REPORT OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION OF TRINIDAD AND · Report of the Equal Opportunity...

REPORT OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION OF TRINIDAD AND

TOBAGO

In the matter of the Equal Opportunity Act Chap 22:03 [Act No 69 of

2000 as amended] („the Act‟)

And

In the matter of the jurisdiction of the Equal Opportunity

Commission („the Commission‟) which was established by that Act

and is empowered by that Act to among other things receive,

investigate, and as far as possible conciliate allegations of

discrimination

And

In the matter of the investigation of complaint of discrimination

lodged with the Commission by Ms. GISELLE GLAUDE

EOC COMPLAINT 0086/2012

Between

GISELLE GLAUDE Complainant

And

QUALITY SECURITY

BODYGUARD SERVICES LIMITED Respondent

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION COMPRISING:

Professor Emeritus John G La Guerre, Chairman

Dr. Eastlyn K Mc. Kenzie, Vice-Chairman

Dr. Indira Rampersad, Commissioner

Dr. Beverly A Beckles, Commissioner

Mr. Gérard A Besson, Commissioner

Report of the Equal Opportunity Commission of Trinidad and Tobago

EOC Complaint 0086/2012 lodged by Ms Giselle Glaude

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Introduction

1. This is a report pursuant to an investigation conducted by the Equal Opportunity Commission

(hereinafter „the Commission‟). The Commission was created by the Equal Opportunity Act

Chap 22:031 (hereinafter „the Act‟). Per section 27(1) (d), one it its functions is to receive,

investigate and, as far as possible, conciliate allegations of discrimination. Per section 4(a), the

Act applies to discrimination in relation to the following four broad categories: employment,

education, the provision of goods and services and the provision of accommodation; but that

discrimination must be -

(i) discrimination on the ground of status as defined in section 3; or

(ii) discrimination by victimisation as defined in section 6.

The Act also applies to a separate category known as „offensive behaviour‟ as provided for at

section 7, but that is not relevant for the purposes of this matter. By virtue of section 30(1), a

person who alleges that some other person has discriminated against him or has contravened

sections 6 or 7 in relation to him may lodge a written complaint with the Commission setting out

the details of the alleged act of discrimination. By virtue of section 32 of the Act, the

Commission is mandated to investigate each complaint of discrimination lodged with it.

2. Ms. Giselle Glaude, (hereinafter „the Complainant‟) was employed as a Security Guard with

Quality Security Bodyguard Services Limited (hereinafter „the Respondent‟). The Respondent is

a company duly incorporated under the Companies Act Chap. 81:012 and is currently headed by

Mr. Kurtis Samuel, Managing Director.

3. The Complainant lodged a complaint with the Commission dated 19th September, 2012, in

which she alleged that contrary to section 9 of the Act3, the Respondent unlawfully

discriminated against her in relation to her employment in the way it has terminated her services

and/or subjected her to detriment contrary to the Act due to her religious status.

4. The Complainant submitted a number of documents in support of her complaint. The

Commission, pursuant to its powers under section 334 of the Act, subsequently requested that

1 Act No. 69 of 2000 as amended by Act No. 5 of 2001

2 Act No. 35 of 1995

3 Section 9 reads as follows:

An employer shall not discriminate against a person employed by him— (a) in the terms or conditions of employment that the employer affords the person; (b) in the way the employer affords the person access to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training or to

any other benefit, facility or service associated with employment, or by refusing or deliberately omitting to afford the person access to them; or

(c) by dismissing the person or subjecting the person to any other detriment.

4 Section 33 reads:

“The Commission may by notice in writing – (a) require any person to furnish such information as may be described in the notice; (b) specify the time in which the required information is to be furnished; and



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the Respondent provide certain information via Notice dated 22nd April, 2013. The

Commission also sought information from the Ministry of National Security via Notice of 18th

June 2013. The Respondent replied by way of letter dated 13th May, 2013 and the Ministry also

responded accordingly. A list of the questions and/or information sought in this investigation

may be found at Appendix I hereto attached. A list of all of the statements, documents and

reports received from the parties may be found at Appendix II attached hereto.

