Thornton (1949) 205 Ga 753, 55 SE2d 115, affirmed a judgment in a quo war-ranto proceeding wherein a county commissioner who had been convicted in federal court of a crime in-volving moral turpitude and had served a 3-year sentence prior to his election to the office was held in-eligible to continue in office, even though he had been pardoned by the President of the United States. Not-ing that a full pardon would restore a person to his citizenship rights under the applicable state constitutionaland code provisions, and further noting that if the officer had been pardoned in time to have been qualifiedto hold the position at the time when he was elected to it, he might well have been eligible to hold the office,the court recalled that where an office has been forfeited by reason of the conviction of a crime, a sub-sequent pardon does not restore the party to the office so forfeited. Then, declining to give any retroactiveeffect to the pardon, the court explained that if a pardon does not void a forfeiture, it should not reach backand annul an ineligibility. The court added that to rule otherwise would mean that a person in office whocommits a crime could not be reinstated by a pardon, but that one who commits a crime before taking officeand then secures a pardon could retain the office.

See also Hildreth v Heath (1878) 1 Ill App 82, in which the court indicated that a pardon from the Pres-ident of the United States of a federal offense should be sufficient to remove any possible disqualificationand ineligibility of a candidate for the office of city alderman.

However, in a mandamus action in which a candidate for the office of state representative sought tohave his name placed upon the ballot as a party nominee because of the alleged ineligibility of his opponentwho had received more votes, but had been adjudged guilty of embezzlement, the court in State ex rel.







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Cloud v Election Board of State (1934) 169 Okla 363, 36 P2d 20, 94 ALR 1007, held that the full and un-conditional pardon which had been granted to the offender made him eligible for election to the state legis-lature, in spite of a state constitutional provision which disqualified persons convicted of a felony fromserving in that legislative body. Recognizing that a full and unconditional pardon reaches both the punish-ment prescribed for an offense and the guilt of the offender, and that a pardon deprives the trial court of anyjurisdiction to enforce its judgment of conviction, the court felt that a felon who had paid the price exactedby the law for his transgression should be given the opportunity to prove by years of exemplary living thathe had removed the stain against his character. Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus whichwould have compelled the state election board to issue a certificate of nomination for the office to the can-didate who had challenged the pardoned candidate's eligibility.

§ 12. Judicial offices

Under the circumstances presented in the following cases, the courts concluded that the granting of apardon to one who had been convicted of a crime did not restore the one pardoned to the judicial officewhich he held prior to the conviction.

The court in State v Carson (1872) 27 Ark 469, held that where a probate and county judge had beenconvicted of a felony and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary, but during the pendency of an appealfrom the conviction he had obtained a pardon from the governor of the state, the office had been forfeited byhis conviction and no pardon could restore it to him. Observing that the state constitution prohibited partieswho had been convicted of crimes punishable with imprisonment in the penitentiary from holding public of-fice, but that the constitution also provided that the governor could grant a pardon after such a conviction,the court pointed out that the judge's guilt and conviction had been acknowledged before the pardon couldbe obtained. Noting that the judge had virtually abandoned his appeal from the conviction, the court said thathe could stand in no better light than if he had never appealed, since the appeal did not set aside the judg-ment but merely suspended the execution of it. The court declared that since the record showed a conviction,it was incumbent upon the offender to either rid himself of it or accept the consequences which followed itsintroduction into evidence. Concluding that the probate and county judge had failed to show a continuingright to exercise his office, the court entered a judgment ousting him from it.

In view of a state constitutional provision which excepted impeachment proceedings from the pardoningpower of the governor, as well as another provision requiring that upon conviction for crime in office, ajustice of the peace should be removed from his office, as if he were found guilty by impeachment, the courtin State ex rel. Webb v Parks (1909) 122 Tenn 230, 122 SW 977, held that a pardon issued by the governorcould not restore a justice of the peace to the office which he had forfeited when he was convicted of officialoppression. Declaring also that it was not necessary that the justice of the peace be ousted from officethrough a quo warranto proceeding, the court pointed out that the applicable state constitutional sectionprovided that in the same proceeding in which the guilt of the accused is ascertained, he should be removedfrom office and disqualified from ever thereafter holding an office. The court emphasized that even asidefrom the state constitutional provisions, a pardon could not restore to a former incumbent an office which hehad forfeited.

The court in Commonwealth v Fugate (1830) 29 Va 724, held that the conviction of a justice of thepeace of malicious stabbing amounted to a forfeiture of his office, thereby legally incapacitating him fromever acting again under his commission, and that the pardon granted by the executive did not restore his ca-pacity to act under his former commission, nor did it avoid the forfeiture of his office. Upon examination ofthe English authorities, the court noted that since felonies were punishable capitally in England, if the holderof an office became convicted of a felony, he could obviously no longer hold such office if the sentencewere carried into effect. Pointing out that its jurisdiction had substituted penitentiary confinement and dis-cipline for capital punishment, the court asserted that a similar incapacity for holding office should followthe conviction for a felony.







In the following case, the court held that one who had been convicted of a felony and later pardonedwas ineligible to hold the office of county judge.

In a quo warranto proceeding by the state, the court in State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v Irby (1935) 190 Ark786, 81 SW2d 419, cert den Irby v Arkansas, 296 US 616, 80 L Ed 437, 56 S Ct 136, held that a countyjudge who had been convicted of embezzlement of funds belonging to the United States while he wasformerly serving as a postmaster was ineligible to hold the office of county judge, even though he had re-ceived a full pardon from the President of the United States, because the pardon had the effect only ofrestoring his civil rights as distinguished from his political privileges. Acknowledging that the applicableconstitutional disqualification could not be considered as part of the punishment for the offense, the courtnevertheless felt that the intent and purpose of the framers of the state constitution was to safeguard the wel-fare of the state, since it evidently was their paramount thought that one who had been convicted for em-bezzling public funds should not again be trusted with their use. Pointing out that the holding of an office isa public trust, and that it never becomes a right until the person claiming it shows that he is constitutionallyeligible, the court recognized that the issuance and acceptance, within itself, of a pardon implies guilt, that itdoes not obliterate the fact of a crime and conviction, and that it does not wash out a moral stain.

§ 13. Miscellaneous; policemen

Under the circumstances presented in the following case, a former policeman who had been convictedof a felony and then pardoned was held not entitled to restoration to the police force.

A former city policeman who had been convicted of murder and removed from the police force becauseof his conviction, but who subsequently was granted a pardon by the governor of the state, was held in Mor-ris v Hartsfield (1938) 186 Ga 171, 197 SE 251, not to be entitled to a writ of mandamus to require his rein-statement to the police force. The court said that while the grant of a pardon restores one to full rights of cit-izenship, including the right to hold public office, it does not operate to confer or restore a public officewhich was previously held, but which on account of a conviction and sentence was necessarily relinquished.

However, in the following cases, the courts concluded that the absolute disqualification resulting fromthe conviction of a felony was removed where the one convicted had received a pardon.

In Upshaw v McNamara (1970, CA1 Mass) 435 F2d 1188 (applying Massachusetts law), under a statuteprohibiting the appointment of felons to a police force, the court recognized that for the protection of thosewho were innocent, pardoned felons could not be excluded from the list of those eligible for appointment aspolice officers, but the court also recognized that the commissioner of police could, as a matter of policy, re-fuse to appoint all whose pardons were granted for grounds other than innocence. However, the court saidthat the commissioner would not be required to do so, and that if he should so choose, he could consider theapplications of those pardoned on grounds other than innocence. At the same time the court declared thatsuch applicants would have a heavy burden of satisfying the commissioner as to their suitability for policework. Finding neither a violation of equal protection nor of due process of law in the commissioner's auto-matic disqualification of all felons, even though they might be pardoned, the court acknowledged that theabsolute disqualification imposed upon felons by statute would be removed by a full pardon, but it con-cluded that in the instant case an automatic refusal to appoint an applicant who had not alleged that he waspardoned because of innocence was a proper and reasonable act by the commissioner. The court explainedthat it could easily see a rationale for a policy decision not to hire persons who have been convicted of felon-ies, even though they have been pardoned, since a person who has committed a felony may be thought tolack the qualities of self-control or honesty required in the sensitive work of a police officer.

Where a statute provided that no person convicted of a felony should be appointed as a police officer ofa district, in considering the fitness of an applicant who had been convicted of armed robbery and carrying adangerous weapon, and who had later been granted a full pardon by the governor, the court in Commissionerof Metropolitan Dist. Com. v Director of Civil Service (1964) 348 Mass 184, 203 NE2d 95, said that the ab-solute disqualification or ineligibility imposed by such a statute should be regarded as removed by a full par-











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don, so that the pardoned person might apply for appointment to the office for which he was formerly dis-qualified, and he could hold that office if he were able to sustain the heavy burden of satisfying the elector-ate or an appointing authority of his good character and suitability at the time of seeking office. The courtwent on to say that in considering such a pardoned applicant's qualifications and suitability, the events un-derlying the pardoned conviction may be, and should be, evaluated and relied upon reasonably by the properpublic body or authority. However, the court declared that in the instant case, while the pardon removed theapplicant's statutory ineligibility as an absolute bar to consideration for appointment, nevertheless the policecommissioner could refuse to appoint him because of the serious character of the criminal conduct underly-ing his conviction. The court asserted that the obvious inappropriateness of appointing as a police officerone previously convicted of a felony, even though he may later be pardoned on grounds other than his inno-cence, was ample justification for the commissioner's refusal to appoint the applicant. Reversing a declarat-ory decree requiring the appointment of the applicant, the court indicated that a new decree should beentered, declaring that the commissioner had the duty and broad discretion to refuse to appoint the applicantas a patrolman, if he deemed him to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or an unsuitable appointee byreason of his pardoned conviction, and that the commissioner could take into account and rely upon the factsrelated to such conviction. The court explained that if character is a necessary qualification for an office, andthe commission of a crime would disqualify even though there were no criminal prosecution for the crime,the fact that a criminal has been pardoned should not make him any more eligible for the office. While it ac-knowledged that a pardon removes all legal punishment for an offense, the court made clear that a pardoncannot obliterate the acts which constituted a crime.

In considering a statute which disqualified an applicant for civil service employment solely because hehad been convicted of a felony, thereby establishing a conclusive presumption that he would not be of thegood moral character required of a civil service employee, the court in Slater v Olson (1941) 230 Iowa 1005,299 NW 879, held that the statute was not applicable to a party who had received a full pardon from the gov-ernor restoring him to all rights of citizenship. Observing that the applicant had been convicted of the felonyof larceny of a motor vehicle, the court stated that to interpret the disqualifying statute as applicable to onewho had received a full pardon would render it unconstitutional as a clear encroachment by the legislatureupon the pardoning power of the chief magistrate. The court said that while the pardon did not of itself con-clusively restore the character of the applicant, and although the acts done by him were not obliterated bythe pardon, they were purged of their criminality and the applicant was entitled to an opportunity of provingto the civil service commission that he was a man of good moral character, even though he had committedthe acts resulting in his conviction. Recognizing that a full pardon granted after a conviction contemplates aremission of guilt both before and after a conviction, and that it forgives an offender and relieves him fromthe results of his offense, the court affirmed the trial court's decision sustaining a writ of certiorari to reviewthe action of the civil service commission in preventing the applicant from taking an examination because hehad been convicted of a felony.