5. Upon considering the information and documents submitted by the parties, the Commission

found further to section 39(1)5 of the Act that the subject matter of the complaint could not

have been resolved by conciliation. This finding is based primarily on two (2) grounds, the first

being that the Respondent‟s actions were taken based on a policy decision which it has

reiterated in its communication to the Commission and the second being that the Complainant

is not interested in re-employment with the Respondent. As such, pursuant to section 39(1) the

Commission has prepared this report; the Commission proposes to send a copy of this report

to the parties, publish this report and make it available for inspection by the public.

Background

6. In September of 2007, the Complainant began working as a Security Guard until her

employment was terminated by the Respondent in March, 2012.

7. In June 2011 she converted to Islam. This conversion required her to modify the manner in

which she attired herself and as such it was now necessary for her to wear a head covering

commonly known as a “hijab”. The Complainant eventually began wearing the hijab while on

duty and she has alleged that it was this change in dress that has resulted in her employment

being terminated.

8. The Respondent has asserted that the dismissal of the Complainant was in keeping with its

disciplinary procedure. As a result the Complainant was charged with Gross Misconduct in

failing/ refusing to comply with instructions issued by a Senior Officer, the instructions being

to remove the hijab whilst in uniform and was subsequently required to appear before a

Disciplinary Tribunal. The Respondent maintains that its hands are tied on this matter as the

uniform was approved by the Ministry of National Security and no alterations can therefore be

(c) require the person to attend at such time and place specified in the notice and to give oral evidence about and

produce all documents in his possession or control relating to, any matter specified in the notice”. 5 Section 39 reads as follows:

(1) Where the Commission is of the opinion that the subject matter of the complaint cannot be resolved by conciliation or it has attempted to resolve the matter by conciliation but has not been successful in that attempt, the Commission shall- (a) prepare a report relating to the investigation with its recommendations (b) send a copy of the report to the parties to the complaint (c) publish the report; and

make the report available for inspection by the public.



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made. The Respondent has also highlighted that several of its clients have indicated that they

do not want security officers dressed in “Muslim garb” whilst on duty.

Complainant’s allegations

9. The Complainant states that although she converted to Islam in June, 2011 she only began

wearing the hijab in August, 2011 after she enquired from Mr. Colin Lange, Operation Manager,

whether it would be permissible to do so. She claims that Mr. Lange informed her that wearing

the hijab whilst on duty would not cause a problem and it was from that point she incorporated

it into her uniform. The Complainant alleges that the inclusion of the hijab as part of her daily

attire did not hinder her in the performance of her duties, nor did it cover or conceal parts of

the requisite uniform as she would always tuck the hijab inside of her completed uniform and

still place the mandatory beret on her head.

10. She alleges that sometime in February 2012, Mr. Lange requested that she write a letter to the

Respondent informing the company of her change of religion and mode of dress to which she

complied and submitted same on the 1st March, 2012. She states that in response she received a

letter dated 5th March, 2012 from the Respondent which required her to make “alternative

arrangements” with respect to her employment if she persisted in wearing the hijab whilst on

duty. The said letter categorised the inclusion of the hijab as an alteration of the uniform which

alteration was not initially authorised by the Ministry of National Security.

11. The Complainant states that from the date of receipt of the said letter to 22nd of March, 2012

whenever she arrived at work wearing her hijab (which was on every occasion) she would either

be sent home immediately and considered “exempt from duties” or she would first be required

to sit in the waiting area for a period of three (3) hours before she could return home.

12. She claims that by letter dated 9th March, 2012 to the Respondent, the Administration of her

place of worship sought to explain her religious obligations in wearing the hijab. The

Respondent by letter dated 19th March, 2012 reiterated that the uniform was approved by the

Ministry of National Security and there cannot be alterations to the uniform.

13. The Complainant alleges that on the 15th March, 2012 she received a “Notice of Intended

Action” from the Respondent citing her failure to comply with the company‟s uniform

standards and refusal to comply with the order given by the Operation Manager.

14. In response by letter dated 16th March, 2012, Complainant states that she wrote to the

Respondent reiterating her religious obligation to wear the hijab and requesting that the matter

be dealt with in a “democratic manner”.