B. Licenses

§ 14[a] To practice law—Held restored

[Cumulative Supplement]In the circumstances of the following cases, in which it appeared that a pardon had been granted to an

attorney whose right to practice law had been forfeited as a result of his commission of a crime, it was indic-ated that the attorney was entitled to reinstatement as a member of the bar.

See also Ex parte Garland (1867) 71 US 333, 18 L Ed 366, in which the court held that an attorney whohad taken the required oath when he was admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, andwho had subsequently been an officer in the legislature of the Confederacy during the Civil War, but had re-ceived a pardon from the President for his acts of participation in the rebellion, was again entitled to practice






in the federal courts, without taking the test oath of loyalty which had been prescribed by the United StatesCongress during the war. The court said that even if the statutory oath requirement were not unconstitutionalas a bill of attainder and as an ex post facto law, the pardon would relieve the attorney of the necessity oftaking the new oath, since the deprivation of his right to practice by requiring the taking of an oath which heobviously could not take would have amounted to a form of punishment for the offense which the Presidenthad pardoned. Noting that the act would operate as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion, the courtreasoned that exclusion from any of the professions, or from the ordinary avocations of life, for past conductcan be regarded in no other light than as punishment for such conduct. Indicating that Congress couldneither limit the effect of the President's pardon nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders, thecourt observed that a pardon reaches the punishment prescribed for an offense, and that when a pardon isfull it blots out the guilt, so that in the eye of the law an offender is as innocent as if he had never committedan offense. Asserting that in the instant case the effect of the pardon was to relieve the attorney of all penal-ties and disabilities attached to the crime of treason, the court said that if the exclusion from the practice oflaw could be effected by the exaction of the expurgatory oath covering the offense, the pardon would beavoided, and a result which could not be reached by direct legislation would be accomplished indirectly.

And see Ex parte Law (1866, DC Ga) F Cas No 8126, in which the court held that an attorney who hadbeen admitted to practice in the federal courts prior to the Civil War and who had received a full pardonfrom the President for his participation in the war on the side of the Confederacy was entitled to again prac-tice in the courts of the United States without taking the required oath of loyalty which had been prescribedby Congress during the war. The court made clear that the loyalty oath could not be applicable to an attorneywho had met all requirements for attorneys practicing in the federal courts prior to the adoption of the oath.

In Ex parte Crisler (1931) 159 Miss 247, 132 So 103, wherein an attorney had been convicted of embez-zlement and the judgment against him included an order forever disbarring him from the practice of law inthe state, in accordance with an applicable statute, but he was granted a full pardon by the governor afterserving a portion of his sentence in the penitentiary, the court held that the full pardon absolved the attorneyfrom all consequences of the order of disbarment made under the statute as a part of the punishment for thecommission of the crime. Making clear that it was not confronted with a statutory proceeding to disbar an at-torney on account of professional misconduct involved in the transaction which culminated in the convictionand pardon, the court observed that a full pardon absolves a party from all the legal consequences of hiscrime and conviction, direct and collateral. Reversing a judgment which had resulted in the dismissal of theattorney's petition to annul the order disbarring him from the practice of law, the court explained that a par-don must be held to rehabilitate a person in all his rights as a citizen, and that after the granting of a pardonany officer of the state must be denied the right to impute the conviction to him.


Cases:

Attorney who was pardoned for perjury offense and who had led exemplary life since original transgres-sion and disbarment 22 years before would be readmitted. Pharr v Standing Committee on Recommenda-tions to the Bar, New Haven County, 32 Conn Supp 183, 346 A2d 115.

Attorney who was disbarred following conviction for failure to report for induction in armed forces in1943, who received full pardon from president in 1947, and whose record was unblemished in succeeding 33years was entitled to reinstatement as attorney at law with retired status. Re Lindquist (Minn) 246 NW2d 35.

Attorney who had been convicted of felony of extortion was entitled to be readmitted to practice of lawwhere activities underlying criminal charge were personally advantageous to him only insofar as they be-nefited his client and were not the conventional extortion situation and where attorney had been granted fullexecutive pardon. Petition of Harrington, 134 Vt 549, 367 A2d 161.

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§ 14[b] To practice law—Held not restored[23]

[Cumulative Supplement]In the circumstances of the following cases, in which it appeared that a pardon had been granted to an

attorney whose right to practice law had been forfeited as a result of his commission of a crime, it was indic-ated that the attorney was not automatically entitled to reinstatement as a member of the bar because of thepardon.

Where an attorney was disbarred after he was convicted of forgery, but he subsequently received a fullpardon from the governor of the state, with a restoration of his civil and political rights, the court in ReStephenson (1942) 243 Ala 342, 10 So 2d 1, 143 ALR 166, affirming a decision denying his petition for re-instatement to practice as an attorney, held that such pardon and restoration of rights did not have the effectof restoring to the attorney the privilege to practice his profession as a member of the bar. Asserting that anapplication of a disbarred attorney must be treated as an application for admission to the practice, and not asan application to vacate the order of disbarment, the court recalled that good moral character is a prerequis-ite to admission to the bar. While it acknowledged that when a pardon is full it blots out the guilt, so that inthe eye of the law an offender is as innocent as if he had never committed an offense, the court explainedthat a pardon does not go as far as to restore offices forfeited. The court added that it was regrettable that theattorney had practiced law in several divorce cases after his disbarment, when he sought to help his relationsand friends for little compensation.

Where a statute purported to provide for the reinstatement of disbarred attorneys upon the strength of apardon of whatever offense was the cause of a conviction and disbarment, and where an attorney had beendisbarred upon his conviction of attempted extortion, but thereafter the governor granted him a full pardon,the court in Re Lavine (1935) 2 Cal 2d 324, 41 P2d 161, reh den (Cal) 42 P2d 311, held that so far as thepardon statute purported to reinstate or to direct any court to reinstate a pardoned attorney, without anyshowing of moral rehabilitation, it was unconstitutional and void as a legislative encroachment upon the in-herent power of the courts to admit attorneys to the practice of law, and that it was tantamount to the vaca-tion of a judicial order by a legislative mandate. The court said that the attorney in the instant case could notbe reinstated upon the mere presentation of a pardon, without more, since he had not satisfied the burden ofshowing that he possessed the moral stamina essential to one qualified to engage in the practice of law.Denying the attorney's application for reinstatement, without prejudice to his right to renew such applicationupon a showing of moral rehabilitation, the court explained that while a pardon obliterates an offense tosuch an extent that for all legal purposes the one-time offender is to be relieved in the future from all of itsresults, it does not obliterate the act itself, but merely puts the offender in the same position as though whathe had done never was unlawful.

The court in Re Riccardi (1923) 64 Cal App 791, 222 P 625, upon the authority of Re O'Connel (1923)64 Cal App 673, 222 P 625, refused to reinstate a disbarred attorney, even though he had received a full par-don from the governor of the state. Recognizing that the question for determination in an application for re-instatement by a disbarred attorney is not the sufficiency of the punishment already suffered by him, but thefitness of the applicant to be admitted to the practice of law, the court emphasized that a mere belief that anattorney has been sufficiently punished will not warrant his reinstatement. The court also observed that it isnot customary for an attorney to be reinstated when his petition follows closely upon the disbarment pro-ceedings, even though his application may be supported by testimonials of numerous persons as to his goodconduct and present character, such as in the instant case. The court felt that it owed a solemn duty to thecommunity and to the legal profession, which had to be performed without regard to feelings of sympathyfor the applicant.

See also Ex parte Browne (1875) 2 Colo 553, where the court held that since the power of the governorto grant pardons for offenses against the laws of the territory did not extend to the case of the disbarment of











an attorney pursuant to a statute authorizing disbarment on the petition of a client to whom the attorney hadfailed to pay money received by him in his office as an attorney, such a pardon did not entitle the attorney toreinstatement. While the court acknowledged that the misconduct imputed to the attorney might be con-sidered in the light of a contempt, as tending to bring the court into public dishonor, and that solely in thatlight the offense was clearly within the scope of executive clemency, the court pointed out that the statuteauthorizing the institution of such a proceeding by the client was intended to afford a remedy for the collec-tion of the client's money. The court reasoned that even though the governor might pardon the public of-fense, he could not deprive the client of his remedy.

A decree dismissing a petition seeking an order to reinstate an attorney to the state bar was affirmed inBranch v State (1935) 120 Fla 666, 163 So 48, wherein the court held that even though the disbarred attor-ney had received a pardon from the state board of pardons for his conviction of assault with intent to commitmurder, such pardon could not automatically restore his right to practice law, and he should furnish at leastthe same evidence as to his moral character that would be required for an applicant to practice law in thefirst instance. The court explained that when an attorney at law has been disbarred because of misconduct, itis the province of the courts to determine whether or not he should be reinstated into his position, and that itis not material that he may have been tried and convicted because of a criminal offense involving the sameconduct, or that afterward he may have been pardoned by a state board and restored to his full rights of cit-izenship. Pointing out that an attorney does not forfeit his right to practice law because of a conviction, butbecause of an adjudication that he has been guilty of conduct showing him to be a person unfit to engage inthe profession of practicing law, the court also acknowledged that the disbarment of a practicing attorney isnot a part of the punishment inflicted for the commission of a crime.

In Petition of Sears (1962, Fla) 147 So 2d 522, the court declared that a complete pardon of the crime ofgrand larceny would not alone be sufficient to justify reinstatement of an attorney who had been suspendedfrom the practice of law. However, in its decision to reinstate the attorney, the court gave substantial weightto the fact that a complete pardon had been granted, since the pardon indicated that the executive branch ofgovernment had found that the attorney was entitled to return to society in the exercise of his civil rights,free of the taint of a conviction.

Where an attorney had been disbarred and subsequently reinstated on the condition that he would ab-stain from the use of intoxicating liquors and would otherwise properly demean himself for a period of oneyear, but before the expiration of the year he was convicted of being intoxicated on a public highway and hisreinstatement to the bar was revoked because of such conviction, the court in Payne v State (1936) 52 GaApp 425, 183 SE 638, held that the disbarred attorney's full pardon by the governor had no effect upon or re-lation to the court's previous order revoking his reinstatement. The court said that while the pardon of thegovernor had the effect of relieving the disbarred attorney from the punishment imposed because of his con-viction, and that it made him eligible to apply for readmission to the bar, such readmission was neverthelessa matter within the discretion of the court. Pointing out that a disbarment proceeding is in no sense a crimin-al prosecution, the court further said that the primary objective of a disbarment proceeding is not the punish-ment of an attorney, but the protection of the court and the public, by removing from the profession oneshown to be unfit for the discharge of its important and honorable duties. Reciting that an attorney seekingreinstatement has the burden of satisfying the court of his fitness to be restored to such an honorable fellow-ship, the court affirmed a judgment denying the attorney's motion for reinstatement.