15. The Complainant alleges that she received on 22nd March, 2012 a “Notice of Suspension” and a

“Notice of Charge & Tribunal” after appearing before a Disciplinary Tribunal. The outcome of



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the Tribunal was outlined by letter dated 26th March, 2012 from the Respondent which had the

effect of terminating the Complainant‟s employment immediately.

16. The Complainant further refers to her former colleague Ms. Ansonia Alleyne who was

employed with the Respondent as a Security Guard. The Complainant states that Ms. Alleyne

followed the Seventh Day Adventist faith and in or around 2009- 2010, the Respondent

specifically altered Ms. Alleyne‟s works hours so that she could observe the Sabbath on

Saturdays. The Complainant cites this as an example of the Respondent facilitating the religious

belief of other employees who do not follow Islam.

Submissions by the Respondent

17. The Respondent in its letter to the Commission dated 13th May, 20136, does not deny the

allegations put forward by the Complainant, but instead has sought to explain and justify its

actions in the matter.

Responses to the allegation:

i. That the Complainant always wore her hijab tucked inside her uniform

18. The Respondent has indicated in the said letter that the Complainant‟s hijab was “…not always

tucked in as she claimed” and that the hijab was extended rather than tucked in at the

Disciplinary hearing on 22nd March, 2012.

ii. That the Complainant was terminated because she wore the hijab

19. The Respondent has essentially agreed that because the Complainant chose to wear the hijab,

this has resulted in her eventual dismissal. The Respondent justifies the dismissal on the

grounds that:

(a) Her Senior Officer requested that she remove the hijab and she failed to comply;

(b) There were no alternatives to the standard uniform “...since the company had numerous

verbal concerns voiced by clients that they did not want any security officers dressed in Muslim

garb on their locations because of the negative impression it creates…”

(c) The Respondent is unable to change the uniform as it is “…approved by the Ministry of

National Security.”

iii. That alterations to the approved uniform cannot be made

20. The Respondent has not provided a copy of the approved uniform from the Ministry of

National Security and has indicated that a request has been made of the Ministry to furnish

same. The Respondent further states it has not made an enquiry from the Ministry whether

6 All direct quotations from the Respondent are taken directly from this letter



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alterations of the uniform can be made on religious grounds since “…the company has no

desire to go outside of the parameters set for uniforms in the paramilitary environment which

includes private security agencies.”

iv. That the Respondent caused the Complainant to be sent home (after three hours) when she arrived to work

wearing the hijab

21. The response provided by the Respondent to this allegation is that the Complainant was issued

with an “Office roster” normally issued:

I. When an Officer is not posted to a specific client location;

II. Where an Officer is habitually tardy or absent from duty

III. To an Officer whose performance is less than desirable and have discipline

issues

22. The Respondent states:

Officers as indicated above are required to report to the Office and are placed on standby to be posted to a

location where there is a short positing within the first three hours of shift. Once there is no posting available

after three hours the officers on standby are paid for the three hours. Ms. Glaude was paid her standby time

once she was present at the office for the specified period.

v. That the Respondent is willing to facilitate other religious beliefs for persons that do not follow Islam

23. The Respondent agrees that it did in fact facilitate Ms. Alleyne‟s religious practices by

rescheduling her roster so that she could observe the Sabbath on Saturdays. However, the

Respondent has distinguished this allowance made to Ms. Alleyne as Ms. Alleyne‟s issue did not

relate to her attire. The Respondent further states that “…had Ms. Glaude made such a request

similar courtesies would have been extended to her for her day of worship as can be rostered.”

24. The Respondent refers to the Terms and Conditions of Employment which the Complainant

agreed and accepted by affixing her signature to same on 28th August, 2008. It must be noted

that the Complainant has acknowledged that she signed the Terms and Conditions in

agreement. She states however that the document she signed was in relation to the uniform for

a “Baton Officer” whereas at the time she began wearing the hijab to the day she was dismissed

she wore the uniform required for “Canine Duty”, a point that the Respondent has not denied.