Where an attorney had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and had been subsequentlydisbarred from the practice of law, but attached to his petition for reinstatement was a full pardon under theseal of the state, pardoning him of the crime which was the subject of the conviction, the court in Scott vLeathers (1949) 78 Ga App 661, 52 SE2d 40, disagreeing with the trial court's opinion that an attorney whohad been convicted of a crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude was forever barred by statute fromthe practice of law in the state, held that such a disbarred attorney was eligible to apply for reinstatement be-cause of his subsequent pardon. Although it acknowledged that a pardon restores one to full rights of cit-izenship, including the right to hold office, the court went on to say that a disbarred attorney may not auto-









matically be reinstated by an executive pardon of a crime which he has committed, but that the pardon is afactor which the court may take into consideration in the exercise of its discretion. Emphasizing that a par-don does not automatically operate to confer or to restore a public office which has been forfeited, the courtreversed a judgment dismissing the attorney's petition for reinstatement to the bar.

In considering the effect of a pardon upon an attorney's right to practice law after his license had beentaken away upon the ground that he was convicted of a felony, the court in Commonwealth ex rel. Harris vPorter (1935) 257 Ky 563, 78 SW2d 800, reversing a judgment canceling the original disbarment order, heldthat while the effect of the pardon was to relieve the attorney of the penal consequences of his act, it couldnot change his character, it did not reinvest him with those qualities which are absolutely essential for an at-torney to possess, and it did not restore his right to practice, even though it purported to restore all rights andprivileges forfeited by the conviction. Pointing out that lawyers are officers of the court, and that they areagents through whom justice must be administered, the court said that the pardon could not rehabilitate thedisbarred attorney in the trust and confidence of the court. The court insisted that attorneys who are morallyunfit to act as worthy instruments of justice should be disbarred.

In Re Gowland (1932) 174 La 351, 140 So 500, the court said that even though the governor's pardon ofan attorney who had been disbarred because of his conviction of forgery had the effect of removing his dis-qualification for admission to the bar, the pardon did not have the effect of restoring the attorney's license topractice law, since whether he could qualify again for admission to the bar would be a matter dependentupon the examining committee. Acknowledging that it had been held that a pardon reaches both the punish-ment prescribed for an offense and the guilt of the offender, the court pointed out that a disbarment proceed-ing is not a means of punishing an attorney at law for misconduct, or even a means of setting up an exampleto other attorneys. Declining to grant a rescission of the decree of disbarment, the court went on to say thatdisbarment proceedings are intended only for the betterment of the profession, and for the protection of themembers of society who at times have to entrust their business and personal affairs to attorneys.[24]

In Re Meyerson (1948) 190 Md 671, 59 A2d 489, when passing upon the moral qualifications of an at-torney who had been disbarred following his conviction of conspiring to cause and causing an abortion, thecourt gave only a small amount of consideration to the fact that the attorney had received a pardon from thegovernor after he had been in a house of correction, released on probation, and had served in the Army dur-ing wartime with distinction. In considering the attorney's petition for reinstatement to the bar, the courtpointed out that reinstatement will not follow automatically from a pardon, without more, and that theremust be proof of innocence before a pardon will restore one to the fellowship of the bar. Declaring that eveninnocence of crime will not suffice if there has been a failure to live up to the appropriate standards of mor-ality and honor, the court said that in spite of the disbarred attorney's subsequent honorable conduct, he hadnot met the burden of satisfying the court of his fitness to be restored to such an honorable profession. Em-phasizing that the attorney had not proven that he was innocent of the act for which he was convicted, thecourt affirmed an order denying his application for reinstatement to the bar.

Under a statute providing for possible vacation of an order of disbarment upon pardon of the convict bythe executive, the court in Re Kaufmann (1927) 245 NY 423, 157 NE 730, held that in view of the fact thatthe President of the United States had granted pardons to two attorneys who had been disbarred after theywere convicted of conspiracy, their applications for reinstatement to the bar should be remitted to a lowercourt for the institution of proceedings to determine their possible innocence of the crime. Reversing an or-der which had denied the attorneys' applications for reinstatement, the court pointed out that reinstatement tothe bar will not follow automatically from a pardon, without more, but that there must be convincing proofof innocence before a pardon will restore one to the fellowship of the bar, and that even innocence of crimewill not suffice if there has been a failure to live up to the appropriate standards of morality and honor. Re-cognizing that a pardon does no more than open the door to an inquiry that would otherwise be barred, thecourt stated that an attorney seeking reinstatement has the burden of satisfying the court of his fitness to berestored to the bar.

Where an attorney who had been convicted of converting the goods of an estate had his right to practice








law revoked as a part of the judgment of the court pronouncing the sentence upon him, and where such attor-ney had received a full pardon of the governor restoring him to the rights of citizenship, the court inHankamer v Templin (1945) 143 Tex 572, 187 SW2d 549, held that the pardon and restoration of citizenshipdid not reinstate the attorney's right to practice. Observing that the governor's power to pardon was limitedto criminal cases after conviction, and that the disbarment of an attorney is a civil proceeding, the court ex-plained that the governor had no power to reinstate a privilege to practice law. Rejecting the contention ofthe disbarred attorney that the revocation of his license was part of the punishment assessed against him, andthat therefore such punishment was also released by the full and unconditional pardon granted to him by thegovernor, the court acknowledged that the disbarment was punishment in a sense, but said that it was notpart of the penalty, as such. Declaring that it is elementary that a pardon is an act of clemency and does notrestore the good character which an attorney is required to possess upon being admitted to the bar, the courtreasoned that the governor's pardon and restoration of political and civil rights merely opened a door thatwould not otherwise have been open to the attorney seeking reinstatement. Denying the attorney's applica-tion for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk of court to enter his name as a member of the bar, the courtemphasized that the right to practice law is in the nature of a franchise from the state conferred only for mer-it.

The court in Ex parte Hunter (1867) 2 W Va 122, held that where a pardon was granted by the Presidentof the United States to an attorney who had been duly admitted to the practice of law prior to his participa-tion in the Civil War on the side of the Confederacy, such pardon could not restore the attorney's right topractice in the state courts in the absence of his compliance with the loyalty oath requirement which hadbeen enacted by the state legislature after the war.

And where the President of the United States granted a pardon to an attorney who had supported theConfederacy during the Civil War, the court in Ex parte Quarrier (1870) 4 W Va 210, held that such pardonmight restore the attorney's right to practice in the federal courts, but that it could not restore his prior stand-ing in the state courts. The court explained that the attorney could not be permitted to again practice in thestate courts, in the absence of his compliance with the required oath of loyalty which had been prescribed bythe state legislature after the Civil War.


Cases:

Petition for reinstatement was denied where attorney, who was granted pardon for robbery, had historyof promotional activities and admitted that this, and not practice of law, was his primary interest, notwith-standing fact that conduct since discipline had been exemplary. Matter of Beck (Ind) 342 NE2d 611.

Where applicant for package liquor license had been convicted of liquor law violations and was sub-sequently pardoned, denial of license solely because of prior convictions was unauthorized. Guastello v De-partment of Liquor Control (Mo) 536 SW2d 21.

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[END OF SUPPLEMENT]

§ 15. To practice medicine

Under the circumstances presented in the following cases, the courts concluded that a pardon did not op-erate to restore a physician's license to practice medicine, which license had been forfeited by the convictionof the crime of manslaughter.

In a prosecution for practicing medicine without a license, the court in People v Rongetti (1946) 395 Ill580, 70 NE2d 568, said that where a pardon restoring the rights of citizenship had been granted by the gov-











ernor to one who had forfeited his right to practice medicine when he was convicted of manslaughter, suchpardon did not reinstate him to the practice of medicine. The court indicated that if a pardon had such an ef-fect of automatically restoring forfeited rights, many persons who obtained divorces because their spouseswere convicted of a felony would find themselves in an embarrassing position. The court pointed out thatthere is a wide distinction between the right which one has to hold his property against the world and to pre-vent even the state from taking it without compensation, and the right to practice a profession which de-mands peculiar qualifications, including the requirement of a license, in order to protect the public.

Where a physician had been convicted of manslaughter and her license to practice the art of healing hadsubsequently been revoked by the state medical board upon the strength of the conviction, the court in Statev Hazzard (1926) 139 Wash 487, 247 P 957, 47 ALR 538, held that an unconditional pardon granted to herby the governor of the state did not have the effect of restoring her license to practice, even though the par-don purported to restore all rights and privileges which she had forfeited as a result of the conviction. Notingthat the state constitution only gave the governor the power to remit fines and forfeitures, and that the par-don could not be construed to be any stronger than if it read that the former physician was restored to all shehad forfeited by reason of her conviction and confinement, the court rejected the contention of the formerphysician that the pardon had been issued because of her innocence, and that its effect was to restore hergood character. Pointing out that the very act of forgiveness implies the commission of a wrong, the courtdeclared that a pardon can relieve one from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a convic-tion, but that it cannot erase the stain of bad character which has been definitely fixed. Reasoning that thereis a wide distinction between the right to hold property and to deny even the state the prerogative to take itwithout compensation, and the right to practice a profession which demands peculiar qualifications in orderto protect the public, the court declared that as to the practice of such professions there could be no inherentright apart from the question of qualifications. The court explained that one qualified in all respects has aright to a license, but that one unqualified has no right whatever.

§ 16. Miscellaneous

[Cumulative Supplement]In the following case, the court held that, under the circumstances presented, the granting of a pardon to

an offender who had been convicted of crimes pertaining to the sale of intoxicating liquor restored his eli-gibility to obtain a liquor permit, notwithstanding a statute providing that no liquor permit should be issuedto any person who had been convicted of such crimes.

The court in Damiano v Burge (1972, Mo App) 481 SW2d 562, 58 ALR3d 1183, held that where a stat-ute provided that no liquor permit should be issued to any individual who had been convicted of certain viol-ations of laws applicable to the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor, and in accordance with the stat-ute, an application for a permit had been refused on the ground that the applicant had been convicted of con-spiracy to violate certain federal tax laws pertaining to the sale of intoxicating liquor, a pardon granted bythe President of the United States to the applicant restored him to his original position prior to the convic-tion. Acknowledging that a pardon re-establishes eligibility for a license which is prohibited to one who hasbeen convicted of a crime, the court nevertheless cautioned that if character is a necessary qualification for alicense and the commission of a crime would disqualify even though there were no criminal prosecution forthe crime, the fact that a criminal has been pardoned cannot make him any more eligible. However, notingthat in the instant case the parties had stipulated that the sole and exclusive reason for the authorities' refusalto issue the liquor permit was because of the alleged conviction of the applicant, and that the refusal was notdue to any misconduct involving moral fitness, the court affirmed a judgment holding that the Presidentialpardon reinstated the applicant's eligibility for the permit.

However, in the following cases, under the circumstances presented, the courts indicated that the grant-ing of a pardon to an offender who had been convicted of a crime which he had committed did not have theeffect of making him eligible to obtain the license he was seeking or of restoring a previously revoked li-






cense.In Baldi v Gilchrist (1923) 204 App Div 425, 198 NYS 493, in which the holder of an expired taxicab

license had applied for a renewal of the license but was refused such renewal in accordance with an adminis-trative rule of the license commission for the reason that he had been convicted of a felony, the court, in re-jecting the applicant's contention that because he was pardoned and restored to the rights of citizenship bythe governor, no further consequences should follow his conviction of crime, held that the pardon did notobliterate the fact of the conviction. Asserting that a pardon proceeds not upon the theory of innocence, butrather implies guilt, the court declared that it was manifest that the pardon and restoration of rights had noretroactive effect upon the judgment of conviction which remained unreversed and had not been set aside.Accordingly, the court reversed a decision which had resulted in a mandamus order requiring the issuance ofthe taxicab license.