Analysis of the law

25. It is for the Complainant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, a contravention of the Act. Per

section 57 of the Act, in order for the Complainant to ground a claim of discrimination:

7 Section 5 reads as follows:



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1) She must establish persons with whom she is similarly circumstanced, that is persons

who are in the same or not materially different circumstances;

2) Then she must show that she was treated differently and less-favourably;

3) Then she must show that there is no valid reason for this, and in particular, that the

reason for this is “on the grounds of status”;

Treatment different to or less- favourable than comparators (persons similarly

circumstanced)

26. In Mohanlal Bhagwandeen v. The Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago [2004]

UKPC 21 Lord Carswell explained at para 18:

“A claimant who alleges inequality of treatment or its synonym discrimination must ordinarily establish

that he has been or would be treated differently from some other similarly circumstanced person or persons,

described by Lord Hutton in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] 2

All ER 26 at paragraph 71 as actual or hypothetical comparators. The phrase which is common to the

anti-discrimination provisions in the legislation of the United Kingdom is that the comparison must be

such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or not materially different, in the other.”

27. The United Kingdom courts have interpreted provisions similar to section 5 of the Act to mean

a comparison of “like with like” (per Shamoon v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster

Constabulary [2003] ICR 337; Dhatt v. McDonalds Hamburgers Ltd [1991] ICR 228. The

above notwithstanding, the Complainant is not expected to identify comparators who are

clones in every respect except race (the applicable status in that matter), but the circumstances

of the comparators must be the same in all relevant respects (per Madden v Preferred

Technical Group CHA Ltd v. Anor [2005] IRLR 46).

28. The Complainant has identified one (1) individual who ostensibly is of a different faith and

who, she alleged, was treated more favourably. However the Complainant must also show that

the relevant circumstances as existing between herself and this individual was the same or not

materially different.

29. The comparator identified by the Complainant and the Complainant at the time in question

were both employed with the Respondent as Security Guards and were both held to the same

standards and both amenable to the same rules and regulations. The Complainant is of the view

that some of the upper management employed with the Respondent follow the same faith as

her comparator, that is, Seventh Day Adventist. She believes that because of her difference in

For the purposes of this Act, a person (“the discriminator”) discriminates against another person (“the aggrieved person”) on the grounds of status if, by reason of— (a) the status of the aggrieved person; (b) a characteristic that appertains generally to persons of the status of the aggrieved person; or (c) a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons of the status of the aggrieved person, the discriminator treats the aggrieved person, in circumstances that are the same or are not materially different, less favourably than the discriminator treats another person of a different status.



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religious beliefs she was treated less favourably. However, when the test enunciated in

Shamoon is applied it does not appear that the comparator put forward by the Complainant is

an appropriate one. The Respondent has distinguished the comparator and Complainant in that

allowances were made for the comparator to meet her religious obligations by rescheduling her

duty times whereas the Complainant‟s issue related to her attire and the fact that she chose to

manifest her religious beliefs by wearing a hijab. The facts are that they held the same post,

wore the same uniform, followed different religions but concessions were made for one religious

belief that affected scheduling rather than attire.

30. If according to Shamoon a hypothetical comparator were to be constructed for the

Complainant to show that she was treated differently or less- favourably, one must consider

several questions:

1. Whether the Respondent would have allowed a comparator to make alterations to her

uniform/ appearance in the form of a crucifix8or rakhi9;

2. Whether the Respondent would have terminated the employment of a comparator rather

than reassign or relocate the comparator to a different post or Site based on the actual or

perceived effects of the altered appearance/ uniform;

3. Whether there exists any negative stereotypes associated with the religion that the

“alteration” seeks to manifest;

4. Whether such negative stereotypes would have been contemplated by the Respondent and

prompted the Respondent to utilise its disciplinary process thereby perpetuating the

stereotype.