Where a statute provided that a real-estate broker's or salesman's license could only be granted to per-sons who bore a good reputation for honesty, integrity, and fair dealing, and where an application for the ex-amination required of those seeking such licenses was denied on the ground that the applicant had been con-victed of a crime involving moral turpitude, the court in Stone v Oklahoma Real Estate Com. (1962, Okla)369 P2d 642, held that the pardons granted by the governor for some, but not all, of the applicant's convic-tions did not remove the stigma attached to the felonies. Observing that the effect of the pardons was to re-store the applicant's right of citizenship and to remove all remaining penalties and legal disabilities, the courtemphasized that such pardons could not and did not substitute a good reputation for a bad reputation. Ex-plaining that the granting of a pardon carries with it an implication of guilt, the court declared that a pardonobliterates neither the fact of the commission of a crime nor the conviction thereof. Recognizing that a par-don involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness, and that a pardon cannot wash out a moral stain, the courtaffirmed a judgment which had prevented the applicant from taking the required examination.

In Prichard v Battle (1941) 178 Va 455, 17 SE2d 393, the court held that inasmuch as the revocation ofa driver's license and the conditions required for reissuance of such license, including the posting of a bondand collateral for payment of future damages, were not penalties or punishment for a motorist's conviction ofleaving the scene of an accident, such revocation and conditions were unaffected by the pardon of the gov-ernor which had been granted to the motorist. Saying that a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilegegranted by the state under its police power, the court explained that the purpose of the revocation of adriver's license is to remove from the highways an operator who is a potential danger to other users of auto-mobiles. The court concluded that while the pardon relieved the motorist from a punishment or penaltywhich the state might have exacted of him for the offense, it did not erase the fact of his conviction, or thefact that by reason of the act committed he was put in a class of persons regarded by the state as unfit todrive automobiles on its highways unless additional provision for the safety of others could be made.


Cases:

Governor lacked power to pardon holder of liquor license from administrative revocation of licensebased on findings that licensee had sold liquor on Sunday and had sold liquor to minor. Theodoro v Depart-ment of Liquor Control (Mo) 527 SW2d 350 (citing annotation).

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[END OF SUPPLEMENT]RESEARCH REFERENCES

A.L.R. Library









A.L.R. Quick Index, Licenses and Permits

A.L.R. Quick Index, Pardon, Parole, or Probation

A.L.R. Quick Index, Public Officers and Employees

Reciprocal Discipline of Attorneys—Noncriminal Misconduct Towards Clients Not Involving ClientFunds, 44 A.L.R.6th 75

Reciprocal Discipline of Attorneys—Criminal Conduct, 43 A.L.R.6th 163

Wrongful or Excessive Prescription of Drugs as Ground for Revocation or Suspension of Physician's orDentist's License to Practice, 19 A.L.R.6th 577

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Criminal Disenfranchisement Provisions, 10 A.L.R.6th31

Criminal Record as Affecting Applicant's Moral Character for Purposes of Admission to the Bar, 3A.L.R.6th 49

Revocation of Order Commuting State Criminal Sentence, 88 A.L.R.5th 463

What constitutes conviction within statutory or constitutional provision making conviction of crimeground of disqualification for, removal from, or vacancy in, public office, 10 A.L.R.5th 139

Abuse or misuse of contempt power as ground for removal or discipline of judge, 76 A.L.R.4th 982

Physician's or other healer's conduct, or conviction of offense, not directly related to medical practice,as ground for disciplinary action, 34 A.L.R.4th 609

Regulation of practice of acupuncture, 17 A.L.R.4th 964

Violation of draft laws as affecting character for purposes of admission to the bar, 88 A.L.R.3d 1055

Criminal record as affecting applicant's moral character for purposes of admission to the bar, 88A.L.R.3d 192

Regulation of private detectives, private investigators, and security agencies, 86 A.L.R.3d 691

Right in absence of express statutory authorization, of one convicted of crime and imprisoned or pa-roled, to prosecute civil action, 74 A.L.R.3d 680

Suspension or revocation of real-estate broker's license on ground of discrimination, 42 A.L.R.3d 1099

Elections: effect of conviction under federal law, or law of another state or country, on right to vote orhold public office, 39 A.L.R.3d 303

Prejudicial effect of statement of prosecutor as to possibility of pardon or parole, 16 A.L.R.3d 1137

Prejudicial effect of statement or instruction of court as to possibility of parole or pardon, 12 A.L.R.3d832

Disqualification, for bias or interest, of member of occupation or profession sitting in license revocationproceeding, 97 A.L.R.2d 1210

































What constitutes conviction within statutory or constitutional provisions making conviction of crimeground of disqualification for, removal from, or vacancy in, public office, 71 A.L.R.2d 593

Reinstatement of attorney after disbarment, suspension or resignation, 70 A.L.R.2d 268

Good moral character of applicant as requisite for admission to bar, 64 A.L.R.2d 301

Grounds for revocation or suspension of license of real-estate broker or salesman, 56 A.L.R.2d 573

What is an infamous crime or one involving moral turpitude constituting disqualification to hold publicoffice, 52 A.L.R.2d 1314