31. Whatever the findings are in relation to the above questions, case- law in recent times has

revealed that Courts tend to stress on the need to focus on the “reason why” question and not

the identification of comparators. In Ladele and Mc Farlene v. The United Kingdom[2010]

ICR 507 10 EAT President Elias J stated “… the use of comparators may be of evidential value

in determining the reason why the claimant was treated as he or she was. Frequently, however,

they cast no useful light on that question at all.” Further, in Cordell v. Foreign and

Commonwealth Office [2011] EqLR 1210, EAT President Underhill J noted that where there

was an actual comparator the less favourable treatment question may be the most direct route

to the answer to both questions, “but where there is none it will usually be better to focus on

the reason why question than get bogged down in the often arid and confusing task of

constructing a hypothetical comparator.”

32. Finally in Shamoon Lord Scott at para 116 held:

“In the absence of any evidentially valuable comparators, was there any other material that the Industrial

Tribunal majority might have had in mind as constituting the “sufficient material” to which they referred? I

8 An independent image of Jesus Christ on the cross with a representation of his body available at:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crucifix 9 A sacred thread in Hinduism tied by a sister on her brother’s wrist, available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raksha_Bandhan

10 This decision was affirmed in Eweida and Ors v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crucifix

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raksha_Bandhan

http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2013/37.html



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would readily accept that it is possible for a case of unlawful discrimination to be made good without the

assistance of any actual comparator…But in the absence of comparators of sufficient evidential value some

other material must be identified that is capable of supporting the requisite inference of discrimination.

Discriminatory comments made by the alleged discriminator about the victim might, in some cases, suffice.

Unconvincing denials of a discriminatory intent given by the alleged discriminator, coupled with unconvincing

assertions of other reasons for the allegedly discriminatory decision, might in some cases suffice. But there is

nothing of that sort in the present case, or, at least, no reference to anything of that sort was made by the

Industrial Tribunal.”

Unlike the facts presented in Shamoon , the submissions made by both the Complainant and

Respondent in the present case provide direct cogent evidence that lends to the inference of

discrimination as outlined in the above- listed allegations/ submissions.

Reason for differential treatment (on the grounds of religion)

33. The Respondent has given two (2) reasons for taking issue with the Complainant‟s wearing of

the hijab. These reasons include:

i. Hijab not approved

The Ministry of National Security has approved a specific uniform for the Respondent

Company and the hijab is not included in this. The Respondent has highlighted that it

follows the examples set by public security arms such as the Defence Force, Police

Service and Fire Services and that all of these arms are comprised of persons with varied

religious persuasions yet “...none of these bodies permit personnel to display any

religious accessory or clothing with their uniform.”

ii. Corporate image

The Respondent has indicated that it has no desire to go outside of what is approved by

the Ministry. The Respondent qualifies this statement with the following:

... the company had numerous verbal concerns voiced by clients that they did not want any security officers

dressed in Muslim garb on their locations because of the negative impression it creates..

...(the Respondent) serves the private sector which is quite particular regarding their security service

providers. Any deviations from what they consider to be the norm and acceptable standard of uniform can

lead to loss or denial of contracts not to mention the negative impact on the company’s image and

credibility and trust.

It is also well known that in the environment of Trinidad and Tobago there is a stigma attached to the

wearing of Muslim wear by security officers since they appear to belong to a sect of Muslims who were

involved in the 1990 insurrection. These officers wearing Muslim attire have a different look and

appearance and connote fear rather than a normal officer who connotes protection to the owner of a

business. It is in this background of post 1990 Trinidad that concerns have been raised by several clients

to ensure that no Security Officer wearing Muslim attire is allowed on their premises. Allied with this is

also the negative international image that has been created since 9/11 of 2001.



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34. Based on the above statements, the Respondent has clearly identified that the reason for

treating the Complainant less favourably is because of her manifestation of religion (Islam) in

the form of a hijab. The Respondent explains that the hijab or any item that appears to be

“Muslim garb” carries with it certain negative connotations which has a negative impact on the

Respondent‟s corporate image and is also outside of the uniform approved by the Ministry.

35. It must be noted that the Respondent has yet to provide an official copy of the approved

uniform to the Commission and has indicated that it has never sought clarification from the

Ministry on whether alterations could be made to the uniform because it has “no desire” to go

outside of the approved uniform. The Commission nevertheless has written to the Ministry

seeking the said information and is currently awaiting a response from the Ministry. With

respect to the “company image” or corporate image, the Respondent claims that it has received

numerous “verbal concerns” from clients about not wanting security guards on location in

“Muslim garb” however the Respondent has not proffered actual written complaints/ concerns

from clients to support this assertion.

36. In looking at the reasons for the treatment meted out to the Complainant to determine whether

the Respondent has discriminated on the grounds of religion the case of McFarlane v. Relate

Avon Ltd11 [2010] ICR 507 is instructive. In this case an employee was dismissed due to his

refusal to work with homosexuals because of his religious beliefs. It was held that direct

discrimination could not be found as the dismissal was based on the employee‟s refusal to

comply with the employer‟s equal opportunities policy. Indirect discrimination could not be

found because the dismissal was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate end, that is, to serve

the community in a non- discriminatory manner.

37. In Cherfi v. G4S Security Services Ltd [2011] EqLR 825 a Muslim security guard was told

that he could not leave the site to which he was assigned to attend the local Mosque for

Jumu‟ah12; he was instead required to take breaks on the premises. He lost his claim for indirect

discrimination on the basis that the employer‟s need to satisfy its client‟s wishes for a minimum

number of security guards to be on the premises at any one time was a proportionate means to

achieving a legitimate aim as the needs of the employee had to be balanced against the needs of the

business.

38. Finally in Azmi v. Kirklees MBC [2007] UKEAT 9/07 a teaching assistant was suspended for

refusing an instruction not to wear a full facial veil when in a class assisting a male teacher. The

EAT rejected her claim of religious discrimination and held that there was no direct

discrimination because any assistant who wanted to hide his face for any reason would have

been treated in the same way. In terms of indirect discrimination, it was agreed that the

11

See footnote 7 12

A congregational prayer that Muslims hold every Friday, just after noon, available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jumu'ah

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noon

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jumu'ah



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requirement put the claimant as a Muslim at a particular disadvantage but found that this was

justified by the school‟s concerns about the effect that the veil had on her ability to

communicate properly with the children.

39. The common principle enunciated in these cases is that there ought to be a proportionate means to

achieving a legitimate aim. The Complainant in the case at hand has asserted that wearing the hijab

has never hindered her in the execution of her duties, such assertion the Respondent did not

deny. The cases show that one must look at the aim of the employers. A security company may

be hired to guard persons, guard persons in a building, guard an empty building or even

equipment on a site. If focus is placed on guarding persons, then the aim of the Respondent

would be to make these individuals feel safe rather than fear. However as previously stated the

Respondent has only made an unsupported claim that their clients have taken issue with

security guards in “Muslim wear”. It appears that the Respondent has instead chosen to give life

to a stereotype associated with Islam by requiring the Complainant to remove the hijab, failing

to enquire of the Ministry whether alterations could be made as it has “no desire” to do so and

opting to terminate employment rather than retaining the Complainant and reassigning her to a

different post/ Site.

40. A key reason stated by the Respondent for its actions was the need to preserve its “company

image”. The case of Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom [2013] Eq LR 264 is

instructive in illustrating the proportionality of an employer‟s actions in achieving its legitimate

aim. Ms. Eweida was employed by a private company, British Airways which required all their

staff in contact with the public to wear a uniform. When an employee reported for work

wearing an item which did not comply with the uniform code, it was British Airways‟ practice

to ask the employee to remove the item in question or, if necessary, to return home to change

clothes. Of the items of clothing considered by British Airways to be mandatory in certain

religions and which could not be concealed under the uniform, authorisation was given to male

Sikh employees to wear a dark blue or white turban and to display the Sikh bracelet in summer

if they obtained authorisation to wear a short-sleeved shirt. Female Muslim ground staff

members were authorised to wear the hijab in British Airways approved colours. On 20

September 2006 Ms. Eweida was sent home from work because of her refusal to conceal a

crucifix she wore around her neck, in breach of the company‟s uniform code. Just over a month

later she was offered an administrative post which would not have required her to wear a

uniform. However, she chose not to accept this offer and instead remained at home without

pay until 3 February 2007, when British Airways amended its rules on uniform and allowed her

to display the cross.