Offenses and convictions covered by pardon, 35 A.L.R.2d 1261

Conviction of offense under Federal law or law of another state or country as vacating accused's holdingof state or local office or as ground of removal, 20 A.L.R.2d 732

Time as of which eligibility or ineligibility to office is to be determined, 143 A.L.R. 1026

Executive clemency to remove disqualification for office or other disqualification, resulting from con-viction of crime, as applicable in case of conviction in Federal court or court of another state, 135 A.L.R.1493

Suspension of imposition or execution of sentence and/or placing upon probation as affecting groundsfor suspension or disbarment of attorney, 132 A.L.R. 659

Pardon as defense to proceeding for suspension or cancellation of license of physician, surgeon, or dent-ist, 126 A.L.R. 257

Construction and Application of "Convicted in Any Court" Element of Offense of Possession of Firearmby Person Convicted of Felony, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922, 196 A.L.R. Fed. 205

State pardon as affecting "convicted" status of one accused of violation of Gun Control Act of 1968 (18U.S.C.A. §§ 921 et seq.), 44 A.L.R. Fed. 692

Legal Encyclopedias

Am. Jur. 2d, Pardon and Parole §§ 59, 60, 62

Forms

2 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Attorneys at Law, Forms 317, 344

5 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Brokers, Form 3, Form 3

16 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Licenses and Permits, Forms 25, 29, 31-33, 61

18 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Pardon and Parole, Form 8, Form 8

Model Codes and Restatements

Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 5 (2000), Professional Discipline


































http://international.westlaw.com/Find/Default.wl?rs=WLIN1.0&vr=2.0&DB=0106584&DocName=REST3DLGOVLs5&FindType=Y

Law Reviews and Other Periodicals

Does a pardon blot out guilt? 28 Harvard L Rev 647

Section 1[a] Footnotes:

[FN1] The annotations at 47 ALR 542 and 94 ALR 1011 are superseded. The present annotationalso supersedes §§ 43-45 of the annotation at 70 A.L.R.2d 268.

[FN2] For coverage of this point, see the cases in the annotation at 135 ALR 1493.

Section 2[a] Footnotes:

[FN3] A general discussion of the effect of a criminal conviction on the right to hold public officeis contained in Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees § 58.

[FN4] § 3, infra.

[FN5] See the cases in §§ 4- 6, infra.

[FN6] § 4, infra.

[FN7] § 5, infra.

[FN8] § 6, infra.

[FN9] § 7, infra.

[FN10] § 8, infra.

[FN11] § 9, infra.

[FN12] § 10, infra.

[FN13] § 11, infra.

[FN14] § 12, infra.

[FN15] § 13, infra.

[FN16] § 14, infra.

[FN17] § 15, infra.

[FN18] § 16, infra.

Section 2[b] Footnotes:

[FN19] The general nature and extent of the pardoning power is discussed in Am. Jur. 2d, Pardonand Parole §§ 11 et seq.

The reader's attention is called to Ferguson v Wilcox (1930) 119 Tex 280, 28 SW2d 526, in whichan amnesty bill which purported to grant a full and unconditional release to every person convicted












in an impeachment case, and which purported to cancel any disqualification to hold office that hadbeen thereby inflicted was held unconstitutional on the ground that the state constitution did notprovide for pardoning power in cases of impeachment, but expressly excepted such cases from theexplicit and exclusive pardoning power granted to the governor by the constitution. The court asser-ted that to hold valid such an amnesty bill passed by the legislature would be a violation of the con-stitutional separation of the powers of the three distinct departments of government, namely, the le-gislative, executive, and judicial departments. Turning to the facts of the case, the court said thatinasmuch as the senate had acted as a court and not as a part of the legislature in the impeachmentof the former governor, who had subsequently filed a petition for mandamus to compel party offi-cials to certify his name as a candidate on the party ticket for governor at a primary election, thesenate's judgment of removal and disqualification was the judgment of a court, and therefore noother department of government could exercise any power properly attached to it, and no otherpower, without an express provision of the constitution authorizing it, could render its judgment ofdisqualification nugatory. Denying the tentative candidate's petition for mandamus, the court poin-ted out that the purpose of impeachment is not to punish an offender, but primarily to protect thepublic.

[FN20] A sample petition or application to a licensing board for restoration of a professional licensefollowing a pardon is contained in 18 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Pardon and Parole, Form 8.In this regard, counsel may also find helpful the sample forms in 16 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Reved), Licenses and Permits, Forms 61, 62, dealing with applications to licensing authorities for rein-statement of a license, and with petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of a license.

[FN21] § 7, infra.

[FN22] In this regard, the annotation at 64 A.L.R.2d 301 entitled "Good moral character as requisitefor admission to bar" will be of interest, as will be the annotation at 70 A.L.R.2d 268, entitled "Rein-statement of attorney after disbarment, suspension or resignation." Counsel will also be interested inthe procedural due process requirements applicable in proceedings involving applications for ad-mission to the bar, which is the subject of the annotation at 2 A.L.R.3d 1266.

Section 14[b] Footnotes:

[FN23] The reader will note, however, that in a number of the following cases the courts indicatedthat the attorney was entitled to have his application for admission considered by the appropriateexamining authorities.

[FN24] In the later case of State v Gowland (1938) 189 La 80, 179 So 41, which was decidedprimarily upon other grounds, the court reaffirmed its previous position that even though the pardonof the disbarred attorney re-established his eligibility for admission to the bar, it did not reinstatehim as a member, and it did not annul or affect the judgment of disbarment.

Westlaw. © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

58 A.L.R.3d 1191

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Restoration of Right to Public Office, License, Etc.

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Transcript of Restoration of Right to Public Office, License, Etc.