41. When considering the proportionality of the steps taken by British Airways to enforce its

uniform code, the Courts at the lower levels agreed that the aim of the code was

legitimate, namely to communicate a certain image of the company and to promote recognition

of its brand and staff. Nonetheless, the European Court of Human Rights found that a fair

balance was not struck in Ms. Eweida‟s case at the lower Courts. On one side of the scales was



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Ms Eweida‟s desire to manifest her religious belief. The Court found this to be a fundamental

right: because a healthy democratic society needs to tolerate and sustain pluralism and diversity;

but also because of the value to an individual who has made religion a central tenet of his or her

life to be able to communicate that belief to others. On the other side of the scales was the

employer‟s wish to project a certain corporate image. The Court considered that, while this aim

was undoubtedly legitimate, the domestic courts accorded it too much weight. It was held that

Ms Eweida‟s cross was discreet and could not have detracted from her professional appearance

and that there was no evidence that the wearing of other previously authorised items of

religious clothing, such as turbans and hijabs by other employees, had any negative impact on

British Airways‟ brand or image.

42. Eweida highlights that the Respondent has a right to put measures in place to maintain a

particular corporate image but it also shows that the measures should be proportionate to the

aim. Consideration in Eweida was taken to the fact that there was no evidence that the wearing

of other religious clothing had any negative impact on British Airways‟ brand or image.

Therefore it seems that based on the particular case the Courts may look at any evidence to

determine whether the “alteration” as in the present case had a negative impact on the brand or

image of the Respondent Company.

Conclusion and Recommendations

43. The Commission‟s investigation of the complaint lodged has revealed that the Respondent‟s

inflexible approach to its rules and regulations have been to the Complainant‟s detriment as her

employment was terminated. The Respondent‟s subsequent communication to the Commission

has only served to underscore the evident case of discrimination on the ground of religious

status.

44. The European Human Rights Commission has produced some guidance to employers on how

to comply with the Court‟s judgment in Eweida. The guide13 recommends the employer‟s

starting point should be that they will accommodate the request unless there are compelling

reasons not to. Some suggestions for the employer to consider include:

The cost, disruption and wider impact on the business if the request is accommodated;

Health and safety implications for the proposed change;

The disadvantage to the affected employee if the request is refused;

The impact of any change on other employees, including on those who have a different

religion or belief, or no religion or belief; and

Whether work policies and practices that are in place to ensure uniformity and

consistency are justifiable.

13

Religion or belief in the workplace: a guide for employers following recent European Court of Human Rights judgments,

available at: http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/advice-and-guidance/guidance-for-employers/religion-or-belief-new-

guidance-february-2013/

http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/advice-and-guidance/guidance-for-employers/religion-or-belief-new-guidance-february-2013/

http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/advice-and-guidance/guidance-for-employers/religion-or-belief-new-guidance-february-2013/



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This is a useful guide to all employers and the Commission considers that more effort could be

made in these situations to attempt to understand and accommodate an individual‟s religious

beliefs where possible.

45. In light of the above, in conjunction with the Complainant‟s desire to have this matter resolved,

and pursuant to section 39 of the Act, the Commission shall:

(1) send a copy of this report to the parties to the complaint;

(2) publish this report;

(3) make it available for inspection;

(4) determine from the parties whether resolution has been otherwise achieved;

(5) should the matter remain unresolved, inquire of the Complainant whether she wants to

go before the Tribunal

(6) upon receipt of the Complainant consents, initiate proceedings before the Tribunal on

her behalf.

Dated this day of June 2013



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APPENDIX I: LIST OF INFORMATION SOUGHT By Letter/ Notice dated 22nd April 2013 the Commission asked the Respondent to furnish the following information and/or documents:

(1) Please provide us with a copy of the “Company Policy Handling Discipline, Code of Conduct” as cited in the “Notice of Intended Action” dated March 15, 2012.

(2) Kindly confirm whether Ms. Glaude wore the hijab and uniform in the manner described in paragraph (c) above.

(3) Is it accurate to state that the varied manner in which Ms. Glaude wore her uniform (as described in paragraph (c) gave rise to her eventual dismissal? If so, kindly suggest any alternative ways Ms. Glaude could have worn the hijab with the uniform and still be in compliance with the regulations of QSBS. If alternative ways have been suggested kindly state whether such suggestions were made to Ms. Glaude.

(4) The Commission notes that QSBS has stated in correspondence dated March 5, 2012, addressed to Ms. Glaude and March 19, 2012 addressed to Imam Abdul Majied that the uniform dress code was approved by the Ministry of National Security. (i.) Please provide a copy of the approval from the Ministry. (ii.) Please state whether any enquiry was made by QSBS from the Ministry on the

possibility of alterations to the uniform on the basis of religious obligations. If so, kindly provide copies of the relevant correspondence and/ or minutes of the relevant meetings held on the matter.

(iii.) If no such enquiry was made by QSBS please indicate why.

(5) With respect to the allegation at paragraph (i) above please confirm whether QSBS has made an exception to facilitate Ms. Alleyne‟s religious practices by altering her scheduled times for duty and provide copies of the relevant documents and/ or minutes of the relevant meetings held on the matter.

(6) Kindly provide a transcript of the Disciplinary Tribunal proceedings of March 22, 2012 at

the QSBS Head Office.

By Letter/ Notice dated 18th June 2013 the Commission asked the Ministry of National Security to

furnish the following information and/or documents:

(1) An official copy of the Ministry‟s approval of the “Canine Duty” uniform for QSBS;

(2) A statement and any supporting documents on the Ministry‟s policy with respect to the alterations of approved uniforms;

(3) An indication/ statement on the extent to which a Security Provider can alter, vary or modify the uniforms as approved by the Ministry.

(4) An indication/ statement whether the Ministry is willing to permit alterations, modifictions, or variations to an approved uniform, and (if so) the applicable process (if any) that must be followed;

(5) If the answer to (4) above is in the affirmative, please provide the extent to which the Ministry is able to accommodate alterations to a uniform, in particular for an Officer to continue to wear a hijab in compliance with her religious obligations under Islam.



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APPENDIX II: LIST OF INFORMATION RECEIVED

A. Documents submitted by the Complainant

1. Complaint lodged with the Equal Opportunity Commission dated 19th September, 2012

2. Documents supplemental to the Complaint form received 1st November, 2012:

Copy of the Terms and Conditions of Employment for Security Officers employed with Quality Security Bodyguard Services Limited

Copy of the Code of Ethics for Quality Security Bodyguard Services Limited

Letter dated 1st March, 2012 from the Complainant to the Respondent indicating her conversion to Islam

Letter dated 5th March, 2012 from the Respondent to the Complainant re Uniform dress code

Letter dated 9th March, 2012 from the Administration of the Complainant‟s place to worship to the Respondent

Notice of Intended Action for Gross Misconduct dated 15th March, 2012 issued from the Respondent to the Complainant

Letter dated 16th March, 2012 from the Complainant to the Respondent asking for matter to be settled in a democratic manner

Letter dated 19th March, 2012 from the Respondent to the Administration of the Complainant‟s place of worship, re Giselle Glaude- Uniform Dress Code

Notice of Charge and Tribunal (Gross Misconduct) dated 22nd March, 2012 issued from the Respondent to the Complainant

Notice of Suspension dated 22nd March, 2012 issued from the Respondent to the Complainant

Letter dated 26th March, 2012 from the Respondent to the Complainant, re Disciplinary Tribunal – Outcome

3. Additional documents received 4th March, 2013:

Individual Duty Roster for Complainant for week of 9th November, 2009

Individual Duty Roster for Complainant for week of 12th March, 2012

B. Documents submitted by the Respondent 1. Under cover letter dated 13th May, 2013 the Respondent provided the following documents:

Quality Security Bodyguard Services Limited Handling Discipline Document

Notes of a Discussion dated 5th March, 2012

Transcript of Disciplinary Tribunal proceedings dated 22nd March, 2012

Terms and Conditions of Employment for Security Officers employed with Quality Security Bodyguard Services Limited signed by Respondent on 9th July, 2007 and executed by Complainant on 26th August, 2008

REPORT OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION OF TRINIDAD AND · Report of the Equal Opportunity...

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